Political Risk:

Low

Score:

70/100

Defence and Security Policy and Policy Transparency

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Q1 92/100

Is there formal provision for effective and independent legislative scrutiny of defence policy?

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Formal rights Score: 100 / 100
The Constitution Act of 1867 gives Parliament legislative authority over the militia, military and naval service, and defence; this has since been construed to…
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Effectiveness Score: 75 / 100
Particularly with respect to arms sales, there is often a lack of disclosure and transparency with the public and with parliament, most recently with…
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Independent legislature scrutiny Score: 100 / 100
In a parliamentary democracy, this is not straightforward. The ‘executive’ can be construed as the Crown/Governor-General, which has no ability to coerce and is…
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Q2 75/100

Does the country have an identifiable and effective parliamentary defence and security committee (or similar such organisations) to exercise oversight?

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Formal rights Score: 100 / 100
There are both House of Commons and Senate committees with oversight, staffed by elected MPs from both (or all, if there is sufficient representation)…
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Expertise Score: 50 / 100
Members of these committees must be Members of the House of Commons or Senators, and while some may incidentally have military experience or expertise,…
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Responsive policymaking Score: 50 / 100
While the committees can review almost anything, they have no requirement or mandate to review anything at any interval. In practice, they review items…
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Short-term oversight Score: 75 / 100
The committees issue recommendations and reports to the Department of Department of National Defence (and sometimes others) but cannot compel a response, which is…
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Long-term oversight Score: 100 / 100
The scope of the committees is fairly broad, as discussed under “Mandate” on the official websites. It includes long term investigations, and investigations of…
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Institutional outcomes Score: 75 / 100
Ministries generally respond to committee recommendations, but that response can frequently be an explanation for why they are rejecting the recommendation. [1] During minority…
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Q3 69/100

Is the country’s national defence policy or national security strategy debated and publicly available?

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Scope of involvement Score: 75 / 100
The latest national strategy was the product of a year-long process of public consultation and roundtables involving experts, stakeholder groups, and opportunities for individuals…
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Scope of debate Score: 75 / 100
Discussion around the new national strategy focused primarily on Canada’s role as a middle power, and procurement. There was little discussion of operations, threats,…
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Public consultations Score: 50 / 100
While the public consultations for Strong, Secure, Engaged were extensive, they were unusual in Canadian practice, and a response to criticism about lack of…
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Transparency Score: 75 / 100
The new defence strategy, Strong, Secure, Engaged (2017) is publicly available. [1] Budget information and disaggregated information about strategy is not publicly available, as…
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Q4 50/100

Do defence and security institutions have a policy, or evidence, of openness towards civil society organisations (CSOs) when dealing with issues of corruption?

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Policy of openness Score: 25 / 100
Global Affairs Canada has a policy requiring openness and cooperation with CSOs. [1] [2] The policy from Global Affairs Canada makes direct reference to…
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CSO protections Score: 75 / 100
Freedom House gives Canada a score of 99/100 for political freedom, including the right to criticise and organise in protest of the government. Canadian…
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Practice of openness Score: 50 / 100
Canada remains a founding and highly involved member of the Community of Democracies, a coalition of states dedicated to strengthening civil society through the…
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Q5 75/100

Has the country signed up to the following international anti-corruption instruments: UNCAC and the OECD Convention?

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Signatory and Ratification status Score: 100 / 100
Canada has signed, ratified, and taken official measures to comply with both these conventions, as well as other regional and similar conventions. [1] [2]…
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Compliance Score: 50 / 100
The Canadian government’s conduct was being monitored by the OECD during the prosecution of at least two major companies, one wholly Canadian, the other…
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Q6 38/100

Is there evidence of regular, active public debate on issues of defence? If yes, does the government participate in this debate?

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Public debate Score: 50 / 100
The Department of National Defence (DND) funds a range of research projects that look at defence, and the results of these projects are made…
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Government engagement in public discourse Score: 25 / 100
The 2017 National Security Act established the National Security Transparency Commitment, which charges the DND and other agencies related to security with providing information…
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Q7 88/100

Does the country have an openly stated and effectively implemented anti-corruption policy for the defence sector?

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Anti-corruption policy Score: 100 / 100
There are broad anti-corruption laws in Canada, such as the Corruption of Foreign Public Official Act, and an assortment of tools and indicators used…
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Effective implementation Score: 75 / 100
The broad anti-corruption laws in Canada (see 7A) in addition to the DND’s “Code of Values and Ethics” (which clarifies expectations of individuals, supervisors,…
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Q8 83/100

Are there independent, well-resourced, and effective institutions within defence and security tasked with building integrity and countering corruption?

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Mandate and resources Score: 75 / 100
The Chief Review Service (CRS) is one of two major groups within the Department of National Defence (DND) tasked with enforcing ethics and corruption…
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Independence Score: 100 / 100
The CRS reports directly to the Deputy Minister of the DND. The Canadian Forces Provost Marshal is a Brigadier General who reports directly to…
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Effectiveness Score: 75 / 100
The Provost Marshal/Canadian Military Police Group and the RCMP are investigative units not mandated with addressing risk proactively, as compared to investigating reactively. The…
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Q9 NS/100

Does the public trust the institutions of defence and security to tackle the issue of bribery and corruption in their establishments?

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Score: NS / 100
This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. Scandals related to fighter jet procurement and the Norman prosecution have revealed profound inefficiencies…
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Q10 75/100

Are there regular assessments of the areas of greatest corruption risk for ministry and armed forces personnel, and are the findings used as inputs to the anti-corruption policy?

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Risk assessments Score: 75 / 100
The Auditor General and the Chief Review Service both publish regular investigations into mismanagement, corruption, and operations of the military, but the reports tend…
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Regularity Score: 100 / 100
Multiple assessments are carried out each year, as per the activities of the agencies listed. [1] [2] [3]
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Inputs to anti-corruption policy Score: 50 / 100
Recommendations from the Chief Review Service of the DND are regularly used to update policy and practices, and the degree to which these recommendations…
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Defence Budgets

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Q11 83/100

Does the country have a process for acquisition planning that involves clear oversight, and is it publicly available?

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Acquisition planning process Score: 100 / 100
The Defence Investment Plan and the Canadian Armed Forces Defence Plan 2018-2023 lay out the connection between needs, capabilities, and acquisitions. The process and…
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Transparency Score: 75 / 100
The former Defence Acquisition Guide was renamed the Defence Investment Plan in 2018, but continues to be published biannually and publicly available. The acquisition…
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External oversight Score: 75 / 100
There is an Independent Review Panel for Defence Acquisition within the DND, which provides broad advice about procurements to the Minister of Department of…
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Q12 50/100

Is the defence budget transparent, showing key items of expenditure? And it is provided to the legislature in a timely fashion?

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Comprehensiveness Score: 50 / 100
The 2019 federal budget is publicly available and readily accessible. [1] However, most mentions of defence involve social programmes and spending to support Canadian…
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Timeliness Score: 50 / 100
The Canadian federal government fiscal year runs from April 1 to March 31. The 2019-20 budget (including defence) was tabled in the House of…
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Q13 63/100

Is there a legislative committee (or other appropriate body) responsible for defence budget scrutiny and analysis in an effective way?

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Formal rights Score: 100 / 100
The Standing Committee on Department of National Defence is empowered to review any aspect of the activities of the Department of Department of National…
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Influence on decision-making Score: 25 / 100
While the House and to a lesser extent Senate Committees have the power to scrutinise, oversee, and provide feedback on budgetary decisions, they seldom…
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Q14 58/100

Is the approved defence budget made publicly available? In practice, can citizens, civil society, and the media obtain detailed information on the defence budget?

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Proactive publication Score: 50 / 100
The national budget contains only very broad categories of information for defence spending. [1] The Departmental Plan contains more detailed spending about the defence…
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Comprehensiveness Score: 50 / 100
The Departmental Plan is the closest publication to a defence budget that is widely available, and it does not contain granular detail. The decisions…
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Response to information requests Score: 75 / 100
The Information Commissioner of Canada reports that the DND was the fourth most frequent agency named in complaints received about failure to provide information,…
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Q15 42/100

Are sources of defence income other than from central government allocation (from equipment sales or property disposal, for example) published and scrutinised?

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Transparency Score: 25 / 100
While military surplus equipment is sold alongside other government surplus, including to foreign governments, it is difficult to obtain information about the funds generated…
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Institutional scrutiny Score: 50 / 100
Federal law states that departments deeming their Crown assets to be surplus to requirements may sell, lease, lend, or give away these assets with…
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Public scrutiny Score: 50 / 100
Some elements of the divestment or disposal of defence related properties are present throughout the Canadian media landscape, such as noting the divesting of…
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Q16 81/100

Is there an effective internal audit process for defence ministry expenditure (that is, for example, transparent, conducted by appropriately skilled individuals, and subject to parliamentary oversight)?

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Activity Score: 75 / 100
The Department of National Defence (DND) publishes yearly reports on its activities to include expenditures. [1] These reports follow a typical template and thus…
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Enabling oversight Score: 75 / 100
Audits are carried out by Departmental Audit Committees, who, by statute, are independent members appointed by the deputy head of department and the Comptroller…
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External scrutiny Score: 100 / 100
The Office of the Auditor General reviews internal DND audits and reporting. In FY 2017-18, the only statement of a federal organisation (out of…
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Institutional outcomes Score: 75 / 100
While the DND frequently responds to recommendations from the CRS in particular, it does not always do so to the satisfaction of subsequent CRS…
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Q17 88/100

Is there effective and transparent external auditing of military defence expenditure?

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Activity Score: 100 / 100
The Office of the Auditor General (OAG) reviews the defence sector for both financial audits and performance audits yearly. [1] Alongside this, the Parliamentary…
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Independence Score: 100 / 100
The PBO answers to Parliament, rather than to the Cabinet, Privy Council, or Prime Minister (which could be considered the executive in a Westminster…
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Transparency Score: 100 / 100
Parliamentary Budget Officer reports and Office of the Auditor General (OAG) reports are published online as a matter of course, with rare redactions as…
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Institutional outcomes Score: 50 / 100
There are instances of PBO report findings being reflected in DND policy, as with a PBO study on personnel influencing recruiting and retention studies,…
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Nexus of Defence and National Assets

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Q18 67/100

Is there evidence that the country’s defence institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation and, if so, are these interests publicly stated and subject to scrutiny?

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Legal framework Score: 0 / 100
There are no restrictions on defence institutions, or other government ministries, having interests in natural resource businesses. [1] [2]
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Defence institutions: Financial or controlling interests in practice Score: 100 / 100
Defence institutions have no such interests in practice. However, the holdings of the Canadian Armed Forces Pension Plan currently include 4% natural resources related…
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Individual defence personnel: Financial or controlling interests in practice Score: 100 / 100
Individuals are required to declare, and in some circumstances divest from, any financial interests that might conflict with their roles as members of the…
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Transparency Score: NA / 100
This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’, as there is no evidence that, beyond the pension plan with 4% of holdings in natural resources, Canadian…
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Scrutiny Score: NA / 100
This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’, as there is no evidence of such interests. [1] [2] [3]
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Organised Crime

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Q19 75/100

Is there evidence, for example through media investigations or prosecution reports, of a penetration of organised crime into the defence and security sector? If no, is there evidence that the government is alert and prepared for this risk?

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Penetration of organised crime Score: 100 / 100
In 2018, the Department of National Defence (DND) issued a general order banning members from associating with ‘outlaw’ motorcycle gangs, as well as with…
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Government response Score: 50 / 100
A number of agencies exist both internally and externally to the CAF to investigate and take action against criminal activity within the CAF. These…
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Q20 83/100

Is there policing to investigate corruption and organised crime within the defence services and is there evidence of the effectiveness of this policing?

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Existence of policing function Score: 100 / 100
The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) National Divison is responsible for investigating corruption and organised crime within government agencies broadly, not just in defence.…
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Independence Score: 75 / 100
The RCMP is entirely independent, both institutionally and practically (as it reports to the Minister of Public Safety), from the CAF and DND. The…
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Effectiveness Score: 75 / 100
An internal investigation into the integrity of the CAF court-martial system found the system to require more study to determine its effectiveness and integrity…
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Control of Intelligence Services

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Q21 88/100

Are the policies, administration, and budgets of the intelligence services subject to effective and independent oversight?

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Independence Score: 100 / 100
A new agency – the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency – was announced in July 2019, which will have oversight of all intelligence…
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Effectiveness Score: 75 / 100
The Parliamentary oversight committees have only limited access to classified information, and there are no standardised guidelines as to when and under what circumstances…
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Q22 33/100

Are senior positions within the intelligence services filled on the basis of objective selection criteria, and are appointees subject to investigation of their suitability and prior conduct?

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Objective selection criteria Score: 0 / 100
There are no statutory or published criteria for the head of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS). [1] Bill C-59 specifies the establishment of…
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Selection bias Score: 50 / 100
While there are no laws specifying neutrality or objectivity, in practice appointments have not been based on overtly partisan affiliations. The first head of…
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Vetting process Score: 50 / 100
Leaders of intelligence community agencies are appointed by an order in council (OIC), [1] a process that is intended to vet qualifications and suitability,…
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Export Controls

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Q23 67/100

Does the government have a well-scrutinised process for arms export decisions that aligns with Articles 7.1.iv, 11.5, and 15.6 of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)?

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Signatory and Ratification Score: 100 / 100
Canada has ratified the ATT, which came into effect on September 17, 2019. [1] Following the introduction of Bill C-47 (which received Royal Assent…
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Compliance Score: 75 / 100
The updated ‘Order Amending the Export Control List (Arms Trade Treaty)’ covers the ATT’s articles pertaining to its purpose, scope, and limitations on Ammunition/munition.…
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Parliamentary scrutiny Score: 25 / 100
Upcoming arms exports are not subject to parliamentary approval, but the amended Export and Imports Permit Act and the Criminal Code provision to implement…
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Lobbying in Defence

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Q76 81/100

Does the country regulate lobbying of defence institutions?

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Legal framework Score: 100 / 100
The Lobbying Act (2008) defines and bounds the activities of all lobbyists, requires their registration, forbids tying their remuneration to specific legislative outcomes, and…
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Disclosure: Public officials Score: 100 / 100
Designated public officer holders (DPOH), which are senior civil servants and equivalents in all sectors, including defence, as well as members of the Upper…
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Lobbyist registration system Score: 50 / 100
Lobbyists must register with the Commissioner of Lobbying, and the publicly available registry includes information on the identity of lobbyists, the identify of clients,…
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Oversight & enforcement Score: 75 / 100
The Commissioner of Lobbying reports directly to Parliament, and is appointed by both houses for a term of seven years, ensuring independence. The Commissioner…
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