How strongly does the government control the company’s use of agents and intermediaries in the procurement cycle?
Burkina Faso score: 25/100
The government imposes no restrictions on the use of agents and intermediaries, nor has it publicly committed to doing so.
There are no controls over the use of agents and intermediaries, but the government has clearly indicated that it intends to rectify this issue.
There are some controls over the use of agents and intermediaries, but no clear policy.
The use of agents and intermediaries is regulated by a strict and clear policy, but this policy does not include all the requirements laid out in score 4.
The use of agents and intermediaries is either prohibited by law or regulated by a strict and clear policy which requires as a minimum that anti-corruption clauses are included in contracts with agents, companies register agents and declare all forms of remuneration, agents receive payments into local accounts and company contracts outline the right to audit agent financial accounts by government agencies.
ControlRisk (2016) writes, “the compliance risks associated with third parties have always been important because so many international corruption cases involve bribes paid by intermediaries, such as commercial agents” (1). The outcome of the 2015-2016 survey highlights that 65% of the respondents say ‘high’ or ‘very high’ to corruption risks associated with intermediaries, with some of them thinking that this percentage could be higher (1). Law N° 039 (2016), and Decree N° 0049 (2017) do not allude to the way companies use their agents or intermediaries in the procurement processes. They do not address how bidding or contracting companies use their agents and intermediaries in the procurement processes (2), (3). However, they both provide sanctions in case these agents and intermediaries are involved in offences to the procurement process, without any regard to their status within the bidding or contracting companies. Yet, there is no evidence of the existence of policies addressing such a case either. Given the fact that there is evidence that the use of agents and intermediaries increases the risk of corruption (4), this use may be regulated in the near future.
1. “International Business Attitude to Corruption: Survey 2015 – 2016,” Control Risk, 2016, http://rai-see.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/corruption-survey-2016.pdf.
2. “Law N° 039 – On the general regulation of the public order,” (2016), https://www.assembleenationale.bf/IMG/pdf/loi_039_portant_commande_publique.pdf.
3. “Decree N° 0049 On the procedure for public procurement and contracting, execution and resolution,” (2017), https://www.droit-afrique.com/uploads/Burkina-Decret-2017-51-maitrise-ouvrage-deleguee.pdf.
4. “Burkina Faso Investment Climate Statement 2013,” United States Department of State, 2013, https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2013/204611.htm.
Burkina Faso score: NA/100
Sanctions are not generally applied when policies and laws on the use of agents are violated.
Sanctions are sometimes applied when policies and laws on the use of agents are violated.
Sanctions are usually applied when policies and laws on the use of agents are violated.
Because there are no controls over the use of agents and intermediaries, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.
Compare scores by country
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|Country||73a. Policies||73b. Enforcement|
|Algeria||0 / 100||NA|
|Angola||50 / 100||0 / 100|
|Burkina Faso||25 / 100||NA|
|Cameroon||0 / 100||NA|
|Cote d'Ivoire||50 / 100||25 / 100|
|Egypt||50 / 100||0 / 100|
|Ghana||0 / 100||NA|
|Jordan||0 / 100||NA|
|Kuwait||0 / 100||NA|
|Lebanon||50 / 100||NEI|
|Mali||50 / 100||0 / 100|
|Morocco||75 / 100||50 / 100|
|Niger||0 / 100||NA|
|Nigeria||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Oman||50 / 100||100 / 100|
|Palestine||0 / 100||NA|
|Qatar||50 / 100||100 / 100|
|Saudi Arabia||0 / 100||NA|
|Tunisia||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|United Arab Emirates||0 / 100||NA|