Are there effective measures in place for personnel found to have taken part in forms of bribery and corruption, and is there evidence that these measures are being carried out?
Canada score: 100/100
Offences are not defined; no evidence of other formal mechanisms. Or the military are exempt from law.
Bribery and/or corruption are not defined offences in law that apply to the defence sector, but there are wider legal mechanisms in place (e.g. national laws supported by policies, regulations, or other laws) used to address this.
Bribery and/or corruption are defined offences in law that clearly apply to the defence sector, but 2 or more of the following mechanisms are not provided for: offering, giving, receiving, or soliciting bribes. Sanctions exist in law, but maximum penalties constitute less than 1 year imprisonment or weak fines that would not act as a deterrent.
Bribery and/or corruption are defined offences in law that clearly apply to the defence sector, but 2 or more of the following mechanisms are not provided for: offering, giving, receiving, or soliciting bribes. Possible sanctions include criminal prosecution/ incarceration, dismissal, and considerable financial penalties.
There are a range of clearly defined offences in law that clearly apply to the defence sector. These offences cover (at a minimum) offering, giving, receiving, or soliciting of any item of value to influence the actions of an official or other person in charge of a public or legal duty. Possible sanctions include criminal prosecution/ incarceration, dismissal, and considerable financial penalties.
The Code of Service Discipline  makes clear that the Criminal Code  which prohibits any of the elements of bribery or corruption discussed, applies equally to DND military and civilian personnel, who are also subject to additional penalties through the military justice system and the Criminal Code as applicable. Section 3 of The Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act states that, “Every person commits an offence who, in order to obtain or retain an advantage in the course of business, directly or indirectly gives, offers or agrees to give or offer a loan, reward, advantage or benefit of any kind to a foreign public official or to any person for the benefit of a foreign public official (a) as consideration for an act or omission by the official in connection with the performance of the official’s duties or functions; or (b) to induce the official to use his or her position to influence any acts or decisions of the foreign state or public international organization for which the official performs duties or functions.” Offences under this Act are punishable by up to 14 years in prison. 
1. “The Code of Service Discipline and Me”, Military law reports and publications, Reports and publications, National Defence, Government of Canada, accessed September 27, 2019, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/military-law/code-of-service-discipline.html.
2. “Anti-corruption, bribery and enforcement”, Doing Business in Canada, Resources, Osler Law Firm, accessed September 27, 2019, https://www.osler.com/en/resources/business-in-canada/browse-topics/additional/anti-corruption-bribery-and-enforcement.
3. “Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act (S.C. 1998, c. 34)”, Consolidated Acts, Justice Laws Website, accessed May 20, 2020, https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/c-45.2/page-1.html.
Canada score: 50/100
There is a complete failure to investigate or prosecute, even in the face of clear evidence.
Instances of bribery or corruption are superficially investigated or rarely disclipined.
Instances of bribery or corruption are investigated but not often disciplined. There is clear undue influence in the decision making process.
Instances of bribery or corruption are investigated or disciplined through formal processes, but undue political influence is attempted and sometimes effective at derailing prosecutions.
Instances of bribery or corruption are investigated or disciplined through formal processes and without undue political influence.
Most recently, the Chief Military Judge of Canada was tried for fraud, and the presiding judge was a friend of the defendant.  The case has not yet been decided. The past three years of reports of the Director of Military Prosecutions reveal no courts martial for bribery or corruption.    This suggests a lack of interest in investigating and prosecuting such behaviour. Additionally, the Auditor General of Canada’s Report on the Administration of Justice in the Canadian Armed Forces found that there were significant delays in resolving military justice cases (which contributed to 10 cases being dismissed or not proceeding to court martial) and that there were systemic weaknesses in the military justice process, for example, the Canadian Armed Forces had not defined time standards for every phase of the military justice system. Even when time standards were defined, unexplained delays still occurred. It was also found that human resource practices did not support the development of specialised expertise in litigation. In addition, commanding officers were found not to immediately inform Defence Counsel Services of the accused’s request for defence counsel. Further, prosecutors did not provide the accused with all relevant information for their defence as soon as was practical. It was also found that the processes used by the Military Police to inform military units, and by the Canadian Military Prosecution Service to inform the Military Police, were inefficient.” 
1. Lee Berthiaume, “Court martial for Canada’s top military judge gets underway,” National Post, June 10, 2019, accessed September 27, 2019, https://nationalpost.com/news/canada/court-martial-begins-for-militarys-top-judge.
2. “Director of Military Prosecutions Annual Report 2018-19”, Military law reports and publications, Reports and Publications, National Defence, Government of Canada, accessed September 27, 2019, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/military-law/director-military-prosecutions-annual-report-2018-19.html.
3. “2017-2018 Director of Military Prosecutions Annual Report”, Military law reports and publications, Reports and Publications, National Defence, Government of Canada, accessed September 27, 2019, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/military-law/director-military-prosecutions-annual-report-2017-18.html.
4. “Director of Military Prosecutions Annual Report 2016-17”, Military law reports and publications, Reports and Publications, National Defence, Government of Canada, accessed September 27, 2019, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/military-law/director-military-prosecutions-annual-report-2016-17.html.
5. “There were systemic weaknesses in the military justice process”, Report 3 – Administration of Justice in the Canadian Armed Forces, 2018 Spring Reports of the Auditor General of Canada, Reports to Parliament, Reports and Petitions, Office of the Auditor General of Canada, accessed December 15, 2020, https://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/parl_oag_201805_03_e_43035.html#hd4b.
Compare scores by country
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|Country||35a. Sanctions||35b. Enforcement|
|Albania||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Algeria||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Angola||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Argentina||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Armenia||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Australia||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Azerbaijan||50 / 100||25 / 100|
|Bahrain||50 / 100||25 / 100|
|Bangladesh||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Belgium||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Bosnia and Herzegovina||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|Botswana||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Brazil||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Burkina Faso||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|Cameroon||100 / 100||0 / 100|
|Canada||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Chile||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|China||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Colombia||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Cote d'Ivoire||100 / 100||0 / 100|
|Denmark||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Egypt||25 / 100||0 / 100|
|Estonia||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Finland||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|France||75 / 100||75 / 100|
|Germany||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Ghana||75 / 100||50 / 100|
|Greece||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|Hungary||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|India||75 / 100||75 / 100|
|Indonesia||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Iran||75 / 100||50 / 100|
|Iraq||25 / 100||0 / 100|
|Israel||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Italy||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Japan||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Jordan||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|Kenya||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Kosovo||25 / 100||75 / 100|
|Kuwait||25 / 100||0 / 100|
|Latvia||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Lebanon||50 / 100||NEI|
|Lithuania||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Malaysia||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Mali||100 / 100||0 / 100|
|Mexico||75 / 100||25 / 100|
|Montenegro||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|Morocco||0 / 100||25 / 100|
|Myanmar||0 / 100||25 / 100|
|Netherlands||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|New Zealand||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Niger||100 / 100||0 / 100|
|Nigeria||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|North Macedonia||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Norway||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Oman||25 / 100||25 / 100|
|Palestine||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Philippines||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Poland||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Portugal||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Qatar||25 / 100||25 / 100|
|Russia||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Saudi Arabia||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|Serbia||75 / 100||50 / 100|
|Singapore||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|South Africa||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|South Korea||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|South Sudan||50 / 100||25 / 100|
|Spain||75 / 100||50 / 100|
|Sudan||25 / 100||0 / 100|
|Sweden||75 / 100||100 / 100|
|Switzerland||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Taiwan||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Tanzania||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Thailand||50 / 100||0 / 100|
|Tunisia||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Turkey||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Uganda||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Ukraine||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|United Arab Emirates||50 / 100||25 / 100|
|United Kingdom||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|United States||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Venezuela||75 / 100||0 / 100|
|Zimbabwe||100 / 100||75 / 100|