Are procurement requirements derived from a national defence and security strategy, and are procurement decisions well-audited? Are defence purchases based on clearly identified and quantified requirements?
63a. Procurement requirements
Burkina Faso score: 25/100
It is impossible to assess whether procurement requirements derive from a national defence and security strategy, even if a national strategy exists. There is no formal procedure in place for defining purchase requirements. Or the defence strategy may be secret so it is impossible to verify how procurement requirements are derived.
Procurement requirements are in theory formally derived from a national defence and security strategy. The strategy is likely to be weak, vague or insufficient to derive procurement requirements.
Procurement requirements are in part derived from a national defence and security strategy. If the strategy is weak, vague or not sufficient to derive procurement requirements, work to quantify the need for significant purchases is occasionally conducted.
Procurement requirements are derived from a national defence and security strategy, but there may be occasions where procurements are not justified based on the national strategy.
Procurement requirements are derived from a national defence and security strategy, and there is logical flow down from strategy to individual procurement with no exceptions.
There is very little evidence on if defence procurement requirements derive from a national defence and security strategy. However, according to the provisions of Article 19 of the Law No. 039 (2016), “the nature and scope of the items to purchase are determined with precision by the contracting authorities prior to launching any call for an opened competition of bids, or any negotiation process in the case of a direct public contract, at the beginning of each budget year, through an annual procurement and contracting plan” (1). It can be inferred that the identification of nature and the scope of the defence items to be purchased is made based on the content of the existing national defence and security strategy of Burkina Faso. For example, DCAF (2010), declares that the “focus of the current defence strategy, adopted by Decree No. 146 (2004), is internal security, particularly civil defence: protection of the population and goods, maintaining law and order, and the preservation of a continuity of government’s action” (P7) (3).
1. “Law N° 039 – On the general regulation of the public order,” (2016), https://www.assembleenationale.bf/IMG/pdf/loi_039_portant_commande_publique.pdf.
2. “Decree N° 0049 On the procedure for public procurement and contracting, execution and resolution,” (2017), https://www.droit-afrique.com/uploads/Burkina-Decret-2017-51-maitrise-ouvrage-deleguee.pdf.
3. “Une perspective de politique de sécurité nationale: Burkina Faso,” Génève: DCAF, 2010, http://www.dcaf-tunisie.org//adminDcaf/upload/ejournal/documentfr_10093.pdf.
Burkina Faso score: 0/100
There is no scrutiny of actual purchases.
Scrutiny is occasionally conducted by a number of legally or constitutionally mandated oversight mechanisms (e.g. the parliamentary oversight committee, the inspector general, or the national audit office) to confirm that procurement is done in line with national security strategy or that work is undertaken to quantify the need for purchases.
There is active scrutiny conducted by a number of legally or constitutionally mandated oversight mechanisms (e.g. the parliamentary oversight committee, the inspector general, or the national audit office) to confirm that procurement is in line with national security strategy or that work is undertaken to quantify the need for purchases.
There is no evidence that oversight institutions perform any scrutiny of the defence sector, as to whether its procurement requirements derive from the existing defence and security strategy. It is difficult to access to government information in general, and to that of the defence ministry, in particular (2). Besides, some items covered by “defence secret”, mentioned by Article 6 (1) of the Law No. 039, makes it difficult for the defence institutions to comply with the publicity requirement of Article 21 of the Law No. 039, and yet, for oversight institutions to scrutinize their purchase (1). This would also mean that a large number of defence purchases just escape from scrutinity. Additionally, oversight institutions (Parliament, Supreme Audit Institution, ASCE-LC and ARMP) are weak (3), (4)
1. “Burkina Faso Country Report,” GAN Institute, 2018, https://www.business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/burkina-faso.
2. “Law N° 039 – On the general regulation of the public order,” (2016), https://www.assembleenationale.bf/IMG/pdf/loi_039_portant_commande_publique.pdf.
3. BTI 2018: Burkina Faso Country Report,” Transformation Index BTI, https://www.bti-project.org/en/reports/country-reports/detail/itc/bfa/.
4. Jean-Pierre Bayala, “Chapter 3: Burkina Faso” in Security Sector Governance in Francophone West Africa: Realities and Oppotunities, eds. Alan Bryden and Boubacar N’Diaye, (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2011), https://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/BrydenN%E2%80%99DiayeENGLISH.pdf.
Burkina Faso score: 0/100
Purchases often are outside of the national strategy and appear to be opportunistic in nature.
The Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces base at least their major purchases on the clearly identified requirements, but there are opportunistic and unplanned purchases.
The Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces systematically base all purchases on clearly identified and quantified requirements.
Purchases are made outside the national strategy. For example, in May 2018, the government purchased 59 vehicles (1), which were not planned in the annual budget. The announcement of the purchase resulted in huge debates within the political arena, civil society, and the media, with some considering the acquisition as opportunistic. Many have argued that the country faces lots of economic, social and security challenges that need to be addressed instead of providing luxuries to government members (2). According to the Executive Secretary of the National Anti-Corruption Network (REN-LAC), the military always purchases items outside of the national strategy. “The military does not have any purchase policy or plan, and there is not an internal newspaper for the recording of the purchases they make either” (3).
1. Gaspard Bayala, “Nouveaux véhicules du gouvernement: ’Une nécessité et non un luxe,” Burkinaonline, May 2018, http://www.burkinaonline.com/wp/nouveaux-vehicules-du-gouvernement-une-necessite-et-non-un-luxe/.
2. “Nouvelles voitures de fonction pour ministres et présidents d’institutions: des dépenses de prestige inopportunes et choquantes!,” NetAfrique, May 2018, http://netafrique.net/nouvelles-voitures-de-fonction-pour-ministres-et-presidents-dinstitutions-des-depenses-de-prestige-inopportunes-et-choquantes/.
3. Executive Secretary of the National Anti-Corruption Network (REN-LAC), interview with author, June 20, 2018.
Compare scores by country
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|Country||63a. Procurement requirements||63b. Scrutiny||63c. Purchases|
|Algeria||0 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Angola||25 / 100||0 / 100||50 / 100|
|Burkina Faso||25 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Cameroon||0 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Cote d'Ivoire||0 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Egypt||0 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Ghana||0 / 100||50 / 100||0 / 100|
|Jordan||0 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Kuwait||25 / 100||50 / 100||50 / 100|
|Lebanon||25 / 100||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Mali||0 / 100||50 / 100||0 / 100|
|Morocco||0 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Niger||0 / 100||0 / 100||50 / 100|
|Nigeria||0 / 100||50 / 100||0 / 100|
|Oman||0 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Palestine||25 / 100||50 / 100||50 / 100|
|Qatar||0 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Saudi Arabia||0 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Tunisia||0 / 100||50 / 100||50 / 100|
|United Arab Emirates||25 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|