Q71.

How does the government monitor offset contracts?

71a. Policies & procedures

Score

SCORE: 0/100

Assessor Explanation

Assessor Sources

71b. Transparency

Score

SCORE: 0/100

Assessor Explanation

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71c. Monitoring

Score

SCORE: 0/100

Assessor Explanation

Assessor Sources

71d. Enforcement

Score

SCORE: 0/100

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As answered in question 70, no evidence was found that the country has specific regulations for offset contracts. Reports published before 2016 stated that Algeria does not have a specific offset policy (1), (2). A review of laws and regulation published in the Official Gazette showed no evidence that Algeria has passed a policy during the last years (3). Also, the Law of Public Procurement of 2016 does not specify any offset policy for the defence and security sector (4).

As answered in question 70, no evidence was found that the country has specific regulations for offset contracts. Reports published before 2016 stated that Algeria does not have a specific offset policy (1), (2). A review of laws and regulation published in the Official Gazette showed no evidence that Algeria has passed a policy during the last years (3). Also, the Law of Public Procurement of 2016 does not specify any offset policy for the defence and security sector (4).

As answered in question 70, no evidence was found that the country has specific regulations for offset contracts. Reports published before 2016 stated that Algeria does not have a specific offset policy (1), (2). A review of laws and regulation published in the Official Gazette showed no evidence that Algeria has passed a policy during the last years (3). Also, the Law of Public Procurement of 2016 does not specify any offset policy for the defence and security sector (4).

As answered in question 70, no evidence was found that the country has specific regulations for offset contracts. Reports published before 2016 stated that Algeria does not have a specific offset policy (1), (2). A review of laws and regulation published in the Official Gazette showed no evidence that Algeria has passed a policy during the last years (3). Also, the Law of Public Procurement of 2016 does not specify any offset policy for the defence and security sector (4).

Overall supervision is conducted by the National Public Procurement Service (SNCP) of the Finance Ministry, which was set up in 2015. The offset contracts law lays out standards of delivery and penalties (Art. 21-25) (1), (2). However, there is no public knowledge of how these procedures have been handled.

The rules of publication for offset contracts are the same as for public contracts, depending on the method applied (1). So far there is no public record of any contract with an offset arrangement.

There is no evidence to show that procurement offices are conducting reporting and delivery obligations at all.

There is no evidence to show that breaches of contract are acted upon.

While the United State Department of State confirms the existence of offset contracts in Burkina Faso, the practice remains informal. The procurement legislation does not reference offset contracts, and there are no existing policies or procedures that clearly outline the performance, reporting and delivery of obligations in offset contracts. Burkina Faso imports arms and a great part of its military equipment. The purchase of these items inevitably creates obligations and rights on both bidders/contractors and contracting country. This is where offset contracts are likely to be generated. Unfortunately, no information with regards to what extent the government manages offset contracts is available (1), (2), (3).

In absence of any law, policy or procedure applying to offset contracts, the government of Burkina Faso does not reveal information about offset contracts, although it continues to encourage foreign investments. The 2013 Investment Climate Statement of the US Department of State, states that “the Government of Burkina Faso (GOBF) wishes to attract more foreign direct investment (FDI) and has been implementing, over the years, reforms to make Burkina Faso more attractive to international investors” (1). It appears that the government of Burkina Faso does not look much what is happening with offset contracts. Since the government does not share much information, the rights and obligations pertaining to offset contracts are not made public (2), (3), which makes it difficult to assess their overall performance.

Again, there is not a legislation, policy or procedure for offset contracts. Foreign suppliers can have their bids approved no matter they invest in the country or not, as the government does not impose offset requirements (1). Hence, the lack of legislation and the waiver on offset requirements are not much in favour of the reporting, monitoring and delivery of offset contracts. Therefore, procurement offices are not conducting any reporting and delivery obligations. Yet, the Regulatory Authority for Public Orders (ARCOP), works on the basis of the powers and rights Law N° 039 (2016) and Decree N° 0049 (2017) (2), (3).

According to the United States Department of State (2013), “the GOBF does not impose “offset” requirements, which dictate that major procurements be approved only if the foreign supplier invests in Burkinabè manufacturing, research and development, or service facilities in areas related to the items being procured” (1). Thus, offset contracts are not being regulated. Procurement legislation is mute about offset contracts, and breaches of contracts are not acted upon. In general, law enforcement is weak (1), which is nurturing corruption in all economic sectors (2), (3).

There are no known formal policies or procedures that outline the reporting and delivery obligations for offset contracts. Such policies and procedures are unlikely to exist, as all defence and security procurement is exempt from oversight as per articles 4 and 71 [1].

The government does not make any details about offset contracts transparent. Information about defence and security contracts between the government and applying companies is not public as defence and security procurement is conducted as ‘special contracts’ as per articles 4 and 71 of the Code (2018) [1]. While information about such contracts is sometimes released by supplying companies or by the media [2], such releases do not provide enough insight into offset contracts.

Defence and security procurement is exempt from oversight as per articles 4 and 71 of the Code (2018) and there is no evidence of contract monitoring taking place.

Contracts between companies and the government are exempted from the provisions of the Public Procurement Code (2018) as per articles 4 and 71 [1] and are not made public, which makes it difficult to evaluate to what extent breaches of contracts are addressed [1]. However, Articles 170, 172 and 197 make provisions for “a bidder who feels cheated during the contract award procedure to file a petition concerning the stage of the procedure to the contracting authority, assigned contracting authority or Committee in charge of examining petitions. For the petition to be admissible, it must contain the facts in relation to violations of the Public Procurement Code, rules relating to the award of contracts and the consultation file concerned” [1]. However, defence and security procurement is exempt from oversight and there is no evidence of contract monitoring taking place or of breaches of contract being acted upon.

The 2009 Code of Public Procurement does not contain any provisions regarding offset contracts or evoking the use of this type of legal arrangement. It is not part of standard legal practice in Côte d’Ivoire (1).

The 2009 Code of Public Procurement does not contain any provisions regarding offset contracts or evoking the use of this type of legal arrangement. It is not part of standard legal practice in Côte d’Ivoire (1).

The 2009 Code of Public Procurement does not contain any provisions regarding offset contracts or evoking the use of this type of legal arrangement. It is not part of standard legal practice in Côte d’Ivoire (1).

The 2009 Code of Public Procurement does not contain any provisions regarding offset contracts or evoking the use of this type of legal arrangement. It is not part of standard legal practice in Côte d’Ivoire (1).

According to our sources, there are no policies or procedures that outline how offset contracts should be handled (monitoring and documentation). As most of the off-set contracts are politically-driven, they are usually not followed by the necessary measures of monitoring and evaluation (1), (2), (3). The contracting party must deposit a copy of the offset contract with the external trade department as per Article 61 of Law no. 118 (1975) and Article 68 of the same law (4), there are no clauses in the relevant laws about how the government should monitor offset contracts.

The process of off-set contracts is confidential and secret. They are mostly non-transparent and not justified (1), (2), (3). According to Law no. 118 (1975), contracting parties need to deposit a copy of the offset contract with the external trade department (4), but there is no obligation for the department to publish the contract, these contracts have never been made public. However, some information related to offset agreements is sometimes found by the selling party, such as in the reports of arms deals published by the US Defense Security Cooperation Agency (5).

According to Article 86 of Law no. 182 (2018), the public agency must conduct an appraisal of contractors it has dealt with at the end of each financial year and publish this on the governmental etenders portal (1). However, the same article exempts processes that are required to be secret by “national security” considerations, which should be understood to include all arms procurements and their offset contracts as per Law no. 204 (1957) (2). There are no procurement officers responsible for monitoring or reporting on off-set contracts (3), (4), (5).

There are no known cases of sanctions against an off-set contactor. Most of the contractors are arms-exporting nations with strategic relations with Egypt, or the off-set contracts are politically-driven (1), (2), (3). Since these contracts are concluded secretly and are not monitored (4) there is no evidence or information about whether breaches of contract are acted upon or not.

In the absence of a formal policy or regulations on offset contracts, this indicator is scored as zero.

In the absence of a formal policy or regulations on offset contracts, this indicator is scored as zero.

In the absence of a formal policy or regulations on offset contracts, this indicator is scored as zero.

In the absence of a formal policy or regulations on offset contracts, this indicator is scored as zero.

The only legislation related to defence procurement and contracting does not include any policies about the reporting and delivery obligations for offset contracts. Military Supplies Law No. 3 of the year 1995, and Military Works Law No. 4 of the year 1995, are both the main sources of legislation in relation to armed forces’ contracting [1, 2]. Military Works Law No. 4 of the year 1995, is the only legislation that includes formal policies and procedures about how to monitor, assess and report upon a supplier’s service and/or delivery obligations, and these only include sanctioning suppliers from bidding for a period of two years [2]. There is no recognition of offset contracts and therefore, there is an absence of policies and procedures related to it.

The government does not make details about off-set contracts transparent. There is a total lack of transparency in relation to defence contracting (see Q70).

Due to the total lack of transparency in offset contracting (Q70), it is impossible to assess reporting on these contracts as no such information is made publicly available [1,2].

Due to the total lack of transparency in offset contracting (Q70), it is impossible to assess reporting on these contracts as no such information is made publicly available [1,2].

There are formal procedures for the monitoring of the quality of the products as well as their delivery according to the payment timeline, according to the NOC’s booklet for these deals (1). There are also procedures that can be taken if a contractor fails to deliver, if there is a problem with quality or following the chain of command. But there is no information on reporting and delivery obligations for offset contracts.

The booklet says that the contractor must provide a bank guarantee whose value must be equivalent to six percent of the value of the program to the Government, which will grant the contractor a guarantee reduction certificate for each partial fulfillment of the contract.

The Government demands that the contractor identifies all risks related to the program and it requires they provide extensive financial data including their monthly cash flows, all their expenses, and their financial projections for at least five years. They also demand the identities of all directors and managers, complete with their qualifications and their salaries. National Offset Company internal auditors make sure that all operations are efficient, transparent (to the government mostly) and in line with its financial laws.
(External state auditors say following the chain of command is seen as an aspect of performance and quality to the NOC and so it is also taken into consideration.)

If there is a problem with any of the above, the NOC can impose a fine whose value should not exceed six percent of the total value of the contract and it can recommend the exclusion of this contractor from future tenders and deals made by the security agencies. It remains unclear though if the NOC can issue multiple fines and how they choose the fine they will set for each violation.

There is no detail on reporting and delivery obligations for the contractor.

The Government does not make any details of the offset agreements available to the public and they only give the SAB and Parliament basic details about them that mostly just describes the total amount of money invested and the identity of the contractor, auditors said.

The security agencies refuse to give these reports, assuming they actually exist, to external auditors and lawmakers, so it is difficult to know if they are actively monitoring all their agreements, the aforementioned sources said (1, 2 and 3). The media has no reports on the matter.

As far as auditors and analysts are concerned, they could not name a single dispute between the security agencies that resulted in the Government taking formal steps against a certain defence or security contractor (1, 2, 3, 4 and 5). The media has no reports on this.

There are no formal policies and procedures that outline the reporting and delivery obligations for offset contracts (1). However, Article 29 of Decree no. 11574 (1968) states the responsible administration for the procurement has the right to ask for products and goods to be produced domestically (2). The Article can reflect a condition for a potential offset policy (2).

The government does not publicize the list of contracts (including details of the supplying companies) or copies of the contracts themselves (1).

There are no published reports conducted by procurement offices on delivery obligations (1). As previously stated, the LAF does not publish any procurement related report or contract (1). Furthermore, the responsible administration for the procured contract monitors the implementation, in theory (2).

No evidence for actual offset policies or contracts, additionally no information on their enforcement was found (1).

The assessor found no evidence that Malian law contains any provision for the use of offset agreements.¹ ² The Procurement Code makes no reference to the concept of an offset agreement, making it unclear whether such a deal would be legal or illegal in the country. Indeed, it is highly possible that such a deal would fall foul of article 29 of the Code, which states that:
“Offers and submissions must contain a commitment by the candidate or tenderer to:
– neither grant nor promise to grant to any person involved in the process of awarding a contract an improper advantage, financial or otherwise, directly or via an intermediary, with the intention of securing the contract.
– inform the contracting authority of any payment, advantage or privilege accorded to the benefit of any person, acting as an intermediary or an agent, to recompense them for any service provided.
– to respect, in general, legal provisions, notably those outlawing acts of passive corruption or trading of favours or any constituting offences of this nature”.¹
What is clear is that were the Malian government to negotiate an offset contract, the contract would not be subject to any special or additional scrutiny under the existing law. An offset contract would be subject to the normal levels of anticorruption oversight for public procurement contracts, as carried out by the ARMDS and the CRD (see Q59).
The assessor found no evidence of the Malian government contemplating, signing or expressing a desire for an offset agreement. Google searches reveal that the only reference to an “accord de compensation” in connection with Mali concerns a media article about Moroccan-Malian economic ties. The author speculates hypothetically whether it would be wise for IBK to negotiate such a deal with Moroccan companies in the event of them finding vast reserves of natural resources in Mali.³

The assessor found no evidence that Mali has any polices or procedures specifically for the use of offset agreements.¹ ²

The assessor found no evidence that Mali has any polices or procedures specifically for the use of offset agreements.¹ ²

The assessor found no evidence that Mali has any polices or procedures specifically for the use of offset agreements.¹ ²

No evidence was found that formal policies or procedures outlining the reporting and delivery obligations for offset contracts exist (1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6). Neither the National Audit Office nor the defence parliamentary commission nor the Ministry of Finance mentioned their existence in theory or in practice.

This lack of evidence raises concerns about the lack of transparency, which in turns increases risks of corruption.

No evidence was found that the government transparently discloses in full details about off-set contracts, be it through the National Audit Office, the defence parliamentary commission or the Ministry of Finance (1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6).

There is no evidence that the government is required by law to do so (7)(8).

No evidence shows that procurement offices are conducting reporting and delivery obligations at all.

No evidence shows that procurement offices are conducting reporting and delivery obligations at all.

The assessor found no formal policies or procedures that outline the reporting and delivery obligations for offset contracts in the case of Niger (1, 2).

The assessor found no formal policies or procedures that outline the reporting and delivery obligations for offset contracts in the case of Niger (1, 2).

The assessor found no formal policies or procedures that outline the reporting and delivery obligations for offset contracts in the case of Niger (1, 2).

The assessor found no formal policies or procedures that outline the reporting and delivery obligations for offset contracts in the case of Niger (1, 2).

Offset conditions are considered particularly sensitive and receive an additional layer of protection from scrutiny because of their politically sensitive nature (1). Further, off-set agreements like main defence procurement agreements are exempted from competitive bidding unless presidential approval has been expressly obtained under the exception contained in Section15(2) and 16(1) PPA 2007 (2).

Offset conditions are considered particularly sensitive and receive an additional layer of protection from scrutiny because of their politically sensitive nature (1). Further, off-set agreements like main defence procurement agreements are exempted from competitive bidding unless presidential approval has been expressly obtained under the exception contained in Section15(2) and 16(1) PPA 2007 (2).

The government does not generally make any details about off-set agreements public. They are considered particularly sensitive and as a result, are shielded from normal scrutiny (1). Procurement offices rarely report on delivery obligations at all. They are considered highly secretive. There are lapses in the monitoring processes as evidenced in the NIMSA case; a down payment was made which did not raise any red flags (2).

Enforcement is difficult to assess, as they are considered highly sensitive (1). Although investigations are taking place concerning the high-profile generals accused of fraud, there are other examples of politicians who have been identified but who have not faced any charges (2). The recent case of Amaechi is illustrative in this regard as there have been no formal charges arising out of the allegation. There is an investigation underway, but it is in the early stages (3).

There are no laws of policies that deal with the reporting process and obligations in the offset contracts (1), (2). There are no formal policies or procedures that outline the reporting and delivery obligations for offset contracts. The Oman Law blog expresses concern over the uncertainties around offset contracts in general and states that in the case of Oman, “it is therefore vital for the Authority to raise awareness of the PFD program and to clarify the requirements and procedures for the parties to eliminate uncertainties that may adversely affect the implementation of the projects it has approved and to not discourage potential investors” (3). No legislation has been passed since the initial RD in 2014, although awareness-raising around PFD economic development program is taking place (4). However, in terms of concrete procedures and policies that outline reporting and delivery obligations for offset contracts no information was found (5), (6), (7). The PFD process is outlined on the Authority website, but no formal policies or procedures accounting for potential breakdowns of obligations is featured (8).

There is a lack of transparency within the government managed offset contracts. There is very little data available on them. These contracts, according to our source, are potential for corruption as they are mostly single-sourced and contracted based on personal links rather than competition (1), (2). Few details about off-set contracts are made public. Only one media report, in the Oman Daily Observer from November 2016, detailing the first offset contracts following RD 9/2014 and ratification in 2015 including the signing of 6 defence and security offset contracts was found (3). Details in the article include the companies name and product, without references to the contract between the Oman Authority for Partnership and Development (PFD) overseeing offset contracts with foreign companies (3). No other media reports detailing off-set contracts between businesses and the government were found, nor were any articles (4), (5), (6). Government ministries do not have any details of defence-related offset contracts on their websites (7), (8). The Oman Authority of Partnership for Development has a comprehensive website; however, no lists of contracts, investments and supplying companies were found (9). The article is the only reference to signed offset contracts in the public domain according to desk-based research, and it lacks details about government monitoring or oversight of offset contracts. Moreover, there is no government transparency around contracts, suppliers or investments.

There is a form of reporting procedures that goes towards completion reports. However, these policies are not always followed, and a completion report has become a bureaucratic (superficial) process rather than a step to ensure credibility and an anti-corruption measure (1), (2).

When a contract is violated, especially in the delivery process, sanctions are highly probable against the suppliers (1), (2). There are rare cases when strategic (i.e. ammunition) contracts are violated, but in logistics, it may happen; however, actions are taken and the quality of services corrected (1), (2).

According to the law (1), some formal policies and procedures outline the delivery obligations for offset contracts (based on the amount of money), the less the amount, the higher probability of having an offset contract. A senior MoF officer stated that the official systems lack the reporting part of the delivery; it indicates the penal code is inadequate concerning the guidelines of the delivery (2).

The MoF and security agencies do not make any details about off-set contracts transparent (1). Post-contracting remains ambiguous and no reports to either the public or other oversight agencies, such as the Parliament, are made. There was no evidence of statements concerning offset contracts when the researcher was researching MoF reports (2).

Officials rarely produce a complete report upon delivery, as they are for internal bureaucratic use (1). Reports that are made are superficial and are not serious. In many cases, the quality of goods do not meet the required standards, but usually, officials ignore the shortcomings of the goods (2).

As there are no regulations concerning offset contracts, there is no enforcment of any law (1), (2).

Qatar has no requirements or formal policies to manage offset contracts, including reporting, monitoring, and delivery obligations. [1,2,3,4] Offset contracts are spread out in Qatar, especially within the armed forces, as many of its purchasing budgets come from the Emir office and not the general budget.

Offset contracts are not available for the public. [1,2,3] However, in some cases, they are published if they include large sums and strategic deals within countries such as the USA, France, and Russia.

The Government’s monitoring of offset contracts is minimal. Officials within the armed forces or the MoD have no authority to monitor or report on these contracts. These contracts are granted by the Emir office, and therefore, there is no authority to monitor them. [1,2,3] The only practice that is allowed is to report on deliverables.

There is a total lack of transparency in offset contracting, as these contracts are mostly granted by the Emir office through the officer of the Commander in Chief. It is impossible to assess how breaches of contracts are handled within the defence sector, as no such information is publicly available. [1,2,3]

According to our sources, there are no policies and regulations with regards to offset contracts. Most offset contracts are managed through the crown prince’s office (1), (2).

As with defence and security deals in general, the Saudi government does not release details to the public surrounding its offset contracts. According to our sources, the details are not even available for many senior commanders until the final few days. Offset contracts are often vague and confidential (1), (2).

The broad details of these contracts are usually covered by international media outlets, or in the government literature of the exporting country, for example, in the published minutes of the UK parliamentary foreign affairs committee meetings. There are also some details published on the website of the British Offset Office, a joint initiative between the UK government and BAE Systems, regarding the latter’s projects in Saudi Arabia (updated only through 2012) (3). There is little to no transparency, however, from the Saudi government side regarding the details of these contracts. The website of the Saudi Economic Offset Committee is currently offline and “under construction”.

Procurement offices are not engaged in monitoring or reporting on delivery obligations in offset contracts. There is anecdotal evidence of Saudi government officials following up on offset contract performance and obligations. According to our sources, there is no known mechanism within the MoD to monitor and report on offset contracts. These contracts are managed through the crown prince’s office which is not under the authority of the MoD (1), (2).

Notably, the UK Ministry of Defence’s official offset liaison office claimed to have completed the required offset projects according to the provisions of the Al-Yamamah arms deal signed in the mid-1980s. However, after unnamed Saudi officials reportedly protested against this, the UK’s offset office claimed to have come to “a gentleman’s agreement” with Saudi Arabia and that “the program will continue to run and run” (3), (4).

However, in other instances, there appears to be little follow-up from the Saudi government as regards to performance on offset contracts. To demonstrate, in 2006 US defence company Raytheon was to set up a shrimp farm in Saudi Arabia as part of an offset contract. The farm ultimately had to be shut down due to difficulties surrounding proper maintenance of facilities due to the high temperatures in the country. According to the Economist, when the Saudi offset authority was asked about the fate of the shrimp farm, it said it kept “minimum information” on projects after their founding and suggested contacting Raytheon. Raytheon then declined to comment and directed inquiries back to Saudi Arabia (5).

There are no further or more recent references in the public domain to illustrate either the existence or lack of monitoring of offset delivery obligations from procurement offices or the Saudi government more widely.

Sources report that offset contracts are where corruption is most likely to occur as there is no oversight, no reporting, and there are no assessment mechanisms. Offset contracts are usually arranged through personal ties and relations with companies and their CEOs (or respective governments). Therefore, any breach or violations of the contract is solved informally and not acted upon (1), (2).
Research shows that since establishing its Economic Offset Programme in the 1980s, the success rate for Saudi offset programs is much lower than in many other procuring nations, despite the country ranking as either the first or second-largest importer of arms depending on the period under review. There have been major shortcomings in delivery obligations contractors under offset programs, for example in the employment of Saudi nationals (3). Although there are provisions to penalize contractors for non-fulfilment of offset obligations (4), these are rarely imposed. Academics have suggested that this is likely because offset programs involve corrupt practices, defence contractors can push back against Saudi demands for penalty payments – for instance when offset target deadlines for program completion are missed (5). According to some estimates, there are trillions of dollars in outstanding offset obligations within the Gulf Cooperation Council states (6), with many analysts blaming this on an incoherent offset strategy. Although Saudi Arabia has at times required offset conditions, its predominant objective has always been security and capability absorption in the short-term over long-term development, and therefore it often waivers these requirements for US contracts (7).

Furthermore, breaches or non-fulfilment of contracts often stem from a lack of institutional capacity from the Saudi side, which problematizes the concept of enforcing punitive measures on the exporting country. A notable example is when Riyadh agreed to purchase 72 Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft from the UK in 2007, with a proposed 50 manufactured locally. Due to the lack of qualified personnel in Saudi Arabia, the UK ultimately fulfilled Saudi Arabia’s commitment to building the 50 jets (7).

According to our sources, the Tunisian MoD and armed forces have not had a policy of offset contracts or regulations for a long time(1,2).

According to our sources, the Tunisian MoD and armed forces have not had a policy of offset contracts or regulations for a long time (1,2).

According to our sources, the Tunisian MoD and armed forces have not had a policy of offset contracts or regulations for a long time(1,2).

According to our sources, the Tunisian MoD and armed forces have not had a policy of offset contracts or regulations for a long time (1,2).

This assessment has thus far demonstrated that there is no evidence or knowledge about the internal procedure and policies that outline the reporting and delivery obligations for offset contracts shared on the website of Tawazun Economic Council, which is run by Tawazun Holding L.L.C. (1). Furthermore, it has been established through this assessment that the UAE Federal Procurement Resolution No. 32 of 2014, amended in resolution No. 43 of 2016, representing the country’s national legislation in relation to procurement, explicitly exempts the Ministry of Defence, the Supreme Council for National Security and the Ministry of Interior (2), (3). Offset contracts occur through the Office of the Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (4), (5), (6).

This sub-indicator has been marked as Not Applicable, as it is irrelevant within the context of the UAE to assess transparency in relation to the government’s monitoring of offset contract, for several reasons: firstly, defence contracts, including offset contracts, are exempt from federal procurement resolutions applicable to the majority of government departments, and secondly, it is not within the mandate of the government to monitor offset contracts as it does not negotiate or manage them (1), (2), (3). As stated before, it is organized by the Office of the Crown Prince.

This sub-indicator has been marked as Not Applicable, as it is irrelevant to assess transparency in relation to the government’s monitoring of offset contracts, for several reasons: firstly, defence contracts, including offset contracts, are exempt from federal procurement resolutions applicable to the majority of governmental department, and secondly, it is not within the mandate of the government to monitor offset contracts as it does not negotiate or manage them (1), (2), (3). As stated before, it is organized by the Office of the Crown Prince.

This sub-indicator has been marked as Not Applicable, as it is irrelevant to assess the enforcement of the government’s policies concerning the monitoring of offset contracts since these policies do not exist (1), (2), (3).

Country Sort by Country 71a. Policies & procedures Sort By Subindicator 71b. Transparency Sort By Subindicator 71c. Monitoring Sort By Subindicator 71d. Enforcement Sort By Subindicator
Algeria 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Angola 50 / 100 0 / 100 NEI NEI
Burkina Faso 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Cameroon 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Cote d'Ivoire 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Egypt 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Ghana 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Jordan 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Kuwait 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Lebanon 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Mali 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Morocco 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Niger 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Nigeria 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Oman 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 50 / 100
Palestine 50 / 100 0 / 100 25 / 100 0 / 100
Qatar 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Saudi Arabia 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Tunisia 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
United Arab Emirates 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100

With thanks for support from the UK Department for International Development and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs who have contributed to the Government Defence Integrity Index.

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