Are there effective measures in place for personnel found to have taken part in forms of bribery and corruption, and is there evidence that these measures are being carried out?
Colombia score: 100/100
Offences are not defined; no evidence of other formal mechanisms. Or the military are exempt from law.
Bribery and/or corruption are not defined offences in law that apply to the defence sector, but there are wider legal mechanisms in place (e.g. national laws supported by policies, regulations, or other laws) used to address this.
Bribery and/or corruption are defined offences in law that clearly apply to the defence sector, but 2 or more of the following mechanisms are not provided for: offering, giving, receiving, or soliciting bribes. Sanctions exist in law, but maximum penalties constitute less than 1 year imprisonment or weak fines that would not act as a deterrent.
Bribery and/or corruption are defined offences in law that clearly apply to the defence sector, but 2 or more of the following mechanisms are not provided for: offering, giving, receiving, or soliciting bribes. Possible sanctions include criminal prosecution/ incarceration, dismissal, and considerable financial penalties.
There are a range of clearly defined offences in law that clearly apply to the defence sector. These offences cover (at a minimum) offering, giving, receiving, or soliciting of any item of value to influence the actions of an official or other person in charge of a public or legal duty. Possible sanctions include criminal prosecution/ incarceration, dismissal, and considerable financial penalties.
Law 1474 of 2011, the Anticorruption Statute,  modifies Article 444 of the Penal Code,  and recognizes “bribery” as the delivery or promise of money or other utility to a witness so that they are not truthful or not fully truthful in their testimony, carrying sanctions of imprisonment for six to twelve years and a fine of 100 to 1,000 pesos based on wage. This Law also recognizes “transnational bribery” as when a foreign public servant, for the benefit of themselves or a third party, is offered, directly or indirectly, any money, object of pecuniary value, or other utility in exchange for acts, omits, or delays related to an economic or commercial transaction; and is sanctioned with nine to fifteen years in prison and a fine of 100 to 200 current legal monthly minimum wages.  The Single Disciplinary Code of the public function, Law 734 of 2002,  stipulates a series of prohibitions of public servants including the receiving, directly or indirectly, gifts, entertainment, favours, or any another kind of benefit, that leads to coercion. This Code classifies disciplinary offenses as very serious, serious, and minor, with a variety of sanctions ranging from dismissal, suspension from office, a fine, or a written warning. Decree 1797 of 2000,  by which the disciplinary regime of the Armed Forces is issued, recognizes the existence of extremely serious offenses related to the receipt of gifts or bribes, benefits from illegal activities, and demand for money or gifts for official services. Article 61 of Law 836 of 2003  outlines further sanctions for acts of bribery including (i) loss of general and special disabilities; and (ii) the loss of the right to attend social headquarters and military recreation sites when the absolute separation of the Armed Forces is imposed. Regarding sanctions, the Military Penal Code, Law 1407 of 2010,  recognizes two main penalties, imprisonment and a fine, in addition to accessory penalties such as the prohibition of the exercise of profession or office, the absolute removal from the public force, house arrest, and the ban of public rights and functions, among others. Finally, in Law 1765 of 2015,  which regulates the Military Criminal Justice, states that “crimes against the public administration” committed by the members of the Armed Forces must be judged under the provisions of the Military Penal Code and the penal code, in addition to its complementary regulations.
1. Ley N° 1474. 2011. “Por la cual se dictan normas orientadas a fortalecer los mecanismos de prevención, investigación y sanción de actos de corrupción y la efectividad del control de la gestión pública.” [Law No. 1474. 2011. “Which establishes regulations aimed at strengthening mechanisms for the prevention, investigation, and sanction of acts of corruption and the effectiveness of public management control.] Congreso de la República. 12 July 2011.
2. Ley N° 599. 2000. “Por el cual se expide el Código Penal.” [Law No. 599. 2000. “By which the Penal Code is issued.”] Congreso de la República. 24 July 2000.
3. Ley N° 734. 2002. “Por la cual se expide el código disciplinario único.” [Law No. 734. 2002. “By which the single disciplinary code is issued.”] Congreso de la República. 5 February 2002.
4. Decreto N° 1797. 2000. “Por el cual se expide el Reglamento de Régimen Disciplinario para las Fuerzas Militares.” [Decree No. 1797. 2000. “By which the Disciplinary Regime Regulation for the Military Forces is issued.”] Presidencia de la República. 14 September 2000.
5. Ley N° 836. 2003. “Por la cual se expide el reglamento del régimen disciplinario para las fuerzas militares.” [Law No. 836. 2000. “By which the regulations of the disciplinary regime for the military forces are issued.”] Congreso de la República. 16 July 2003.
6. Ley N° 1407. 2010. “Por la cual se expide el Código Penal Militar.” [Law No. 1407. 2010. “Through which the Military Penal Code is issued.”] Congreso de la República. 17 August 2010.
7. Ley N° 1765. 2015. “Por la cual se reestructura la justicia penal militar y policial.” [Law No. 1765. 2015. “By which the military and police criminal justice is restructured.”] Congreso de la República, 14 September 2015.
Colombia score: 75/100
There is a complete failure to investigate or prosecute, even in the face of clear evidence.
Instances of bribery or corruption are superficially investigated or rarely disclipined.
Instances of bribery or corruption are investigated but not often disciplined. There is clear undue influence in the decision making process.
Instances of bribery or corruption are investigated or disciplined through formal processes, but undue political influence is attempted and sometimes effective at derailing prosecutions.
Instances of bribery or corruption are investigated or disciplined through formal processes and without undue political influence.
According to the Single Disciplinary Code, Law 734 of 2002,  the application of measures aimed at generating disciplinary action against public servants falls to the offices of internal disciplinary control of each entity. Such processes may, in second instance, be investigated by the Attorney General’s Office. The holder of disciplinary power forwards, initiates, or continues investigations carried out by the offices of disciplinary internal control.  Article 16 of the Disciplinary Code states that disciplinary sanction has the preventive and corrective function of the exercise of the civil service, based on transparency, objectivity, legality, honesty, loyalty, impartiality, etc., in such a way as to guarantee “the effectiveness and purposes of the Constitution.” As for the political influences that the sanctioning process may have, the internal control offices could have some kind of influence since even though the person in charge of this unit is autonomous in his duties  these units are formed through internal acts of the Head of the Agency and coordinated by the Director of that unit, so the possible emergence of undue political influence on decision-making around disciplinary processes should not be ruled out. With regard to criminal proceedings, corruption cases are investigated and put to trial by the Attorney General’s Office. That Office has an accusatory criminal proceeding divided into three phases: inquiry, in which the prosecutor and the judicial police obtain evidence and physical evidence of the crime that occurred, and the prosecution is made before a judge of guarantees; research phase, where a formulation hearing is held and research is open; and trial phase, where indictment, preparatory, oral trial, and judgment hearings are held before a judge of knowledge.  For Interviewee 6,  during this judicial process there could be attempts at undue political influence in the application of justice, evidenced by the denial of contexts referred to in cases of corruption. This means that for cases such as the systematic nature of the murders of social leaders, there is a denial by the responsibility by the Military and the Colombian government for the protection of human rights, while in cases of administrative corruption within the Military Forces there is a whole media movement that allows for the acceleration of the investigation and arrest processes of those involved. [6, 7]
1. Ley N° 734. 2002. “Por la cual se expide el código disciplinario único.” [Law No. 734. 2002. “By which the single disciplinary code is issued.”] Congreso de la República. 5 February 2002.
2. Concepto N° 75721. 2014. Organización del control interno disciplinario al interior de la entidad. [Concept No. 75721. 2014. Organisation of internal disciplinary control within the entity.] 29 April.
3. Departamento Administrativo de la Función Pública. n.d. Radicado N° 20146000075721. [Prosecution No. 20146000075721.] Obtained from: https://www.funcionpublica.gov.co/eva/gestornormativo/norma.php?i=65243
4. Avella, Pedro. 2007. Estructura del proceso penal acusatorio. [Structure of the accusatory criminal process.] Bogotá: Fiscalía General de la Nación.
5. Entrevista 6. [Interview 6.] Entrevista de M. E Rugel. 2019. Experto en temas de seguridad y conflicto armado. [Expert in security issues and armed conflict.] 19 July.
6. Periódico El Espectador. 2019. “Estos son los capturados por escándalo en la contratación de la IV Brigada del Ejército.” [“These are the ones captured by scandal in the hiring of the IV Army Brigade.”] 24 July. Accessed 30 July 2019. https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/judicial/estos-son-los-capturados-por-escandalo-en-la-contratacion-de-la-iv-brigada-del-ejercito-articulo-872646.
7. Periódico El Tiempo. 2019. “Militares capturados por escándalo de corrupción no aceptaron cargos.”] [“Military captured by corruption scandal did not accept charges.] 25 July. Accessed 30 Julio 2019. https://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/medellin/avanza-audiencia-en-contra-de-militares-de-la-cuarta-brigada-393128.
Compare scores by country
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|Country||35a. Sanctions||35b. Enforcement|
|Albania||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Algeria||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Angola||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Argentina||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Armenia||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Australia||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Azerbaijan||50 / 100||25 / 100|
|Bahrain||50 / 100||25 / 100|
|Bangladesh||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Belgium||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Bosnia and Herzegovina||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|Botswana||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Brazil||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Burkina Faso||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|Cameroon||100 / 100||0 / 100|
|Canada||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Chile||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|China||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Colombia||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Cote d'Ivoire||100 / 100||0 / 100|
|Denmark||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Egypt||25 / 100||0 / 100|
|Estonia||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Finland||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|France||75 / 100||75 / 100|
|Germany||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Ghana||75 / 100||50 / 100|
|Greece||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|Hungary||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|India||75 / 100||75 / 100|
|Indonesia||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Iran||75 / 100||50 / 100|
|Iraq||25 / 100||0 / 100|
|Israel||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Italy||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Japan||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Jordan||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|Kenya||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Kosovo||25 / 100||75 / 100|
|Kuwait||25 / 100||0 / 100|
|Latvia||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Lebanon||50 / 100||NEI|
|Lithuania||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Malaysia||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Mali||100 / 100||0 / 100|
|Mexico||75 / 100||25 / 100|
|Montenegro||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|Morocco||0 / 100||25 / 100|
|Myanmar||0 / 100||25 / 100|
|Netherlands||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|New Zealand||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Niger||100 / 100||0 / 100|
|Nigeria||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|North Macedonia||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Norway||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Oman||25 / 100||25 / 100|
|Palestine||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Philippines||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Poland||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Portugal||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Qatar||25 / 100||25 / 100|
|Russia||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Saudi Arabia||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|Serbia||75 / 100||50 / 100|
|Singapore||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|South Africa||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|South Korea||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|South Sudan||50 / 100||25 / 100|
|Spain||75 / 100||50 / 100|
|Sudan||25 / 100||0 / 100|
|Sweden||75 / 100||100 / 100|
|Switzerland||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Taiwan||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Tanzania||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Thailand||50 / 100||0 / 100|
|Tunisia||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Turkey||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Uganda||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Ukraine||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|United Arab Emirates||50 / 100||25 / 100|
|United Kingdom||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|United States||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Venezuela||75 / 100||0 / 100|
|Zimbabwe||100 / 100||75 / 100|