Q56.

Are private military contractors employed and if so, are they subject to a similar level of scrutiny as for the armed forces?

56a. Policies

Score

SCORE: NS/100

Assessor Explanation

56b. Scrutiny

Score

SCORE: NS/100

Assessor Explanation

56c. Enforcement

Score

SCORE: NS/100

Assessor Explanation

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This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Algeria has not signed the Montreux Document (1). There are some controls over the use of private military contractors defined in national legislation. According to this newspaper article (2), the field of security companies is governed by Legislative Decree No. 16-93 (1993), which lays down the conditions for carrying out the activities of guarding and transporting cash and sensitive products. The decree stipulates that the security companies can only protect property that has been defined before (Art. 2) and approved in advance (Art. 5). According to Art. 6, the security companies are not allowed to undertake their activities in the public sphere (3). Usually, security companies have secured the premises of companies, including energy companies (2); also see the country’s last assessment (6). Decree No. 16-93, does not mention any corruption policy. It is likely that the anti-corruption law (4) also applies to security firms, but as has been mentioned before it is not fully implemented (5). No information could be found that the military contracts private security firms.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Legislative Decree No. 16-93 of December 1993 does not mention any regulations with regards to scrutiny. It also does not mention which authority authorizes the activities of security companies (1). There is also, no evidence on the website of the two parliamentary chambers scrutinizing the activities of security companies (2), (3). Since security provisions are very sensitive issues, it seems likely that private security companies are overseen by a state authority, but no information could be found regarding this.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

No evidence could be found that policies and laws are not applied to PMC’s. A recent newspaper article on security companies in Algeria does not mention any violations of the laws or sanctions that have been applied to private security firms (1). It is, however, unclear what sanctions would apply. Legislative Decree No. 16-93 of December 4, 1993, does not mention what sanctions apply if regulations are not followed (2). Decrees connected to the issue, such as Executive Decree No. 94-65 of March 19, 1994, which lays down the procedures for issuing licenses and arms to companies for the security and transport of funds does not mention any sanctions either (3). Executive Decree No. 95-396 of November 30, 1995, on the procedures for importing firearms on behalf of security companies and the transport of sensitive funds, does not include sanctions (4). Even though no sanctions could be found in the laws, it seems very likely that there are sanctions in place. With the provision of security being such a sensitive issue and that the security forces play such an important role in the country, it seems unlikely that the government would not sanction any violations related to national security.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

The Angolan government used private military companies during the civil war. The private security industry was first regulated in 1992, though with little effective oversight and arms control. Angola was among the founding drafters of the 2008 Montreux document and has since passed new domestic legislation on PMSCs, the 2014 law on private security companies (Law 10/14 that replaced the previous 1992 law) and the respective 2017 regulations that established norms for arms use and staff training. However, neither the 2014 law or the 2017 regulations include any provision to establish preventive measures against corruption (1), (2), (3).

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

According to the 2014 law on private security companies and the regulations passed in 2017, the National Police is tasked with oversight at the national and provincial level. However, oversight and monitoring tasks are limited in scope, mainly to verify compliance with authorization procedures, office installation and staff training requirements at the beginning of a company’s activity, and again after three years of activity (1), (2).

According to Rafael Marques, who has documented human rights abuses committed by private security companies engaged by diamond companies in the Cuango area in Lunda Norte for more than a decade, impunity has been the norm, both regarding severe human rights abuses committed by private security companies, and to violations of anti-corruption laws by senior officials engaged in private businesses in the diamond and private security sector (3).

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

There is little evidence of effective oversight of private security companies by the police, though regulations were enacted in 2017. One of the challenges is to enforce a ban on weapons of war from being used by private security companies (1), (2). A Lusa /Diário de Notícias report from November 7, 2017, states “the new regulation stipulates that private security companies may use and carry semi-automatic guns of a calibre not exceeding 7.65mm, pistols of a calibre of less than 9mm and semiautomatic shotguns” (1).

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Cameroon prohibits PMC from operating within the country [1]. Accordng to the ICRC, Cameroon’s Military Manual states, “Mercenaries who take part in military operations for private gain shall not be considered as combatants and consequently are not entitled to prisoner-of-war status… Mercenaries do not benefit from the protection of the law of armed conflict and international humanitarian law” [1]. The lack of legal protections provided to mercenaries suggests they are not permitted to operate by law. However, there are Israeli intelligence officers who train Presidential Guards and part of the Rapid Intervention Unit (BIR). Their status is not scrutinised as they operate under the direct discretion of the President of the Republic [2].

Though Cameroon prohibits PMC from operating within the country, private security guards are allowed to function by law [3]. Cameroon has an estimated forty-plus private security companies with over 70,000 private guards [4]. The Government’s closure of several unlicensed companies in 2016 made many scramble to meet the new requirements established by the 16th September 2015 Presidential Decree [3].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Private military companies are not permitted to operate in the country [1] and are not subject to any form of scrutiny if they exist.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Private military companies are not permitted to operate in the country [1].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Côte d’Ivoire imposes some controls on the use of private military contractors (PMCs). But it does not implement the Montreaux Document and the legislation applicable to PMCs is inconsistent. The legislative framework is focused more on private security companies (PSCs) contracted to transport cash domestically rather than on international PMCs. Finally, there is no evidence of corruption offences for PMCs and PSCs. Law No. 2016-1109 (Portant Code de la Fonction Militaire) of February 16, 2016, is the updated Code of Conduct for the Armed Forces of Côte d’Ivoire that repealed the previous Act No. 095-695 (Portant Code de la Fonction Militaire) of September 7, 1995. The provisions in Law No. 2016-1109 that cover aspects of recruitment are in Chapter 2 (Recrutement), Articles 60-67. Though Articles 60 and 62 mention ‘commissioned soldiers’ (militaires commissionnés), it is not in the sense of PMCs that are contracted for a specific project (1).

Côte d’Ivoire is not a participating member of the Montreaux Document (MC) that regulates PMCs and establishes legal standards. As a result, the country does not have a 100% clear set of legal obligations and good practices to regulate PMCs and PSCs (2). Still, it can be described as having certain controls on the use of PMCs, known in French as an SMP (Société Militaire Privée). The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has recommended that Member States become part of the MC within the sub-regional Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform and Governance to regulate the industry efficiently. ECOWAS specifically targets private security companies in its Conflict Prevention Framework document (2).

According to a 2016 DCAF report on the private security industry in West Africa, the boom in PSCs reflects a spike in the demand by individual and corporate clients. The DCAF report distinguishes between PSCs and the PMCs that offer services to the armed forces. It reports that Côte d’Ivoire only regulates the way cash and goods are transported in the country by PSCs. Additionally, the country’s legislation does not mention international PMCs or multinationals that operate domestically. The report characterizes the 2016 situation as follows:

“In Côte d’Ivoire, the generalized insecurity created by the civil war resulted in what Edem Comlan characterizes as the ‘quasi-anarchic’ growth of the private security industry. Mirroring the imperatives of the wider SSR process, he identifies the need for increased transparency and accountability of private security arrangements while at the same time acknowledging the requirement to be mindful of the sensitivities around an industry that has gone some way to addressing rampant domestic unemployment, notably providing a reintegration option for ex-combatants” (3).

Côte d’Ivoire is not part of the Montreaux Document and has not implemented the ECOWAS recommendations regarding PMCs and PSCs.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

There is a lack of a real legal framework or policy for the use of PMCs and PSCs. Although there are several controls through other legislation that are not specific to the MoD, such scrutiny appears to be very weak.

Ivorian media have reported widely in 2018 on the existence of foreign combatants that were integrated into the armed forces after the post-election crisis of 2010-2011. However, most of these were not part of PMCs (Société Militaire Privée, SMP), but sub-regional combatants that joined Ivorian rebel forces and eventually settled in Côte d’Ivoire (1), (2).

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Evidence shows that there are only a few controls on the use of PMCs and PSCs, but no consistent legal framework or policy. Therefore, there is little evidence that the policies are enforced. According to a 2018 report by Middle East Eye, Islamist terror in North and West Africa has become a new business line for private military contractors, including in Côte d’Ivoire. In the Sahel, Ukrainian military outfitters are working directly with international organizations. For example, Ukrainian Helicopters, tasked with medical evacuations, has worked with the international MINUSMA peacekeeping force in Mali. The company has also been allegedly hired in Côte d’Ivoire. The report highlights another Ukrainian military contractor, Omega Consulting Group, that has opened an office in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, to hire combat soldiers (1).

In a March 2018, an article in Afrique sur 7 reported about uprisings in January and May 2017 by 8,400 former rebel combatants who had become part of the country’s armed forces following the post-election crisis of 2010-2011. Many of them, according to the report, were private hires who had joined the former Forces Nouvelles (FN) and later joined the armed and security forces, among them foreign soldiers who had forged identification papers (2). In November 2018, Ivoirecho confirmed the government suspicion that many of the 8,400 soldiers behind the uprisings in the barracks of Bouaké in 2017 were, in fact, foreign soldiers who could not prove Ivorian citizenship. Army Chief of Staff General Sékou Toure launched an identification campaign that led to a new list from which these soldiers were eliminated. This was programmed simultaneously with the early retirement schemes. Both initiatives have proven successful in reducing the number of soldiers in the armed forces, one of the pillars of the 2016-2020 Military Planning Act (LPM) (3), (4).

The only instance in which the government has acted on the status of members of the armed forces was for being non-Ivorian, but these were not sanctions imposed for use of PMCs, but because of the nationality of the combatants.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Private military contractors are banned by the Constitution and only the state has the right to establish armed forces. Article 200 of the Constitution states that “no individual, organization, entity, or group shall be allowed to create military or quasi-military squadrons, groups or organizations” (1). The law, however, allows for the establishment of security companies (such as G4S) that are regulated by the Ministry of Interior, and are normally only allowed to carry light weapons where the personnel are not allowed to keep them off duty. These companies do not carry out military operations.

This is indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

This is indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Ghana is not a participating state of the Montreux Document, which defines how international law applies to the activities of private military and security companies (PMSCs) when operating in armed conflict zones (1).

At present, the GAF has never deployed private military contractors in its operations. However, the private security industry is a rapidly growing business in Ghana with more than 350 companies operating (including companies without license or premises), and employing around 15,000 people (2).

The legal framework that deals with the private military and security companies (PMSCs) is weak. The industry is regulated by the Police Act, 1970 (Act 350) and following regulations, such as the Police Service Regulations (1992), and Legislative Instruments 1571 and 1579. However, there is a lack of specificity, and overall it is outdated (no mention of the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the Act, the definition of “private security organisation” is vague, and does not specifically address corruption-related offences) (3).

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Laws ensure the Ministry of Interior has oversight and scrutiny powers over private military and security companies (PMSCs) (1).

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

According to the Association of Private Security Organisations of Ghana (APSOG), most of the 350 private security companies in Ghana do not have a licence (1). Consequently, the association expressed its concerns over the enforcement capacity of the Ministry of Interior.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Private military contracting is not prohibited and/or restricted in Jordan and the government imposes no restrictions on the use of Private Military Contractors and intermediaries. Law No. 35 of the year 1966, Officers Service Law of the Armed Forces, does not include any article on private military contracting. Law No. 35 is one of the very few public laws available to the public in relation to the defence sector in Jordan. There is no evidence of policies restricting Private Military Contractors, and instead there is evidence that private military contracting is common in Jordan. The state of Jordan does not outlaw private enterprise under the umbrella of the state’s defence and security operations. There are many examples of defence personnel being involved in defence-related private enterprises, as well as corruption related to them [2, 3, 4]. Abdel-Hadi al-Majali, who held defence posts, founded one of Jordan’s first private security enterprise in the country; his son is currently the head of MID Contracting, and his cousin, Shadi Ramzi, heads the KADBB, Jordan’s largest military services private business [4]. These examples provide evidence that private defence-related enterprises are legal in Jordan, however, corruption accusations related to these enterprises are usually in relation to granting these companies preferential treatment for contracting [3, 4,5]. It is to be noted that Jordan signed the Montreux Document May 18, 2009 [6].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

There are a few military contractors in Jordan. Some of them work for foreign embassies (USA), and have been more present in the last five years. There is no external or internal scrutiny over these contractors. Besides that, there is no law that organises the work of external contractors. Private Military Contractors are not subject to any form of external scrutiny [1,2]. King Abdullah II Design and Development Bureau (KADDB) [3] is a private military contractor. Operating under the umbrella of KADDB Investment Group, KADDB owns several other companies, which are also associated with the country’s natural resources such as JLVM, JORDANAMCO, JMSS, JADARA, JORAMMO, and ARM. It has become clear through research that these major enterprises, which are also military contractors, are not subject to scrutiny. Despite the Jordanian Armed Forces partially declaring the investments and businesses it runs [4], none of these enterprises have been audited by the Audit Bureau, as they do not appear on the list of audited entities.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

There are no restrictions on the use of Private Military Contractors in Jordan. In this context, as Private Military Contractors are not governed by clear policies, an assessment of the enforcement of policies is irrelevant.

This is indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Analysts and officials say private military contractors are employed (1,2,3,4,5). But their work appears to be completely unregulated because not one of Kuwait’s military and security laws address them.

This is indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

There are no special provisions for the oversight of PMCs but all financial transactions are scrutinised by the SAB and Parliament, as detailed in the answer to Q17.

Articles 2 and 3 of Law no. 25 of 1996 (1), which is concerned with the agreements in which the state is part, say that procurement deals and any kind of agreement that the defence and security agencies enter must give an explicit breakdown, which shows what exactly has been given to the state and for how much. Article 5 says that parties that fail to report, or misreport, any payment or favour they received in relation to the deal (within 30 days of receiving it) could be sentenced with to up to three years in prison and given a fine that is in equal in value to whatever they received. They also have to give the state whatever they got.

But there are shortcomings: first, the above law only applies to agreements worth 330,000 USD or more, and the law mentions that the parties involved could avoid prosecution so long as they report these payments to the SAB, and have a known partner in Kuwait in case they are “a known or hidden intermediary.” Additionally, Article 2 of this law also reveals that the defence and security agencies do not need to conduct tenders if they do not want to.

This is indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

There are no policies or laws in place regarding the use of PMCs. Additionally, it is impossible to make a reliable assessment when officials refuse to talk about the matter and there are no research papers or news stories about the subject, but this complete absence of information is a cause for concern, especially since state auditors have said that no one is ever punished for corruption in these agencies.

It is important to bear in mind that this does not necessarily mean that there are many violations related to this issue since we have almost no facts on the matter.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Lebanon is not a signatory of the Montreaux Document (1). Furthermore, research has not found policies or laws related to Private Military Contractors (PMCs) (2). However, Decree no. 4082/2000 “Organizing the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities” mentions the presence of a department for monitoring and controlling the Private Security Companies (PSCs) (3).

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

No evidence was found for the provision of scrutinizing PMCs. The “Department of Control over Security Companies” at the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities is responsible for monitoring private security companies and has the authority to revoke their license if they violate laws and regulations (Art. 77 ) (1).

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

There are no laws or policies related to PMCs in Lebanon (1).

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Private security companies are regulated by the law N° 96-020 (February 1996) and Arrêté n° 2011-0569/MSIPC-SG (February 2011).¹ The law from 1996 allows PSCs to use weapons, but only if they have obtained special dispensation from the government.² However, virtually all companies are limited to using arms such as cudgels, truncheons or, at most, bladed weapons.³ Despite this provision, it appears that in reality very few companies are able to arm their guards at all.³ The one exception to this is the company Escort, which guards the high-profile Radisson Blu Hotel, the site of a major terrorist attack in 2015, among other locations.⁴ Security personnel working for Escort have access to guns.⁴
Meanwhile, the decree from 2011 outlines some of the laws that PSCs, along with other security actors, are subject to, and stipulates that the use of private detectives is outlawed in Mali.¹
In November 2016, the Council of Ministers adopted a modified version of the 1996 law governing PSCs in a bid to improve the regulation of the sector. The amendment will oblige PSCs to subject job applicants to medical and psychological examinations to help ensure that guards, especially armed guards, are of sound mind.⁶ Moreover, PSCs will also be legally required to ensure that their employees undergo formal training – either through private training centres or with the assistance of public security agencies.⁶ From now on, security guards will have the possibility of accessing and deploying self-defence sprays, dogs and pump-action shotguns. PSCs will have six months, starting from 15 March 2018, to comply with the new legislation.⁸

However, there is no evidence from the media coverage of the amendment that suggests it contains provisions outlining the criteria against which PSCs are selected or the circumstances under which they may lose their contracts for abuses, irregularities or other misdemeanours.² ⁴ ⁶ ⁸ The country has not signed The Montreux Document,⁷ nor are there any anticorruption regulations in the domestic legislation specifically relating to PSCs.¹ ² ³ ⁴ ⁵ ⁶ ⁷

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Until recently, there was no legal framework relating to recruitment or training procedures for PSCs.1 There is a collective convention for companies providing guards, which covers some of the rights and responsibilities of employers in regulating the industry. It also provides a salary framework for guards. However, the convention is not widely circulated or known by many people working in the sector.1
The level of training and remuneration offered varies widely within the sector. Many security guards earn as little as 30,000 to 50,000 CFA per month (56 to 94 USD), indicating a strong potential for bribery to persuade guards to help criminal actors.3
The fact that the government has only very recently introduced legal requirements for PSCs regarding training standards and psychological assessments for employees highlights how unregulated the sector is at present (see 56A). The new law will require PSCs to deposit 50,000,000 CFA if headquartered in Bamako or 30,000,000 CFA if operating anywhere outside of the capital as part of their operating agreements.2 This will give the state authorities greater leverage over PSCs operating in the country. But there is still no comprehensive policy for how the government scrutinises the conduct of PMCs.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

There are currently more than 300 PSCs operating in Mali (6). In law, each company has to have an agreement with the government in order to be commercially active. International PSCs, such as G4S and ERYS, are subject to the same legal constraints as Malian firms (5). However, many PSCs are operating without having entered into an agreement with the authorities (9). The authorities maintain that police and gendarmerie units are seeking to identify companies operating without agreements with a view to closing them down (9). But there are no publicly recorded instances of such PSCs being punished for violations (1-9).

This sub-indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

No evidence was found that the Moroccan government imposes restrictions on the use of private military contractors and intermediaries (1)(2).

This sub-indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

No evidence was found that PMCs are subject to any form of scrutiny and no background information was found surrounding PMCs in Morocco (1)(2)(3)(4).

This sub-indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Morocco has no policies or laws on the use of PMCs.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

The assessor found no evidence of the defence sector hiring private security contractors. However, doing so is not outlawed in either the Constitution (1) or the Military Penal Code (2). The score reflects the fact that there is no express ban in the Constitution or the Military Code prohibiting the use of PMCs. There is no clearly stated policy either. Private companies (uranium miner AREVA, for example) in the north do hire PMCs to protect infrastructure and staff from security threats. Niger has not adopted/signed and does not participate in the 2008 Montreaux Document on Private Military and Security Companies (3).

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Niger has no policies or laws on the use of PMCs. The lack of legislation is evidence of a lack of scrutiny.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Niger has no policies or laws on the use of PMCs. The lack of legislation is evidence of a lack of enforcement.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Private military contractors are engaged from time to time; however, there is no evidence of any organisational guidelines on any sort of due diligence checks, which should be carried out before engaging private military contractors. “This is a common attraction about hiring private military companies or mercenaries – they can get away with things that private citizens can’t if you are a national government” (1), (2). The use of military contractors is expedient, as the normal rules do not apply to them, this has been identified as a reason for their continued attraction. In the North-East internal security situation, there is widespread use of CJTFs. Although it is reported that “MOUs” are signed with them, there is little evidence to suggest that clear guidelines exist, or effective training of civilians involved in military operations occurs. As a result, there are many allegations of the involvement of the CJTF in human rights abuses. Another development is the proposal to absorb “qualified” members of the CJTF into the regular army corp (3), (4), (5), (6).

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Private military contractors are engaged from time to time; however, the engagement of PMCs falls under the purview of the executive arm of government. This is normally an extra-budgetary expenditure, so it would not be a decision which follows the normal exercise of executive discretionary powers (1). There is no legislative oversight or scrutiny of such decisions. During the last administration when PMCs were hired, the matter was considered a national secret and rarely reported within the national media. “Paradoxically, the new administration would again re-engage the services of another PMC, the Specialised Tasks, Training, Equipment and Protection company (STTEP), to support the military, despite the absence of an enabling law to allow this type of arrangement. It is uncertain if the current government contemplated the far-reaching concerns over probity and transparency or even the possible backlashes of such engagement. It might be that precisely because of such negative prospects, the administration preferred the whole affair to be shrouded in secrecy” (1), (2), (3). The use of children in the Civilian Joint Task Force was recently stopped, by the signing of an action plan to stop the use of children in conflict (4). The use of local PMCs has raised some questions in the media. No official oversight mechanism exists concerning the use of the CJTF (5).

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

No laws deal with the hiring of PMCs. For example, there is no oversight body responsible for scrutinizing the activities of the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) (1). A recent development prevents the use of children in the CJTF (2), (3). No rules govern the use of private military contractors. The FGN has recruited both foreign private military contractors and local citizens who were formed into a militia to support the military operations in the North East of the Country. Over the years, as the CJTF has demonstrated its usefulness there have been attempts made to formalize its use through the provision of some training and recruitment into the regular army (3). However, widespread allegations of the complicity of the CJTF in human rights abuses exist. The evidence suggests that the CJTF are a state-sponsored militia (2), (3). Although some training is provided for them, they have been implicated in several cases of human rights abuses. The level of scrutiny is less than that applied to the regular Nigerian military. For example, they were able to use child soldiers and commit human rights abuses such as extrajudicial killings and rape. The recommendation is that the use of militias such as the CJTF should be regularised as soon as possible, training should be provided, and internal and external accountability mechanisms created (4).

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

There is no law or policy dedicated solely to PMCs, nor is there evidence of employment of any PMCs by the MoD (1), (2). Oman is not a participating member of the Montreaux Document, defining PMCs within international law (3). The Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism Law includes applicable provisions for PMCs, which are considered non-financial businesses (4). The legislation scrutinises transactions suspected to involve money laundering, terrorist funding or organisations (4). They do not explicitly relate to PMCs, but as mentioned above there are no examples of contracting PMCs, and PMCs would have to abide by business standards in any case. According to our sources, some guidelines restrict and have some control over PMCs in Oman (5), (6). These guidelines are not law and are flexible too, they can be applied differently across the years and contractors.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

There is no legislation explicitly targeting PMCs (1), (2). There is no reference to the employment of PMCs in Omani media. There is no evidence of oversight bodies scrutinising PMCs and parliament does not have the mandate to discuss or scrutinise the defence and security sectors (3). According to our sources, there is no oversight of PMCs. The reason is, that they are not widespread and if they are present, they conduct training and are not engaged in military operations (4).

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

There are no policies explicitly applicable to employing PMCs in Oman (1). In cases of violations of the PMC guidelines (as there are no policies or laws), there are almost no sanctions applied (2). According to another source, PMCs are at a small scale, and when they violate guidelines, there is no potential to sanction them as the process of investigation, and sanctioning will be expensive (3).

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

As Israeli forces have full control over security in the area (1), a private contractor by the Palestinian Authority is not allowed. Besides that, the PA is not part of the Montreaux document (1).

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

There are no laws for private military contractors as the political situation does not permit that. According to the Oslo agreement, the security of the are will be under the Israeli military forces until 1999. However, Israel still controls the areas in the West Bank, dividing it into several cantons, it is not possible to have private military contractors as it would require permission and an agreement with Israel (1).

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

There are no laws for private military contractors as there is no sovereignty over the security and defence of the West Bank. Therefore, the absence of PMCs is related to an external force (Israeli occupation), and therefore, there is no need for policies and laws that organize them (1).

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Qatar is a signatory to the Montreux document as of April 30, 2009 and has policies on the use of private military contractors, which do not specify particular preventive measures. The Qatari policy in relation to regulating PMCs is Law No. 19 (2009) for Regulating the Provision of Private Security Services. Article 2 of the law states that ‘it is not allowed to provide private security services by private security services companies without obtaining a license for that from the Licensing Authority, and in accordance with the provisions of this Law.’ [1] In relation to its commitments to the Montreux document, Qatar has expressed that it has ‘specific provisions for on-the-ground monitoring of PMSC compliance with legislation, licences or regulations ……and PMSCs in Qatar are expected to submit updated registers every two years.’ [2,3] Whilst there is a law that regulates PMCs, the law does not include specific provisions in relation to the conduct expected of PMCs. [4]

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Scrutiny over PMCs is much more present than scrutiny over the public defence sector. Although there is some scrutiny over PMCs, there is no evidence of this being carried out in a meaningful way. Policies set out the main regulations and guidance PMCs should adhere to, and those include restrictions over their work and the necessity of obtaining licences from relevant authorities prior to commencing their work. For example, article 18 of the Law No. 19 (2009) states that ‘private security services companies are subject to the control and inspection of the Licensing Authority in the manner it deems appropriate.’ [1] However, the policy does not specify the form of scrutiny PMCs could be subject to by the authorities, or the mechanism through which such scrutiny could possibly take place, and therefore the process remains unclear. In addition to that, the policy does not mandate PMCs to submit financial or audit reports. [2]

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

There are rare incidents when PMCs violate the terms and laws, but they are usually sanctioned according to the law. Such PMCs normally work as consultants at a senior level. [1,2]

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

According to our sources, PMCs are used in the country through the office of the crown prince. Therefore, there are some de-facto restrictions on them but not through a legal framework. These restrictions vary based on the mission, and duration of the mission (1), (2). Controversial US private military contractor Blackwater (now known as Academi) is also said to be active in the country, with UK press source the Daily Mail alleging that Blackwater mercenaries were employed by the Saudi state to torture detainees that were held in the Ritz Carlton as part of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s anti-corruption crackdown in November 2017 (3). Blackwater operatives were also reportedly used by the government to “guard” Lebanese Prime Minister Saad al-Hariri after he was allegedly held hostage by Saudi authorities in the same month, according to London-headquartered media outlet The New Arab (4). Beyond Saudi Arabia, the government has made extensive use of PMCs in the regional conflicts in which it is engaged, primarily the ongoing war in Yemen that began in March 2015 where Saudi is leading a coalition against the Houthi fighters. Other than Blackwater/Academi, Saudi Arabia has hired other PMCs to fight and provide security services in that conflict, including UK companies Griffin Security and ArmourGroup International (5), (6).
According to a US military official with knowledge of Saudi defence policy, “private military companies such as US-based Vinnell have been operating in Saudi Arabia since the 1970s, and they are not currently executing missions, but rather are there as trainers, for example, training the Saudi Arabian National Guard, and some as maintainers. They are regulated in the sense that they must obtain a license to operate there from the US State Department, which represents some kind of oversight, but I’m not aware of any scrutiny or oversight regulating their conduct in Saudi Arabia” (7).

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

There is no evidence of PMCs in Saudi Arabia being subject to any kind of scrutiny or oversight (1). There are some restrictions on the operations of military contractors in Saudi Arabia, for example limiting them to selling weapons and other military equipment to the Saudi government as well as providing ancillary services such as servicing military equipment and training military personnel. There are also regulations prohibiting military contractors from engaging agents on a commission basis in sales of armaments and other military equipment to the Saudi government (2). However, there is no indication of any oversight mechanism specifically for PMC operations in Saudi Arabia under local law, nor of what repercussions PMCs may be subject to in the event of a breach of law or involvement in corrupt activities.

Saudi Arabia is not a signatory to the Montreaux Document (3).

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Saudi Arabia has no policies or laws on the use of PMCs (1).

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Private military contractors are not allowed in Tunisia. Article 17 of the constitution decrees that only the State may establish armed forces and internal security forces, according to the law and to serve public interest prohibiting the existence of any armed group that does not belong to the State (1). According to our sources, PMCs are forbidden and there are no PMCs in Tunisia, past or present (2,3).

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

As private military contractors are not allowed in Tunisia (1), is is not relevant to talk about their scrutiny (2,3). Therefore, this subindicator should be marked as Not Applicable.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

According to our sources, there are no PMCs within the Tunisian military however, if there were, these violations of the law would be punished. Besides that, any use of PMCs would be faced vigorously by the state and its institutions. Security and armed forces are strictly state-owned and PMCs are not allowed (1,2).

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

The UAE is not a signatory to the Montreaux document, which is an agreement about the use of private military and security companies in war zones (1). The UAE’s position concerning the Montreaux document demonstrates its interest in not regulating the use of private military contractors. There is only one federal law that partially governs PMCs; Federal Law No. 37 of 2006 regulates the setting up and licensing of PMCs, but the law includes no information or regulations in relation to corruption (2). The policy lacks regulations about the procedure for selecting PMCs, criteria for dealing with PMCs which have been convicted of corruption, and provisions for contract language which enables the state to fire PMCs for offences or violations. The policy also lacks information on how these PMCs could be contracted and overseen (3), (4).

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Whereas there are barely any policies that imposing restrictions on the use of private military contractors and intermediaries, laws within the UAE contain provisions for oversight of PMCs but these laws are weak, and scrutiny is not undertaken in a meaningful way. There is only one regulation that specifically deals with PMCs, and that is Federal Law No. 37 of 2006 On Private Security Companies (1), (2), (3). This law; however, does not provide a proper policy for regulating the work of PMCs and is mainly concerned with the minimum standards for operation. It is important to take into consideration that PMCs as private companies are also regulated by other laws such as those related to Labour Laws and Human Resources (4), (5), (6), (7).

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

There are no restrictions on the use of private military contractors in the UAE. In this context, as private military contractors are not governed by clear policies, an assessment of the enforcement of policies is irrelevant in this context.

Country Sort by Country 56a. Policies Sort By Subindicator 56b. Scrutiny Sort By Subindicator 56c. Enforcement Sort By Subindicator
Algeria NS NS NS
Angola NS NS NS
Burkina Faso NS NS NS
Cameroon NS NS NS
Cote d'Ivoire NS NS NS
Egypt NS NS NS
Ghana NS NS NS
Jordan NS NS NS
Kuwait NS NS NS
Lebanon NS NS NS
Mali NS NS NS
Morocco NS NS NS
Niger NS NS NS
Nigeria NS NS NS
Oman NS NS NS
Palestine NS NS NS
Qatar NS NS NS
Saudi Arabia NS NS NS
Tunisia NS NS NS
United Arab Emirates NS NS NS

With thanks for support from the UK Department for International Development and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs who have contributed to the Government Defence Integrity Index.

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