Q46.

Is there a Code of Conduct for all military personnel that includes, but is not limited to, guidance with respect to bribery, gifts and hospitality, conflicts of interest, and post-separation activities? Is there evidence that breaches of the Code of Conduct are effectively addressed?

46a. Code of conduct

Score

SCORE: 25/100

Assessor Explanation

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46b. Transparency

Score

SCORE: 25/100

Assessor Explanation

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46c. Enforcement

Score

SCORE: 50/100

Assessor Explanation

Assessor Sources

46d. Training

Score

SCORE: 100/100

Assessor Explanation

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There is no evidence that there is a code of conduct for military personnel. For example, the website of the armed forces does not provide such a document (1). The Statute of Military Personnel of 2006 only includes some articles that deal with the issue of corruption but it is not an overall code (2).

Art. 35 of the statute addresses conflicts of interests and says that professional soldiers shall be prohibited from involvement in enterprises with the Ministry of Defence until five years after their termination of military service. The same article, however, says that this measure may be derogated by a decision of the Minister of Defence, who must inform the President of the Republic. With regards to briberies, gifts and hospitalities, Art. 47 says that it is prohibited for a military member to solicit benefits, accept donations or rewards from anyone having a relationship with the military institution (2). No further definitions, for example of rewards, were given. It also does not provide any information on how to proceed in such a situation.

The code of conduct of the police, which was mentioned in the country’s last assessment (4), could still not be found online. There were reports in 2017 noting that the police now also have a code of ethics. A memorandum of understanding was signed by the General Directorate of National Security (La direction générale de la sureté nationale, DGSN) signed with the National Council for Human Rights. The protocol aims at consolidating human rights within the police and establishing the rule of law within the ranks of the police (3).

This sub-indicator has been scored as Not Applicable because there is no evidence that there is a code of conduct for military personnel. For example, the website of the armed forces does not provide such a document (1). The Statute of Military Personnel of 2006 only includes some articles that deal with the issue of corruption but it is not an overall code (2).

This sub-indicator has been scored as Not Applicable because there is no evidence that there is a code of conduct for military personnel. For example, the website of the armed forces does not provide such a document (1). The Statute of Military Personnel of 2006 only includes some articles that deal with the issue of corruption but it is not an overall code (2).

This question has been scored Not Applicable because there is no evidence that there is a code of conduct for military personnel. For example, the website of the armed forces does not provide such a document (1). The Statute of Military Personnel of 2006 only includes some articles that deal with the issue of corruption but it is not an overall code (2).

Media reports occasionally refer to a code of conduct for the armed forces. However, since no such document is publicly available, it appears to be a set of principles rather than a code of conduct (1).

Media reports occasionally refer to a code of conduct for the armed forces. However, since no such document is publicly available, it appears to be a set of principles rather than a code of conduct (1). Thus, this indicator is marked Not Applicable.

Media reports occasionally refer to a code of conduct for the armed forces. However, since no such document is publicly available, it appears to be a set of principles rather than a code of conduct (1). Thus, this indicator is marked Not Applicable.

Media reports occasionally refer to a code of conduct for the armed forces. However, since no such document is publicly available, it appears to be a set of principles rather than a code of conduct (1). Thus, this indicator is marked Not Applicable.

Decree N°2008-700 (2009), is the code of conduct that currently applies to all military personnel. In general, it provides a conduct code that military personnel must adhere to, both as a citizen and as a soldier. It provides the rights and duties of the military and prevents misconduct at all levels of the hierarchy. Article 21 of Decree N°2008-700 (2009) provides the duties of the military as a citizen and as a member of the armed forces. Indeed, any other issue not covered by this decree is covered by Law No. 038 (2016). Unfortunately, the content of these legal instruments remains unknown by most of the members of the armed forces (1), (2). The total adult literacy rate was 28.7% from 2008 to 2012 (3). This low rate probably explains why the personnel of the armed forces do not have much knowledge about the military code of conduct, though it may have improved as of 2018.

Both LawNo. 038 (2016) and Decree N°2008-700 (2009) are available online and in hard copy (1), (2). However, there is no evidence that it is readily available. There is no evidence that personnel can get access to it upon request either. As per my own experience as a former member of the armed forces of Burkina Faso, I have never seen the military code of conduct readily available for anyone that needs it, in the units I used to belong to. In practice and according to the law, once a law or decree gets published in the Official Journal of the country, the public is supposed to have access to it, including the military personnel (3).

On January 12, 2018, an article by France24 reported that some Burkina Faso gendarmes were filmed committing a racket at the Niger border, it has resulted in an investigation within the defence sector (1). Later on, they were identified and removed from their positions (2). The gendarmerie is responsible for investigating cases of corruption within both the police and the gendarmerie, but it does not always publish its reports (3), and the case of the Niger border would not have been investigated and reported on if it was not widely known by the public (4). In sum, breaches of the code of conduct occur, and are occasionally investigated.

Fortunately, guidance on the code of conduct is provided in every military training module. Subjects like military discipline, military ethics, gender, human rights, amongst others, are integrated into curricula (1).

Military Justice in Cameroon is handled by the Military Justice Directorate. It handles issues ranging from prosecutions to sentences of those charged with offences. It is authorized to deal with offences like the holding of weapons without an official permit and unauthorised use of service cars. Though the military has a Code of Conduct, it does not specifically make mention of bribery and corruption, gifts, or conflicts of interest [1] [2] [3] [4].

There is also a Code of Military Justice which is not accessible to the public but which according to one interviewee does not specifically mention bribery, gifts, conflicts of interest or post-separation activities [2] [3].

There is a Code of Conduct for military personnel but it does not specifically make mention of issues relating to corruption and it is not made available to the public [1] [2].

The US State Department report (2017) states, “The DGSN and gendarmerie investigated reports of abuse and forwarded cases to the courts. Lesser sanctions were handled internally. The DGSN, Ministry of Defense, and Ministry of Justice claimed members of security forces were sanctioned during the year for committing abuses, but few details were known about investigations or any subsequent accountability… Although the government took some steps to punish and prosecute officials who committed abuses in the security forces and in the public service, it did not often make public actual sanctions, and offenders often continued acting with impunity [1]. According to International Crisis Group (2017), “Police were ineffective, poorly trained, and corrupt … Impunity was a problem” [2]. This suggests that training in the Code of Conduct is insufficient and not regularly enforced.

Police are said to be ineffective, poorly trained, and corrupt. Impunity is a problem [1]. This suggests that training in the Code of Conduct is insufficient and not encouraged.

There is a Code of Conduct for military personnel in the form of Law No. 2016-1109. Though the law includes aspects of integrity that affect military personnel, it does not fulfil the criteria for a score of 3 or 4. For example, there is no mention of bribery or gifts, and the references to conflicts of interest are unrelated to corruption risk.

Law No. 2016-1109 (Portant Code de la Fonction Militaire) of February 16, 2016, is the updated Code of Conduct that repealed the previous Act No. 095-695 (Portant Code de la Fonction Militaire) of September 7, 1995. The provisions in Law No. 2016-1109 that cover aspects of personnel integrity are contained in Book 1 (Statut Général des Militaires), Title 1 (Droits et Obligations), Chapter 1 (Exercice des droits civils et politiques) and Chapter 6 (Discipline) (1). The references to conflicts of interest in Law No. 2016-1109 are in Articles 13 and 14, and they are unrelated to corruption risk as per the criteria for a score of 4. For example, Article 13 regulates the participation of officers in certain for-profit activities, with MoD authorization, as long as they do not pose a conflict of interest. And Article 14 allows the spouse and/or children of the military officer to carry out a for-profit activity, as long as it does not represent a conflict of interest for the officer (1).

Though not specific to military personnel, Order No. 2013-660 (Relative à la prévention et à la lutte contre la corruption et les infractions assimilées) of September 20, 2013, contains clear and comprehensive guidance for public officials concerning bribery, gifts and hospitality and conflicts of interest. In Title 1 (Dispositions Générales), Chapter 1 (Définitions), Article 1, the scope of Order No. 2013-660 includes military personnel:

“Art. 1 – For the purposes of this order, the following terms mean: (2)
– public administration, all bodies, institutions and public services created by the laws and regulations in force;
– a public official, any natural person who holds an elected, executive, administrative, military, paramilitary or judicial mandate, whether he has been appointed or elected, permanently or temporarily, whether he is paid or not, and whatever the hierarchical level is” (2).

Law No. 2016-1109 was partially amended by Order No. 2018-515 of 30 May 2018 (Portant sanctions administratives applicables aux militaires). This Order gave teeth to Law No. 2016-1109 and has allowed the executive to effectively root out the rebellious elements in the armed forces behind the soldier uprisings of 2017. However, this order does not serve as an extension of the code of conduct but is aimed at enabling the Executive to deal with the instigators of the soldier mutinies of 2017 more effectively (3).

Law No. 2016-1109 cannot be considered a comprehensive code of conduct for members of the military regarding corruption risk. The two single references to conflicts of interest in the Law are unrelated to broad-based corruption risk. Therefore, it cannot serve as anti-corruption guidance.

Law No. 2016-1109 (Portant Code de la Fonction Militaire), Order No. 2013-660 (Relative à la prévention et à la lutte contre la corruption et les infractions assimilées) and Order No. 2018-515 (Portant sanctions administratives applicables aux militaires) are all readily available to military personnel. Full-text versions of all three bodies of legislation can be uploaded online through open sources (1), (2), (3). An example of the availability of information on the Code of Conduct and the penalties that can be incurred for lack of discipline is illustrated with the article in Pôle Afrique that explained how the government had passed Law No. 2016-1109 in December 2016 to contain the discontent among military ranks. The article described how Law No. 2016-1109 had replaced the previous act from 1995 in terms of the rights and obligations of members of the armed forces (4). Although there is no evidence that the Code of Conduct, in the form of Law No. 2016-1109 and the amendments in Order No. 2018-515, are “effectively distributed to all military personnel” (criteria for a score of 3), both pieces of legislation are readily available to members of the military.

The breaches of Law No. 2016-1109 are only investigated occasionally whenever they involve rebellion (mutiny) or lack of discipline among the officers. For more broad-based corruption offences contained in Order No. 2013-660 (Relative à la prévention et à la lutte contre la corruption et les infractions assimilées), it appears that enforcement is weaker, and an even lower level of investigation is applied.

Law No. 2016-1109 of February 16, 2016, was partially amended on November 5, 2018, via the unanimous adoption by the NA Commission on Security and Defence (CSD) of Order No. 2018-515 of 30 May 2018 (Portant sanctions administratives applicables aux militaires). This Order gave teeth to Law No. 2016-1109 and allowed the executive to more effectively root out the rebellious elements in the armed forces that were behind the soldier uprisings of 2017. Order No. 2018-515 served the purpose of fast-tracking the forced retirement or ousting of several military officers. Submitted for adoption in the NA by Minister of Defence Hamed Bakayoko, the Order revoked certain provisions in Law No. 2016-1109 to empower the executive to eliminate the officers accused of serious crimes. For example, Article 1 stipulates that the minister of defence can effectively punish the officers for lack of discipline (1), (2).

In terms of the enforcement of Order No. 2013-660 and the creation of the High Authority for Good Governance (HABG), the track record in the last 5 years is poor according to a June 2018 interview with Tiémoko Assale, Director of the satirical weekly L’Eléphant Déchaîné in Abidjan. In the interview, he stated that he is currently pursuing several cases of corruption, but made no references to military personnel. Assale stated:

“Since 2011, corruption and the loss of public funds have increased despite the creation of various structures such as the HABG, which are supposed to fight against these phenomena. Corruption has reached a frightening level. It is as if the ruling class had formed a sort of vicious and paralyzed circle in which everyone is bound, in the same families, parties or political alliances” (3).

Most of the general anti-corruption guidance for military personnel that is focused on bribery, gifts and hospitality, conflicts of interest and post-separation activities is provided through hands-on training (1), (2), (3).

There is a Military Code of Conduct however, the content and the Code of Conduct is not available and no guidance is given at all during training or in the units (1), (2), (3).

According to our sources, although there is a Code of Conduct, it is not available for the public, as well as not readily available for the majority of the units of the army. There is no training provided to the soldiers or officers with relevant guidance. The majority of the soldiers (not officers) are not aware of its existence (1), (2), (3).

The code of conduct is not readily available, there is no enforcement mechanism and therefore, it is not credible (1), (2), (3).

There is a Military Code of Conduct however, the content and the Code of Conduct is not available and no guidance is given at all during training or in the units (1), (2), (3).

There is a Code of ethics for military personnel. It is not made publicly available (1), (2).

The Ghanaian Army, Air Force, and Navy have a code of conduct and take classes on it, but it is not clear whether they receive a copy of the code (1). Neither the MOD nor the GAF (on their websites and their other channels of communications) have published the Code of Ethics.

Investigations on breaches of the code of conduct are reported on in the media. For instance, in October 2016, a soldier was sanctioned upon actions against the code of conduct (1). “The army has a firmly established ethical and moral code based on the laws and institutions of the State of Ghana, the traditions of the Ghanaian people and democratic principles” (2). The military police are committed to enforcing charges of any misconduct and inappropriate behaviour. The armed forces also have policies to help military personnel during combat or noncombatants, for instance, “weapons and force can only be used for the purpose of a military operation and not to harm human beings who are non-combatants or who are prisoners of war” (2).

However, since the code is not available to the public it is not possible to assess the quality and extent of these investigations and their enforcement.

The Ghanaian Army, Air Force, and Navy have a code of conduct and take classes on it, but it is not clear whether they receive a copy of the code (1).

A military-specific code of conduct for the year 2018 was published by the Integrity Commission, “The Code of Conduct for the Military and Internal Security Forces, No. 1 (1), as an extension of the Integrity Commission Law No. 30 of the year 2011. The Code consists of 26 provisions, some of which mirror Iraq’s constitutional laws such as 9B/C, which prohibits the formulations of state militias outside of the state’s legal framework and their involvement in politics. While it stresses principles of loyalty towards thy nation, the code’s legal provisions appear vague, which leaves them open to individual interpretation. Overall, it fails to specifically address guidance concerning bribery, gifts or conflict of interest. On the contrary, Iraq’s 1969 Penal Code (2) remains the country’s main source of the anti-bribery legislature.

Iraq’s Code of Conduct for military personnel (1) is available for public viewing on the Integrity Commissions website, but little evidence exists to imply its wide dissemination and promotion within Iraq’s security and defence institutions.

A retired military officer (1) told Transparency International that the unrestricted growth of paramilitaries has undermined the enforceability of the code’s provisions; “exacerbated” the source said, in the absence of guideline implementation, which he, among other analysts, argue has facilitated the growth of parallel security structure outside legislative oversight, in violation of provision ’19’ of the code.

There is no evidence that training is provided to military personnel on the code of conduct.

In 2017, the Jordanian Armed Forces and the intelligence agency announced the launch of its Code of Conduct and the Ethics of Senior Officers [1]. However, the Code of Conduct is not available online or to the public. In the Code of Conduct, according to an officer, it gives guidance on bribery, corruption, conflict of interests and power abuse [2,3]. Media reporting around the Code of Conduct mentions that it includes regulations on bribery, gifts and hospitality, and conflicts of interest [4]. The Armed Forces Radio Station, Jaysh FM, produced a video about the Code of Conduct, and launched this on its YouTube channel. The video includes some information about the Code of Conduct [5], however, it is to a great extent a combination of Law No. 35 of the year 1966, Officers Service Law of the Armed Forces, issued in accordance with Article 126 of the Jordanian Constitution [6], and the Military Penal Code [7]. There is a Code of Conduct, but its content is largely unknown.

The Jordanian Armed Forces Code of Conduct and the Ethics of Senior Officers is recent and has only been in place since 2017 [1, 2]. The Code of Conduct is not available online or to the public. As it is recent, the armed forces and the intelligence agency made tremendous efforts and offered some training sessions for officers on the Code of Conduct. Besides that, the armed forces political division provides lectures to many units to raise awareness of the Code of Conduct [3,4].

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable because the Jordanian Armed Forces Code of Conduct and the Ethics of Senior Officers is recent and has only been in place for a year [1, 2]. As the Code of Conduct only recently became practice, assessing its enforcement is not feasible. There are ongoing efforts to enforce it, but no information as to whether there is any progress [3,4].

The Jordanian Armed Forces Code of Conduct and the Ethics of Senior Officers is recent and has only been in place since 2017 [1, 2]. The armed forces and the intelligence agency have made efforts to hold training sessions for officers on the code of conduct. Besides that, the armed forces political division provided/ provides lectures on many units to raise awareness of the personnel on the code of conduct [3,4].

There is a Code of Conduct for all military personnel, but its content has never been made available to the public, state auditors said (1, 2 and 3). As such, its contents are largely unknown. With regards to related materials on the topic of bribery, hospitality and post-separation activities, Article 14 of the military law provides guidance (4). The Article does not explicitly address bribery, gifts, hospitality and conflict of interest, but it does include a broad clause which forbids all officers from receiving any money in exchange for any service, and getting involved in business. It also outlaws sharing any information about the military even after leaving it.

As for conflict of interests, the military is one of the institutions to which Kuwait’s conflict of interest act, which was passed in March 2018, applies (5). Not much can be said about its efficacy at the moment since it has not been enforced yet, according to officials (1, 2 and 3)

The code is not available to the public, but it is available to all military personnel. The above laws, which contain many important rules of relevance, are available to the public. There is a lack of information about guidance programs, however (1,2,3,4)

The code is generally not used since most corrupt practices are never stopped and those behind them are never punished, officials and activists said (1,2,3,4,5).

There is no evidence that training is provided to military personnel on the code of conduct.

A booklet laying out the rules and principles of the LAF is given to military personnel. However, it is largely unknown because it is not publicized (1). The LAF launched, in January 2019, a Code of Conduct for Human Rights that ensures the LAF’s commitment to human rights and highlights the fundamental principles for the protection of civilians and ensuring peace (2). The 2019 code of conduct is available to all military personnel, stating in the introduction that it resembles SOPs for military personnel to abide by – having integrity and transparency in its vision. In the law enforcement section, article H states that “no bribe or gift should be accepted, nor any corrupt action”, article I includes “Any post usage for personal benefit is forbidden”, while article J forces the military personnel to “report to leaders any illegal action” (3).

There is a booklet given by the LAF to all military personnel but is not available to the public (1).

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable, as the booklet given to military personnel is not publically available – hence its enforcement is difficult to assess (1). However, according to DoO, the LAF is keen on military discipline, the enforcement of its rules, and having an adequate level of morale (2).

As previously indicated, the booklet is not publicized. Hence, it is impossible to know if training is part of the document (1). However, according to the DoO, anti-corruption and best-practices are integrated into the internal laws and rules of the LAF (2).

There is a Code of conduct for all Malian military and civilian personnel that addresses ethical issues and behaviour. It is separated into four parts:
– Duties of the Armed Forces and Security Towards The State
– Relations between the Armed and Security Forces and Civilians
– Relations between the Armed Forces and Security Forces
– Armed and Security Forces and Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law
It was developed in 1997 with the UNDP and was disseminated in booklet form by the Malian government.¹ It is available online through third parties.³ It does not, however, refer to bribery, gifts and hospitality, conflicts of interest, or post-separation activities. The Code does not refer to any formal oversight mechanism and Bryden comments that the code is largely ineffective.² Moreover, several articles note that there is a need to adopt a new code of ethics and compliance within the armed forces if the government is to have any hope of eradicating corruption and other abuses:⁵ ⁶ ⁷ “To do this, we will need a Code of military ethics created through the meeting of the Minister of Defence, the General Chief of Staff, different unit chiefs and the soldiers”.
However, standards of conduct related to bribery and corruption are established in legislation. The Penal Code specifically outlaws corruption and acts of bribery for all public servants, including military personnel. Article 121 states that “Anyone who, in either the performance or the obtaining of an act or a benefit or favour, uses violence or threats, promises, offers, gifts or presents, or acts tending to corruption will be subject to the measures included in article 130, ‘five to ten years’ imprisonment and a fine of twice the value of approved promises or things received or requested, without that fine be less than 100,000 francs”.⁴

The Code of Conduct is not made readily available to the public. It is available online, albeit via an obscure third-party website.¹ There is clear evidence showing that members of the armed forces receive specific training modules dedicated to the existing Code of Conduct.² A defence attaché working at a foreign embassy in Bamako told the assessor: “I do not know if the individual soldier gets a card with the code of conduct issued, but I know that during basic training, they have to learn the code of conduct by heart”.³ The source added that copies of the Code of Conduct are displayed in prominent locations at military bases where soldiers will typically gather or pass through, such as the guardroom or the mess area.³

Grave violations of the Code of Ethics and the Geneva Convention by the state armed forces are widespread and are rarely investigated by the authorities. Human Rights Watch states that “since late 2016, Malian forces have committed extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, torture, and arbitrary arrests against men accused of supporting Islamist armed groups”.¹
Human Rights Watch documented three mass graves believed to contain the remains of at least 14 men executed after being detained by Malian soldiers. “On several occasions, Malian forces severely beat, burned, and threatened dozens of men accused of supporting Islamist armed groups. Human Rights Watch also documented 27 cases of enforced disappearance, in which the Malian government provided families no information on missing relatives who had been detained”.¹
HRW notes that “domestic and international human rights groups, including Human Rights Watch, have consistently raised their concerns with the Malian government through letters, reports, and meetings with high-level government officials. The media has also reported on some of these cases. Nevertheless, neither the military nor civilian justice systems have made a serious effort to investigate these alleged abuses and hold the responsible soldiers and officers to account”.¹
Similarly, Amnesty International reports that “according to a report of the UN Secretary-General in 2016, Malian security forces and UN peacekeepers used excessive force and were accused of more than 37 instances of killings, summary executions or enforced disappearances in 2016. As of June 2017, the UN had reported four extrajudicial executions, one case of enforced disappearance, and seven cases of ill-treatment”.² Amnesty urges the Malian authorities to “carry out prompt, thorough, independent and impartial investigations into all allegations of extrajudicial executions, enforced disappearance or any other crime under international law”.²
According to the US Department of State, in 2017, “officials frequently engaged in corrupt practices with impunity”.³ For instance, “officials, police, and gendarmes frequently extorted bribes. There were reports of uniformed police or individuals dressed as police directing stopped motorists to drive to dark and isolated locations where they robbed the victims”.³
A defence attaché working at a foreign embassy in Bamako confirmed that there is a military judicial system.⁴ The source said he had seen soldiers arrested and tried for breaking the code of conduct, with cases involving theft, robbery and murder. But he said he had not come across any cases of corruption being tried.⁴ In any case, he noted that results of such investigations are rarely made public, raising questions about whether offenders have been sanctioned or not.⁴ From the above evidence, it is unclear whether the Code of Conduct is credible and whether, when breaches occur, it is effectively used or enforced.

The Code of Conduct may not be readily available to all military personnel, but there is evidence that guidance is provided through training (1), (2).

The general conduct of military personnel is detailed in two documents: the Regulations on General Discipline of the Royal Armed Forces and the Military Justice Code (1)(2).

However, neither of them covers conduct with respect to corruption, even though they provide a detailed account of the behaviour military personnel should observe before, during and after operations (1)(2).

In the absence of elements referring to the conduct of military personnel with respect to corruption in these documents, the assessor looked for similar elements in other documents and sources, such as the government’s website, NGO reports and the anti-corruption government platform (3)(4)(5).

However none of them mentioned conduct with respect to corruption.

This lack of evidence of a clear, proper and published code of conduct with respect to corruption indicates a lack of transparency.

Since Morocco has no code of conduct, this sub-indicator is marked Not Applicable.

Since Morocco has no code of conduct, this sub-indicator is marked Not Applicable.

Since Morocco has no code of conduct, this sub-indicator is marked Not Applicable.

There is no actual code of conduct for all military personnel. Nigerien military personnel are provided with an instruction manual on international humanitarian law that was presented by the ICRC to the defence minister in March 2015. The ICRC Instruction Manual (see 46B) is an ethics code for the military establishment. Even if the manual does not directly address corruption and bribery, according to the Nigerien Defence Minister at the time, Mr. Karidjo Mahamadou, the manual is important to help soldiers to “behave in a way respectful of the rules and values which form the basis of our republican army.” (2) Moreover, it is not the legal equivalent of the Military Code of 2003. In general terms, it states that officers found guilty of corruption, theft or other general crimes can be dismissed, demoted or imprisoned. As a Code of Conduct, the guidance provided in the Military Code lacks clarity and specificity (Livre III, Des peines applicables par les jurisdictions militaries et infractions militaires).

The ICRC Instruction Manual (see 46A) is an ethics code for the military establishment. According to the ICRC Instruction Manual for Niger’s Ministry of Defence (25 March 2015): “Since 2003 the ICRC has been helping Niger’s forces in their efforts to promote humanitarian law, include its rules in their training and military doctrine, and incorporate it into the process of planning and carrying out operations. In July 2012, a joint order was issued by the Defence and Interior Ministries making it compulsory to teach this law as part of military training.” (1)

Breaches of the Military Code of 2003 are only occasionally investigated. The Military Code of 2003 does contain enforcement provisions in Articles 47 and 48:

Art. 47 – Le ministre chargé de la défense nationale procède ou fait procéder à tous les actes nécessaires à la recherche et à la poursuite des infractions relevant de la compétence de la juridiction militaire…

(“The Minister of Defence shall carry out or have carried out all actions necessary to the investigation and prosecution of military offences…”)
(Consultant translation French to English)

Art. 48 – Le chef d’État major des armées, le haut commandant de la Gendarmerie nationale, les chef d’Etat-major des armées de terre…peuvent en cas de crime ou délit flagrant, faire personnellement, tous les actes nécessaires à l’effet de constater les infractions relevant de la juridiction militaire commises à l’intérieur des établissements militaires.

(“In the event of serious crimes or cases of flagrante delicto, the Army Chief of Staff, the High Commander of the National Gendarmerie, the Territorial Army Chiefs of Staff … can personally carry out all acts necessary for the effect of noting military offences committed within military establishments.”)
(Consultant translation French to English)

According to an interviewee, cases of possible breaches of the Military Penal Code are investigated through established procedures (1). The Penal Code provides for a judiciary military police that reports to the Ministry of Defence (Article 46). They are charged with finding and following up all infringements of the law (Article 47) at all levels of armed forces (Article 48) (2). However, the assessor was not provided with any statistical information regarding the numbers of identified, investigated and prosecuted cases that involved the military in the last three years. According to an interviewee, direct cases of corruption are almost exceptional (1).

Furthermore, according to an interviewee, breaches of international humanitarian law could have occurred, especially during the first half of 2018 (3), but only a neutral investigation could establish facts and evidence, should the breaches have really taken place.
Finally, it should be noted that some cases involving military are made public through international reports and are investigated. For example, the UN investigations determined that Nigerien police forces serving in the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti sexually exploited an adult in February. Another investigation determined that Nigerien military forces serving in the UN operation in Cote d’Ivoire sexually exploited two adults in September 2015. Investigations continued into additional incidents involving Nigerien forces in Cote d’Ivoire and the Central African Republic. The government removed the concerned peacekeepers from UN peacekeeping missions and began investigations (4).

The ICRC Instruction Manual (see 46B) is an ethics code for the military establishment. According to the ICRC Instruction Manual for Niger’s Ministry of Defence (25 March 2015): “Since 2003 the ICRC has been helping Niger’s forces in their efforts to promote humanitarian law, include its rules in their training and military doctrine, and incorporate it into the process of planning and carrying out operations. In July 2012, a joint order was issued by the Defence and Interior Ministries making it compulsory to teach this law as part of military training.” (1)

The General Code of Conduct in the Fifth Schedule of the 1999 Constitution applies to all Public Officers, including the military. It prohibits accepting bribery and benefits of any kind, accepting any gifts or benefits from commercial firms, business enterprises or persons who have contracts with the government, except gifts from family as custom demands. Conflicts of interests are not mentioned (1).

The military also has its own specific Code of Conduct under Section 103 of the Armed Forces Act, which prohibits bribery and gifts but fails to apply to post-separation activities. The Code of Conduct Bureau also plays a role with the declaration of assets by public officials which includes military personnel. There is a residual jurisdiction under section 103 of the Armed Forces Act 2004 (2), (3).

The Code of Conduct is distributed to all service personnel. However, the general public is not familiar with its contents (1).

Following the inauguration of the Buhari administration, there was the prosecution of high-ranking officers for various infractions of the code of conduct. This initial activity has; however, not been sustained (1).

There is no evidence to show that guidance is provided through training (1).

There is a military code of conduct; however, it is not widely known to the different units and parts of the military (1), (2). The legislation mentioned in sub-indicator 44, such as anti-bribery (RD 120/2004), and anti-corruption legislation (RD 12/2011) combats conflicts of interest and gifts, no exceptions for military personnel are stated in this legislation suggesting it extends to military personnel (3). No code of conduct was found on the armed forces or the Ministry of Defence websites (4), (5).

Despite the fact there is a code of conduct, it is not readily available for all soldiers and across all units. It also does not include guidance around bribery, gifts and hospitality, conflicts of interest, and post-separation activities (1), (2).

As the code of conduct is not available, enforced and followed up, it lacks credibility and not taken seriously by the commanders and officers (1), (2).

There is little to no guidance during training, and ad hoc guidance is dependent on commanders’ preferences. There is no further data on how guidance would be implemented or if it is part of other training packages, e.g., theory, physical trianings, etc. (1), (2).

There is a Code of Conduct. However, its guidance is inadequate and lacks clarity. The Code of Conduct is published by military intelligence, which is responsible for the monitoring and prosecution of military personnel. The Code of Conduct does not explicitly include bribery and conflicts of interests (1).

The code of conduct may not be readily available to all military personnel, despite being available publicly on the military intelligence’s website (1). Guidance is provided through training in all units and offices. The Code of Conduct is given to new soldiers at the time of inscription, but then rarely shared with higher rank officers (2).

Breaches of the Code of Conduct are investigated either by the respective units or by military intelligence members. However, these investigations are usually superficial and rarely result in legal consequences (1), (2), (3), (4).

In some cases, some guidance is provided during military rehabilitation courses, which is rare, happening every four years for officers (1).

Although there are no traces of a military code of conduct within the armed forces of Qatar, our sources confirm that there is one available internally. This code of conduct is similar to ACTA but has been adapted to the defence and military sector. [1,2]

The code of conduct is not available publicly, and it can be hard to access it in the units. However, if one asks for the “ethical guidance unit,” he could be sent a copy. [1,2]

There could be cases of breaching the code of conduct, but they are rarely investigated, and mostly settled in an informal way within the different units. [1] Commanders do not take the code of conduct to be law. Grave breaches may lead to investigations (but our sources say this has never happened). [2]

Ad hoc guidance may be provided to military personnel by local experts or their commanding officers. There is a little guidance provided to the soldiers in general [1,2].

According to our sources, Saudi Arabia does have a Code of Conduct for civilian and military personnel that prohibits bribery, the acceptance of gifts and hospitality; it focuses on ethical issues within the military service. The code of conduct, however, is not available in all units and lacks clarity, especially for soldiers in the fields (1), (2), (3).

According to our sources, the Code of Conduct is not always available, especially in rural areas and units outside headquarters and the main offices (1), (2). In August 2018, Nazaha published a survey stating that 69% of the country’s public sector employees did not have access to the Code of Conduct for public service within their government agencies. This survey was based on a random sample of approximately 4,700 employees across the country, with 63% of those surveyed stating that the government agency at which they were employed did not publish the relevant Code of Conduct on its website (3). It was not specified whether this included military personnel. It is unclear the extent to which the government makes efforts to ensure the Code of Conduct is available to all military personnel, nor is there any evidence of training provided in this regard.

According to our sources, the Code of Conduct is not credible, the majority of personnel do not care about it, and it has no enforcing mechanism, which allows personnel to ignore it (1), (2). There is no evidence in the public domain indicating that breaches of the Code of Conduct have been investigated by Saudi authorities or that punitive measures have been enforced based on this code. In November 2017, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman ordered the arrest of a large number of individuals on corruption charges, including the then head of the Saudi Arabian National Guard, Miteb bin Abdullah. Charges against Miteb included embezzlement and awarding military contracts to his firms (3). However, there are few details surrounding the nature of the investigation into Miteb bin Abdullah or other government officials arrested as part of this sweep; they have largely been characterized in the international press and rights groups as arbitrary and void of due process (4).

It is unclear the extent to which the government makes efforts to ensure the Code of Conduct is available to all military personnel, nor is there any evidence of training provided in this regard [1,2,3].

According to our sources, there is a Code of Conduct for the military which is derived from the general Code of Conduct of the State.(1) This Code of Conduct is not comprehensive and lacks clarity, however, it covers many aspects and events in general terms (2,3).

The Code of Conduct for the military is available in all units and readily available for all within their training period. The availability of the Code of Conduct depends on the geographical place of the units. For example it is readily available within central commands and Headquarters, but not in far away units on the borders (1,2).

According to our sources, breaches of the Code of Conduct are occasionally investigated, but investigation is superficial and usually does not lead to sanctions if the breach is not serious (1,2). Breaches to the Code of Conduct should be investigated and sanctioned as a disciplinary or criminal matter. All breaches of this code are addressed by a disciplinary conviction and when the disciplinary breach is classified as a crime it will be addressed by the code of Military Justice (3).

According to our sources, periodic ad hoc guidance may be provided to military personnel by commanding officers(1).

There is a clear and well-defined code of conduct within the UAE armed forces. This code of conduct is simple and available in the majority of units. Federal Laws No. 6 and 7 of 2004, which specifically apply to the Armed Forces, clearly define bribery and prohibit corruption (1). For instance, Article 47 of the law prohibits an officer from accepting gifts of any sort whatsoever, whether directly or indirectly. There are also prohibitions related to the submission of bids to armed forces’ tenders by members of the armed forces, the awarding of contracts to members of the armed forces and the purchasing of items from members of the armed forces (2). However, no code of conduct is attached to these federal laws, and no evidence of any military codes of conduct are available online. It is important to note here that in spite of the lack of a code of conduct, breaches of federal laws prompt sanctions in relation to bribery and gifts in specific (3), (4).

There is a military code of conduct; however, it is not available for all military personnel and not available for the public at all. It exists in the offices, but it is not available to soldiers deployed on the ground (1), (2).

The code of conduct is not enforced and can be thought of as a superficial code based on information of our sources. They are not enforced, and there is no instiution to follow up and sanction the breaches in the code of conduct (1), (2).

There is no guidance provided during the training period or ad hoc training for middle/ senior officers (1).

Country Sort by Country 46a. Code of conduct Sort By Subindicator 46b. Transparency Sort By Subindicator 46c. Enforcement Sort By Subindicator 46d. Training Sort By Subindicator
Algeria 0 / 100 NA NA NA
Angola 0 / 100 NA NA NA
Burkina Faso 25 / 100 25 / 100 50 / 100 100 / 100
Cameroon 25 / 100 25 / 100 25 / 100 0 / 100
Cote d'Ivoire 50 / 100 50 / 100 25 / 100 50 / 100
Egypt 25 / 100 25 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Ghana 25 / 100 25 / 100 50 / 100 100 / 100
Iraq 25 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Jordan 25 / 100 50 / 100 NA 50 / 100
Kuwait 25 / 100 75 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Lebanon 75 / 100 75 / 100 NA 0 / 100
Mali 50 / 100 50 / 100 0 / 100 100 / 100
Morocco 0 / 100 NA NA NA
Niger 25 / 100 50 / 100 25 / 100 100 / 100
Nigeria 50 / 100 75 / 100 25 / 100 0 / 100
Oman 25 / 100 25 / 100 0 / 100 25 / 100
Palestine 25 / 100 50 / 100 50 / 100 25 / 100
Qatar 25 / 100 25 / 100 25 / 100 25 / 100
Saudi Arabia 50 / 100 25 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Tunisia 50 / 100 75 / 100 50 / 100 25 / 100
United Arab Emirates 75 / 100 25 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100

With thanks for support from the UK Department for International Development and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs who have contributed to the Government Defence Integrity Index.

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