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Q25.

Is independent and transparent scrutiny of asset disposals conducted by defence establishments, and are the reports of such scrutiny publicly available?

25a. Scrutiny

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25b. Independence

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25c. Transparency

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The disposal of assets is subject to scrutiny by the State Supreme Audi Institution (SSAI). Regarding the disposal of the immovable assets such as buildings and land, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) requests the removal of the given property/properties from the inventory of the MoD and once this is done the responsible institution is the Ministry of Finance and Economy (MoF). Therefore the auditing focus is shifted to this ministry [1].
The SSAI does not frequently audit the MoD. The last SSAI audit into the MoD was conducted in 2015. The SSAI recommendations regarding assets focused on the need to create an updated immovable property register and ensure their registration in the cadastral system [2]. The report does not contain any information on the disposal of immovable assets.

Regarding the military, there is no evidence of undue direct or indirect influence on the Internal Audit (IA) body about asset disposals [1].
On the other hand, there is the potential for undue political influence by the executive branch, given the Internal Audit’s double dependence from the minister of defence and the Directorate for the Harmonization of Public Financial Internal Control under the MoF, which has incentives to avoid exposing negative performances by institutions of the executive branch [2].
Since the Internal Audit has restricted freedom to independently audit ‘high risk’ activities, as its auditing programs are approved by the minister of defence, this procedure has been used previously to misdirect the work of Internal Audit within the MoD by allowing the audit body to focus only on low-risk activities and avoid monitoring activities with higher risks [2]. This was the case with a tender about repairing of radars in a military base and with the procurement of helicopters for the air force. In both cases, malpractices from this ‘high-stakes’ tenders were only detected by the SSAI, whereas the IA unit of the MoD had only considered auditing them [3]. The SSAI has specifically pointed out the need for improving the capacities of the Internal Audit unit within the MoD [4]. In terms of the influence of the executive branch into the external audit body (Supreme State Audit Institution), no evidences prove a direct impact. However, SSAI is affected indirectly as this institution uses IA reports for most of its evaluations. It then builds on those areas which it believes might present greater risk. However, since their work is largely directed by what the IA units do, there is a good chance that, unless there are other indications, the SSAI would also miss detecting all the potential malpractices within the institution.

Generally the SSAI publishes the auditing reports on its webside once the reposts are ready for publication (5). However, the audits are not conducted on yearly basis reports -since 2015 there have been only two SSAI reports published by auditing bodies on the work of the MoD – and not destined to be understood by the public (6) (7) (8). The report lack also detailed data and generally the information provided consists of summary findings and recommendations. The language used in the reports is rather technical and most of the public cannot easily process or understand its content (6) (7) (8).
No other reports have been published on the MoD on the audit of asset disposals.

There is no evidence that asset disposal by the Ministry of Defence is scrutinized by an internal oversight body. The last country assessment came to the same conclusion (1) and no evidence was found in the official gazette that an oversight body has been established in the meantime (2). The only other information related to the control of assets is Executive Decree No. 92-371 of October 10, 1992. It stipulates the rules regarding the management of real estate allocated to the Ministry of Defence and properties under the authority of the ministry are inventoried by the Ministry of Defence (3). No further information could be found.

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable because there is no evidence that asset disposal by the Minstry of Defence is scrutinized by an internal oversight body, see the last country assessment (1) and laws passed since 2016 (2). Also, see answer 25A.

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable because there is no evidence that asset disposal by the Ministry of Defence is scrutinized by an internal oversight body, see the last country assessment (1) and laws passed since 2016 (2). Also, see answer 25A.

Generally, the inventory and disposal of public assets are regulated by the Law on Public Assets (Law 18/10 of August 6) (1). This explicitly includes military naval vessels, combat vehicles and other equipment of similar durability (Law 18/10, Art. 12) [1]. Public asset disposals fall under the same legal procedures as their acquisition – the public procurement law (1), under the oversight of the Audit Court and the National Procurement Service of the Finance Ministry. However, there is no evidence of effective and transparent scrutiny of asset disposals by any oversight body. Arms, military and police logistics are exempt under a secrecy clause (Law 18/10, Art. 7) (1). The inventory and disposal of military defence and intelligence services assets fall under a special regime managed by the armed forces and the intelligence services (Law 18/10, Art. 84) (1).

Recently, according to a Maka Angola article, in 2017 the Finance Minister Archer Mangueira authorized the selling of three light aircraft to three private companies (SJL – Aeronáutica, EAPA and Air Jet) (2). Two of the companies are owned by two current senior officials (one is President João Lourenço’s brother), and one by a former senior military official. According to Maka Angola, no public tender took place, and the transaction violated the Law on Public Probity. Meanwhile, the national director of national assets of the Finance Ministry claimed a public tender took place and the sales were legal (2), (3).

Undue influence by the military or the executive on asset disposal scrutiny is likely to be a common feature of asset disposals (1), (2).

Audit reports on asset disposals are not available to the public (1), (2).

The disposals of assets of the National State that are carried out through the AABE (Governing Body of all the real estate activity of the state patrimony), are not regularly subject to scrutiny by the control bodies of the national administration (AGN, SIGEN ). [1] [2] In the 2016-2021 audits conducted by the AGN and SIGEN, both on the defence jurisdiction and the AABE itself, there is no evidence of processes audited specifically for the disposals of assets. [3] [4] [5] Within the scope of the Internal Audit Unit of the AABE, in the universe of audits carried out, a report on the sales of state properties is found in 2017, but focuses on the control of regulatory compliance of the management process of the sales. [6] [7] There are also reports regarding the performance of the AABE, for example, on the advances in the use and rational administration of all the properties of the National State and reports regarding contracts on real estate of the State. [8] However, and especially with regard to disposals, these audits are not regular.

There is no evidence regarding undue influence of the executive or military brances found in the scrutiny around the disposal of assets which is only occassionally carried out by the UAI of the AABE.

External control by AGN and SIGEN is normatively independent and self-sufficient. However, according to a report published in the SAIJ, the main weaknesses that affect the effectiveness of the AGN are: “a) The lack of independence from the governing party. Although in the tenor of Article 85 CN the AGN must be conducted by the opposition, in practice the College is composed of seven members with similar faculties, four of which – a majority – were proposed by the ruling party. This offer political force so the Executive Branch is in a position to influence the control body; b) Lack of powers to carry out ex ante or concomitant controls.” [1]

In the case of SIGEN, the SAIJ points out that its main problem is total lack of independence from the Executive Branch, with the General Trustee appointed and removed at the discretion of the President, while Internal Auditors, although they technically depend on SIGEN, hierarchically the answer to the highest authorities of the organisations and entities they should oversee. [2]

Audit reports regarding disposals were only found within the framework of the UAI of the AABE, and only in 2017. This is available to the public on that agency’s web platform, in the “Transparency” section under Audits. The remaining control bodies, such as SIGEN and AGN, do not show reports regarding the sale of assets from the defence jurisdiction from 2016 to date. [1] Through periodic news [2] it is possible to know, for example, the amount collected by the Armed Forces for the sale of assets (land), whose 70% is directed to the purchase of other assets (helicopters for example) and the remaining 30% remains in the National Treasury. There is also no publicly available information on scrutiny of these actions.

The Law on State Property Management (Article 4) does not apply to state property classified/envisaged under secret works and property under the possession and use of state-authorized agency in the field of defence, border and civil defence, as well as national security [1]. The new Law on Audit Chamber allows conducting an audit in regards to state and community property, however, it does not provide any clause for assets disposal’s audit in regards to defence and security [2]. The Standing Committee on Defence and Security of the National Assembly exercises oversight over defence, security and internal affairs. Under the regulations of the Committee, the Committee’s activity is public except for activities classified as state secrets. The regulations do not provide any clause about asset disposals scrutiny of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) by the committee. [3] The official answer received on this question is as follows: “The material resources taken out of the military units of the Defence Ministry are alienated by the Department of Logistics of the MoD. The alienation is carried out based on the market value provided by the licensed organization by auction published under the agreement between the MoD and the Rialto (trading exchange, bourse). The Rialto publishes information on the alienation of the mentioned material on its website in advance” [4].

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable, as asset disposals are not scrutinised by an oversight body of any form.

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable, as asset disposals are not scrutinised by an oversight body of any form.

Asset disposal processes do not seem to be subject to periodic external scrutiny, though the entire content of the Department of Defence’s (DoD) annual financial statements, including those relating to asset disposal, are subject to annual audit and certification [1]. The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade reviews the Defence Annual Report, which includes financial statements on disposal, annually; however, these reviews do not usually go into any level of detail on disposals [2]. The Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) may be requested to or initiate audits on any area within Defence [3]. In recent years, ANAO have conducted performance audits (including a follow-up audit) on DoD’s disposal management system for specialist military equipment at the request of the Minister of Defence and Chief of Defence Force [4, 5], and in 2005 ANAO conducted a performance audit on DoD’s management of long-term property leases, including disposal arrangements [6]. The performance audits are strongly formalised, with ANAO having extensive authority, including the power to demand any information required in the course of carrying out an audit, and to access any Commonwealth premises [7]. Therefore, while superficial financial audits are regularly undertaken, more thorough performance audits can only be expected irregularly,

The Auditor-General, heading the Australian National Audit Office, is an independent officer of Parliament [1], and has extensive powers based in legislation and policy to conduct audits which are respected by Defence. An expert respondent indicated that cooperation with the ANAO was practiced within Defence (though they also noted that ANAO’s focus on process rather than outcomes meant audits sometimes missed real issues) [2]. However, a recent case where the Auditor-General was forced to redact a public report about the Thales-produced Hawkei mobility vehicle in response to an order from the Attorney-General [3] was alleged in media reports to be because of undue influence from Thales. Though the conduct of the audit was not undermined, and this was not an instance of a performance audit of asset disposal processes, the regular course of publicly presenting the information revealed by the audit was subverted, and the incident has raised questions of whether a precedent has been set for political interference in regular audit (and information release) processes [4].

While reports from the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) are readily available online, including on asset disposal and audits of Defence finance statements – including disposals – the public information is aggregated and not useful to drawing conclusions about specific disposals [1, Appendix 2]. This may be because, while Defence is obliged to give ANAO information if requested, even if the information is classified, the public reports ANAO release must “be prepared in such a way as to allow for unclassified publication” [2]. In an environment where “Defence has come to view disclosure of information about its operations, policies, projects and directions as just creating risk, and so is reluctant to release anything not required by law” [3], information publicly released by ANAO on Defence asset disposals will be minimal. In a recent case, the Auditor-General was forced to censor some of a performance audit on the Thales Hawkei Protected Mobility Vehicle after the Attorney-General of Australia invoked for the first time the power to redact the report on national security or “commercial in confidence” grounds [4]. Reports indicated that Thales put pressure on the Australian government to censor the report after discovering that it included unflattering cost comparisons to other light armoured vehicle possibilities, among other criticisms [5]. While the Hawkei case was not an instance of a performance audit of asset disposal processes, the regular course of publicly presenting the information revealed by the audit was subverted, and the incident has raised questions of whether a precedent has been set for political interference in regular audit information release processes [5]. The ANAO releases audit reports in a timely fashion, publicly indicating clear timelines for the different stages of a report’s development on its website [6].

The website of the Chamber of Accounts does not have any information about it (1). No discussions have been held in the parliament in this direction either. According to Natig Jafarli this issue is closed to the public (2).

There is no exception to the fact that the audit organization is influenced by the military and executive regarding asset disposals (1, 2).

Generally, there have been no reports on asset disposals so far (1, 2, 3). There is no nformation on the website of the Chamber of Accounts (4). It is not available to the public.

There is no external or internal oversight body (other than the disposal committees formed by ministerial decree). These committees are formed whenever there is disposal activity (there is no specific time and there could be up to 15-20 per year based on how many disposal activities per year), and they are formed to oversee asset disposal or be part of the asset disposal process (they write a report and send it to the commanders/financial department). Scrutiny is completely absent on asset disposal within the Ministry of Defence (MoD) [1, 2, 3]. The committees are formed to ensure semi-formal procedures of asset disposal. After each process of asset disposal, the committees are dismantled. In some cases, some committees are formed by the director of financial administration at the MoD. An extensive search online and offline was conducted by researchers, but no further information on the issue was found.

As outlined in 25A, there is an absence of an internal and external body to scrutinize asset disposals. This indicator has therefore been marked ‘Not Applicable’ [1, 2, 3].

As outlined in 25A, there is an absence of an internal and external body to scrutinize asset disposals. This indicator has therefore been marked ‘Not Applicable’ [1, 2, 3].

The Defence Audit Directorate conducts an annual test review of assets written off or disposed of as per Section 47(V) of the Audit Code of 1999 [1]. The audit results are sent to the CAG for its annual reports to Parliament.

Section 170 of the government’s General Financial Rules Volume 1 [1] stipulates rules for the auditing of stores and stock accounts. The defence sector was excluded from these rules, allowing it to frame its own regulations and guidelines, which are not publicly available. Sales of fixed and non-financial assets are also duly coded in the government’s Budget & Accounting Classification Manual [2]. No official or public records are available to suggest whether there has been any undue interference in the audit reports on asset disposals by the Ministry of Defence or its entities, or whether they are fully independent.

The CAG generally publishes audit reports for all ministries, including the Ministry of Defence. However, there is no summary report on asset disposal [1].

Depending on the contract type, every sale above an amount stipulated in the Royal Decree on administrative and budget controls is subject to the preliminary advice of the Inspectorate of Finance, an independent control body depending from the Ministry of Budget [1]. Every sale of military equipment above 2.200.000€ (VAT excluded) is subject to the approval of a specific commission of the House of Representatives [2].

Sales may be subject to audits by the Federal Internal Audit Service (FIA), which is part of the Federal Public Service of the Chancellory of the Prime Minister, or to a posteriori audit of the Court of Auditors (Rekenhof) — an auditing body independent from Parliament.

Every sale of military equipment by the Belgian Defence to a foreign buyer is subject to the granting of an export license by the Ministry of Economics, and is subject to the signature of an End User Certificate whereby the purchaser commits not to further sell the material without prior approval [3].

The material resources directorate-general is headed by the material resources director-general [1]. The director-general’s area of ​​expertise is equipment, communication and information systems, infrastructure, environment and logistics, including public procurement.

The director-general prepares the possible sale of surplus materials and real estate and executes them; the possible balance will be charged either to the General Expenditure Budget or to the Ways and Means Budget for the benefit of the budgetary fund 16.4; for the reinvestment of the receipts coming from services rendered against reimbursement, from the disposal of surplus equipment, materials or ammunition and from the disposal of real estate forming part of the patrimony entrusted to the management of the Minister of Defence [2].

Finally, the Minister of Defence is authorised, with regard to equipment, materials, weapons and ammunition, to enter into reciprocal transfer, exchange and loan agreements with other departments, Belgian or foreign companies and third countries, provided that the renewal of stocks useful to the Armed Forces is promoted in this way.

There is no indication that the executive or the military unduly influence scrutiny by the Court of Auditors of the Federal Internal Audit Service [3].

Audit reports of the Court of Auditors are made public online [1]. They generally include the report, a summary and a press communication and are published within a reasonable timeframe.

A Strategic Committee for Weapons, Ammunition, Mines and Explosives is a body established for the primary purpose of dealing with surplus weapons, ammunition and explosives controlled by the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina which held its first meeting in 2013. The members of the forum are representatives of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina (AFBiH), as well as representatives of the EU, OSCE Mission to BiH, NATO HQ in Sarajevo, EUFOR, UNDP and representatives of different embassies in BiH [1].
During the sessions of the meeting results of performed activities related to the management of MiMES surplus owned by the MoD, the degree of realization of the EU STAR and SAFE-UP projects that are implemented in cooperation with United Nations Development Program and OSCE Mission in BiH, EUFOR support to ensure the stated activities and challenges and future activities related to the mentioned process were presented [2].
Within the MoD, this process is a part of control performed by the Internal Audit Service of the MoD. The Internal Audit Service carries out audits following the Rulebook on Internal Audits in BiH Ministry of Defence. The control is performed following the Rulebook on Financial and Accounting Operations in BiH MoD and BiH AF (Internal audit, Article 14 and Chapter XII – Internal Audit Service)[3, 4]. Auditing of this process is a part of internal auditing within the MoD that is carried out at least once a year [5]. The audit report is submitted to the relevant organizational units of BiH MoD that take care of surplus assets, but also to the Ministry of Defence, Central Harmonizing Unit of the Ministry of Finance and Treasury of BiH and Auditing Office for Institutions of BiH [5].
Solving the issue of surplus assets of the MoD and AFBiH is the part of EU STAR and SAFE-UP projects that are implemented in cooperation with United Nations Development Program in BiH and OSCE Mission in BiH, so the monitoring of this process is performed by UN and OSCE Mission as international factors[5]. When audits are conducted in institutions, all the documents of the institution being audited are made available to the audit team, based on which one can conclude that everything is transparent for their work in this process [5]. No specific obligation or recommendation in this respect could be identified in their final report.
External financial auditing occurs once a year. Within the yearly external financial audit conducted by the Audit Office of the Institutions of BiH, within the chapter “Balance Sheet” there is a sub-chapter “List of Assets and Liabilities”. This is an oversight of the inventory procedures and there is no scrutiny or verification of the data in the report [6].
The inventory is conducted based on the Inventory Guidance of the MoD and AFBiH from March 2012 [7].

According to the government reviewer, paragraph 1 of Article 16 of the Law on Audit of BiH the Audit Office requires the submission of a report to the audited institution (including MoD BiH – Note to GI MoD BiH) and Parliament. The report is submitted simultaneously to the Council of Ministers and the Presidency and may be submitted to any other competent institution. The Audit Office will make the audit reports public after they have been submitted. An example of implementation is the agenda of the Session of the House of Peoples of BiH in item 2 and 4 of the agenda subject reports submitted by the Audit Office of the Institutions of BiH in 2019 [8].

Upon the suggestion of the MoD and with the approval of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the MoD sells surplus assets, weapons, ammunition, mines and explosives, donation and destruction [1]. Overarching supervision of the disposal of surplus weapons, ammunition and explosive ordnance is exercised by the executive branch [2]. Further supervision is provided by a commission formed by the MoD, through the Joint Staff of the AFBiH. No undue influence has been found.

Reports on the process are presented at sessions of the Strategic Committee for Weapons, Ammunition, Mines and Explosives [1]. Information regarding this is publicly available at the web site of BiH MoD [2]. The audit report on the status and management of surplus assets is also published. For example, the Report on Performed Financial Audit of the BiH Ministry of Defence for 2017 contains the information. The status of non-prospective movable and real property was described in Chapter 5.2.5 of the report [3].External financial auditing occurs once a year.

As highlighted above, the disposal of assets is not left to the discretion of the security sectors but it is conducted by the PPADB in terms of the PPADB Act. The PPADB is audited primarilly by the Botswana Auditor General [1]. The following institutions share some responsibility for auditing disposals with various oversight mandates: Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC), Directorate of Public Service Management (DPSM), Office of the Ombudsman, Independent Electoral Commission, Office of the President, Auditor General, Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Board (PPADB), Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MFED), Financial Intelligence Agency (FIA), Bank of Botswana, Botswana Unified Revenue Services (BURS), Non-Banking Financial Regulatory Authority (NBFIRA), Police Service, Administration of Justice, Directorate of Public Prosecutions (DPP), Attorney General’s Chambers and Competition Authority [2]. The auditing of assest disposal is thorough and formaised as provided for in the legal provisions.

Disposals of assets are not conducted by defence establishments [1]. It follows that the defence establishments are not published by the defence but by the PPADB that is responsible for both disposal and procurement [1]. The 2017/2018 PPADB Annual Report, states inter alia that: during the period under review, 41 Board meetings were held and decisions (excluding those of the Board Committees), were published in the DailyNews. Furthermore, procurement plans continue to be published. As a way of enhancing transparency, PPADB launched the tip-off anonymous service in June 2017 operated by Deloitte whereby members of the public, contractors, procuring entities, or even PPADB employees, can report perceived acts of corruption or unbecoming behavior without fear of intimidation. A few reports received were investigated and measures put in place to publicise the services for optimal use [2]. The PPADB which conducts audit of asset disposal is independent of the Military and there is no evidence of undue influence.

The Auditor General of Botswana is mandated to undertake an annual performance audit of the Board, its Committees, sub-Committees and the Procuring and Disposing Entities. The Auditor General has consistently audited the financials of the PPADB since its formation [1, 2]. The mandate of the Auditor General is prescribed in terms of the law. Reports are produced by the Auditor General annually, and they are usually released 9 months after audit is done. It must be noted that BDF does not conduct its own disposals as they are conducted by the PPADB instead. As such, PPADB publishes the reports of asset disposals that it conducts on behalf of defence establishments.

The Court of Auditors (TCU) as the federal external control institution audits asset disposals together with all public acquisitions made by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and single forces. There is some evidence of legislative control over asset disposals of the Brazilian Navy, for example [1]. The army follows the General Instructions for Asset Disposals [2] and complementary regulations [3], which are relatively old regulations (1987-1988). However, it is not clear how often these controls are utilized.

There is no evidence of undue influence in the scrutiny of asset disposals of defence institutions. However, this could happen, and according to an interviewee who chose to remain anonymous, even while control institutions in Brazil are independent, their composition often privileges people aligned with the government to be in decision-making positions [1].

No audits of asset disposals made by defence institutions were found within the TCU’s website [1]. However, audit reports are made public by the armed forces in their respective Annual Management Reports (Relatório de Gestão), but only summary information on asset disposals is made publicly available, under specific rubrics of “Alienação de bens” (Asset Disposal) [2]. The Navy also publish summarized information regarding asset disposals [3].

There is no evidence concerning military disposals. However, the GAN 2016 report states that “Businesses dealing with public procurement in Burkina Faso are faced with high corruption risks. Corruption in the form of facilitation payments, bribery and preferential treatment in procurement deals is common (GCR 2014-2015) (2). The people of Burkina Faso rank procurement officials among the government staff who commonly engage in corruption (ICS 2016). Procurement procedures are not always respected; in certain tenders, contract conditions are not clearly defined (GI 2016) (2). The Autorité de Régulation de la Commande Publique (ARCOP) is responsible for monitoring the execution of all government contracts and ensuring transparency and fairness of in the process (ICS 2016). ARCOP works closely with the media, which substantially increased the latter’s ability to report on high-profile corruption cases (ICS 2016). Furthermore, reports suggest that several public contracts have been awarded without a tender, but merely through mutual agreement (GI 2016). The percentage of tenders awarded no tender increased from 14% in 2014 to 18.5% in 2015, indicating a decrease in the levels of transparency in public procurement (GI 2016). However, when tenders are publicized, private and state-owned companies compete on equal terms and conditions, yet public enterprises have a monopoly over the segment in which they are active (ICS 2016). Companies found guilty of violating procurement regulations are prohibited from participating in future bids (GI 2016) (1).

Article 174: Every public purchase contract shall be subject to supervision, control, monitoring and supervision of its administrative, technical and financial execution. These missions are carried out by the Contracting Authority and the Central Procurement Directorate. The various clauses of the administrative and technical clauses set the conditions and the modalities of the exercise of these missions (2).

Article 175: Independently of these controls, the execution of any public order is submitted to the various bodies of inspection and control of the State. Article 176: Periodic external audits may be organized as necessary on the initiative of the Central Directorate of Public Procurement (2).

Because there is no scrutiny of asset disposals, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

Because there is no scrutiny of asset disposals, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

Although there are several organs with the authority to audit state institutions, including defence and security, there is no evidence that these institutions have been audited for asset disposals over the past five years. Constitutionally, scrutiny of defence and security matters falls under the authority of the executive and this is carried out at the discretion of the Head of State, who is also the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (Article 35 of Law No. 96-06 of 18 January 1996) [1]. There is also no evidence that civil society has played an effective oversight role in scrutinising defence and security, whose processes are often labelled as matters of national security [2].

In addition, the most recent budget did not present individual sources of non-tax revenue in the Executive’s Budget Proposal, which confirms the fact that there is hardly any scrutiny [3].

There is no evidence that defence and asset disposals are subject to any form of scrutiny or oversight [1] [2]. Therefore, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

There is no audit report on the military and other security institutions in the annual budget for 2017 [1]. Therefore, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

The Auditor General has auditing responsibilities for the entire government; the internal auditor for the DND and CAF is the ADM (Review Services). Both can audit asset sales or disposals. DAOD 3013-0 (see 24B) lays out transparency requirements for all asset disposals by defence establishments. It required the DND and CAF authorities to: “ensure transparency and fairness in the management of the disposal of materiel; keep records of decisions and approval documents substantiating any disposal of materiel, including auditable records of the costing analyses used for the disposal; utilize the materiel management system of record for the retention of documents relating to the disposal of materiel and for audit purposes; protect the integrity of materiel pending disposal action;…have delegation instruments in place that clearly set out DND and CAF authorities and accountabilities for the disposal of materiel; utilize applicable Public Services and Procurement Canada (PSPC) sales instruments when conducting any sales of surplus materiel in Canada; attempt the sale of surplus materiel at fair market value in an open and transparent process when conducting sales outside of Canada or in locations too remote for PSPC; attempt the sale of valuable surplus materiel at fair market value, utilizing applicable PSPC sales instruments…”. [1] Therefore, there is an direct responsibility to ensure all sales and disposals may be audited and that the central infrastructure of PSPC (buyandsell.ca / GCSurplus) is used, which adds another layer of transparency and oversight. [2] Furthermore, the DND and CAF are not permitted to donate surplus materual to an individual or private sector organisation without the express written approval of the Treasury Board or an Order in Council (i.e. a Cabinet directive). [1] Within the Audit and Evaluation (A&E) Reports are asset disposal-related topics; however, the frequency of those specific to asset disposals is irregular. [3]

Both the Chief Review Service and the Auditor General, as well as Public Works Canada, are insulated from interference by the executive or military. [1] [2] Jordan Taft, in his article “From Change to Stability: Investigating Canada’s Office of the Auditor General” notes that there has been a very consistent relationship between the Office of the Auditor General (OAG) in that its interactions often occur in the context of standing committee hearings and reports, and are especially prevalent after a change in government when there is a heightened interest in the accountability of the previous government. [3] Taft additionally notes that, “According to a former top OAG official ‘the OAG, from the point of view of its public profile, can seem to be an important organization. But, do I think that a Prime Minister or a Cabinet of a Liberal or Conservative government has a big discussion about how it’s going to deal with the OAG? We’re not that important, we’re just auditors.'” [3]

Independent and transparent audit reports on asset disposals by DND have been released within a reasonable timeframe, albeit infrequently. However, the data available in the last reports from internal and external audits contained only vague or aggregate information about items disposed off, and revenue generated. [1] [2] [3]

Each year, the branches of the military and their associated organisms, in coordination with the sub-secretary for the armed forces, provide information about the financial accounts of the institutions, including money obtained through financial and non-financial assets [1]. According to the legislation [2, 3], these resources constitute the institutions’ own sources of income, and they do not form part of the nation’s general accounts. The procedures for the disposition of assets are scrutinised by the General Comptroller’s Office (CGR) through special audits. The scrutiny is thorough and formalised according to the CGR’s audit methodology and the procedures of internal control. Audit reports are official documents communicated to the authorities of the defence sector. An analysis of published audits in the defence sector suggests that the examination of asset disposals is performed [4, 5, 6, 7], but it is not regular in time and across institutions. Moreover, various audits are restricted reports, for which there is only a general description of the content and the results of the audit.

There is no evidence of the exercise of undue influence in the audit processes carried out by the CGR. Despite its lack of assets, the CGR is capable enough to stand on trials related to the exercise of its powers [1]. The CGR’s audit reports follow a methodology and procedures of internal control independently established by the institution [2, 3]. A former senior analyst in the CGR suggested that deficiencies were related to the scope, regularity, and public availability of audit reports rather than its possible biases [4].

Comprehensive audit reports produced by the General Comptroller are available on the transparency platform of the armed forces [1]. For each institution, the final reports of the audits and the written response of the corresponding service are published. Documents are published with an average delay of four months. It must be noted, however, that while the air force and the army have an updated register of audits (until 2019), the navy only reports audits until (2017). An audit report that examined the accounts for the programming process and compliance with the annual disposal plan in the Chilean Navy during 2017 has not been published yet. On the other hand, there is not an overarching asset disposal audit report for all services in the military, and the information of financial and non-financial asset disposals, as well as their amounts, are only informed via a summary [2, 3]. The army publishes Financial Statements Reports with updated information on balance sheets; however, the information is aggregated and only contains the total income from disposals of assets, both financial and non-financial [4]. In the navy and the air force, information of sources of income are reported in the Statements of Budget Execution, but the resources coming from disposals of assets is not reported in detail [5, 6].

The CMC Audit Office (CMCAO) is in charge of scrutinising asset disposals. In 2014 the CMCAO became independent from the former PLA General Logistics Department, which was a bastion of corruption before 2012 and had the political power to interfere in audits of asset disposals. [1] There is no independent (non-military) scrutiny other than that conducted internally by the CMCAO. Since 2013, there has been an intensification of the frequency of audits in military units, with over 39,000 having been audited in the following six years. [2] There is no information on the effectiveness of audits in relation to asset disposals, but overall, there is ample evidence of effectiveness of audits as part of or leading to prosecutions. [3]

Scrutiny is only internal, provided by the CMC Audit Office and, in case of suspected corruption, the Discipline Inspection Commission. Both the CMCAO and the CMCDIC are under the control of the CCP, which means that political influence is present, including undue influence by individual politicians. There is no independent scrutiny of any kind (parliamentary, judicial, executive).

Audit reports are not made public. There is no guaranteed access to information by law and in practice, asset disposal reports are not made public.

The financial and administrative operations of the defence sector are subject to the control and supervision of the supervisory bodies such as: Ombudsman’s Office, Office of the Attorney General, and Comptroller General of the Republic. According to the State Council in its Concept C.E. 1663 of 2005, [1] the role of the Ombudsman’s Office is to ensure that transparency is ensured in the design process of the disposal programmes submitted by the Executive, which implies the proper publicity of the process, and the conditions of the sale of the asset. With regard to fiscal control, the Comptroller General of the Republic conducts external audits annually, the objective of which is to reflect the results of operations and changes in the financial situation of the entities. [2] The audit plans for 2018 reflect the conduct of 26 financial audits [3] and in 2019, 26 actions within the framework of the defence sector. [4] It should be clarified that in the audit plans details about whether the actions will be aimed at reviewing the alienated assets are not published, so recent documents on external audits relating to these issues are not clearly evident. With regard to the role of the Office of the Attorney General, the Office should investigate the conduct of public servants, which impede or hinder the development of the disposal processes. [1]. The Office of the Attorney General also does not clearly define disciplinary concepts around the asset disposal processes in the defence sector. However, there is no evidence of regularity in the expeditions of disciplinary concepts in the three control authorities exposed. [5]

The supervisory bodies, namely the Office of the Attorney’s Office, Comptroller, and Defender’s Office, have functional, administrative, and budgetary independence, which allows them to exercise functions such as the prevention and sanctioning of actions related to the management of public resources, the management of the state, and the actions of public officials [1, 2] With regard to fiscal control, the Comptroller carries out its actions independently and effectively. The Political Constitution of Colombia, in Article 267, determines the administrative and budgetary autonomy of the Comptroller, exercising external control, of a later and selective nature. [3] The Comptroller’s Office is a decentralized entity with 65 Comptrollers distributed throughout the national territory. This internal structure has received much criticism because in some regions the Comptroller’s Office has been the site of scandals of clientelism and corruption, according to Barreto. [4] Regional Comptrollerships have served as avenues to give jobs to friends of Councillors and Members, which calls into question their autonomy with regard to the external audit processes. However, in view of the influence that may arise in the counting processes on the issues of asset disposal, there is no press evidence of possible involvement of the Military or the Executive. Yet due to the prevelance of allegations of clientelism and corruption, it can be inferred that fiscal audit processes may carry this risk.

The financial audit reports submitted by the Comptroller present a comprehensive analysis on accounting, budget, and external control terms, which allows for a number of findings related to administrative accounting, fiscal responsibility, disciplinary, and criminal liability. [1] These analyses also include asset disposal audits. The reports presented relate only the findings, the responses of the entities, and the action to be taken regarding the processes and actions performed in the entity that need to be improved. With regard to asset disposal issues, only inconsistencies presented in the process are described, therefore not all audit reports are freely available to the public. Of the 26 financial audits carried out on the defence sector in 2018, [2] there are only 6 audits published on the Comptroller’s website.

The procedure for disposing of arms and ammunition is subject to the controls of ComNat-ALPC, a coordinating body of the Ministry of the Interior. There is no evidence that asset disposals carried out by the ComNat-ALPC are audited by the Cour des Comptes (Supreme Audit Court) or by the NA. However, part of the responsibility of the ComNat-ALPC is to raise public awareness about the need to control the circulation of arms and ammunition. Because the first and second phases of ComNat-ALPC activities have been financed by the government of Japan, it is in theory subject to the scrutiny of the Embassy of Japan (1). Additionally, scrutiny might be carried out by the Comptroller General, the Commissariat des Armées, the Inspection générale des Armées, the Inspection générale d’Etat or the Cour des Comptes.

Given the tension and rivalry within the government of President Ouattara, it is inevitable that some of the more problematic asset disposal activities of the ComNat-ALPC are subject to undue pressure by the executive and high-ranking officials. Further, the informal pressure from the former rebel leaders known as COMZONES likely regularly undermines the independent scrutiny of assets disposals. For example, a video uploaded to the Ivoire Business website in 2013 allegedly showed decommissioned armoured vehicles, pickup trucks and cars that now belong to the former rebel leader known as Wattao. Though dated, it illustrates how Investigating such instances of illicit decommissioning of assets would likely result in “undue pressure” (1).

There is no evidence that the coordinating body, ComNat-ALPC, makes its audit reports on the disposal of arms and ammunition publicly available. However, Ivorian media coverage of asset disposals coordinated by ComNat-ALPC often provides details about the number and types of machine guns, sub-machine guns, ammunition, explosives, vehicles, license plates, and other things that have been seized or destroyed.
For example, the ComNat-ALPC destroyed a cache of 360 small arms in the region of Soubré from 12 to 15 September 2017. The stockpile had been initially seized by a court of law in Soubré during a judicial investigation. Before their destruction by ComNat-ALPC, they were registered in a database of destroyed arms set up by UNDP. A ComNat-ALPC spokesperson explained that the arms had been separated by type, then registered in the database and then destroyed, as per Article 17 of the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms (1). In an interview with Abidjan-based Fratmat.info in April 2018, the President of the ComNat-ALPC, Kouadio Yao, provided details about the decommissioning of arms within the forest reserve of Goin Débé in the region of Cavally. In 3 months, ComNat-ALPC collected 600 arms and 5,000 rounds of ammunition from locals in the region (2).

Beyond the Danish National Audit Office’s scrutiny of the annual state budget, research indicates that asset disposals specifically are not scrutinised on a regular nor frequent basis by the Danish National Audit Office, nor by Parliament [1]. As reported in Q24, DNAO audits will normally only be initiated if internal controlling mechanisms or audits show irregularities or shortcomings. Research found one recent instance of a DNAO audit of asset disposals within the Defence, a so-called legal critical revision report (“juridisk-kritisk revision”) [2].The report did not include any critical remarks. Audits of asset disposals are thus thorough but rare.

The Danish National Audit Office is governed by legislation (The Auditor General Act) which, among other things, guarantees its independence [1]. Research found no evidence of undue influence of the DNAO [2].

Judging only by the single audit report that research found, audit reports on assets disposals are not made available to the public, but are made for internal use. However, they may be made available to the public upon request. [1, 2].
As stated on the DNAO website, the so-called legal critical revision reports are written for the authority that is being revised and a copy is sent to the ministerial department [3].

The two bodies that might have some formal oversight powers over asset disposal are the parliament and the CAA. This Parliament has very limited powers vis-a-vis the National Defence Council (1), (2). This Parliament has never summoned the minister of defence for questioning despite summoning most of the other ministers, including the minister of interior (3). As for the CAA, it is very unclear the extent to which asset disposals are subject to external audits, but the complaints of the former chief auditor Hisham Geneina shows that whatever formal legal powers the CAA might have over the defence sector, it does not translate to real power. Geneina in April 2013 before the military power takeover said: “the economic projects, companies, social clubs and hospital of the ‘sovereign entities’ are not subject to the scrutiny of the CAA.” (4). This statement was given in 2013 before the current reporting period however, all the development since shows only indicate that the CAA has fewer powers in auditing military defence expenditure, especially the increasing power of the president and the executive over the CAA manifested in the law passed by al-Sisi granting himself the power to remove the head of the CAA (5).

According to our sources, both the executive (which is mostly made up of former military officers) and the military undermines the work of the oversight agencies. Although there are laws (1) that provide oversight agencies with the right to scrutinize the military, they have been sidelined by passing other laws that give the military special status against scrutiny (2), (3), (4). The wide powers granted to the military and the executive undermine scrutiny by the audit body over asset disposals, and even if the CAA has formal powers to audit, they do translate to a real power to audit asset disposal in the defence sector. For example, there are secret budgets (1) that are exempted from financial regulations and scrutiny when it comes to tenders (5) and any arms-related contracts (6).

According to our sources, there are no such reports available internally in the MoD in principles. Therefore, the public will not have reports that do not exist (1), (2), (3). There are no external audit reports on asset disposals due to the restrictions imposed on the CAA concerning the defence sector.

The State Asset Department at the Ministry of Finance manages the functioning and the policies of state assets in Estonia. [1] The Ministry of Finance is entitled to require the Ministry of Defence to submit information and documents concerning administration of state assets. They are allowed to conduct on-site inspections and make recommendations. The Ministry of Finance is audited by the National Audit Office. [2]
The National Audit Office also exercises economic control over the use and preservation of state assets. It audits the use and preservation of state assets that have been transferred into the possession of other persons, as stipulated by the National Audit Office Act. [3] The legislation does not specify whether it also includes the disposal. However, the National Audit Office exercises supervision [4] over the Riigi Kinnisvara Aktsiaselts (State Real Estate Ltd). The latter’s objective is to guarantee the saving and effective provision of the real estate service to the executors of state authority. [5]

The National Audit Office is an independent state body that assures the Riigikogu and the public that the funds of the public sector are used legally and effectively. [1] There has not been any known cases of the National Audit Office being influenced when it comes to asset disposals. Moreover, the National Audit Office submits their annual reports concerning state assets to the Riigikogu. [2] The National Audit Office publishes short summaries of the audits of the Ministry of Defence’s bookkeeping and legality of transactions, which include the disposal of assets. More specifically, the Ministry of Finance is exercising oversight of the managing of the public real estate. The Ministry made two reports public concerning this. [3]

Annual audit reports published by the National Audit Office are made public on their website. [1] However, only in short summaries. The law does not stipulate when the reports must be made publicly available, but based on the dates of the published summaries of the reports it may be concluded that they are published within reasonable timeframe – usually between two to four months after the end of the audited timeframe.
There have been more thorough audits conducted on specific issues (including asset disposals) in the Ministry of Defence. [2] These audits are irregular, but instead of short summaries, longer reports on those audits are made publicly available. The reports of the Ministry of Finance regarding the management of real estate by state-owned institutions are also publicly available. So far there have been only two reports published. [3]
However, there is an effort from the Ministry of Finance to renew the system in order to make gathering and analysing data easier. One of the goals of the renewing of the system is also to make the data more accessible for the public. The analysis done by the Ministry of Finance concluded that the current system does not give a full overview of the current situation related to the state assets. [4]

According to a written response of the Headquarters of the Defence Forces, asset disposals in the Defence Forces are documented accordingly and this documentation is publicly available by default, unless obligations of confidentiality in legislation otherwise require. Asset disposals are carried out according to the legislation in force. [1]

Changes in the assets of the Defence Forces are documented in financial accounts which are inspected by the National Audit Office. According to its website, the NAO “annually audits the financial statements of the central government and its accounting units, i.e. ministries and other agencies and institutions. […] [NAO] conducts approximately 70 financial audits every year. During an audit, the following areas are reviewed in organisations being audited: budget procedures, setting of financial goals, final accounts, annual report, internal control procedures, compliance with the budget and key budget provisions.

The need for an audit is determined according to the significance of the entity considering the management of central government finances and financial statements and the risks involved. Another key factor is the impact of the entity on public decision-making. On the basis of an audit, [NAO] issues a statement on: whether financial statements have been prepared as required in regulations, whether the review of statements and notes provides correct and sufficient information about the finances of the accounting unit and the state, whether correct and sufficient information about operational efficiency has been presented in the annual report, whether internal control has been arranged properly in the agency or institution being audited, whether the budget and key financial regulations have been complied with. [2] Auditing reports are available on NAO’s website [3].

According to a written response of the Headquarters of the Defence Forces, asset disposals in the Defence Forces are documented accordingly and this documentation is publicly available by default, unless obligations of confidentiality in legislation otherwise require. Asset disposals are carried out accoring to the legislation in force. [1] The National Audit Office operates as an independent institution.There is no evidence from open-source research of undue influence in the audit of asset disposal accounts.

Changes in the assets of the Defence Forces are documented in financial accounts inspected by the National Audit Office. According to its website, NAO “annually audits the financial statements of the central government and its accounting units, i.e. ministries and other agencies and institutions. […] [NAO] conducts approximately 70 financial audits every year. During an audit, the following areas are reviewed in organisations being audited: budget procedures, setting of financial goals, final accounts, annual report, internal control procedures, compliance with the budget and key budget provisions. The need for an audit is determined according to the significance of the entity considering the management of central government finances and financial statements and the risks involved. [1]

Another key factor is the impact of the entity on public decision-making. On the basis of an audit, [NAO] issues a statement on: whether financial statements have been prepared as required in regulations, whether the review of statements and notes provides correct and sufficient information about the finances of the accounting unit and the state, whether correct and sufficient information about operational efficiency has been presented in the annual report, whether internal control has been arranged properly in the agency or institution being audited, whether the budget and key financial regulations have been complied with. [1] Auditing reports are available on NAO’s website [2].

According to a written response of the Headquarters of the Defence Forces, asset disposals in the Defence Forces are documented accordingly and this documentation is publicly available by default, unless obligations of confidentiality in legislation otherwise require. Asset disposals are carried out accoring to the legislation in force. [3] The timeframe for the release of such audits could not be determined.

The Cour des comptes is the highest audit institution that reviews, scrutinises, criticises, publishes reports and recommendations about all aspects of the State budget, including ministries’ assets disposals. [1] Scrutiny is thorough and formalised. The Cour des comptes is an independent, vocal and well-respected institution. But there is no regular timeframe for its assessments of the ministries’ assets disposals, no planned calendar, nor any regularity in its nature.
In the latest edition of the Senate information report about the Ministry of Armed Forces real estate assets, [2] no mention is made of an “internal control” by the Executive Permanent Commission (CEP), contrary to the 2010 report quoted in the Government Defence Index 2015. [3]

No record of undue influence exerted by the executive or the military on the asset disposal process was found. [1]

Audit reports on asset disposals aren’t publicly released on a regular basis.
The Cour des comptes does publish reports about the “management of real estate assets of the State” on a regular basis, but even if it mentions the disposals of the Ministry of the Armed Forces, [1] it addresses the real estate assets of all ministries combined, and doesn’t target the defence disposals in particular.
The only detailed information about asset disposals of the Ministry of the Armed Forces available is in the appendix part of the latest Senate information report about the Ministry of the Armed Forces real estate assets. [2] The previous report on this topic was published in 2010. [3]

Independent and transparent scrutiny of asset disposals is carried out by the Federal Audit Office, as this is the external body responsible for the scrutiny of all public expenditure. Data is publicly available [1].

The Federal Disposal Sales and Marketing Agency (VEBEG), which is responsible for asset disposal, is subject to an annual audit carried out by external audit companies, as well as sporadic audits carried out by the Federal Audit Office. VEBEG GmbH is wholly owned by the Federal Republic of Germany. VEBEG continuously offers and sells a wide range of surplus equipment, mainly for the account of any type of public body [2]. The disposal of assets within the Ministry of Defence is also monitored by the Defence Committee and (to the extent that it is already discussed within the budget) the Budget Committee of the German Bundestag. This data is publicly available as well. The revenue from asset disposals, for example, can be found in the budget of the Ministry of Defence under ‘Erlöse aus der Veräusserung von beweglichen Sachen’ (132 01-032) [3].

An independent review of the sale of assets is conducted as part of the audits of the Federal Audit Office and relates to the assets that are the responsibility of the Federal Ministry of Defence (material, defence material). The fiduciary sales of VEBEG are primarily checked by the auditor as part of the audit of the annual financial statements and the company’s executive bodies are informed accordingly. The review by the Federal Audit Office is carried out on a point-by-point basis or as part of a thematic audit [4].

Neither the executive nor the military exert undue influence over the scrutiny carried out by the audit body regarding asset disposals.

The Federal Audit Office, as an independent body of financial control, is a supreme federal authority that is only subject to the law. The President, the Vice President, the heads of department and the heads of the audit department enjoy judicial independence [1]. Any inadmissible influence on the external review by the Federal Audit Office is not possible [2].

Comprehensive audit reports are available to the public [1]. For example, the revenues from asset disposal can be found in the annual budget of the Ministry of Defence [2]. According to the existing regulations, reports from the Federal Audit Office are made available to a group of people authorised to receive them (public, parliamentary space, etc.). The Federal Audit Office decides whether and to what extent it publishes its audit results, be it in the form of audit communications (see Section 96 of the Federal Budget Code) or comments to be dealt with in the Auditing Committee of the Budget Committee of the German Bundestag (see Section 97 of the Federal Budget Code) [3,4]. There is no evidence of any major delays in the publication of audit reports.

Asset disposals are scrutinised by an audit body the Public Procurement Board they are scrutinised to meet a set of minimum regulations. Scrutiny after contract approval has been criticised as sporadic and often superficial (1), (2), (3), (4), (5). For example, in February 2017, soldiers complained that their senior officer had sold off military land to private developers with no intervention from officers of a higher rank (6).

On paper, the military has a thorough process for asset disposal; armaments are destroyed. The disposal of assets that are not armaments is governed by a board within the armed forces, which follows the laws that govern the armed forces. However, there is no public evidence that asset disposal is independent of any other sections of the services, particularly arms disposals (1), (2).

The Public Accounts Committee of Parliament scrutinises the Auditor General’s Report that covers the disposal of assets within the Ministry of Defence. Those reports are made public to Parliament, and they are indicated in the annual budget and budget adjustment bills, but they are not extensively detailed (1), (2).

Since September 2020, there has been new legislation on asset disposals. According to Article 15 of this legislation, a primary and secondary committee must scrutinise such disposals [1]. The country’s armed forces do not usually dispose assets for commercial reasons. Parliamentary committees may occasionally scrutinise certain decisions if there is an indication of mismanagement. The Greek media does pay attention to these because of the political implications [2].

Since September 2020, primary and secondary committees have been required to scrutinise asset disposals; however, it is hard to find evidence of scrutiny in publicly available sources. This being said, the members of such committees are mainly officers [1]. Practically, there is no independent and transparent scrutiny of asset disposals [2].

Some audit reports are released occasionally but only summary information on asset disposals is made publicly available [1, 2]. Audit reports are no longer published publicly online.

Formally, the Supreme Audit institution scrutinised disposal audits; However, in practice, there is no independent scrutiny of asset disposals. There is an internal auditing committee before disposals involving a representative of the Ministry of Defence’s (MoD) Finance Unit, respective branches of the military and the MoD Agency for Development and Logistics (also HM EI Zrt). The reports of the committee are not classified, but they are not available to the public [1]. We have no information on the regularity of these internal audits.

Most of the equipment of the Hungarian Army could be disposed of any time, but the actual lists of disposal were often influenced politically [1]. The motivation varied, but one explanation is that by not putting certain items on the disposal list, it allowed the military to keep certain abilities existing on paper.

The reports of the commitee are not classified. However, they are not available to the public [1].

There is independent scrutiny of asset disposals. CAG carries out audits with regularity and reports on the same; it is noted that information in asset disposals are not available with the same regularity as other audits [1][2].

Neither the executive nor the military unduly influence scrutiny by the audit body regarding asset disposals. CAG is an independent body and functions autonomously [1][2].

Audit reports are released with regularity within the prescribed timeframe. Reports are available online containing some information pertaining to asset disposals however it is not in depth [1][2]. It is noted that 2018 CAG reports are not available online but are referenced by the media.

Minister of Defence Regulation No. 18/2017 stipulates the procedures for the implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the removal of goods, including weapons systems, in the Ministry of Defence and TNI [1]. Articles 5 and 6 of this regulation state that PPB-EI and PPB-W are authorised and responsible for carrying out supervision and control functions for the implementation of the disposal and removal of the state property under their supervision. It can be concluded that the existing supervision of assets disposal is conducted internally. External scrutiny has applied on a number of occassions. For example, assets disposal by destruction was carried out in July 2017, when 13,080 weapons of the Indonesian Army were openly destroyed. This was witnessed by representatives of the regional office of the Directorate General of State Assets Management, Ministry of Finance [2]. External oversight of asset disposal by parliament is carried out through working meetings between the DPR and related ministries/agencies, but it has not been conducted routinely [3]. External oversight of weapon systems assets is also carried out by the Audit Board after the latter was requested to conduct an Investigation with a Specific Purpose (Pemeriksaan Dengan Tujuan Tertentu/PDTT) on defence equipment (investigation audit) in 2017 [4], but it is unclear whether the Audit Board has ever audited reports on the destruction or the disposal of defence equipment.

This indciator is marked ‘Not Enough Information’ as information regarding the removal or destruction of state property will be recorded in the official report (Berita Acara). No information can be found indicating undue influence on the audit body with regard to assets disposal.

No audit reports on the disposal or removal of weapons are accessible to the public. A search on the internet only found news about the destruction of weapons, and this was not published on the Ministry of Defence website but on the Ministry of Finance website [1]. These items were non-standard weapons collected during operations and therefore had to be destroyed. The disposal of weapons is conducted during military exercises, during which the items to be destroyed are made into targets for testing weapons [2].

There is no evidence that asset disposals are scrutinised by an oversight body. According to Reuters, in 2008, Parliament reportedly amended its bylaws to limit its power to audit institutions under the supreme leader’s supervision, except with his permission [1].

This indicator is marked Not Applicable, as there is no evidence that asset disposals are scrutinised by an oversight body. According to Reuters, in 2008, Parliament reportedly amended its bylaws to limit its own power to audit institutions under the supreme leader’s supervision, except with his permission [1].

This indicator is marked Not Applicable, as there is no evidence that asset disposals are scrutinised by an oversight body. According to Reuters, in 2008, Parliament reportedly amended its bylaws to limit its own power to audit institutions under the supreme leader’s supervision, except with his permission [1].

No single body can be identified as the body tasked with the responsibility of Iraq’s asset disposal practices, but that is not to deny the existence of various oversight bodies; the COI, FBSA and the largely defunct Ombusban Institution (1). However, in the absence of reliable information, the interaction of these agencies with procurement officials in managing or scrutinising asset disposals is not known.
The FBSA’s ability to conduct checks and monitor expenses and payment to contractors (2) hinges on its ability to maintain independence from the respective governmental ministry department and limited interagency cooperation. Provided that both the FBSA and the COI report to the CoR, their ability to act independently has been in doubt, owing to the alleged exploitation of constitutional powers by the council’s members, acting as the highest executive branch of government which, alongside the PM, have the final say over the appointments of the Judicial Supreme Court (3). Criminal proceedings in Iraq are activated only under the CoR’s approval (3). Ties forged by members of the CoR to powerful militias and rivals of the Iraqi state (4), as one interviewee told Transparency “are swayed by political or material incentives which has historically culminated in abuses of power (5).

The data sought out by the FBSA and its sister bodies, including the COI, is not always readily available, an obstacle that discernibly undermines its scrutinising powers in and beyond the defence and security sector (1).

Various international monitoring agencies including Amnesty International (2) have reported on the unlawful seizure of Iraqi army stockpiles by paramilitary outfits for committing war crimes and reprisals, which suggests lax controls facilitating the theft, seizure and transportation of state weapons by sub-state actors (2) which further undermines the ability of relevant stage agencies. A case in point comments that COR member Ahmad al Asadi has vocalised in favour of salary payments to PMF recruits equal to those army soldiers receive, while some were receiving both salaries from Baghdad and Iran (3).

A military expert (4) interviewed stated for this assessment explains that “as the rule of law stands, the responsibility of approving asset disposal fall squarely on the current commander-in-chief of the armed forces; Iraqi premier Adel Abdul Mahdi” (5). Outgoing PM Abadi previously announced a difficult task of launching an arms inventory of Iraqi stocks following calls from the country’s highest clerical leadership; Ayatollah Ali al Sistani’s Office.

Little evidence of scrutiny could be found but recent in light of ‘non-public disclosure’ of sensitive defence information. Recent reports disclose the seizure of scrap metal from vehicles and other metal debris in Mosul by PMF security forces. An investigation by Reuters discovered that the “PMF have made millions of dollars from the sale of anything from wrecked cars and damaged weapons” (6). While this does not offer direct evidence of asset disposal scrutiny it suggests that gains on assets seized or disposed of by the PMF are out of central state control. What this demonstrates is the absence of an effective system of asset disposal, in-built scrutiny within that and, a disposal doctrine and standards instructing armed forces.

In light of the above information, it can be said that warnings of weak arms controls, while heeded by the GOI, have done little to ensure either transparency or strict central control of weapons arsenals (7) [969]. The need to introduce such controls may be telling of asset disposal and the overall management of surplus defence equipment.

Reports that divulge information and details of asset disposal are not available online. Nevertheless, some details are leaked live on television. The widely watched ‘Single Word’ Television programme presented by Ahmad Mullah Talal on Shariqiyya (1) revealed that the latest MoD defence auction yielded a total of 50 million IQD. These proceeds, are leaked, rather than being issued by a state-sanctioned government department/agency. As various sources make clear, weapons and equipment are distributed exclusively by the MoD as the “sole supplier of the Iraqi security system” (2). In spite of this, it’s official website does not disclose asset disposal guidelines or procedural rules.

The State Audit is part of the check and balances and assesses the activities of the Executive and other public bodies. It is responsible for the annual scrutiny of asset disposals (1) (2). The audit is carried out by its directors, coordinators and those in charge of supervising the audit departments and divisions. In order to ensure its proper direction and quality, during the course of the audit, interim discussions are held within the staff units and the office management team (3). The review is formalised, but seems superficial and doesn’t take place systemically. The reports are publicy available, but not on a regular basis. Information are even limited and classified inside the system (4).

Officially the State Comptroller is an independent organ. According to Section 6 of the Basic Law, the State Comptroller as part of the State Audit provides that in carrying out his functions the State Comptroller shall only be accountable to the Knesset, and emphasises his autonomy and independence from the Government. Similarly, section 12(A) of the Basic Law provides that “the State Comptroller shall maintain contact with the Knesset, as determined by law”. The State Comptroller submits reports to the Knesset containing information and recommendations which are used by it as a means of supervising the Executive, and thus he assists the Knesset in a professional and independent way to carry out its duties, which is one of the supporting pillars of the separation of powers in a democratic state: supervision by the legislature of the Executive (1). The State Comptroller can recommend that the State Audit Committee appoint a special commission of inquiry (1), but having no statutory authority of its own it relies on the Knesset to impose sanctions on errant bodies. In general, the military and the executive have a lot of power within the state and can undermine the scrutiny of the audit body regarding asset proposals, if they think it is necessary due to security reasons.

There is a procedure, set by law, for determining confidentiality, which must be followed in order to keep audit reports confidential. As part of this procedure, there must be adequate justification for the need for confidentiality. According to Article 17(a) of The Comptroller Law of 1958, for example, only a sub-committee of the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee is authorized to decide, after having consulted the State Comptroller, that a certain report or parts of it will not be delivered to the Knesset and will not be published, due to state security reasons or in order to not harm foreign affairs or international trade relations (1). However, despite the majority of audit reports being required to be made publicly available, reports on asset disposals are not made publicly available due to classification considerations and are only released to relevant oversight bodies, such as the FADC (2) (3) (4) (5).

The disposal of asssets of the Ministry of Defence is regulated by Decree of the President of the Republic n.90/2010 [1] and managed by the State Property Agency. Audit of asset dismissal is carried out by the Court of Auditors. In 2016, the body performed a thorough audit of all assets of the Ministry of Defence to be disposed [2]. Such comprehensive audit reports are not always available. Indeed, by looking at the latest available annual report of the Court of Auditors, it is possible to read that acts of the dedicated directorate general in the Ministry of Defence (GENIODIFE) are subject to the scrutiny of the auditors. However, it is not possible to see if control was performed on acts related to the dismissal of assets or on any other function of GENIODIFE [3]. Available information on the performace of audit is reported in the state report of the court of auditors, where it is possible to read that “the management of real estate sale […] continues not to be valued in the asset account” and that internal inventories are not updated on a case-by-case basis [4]. The control of the court of auditors is also performed on the entire work of the State Property Agency [5].

There is no evidence of undue influence of executive or military personnel on the work performed by the Court of Auditors. In addition, the independence of the magistrates is ensured by the constitution. [1]

Comprehensive audit reports are available to the public but with significant delay [1]. The most recent comprehensive report was released in 2017 and covered the audit of asset disposals in the years 2003-2016.

The administration of the disposal of assets is explained in the answer to Q24A. After the end of the fiscal year, the Ministry of Finance sends the accounts of year to the Board of Audit (see Q28A). The Board makes an audit report of the fiscal year in which it studies in depth a selection of topics that it deems important. The chapter on the Ministry of Defence (MOD) in the audit report for 2015 is 49 pages long. Two of the topics examined in that chapter are the registration of the value of defence equipment in the ledger of national property and the disposal of defence equipment. The Board also suggested some improvements in the handling of these topics. [1] In the audit reports for 2016 and 2017, the Board examined other topics with regard to the Ministry of Defence. [2] [3] Thereafter, the Diet reviews the audit reports. However, in a search of the mainstream newspapers Asahi Shimbun [4] and Yomiuri Shimbun, [5] no reports were found of the Diet being concerned with the audit of the disposal of defence assets. Furthermore, a former MP in the House of Representatives said in an interview that Diet members are not very concerned with the disposal of defence equipment. [6] Nevertheless, if the attention of voters on this issue were to increase, one would expect that MPs would use their right to demand information from the government to question government about this issue, he said. [6]

Both the Board of Audit of Japan and the Diet of Japan have powers that strengthen their independence. The Board of Audit is guaranteed independence from the Cabinet by the Board of Audit Act (see Q17B). Its expenses are covered by an annual budget that it receives over the fiscal budget which is passed by the Diet. Under the governments of Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, who was in office from 2012 to 2020, the executive increased its authority over the civil service somewhat by establishing councils such as the National Security Council and increasing the staff of the Cabinet Office. [1] However, after the Law on Designated Secrets was passed, the Board of Audit retained its right to inspect classified documents to do its work, indicating that the Board has maintained independence. [2] A House of the Diet or a Diet Committee may request reports and records from the Cabinet or a public agent (see Q1A). [3] These powers are curtailed by the ability of the parties in government to vote against such measures being taken in the committees. A Diet member may request an explanation from a Minister by posing a question to the presiding officer of the House as a concise statement in written form. [4] At any rate, no reports of undue influence by the Executive or military on the audit of the disposal of defence assets by either the Board of Audit or the Diet were found in a news search of the mainstream newspapers Asahi Shimbun [5] and Yomiuri Shimbun. [6]

Audit reports are posted in a database on the website of the Board of Audit, [1] including audit reports on the annual accounts, [2] special reports to the Diet and Cabinet written on the initiative of the Board of Audit [3] and reports requested by the Diet. [4] Audit reports of the annual accounts show figures for government income and spending, as well as reports for the different government agencies, including the Ministry of Defence. The chapter on the Ministry of Defence in the fiscal year 2017 lists audit results for the following items: an item concerning construction and an item concerning goods, both in need of corrective measures, one item about which the Board of Audit has requested an explanation or that measures be taken, five examples of measures implemented by the Ministry of Defence to deal with issues pointed out by the Board of Audit, a description of how a report by the Board of Audit in 2011 and one in 2016 have been followed up. A brief examination of the reports indicates that information release is not unreasonably delayed. [5] A settlement of accounts is appended to the Board’s audit report (see Q28A). For fiscal year 2017, 23 pages in this document were devoted to Ministry of Defence expenditures. The expenditure of an important institution such as the Defence Intelligence Headquarters is not explicitly listed, although the expenditure on information gathering satellites is given.

There is no evidence that asset disposal within the defence sector is scrutinised by an oversight body of any form. In fact, the list of audited entities by the Jordanian Audit Bureau excludes the Ministry of Defence, the Armed Forces and all commercial entities associated with the Armed Forces such as the King Abdullah II Design and Development Bureau (KADDB) [1]. In addition to that, defence sector income is not declared or included in the final governmental financial annual accounts [2]. Media and news reporting sporadically mentions instances of sales or disposal of defence assets, which shows that there is activity in relation to the disposal of defence assets in the country [3, 4, 5] but these are not reported or accounted for by neither the Audit Bureau, the Ministry of Finance or any other entity that could possibly exercise such oversight.

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable because, as explained in the previous sub-indicator, there is no audit body overseeing asset disposal within the defence sector [1]. The fact that there is no entity that exercises scrutiny over asset disposal by the defence establishment means that assessing independence is irrelevant.

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable because in Jordan there is no entity/unit within the Government that is responsible for reporting or oversight over defence sector asset disposal. There is, however, a committee within the armed forces responsible for that. The official page of the House of Representatives in Jordan includes several reports presented to the legislature by the Audit Bureau [1]. However, none of these includes information on defence asset disposal. There are no comprehensive audit reports on asset disposals by the defence sector, and there is not an effectual defence ministry in the country. On the list of audited entities by the Audit Bureau there is no mention of any defence-associated entities [2, 4, 5]. In addition to that, the annual financial reporting carried out by the Ministry of Finance does not cover either defence income or expenditure [3].

A recent initiative by the National Treasury now requires ministries and state corporations including national security institutions like Ministry of Defence (MOD), Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) and National Intelligence Service to submit details of their Asset registers and financial records of their asset disposals. MOD and KDF are required to submit records of asset managment. [1] The submissions are in-turn submitted to Parliament for public scrutiny. [2] This process however only began in July 2020 and whereby the Directorate of Portfolio Management under National Treasury will manage the aggregation of asset management data from ministries and state corporations. [3] Therefore it will be sometime until the national treasury publishes the information for the public through parliament for them to scrutinise and the public to have access.

In the past, MOD asset disposal activities have been managed internally by the ministry’s audit division. However this has been done with minimal external oversight. [1] Although Parliament may have had access to information provided by the Office of the Auditor-General (OAG) reports, a review of the reports gives little or no details of asset disposal. Furthermore, neither parliament nor OAG have the full capacity to audit all activities. [2] This is consistent with Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) findings that public information on actual asset disposal in government is minimal. [3] Nevertheless, according to the MOD, there was an elaborate process that guided procurement and asset disposal as provided for in the previous Public Procurement and Assets Disposal Act (2016). [4]

There is limited evidence to suggest whether or not the executive or the military undermines scrutiny by audit bodies specifically relating to asset disposals. Nevertheless, there have been several reports that indicate that the military has undermined audit processes in general. [1] Previously, national security institutions including Ministry of Defence (MOD), Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) and National Intelligence Service used section 90(7) of the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act of 2015 not to corporate with audit processes. [2] The provision prohibited disclosure of any information that might put the Nation’s security at risk. However, this law was repealed with Section VII of The Public Procurement and Assets Disposal Act (PPADA), 2020 which now outlines regulations for disposal of classified assets that national institutions like the defence sector handles. [3] The provisions are recent and the impact is yet to be realised.

Data on asset disposal within government agencies including the defence sector is generally minimal. [1] The only publicly available information is from the Office of the Auditor-General (OAG) which publishes annual reports on military financial activities including asset management. In recent years, however, OAG have had limited information on asset disposal. In events where OAG has published information procurement and asset disposal activities, reports have indicated major irregularities in asset management activities within the Ministry of Defence such as skewed awarding of tenders and acquisition of faulty assets; all totalling to billions of shillings [2].

In addition, the Auditor-General’s office has reported on how the ministry often blocks auditors from scutinizing what the Auditor-General considers questionable dealings. [3] As a result, only selective or incomplete information is available to the public regarding audit activities within the KDF.

The National Audit Office (NAO) undertakes regularity and performance audits of all public institutions across Kosovo. The Office publishes annually the individual reports on financial statements of all Ministries of the Kosovo Government, including the Ministry of Defence [1]. However, the reports are somewhat superficial [2]. The National Audit Office assess capital and non-capital assets of the Ministry of Defence, and carriers out an examination of these assets to confirm they exist. In 2017, these tests did not identify any issues that needed reporting [1]. However, the NAO’s 2018 Audit Report on the Ministry of Defence highlighted delays in carrying out the asset inventory. The NAO identified that the inventory commission had submitted their asset inventory report on 19 February 2019 – two months after the required date. Consequently, the inventory report had not been agreed with asset registers prior to the preparation of the Annual Financial Statements. This Audit Report also found that the Ministry of Defence has seven disposal camps in other cities, and therefore each sub-commission within these cities needed to complete their own inventory reports, leading to the prolongation of the entire inventory process. Therefore, the NAO recommended that the Minister of Defence should ensure the inventory process be carried out in accordance with the requirements set out in the internal asset management guidelines, and should ensure reconciliation of the inventory report with the assets registers of the organisation prior to the preparation of the financial statements [2].

Based on the Kosovo Constitution and domestic laws, the National Audit Office has functional, financial and operational independence to strengthen accountability in public administration in order to promote an effective, efficient and viable use of national resources [1]. This Office is accountable to the Kosovo Assembly [1]. There is no evidence that the Kosovo Government, the Ministry of Defence or the Kosovo Security Forces have had any kind of influence on the National Audit Office’s work with regards to the disposal of assets [2].

The National Audit Office (NAO) publishes on its website all individual audit reports, the Annual Audit Report, the Annual Performance Report of the Office including the audited financial statements, internal guidelines and regulations, and other information relating to the Office and its activities [1]. The NAO submits final Audit Reports to respective audited institutions, and copies may be sent to other related institutions. The NAO publishes Audit Reports one day after their submission [2]. Any of the NAO reports are published in full on the Office’s website [3], although the reports relating to asset disposals remain quite superficial [4].

Both the military and the executive branch undermine the internal audits in general and not just the ones concerning audit disposals, auditors said (1, 2 and 3). The SAB has been publicly complaining for years about the failings of the internal audits in Government agencies, and SAB officials say these audits tend to be missing key facts, and the organisations almost never respond to demands for more information. (4, 5 and 6).

The military and the police also happen to be full of officers related to the royal family, which makes them particularly uncooperative with auditors, the auditors said.

This interference is one of the main reasons why the SAB often says that the internal auditing system in many Government facilities are weak (and underqualified), and that its auditors are frequently ignored and stonewalled in its annual reports, they added. The SAB does not name them usually so as not to embarrass the country’s security leader, they said.

Both the military and the executive branch undermine the independence of both the internal auditors and the external auditors, the aforementioned officials said (1, 2 and 3).

The internal auditors are particularly easy to threaten because they are legally under the control of the Defence and Interior Ministers. External auditors who are interested in scrutinising deals are often threatened with arrest, among other things, by individuals from the military or the executive branch, they said.

The end result is that Kuwaiti auditors are often too intimidated to scrutinise these deals. But a brave few do manage to get some of the job done.

(Many auditors are demoralised and passive towards corruption because they believe there is no serious political will to fight and so they are not willing to put their jobs on the line to fight a losing battle, officials said.)

Also, there has been a rumour making the rounds in Kuwait about auditors getting assaulted and verbally abused in unnamed Government agencies when they asked to view their records since 2016. Waleed al-Tabtabaki, a lawmaker, formally asked the Finance Minister to respond to these claims in May 2018 (4).

Both the internal and external audit reports are never made public, auditors said (1, 2 and 3). The external bodies like the SAB, however, address these issues in their final report about the financial year as a whole, and they rarely address specific issues in the security and defence sector, to spare the public embarrassment, officials said. This annual report has to come out before the end of October each year, and it has never been late, the officials and activists said (4, 5 and 6). These reports are, however, comprehensive but they do not address corruption clearly in each institution. They almost never talk about the defence and security sector in a critical manner (7, 8 and 9).

The internal control system in the protection zone is in operation. Publicly available audit reports are made by the State Audit Office, so far as it is permitted by the Law on State Secrets and the Law on Information Freedom. [1] These reports are produced annually.

There is not enough information to provide a score for this indicator.

The law suggests that this sector operates independently. The primary institution responsible for is the State Centre for Defence Military Sites and Procurement of the Republic of Latvia (VAMOIC) which operates under the Ministry of Defence. [1] [2]

The internal control system within the defense sector operates well. There are also publicly available audit reports by the State Audit Office, to the extent permitted by the Law “On State Secrets” and the “Law on Information Freedom”. The main institution responsible for it is the State Centre for Defence Military Sites and Procurement of the Republic of Latvia (VAMOIC) which operates under the Ministry of Defence. [1] [2]

No evidence of an exclusive audit body to oversee the asset disposal was found (1). According to a source, asset disposal takes place with the approval of the Council of Ministers through a ministerial decree (2). The LAF has disposed of heavy military equipment and but not light weapons (2). However, it is important to note that scrutiny exists at the level of the LAF, as opposed to the legislative level (3). LAF’s Logistics Brigade and Directorate (J4) are one of the most sensitive to systems and assets’ improper allocation, use, accounting, or disposal(3). For instance, the LAF is gradually phasing out its small arms based around the AK-47 and the AK-74 legacy Warsaw Pact weapons (3). Those systems/assets are being kept in secure stockpiles, until the LAF finds a suitable arrangement to dispose of them without proliferation risks (3).

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable, as no exclusive governmental audit body to oversee the asset disposal of the LAF was found (1). However, it is important to note the high level of cautiousness over asset controls amid the absence of active and effective government and/or parliamentary scrutiny.

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable, as no evidence of an exclusive governmental audit body that publishes reports for the public was found (1).

All asset disposals conducted by defence establishments are managed by the State Enterprise, ‘Turto Bankas’ [1]. That includes management, use and disposal of the state-owned real estate transferred under the right of trusts, the organisation of public auctions of redundant state-owned property, the administration of unified state-owned assets through informed online search systems, etc. The activities and finances of ‘Turto Bankas’ are then audited by an independent auditor, accountable to the Ministry of Finance. According to the Law of Centrally Governed State Property, audits are organised by the institution representing Lithuania – in this case the Ministry of Finance [2]. In 2018, the private accounting and management company Auditas, JSC performed an audit of SE “Turto bankas” [3]. Audits are carried out annually, and the financial and narrative reports together with audits’ conclusions are published online on the official website of ‘Turto Bankas’ [4].

There is no evidence that the military and/or the executive branch influence the audit body regarding asset disposals [1, 2,3,4].

Only a summary audit report is made publicly available. It is included in the yearly financial and activity reports, and is accessible online for free in PDF format. The summary is released within a reasonable time frame. Currently it is possible to access the most recent audit summary of 2017 [1].

There is no parliamentary or independent body to scrutinise asset disposals conducted by the defence establishment, but the disposals must be recorded in the yearly financial report of the Ministry, which is then examined by the internal Auditor and the Auditor General’s Office later in the year. Asset Disposal procedures and mechanisms have to adhere to the procedures stipulated by the Public Asset Management System of the Finance Ministry. [1] Furthermore, public disposal appears to focus on non-strategic assets. There are not clear indications on how strategic assets disposal are audited and made public.

Asset disposals have to adhere to the procedures issued by the Finance department’s directive. But there is no proof that the Public Asset Management System of the Ministry of Finance has influence over asset disposals in the defence sector. [1] For instance, any asset disposals with a value of more than RM500,000 must go through a tender process. In a recent statement, the Finance Minister, Lim Guang Eng, said that the sale of government strategic assets was decided by the Prime Minister and not the Finance Minister, showing that the Prime Minister does have some influence over the country’s strategic asset disposal. He said that “the disposal of [government] assets is under the purview of the Prime Minister, not the Finance Ministry, but often, I am asked about these matters as if I am the one who sold these assets but that is not under me.” He further added that “the sale of government assets is done through open tender to ensure the best possible offer is received, unlike during the time of the previous Barisan Nasional government which preferred to reward certain buyers by offering to sell them strategic assets below market value”. [2]

No reports or information on asset disposals are made public. [1] [2]

The assessor did not find any information relating to asset disposals with regard to the defence and security sector. Indeed, the Malian government’s own evaluation of the 2015 budget notes that “there were no asset disposals” during the year.[12] The report goes on to state that the public body responsible for managing state resources and assets, the Direction Générale de l’Administration des Biens de l’État (DGABE), failed to meet its objective that year. The goal had been to implement the programme of reforming public sector organisations. But the document records that the DGABE was unable to survey or evaluate existing assets within the public sector due to a “lack of financial means”.[12]
The body that would be tasked with auditing such disposals would be the BVG, which has 17 agents and which publishes annual reports evaluating the government’s various spending programmes and budgets. But the BVG’s last published report came in 2015 and made no mention of defence spending.[7] The failure to publish any subsequent reports or to address the defence budget by the body supposed to monitor accountants and administrators highlights the lack of external oversight. As the World Bank points out, the BVG has not specifically reviewed Ministry of Defence accounts, and only an aggregate administrative account is transmitted to the auditor when the annual budget is examined.[3,4]
Recent reports by the IMF and by the World Bank make no mention of asset disposals in the context of the Malian military.[2,3,4,10,11] Similarly, previous analyses of the Malian defence sector by Transparency International, RAND and SIPRI do not contain any information concerning the disposal of defence assets.[5,6,9] The websites of the Malian armed forces, the Malian government and the BVG do not contain any information about asset disposal in the defence sector either[1,7,8].

Because asset disposals are not scrutinised by an oversight body of any form, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

The body that would be tasked with auditing such disposals would be the BVG, which has 17 agents and which publishes annual reports evaluating the government’s various spending programmes and budgets. But the BVG’s last published report came in 2015 and made no mention of defence spending.3 The failure to publish any subsequent reports or to address the defence budget by the body supposed to monitor accountants and administrators highlights the lack of external oversight. As the World Bank points out, the BVG has not specifically reviewed Ministry of Defence accounts, and only an aggregate administrative account is transmitted to the auditor when the annual budget is examined.1,2
When the IMF demanded an audit of the off-budget purchase of a new presidential jet in 2014, the BVG led the investigation (see 16C). But the BVG never received access to the plane’s operating contract, highlighting the limited ability of independent and external audit bodies to perform their functions in the face of opposition from the executive and/or the military.4

Because asset disposals are not scrutinised by an oversight body of any form, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

The body that would be tasked with auditing such disposals, were they to take place in a formal manner, would be the BVG. The BVG has 17 agents and publishes annual reports evaluating the government’s various spending programmes and budgets. But the BVG’s last published report came in 2015 and made no mention of defence spending [12]. The failure to publish any subsequent reports or to address the defence budget by the body supposed to monitor accountants and administrators highlights the lack of transparency relating to defence activities. As the World Bank points out, the BVG has not specifically reviewed Ministry of Defence accounts, and only an aggregate administrative account is transmitted to the auditor when the annual budget is examined [8,9].
When the IMF demanded an audit of the off-budget purchase of a new presidential jet in 2014, the BVG led the investigation (see 16C). But the BVG never received access to the plane’s operating contract, highlighting the limited ability of independent and external audit bodies to perform their functions in the face of opposition from the executive and/or the military.²²
Recent reports by the IMF and by the World Bank make no mention of asset disposals in the context of the Malian military [7,8,9,16,18]. Similarly, previous analyses of the Malian defence sector by Transparency International, RAND and SIPRI no do contain any information concerning the disposal of defence assets [10,11,14]. The websites of the Malian armed forces, the Malian government and the BVG do not contain any information about asset disposal in the defence sector [3,12,13]
Moreover, the current government’s major reform programme for the armed forces (LOPM), which was adopted by the National Assembly in May 2015, does not contain any mention of formal systems for asset disposals, underlining the lack of attention paid to the subject [17]. The LOPM provides for USD2.3 billion of investment for the armed forces and is set to recruit an additional 10,000 personnel between 2015 and 2019 [17].

The Superior Audit of the Federation (ASF), an organ of the Chamber of Deputies, is in charge of supervising public resources, including the disposals of assets of entities, including for SEDENA. [1] However, oversight does not occur regularly. In fact, there have been few audits carried out by ASF to SEDENA, and none of them detail the sale of assets. [2]

There is no information that allows us to demonstrate that the Executive branch or the military have exerted undue influence on the ASF’s audits of SEDENA or that due to this influence, the disposals of assets have not been scrutinized.

However, a CSO [1] and even the current head of the ASF [2] have reported acts of corruption in the work they have performed as an auditor. [3] [4]

There is no information to demonstrate that ASF has audited SEDENA on asset disposals. Therefore, there are no public reports. [1] [2]

Scrutiny of asset disposals is occasionally conducted by the State Audit Institution, while the Parliamentary Committee only superficially reviews those reports.

The State Audit Institution conducted only one audit of disposals by the Ministry of Defence in 2017 [1] and one audit of the Ministry itself in 2014. [2]

The Parliamenary Committee for Defence and Security reviewed reports of the State Audit Institution, but adopted very general conclusions and did not monitor their implementation. According to publicly available reports of the Committee, it did not scrutinise disposals on other occasions. [3][4][5][6]

In recent years, the appointments of several Senators to the State Audit Institution have undermined the independence of the Institution. [1] The majority of members of the Senate have close links with the governing political party and the executive, and some of them were actors in affairs related to alleged political corruption. [2][3][4]

Two audit reports related to asset disposal and internal control of the Ministry of Defence are publicly available. [1][2] While the reports are fairly comprehensive it cannot be determined when they were released from the time they were completed.

There is little to no information publicly available about the process of asset disposal.

Recent official and press statements on anti-corruption fail to mention the process of asset disposal within the Moroccan armed forces, or the armed forces in general (1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6).

This process was also left unaddressed by official public bodies that might be in charge of asset disposal processes, such as the Ministry of Finance, the National Audit Office or the Royal Treasury (7)(8).

Interviewees argue that this lack of evidence indicates a lack of transparency, which in turn could imply risks of corruption (9)(10).

Almost no information is available about the clear process of asset disposal. In Morocco’s anti-corruption legislation or other related articles, there is no clear statement on how to dispose of assets within the Moroccan army. The absence of independent scrutiny could also be explained by the fact that the King is the head of the military, and that the defence administration (lead by a Minister in charge of defence, but not a dedicated Defence Minister) remains strongly controlled by the Palace. .

Because there is little to no information publicly available about the process of asset disposal, this sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

Recent official and press statements on anti-corruption fail to mention the process of asset disposal within the Moroccan armed forces, or the armed forces in general (1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6).

This process was also left unaddressed by official public bodies that might be in charge of asset disposal processes, such as the Ministry of Finance, the National Audit Office or the Royal Treasury (7)(8).

Interviewees argue that this lack of evidence indicates a lack of transparency, which in turn could imply risks of corruption (9)(10).

Almost no information is available about the clear process of asset disposal. In Morocco’s anti-corruption legislation or other related articles, there is no clear statement on how to dispose of assets within the Moroccan army. The absence of independent scrutiny could also be explained by the fact that the King is the head of the military, and that the defence administration (lead by a Minister in charge of defence, but not a dedicated Defence Minister) remains strongly controlled by the Palace.

As there is little to no information publicly available about the process of asset disposal, this sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

Recent official and press statements on anti-corruption fail to mention the process of asset disposal within the Moroccan armed forces, or the armed forces in general (1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6).

This process was also left unaddressed by official public bodies that might be in charge of asset disposal processes, such as the Ministry of Finance, the National Audit Office or the Royal Treasury (7)(8).

Interviewees argue that this lack of evidence indicates a lack of transparency, which in turn could imply risks of corruption (9)(10).

Almost no information is available about the clear process of asset disposal. In Morocco’s anti-corruption legislation or other related articles, there is no clear statement on how to dispose of assets within the Moroccan army. The absence of independent scrutiny could also be explained by the fact that the King is the head of the military, and that the defence administration (lead by a Minister in charge of defence, but not a dedicated Defence Minister) remains strongly controlled by the Palace.

Myanmar does not have a public procurement law that includes provisions for public asset disposal [1]. The bill was queued for debate in Parliament [2]. In the Assessment of Country Public Procurement System, conducted by the Asian Development Bank, significant weaknesses were found in Myanmar due to 22 risks, including a lack of an effective procurement law, a lack of standard bidding documents and guidelines, a lack of transparency, integrity and consistency in the tendering process, a lack of access to tender information, absence of a central oversight mechanism and a lack of expertise in the Office of Auditor General to support its role in effective financial and procurement audits [3]. In 2016, MP Daw Khin San Hlaing proposed a statement calling to scrutinize the disposal of government asset but reports indicate that it was objected by military representatives and MPs of USDP [4].

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’ as there is no oversight mechanism and the military has the right to administer its own affairs, according to the Constitution [1].

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’ as there is no oversight mechanism and the military has the right to administer its own affairs [1].

The Central Government Audit Service (ADR) is the independent internal auditor of the Dutch Government, including the Ministry of Defence [1]. The Government Accounts Act of 2016 stipulates that the ADR provides assurance on the financial statements within the annual reports of each ministry and conducts research into their budget and material management, including the disposal of assets [2]. The ADR publishes reports with the departmental annual reports of all ministers. Reports written by the Central Government Audit Service (ADR) are publicly disclosed and go into significant detail [1,3]. The Minister of Finance sends an overview to the House of Representatives every six months with the titles of reports issued by the Central Government Audit Service [4].

Furthermore, the Netherlands Court of Audit is an independent, external organisation that audits all ministries and other public organisations, including the Central Government Audit Service (ADR) [5]. The Court of Audit works to improve the performance, quality and reliability of internal audits completed by the Central Government Audit Service (ADR) [6]. Recently, a Court of Audit report assessed how the MoD implemented austerity measures put in place in 2011 [7]. The critical report drew upon four case studies, three of which concerned asset disposals, and found that the cutbacks had not been achieved in the asset disposal processes [7].

There is no evidence to suggest that the Central Government Audit Service is unduly influenced in its audit process. The role of the Court of Audit in scrutinising the Central Government Audit Service reinforces this independence [1]. In recent cases of asset disposals that have gone wrong, the Central Government Audit Service has not appeared to hold back on its scrutiny [2,3].

The Central Government Audit Service annual reports are extensive in their comprehensiveness and include topics such as acquisition processes, financial management and IT management [1]. Reports include several recommendations. Annual audit reports for the Ministry of Defence are published online around mid-March following the year in question [1].

The Internal Audit function within the NZDF is performed by the Directorate of Risk Assurance who report directly to the CDF [1]. In the Army, the Directorate of Land Equipment Management is responsible for through-life support of operational equipment, which includes disposal. Responsibility for disposal of non-operational equipment is achieved under the Logistics Commander (Land). [2] Asset disposal is also considered within the Capability Management Framework conducted by the MoD [3]. The Auditor-General also exercises scrutiny over the annual audit process, though the specifics of asset disposal are unknown [4, 5]. In addition, the FADTC probes issues of procurement and disposal as part of its annual reviews of defence [6, 7]. At the formation HQ level, the S4 Branch cell is responsible for store accounts, provides advice on risk factors, and assists in implementing audit reports (among other activities) [8]. At unit level, the Supply Control Officer is responsible to the OC/CO for internal auditing [9]. In the Army, scrutiny is maintained through the Supply Chain Manager Land on any matters affecting stores accounting, and includes supervision and control of stores inspection reports and matters arising therefrom, which would include disposals [10]. Disposals are also included in the Internal Control Check Programme [11].
Moreover, all proposals to dispose of assets with a carrying value of $25 million or more requires Cabinet approval and carrying value of $15-$25 million requires Ministerial approval.[12].

The Auditor-General is an independent body and there is no indication of undue influence from the Executive or the Military [1].

The Auditor-General’s review is provided as a submission to the annual review of the FADTC and is available online [1, 2]. Disposals are considered under the Financial Statements audited by Audit NZ, and are delineated by Land, Buildings, Specialist Military Equipment, Plant and Equipment, Office and Computer Equipment, and Heritage Assets [3].

There is little to no information publicly available about the audit process of asset disposal (1). According to an interviewee, there is an internal commission (audit body) that ensures control of weapons and vehicles disposal; this process depends on the Chief of the General Staff of the Armies (2). This information could not be verified through a different source; therefore, a score of 0 is the most appropriate here.

The assessor found no evidence of a functioning audit body or of military or executive undermining scrutiny by the audit regarding asset disposals (1).

There is little to no information publicly available about the audit process of asset disposal, should there be any. However, according to an interviewee, data regarding the number of weapons seized may be available on the request from the relevant institution. According to the Small Arms Survey report (2017), it should also be noted that currently Niger has limited capacity and resources to assist with international tracing requests. Nigerien authorities have not sent out any tracing requests to other national authorities. The lack of a central registry of lost or stolen weapons makes domestic tracing difficult (1). 

The Committee on Audit of Defence Equipment Procurement (CADEP) under the authority of the president was created to audit defence equipment procurement from 2007 to 2015. It has made few indictments including, two ex-army chiefs and a former minister. It is not clear if the disposal of special goods and services involving defence and security receive any scrutiny since, under Section 15 (2) of the PPA 2007, they are excluded from the process under the act unless the president approves (1). Since the disposal of defence and security assets are under the president’s authority, there is no evidence to justify it being scrutinised. The committee is set up to audit defence procurement from 2007 to 2015, which looks more as a special mission not free and independent committee to scrutinise present and future disposals of defence assets (2).

Because asset disposals are not scrutinised by an oversight body, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

Because asset disposals are not scrutinised by an oversight body, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

So far, neither the Parliament nor the Committee of Defence and Security have reviewed or scrutinised the process of asset disposal within the Ministry of Defence or Army [1]. The State Audit Office (SAO) audited the Ministry of Defence’s finances and capital assets from 2012 to 2014, but there’s no information on the assets disposal exists [2]. The DiFi report also hints at the disinterest of the SAO with regards to the Ministry of Defence’s assets disposal [3]. The MoD has not received compensation for any asset disposal since 2012 [4]. All the same, the process performed by MoD needs to be regularly scrutinised.

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable. The State Audit Office has not yet reviewed the Ministry of Defence’s assets disposal. It is worth noting that the Audit Office’s general independence has not been directly compromised by the executive or the military. However, some reports question the financial independence of the State Audit Office, especially due to the lack of resources for planned revisions [1].

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable, as the State Audit Office has not yet reviewed the Ministry of Defence’s assets disposal. The State Audit Office’s reports on the Ministry of Defence are publicly available in a summarised format. The latest one, however, dates back to 2014 [1]. Even in the latter report, there was no audit of assets disposal.

Asset disposals may be scrutinised by the Office of the Auditor General of Norway. Scrutiny is thorough and formalised, but audits have been conducted on a more ad hoc basis. The latest audit, on the sale of the F-5 fighters by the Norwegian Armed Forces in the years 1999-2015, was conducted in 2016-17 [1]. The report disclosed lack of effective internal control in the process. The Standing Committee for Scrutiny and Constitutional Affairs is responsible for reviewing reports from the Office of the Auditor General [2]. Further, in 2013 the Norwegian Defence Estates Agency appointed an independent working group to scrutinise disposal of real assets from the Armed Forces in the years 2002-2012 [3].

There is no indication that the executive or the military unduly influence scrutiny by the Office of the Auditor General of Norway [1].

Comprehensive audit reports on asset disposal are available on the website of the Office of the Auditor General of Norway [1] and are made available to the public immediately after publication.

There is no internal or external scrutiny mechanism for asset disposal. The process follows the flawed regulations and policies, and the final report is sent to the commanders or head of units. There is no transparency regarding the disposal of assets. No scrutiny procedures were located on the Ministry of Defence website (1). Moreover, the tender board mentioned on the MoD Secretary-General website has no details about its work or actions beyond its name (2). As discussed in sub-indicators 1A-C, the elected al-Shura is not mandated to address issues of defence, this extends to expenditure and financial scrutiny (3). Reference is made to the State Audit Institution capacity to provide independent scrutiny; however, there is a lack of detailed information about the STI mandate in the defence sector (4). There is no clear evidence that an oversight body dedicated to scrutinizing asset disposals exist (5), (6).

This sub-indicator has been marked as Not Applicable, because there is no body to scrutinise defence asset disposals.

As there is no scrutiny mechanism, there is no way for it to be undermined by the executive or the military itself (1), (2). As set out above, there is no audit board scrutinising asset disposal (3), (4), (5). In the absence of an audit board, it is not possible to comment if the military or the executive regularly undermine such a body.

This sub-indicator has been marked as Not Applicable, because there is no body to scrutinise defence asset disposals.

As there is no scrutiny mechanism, there is no way for it to be undermined by the executive or the military itself (1), (2). As set out above, there is no audit board scrutinising asset disposal (3), (4), (5). In the absence of an audit board, it is not possible to comment if the military or the executive regularly undermine such a body.

The State Audit and Administrative Control Bureau, the Department of General Supplies, and the military auditing unit within the MoF control and audit asset disposal in Palestine (1). The SAACB conducts annual or bi-annual inspections on internal reports, the MoF department is engaged with the process as well (2), the regularity of and the depth of oversight are superficial, accountability is also absent in the case of corruption findings (3).

The SAACB, and the military auditing unit within the MoF, are independent of the national forces but the SAACB is part of the MOF (2). They are subject to political influence from the executive in case of misconduct (1). As most of the auditing is superficial, there are only rare incidents that the audits generate serious recommendations. According to an officer from the SAACB, the audits are superficial, and when an institution is checked, they are informed beforehand of the SAACB’s arrival to prepare the inspection. Furthermore, according to the source, a phone call from the head of a security agency to the head of the SAACB, all issues will be buried (1).

There are no reports published other than the annual report of the State Audit and Administrative Control Bureau (1). The annual report of 2017 focused in the security/military section on the use of military circles for private use by officers. The report shows that it does not have in-depth access to the security apparatuses financial system auditing (the internal unit). Access to internal reports on auditing is simple.

The Commission on Audit (COA) is mandated to impose a pre-audit of all BCDA proposed substantial sales, transfers and alienations of property, then submit a full report to the executive and to Congress [1]. The results of such scrutiny are then submitted to the executive and Congress but little information is available to the public. As for firearms and ammunitions, the military does not sell these to external parties. However, media reports have revealed that military firearms and ammunitions were found in the hands of gunrunners connected with a terrorist organisation. A lawmaker filed a House Resolution No. 2386 to investigate the reported sale of AFP firearms to terrorists [2]. However, according to an internal investigation conducted by the Army, the firearms do not belong to them [3].

The BCDA is subject to the scrutiny and independent review of the Commission on Audit [1, 2]. There is no evidence that the executive or the military has influenced the audit body, of which information regarding delayed remittances to the military from the BCDA has been revealed, prompting the Senate to call for a legislative probe [3, 4].

Comprehensive audit reports are available to the public via the COA website within 12 months of the end of the financial year [1].

An in-depth audit of the agency activities can be provided by the Supreme Audit Office, not by the parliament. In the last five years, the Supreme Audit Office annually audited the general financial management of the agency, including financial plans of asset disposal [1]. Such audits are part of annual audits of state budget implementation of the defence sector.
In 2018 SAO audited also its real estate management, which is a main part of assets disposal activity. [2]
Disposal of arms may be inspected also by state agencies in charge licencing and of control over arms trade and storage. In 2018 the Warsaw Military Police Headquarters (independent form the MoD) carried out such inspection in the Military Property Agency. [3]
Consequently we may conclude that the external scrutiny of asset disposals is irregular in nature.

The Supervisory Board of the Military Property Agency is composed of representatives of the Ministry of National Defence, Ministry of Interior Affairs and Administration, and the Ministry of Finance [1]. Another, fully independent audit body is the Supreme Audit Office. While the board is part of the defence establishment, there is no evidence of undue influence over its activity [2].

The annual financial plan and financial statements, including the financial value of the acquisition or disposal of the assets, are presented to the Council of Ministers and are available to the public [1, 2]. They are also audited by the Supreme Audit Office. These audits are publicly available [3]; however, they are not comprehensive on asset disposals.

The Supreme Audit Institution (SAI) monitors asset disposal through its ongoing audit of the Military Programming Act. The latest available report follows the SAI procedure and is highly detailed [1]. As detailed in the report, the CA follows the International Standards of Supreme Audit Institutions [2] and its procedures are highly formalized [3]. However, it dates from 2017 and pertains to 2015, while the previous ones date from 2014 [4] and 2012 [5]. The SAI does not provide a timeframe for the publication of these reports.

SAI reports are highly critical [1, 2] and show no evidence of undue influence by the executive or the military.

SAI reports are made available to the public as soon as they are completed and validated [1, 2]. These reports are released in unredacted form and do not include primary sources; they do include rejoinders by audited agencies.

There is not an independent body mandated to scrutinise defence asset disposals. There is no information available about any regulations or processes for asset disposals, and asset disposals are not made available to the public. Neither the State’s Audit Bureau nor the Administrative Control and Transparency Authority has the power to scrutinise defence assets disposal [3,4,5].

This sub-indicator has been marked as Not Applicable, as there is no independent body mandated to scrutinise defence asset disposals [1,2].

There is no information available about any regulations or processes for asset disposals, and asset disposals are not made available to the public. Neither the State’s Audit Bureau nor the Administrative Control and Transparency Authority has the power to scrutinise defence assets disposal [3,4].

This sub-indicator has been marked as Not Applicable, as there is no independent body mandated to scrutinise defence asset disposals [1,2].

Defence institutions in Qatar are not subject to any external form of audit or scrutiny, and therefore, there are very few audit reports on asset disposal for the public. There is no information about audits within the defence sector on the official webpages of the Ministry of Finance, the State’s Audit Bureau, or the Administrative Control and Transparency Authority [1,2]. There is no transparency in relation to asset disposals, and audit reports on asset disposals are not made available to the public [3,4,5].

A number of MoD departments, including the departments for property relations, financial procurement, financial planning, military-economic analysis and prognisis, and internal financial control and audit, conduct regular internal checks of asset disposal [1]. Externally, the Accounts Chamber scrutinises the MoD assets disposal, though there is no information indicating how often the audits take place (see Article 22 of the federal law ‘On Accounts Chamber’) [2]. Also, in the Federal Treasury, there is a department for department for control and audit in the national defense, security, and judicial sectors [3]. It checks the comprehensiveness of MoD reports and conducts audits to check whether the ministry is complying with the assigned budget, as detailed in Article 5 of the federal law ‘On Accounts Chamber’ [2]. No reports of these audits are available on the department’s official webpage or in the media. The thoroughness of these reports is also unknown.

The independence of the internal controls is questionable because the MoD departments are subordinate to the Minister [1], whereas the Accounts Chamber [2] and Federal Treasury [3] department for control and audit are independent from the military. The Accounts Chamber and the Federal Treasury are independent from both the military and the executive branch. According to Interviewee 2, there is a special audit group in the Accounts Chamber that has a security clearance form and can access, monitor and question in detail all secret items of the military budget, including asset disposals [4].

The reports from the internal audit, for example by the Property Relations Department, are regularly published within a reasonable timeframe. They only provide a summary without even minimal description of audited sales, assets or audited territorial or institutional subjects [1].

The Account Chamber publishes its audit every year and provides a summary of uncovered budget misuse, corruption cases, etc. [2,3]. Its report, like all other reports, omits information about secret MoD assets. No reports about the Federal Treasury department are publicly available.

According to our sources, there is a defined process of scrutiny by an internal unit, but the process in itself is superficial (1). The external relevant body that would be tasked with this is the General Auditing Bureau, which has, in theory, a mandate to audit all government bodies and departments (2). Nonetheless, in practice, it does not have access to full information relating to the activities of military and security agencies. This is especially the case given that the Ministry of Defence is tightly controlled by Saudi de facto leader Mohammed bin Salman, who became minister of defence in January 2015 (3).

This sub-indicator is Not Applicable because asset disposals only superficially scrutinised by an oversight body.

The internal unit that is responsible for oversight and scrutiny of the asset disposal is not independent, and the external body, the General Auditing Bureau is not(practically) have access to the MoD informations and data(6,7).

This sub-indicator is Not Applicable because asset disposals only superficially scrutinised by an oversight body.

Although there are some internal reports which are produced, there are none of these reports are made publicly available for the public or media. These reports are kept private; with the auditing unit, the only unit allowed access to it (1), (2).

The State Audit Institution (SAI) has not specifically audited military asset conversion (implementation of the Master Plan or sale of the moveable property) so far. In 2015, the SAI completed a performance audit of public real estate management in the Republic of Serbia, which did encompass property managed by the MoD, but excluded property for ʻspecial purposesʼ. The audit was carried out following standards adopted by the International Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI) [1]. Whereas none of the property items managed by the MoD and SAF were selected as case studies in the auditing process, the overall audit report found that the Republic of Serbia did not even have complete records of its property and that there were major discrepancies among property registries run by different agencies [1].
Furthermore, the SAI does regularly examine revenues generated through sales as well as through the lease of immovable property in its annual audits of national budget execution [2]. However, since these audits scrutinise public accounting in general, they do not have an in-depth, specific focus on asset management as such and can only provide a general overview of the reallocation of revenues.
Some information about asset disposal (number of real estate items converted, revenues from real estate conversion and sales of surplus arms) are submitted in quarterly reports to parliamentary Defence and Internal Affairs Committee (DIAC) [3, 4, 5], but there has been no real debate in the DIAC on asset management in the MoD and SAF.

The State Audit Institution does not carry out regular oversight on asset disposals, as outlined above, and, therefore, this indicator is scored Not Applicable.

The State Audit Institution does not carry out regular oversight on asset disposals, as outlined above, and, therefore, this indicator is scored Not Applicable.

As with any government activity, the disposal of defence assets is tracked for accountability by internal and external auditors [1, 2]. However, there is no evidence that higher audit bodies such as the Auditor-General’s Office (AGO) makes regular findings available for public awareness, while the Ministry of Defence’s (MINDEF) annual budget reports make no mention of specific details including disposal [3]. Singapore law specifically states that disposal of all government assets must be subject to the appropriate audits by the Auditor-General’s Office or relevant authority [4].

There is no evidence to suggest that independent audits on asset disposals have been unduly influenced by the executive or the military. While there is no publicly accessible report on asset disposals, the military appears to take a dim view of malpractice and has demonstrated a willingness to punish personnel who transgress in this area [1].

There is no evidence that higher audit bodies such as the AGO makes regular findings available for public awareness, and its annual reports are often scant on details [1]. MINDEF’s annual budget report does not make this information available to Parliament or the public [2].

“Armscor’s Defence Disposal Solutions (DDS) mandate provides for the disposal of excess and obsolete defence matériel on behalf of the DOD. Disposal of the defence materiel is carried out in accordance with the requirements of the DOD and regulatory authorities such as the NCACC and the National Non-Proliferation Council” [1]. Disposals, through DDS of Armscor, fall under both the Auditor General (AGSA) and the Inspector General of the Department of Defence (IG-DOD). While the external auditor-general’s role is well-established, the internal auditor-general’s role and mandate are relatively new and untested [2].

Presumably, the AGSA audits of DDS are included in the annual DoD audit – and are then subject to parliamentary oversight through the Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA) and the Joint Standing Committee on Defence. There is a distinct lack of update information clarifying this, however.

Armscor does not appear to be subject to undue influence from the military regarding asset disposals. There is no media commentary regarding incidents of military (South African Defence Force (SANDF)) or executive interference in the auditing of asset disposals. “The relationship between the DOD/SANDF and ARMSCOR is at arm’s length, where the department transfers funds to ARMSCOR (as disclosed in Note 6) in their mission to meet the acquisition, maintenance and disposal needs of the DOD and other clients in terms of Defence Material related products and services” [1]. The DoD/SANDF is, however, able to affect the behaviour of Armscor with regards to asset disposal, for instance, by instituting a moratorium in the sale of Samil-type vehicles [2], but these instances do not suggest interference with auditing functions.

Information on asset disposals are available through Armscor, the DoD and auditor-general reports, but the figures are totals or general summations, and it is not provided in great detail [1, 2].

The Board of Audit and Investigation of Korea (BAI) is an independent constitutional institution which inspects all matters of government institutions, including state asset disposals. [1] The Ministry of Economy and Finance (MOEF) is responsible for conducting an audit and inspection with a focus on asset disposals when it is necessary, according to the Enforcement Decree of the National Property Act. [2] Although audits of the disposal of state assets are conducted by the BAI occasionally, [3] they are not very regular due to the lack of relevant legislation enforcing them on a regular basis.

It is obvious that the BAI and MOEF in charge of overseeing the disposal of state assets, are independent from the military. [1] [2]
The BAI as a statutory (constitutional) institution is independent also from the executive branch.

Although some audit reports are released through media reports occasionally, they are not always available publicly. [1] After reviewing media sources and relevant legislation, such as the Board of Audit and Inspection Act and State Property Act, there is no evidence that shows prompt audit report releases in full detail to the public. [2] [3]

By law, asset disposal is supposed to be scrutinised by the strong mechanisms outlined in the Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets Act 2018. [1] There is no evidence that this is happening because of the general opaqueness of the government. [2]

The Procurement Act details the establishment of independent mechanisms to oversee the process, but there is very minimal evidence available to show any disposal of assets process by the Ministry of Defence since 2018 [1]. Due to the lack of clarity over scrutiny mechanisms, as outlined in 25A, this indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’.

Audit reports of the Defence Ministry are generally not available to the public due to the opaque nature of the government. [1]

The Institute of Housing, Infrastructure, and Equipment for Defence (Instituto de Vivienda, Infraestructura y Equipamiento de la Defensa (INVIED)) is subject to audits, permanent financial control and public audits exercised by the General Intervention of the State Administration, through the General Intervention of Defence, in accordance with the provisions of Law 47/2003 [1], without prejudice to the audit powers attributed to the Court of Accounts by Organic Law 2/1982 [2]. An audit report is done by the delegate body for INVIED from the Supreme Audit Institution (IGAE), it is added to annual accounts reports, but there is only evidence of it in 2019 [3].

The department in charge of auditing function, permanent financial control, and the public audit in the Ministry of Defence is the General Intervention of Defence and the General Accounting Subdirectorate of the Ministry of Defence, which is functionally dependent on the General Comptroller of the State Administration [1], and is regulated by Law 47/2003 [2]. The General Defence Intervention, as established by Royal Decree 454/2012, is integrated into the Defence Undersecretariat. It is functionally dependent on the General Intervention of the State Administration, and exercises, within the scope of the Ministry of Defence and the public bodies dependent on it, the functions attributed to it by current regulations relating to internal control of economic-financial management through the exercise of the auditing function, permanent financial control, and public audit. Thus there is a scrutiny of defence asset disposals done by independent bodies, but there is a risk of military influence due to the role of the Ministry of Defence in these processes [3].

The main audit reports of defence asset disposal are included in the annual accounts of INVIED, with only summary information about the institution activities. An Activity Report is also annually published, which includes extensive information about all asset disposals of the year, but does not include all the details related to each operation and other indicators that could grade aspects, such as transparency or efficiency about every operation [1, 2, 3, 4].

Since a significant proportion of defence sector spending is conducted directly by individual security sector components and individuals that/who make purchases with revenue they have independently and opaquely generated – without the visibility of any central government ministry or oversight body (see example under [1]) – there is no way to effectively scrutinise asset disposal. Effectively, the government and any independent oversight entities cannot scrutinise the disposal of assets if it was never made aware that those assets were purchased to begin with. The International Budget Partnership’s Sudan Open Budget Survey 2017 scored Sudan’s transparency 2 out of 100 [2].

This indicator is marked Not Applicable as information on asset disposal is not readily available to any oversight body, so they cannot scrutinise it.

This indicator is marked Not Applicable as information on asset disposal is not readily available and is therefore not scrutinised at all by any oversight body.

Asset disposals are scrutinised regularly, thoroughly, and in a formalised fashion by the National Audit Office (NAO) [1].

As the NAO is an autonomous auditing body reporting to parliament, neither the executive nor the military are able to unduly influence scrutiny regarding asset disposals [1].

Audit reports of the military organisation’s asset disposals, and other relevant elements of the SAF annual reports, tend to be released after 3 months of scrutiny [1]. Information on asset disposals, including recommendations on how to address any potential errors or shortcomings, is only made publicly available in summarised form [2].

The Federal Audit Office has previously published audits of liquidation processes (but they are outside of the time frame of this study) [1]. A search on the Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport (DDPS) website did not yield an internal audit report for a liquidation process. However, the liquidation process is covered by the mandate of that office (Article 11 FKG) [2]. Important weapons systems have to be liquidated through the Federal Assembly (Article 109a MG) [3]. They are therefore subject to systematic parliamentarian oversight. For the other liquidation processes, they are part of the regular budget and reporting process and hence the finance committee also has the same oversight powers (Section 3 ParlA) [4].

Liquidation processes are reported within the regular legislative process, including budgeting and reporting. Thus the same oversight procedures apply. Article 1.1 of the Federal Audit Act states that the SFAO is “bound only by the Federal Constitution and the law” and Article 1.2 that it is “independent and autonomous.” The director of the Swiss Federal Audit Office (SFAO) is elected by the Federal Council for six years and has to be confirmed by the Federal Assembly (Article 2.2). The person holding the position can only be removed before the end of the term for “serious breach of his or her official duties.” This needs to be done in consultation with the Financial Committee (Article 2.2). The director has full autonomy in staffing (Article 2.1) [1]. The budget of the SFAO is “advised by the parliament without the Federal Council getting involved” [2]. Technically the SFAO has to submit the budget to the government, which is required by law to pass it on to parliament unaltered (article 2 Federal Audit Act) [1]. A search on the DDPS website did not yield an internal audit report for a liquidation process. However, there is no indication that the oversight of the liquidation process is not covered by that office [4].

Not all reports are systematically published; however, they are generally covered by the Freedom of Information Act [1]. The DDPS also has an independent internal audit department that publishes its reports since 2015 [2]. The SFAO publishes reports on areas of the processes within the DDPS [3]. Parliamentarian oversight occasionally produces reports that are available online on particular topics, and the government is obligated to respond. A search on the DDPS website did not yield an internal audit report for a liquidation process [4]. The Federal Audit Office has previously published audits of liquidation processes (but outside of the time frame of this study) [5].

Revenues generated from asset disposals are regarded as incomes and are subject to the regulations of the Budget Act [1]. Therefore, financial performances of the three major funds for asset managements (“Fund of Production and Services for Military Personnel”, “Fund of Rebuilding Old Quarters for Military Dependents”, and “Fund of Rebuilding Old Barracks & Military Installations”) must be compiled into the annual Government Budget which is subject to LY’s Annual Government Budget Review and Approval process [1, 2].

In the meantime, asset disposals are scrutinised according to the regulations of governmental audit mechanisms [3, 4].
MND puts the results of asset disposal in the Accounting Monthly Report and Annual Financial Statement and submits those to the National Audit Office regularly. The NAO publishes the audit of asset disposal in the Semi-Annual Balance Account Report of General Budget and Audit report of Annual Financial Statement. The audit information includes implementation of revenue and analysis of the courses of significant difference in asset disposal implementation. [5,6,7,8, 9].

The three major funds for asset managements (i.e. “Fund of Production and Services for Military Personnel”, “Fund of Rebuilding Old Quarters for Military Dependents”, and “Fund of Rebuilding Old Barracks and Military Installations”) are also subject to audit mechanisms of CY’s National Audit Office [1]. CY’s National Audit Office has indisputable authority over MND’s asset managements [2].

Audit reports on asset disposals are released in the format of financial reports of the “Fund of Production and Services for Military Personnel” and “Fund of Rebuilding Old Barracks and Military Installations”. These two audit reports disclose information of MND’s asset disposals via the official web pages of the Ministry of National Defense on a monthly basis [1, 2].

As noted in 24C, the Controller and Auditor General (CAG) can only audit the information it is given, and its most recent audit report noted concerns about disposal of assets by the Tanzania People’s Defence Force, but aggregrated it with concerns about a number of state entities. [1]

There is an understanding in the public service that the defence sector is not subject to the same level of scrutiny as other sectors for what are usually referred to as “security reasons”, [1] so scrutiny may not directly be ‘interfered with’ but rather discouraged.

There are timely audit reports prepared annually by the CAG which comprise all reports of funds accumulated by the defence sector. [1] [2] [3] However, only summary information on assets and disposal is made public, in the name of security concerns.

According to the Public Procurement and Supplies Administration Act 2017, Section 113, the disposal of supplies must be managed in accordance with the rules prescribed by the minister of each ministry, including the Minister of Defence. However, according to Section 7, this Act does not apply to the procurement of armories and services related to national security by a government-to-government method or by procurement from a foreign country, which means that the disposal of the items purchased by these methods are not scrutinised by any external oversight body [1].

According to the Regulations of the Office of the Prime Minister on Procurement 1992, the 6th revision (2002), public procurement must be investigated in terms of value for money, transparency, efficiency and effectiveness and accountability [2]. As stated in the Guidelines for Public Procurement and Supplies Administration, Article 213, annual asset scrutiny must be conducted in the last month before the end of each fiscal year and then a report must be submitted to the Comptroller-General’s Department for further scrutiny, in accordance with Article 216 [3]. However, since there are no publicly available reports on this issue, it is unclear how thorough and formalised the process of asset disposal is.

According to the Public Procurement and Supplies Administration Act 2017, Section 113, the disposal of supplies must be managed in accordance with the rules prescribed by the minister of each ministry, including the Minister of Defence [1]. Accordingly, each governmental agency or department is required to audit and report its procurement of each item to the head of the agency or procurement unit on an annual basis [2]. However, as reported by Watcharothai (2018), regarding the prevalence of gaps in the act issued under the NCPO, the procurement of some armories and services related to national security, as well as the disposal of these items, are exempt from scrutiny, meaning the disposal of national security-related items are not scrutinised [3]. The Financial Unit, Office of Internal Audit under the Royal Thai Armed Forces Headquarters and the Office of Army Comptroller have full and direct authority to scrutinise asset disposal within the Ministry of Defence [4,5]. In 2019, the State Audit Office conducted an audit report with some conditional commentaries which stated that there was a lack of documentary evidence supporting the financial audit reports from the military. The office also commented that it is impossible to recommend improvements because of the lack of supporting documents [6]. This suggests that the military undermines and at times unduly influences scrutiny by the internal audit body.

According to the Public Procurement and Supplies Administration Act 2017, Section 113, the disposal of supplies must be audited in accordance with the rules prescribed by the minister of each ministry, including the Minister of Defence [1]. Accordingly, each governmental agency or department is required to audit and report the current status of the procured item, i.e. whether it has been received, registered, deteriorated, damaged, lost or no longer needed by the agency. A copy of each report is also submitted to the Comptroller-General’s Department for further scrutiny. However, there is no requirement for this information to be made publicly available [2].

According to our sources, there is a very clear and defined monitoring and follow-up mechanism for more than one institution (Ministry of Finance, MoD, and the Auditing units at the officeof the Prime Minsiter) that scrutinises the asset disposal at a different level. They have the capacity and the power to stop, intervene and investigate any asset disposals. The process happens either annually or based on the oversight institutions schedule. Sometimes they conduct a surprise auditing and scrutinise the process of asset disposal (1,2) . In addition to the concerned department at the Ministry of Defence, specialised departments of the Ministry of State Properties and Land Affairs are responsible for asset disposal in terms of monitoring, following-up and keeping statistics of these properties, as well as for selling them when they become unusable. The Public Services General Control (under the authority of the President of the Government) and the Court of an Audit can also intervene in the scrutiny of such matters.

According to our sources, neither the executive nor the military has made any effort to unduly influence the process of asset disposal or the scrutinisation of it. As the number of scrutinisation institutes is high, there is no way that one institute would try to intervene. (1,2)

According to our sources, there are no auditing reports of asset disposal made public and available. (1,2)This is because most of the reports are internal.

Both legislative oversight/monitoring mechanisms and civil society monitoring mechanisms have been excluded from asset disposal, which has been conducted under the strict control of the Ministry of Treasury and Finance, led by Erdogan’s son-in-law Berat Albayrak. These disposals are not scrutinised by an oversight body of any form within the legislative mechanism. However, it should be noted that the judicial control of the CoA and executive oversight mechanisms, such as the Presidential Supervisory Board, are two government actors that may conduct scrutiny [1]. All of these disposals should in fact be within the reach and under the full control of the CoA and executive oversight mechanisms [2], but due to Erdogan’s extreme accumulation of power, it is unlikely that the CoA or the Presidential Supervisory Board would take the initiative to conduct a scrutiny process by themselves in case there were allegations of corruption.

Article 2 of Law No. 6085 on Turkish Court Of Accounts suggests that the CoA is in charge of financial compliance and performance and that it regularity audits all administrations, organisations, institutions, associations, enterprises, subsidiaries and companies subject to audit by the Turkish Court of Accounts, regardless of whether they are subject to the provisions of public or private law. However, Article 44 of the law emphasises: ‘Matters regarding the public announcement of reports to be prepared as a result of auditing, as stipulated herein, the assets owned by public administrations related to defense, security and intelligence shall be laid down in a by-law, that will be prepared by Turkish Court of Accounts upon taking the opinion of the relevant public administrations, and issued by the President of the Republic’ [2].

This article means that, if/when the CoA attempts to conduct an audit, it should first obtain the opinion of the relevant administration and the permission of the presidential palace.

Interviewee 6 suggests that, currently, due to the full control of the presidential palace over asset disposal/privatisation within the defence/security sector, it is almost impossible for Ministry of Defence’s Inspection Department and Finance Department to conduct sucrunity of asset disposal or to make this scrutiny publicly available [3].

As explained above, legislative oversight mechanisms and civil society monitoring mechanisms (media, think tanks, etc.) are now totally excluded. Only the CoA and exective oversight mechanisms can control these disposals for sure, but neither the CoA nor the executive oversight mechanisms are independent of the presidential palace. In the legal framework, the CoA is an fully independent judicial body within the state apparatus, but in practice, according to Interviewee 6, the CoA is under full presidential control because the president has full control of the appoinment of the CoA president [1]. Article 45 of Law No. 6085 on Turkish Court Of Accounts suggests that ‘The Presidency of the Republic of Turkey shall be excluded from’ demands of parliament for research and investigation by the CoA [2]. Since the Chief of General Staff, the SSB and the TSKGV are directly attached to the presidency, this means that these administrations are protected from legislative demands for audit by the CoA. This article has been a hotly debated issue in Turkey [3].

The CoA audit reports on defence/security-related asset disposals are not made available to the public. Interviewee 3 suggests that parliament’s National Security Council could get some reports from the CoA if/when it applies with a written appeal containing a full explanation of why it needs the reports. However, he emphasised that this is not a routine procedure [1,2].

The Office of the Auditor General [1, 2] and the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets (PPDA) [3] scrutinise what has been given to them. At the same time, the Office of the Auditor General has the mandate to specifically select items for auditing and submits his report to Parliament for further action; then the classified audits are only seen by three people in Parliament, with no debates [4].

According to one MP [1], “[the] defence is not accountable, they are accountable to only Museveni and may be some of their supervisors”. He argued that there is no independence in the system when it comes to the procurement and disposal of assets. There are many reported cases where the military has undermined their institutions if it serves the interests of the president [2].

The Office of the Auditor General [1, 2] and the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets (PPDA) [3] scrutinise what has been given to them. Then the classified audits are only seen by three people in Parliament, with no debates [4]. The Committee on Defence and Internal Affairs is dominated by the ruling party, so there is little independence. However, with the exceptions of classified reports, the rest are public documents that can be accessed by the public at any time [5].

There is no evidence of regular scrutiny of asset disposals by audit bodies or the VRU. However, there were a few occasional audits [1, 2]. At the same time, there is evidence of the State Audit Service auditing some of the state-owned enterprises which sell military property [3] as well as complaints on violations during the asset disposals tenders that were submitted by private enterprises [4]. However, the MoD Internal Audit Unit claims to have conducted several activities in the past four years which also leads to an increase in the security of the MoD assets [5].

The Accounting Chamber of Ukraine conducts the external financial control function on behalf of the VRU [1]. Independence of the Accounting Chamber is provided by both the Constitution of Ukraine and the Law on the Accounting Chamber [1, 2]. The legislation provides that the Accounting Chamber carries on its activities independently, regardless of any other state bodies and is only accountable to the VRU [3]. In this way, the Accounting Chamber is independent. Meanwhile, the head of the Accounting Chamber, as well as its members, are appointed by the VRU [3] which makes the Chamber vulnerable to the VRU’s majority influence. The Internal Audit Department is subordinate to the Minister of Defence of Ukraine [4] which makes it less vulnerable to undue influence.

There is a lack of evidence of regular scrutiny of asset disposals. The last corresponding reports are dated 2005 and 2014 [1, 2]. The audit report for 2005 contains comprehensive data, and the one for 2014 allegedly also contains comprehensive data, but the Accounting Chamber website provides only a general summary. Meanwhile, the results of internal audit are regularly being published on the MoD website: internal audit results from 2014 up to May 2018 [3]. The figures and the report are somewhat general without detailed specifications.

There is no external auditing or a body that audits defence expenditure and income from asset disposal. There is an internal reporting mechanism, but it is not considered auditing or oversight. Although the SAI is mandated to audit all governmental departments, research has revealed that since the SAI reports to the FNC, it undermines its authority, mainly since the FNC does not provide a role of oversight or scrutiny. As the evidence suggests, defence institutions have not gone through an external audit (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), in general, it can be concluded that there is no oversight body in any form that does scrutinize asset disposals.

This sub-indicator has been marked as Not Applicable, as with the lack of existence of a body to scrutinise defence asset disposal, an assessment of independence is not relevant in the context of the UAE.

It has been established that defence institutions, generally, do not go through scrutiny in any form, and particularly concerning asset disposal (Q25A). In the absence of a body tasked with scrutinising asset disposal within defence institutions, it is not possible to comment on whether the military or the executive regularly undermine such a body (1), (2).

This sub-indicator is marked Not Applicable because, in the absence of an entity that is tasked with scrutiny over defence budgets, expenditure and asset disposal an assessment of transparency of results is irrelevant in this context.

The scrutiny of asset disposals falls under the remit of the National Audit Office (NAO). For example, in its 2017 report on the MoD, the NAO scrutinises the risks and challenges related to the MoD’s Better Defence Estate strategy [1]. The Parliament’s Defence Select Committee also has powers to scrutinise asset disposals, under the remit of its role of examining the expenditure, administration, and policy of the Ministry of Defence and its associated public bodies [2]. While the scrutiny process is formalised, scrutiny does not appear to be regular in nature [1, 3]. Apart from the 2017 report mentioned previously, the only other NAO report concerning asset disposals is upcoming in summer 2021 [1, 4]. Both reports only cover estates disposals – no audit reports covering equipment disposals were identified.

The NAO’s independence and auditory powers are enshrined in the National Audit Act (NAA) 1983 (s.6 & 8 particularly) and the Budget Responsibility and National Audit Act (BRANA) 2011 [1, 2, 3]. There is no indication that the executive or the military unduly influence scrutiny by the NAO or the Defence Commitee regarding asset disposals.

Audit reports by the NAO are released as part of the MoDs Annual Report and Accounts reports [1]. The reports are comprehensive and detailed – see, for example, the Delivering the Defence Estate and its forthcoming follow up report [2, 3]. However, there is a four-year gap between the previous report and the upcoming follow up report [2, 3].

The DLA has its own Inspector General and Office of Inspector General. Within this office, there is an Audit Division which undertakes independent internal audits in accordance with the DoD OIG requirements [1]. The Audit Division’s reports are not published on its website. The DoD OIG undertook a system review of the DLA OIG’s audit organisation between 2016 and 2019, and, while the DLA OIG passed this review, the DoD OIG found that the DLA OIG did not monitor the quality of its audits [2], suggesting that the internal audit of disposals might not be adequate.

The asset disposal process, as managed by the Disposition Services under the Defence Logistics Agency (DLA), was also mandated to prepare for an external audit by 2017, along with the entire DoD, by Congress through the 2010 National Defense Authorisation Act [3]. However, since 2017, the independent auditor Ernst & Young (EY) has been unable to complete the audit of DLA due to a lack of financial controls that are necessary for an audit to take place [4,5]. The Independent Auditors’ Report conducted by EY in 2017 found that the DLA does not comply with applicable federal accounting standards [6]. Similarly, in 2018, EY found material weaknesses in the DLA’s inventory policies, controls and stockpile, recording sales and transactions and financial reporting, amongst other issues [7]. In 2019, similar issues were noted, including weaknesses in oversight [8]. In 2020, the same issues were still present [9]. Therefore, although the DLA has been audited by an external organisation annually since 2017, it is yet to pass the audit.

The Goverment Accountability Office (the US equivalent of a Supreme Audit Institution) does not scrutinise asset disposals on a regular basis. It produces ad-hoc reports on specific issues. For example, in 2017, it published a report on excess property as mandated by the 2016 NDAA [10].

There is no evidence of undue influence by the executive or the military on the independent audit undertaken by Ernst & Young. GAO is also an independent organisation, free from undue influence. The DLA OIG is not a statutory inspector general and therefore may not have the same level of independence as the DoD OIG [1].

The audit opinion of the external auditor Ernst & Young is included in the annual financial reports of the DLA [1,2,3,4]. These reports do not specifically focus on asset disposals but rather on the operations of the DLA as a whole. Very little information is included specifically about the DLA Disposition Services. The reports are normally published in November, a couple of months after the fiscal year ends in September.

The legal process for disposals includes an internal audit carried out by the Superintendence of Public Goods (SUDEBIP) directorate for supervision and oversight of assets, irrespective of the external audit that the Comptroller General of the Republic (CGR) may perform [1]. While these controls exist, it is impossible to assess the regularity and quality at which audits are carried out, given that they are not public.

In terms of parliamentary control, two factors should be taken into consideration. The first is the economic crisis, within which the executive and judicial branches disregard the National Assembly (AN), which is why no ministers or directors of other public bodies such as the Comptroller or the SUDEBIP have reported on their activities. This situation has directly hindered scrutiny of detailed information on the management of public resources and goods. Secondly, evidence points to irregularities and a neglect of scrutiny in years prior to the establishment of the AN, and no documents or reports indicate oversight of asset disposal by the former assembly.

As for civil society, the widespread deadlock on access to information [3] prevents organisations from scrutinising information concerning the disposal of public assets.

Institutions with the power to oversee and monitor disposal processes are lack independence from the executive or military forces. Although a decentralised entity, the SUDEBIP depends on the Ministry of the People’s Power for Economy and Finance (MPPEF) [1], leaving it highly prone to the influence of the executive branch. Moreover, given that assets intended for defence and security are permitted their own regulations for management and disposal [2], involvement of the military is high.

Meanwhile, the CONGEFANB theoretically has the power to supervise and monitor transactions made with assets managed by the Ministry of the People’s Power for Defence (MPPD). However, it too is led by military officials [3], and since 2016 has been considered the sole management of FANB resources and assets, restricting even the external oversight of the CGR [4].

Audits on public assets, including asset disposal, must be conducted by law by the SUDEBIP. However, reports are not made public. Likewise, audits carried out by the CGR and, in the case of the defence sector, the CONGEFANB are not made available to the public either. The only available information was in the SUDEPIB management reports, which noted total asset disposals without disaggregating by goods or sector, and without detailing subsequent processes [1].

Recent civil society organisation reports – scrutinizing the management of assets in the defence sector – mainly refer to acquisitions, shedding no further light on whether the MPPD has recently disposed of assets [2].

By law, the books must be submitted before the auditor general for scrutiny, the Public Accounts Committee of Parliament must also have access to all public accounts, including revenue generated; this is in line with the Public Finance Management Act. However, these two would, in principle, only be able to deal with issues of revenue generated from the sale of disposed of assets, yet there are other prescribed methods of disposal, which include burning of assets, among others. In this respect, the Parliamentary Committee on Defence and Security would be the most appropriate to provide oversight, but there is no evidence of this information being provided by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) or the Zimbabwe Defence Forces. The information available is that the MoD, at times, failed to submit returns pertaining to revenue generated, including from asset disposal to the auditor general. In any case, the Defence Act gives a service commander the power to authorise the submission of books for scrutiny or withholding them [1, 2, 3, 4, 5].

The Defence Act gives the command structure of the military the power to withhold books with information pertaining to financials or disposals to scrutiny even by the Defence Commission, which in essence has the responsibility to ensure the proper administration of the defence forces. Such powers translate to the undermining of scrutiny. This might be part of the reason why returns of revenue generated by the military are not submitted to the Auditor General for scrutiny in terms of the Public Finance Management Act [1, 2]. Ordinarily, the Ministry of Defence Internal Audit department is supposed to provide scrutiny and oversight over asset disposal. However, in practice, this is not the case. The ministry does not have an audit charter or an audit committee to guide internal audit processes [3].

Audit reports on asset disposables are not publicly available. The MoD has an internal audit department; its responsibility is to ensure that the books of the defence forces are in order. There is some evidence of internal audits happening, but the full details are not published, therefore, it is unavailable to the public [1]. The Office of the Auditor General Zimbabwe reports that the information is not given to the office, let alone the publication of such information [2].

Country Sort by Country 25a. Scrutiny Sort By Subindicator 25b. Independence Sort By Subindicator 25c. Transparency Sort By Subindicator
Albania 25 / 100 50 / 100 25 / 100
Algeria 0 / 100 NA NA
Angola 0 / 100 NA 0 / 100
Argentina 25 / 100 75 / 100 0 / 100
Armenia 0 / 100 NA NA
Australia 50 / 100 75 / 100 50 / 100
Azerbaijan 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Bahrain 0 / 100 NA NA
Bangladesh 25 / 100 25 / 100 0 / 100
Belgium 100 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100
Bosnia and Herzegovina 50 / 100 75 / 100 75 / 100
Botswana 100 / 100 100 / 100 75 / 100
Brazil 75 / 100 75 / 100 50 / 100
Burkina Faso 0 / 100 NA NA
Cameroon 0 / 100 NA NA
Canada 75 / 100 100 / 100 50 / 100
Chile 75 / 100 100 / 100 50 / 100
China 50 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Colombia 75 / 100 75 / 100 50 / 100
Cote d'Ivoire 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Denmark 75 / 100 100 / 100 50 / 100
Egypt 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Estonia 100 / 100 100 / 100 75 / 100
Finland 100 / 100 100 / 100 75 / 100
France 75 / 100 100 / 100 25 / 100
Germany 100 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100
Ghana 25 / 100 0 / 100 25 / 100
Greece 50 / 100 25 / 100 25 / 100
Hungary 25 / 100 50 / 100 0 / 100
India 100 / 100 100 / 100 50 / 100
Indonesia 50 / 100 NEI 0 / 100
Iran 0 / 100 NA NA
Iraq 25 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Israel 50 / 100 50 / 100 0 / 100
Italy 75 / 100 100 / 100 50 / 100
Japan 75 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100
Jordan 0 / 100 NA NA
Kenya 50 / 100 50 / 100 50 / 100
Kosovo 50 / 100 100 / 100 50 / 100
Kuwait 25 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Latvia 100 / 100 NEI 100 / 100
Lebanon 0 / 100 NA NA
Lithuania 100 / 100 100 / 100 50 / 100
Malaysia 75 / 100 50 / 100 0 / 100
Mali 0 / 100 NA NA
Mexico 25 / 100 50 / 100 0 / 100
Montenegro 25 / 100 50 / 100 75 / 100
Morocco 0 / 100 NA NA
Myanmar 0 / 100 NA NA
Netherlands 100 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100
New Zealand 100 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100
Niger 0 / 100 NA 0 / 100
Nigeria 0 / 100 NA NA
North Macedonia 0 / 100 NA NA
Norway 75 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100
Oman 0 / 100 NA NA
Palestine 25 / 100 50 / 100 0 / 100
Philippines 50 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100
Poland 75 / 100 100 / 100 50 / 100
Portugal 75 / 100 100 / 100 50 / 100
Qatar 0 / 100 NA NA
Russia 50 / 100 50 / 100 50 / 100
Saudi Arabia 0 / 100 NA NA
Serbia 25 / 100 NA NA
Singapore 75 / 100 100 / 100 0 / 100
South Africa 75 / 100 100 / 100 50 / 100
South Korea 75 / 100 100 / 100 50 / 100
South Sudan 0 / 100 NA 0 / 100
Spain 75 / 100 75 / 100 50 / 100
Sudan 0 / 100 NA NA
Sweden 100 / 100 100 / 100 50 / 100
Switzerland 75 / 100 100 / 100 25 / 100
Taiwan 100 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100
Tanzania 50 / 100 50 / 100 50 / 100
Thailand 25 / 100 50 / 100 0 / 100
Tunisia 100 / 100 100 / 100 0 / 100
Turkey 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Uganda 50 / 100 0 / 100 50 / 100
Ukraine 25 / 100 75 / 100 0 / 100
United Arab Emirates 0 / 100 NA NA
United Kingdom 50 / 100 100 / 100 75 / 100
United States 75 / 100 100 / 100 25 / 100
Venezuela 25 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Zimbabwe 25 / 100 50 / 100 0 / 100

With thanks for support from the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs who have contributed to the Government Defence Integrity Index.

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