Are there independent, well-resourced, and effective institutions within defence and security tasked with building integrity and countering corruption?
8a. Mandate and resources
Colombia score: NEI/100
There are no compliance or ethics units in place and no effort to establish them.
There is no evidence of such units, but there is evidence that the country is making proactive efforts to establish them.
Compliance and ethics units in the defence sector are in place. But there are extensive weaknesses in both staffing and funding, and expertise or their mandate is unclear.
There are identifiable compliance and ethics units within defence and security that are mandated to handle integrity and corruption in defence, but there are some weaknesses either in staffing and funding, or expertise.
There are identifiable compliance and ethics units within defence and security that are mandated to handle integrity and corruption in defence, and they are suitably staffed and funded.
There is not enough information to score this indicator. The Colombian legislation clearly stipulates that internal control offices have the independence to carry out their audit work, to do so, their direct participation in the acts of the administration is avoided. The Ministry of Defence has an Internal Control Office that is independent and there is also a General Comptroller’s office. Article 12 of Law 87 of 1993,  establishes that ICOs must, among others, engage in oversight of procedures and activities of the organisation. The budgets do not specifically state how much money went into this entity or what is its level of staffing. There is no publicly available information on funding and staffing. Also, although there are no specifically independent institutions responsible for exclusively controlling MMFs, control bodies such as the Attorney’s Office, Comptroller’s Office, and Prosecution are responsible through advisory offices for security and defence issues for the role of such control.
1. Ley N° 87. 1993. “Por la cual se establecen normas para el ejercicio del control interno en las entidades y organismos del estado y se dictan otras disposiciones.” [Law No. 87. 1993. “Which establishes norms for the exercise of internal control in state entities and organisms and dictates other provisions.”] Congreso de Colombia. 29 November 1993.
Colombia score: 75/100
The institutions/ units are under political control or they are misused. The work of the institutions can be shut down by other defence and security institutions.
The institutions/ units may be in the chain of command of the defence and security institutions that they oversee. However they can not be shut down by these institutions.
The institutions/ units are not in the chain of command of the defence and security institutions which they oversee. They report directly to a senior member of the Ministry of Defence (e.g. Chief of Staff).
With respect to the independence of officials of internal oversight offices, Article 8 of the Anti-Corruption Statute  mentions that appointments are made by the President of the Republic only for entities of the executive branch of the national order. These officials are thus accountable or subordinate to the President of the Republic, but not to the entities they supervise. However, the assessment of officials on their own performance remains with the Executive branch, as is the case in territorial entities, and there is no evidence of merit-based competition to fill these positions. In the case of territorial entities, these appointments are made by mayors and governors for a period of four years. According to Concept 166021 of 2014  of the Administrative Department of the Civil Service, the head of internal control through its audit mechanisms must ensure its due independence and objectivity, avoiding direct participation in the administrative acts of the entities. This characteristic should not be confused with discretion, since this office must attend internal coordination processes in the entities. It should be added that at the national level, entities responsible for exercising control over all other state institutions have independence from the defence sector, and belong to other powers such as the legislative and judicial branches. Although internal oversight offices are not subordinate to the Military Forces it oversees, if internal reporting processes exist within the supervised entity, in many cases this will limit the oversight body’s ability to take action.
1. Ley N° 1474. 2011. Por la cual se dictan normas orientadas a fortalecer los mecanismos de prevención, investigación y sanción de actos de corrupción y la efectividad del control de la gestión pública. [Law No. 1474, which establishes regulations aimed at strengthening mechanisms for the prevention, investigation, and sanction of acts of corruption and the effectiveness of public management control.] 12 July. Congreso de Colombia.
2. DAPF. 2014. Concepto 166021 de 2014. Radicado No. 20149000180432 del 27 de octubre de 2014. Departamento Administrativo de la Función Pública [Concept 166021 of 2014. Filed No. 20149000180432 of 27 October 2014. Administrative Department of the Public Function.] http://www.funcionpublica.gov.co/eva/gestornormativo/norma.php?i=73257.
Colombia score: 75/100
These institutions or units are not even aware of corruption risks within their institution.
Staff within the units understand the corruption risks specific to their institutions, but they fail to prepare an effective action plan with appropriate mitigation measures which address the risks.
Staff within the units understand the corruption risks specific to their institutions, but they are not able to address risks appropriately or adequately, either through their own work or by compelling others.
Staff within the units understand the corruption risks specific to their institutions, and are able to address some risks independently. But they are not able to ensure other departments address risks adequately.
Staff within the units understand the corruption risks specific to their institutions. They are able to address risks independently and to ensure that other departments or units handle risks appropriately. Actions to handle risks may include training, oversight, or policy recommendations.
The Ministry of Defence, the Armed Forces and the Police understand the specific risks of corruption in their institutions, which is why they have created different actions and measures to address this phenomenon. This is the case of the Directorate of Application of Transparency Standards of the DANTE Army, created by a Working Table conducted by Central Command on 28 April 2016, by Ministerial Resolution No. 3402 Article 27, in Bogotá under the Second Command of the National Army (SECEJ).  Its objective is to “sensitize and prevent on issues of institutional transparency and the generation of methods of combating corruption,”  and its role lies in the application of standards and pedagogical processes of ethics and transparency. In consulting the progress and balance of the DANTE strategy, interviews conducted suggest that this strategy has managed to position itself at the strategic level of the Army, which allows direct access to all units and battalions to highlight transparency and morality with the Armed Forces; and also has promoted permanent training processes on related issues, and technical, legal, and financial accompaniments to all units that manage public resources, achieving prevention.  In the National Police, there is a Comprehensive Policy of Police Transparency (PITP), designed to fight against “conduct that affects morality, defining general guidelines in matters of ethics, discipline, human rights, conflict resolution and attention and service to the citizen.”  On the other hand, under Resolution 6302 of 2014, the Ministry of Defence established the Action Group for Institutional Transparency (GATRI) and a review committee of conventions and/or inter-administrative contracts.  These will have the function of monitoring and evaluating the procurement processes and management of the security and defence budget, in addition to financial controls. However, no further information is available on the progress made by this Group. While control mechanisms are stipulated and operational, corruption situations persist within the defence sector. Beyond existing regulations and bodies, the difficulty in combating corruption lies with the need to consolidate an anti-corruption policy at the national level, which transcends the transparency procedures of sub entities, and has a widespread and comprehensive “pedagogical program” installed from the centres of basic, secondary, and higher education, so that it is possible to train professionals and officials in the future. 
1. Comando General Fuerzas Militares de Colombia. n.d. Dirección de aplicación de normas de transparencia y ética. [Department for the application of standards of transparency and ethics.] Accessed on: 2 November 2019. https://www.cgfm.mil.co/es/dante.
2. Ejército Nacional. 2017. Transparencia y acceso a la información, DANTE. [Transparency and access to information, DANTE.] 23 January. Obtained from Ejército Nacional: https://www.ejercito.mil.co/transparencia_acceso_informacion/informacion_interes/informacion_adicional/dante.
3. Entrevista 2. [Interview 2.] Entrevista de M. E. Rugel. 2019. Dirección de Transparencia e Integridad del Ejército de Colombia. [Department of Transparency and Integrity of the Colombian Army.] 30 April.
4. Policía Nacional de Colombia. 2018. “Una nueva política integral de transparencia policial.” [“A new comprehensive police transparency policy.”] Obtained from Policía Nacional: https://www.policia.gov.co/noticia/nueva-politica-integral-transparencia-policial.
5. Resolución N° 6302. 2014. “Por el cual se adopta el manual de contratación del ministerio de defensa nacional y sus unidades ejecutoras.” [Resolution No. 6302. “By which the contracting manual of the Ministry of National Defence and its executing units is adopted.”] Ministerio de Defensa Nacional. 31 July 2014.
6. Higuita, O. 2018. “Las leyes anticorrupción en Colombia: ¿de qué han servido?” [“Anti-corruption laws in Colombia: what have they been good for?”] 26 November. Obtained from TeleSur: https://www.telesurtv.net/bloggers/Las-leyes-anticorrupcion-en-Colombia-de-que-han-servido-20181126-0004.html
Compare scores by country
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|Country||8a. Mandate and resources||8b. Independence||8c. Effectiveness|
|Albania||100 / 100||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|Algeria||0 / 100||NA||NA|
|Angola||0 / 100||NA||NA|
|Argentina||100 / 100||50 / 100||75 / 100|
|Armenia||75 / 100||75 / 100||75 / 100|
|Australia||75 / 100||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Azerbaijan||25 / 100||25 / 100||25 / 100|
|Bahrain||0 / 100||NA||NA|
|Bangladesh||75 / 100||25 / 100||25 / 100|
|Belgium||75 / 100||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Bosnia and Herzegovina||100 / 100||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Botswana||25 / 100||50 / 100||50 / 100|
|Brazil||100 / 100||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Burkina Faso||50 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Cameroon||50 / 100||0 / 100||50 / 100|
|Canada||75 / 100||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Chile||50 / 100||25 / 100||50 / 100|
|China||75 / 100||0 / 100||75 / 100|
|Colombia||NEI||75 / 100||75 / 100|
|Cote d'Ivoire||50 / 100||25 / 100||25 / 100|
|Denmark||75 / 100||50 / 100||50 / 100|
|Egypt||50 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Estonia||75 / 100||50 / 100||50 / 100|
|Finland||100 / 100||50 / 100||NEI|
|France||50 / 100||50 / 100||75 / 100|
|Germany||75 / 100||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Ghana||50 / 100||0 / 100||25 / 100|
|Greece||0 / 100||NA||NA|
|Hungary||75 / 100||25 / 100||50 / 100|
|India||75 / 100||50 / 100||50 / 100|
|Indonesia||75 / 100||25 / 100||25 / 100|
|Iran||50 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Iraq||50 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Israel||75 / 100||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Italy||75 / 100||75 / 100||100 / 100|
|Japan||75 / 100||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Jordan||50 / 100||50 / 100||25 / 100|
|Kenya||75 / 100||50 / 100||50 / 100|
|Kosovo||75 / 100||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Kuwait||25 / 100||0 / 100||25 / 100|
|Latvia||75 / 100||75 / 100||100 / 100|
|Lebanon||50 / 100||50 / 100||25 / 100|
|Lithuania||75 / 100||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Malaysia||100 / 100||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Mali||50 / 100||NEI||0 / 100|
|Mexico||100 / 100||50 / 100||NEI|
|Montenegro||75 / 100||25 / 100||25 / 100|
|Morocco||0 / 100||NA||NA|
|Myanmar||25 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Netherlands||100 / 100||50 / 100||50 / 100|
|New Zealand||100 / 100||100 / 100||NEI|
|Niger||50 / 100||25 / 100||50 / 100|
|Nigeria||50 / 100||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|North Macedonia||75 / 100||75 / 100||75 / 100|
|Norway||100 / 100||75 / 100||75 / 100|
|Oman||0 / 100||NA||NA|
|Palestine||50 / 100||0 / 100||25 / 100|
|Philippines||50 / 100||0 / 100||50 / 100|
|Poland||75 / 100||50 / 100||50 / 100|
|Portugal||75 / 100||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Qatar||0 / 100||NA||NA|
|Russia||50 / 100||25 / 100||75 / 100|
|Saudi Arabia||25 / 100||NA||NA|
|Serbia||50 / 100||25 / 100||NEI|
|Singapore||75 / 100||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|South Africa||75 / 100||50 / 100||NEI|
|South Korea||100 / 100||75 / 100||50 / 100|
|South Sudan||0 / 100||0 / 100||NEI|
|Spain||50 / 100||NEI||50 / 100|
|Sudan||0 / 100||NA||NA|
|Sweden||100 / 100||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|Switzerland||75 / 100||75 / 100||75 / 100|
|Taiwan||100 / 100||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Tanzania||50 / 100||25 / 100||NEI|
|Thailand||100 / 100||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|Tunisia||50 / 100||50 / 100||NEI|
|Turkey||0 / 100||NA||NA|
|Uganda||50 / 100||50 / 100||50 / 100|
|Ukraine||75 / 100||0 / 100||75 / 100|
|United Arab Emirates||0 / 100||NA||NA|
|United Kingdom||100 / 100||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|United States||100 / 100||25 / 100||100 / 100|
|Venezuela||0 / 100||NA||NA|
|Zimbabwe||50 / 100||100 / 100||25 / 100|