Is defence procurement generally conducted as open competition or is there a significant element of single-sourcing (that is, without competition)?
64a. Open competition
Burkina Faso score: 0/100
The majority of defence procurements are not conducted as an open competition.
Less than half (30-50%) of defence procurements are conducted as open competition. A majority of procurements are either restricted competition (i.e. 2-3 suppliers invited to compete) or single-sourced.
Most (50%+) defence procurements are conducted as an open competition, though a significant percentage of the value of contract (30% to 50%) are single-sourced.
The majority (70%+) of defence procurements are conducted as an open competition, though a significant minority of the value of contracts (10% to 30%) are single-sourced.
The vast majority (90%+) of defence procurements are conducted as an open competition, except in clearly defined and limited circumstances. There is a relatively small component (less than 10%) of single-sourcing.
According to Article 23 (1) of Law No. 039, “public contracts on works, supplies, usual services, and delegations of public services, are made after a call for open competition or exceptionally, after a restricted competition, or through direct arrangement.” However, Article 6 (1) of the same law, focusing on the purchase of items covered by the so-called ‘defence secret’, constitutes a huge exception to the requirements of Article 23 (opened competition, restricted competition, or arrangement ) (1). Hence, the defence procurement process is not opened at all for secret defence items. Unfortunately, items not covered by defence secret rarely go through an open competition. According to Dr. Wetta Claude, Executive Secretary of the REN-LAC, “defence procurement usually results in a weak or limited competition. The military just make calls for restricted competition. They do not make any calls for open competitions” (2). Majeed and MacDonald, state that “one of the key reasons for corruption in the case of the military procurement is the lack of competition” (3).
11. “Law N° 039 – On the general regulation of the public order,” (2016), https://www.assembleenationale.bf/IMG/pdf/loi_039_portant_commande_publique.pdf.
2. Executive Secretary of the National Anti-Corruption Network (REN-LAC), interview with author, June 20, 2018.
3. Muhammad Tariq Majeed and Ronald MacDonald, “Corruption and the Military in Politic: Theory and Evidence from around the World,” University of Glasgow (University of Glasgow), s.d. https://www.gla.ac.uk/media/media_184189_en.pdf.
64b. Scrutiny of single/restricted competition procedures
Burkina Faso score: 25/100
Oversight agencies have no powers to question single/sole or restricted competition procedures.
Oversight agencies have some powers to question single/sole/restricted competition procedure selected or purchase and occasionally do so.
Oversight agencies have powers to question the competition procedure selected and actively do so in a number of cases.
All single/sole source and restricted competition procedure contracts are justified to external scrutiny who have powers to question the competition procedure selected.
All single source and restricted competition procedure contracts must be justified and subject to external scrutiny (such as parliament or the external audit office), who have the power to reject the competition procedure selected.
In Burkina Faso, Articles 84 and 127 of the Constitution give power to both the Parliament and the Supreme Audit Institution, to scrutinize defence activities, including single or restricted competition procedures for the purchase of defence items (1). The ASCE-LC also has similar powers. The scrutiny of single or restricted competition procedures is highly important, as they are more susceptible to corruption. In this regard, Pyman, Wilson and Scott (2009) state that, “if [its] known that single-source contracts are part of the usual defence environment and will not be scrutinized, companies can see an inducement to cut off the risk of losing a bit by influencing and/or bribing key officials to obtain a non-competitive contract” (2). Unfortunately, the scrutiny of single/sole/ restricted competition procedure undertaken by oversight institutions remains very weak (4), (5) without mentioning the fact that access to government information is difficult (3). Overtime these undermine oversight of defence competition procedures for the purchase of defence items. Single source procurement has become a serious concern for many, as it brings up issues of transparency, democratic oversight, and corruption risks (2). Pyman, Wilson and Scott (2009) write, ” the tenders for even routine items like uniforms and food are often severely manipulated and usually awarded to companies which are non-competitive in order to create payoffs for military officials” (2). Oversight institutions are having a hard time scrutinizing restricted competitions in the defence sector.
1. Constitution of Burkina Faso (1991), https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Burkina_Faso_2012.pdf?lang=en.
2. Mark Pyman, Regina Wilson, and Dominic Scott, “The Extent of Single Sourcing in Defence Procurement and its relevance as a corruption risk: A first look,” Defence and Peace Economics 20, N° 3 (2009): 215–232, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10242690802016506.
3. “Burkina Faso Country Report,” GAN Institute, 2018, https://www.business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/burkina-faso.
4. “BTI 2018: Burkina Faso Country Report,” Transformation Index BTI, https://www.bti-project.org/en/reports/country-reports/detail/itc/bfa/.
5. Jean-Pierre Bayala, “Chapter 3: Burkina Faso” in Security Sector Governance in Francophone West Africa: Realities and Oppotunities, eds. Alan Bryden and Boubacar N’Diaye, (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2011), https://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/BrydenN%E2%80%99DiayeENGLISH.pdf.
Compare scores by country
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|Country||64a. Open competition||64b. Scrutiny of single/restricted competition procedures|
|Algeria||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Angola||0 / 100||25 / 100|
|Burkina Faso||0 / 100||25 / 100|
|Cameroon||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Cote d'Ivoire||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Egypt||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Ghana||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Jordan||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Kuwait||0 / 100||25 / 100|
|Lebanon||NEI||25 / 100|
|Mali||25 / 100||25 / 100|
|Morocco||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Niger||25 / 100||0 / 100|
|Nigeria||NEI||0 / 100|
|Oman||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Palestine||75 / 100||25 / 100|
|Qatar||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Saudi Arabia||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Tunisia||0 / 100||25 / 100|
|United Arab Emirates||0 / 100||0 / 100|