Q34.

Do the Defence Ministry, Defence Minister, Chiefs of Defence, and Single Service Chiefs publicly commit, through, for example, speeches, media interviews, or political mandates, to anti-corruption and integrity measures?

34a. Chiefs/Ministers: Internal communications

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SCORE: 0/100

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34b. Chiefs/Ministers: Public commitment

Score

SCORE: 0/100

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34c. Unit commanders and leaders

Score

SCORE: 25/100

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The review of the internal communication of the armed forces is based on the military magazine El-Djeich, which is published monthly by the armed forces. In the editions published between 2016 and 2018 (1), former President Bouteflika, who was also officially the Minister of Defence, called on the armed forces to face “corruption and drugs, which eat away the economy and security” in August 2018 (2). No other more concrete commitments to fight corruption were found.

Bouteflika’s August 2018 speech in which he called on Algerians to face “corruption and drugs, which eat away the economy and security” (1) was reported in the media (2). Statements by Deputy Defence Minister Salah related to the topic of corruption could only be found with regards to organized crime but not corruption. In May 2018, he welcomed the results that have been achieved in the fight against terrorism and organized crime (3). No explicit commitments on fighting corruption could be found by the President or the Vice-Defence Minister.

There is no evidence that commitments to anti-corruption have been made by senior officers of the Ministry of Defence or armed forces staff members. No information could be found in the official journal El-Djeich (1) or local news.

There are however statements from other officials. For example, the Director-General of the Police said that one has to be “clean” to be able to fight corruption effectively. The statement came in the wake of a seizure of 700kg of cocaine in May 2018 (2). The Minister of Justice also emphasized that no one is above the law and that corruption cases will be handled with rigour and confidence. He also said that the fight against corruption is pursued under the directives and guidelines of the President of the Republic (3).

Since President Lourenço took office, there has been more emphasis in public speeches by top officials of the armed forces, as well as the Minister of Defence and others to highlight the fight against corruption in the defence sector as a priority (1), (2), (3). For example, in July 2018, Angop reported that “The Chief of Staff of the FAA, António Egídio de Sousa Santos “Discipline”, announced in the city of Lobito, among other measures, the fight against corruption, impunity and nepotism within the Armed Forces, taking into account the context that the country goes through” (1).In March 2018, Angop reported that “Hélder Pinto, a judge from the court of the Military Region Center said, Corruption is an evil that affects the defence and national security organs, as it can negatively influence their efficiency and operationality” (3).
However, there is no public information on internal strategic communications on fighting corruption nor is there evidence of the speeches translating into effective measures to conduct reforms.

While a commitment to fight corruption in the military is publicly stated (see Q34A), little is said about specific integrity measures and management of risk (1), (2), (3), (4).

Since President Lourenço took office, there has been more emphasis in public speeches by top officials of the armed forces, as well as the Minister of Defence and others to highlight the fight against corruption in the defence sector as a priority (1), (2), (3). For example, in July 2018, Angop reported that “The Chief of Staff of the FAA, António Egídio de Sousa Santos “Discipline”, announced in the city of Lobito, among other measures, the fight against corruption, impunity and nepotism within the Armed Forces, taking into account the context that the country goes through” (1). In March 2018, Angop reported that “Hélder Pinto, a judge from the court of the Military Region Center said, Corruption is an evil that affects the defence and national security organs, as it can negatively influence their efficiency and operationality” (3). However, there is no public information on internal strategic communications on fighting corruption nor is there evidence of the speeches translating into effective measures to conduct reforms.

There is no evidence of statements by unit commanders and leaders, as internal defence service publications cannot be accessed.

Since President Lourenço took office, there has been more emphasis in public speeches by top officials of the armed forces, as well as the Minister of Defence and others to highlight the fight against corruption in the defence sector as a priority (1), (2), (3). For example, in July 2018, Angop reported that “The Chief of Staff of the FAA, António Egídio de Sousa Santos “Discipline”, announced in the city of Lobito, among other measures, the fight against corruption, impunity and nepotism within the Armed Forces, taking into account the context that the country goes through” (1). In March 2018, Angop reported that “Hélder Pinto, a judge from the court of the Military Region Center said, Corruption is an evil that affects the defence and national security organs, as it can negatively influence their efficiency and operationality” (3).

However, there is no public information on internal strategic communications on fighting corruption nor is there evidence of the speeches translating into effective measures to conduct reforms.

Burkina Faso’s armed forces do not make public speeches without prior authorization from the hierarchy. Defence ministers, chief of defences, and single service chiefs rarely make public speeches. There is no evidence that internal communications relating to corruption are being addressed, except on topics like integrity, even though corruption is widespread among public officials (3). According to UNODC 2017, “From 22 to 23 March 2017, a national workshop on “Police, Gendarmerie and Customs: integrity and combating corruption” was organized in Ouagadougou, in cooperation with the High Authority for State Control and Anti-Corruption…This will allow for the development of more realistic and pertinent strategies” (1). According to GAN 2016, “Corruption is pervasive in all sectors of the economy and government… Foreign donors have pushed the government to pass new anti-corruption legislation in 2015″ (2). Although corruption is criminalized under the Penal Code, however, weak enforcement of these laws, coupled with poor access to information, a culture of impunity, weak institutions, have made the fight against corruption all the more difficult…The police and gendarmerie are perceived to be among the most corrupt institutions in Burkina Faso. Investigations of corrupt practices and the abuse of the police are carried out by the gendarmerie, but results of these investigations are not always made public….. however, only between 1-15% of households report having paid a bribe to the police” (2), (4), (6).

According to the DoS (2017), “use of excessive force, corruption, a climate of impunity, and lack of training contributed to police ineffectiveness… The government announced investigations in progress, but as of September 20, none had led to prosecution.inadequate resources also impeded police effectiveness…NGOs reported pervasive corruption in… the gendarmerie, national police, municipal police. The local NGO Anticorruption National Network (REN-LAC) categorized the municipal police as the most corrupt government sector. They reported a lack of political will to fight corruption, stating the government rarely imposed sanctions against prominent government figures (3). According to BTI 2016, “Isolated cases of corruption are prosecuted, but often without consequence…Though the law provides criminal penalties for official corruption, the government did not implement it effectively. There are few reliable public sources of information about corruption, and the media are often left to publish rumors and accusations. Few government agencies provide customer-friendly services (for example on web sites), which seriously compromises citizens’ ability to obtain information about government operations, including the proposed national budget” (5). The oversight mechanisms are not also able to nurture a tradition of internal communication on corruption or have the military to point out corruption or integrity in the public speeches or on the media. The Parliament, the Higher Authority for State Control and Anti-Corruption, and the Cour of Accounts do not exercise their constitutional rights of control over the armed forces (5).

There is little evidence of commitment from chiefs and ministers with regards to anti-corruption within the military and security sectors. There is no evidence to show that anti-corruption is part of public talking points for chiefs and ministers, with explicit reference to corruption and management of corruption risks through interviews with journalists and CSOs, and statements at events and conferences. According to GAN 2016, “Corruption is pervasive in all sectors of the economy and government… Foreign donors have pushed the government to pass new anti-corruption legislation in 2015″ (2). Although corruption is criminalized under the Penal Code, however, weak enforcement of these laws, coupled with poor access to information, a culture of impunity, weak institutions, have made the fight against corruption all the more difficult…The police and gendarmerie are perceived to be among the most corrupt institutions in Burkina Faso. Investigations of corrupt practices and the abuse of the police are carried out by the gendarmerie, but results of these investigations are not always made public….. however, only between 1-15% of households report having paid a bribe to the police” (2)

According to the DoS (2017), “use of excessive force, corruption, a climate of impunity, and lack of training contributed to police ineffectiveness… The government announced investigations in progress, but as of September 20, none had led to prosecution.inadequate resources also impeded police effectiveness…NGOs reported pervasive corruption in… the gendarmerie, national police, municipal police. The local NGO Anticorruption National Network (REN-LAC) categorized the municipal police as the most corrupt government sector. They reported a lack of political will to fight corruption, stating the government rarely imposed sanctions against prominent government figures (3). However, the military disciplinary code focuses on integrity and is among the core shared values in the armed forces (5), (6), (7). Integrity is taught at military training centres. One key reasons for being fired in the defence sector remains offences committed in violation of military doctrine. Burkina Faso’s armed forces have been strict on this matter as they consider discipline to be the strength of the armed forces. Training in communication, integrity and corruption mostly takes places at professional workshops (1). For most personnel, integrity is something embedded from when they signed up to serve in the armed forces and they fear breaking military discipline (4). However, at the 2018 Council of Administration of the Ministry of Defence, the speech focused on ethics and integrity (1), (8). According to UNODC 2017, “from 22 to 23 March 2017, a national workshop on “Police, Gendarmerie and Customs: integrity and combating corruption” was organized in Ouagadougou, in cooperation with the High Authority for State Control and Anti-Corruption… This will allow for the development of more realistic and pertinent strategies” (1).

There is little evidence of commitment from unit commanders and leaders with regards to anti-corruption within the military and security sectors. There is no evidence to show that anti-corruption is part of public talking points for chiefs and ministers, with explicit reference to corruption and management of corruption risks through interviews with journalists and CSOs, and statements at events and conferences. According to GAN 2016, “Corruption is pervasive in all sectors of the economy and government… Foreign donors have pushed the government to pass new anti-corruption legislation in 2015″ (2). Although corruption is criminalized under the Penal Code, however, weak enforcement of these laws, coupled with poor access to information, a culture of impunity, weak institutions, have made the fight against corruption all the more difficult…The police and gendarmerie are perceived to be among the most corrupt institutions in Burkina Faso. Investigations of corrupt practices and the abuse of the police are carried out by the gendarmerie, but results of these investigations are not always made public….. however, only between 1-15% of households report having paid a bribe to the police” (2)

According to the DoS (2017), “use of excessive force, corruption, a climate of impunity, and lack of training contributed to police ineffectiveness… The government announced investigations in progress, but as of September 20, none had led to prosecution.inadequate resources also impeded police effectiveness…NGOs reported pervasive corruption in… the gendarmerie, national police, municipal police. The local NGO Anticorruption National Network (REN-LAC) categorized the municipal police as the most corrupt government sector. They reported a lack of political will to fight corruption, stating the government rarely imposed sanctions against prominent government figures (3). The military disciplinary code focuses on integrity and is among the core shared values in the armed forces (5), (6), (7). Integrity is taught at military training centres. One key reasons for being fired in the defence sector remains offences committed in violation of military doctrine. Burkina Faso’s armed forces have been strict on this matter as they consider discipline to be the strength of the armed forces. Training in communication, integrity and corruption mostly takes places at professional workshops (1). For most personnel, integrity is something embedded from when they signed up to serve in the armed forces and they fear breaking military discipline (4). However, at the 2018 Council of Administration of the Ministry of Defence, the speech focused on ethics and integrity (1), (8). According to UNODC 2017, “from 22 to 23 March 2017, a national workshop on “Police, Gendarmerie and Customs: integrity and combating corruption” was organized in Ouagadougou, in cooperation with the High Authority for State Control and Anti-Corruption… This will allow for the development of more realistic and pertinent strategies” (1).

There is no evidence of any internal communications from senior members of the defence and security establishment. Due to the lack of transparency and accountability regarding issues of defence and security in Cameroon (Constitution, Article 35) [4], any internal communications, if they do exist, would not likely be made public. In addition, the lack of known proactive measures to fight corruption within the defence and security establishments, the prevalence of corruption across all aspects of Cameroonian society [1] [2], and the lack of transparency and accountability regarding wrongdoing and corruption by members of the security forces [3], suggest that there is unlikely to be an internal commitment to integrity and anti-corruption by the Defence Minister, Chief of Defence, Single Service Chiefs or the ministry as an institution.

The Minister of Defence has made several pronouncements on cases relating to corruption within the defence systems. Corrupt military officers have been disciplined and some of the sanctions broadcast on the National Radio and Television station. The Director of Communication of the Ministry of Defence has also made pronouncements concerning corrupt security officers. [1] Addressing military officers in 2015, the former Minister of Defence Edgard Alain Mebe Ngo’o stated that military officers who had embezzled the allowances of military personnel assigned to fight Boko Haram would be tried for embezzlement: “The Defence Minister insisted on good governance to guide the actions of soldiers on the field to enable them effectively to carry out war operations. The military leaders on the war front should lead by example: ‘I state clearly that depriving troops and soldiers of their rights in times of war is an act of treason that will lead the perpetrators to be judged in military courts,’ Mebe Ngo’o said” [2]. As noted in 33B, Mebe Ngo’o has been charged with allegations of corruption and embezzlement himself and so these communications should be taken as superficial.

There is no evidence of senior military officers denouncing corruption in the military and Ministry of Defence openly. The former Minister of Defence did in 2015 denounce corruption in relation to security officers embezzling the allowances of military personnel assigned to fight Boko Haram who would be tried for embezzlement (Cameroun Web, 2015) [1], but no senior military officers denounced such acts.

The only item that was published in the MoD magazine (Magazine Défense, No. 3) that could be considered to address general corruption issues at MoD institutions was a piece published in January 2017 reporting on the findings by Transparency International’s GI Index 2015. However, the author (Jean-Francois Curtis) is not a chief/minister at MoD (1). Most of the internal communications regarding anti-corruption issues seem to have involved anti-racketeering or small arms issues–not broad-based anti-corruption initiatives. There is little evidence of a more pro-active general engagement at the top level of officers, including the minister of defence, based on the MoD internal communications. The MoD magazine (Magazine Défense, No. 1) from June 2016 had two pieces on efforts to end racketeering at police roadblocks. Since operation “Renard” was deployed in 2012, more than 1,000 weapons have been seized and 18 roadblocks have been dismantled. This is an example of internal communication on anti-racketeering in an MoD internal publication, whose publication director is the minister of defence himself (2).

The MoD magazine (Magazine Défense, No. 2) from October 2016, dedicated to the Military Programming Act (Loi de Programmation Militaire) and national security issues, reported on a communications platform linking the National Commission to combat Small Arms (ComNat-ALPC) with the Gendarmerie Nationale as a way to exchange information on the trafficking in small arms. The chief of staff representing the then minister of defence made statements regarding the need to improve the traceability of small arms (3):

“As part of the implementation of its National Action Plan to Combat the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons, the National Commission the fight against small arms and light weapons (ComNat-Alpc), undertook to set up a system of interconnection between squadrons of the Gendarmerie Nationale and the Armies of Côte d’Ivoire, in accordance with the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons…Jean-Paul Malan, Chief of Staff, representing the Minister to the President of the Republic, in charge of Defense, welcomed this operation which allows the registration and management of arms movements” (3).

The MoD magazine (Magazine Défense, No. 2) from October 2016 carried a piece on the closure of illicit gold-mining operations. During a visit to a clandestine gold-mining operation in the district of Buyo (Western Region) on July 17, 2016, then Minister of Defence Alain Richard Donwahi declared the illicit mining operation officially closed. But he failed to mention the involvement of members of the armed forces in this type of operation, which is a widespread corruption issue at the MoD (4).

The recent ministers of defence and army chiefs of staff have publicly committed to a general anti-corruption agenda since the end of the post-election crisis of 2010-2011. But due to political alliances and the threat of soldier mutinies, such commitments are made only indirectly at public events. The ministers of defence and army chiefs of staff routinely use the codeword of “discipline” to address values or codes of military conduct, but that they fail to address specific incidents of corruption involving local zone commanders known as COMZONES due to the political liabilities. The current Defence Minister Hamed Bakayoko acknowledged the image problem of the armed forces and addressed the reforms underway to help restore its “tarnished image” by referring to “discipline” and “mentality changers” (Ivorian Press Agency (AIP) on 2 Nov. 2018) (1).

There have also been public communiqués regarding disciplinary issues in the armed forces since the soldiers’ mutiny of January 2017 in Bouaké and other towns, in which soldiers rebelled to demand wage increases and upgrades to barracks infrastructure. The then Minister of Defence Alain Richard Donwahi announced an agreement, as long as “discipline” was maintained (2). The most recent event illustrating Minister of Defence Hamed Bakayoko’s public commitment to root out corruption at MoD is from November 5, 2018. The APA source describes his firing of 48 soldiers in 2017-2018. According to the source, the Minister supports draft legislation that would impose administrative sanctions on members of the military (3). With the Military Programming Act (Loi de Programmation Militaire, LPM) through 2020, the MoD can be said to be going through a reform process. The LPM contains several integrity commitments, but few top officials address these issues at public events directly and explicitly.

There is a low level of public commitment to anti-corruption and integrity issues by unit commanders and less senior military leaders. As in 34B, such commitments are expressed indirectly and only occasionally in public statements, and often prefer the usage of the codeword of “discipline” instead of “corruption”. In May 2017, a former military commander calling himself Officer Zinzin (Adjutant Zinzin) revealed the backstories behind the soldier mutinies in Bouaké and the discovery of a weapons cache at the home of Soul to Soul, the Protocol Director of NA President Guillaume Soro. But the revelations of purported corruption were made under a pseudonym (1).

In January 2018, the Chief of Staff of the Ivorian Armed Forces, General Sékou Toure, promised that the military would cease being problematic for the government during a ceremony in honour of President Ouattara. During his speech, General Toure stated that his goal was to restore the “tarnished image of the Armed Forces” (2). “In 2017, 230 soldiers and gendarmes were laid off for misconduct, desertion and other breaches of discipline, according to a report by the Chief of Staff. In 2018, I promise to restore the tarnished image of the army,” promised General Sekou Toure” (2). Whenever a unit commander or a junior member of the military establishment publicly denounce corruption, it is done anonymously.

According to our sources, there are no internal communications of any type with regards to corruption or corruption activities (1), (2), (3). There is no evidence of meetings or any form of internal communication about the sector’s commitment to fighting corruption.

Examining tens of news pieces and press releases going a year back on the official website of the MoD, there was no mention whatsoever of anti-corruption, and there was not a single communication about the commitment integrity (1). The same also applies to the Facebook page of the Armed Forces spokesperson (2). However, there have been some statements about countering the smuggling of drugs and weapons (3). This was confirmed by our interview sources (4), (5), (6).

After listening to some recent speeches by defence leaders addressing other officers (e.g. graduation ceremonies), anti-corruption issues were mentioned, though most of the speeches were about counter-terrorism efforts (1), (2). Other than these examples, there is no mention of issues of transparency, anti-corruption and integrity in the defence sector on any of the armed forces’ official platforms. According to our sources, there are no statements with regards to corruption. The MoD does not see corruption as strategic risk despite the clear evidence of widespread corruption within the army (3), (4), (5).

There is a commitment by the Ministry of Defence to enhance anti-corruption measures and build integrity in the MOD. However, if internal communications are issued, these are not made publicly available; either on the MOD’s webpage or in the main Ghanaian newspapers such as Modern Ghana, Myjoyonline, GhanaWeb, Ghana News Agency, Graphic Online (1). There are general statements on new anti-corruption initiatives, but not many public comments. There is no evidence of internal communications around the issue.

The MOD’s commitment is more often demonstrated during public interventions and statements by the minister and senior staff, as well as during events and conferences. For instance, in August 2017 during the presentation of the Entity Tender Committee, established in compliance with the Public Financial Management Act, 2016 (Act 921) (1), the Defence Minister, Dominic Nitiwul announced the online publication of the MOD’s tender processes (except for the procurement of confidential items) to improve the transparency of the procurement activities (2). On the same day, he encouraged the GAF to perform their role effectively and free from corruption stating, “the public know the GAF as being disciplined, and they will not forgive us for any infractions in the implementation of bad procurement and corrupt practices”.

The minister took part in the event “Winning the fight against corruption: a sustainable path to Africa’s transformation” organised to celebrate the 55th anniversary of the formation of the African Union (AU) in May 2018 (3).

In May 2018 the MOD organised, in partnership with the National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE), an open forum for personnel to improve civic participation in the defence sector. During the event, the commitment to fighting corruption was reiterated (4).

Sporadic statements from senior armed forces officers mostly refer to the promotion of self-discipline, integrity, and professionalism among the Armed Forces personnel rather than specifically addressing corruption risks. For instance, in June 2018 Brigadier-General Francis Ofori stressed the need to maintain self-discipline to build and consolidate public confidence in the GAF (1). Also in June, Brigadier-General Mohammed Aryee speaking at a military parade military stressed the need of preserving the image of the Armed Forces with “discipline” and “self-sacrifice” (2), (3), (4), (5).

There is very little internal communication or efforts to support commitment to anti-corruption. Usually, such communications come with external efforts to train officers on anti-corruption and integrity measures [1,2].

Commitment to countering corruption is publicly stated – though perhaps not strongly. There are many examples of Chiefs and Ministers speaking about anti-corruption measures being on the list of their priorities, without specifying these measures or strategies. The Prime Minister, acting as Defence Minister as well, often makes statements about the importance of countering-corruption and the Government’s dedication to it [1, 2]. In official statements, the King of Jordan Abdullah II, who is the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, also expresses his dedication and desire to end corruption in the country [3, 4, 5]. These statements fail to mention specific integrity measures and management of risk.

Other than public statements and commitments to countering corruption made by very senior officials associated with the defence sector, including those by the King and the Prime Minister [1, 2, 3, 4, 5], there are many instances of statements from unit commanders and leaders. These statements are usually presented at international and regional events.

The heads of security agencies in Kuwait have made a commitment to anti-corruption measures, but these ministries do not regularly communicate that to officers, former and current officials, activists and an analyst said (1,2,3).

They just have ordered their employees to hand over to the ACA their financial disclosures, and to accept some of the recommendations of the CSC regarding their pay structure.

The changes are, however, minor, they said. They simply concern formalizing the job description of some employees and asking employees to bring in their degrees to make sure they have the credentials they claimed to have when they were hired. Some of those who lied have had their pay reduced as a result, but there are no reliable estimates on the matter.

The security agencies have allowed the ACA to hold workshops and lecture officers on anti-corruption methods since the body was formed in 2016, officials said (4,5,6). The SAB and the CSC have always been allowed to lecture officers as well about more newer methods of administration and fighting corruption, they added.

High-ranking security and defence officials do not discuss corruption in their institutions explicitly or clearly. They rarely give press interviews and they do not ususally give public speeches.

ACA and SAB officials do routinely speak to the media about finding corruption in all Government ministries. The security agencies are not given special attention in this campaign, officials and activists said (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6).

The closest thing to a direct statement of commitment from the Defence Minister came in April 2018, when the state news agency KUNA announced that the Minister had met Johann Graf Lambsdorff, a German anti-corruption expert (7). The minister also told reports in February 2018 that most of the questions that the Parliament had about the aforementioned Caracal deal were valid and that he will cooperate with them (8).

There are very few statements from the security agencies discussing the issue of corruption, but there are many statements about integrity as one of the core values of their work. However, these statements lack depth and regularity. They are usually delivered through service publications and occasionally at unit parades and other military or police ceremonies, officials said (1, 2 and 3).

There is a commitment to increase transparency and integrity measures by the LAF, demonstrated by internal measures taken place (1). However, the LAF does not often publicize its internal implemented measures (2). For example, the military college’s corruption case in 2017 is one of the publicized cases the LAF investigated (3). Furthermore, the LAF Commander General Joseph Aoun emphasized the meritocracy for the new cadets accepted in the military college in 2017 (4).

Though the LAF does have strict anti-corruption training (1), it has publically expressed its commitment (2) through interviews with CSOs and statements at events and conferences (3). Top-level officers reference and clarify integrity and internal measures in the management of corruption risks (3). For example, the LAF representative at a workshop with LTA and TI UK on anti-corruption reaffirmed the LAF’s commitment to anti-corruption and spoke about the internal measures that the LAF adopts (4). A source confirmed these LAF’s activities and discipline (3). Furthermore, Lebanon’s President Micheal Aoun praised the LAF’s efforts, including combating corruption (5).

Statements by senior military personnel representing the LAF commander are not made often (1). However, a few of the public statement include LAF’s commitment to combatting corruption, integrity, good governance, and transparency concerning international standards (2). On the other hand, publications by senior active military personnel addressing corruption were found on this subject (1), (3), (4).

According to LAF’s regulations, no unit commander has the right to express personal thoughts unless permitted by commandment (5). So any representative of the LAF commander stating the LAF’s commitment to anti-corruption and transparency is saying the official position of the LAF, as their personal opinions are not allowed (6).

The assessor has found no evidence online that the Ministry of Defence issues internal communications or has adopted clear commitments to tackle corruption within the defence sector [3,4]. The Ministry of Defence does not have its own website, but the armed forces (FAMa) do [1]. Similarly, there are no reports online of the former head of the armed forces, Didier Dacko, who is now the commander of the G5 Sahel Force, referencing the need to reduce corruption in any of his public engagements [2].
However, shortly after succeeding Dacko, the armed forces’ current General Chief of Staff, M’Bemba Moussa Keïta, delivered a speech to Malian troops at bases in Bamako and Kati in which he emphasised the need for soldiers to uphold the army’s values, albeit in vague terms.⁵ He called on all individuals to be mindful of presenting a positive image of the FAMa – both externally and internally – and warned that he would impose penalties for misconduct.⁵ He also underlined that he would ensure that the current recruitment programme would be conducted in a transparent manner.⁵

President IBK, who is also head of the armed forces, promoted 2014, his first full calendar year in office, as ‘the year against corruption’ [2,3]. The government organised a symposium with civil society to discuss solutions in the ‘fight against corruption’ (the January 2014 Forum sur la Corruption et la Délinquance Financière).[2] Yet, 2014 turned into the most damning year for IBK in terms of corruption because of the scandal concerning the 40 billion CFA overspend on a new presidential jet. [1,4] The deal prompted the IMF to suspend aid to the country and provoked an investigation by Mali’s national audit body, as well as a more general assessment by the IMF.[1,4] The scandal highlighted the superficial nature of the president’s public pronouncements.
Since IBK became president in 2013, there have been five different Ministers of Defence: Soumeylou Boubèye Maïga, Ba N’Dao, Tiéman Hubert Coulibaly, Abdoulaye Idrissa Maïga and Tiéna Coulibaly. Searches of online sources have revealed little evidence of the defence ministry or representatives of the ministry making public commitments to combat corruption. Indeed, the second of these defence ministers, Colonel Major Ba N’Dao, was removed from his post in late 2014. He was dismissed shortly after he was directly implicated in the “dubious” award of a public tender for military equipment, worth 20 billion CFA.[5] The contract was awarded in a manner that contravened the existing legal standards for issuing public tenders.[5] Local media outlets alleged that the deal contained a kickback of approximately 4 billion CFA for several “high placed individuals” involved in the awarding of the contract.[5] The assessor has not found more recent evidence.

The one exception in this series is the current Minister of Defence, Tiéna Coulibaly, who was appointed in April 2017. Within a month of his arrival at the MDAC, Coulibaly publicly determined that the army’s main weakness is in recruitment. He said that during the recruitment process, various ministers, MPs and officers present their own lists as to who should be selected.[6] Rather than recruiting soldiers on merit, the current process favours those who are well-connected. As a result, these new soldiers, recruited without competition and “for whom strings have been pulled”, are unfit for fighting because they are simply in the armed forces to draw a salary.[6] Coulibaly has pledged to ensure that from now on soldiers are recruited through a fair and competitive process.[6]

Searches of online sources have not found any evidence of military commanders making public commitments to combat corruption.[1] There is also no mention of tackling corruption as an institutional goal on the FAMa website. Well-informed sources in Bamako told the assessor that it is precisely at this level where the resistance to change and greater transparency is strongest.⁹ ¹⁰
A defence attaché at a foreign embassy in Bamako said that those at the very top of the armed forces, such as the current Chief of the Defence Staff, General Keita, know what needs to be done to reduce corruption and are genuinely committed to achieving this. [2,3] However, the source said that an electronic payments system, for example, would reveal how many soldiers each commander has under their authority and thus curb the opportunities for commanders to pocket the salaries of non-existent, deceased or retired soldiers.[3] Meanwhile, a security governance official said that the current system is “a golden egg for some commanders” and so there is a lot of resistance to the idea of an electronic system from Keita’s subordinates.[4]
Furthermore, a security expert working closely with the Malian armed forces said he was unaware of any unit commander making a public statement about tackling corruption.[5]

There is no defence minister in Morocco, defence matters being directly overseen by the King. Abdellatif Loudiyi has been serving as the delegate minister (secretary of state) to the Prime Minister in charge of the administration of national defence since 2010 upon the King’s orders, keeping his position throughout various governments (1) (2).

No evidence was found of internal communications about the commitment to integrity and anti-corruption made by Mr Loudiyi or the King on the website of the Ministry of Communication (which acts as the government and the King’s spokesperson). In the absence of a website dedicated to the Moroccan armed forces (or any government support or media offering official information about the Moroccan armed forces), the website of the Ministry of Communication was also screened for internal communications about the commitment to integrity and anti-corruption made by the Chief of Defence, Single Service Chiefs or the ministry as an institution. No evidence of such communication was found (3).

No evidence of internal communications about the commitment to integrity and anti-corruption measures made by Ministry of Defence or armed forces senior officials was found in the Moroccan and international press (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12).

This lack of evidence, coupled with the lack of evidence found on the website of Transparency Maroc and statements by the latter denouncing the lack of concrete anti-corruption policies implemented by the Moroccan authorities lead to the conclusion that there is no clear and detailed anti-corruption commitment at the internal level in the Moroccan armed forces. It was neither possible to talk to members of the Moroccan armed forces nor to access military gazettes and internal magazines (13) (14) (15).

There is no defence minister in Morocco, defence matters being directly overseen by the King. Abdellatif Loudiyi has been serving as the delegate minister (secretary of state) to the Prime Minister in charge of the administration of national defence since 2010 upon the King’s orders, keeping his position throughout various governments (1)(2).

No evidence was found of public communications about the commitment to integrity and anti-corruption made by Mr Loudiyi or the King on the website of the Ministry of Communication (which acts as the government and the King’s spokesperson). In the absence of a website dedicated to the Moroccan armed forces (or any government support or media offering official information about the Moroccan armed forces), the website of the Ministry of Communication was also screened for internal communications about the commitment to integrity and anti-corruption made by the Chief of Defence, Single Service Chiefs or the ministry as an institution. No evidence of such communication was found (3).

No evidence of public communications about the commitment to integrity and anti-corruption measures made by Ministry of Defence or armed forces senior officials was found in the Moroccan and international press (4)(5)(6)(7)(8)(9)(10)(11)(12).

This lack of evidence, coupled with the lack of evidence found on the website of Transparency Maroc and statements by the latter denouncing the lack of concrete anti-corruption policies implemented by the Moroccan authorities lead to the conclusion that there is no clear and detailed anti-corruption commitment at the internal level in the Moroccan armed forces. It was neither possible to talk to members of the Moroccan armed forces nor to access military gazettes and internal magazines (13)(14)(15).

There is no defence minister in Morocco, defence matters being directly overseen by the King. Abdellatif Loudiyi has been serving as the delegate minister (secretary of state) to the Prime Minister in charge of the administration of national defence since 2010 upon the King’s orders, keeping his position throughout various governments (1)(2).
No statements of commitment by senior officials of the Moroccan Ministry of Defence or armed forces, including the King and Mr Loudiyi were found in the Moroccan and international press (4)(5)(6)(7)(8)(9)(10)(11)(12).
No statements of commitment by senior officials of the Moroccan Ministry of Defence or armed forces, including the King and Mr Loudiyi were found on the website of the Ministry of Communication (3).
This lack of evidence, coupled with the lack of evidence found on the website of Transparency Maroc and statements by the latter denouncing the lack of concrete anti-corruption policies implemented by the Moroccan authorities lead to the conclusion that there is no clear and detailed anti-corruption commitment at the internal level in the Moroccan armed forces. It was neither possible to talk to members of the Moroccan armed forces nor to access military gazettes and internal magazines (13)(14)(15).

Anti-corruption represents one of the pillars of President Mahamadou Issoufous’ Renaissance Programme (2016–2021). Alongside this, there is a broad-based commitment to tackling corruption in other branches of government and widespread awareness of the issue among the public. In July 2018, a public panel to discuss the issue was organised as part of the African Day of Civil Service (Journée africaine de la fonction publique, JAFP). This was attended by the Minister of Civil Service and Administrative Reform, Christelle Kaffa Rakiatou (1). Based on the assessor’s observations, there is little public commitment by the defence minister, chief of defence, or single-service chiefs in support of anti-corruption and integrity measures. For example, in a February 2018 interview with Jeune Afrique, Minister Moutari did not refer to anti-corruption or integrity measures at the Ministry of Defence (4). Also, the website of Niger’s Ministry of Defence (part of which was hacked in July 2018) does not carry news of speeches or media interviews with Minister of Defence Kalla Moutari (or his staff), regarding anti-corruption or integrity measures. Finally, it seems that internal communication by various government bodies, in support of anti-corruption and integrity measures, is superficial.

Public commitment to anti-corruption and integrity measures consists of vague statements, with no reference to chiefs or ministers. The assessor did not find evidence that top officials at the Ministry of Defence (including the minister himself) have made recent public statements about anti-corruption.
The Third Chapter of the Presidential Renaissance Programme for 2016-2021 includes fighting against corruption in security and defence institutions as part of improving the overall security governance strategy (1). More broadly, the president, who is also the supreme head of the armed forces, has voiced his commitment to countering corruption in public institutions (2,3). Alongside this, the minister of defence underlined in 2013 the “harmful consequences of corruption for the development of the country” and the need to tackle it in the security and defence sectors (4).

The assessor found no evidence of public commitment (through, for example, speeches, media interviews, or political mandates) to anti-corruption and integrity measures by unit commanders and leaders.
However, on some rare occasions, security forces, related to the Ministry of Interior, have expressed a commitment to combating corruption publicly. For example, in October 2015, the UNODC organised a meeting in Niamey that brought together deputy director generals of the National Police, Judicial Police officers and directors of National Police Schools, as well as heads and representatives of national institutions contributing to the fight against corruption from five Sahel countries (Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Mali, Niger and Senegal) (1). The Director-General of the National Police of Niger, Mr Boubacar Souley, reiterated his “firm commitment to fight tirelessly against corruption in [his] institution.” The Secretary-General of the Interior Ministry declared that corruption “is a major factor of instability and a threat to the peace.” (1) As an outcome of the meeting, participants issued a public statement calling to fight corruption within security institutions (2).

There is an internal commitment to anti-corruption, as evidenced by the direction that all officers should declare their assets. “The head of Nigeria’s army has ordered all officers to declare their assets in a bid to improve transparency” (1). This internal direction was released to the public. Having identified corruption as a strategic issue, the internal correspondence also backs up the commitment as well as internal communication documents (2).

This indicator has not been assigned a score due to insufficient information or evidence.

“Corruption in the Nigerian Army might be the biggest impediment to the fight against Boko Haram insurgency say rank and file soldiers” (1). Lower ranked officers continued to allege that despite the public statements on corruption within the army, supplies are still not available. This has serious operational implications for serving soldiers.

According to a high-rank officer within the Omani army, there are no internal communications about the commitment to integrity and anti-corruption by high-ranking Defence and Security officials or the Ministry of Defence (1), (2). Another officer suggests that there are no clear communication channels between branches within the Ministry of Defence, such as the Royal Armed Forces and Royal Police with a focus on corruption and integrity (3), (4), (5). Military courts which address issues of corruption in the defence and security forces have no communication outlets or explicit values of accountability to integrity and anti-corruption (6). Sayyid Badr bin Saud bin Harib al Busaidi, the minister responsible for Defence Affairs is the sole high-ranking senior official named in the Ministry of Defence, there is no public information on structures within the Ministry, or roles equivalent to Chief of Defence or Single Service Chiefs (3).

We could not find a public commitment by the Ministry of Defence or high‐ranking Defence or Security
officials around issues of anticorruption or integrity (1). Also, we did not identify media interviews
granted by any high‐ranking MoD officials on anticorrup?on (2,3). According to our sources, they claim that the army and MoD do not feel that corruption is a pressing issue and therefore, they ignore it (4), (5). The only public announcements concerning corruption are made by the sultan through royal decrees, the latest of which was in 2011, the Law for the Protection of Public Funds and Avoidance of Conflicts of Interest (6). Efforts made by the sultan to address corruption, though without explicit reference to defence and security, are key given he holds the position of head of the state, government, Minister of Defence and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces (7), (8). We did not find evidence of high‐ranking officials in the Ministry of Defence publicly commiting to anticorruption or integrity in relation to their work.

There are no statements by senior Ministry of Defence or armed forces staff committing to integrity and anti-corruption measures. As discussed above, in the two prior sub-indicators, there is little information regarding structures within the ministry including communication and accountability channels (1). No speeches, media interviews, or endorsements of political mandates were found in institutional or media outlets (2), (3). The Ministry of Defence procedures around tenders and auditing are not published, neither are employees in positions of power within the ministry named on the website apart from Sayyid Badr bin Saud bin Harib al Busaidi, the minister responsible for Defence Affairs (4). No social media accounts of the Ministry of Defence were found, and the news section on the Ministry website is not regularly updated; it contains no news items relating to anti-corruption and integrity measures.

It is very rare that internal communications within the national forces or the security agencies, about integrity and corruption practices happens. The heads of the NF and security apparatuses rarely admit that there is a need for communication on this issue (1).

As a significant number of senior commanders are politically engaged or are indeed members of the executive branch, sometimes they issue statements during interviews where they assert their commitment to anti-corruption and integrity measures (1). For example, according to several journalists, the head of the Civil Police during an AMAN conference on corruption and security forces made this type of statement (2).

There are few statements of commitment by senior commanders on anti-corruption measures. These rare statements, when made, may come from commanders who have a political role (1), (2). For example, the head of intelligence, as a member of the Fatah Revolutionary Council, expressed his efforts against corruption in general terms. There is a concern that these statements are a cliche of political manoeuvering efforts to gain more power among the public (3).

There is no evidence of any internal communications around commitment to integrity and anti-corruption between chiefs/ministers. There is also no transparency or any information available in relation to internal communications within the defence sector to combat corruption or related to any other defence issues. There is no evidence that the defence sector has internal processes and communications to discuss corruption within its bodies. Although there is no evidence of communications around corruption within the defence sector, the Emir issued Decree No. 6 (2015), aiming to restructure the Administrative Control and Transparency Authority (ACTA), and to increase penalties for corrupt officials. In 2016, another decree was issued to guarantee the State’s Audit Bureau more financial authority and independence [1,2]. In addition to that, Qatar has ratified the UN Convention for Combating Corruption. A National Committee for Integrity and Transparency was established in 2007, through Emiri Decree No. 84, and is currently supervised by the chairman of the State’s Audit Bureau. Furthermore, Law 11/2004 of the Qatari Penal Code focuses on crimes related to corruption and bribery [3]. Qatar also established the Rule of Law and Anti-Corruption Centre on November 25, 2012 in Doha, in collaboration with the United Nations [4]. These initiatives show Qatar’s commitment to countering corruption within the government, however, none of these regulations apply to the defence sector. There is no evidence of any internal communications about the commitment to integrity and anti-corruption specifically within defence institutions, despite the efforts Qatar has exerted to countering corruption in the country more generally [5]. According to our sources, there is no internal communication with regards to corruption. There are, however, internal units (ethical guidance units) that sporadically send communications concerning ethical and religious commitments, but not about. [6,7,8]

As mentioned in the previous sub-indicator, officials within the government have made efforts and expressed commitment to anti-corruption and integrity measures, however, this has not been the case in relation to defence. None of the public statements and commitments made by Qatari officials make any reference to the defence sector. For example, Ibrahim Ali Abel, Director of the Transparency Department, and the Administrative Control and Transparency Authority of the Qatar Government, attended the General Assembly meeting to discuss the battle against corruption. [1] In the meeting, the Qatari representative talked about the efforts Qatar is exerting to promote international instruments to combat corruption on all levels. He added that Qatar is ‘focusing on building fair systems of justice in addition to countering organised crime and terrorism. In cooperation with UNODC, it aimed to promote the capacity of States by boosting its own judicial integrity’. Representatives from the Administrative Control and Transparency Authority (ACTA) and the State Audit Bureau have participated in workshops to inform OECD public governance reviews. [2,3,4] However, none of these reviews stated that public commitments relate to the defence sector, and none of these statements were made by chief or ministers within defence. There is no public commitment stated by defence personnel around building integrity and countering corruption within the defence sector itself. There have not been any cases of official public commitment by any of the senior army officers or commanders. [5,6]

There is no stated commitment on behalf of any defence personnel regarding building integrity and countering corruption within the sector. [1,2] Research showed that many Qatari government representatives, none of which are unit commanders or leaders, have committed to countering corruption in the country. Government officials making these statements were mostly representatives of the State’s Audit Bureau and the Administrative Control and Transparency Authority and the General Attorney. These statements mostly appear on media outlets such as Gulf Times, Doha News and The Peninsula. A recent meeting between the Qatari General Attorney-Ali Al Marri, chairman of the Rule of Law and Anti-corruption Centre (ROLAAC), the UN Under Secretary General, and the Executive Director of UNODC, took place with the aim of discussing ways and means to improve transparency and integrity at regional and global levels [3]. Whereas these examples show public commitment to countering corruption in the country, none of these is specifically relevant to the defence sector.

According to our sources, there is very little anti-corruption communication and commitment through official channels. According to one source, in the last five years, there was only one internal communication with a focus on anti-corruption measures and statement from senior officials. However, there are many recent statements by the crown prince (1), (2). King Salman and more notably his son, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the country’s de facto leader who also serves as minister of defence, in addition to several other senior roles, have ostensibly made fighting corruption one of the main pillars of his Vision 2030 reform programme, a broad series of reforms that include an overhaul of the Saudi economy, society and bureaucracy (3). This has extended to the defence ministry. However, the researcher found no publicly available information on the internal communications within the Ministry of Defence regarding these measures, nor is there evidence of internal commitment to carry out anti-corruption and integrity processes.

According to our sources, there is a public commitment from the senior leadership, but not the military leadership. The commander in chief, who happens to be the crown prince is the only leader who has issued many public statements against corruption; however, these commitments are not followed by serious measures that are not politically motivated against the opposition (1), (2).

The crown prince has made a large number of public statements and instituted measures to tackle corruption, including in the defence industry (3). Notably, in November 2017, Mohammed bin Salman arrested the commander of the Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG), Miteb bin Abdullah, son of former King Abdullah, as part of a widespread anti-corruption sweep. This sweep was spearheaded by a newly-formed anti-corruption committee led by the crown prince, with authority to investigate, arrest, issue travel bans and freeze the assets of those it found to be corrupt (4). Other senior officials in the defence industry were also targeted, including 14 retired military officers who previously served in the Ministry of Defence, as well as two retired SANG officers, on suspicion of involvement in financial contracts which were allegedly corrupt (5).

That being said, this was an ad hoc measure rather than a formalized anti-corruption policy. Furthermore, several analysts and observers have suggested that the anti-corruption crackdown represented a purge of the crown prince’s political enemies and his aim to consolidate his power rather than a meaningful attempt to combat corruption and build integrity in the country’s institutions (6), (7). Given the top-down nature of these initiatives and the lack of transparency regarding the internal processes to battle corruption in the sector, it is unclear to what extent such measures are genuine or how far-reaching they are in reality.

According to our sources, the only person who issues such statement is the crown prince. Except for Crown Prince and Minister of Defence Mohammed bin Salman, there are no statements from senior MoD or armed forces staff making references or statements in support of anti-corruption measures in the sector (1), (2), (3).

According to our sources, there is a clear anti-corruption commitment from the senior levels of the MoD and the commanders. This is shown through several pieces of training and internal communications during meetings or written statements (1,2). There is a commitment to anti-corruption and integrity measures by the Defence Ministry and senior members of the Armed Forces. This commitment is shown through the organisation of several anti-corruption pieces of training (3,4,5,6,7). Integrity measures are being implemented in collaboration with the Anti-corruption Authority (INLUCC). (8)

According to our sources, the anti-corruption commitment within the MoD is communicated mainly internally and not to the public. The focus is to work internally without any public enagegment within the issue of corruption in the MoD (1,2). The Ministry of Defence does not communicate on issues of corruption on its website (3). Only a few public announcements concerning anti-corruption from the Ministry of Defence could be found through press reviews and these declarations were generally made at seminars or at the conclusion of a convention between the Ministry of Defence and the Anti-corruption Authority (4).

According to our sources, there is commitment yet in a very minimal form by senior figures from the MoD. This is because it is rare that the MoD and its senior commanders comment on issues in general (1,2). There are no indications of senior military officials discussing corruption inside the units or during educational programs.

There is a very little commitment by the MoD and its personalities. During a few events, and visits by the commander in chief of the armed forces, they express enthusiasm against corruption. However, the ministry might issue internal communications of a superficial nature in support of anti-corruption and integrity measures, which come as letters during special events like the Transparency International Index Annual Report that the UAE is the first in the region (1), (2).

The UAE leadership is also the head of the armed forces, and they issue many public statements committing the country and its leadership and institutions to integrity and anti-corruption (1), (2). Many of the statements are available online in newspapers or elsewhere (3).

There is little stated commitment on behalf of any defence personnel (commanders are mostly from the royal families) about building integrity and countering corruption within the defence sector. Research showed that many UAE government representatives, none of which are unit commanders or leaders in the defence sector, have reiterated their commitment to countering corruption in the country (1), (2).

Country Sort by Country 34a. Chiefs/Ministers: Internal communications Sort By Subindicator 34b. Chiefs/Ministers: Public commitment Sort By Subindicator 34c. Unit commanders and leaders Sort By Subindicator
Algeria 0 / 100 25 / 100 0 / 100
Angola 0 / 100 25 / 100 0 / 100
Burkina Faso 0 / 100 0 / 100 25 / 100
Cameroon 0 / 100 25 / 100 0 / 100
Cote d'Ivoire 25 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Egypt 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Ghana 50 / 100 75 / 100 25 / 100
Jordan 25 / 100 75 / 100 25 / 100
Kuwait 25 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Lebanon 50 / 100 100 / 100 0 / 100
Mali 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Morocco 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Niger 25 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Nigeria 25 / 100 NEI 0 / 100
Oman 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Palestine 25 / 100 75 / 100 25 / 100
Qatar 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Saudi Arabia 25 / 100 25 / 100 0 / 100
Tunisia 100 / 100 25 / 100 25 / 100
United Arab Emirates 25 / 100 25 / 100 0 / 100

With thanks for support from the UK Department for International Development and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs who have contributed to the Government Defence Integrity Index.

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