The defence procurement is regulated by the law on public procurement (LPP) [1] and the Decision of Council of Ministers 1403/2008 (DCM 1403/2008) which specifies the bodies, rules and procedures for conducting the procurements for which the LPP does not apply [2]. DCM 1403 specifies also all the bodies responsible for the acquisition cycle:
­ The MoD conducts the procurements and reports to the Council of Ministers every year.
­ The Structures for the Generation of Operational Demands, generate requests for equipment or services which will be used for operational purposes.
­ The Defence Modernisation Board (DMB) analyses, classifies and evaluates the requests from the structures for the generation of operational demands and is also responsible for classifying requests which will be excluded from public procurements.
­ The Directorate for the Modernisation is responsible for conducting and administering the procurement process, in accordance with the decisions of the DBM.
­ The Group for the Evaluation of the Offer is a temporary structure that is established by the Minister of Defence on a case by case basis.
­ The Group for the Negotiation of the Contract is a temporary structure that is established by the Minister of Defence.
­ The Sector for the Management of the Contracts is responsible for the management of the main contracts conducted in accordance with the LPP,
­ The Structures for the Operational Use are the structures that make use of the acquired materiel.
The General Directorate of Resource and Modernization is responsible for the disposal procedures [3]. The SSAI has identified shortcomings in the implementation such as, incompatibilities between the evaluated budget in the procurement procedure and the actual amount spent (in violation with the DCM 1403), provision of goods by companies that fail comply with the tender specifications, specification of prices that exceed the market offer by the procurement boards, the misuse of classification clause to classify procurements that do not fall under the classified procurement category, etc. [4].

Although the process is regulated in terms of structures and responsibilities performed by them, the outcome of their activity is not made public. The financial information of major procurements is made public only through the publication of the SSAI reports and only when irregularities are found [1]. Information on the procedures set out in the LLP is provided by the Agency on Public Procurements [2].

The SSAI has identified shortcomings in the implementation such as, incompatibilities between the evaluated budget in the procurement procedure and the actual amount spent (in violation with the DCM 1403), provision of goods by companies that fail comply with the tender specifications, specification of prices that exceed the market offer by the procurement boards, the misuse of classification clause to classify procurements that do not fall under the classified procurement category, etc. [1].

No evidence could be found that there is a formal defence procurement cycle. Some policies and formal procedures could be found in the Public Procurement Law but it is unclear what if any sections apply to the defence sector; also see the country’s last assessment (1).

Article 65 of the 2016 Public Procurement Law states, (2) that tenders should be published in the Official Bulletin of the Public Operator’s Markets (BOMOP) (3) and, at least, in two daily national newspapers, both in Arabic and at least one in another foreign language. The tender should also include, if possible, the price, the time limits for the contract and all other relevant information (2). There is no evidence that these regulations also apply to the defence realm. A 2014 Jane Report cites that military procurement is exempted from general procurement legislation (4). A 2017 Epicos report details that tenders for defence and security items are restricted (5). Public contracts that are “specific in nature” cannot be published in the BOMOP, which likely includes security items (Art. 158), (2).

There is no evidence that the entire defence procurement cycle is disclosed. The only document that might apply to defence procurements is the 2016 Public Procurement Law (1). The armed forces publish tenders on their websites. Tenders published in September, October, and November 2018 were only for non-military goods, such as the supply and installation of photographic equipment (2). An earlier report confirmed that large-scale procurements in the defence sector are conducted through restricted tenders. Open tenders are published only for smaller and less sensitive items (3), (4). No other information on the defence procurement cycle could be found on the website (2).

No evidence could be found that there is a formal defence procurement cycle. Some policies and formal procedures could be found in the Public Procurement Law but it is unclear what if any sections apply to the defence sector (1, 2, 3 ,4 ,5).

By law, only parts of the procurement cycle for defence (as well as other high-value contracts) are required to be disclosed publicly. Needs assessments and asset disposal procedures are commonly not disclosed (1).

The 2016 Public Procurement Law calls for the publication of two types of contracts: open tenders and restricted tenders by the previous qualification, both in the official gazette and the online public contracting website of the Ministry of Finance. Simplified procedure contracts (direct awards) above a given value (determined by the state budget law), require a publication of approvals as well as pre-review by the audit court (Art. 99). Non-publication counts as a procedural infraction and may be sanctioned by annulment (Art. 381) (1), (2).

The Finance Ministry’s oversight body, the National Public Procurement Service (SNCP), is tasked with setting up a public contracts database; however, in 2018 the SNCP stated that only a minority of public contracts and execution reports were being reported to them, often with incomplete information (1).

The public procurement law provides for disclosure of parts of the procurement process cycle (see Q58A); however, in practice disclosure is limited and incomplete (2), (3). Presidential authorisations for high-value contracts published in the official gazette provide limited information, as do summary references in state budget proposals (later in the procurement cycle). The audit court publishes its opinions and decisions online. Yet, the public database is incomplete, and many opinions deal with the lack of information provided by the contracting entities (2).

This indicator has not been assigned a score due to insufficient information or evidence.

The cycle of defence procurement and contracting is formalised, but only partially. It lacks detailed policies and procedures for each stage of the process that are public knowledge. The beginning of the process is public knowledge, with the DPDN (quadrennial) of the national executive branch. [1] However, the other stages are not easily accessible since they are not raised in the regulations as public documents. This is the case of the Comprehensive Defence Investment Management System (SIGID) which, according to the Decree that instructs the planning cycle, is postulated by the EMCO and then approved by the Ministry as the Defence Investment Plan (PIDEF). [2] The DPDN 2018 starts the third planning cycle and proposes as a guiding criterion for resource planning the implementation of a progressive internal redistribution of military spending, destined to the process of reconversion of the Military Instrument and multi-annual investments aimed at capacity recovery, incorporation of equipment, and technological development. [3] [4] The main role in the cycle regarding the planning and execution of joint procurement and contracting (large arms systems and the Antarctic campaign among others) is in the 2019 organisation chart in the Secretariat of Logistic Services of the Defence and Military Coordination in Emergencies. [5] What is not set, each Force executes its budget by making the contracting and procurement stipulated.

The preparation of the documents that come directly from the DPDN are the responsibility of the Military and National Strategic Level (Joint Chiefs of the Armed Forces and Ministry of Defence). Certain documents of the planning cycle of the defence area that must be released according to the DPDN in 2018 have not yet been prepared or are not freely available to the public, as is the case with the Comprehensive Reconversion Plan. [1] The other documents provided for in the planning cycle, such as the Comprehensive Defence Investment Management System (SIGID), which according to the Decree is postulated by the EMCO and then approved by the Ministry as the Defence Investment Plan (PIDEF). In addition to the plans there is a sequence of strategic military planning in the short, medium, and long term. Regarding all of them, the only one accessible to the public on the web is the DPDN. Some elements of the defence procurement and contracting cycle are formalised on the COMPR.AR and CONTRAT.AR websites (purchases, auctions, tenders), but they are disclosed in a general manner and the detail of available information varies depending on the case. In this sense, the World Bank highlights the improvements that Argentina has made in relation to the public procurement and procurement system through two online portals (Buy and Contract) which allow a more agile and transparent participation of the contractors and suppliers. The Bank financially supports the implementation of the electronic public procurement system through the Modernisation and Innovation project to ensure better public services in Argentina. [2] [3]

There is Not Enough Information to score this indicator.There are partially detailed policies and procedures for the implementation process of the procurement cycle. However, it has not been possible to find evidence of implementation.

The whole cycle of the procurement process is regulated by the Law on Procurement, that stipulates that the planning, the announcement (whether open or targeted and closed), the signing of the contract, its further implementation should be disclosed to the public to the extent possible, Articles 2, 4 and 15 provide clauses that regulate the overall procedure on general procurement which equally applies to the defence sector expenditure. [1] The procurement that contains state or official secret that is defined by the Law on State and Official Secrecy [2] are excluded from the general provisions of the Law on Procurement and are regulated with separate clauses on non-disclosure.
There is detailed information on the applicants to the bids announced by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) on the www.gnumner.am portal. The whole package including details on the expertise, financial sustainability, other related activities, etc, is publicly available to anyone who might be interested in the procurement details. The institution that orders the bid does not influence the electronic application. Defence procurement plans for 2018 can be seen at, https://www.armeps.am/ppcm/public/procurements and bidding by the MoD at https://armeps.am/ppcm/public/bid-report.

Government Decree N 526-Ն provides a detailed outline of public procurement that should be applied by all state agencies, defence establishments inclusive [1]. The Ministry of Finance as the main authorized body is responsible for checking the compliance of the procurement cycles to the main law and government decrees. In the attempt of making the whole process transparent, the bulletin portal (www.gnumner.am) provides the results of the expertise towards each stage of the procurement cycle. In 2018, two of the price quotation requests by MoD were assessed against the law with negative recommendations. In one case [2] there was a very specific description of a product that was a violation of law․ However the processes of assessment of needs and assets disposal are not disclosed to the public.

Comprehensive information on procurement made by the MoD is available at www.armeps.am. [1, 2]
However, there is a lack of information on implementation of the assessment of needs and assets disposal processes.

The Defence procurement cycle is broadly explained in the Defence Procurement Policy Manual (DPPM) [1] and in more detail through the Capability Life Cycle [2]. While the DPPM provides a superficial outline of the steps involved in the procurement cycle, it points to the Complex Procurement Guide and Simple Procurement Process Tool as resources which contain the details of each section of the procurement life cycle [1]. However, these resources are not available publicly. The defence procurement long-term planning process is set out in the Integrated Investment Program (IIP) 2016 [3], which is claimed to be regularly reviewed and updated during the annual parliamentary budget-setting process [3, p7-8]. However, analysts say that the promised IIP updates have not been consistent or detailed [4, 5]. As part of the First Principles Review recommendations to streamline the defence acquisition process, a new Capability Life Cycle process, tracking and providing a better overview of the introduction of new and refreshed capabilities was approved in March 2016 [6]. Though more detailed documents than an executive summary are not formally publicly available on the Department of Defence website, a fairly comprehensive overview is available as a publicly available conference presentation by two academics tied to defence, showing that the procedures in the life cycle are formalised [2].

The Defence Procurement Policy Manual (DPPM) is fully available online [1], as is the Integrated Investment Program 2016 (IIP) [2]. Despite these processes being complex, the DPPM and IIP are written in accessible language and include diagrams and charts to make the content more understandable. Additionally, searchable information about ongoing procurement tenders are easily available through the AusTender website [3]. However, for the Capability Life Cycle (CLC) process, only an executive summary of the CLC Detailed Design is available online through the Department of Defence website [4]. A publicly available conference presentation by two academics tied to defence – with far more detail on the processes of the CLC – is accessible external to the official website, so cannot be considered a ‘disclosure’ [5]. Additionally, the Simple Procurement Process Tool and Complex Procurement Guide, which are referred to repeatedly in the DPPM [1, p9-11], is not available online [6].

While it is clear that there is at least a semi-formalised procurement cycle process [1, 2], the extent to which these are detailed in policies and procedures and subsequently implemented is unclear. Official documents which might shed light on the detailed policies are procedures are not publicly available, though unofficial documents point to concerted efforts at implementation [3]. In an internal Department of Defence audit reported on in the media, auditors found serious deficiencies with how procurement personnel were following guidelines and policies [4]. It is unclear if these shortcomings have been addressed.

There is no legislation regulating all defence procurement processes, including public access to information to procurement activities. Minister of Defence Zakir Hasanov said at a press conference (2018) that if the Ministry of Defence needed any weaponry and military equipment, their list would be prepared, sent to other state agencies, and they would purchase military equipment (1). The defence procurement cycle, from the assessment of needs, through contract implementation and sign-off, all the way to asset disposal, is partially formalized. However, the MoD often issues public tenders about MoD needs. This practice is limited to non-defence products (2).

Currently, in Azerbaijan, there is limited access to information on procurement by civil society organizations and the media. The defence procurement cycle is disclosed only in a very abridged format – open calls for tender are published (this practice is limited to the non-defence products), but procedures and ultimately the selection process is biased (1). The press wrote a few years ago about the “tender battle” between Defence Minister Zakir Hasanov and Deputy Prime Minister Yagub Eyyubov. Both officials wanted to benefit from tenders for their benefit (2).

There is no legislation regulating all defence procurement processes, including public access to information to procurement activities. Minister of Defence Zakir Hasanov said at a press conference that if the Ministry of Defence needed any weaponry and military equipment, their list would be prepared, then sent to other state agencies, and they would purchase military equipment (1).

There is some formalisation of the defence procurement cycle, in that some internal guidelines exist. For strategic procurement however, there is no defined mechanism. For logistics, there is a cycle that starts with assessments needs. For asset disposal, there is an internal guideline, but not a formal process [1, 2, 3]. Following a search of the websites of the Parliament, the Ministry of Defence (MoD), and other government and media sources, and then verified by interviews, there is no more information on this topic.

The defence procurement cycle is not disclosed and not available to the public at all. It is considered a confidential and matter of national security [1, 2, 3]. Following a search of the websites of the Parliament, the Ministry of Defence (MoD), and other government and media sources, and then verified by interviews, there is no more information on this topic.

Although there are procedures for the procurement cycle that can be considered formal processes for logistics procurement, they are not implemented most of the time. It depends on type, quantity and time of procurements [1, 2, 3]. Following a search of the websites of the parliament, the MoD, Ministry of Finance, the government and other media sources, and then verified by interviews, there is no more information on this topic.

The formal procurement system of the Armed Forces is clearly laid out in a flowchart, which details 14 stages of procurement action as well as the agencies responsible for the implementation of each stage [1]. However, the disposal of defence assets is missing from this flowchart.

The defence procurement cycle is only disclosed in a generalised manner [1].

The Armed Forces Procurement Policy of 2010 outlines detailed steps for implementing the stages of the procurement cycle [1,2]. There is no evidence to suggest that these steps are fully followed in practice.

In terms of procurement, the Minister of Defense must follow a prescribed procedure as detailed in the law on public procurement. and the law on public procurement regarding security and defence [1, 2]. The process includes (a) the need for a weapon system in a ten-year program before explaining it (to the Chamber), (b) the analysis of the different possibilities (in terms of choices of equipment purchases); (c) reporting (to the Chamber) on the negotiations (with arms producing companies) and on aspects related to joint production and compensation (handled by the Ministry of Economic Affairs), and finally (d) taking the decision (in terms of modernization program).

The lifecycle also needs to be defined in advance. This includes all the successive and/or interdependent stages, including the research and development to be carried out, production, marketing and its conditions, transport, use and maintenance, throughout the life of the product or work or the provision of a service, from the acquisition of raw materials or the production of resources to disposal, restoration and the end of the service or use. In support of these deliberations, Belgium set up in 1996 an ad hoc “military procurement” committee in the House of Representatives [3].

Laws and royal decrees are available to the public. These include the government procurement law, and the law on defence and security procurement legislation [1, 2]. This legislation includes a detailed description of the procurement process. The procedure for awarding individual contracts is entirely transparent to the control organisations (Inspectorate of Finance, parliament, council of ministers, Court of Auditors). Procurement notices (contract notices, contract award notices) are systematically published in accordance with Belgian and EU law and available to the public [3]. Omitting to do so is rare and generally has to do with international security reasons.

The implementation process is detailed in the law on public procurement, the law on defence and security procurement and the royal decree on defence and security procurement [1, 2, 3]. A review of parliamentary documents and media articles does not reveal evidence of issues with the implementation of the legislation of defence procurement [4, 5].

The disclosure of public procurement is prescribed by the Public Procurement Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina (PPL), except for the procurement of armaments, military equipment and special equipment, which are defined by a special regulation as confidential goods [1, 2]. Public calls have to be issued [1]. The Ministry of Defence’s (MoD) annual procurement plan for 2018 available online and audit reports suggest that the MoD produces regular procurement plans and amendments according to the legislation, also the MoD publishes the basic contract elements as demanded by the legislation. The Rules on Planning, Organising and Contracting for Logistical Needs in MoD and the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina (AFBiH) was adopted in February 2018, but it is not publicly available [2]. Currently in force in the MoD and AFBiH are the Rules on Planning, Organising and Contracting for Logistical Needs in MoD and AFBiH, (No. 11-02-3-3759-58/16 dated 19 February 2018) [3]. With their entry into force, the rules superseded earlier MoD’s internal regulations governing the planning of logistical needs, namely the 2015 Guidance on planning logistical needs and procurement in MoD and AFBiH, and the 2015 Instruction for the performance of contracts for the procurement of goods, services and works in the MoD and AFBiH [4]. The two aforementioned regulations were repealed under Article 79 of the applicable Rules on Planning, Organising and Contracting for Logistical Needs in MoD and AFBiH [4].

All documentation related to procurements listed on the MoD website is in a disaggregated form on the main sub-page “Public procurements and tenders” where the procurement plan is published and different notifications or under one of the four tabs: “decisions”, “requests for tender documentation” (with no posts), “call for offers” and “information on concluded contracts”. Thus, it is not possible to verify that all steps in the defence procurement cycle are disclosed to the public [1]. A nationwide public procurement portal was established in 2014, where data regarding procurements is published and which allows the linking of different notifications in regards to one procurement. However, there is no guarantee that all documents have been published [2]. Civil society organizations have also, in 2017 and 2018, publicized the issue of the way how information on public procurements are posted on the website of the MoD, as well as the lack of the published basic contract elements as demanded by the legislation [3, 4].

According to the government reviewer, the MoD approaches the spending of budget funds transparently and in accordance with the law. The MoD regularly publishes Public Procurement Plans, PPP amendments, as well as published tenders on its website. Regular reporting on concluded contracts is also made. This includes the publication of Contract Award Decisions, the Contract Award Notice, which links PPP with the concluded contract, and the subsequent publication of complete details in the Contract Information section, which shows all information on the type of goods, the supplier, type of procedure, value and the duration of the contract, the date and scope of the contract, and if there are, a link to the Framework Agreements. The MoD, from the moment of an announcement, reports on all further steps in the spending of budget funds.

There is not enough available evidence on the implementation of policies and procedures. As such, we are not able to provide a score for this indicator and instead it is marked ‘Not Enough Information’.

BDF’s procurement processes are formalised with a number of them are published by the PPADB on their website [1]. However, the defence procurement cycle process from needs assessments through contract implementation and sign off are not made public [2]. As explained in 57A and as seen on the PADB website, defence procurement is conducted in term so the PPADB. As explained elsewhere, not all BDF procurement is conducted through the PPADB. Sensitive procurement of BDF is naturally excluded from PPADB.

BDF procurement cycle is not disclosed in full. Only the procurement plan and certain provisions are available through the PPADB [1]. For example, in 2017, the lack of availability of the procurement cycle was questioned in Parliament and the Minister of Defence responded as follows: Minister Shaw Kgathi of Defence, Justice and Security has told parliament that his ministry is not aware of any plan to engage companies and/or directors to handle the purchase and sale of aircraft from the Swedish government as no agreement or procurement has been concluded in this respect [1]. Thus, he said he is not in a position to explain the purchase of the Gripen aircraft or any other defence equipment with the Swedish government as the BDF is still in the process of considering options for a fighter aircraft that will meet its needs in terms of the design philosophy of the aircraft, multi-role capability, technical superiority and interoperability [1]. He confirmed though that the Gripen aircraft is one of the many platforms under consideration; noting that others include the Russian Yak 130 and Mig 29, the Korean T/FA 50, the French Mirage 2000-5, the American F16 and the Brazilian Super Tucano [2].

The PPADB Operations Manual provides detailed steps that must be followed by the BDF [1]. However, it is difficult to ascertain their implementation due to the unavailability of the detailed procurement cycle processes [2]. However, in the purchasing of aircraft in 2017, the Minister of Defence responded inter alia that: Minister Kgathi said regarding the need or otherwise of a third party in the procurement, it has to be understood that the BDF has the competence and technical expertise to define their requirements and execute procurement without the assistance of agents commonly known as middlemen [2]. Mr Kgathi thus urged MPs to desist from pre-empting defence procurement processes outcomes. He also said that the issue of a possible escalation of the arms race is an irrelevant theoretical approach to the national defence analysis; explaining that procurement of military equipment is required for military protection of a particular country for which the military is established [2]. The lack of transparency makes it is very difficult to evaluate. This is worsened by the absence of a monitoring process where results are made publicly available.

Law 8.666/93 formalises the entire procurement process with very strict phases. As the previous assessments pointed out, most of the defence acquisitions occur under the same acquisitions law (Law 8.666/1993) [1], that imposes many bureaucratic mechanisms to government institutions. This law determines a set of acquisition modes – from long and manual processes in cases of complex, expensive or international acquisitions, bidding (electronic or not) and invitations (in cases where there is only one provider with recognizable authority in the service or product). All these procurement modes have an internal phase, where the institution identifies the need of the acquisition, elaborate its justification and specificities, and check internally if there is budget available in order to execute the bidding. After that, the external phase begins, with the launching of a public call or the publication of bidding exemption justification [2]. Regarding defence, Article 24 of Law 8.666/93 establishes the possible exemption from public bids when: (a) there is the possibility of harming National Security, in cases established by a presidential decree, with the approval of the National Defence Council; and when (b) for the contracting of high technology related to national defence [4]. Decree 2295/97, establishes a bidding exemption for warfare assets, technology development and services related to intelligence. Law 12598/2012 establishes special norms for defence acquisitions, defining important concepts such as Defence Product (Prode), Defence Strategic Product (PED), Defence Systems (SD) and Defence Strategic Company (EED) [4]. The contracts are available on the federal portal of public biddings, and asset disposals are formalized in the yearly management report [5].

The defence procurement cycle process is fully disclosed through the Public Biddings Law and many available documents that explain the cycle’s legislation, including assessment of needs, contract implementation and sign-off, asset disposal; process of awarding contracts, and mechanisms for contract implementation. [1, 2]. In practice, the Transparency Portal has a list of all contracts, with value information, the name of the contracted companies and a brief description of the service or product. However, when it comes to linking documents, including, the public call, the contract and asset disposals, in some cases the fields in the system are present, but they are blank [3].

Even with partially incomplete databases, the data available in the Brazilian Transparency Portal gives us some evidence of compliance with acquisition norms and phases [1]. One positive example is the Submarine Development Program (PROSUB) website, which contains a comprehensive list of contracts and justifications for exemption [2].

According to Article 6 of Law N° 039 (2016), this Act does not apply to contracts for works, supplies and services and public service delegations, where they relate to the needs of defence and national security that require secrecy or for which protection essential interests of the State is incompatible with publicity measures (1).

According to Article 6 of Law N° 039 (2016), this Act does not apply to contracts for works, supplies and services and public service delegations, where they relate to the needs of defence and national security that require secrecy or for which protection essential interests of the State is incompatible with publicity measures. A decree issued by the Council of Ministers specifies the rules that govern the acquisition of goods and services (1).

A decree issued by the Council of Ministers specifies the rules that govern the acquisition of goods and services (1).

Legislation that covers procurement in Cameroon exempts defence and security contracts (‘Special Contracts’) as per Article 71 of the Public Procurement Code (2018) [1]. There is no other evidence that the defence procurement cycle is formalised at all and there are no policies or procedures for the implementation process of the procurement cycle.

Legislation that covers procurement in Cameroon exempts defence and security contracts (‘Special Contracts’) as per Article 71 of the Public Procurement Code (2018) [1]. In addition, the defence procurement cycle is not disclosed.

There is no other evidence that the defence procurement cycle is formalised at all and there are no policies or procedures for the implementation process of the procurement cycle [1].

The entire defence procurement cycle, from assessment of needs, through contract implementation and sign-off, to asset disposal, is formalised. [1] Procurement initiatives are made public in their early stages (through soliciting Letters of Interest and Requests for Proposals) on the Canadian Government’s “Buy and Sell” website and all elements of the process are subject to the Access to Information Act. [2] [3] The Defence Production Act, as well as regulations by PSPC provide legislative support for the formal defence procurement cycle process noted above. [4] [5]

Processes and specific initiatives regarding defence procurement are outlined on the Public Services and Procurement Canada website. [1] Needs assessments, contract implementation and sign-off, the process of awarding contracts, and mechanisms for contract implementation are all outlined on the government buy and sell website for each announced procurement. [2] There are some exceptions for special operations, cyber, or intelligence specific procurements. [3] Transparency has increased in recent years as the Department of National Defence (DND) and Innovation, Science, and Economic Development Canada (ISED) have become more collaborative with industry and lines of communication have been improved earlier on in the procurement processes. [3] Five stages of military equipment acquisition: Identification, Options Analysis, Definition, Implementation and Closeout, are described, [4] but as several, namely 5/6, reports related to the CF-18 Replacement project have been labeled as “archived”, there are elements of the defence procurement cycle that are less clear. [5] Detailed procedures for asset disposal are not clear. Government processes of disposals can lack clarity, as was the case for the planned sale of Kapyong Barracks, which was ruled invalid [6] and led to a government settlement with the Manitoba Metis Federation. [7] There is also little clarity in asset disposal processes and associated costs when plans for environmental remediation may be ongoing. [8]

There are policies and procedures for each step of the implementation process of procurements cycle and there is evidence that these are followed in practice. [1] As noted in 58B, procurement needs assessments, contract implementation and sign-off, the process of awarding contracts, and mechanisms for contract implementation are all outlined on the government buy and sell website for each announced procurement. [2]. There is, however, a lack of detailed policies and procedures for asset disposal, as was the case for the planned sale of Kapyong Barracks, which was ruled invalid [3] and led to a government settlement with the Manitoba Metis Federation. [4] There is also little clarity in asset disposal processes and associated costs when plans for environmental remediation may be ongoing. [5

There is not enough information to score this indicator. The disclosure of the defence procurement cycle is fragmented and dispersed. In conjunction with the institutions of defence, the system of public procurement or “Chile Compra” developed guidelines for acquisitions and contracts for the sub-secretary for the armed forces, the army, the Retiring Fund for the National Defence (Capredena), the navy, the Estado Mayor Conjunto (EMCO), and the air force. These guidelines and procedures are consistent with multiple pieces of legislation that regulate the procurement and contract process in public agencies. However, there is no clarity on how this system is linked to the new framework for strategic planning based on capacities [1]. Not enough information can be found on details of the procurement cycle, including specific details needed on the three components of this indicator: assessment of needs, contract and asset disposal [1, 2].

The disclosure of the defence procurement cycle is fragmented and dispersed. In conjunction with the institutions of defence, the system of public procurement or “Chile Compra” developed guidelines for acquisitions and contracts for the sub-secretary for the armed forces, the army, the Retiring Fund for the National Defence (Capredena), the navy, the Estado Mayor Conjunto (EMCO), and the air force. These guidelines and procedures are consistent with multiple pieces of legislation that regulate the procurement and contract process in public agencies. However, there is no clarity on how this system is linked to the new framework for strategic planning based on capacities [1]. Moreover, procedures and regulations do not cover the cycle of investments that belong to the Restricted Law of Copper, which is defined in general terms and with mechanisms of implementation and awarding considered reserved.

There is not enough information to score this indicator. This is due to limited information on the policies and procedures relating to the defence procurement cycle, as well as the lack of information on implementation.

The Equipment Procurement Regulations (中央军委装备采购条) of 2002 outline the process of procurement in detail, with deadlines and concrete measures that need to be taken at every step from planning to delivery (articles 16 to 56). In the PLA’s two procurement platforms (mundane/weaponry) there is clear evidence of a formal online procurement process, but overall it is not open to the public (plap.cn ; weain.mil.cn) . The technical aspects of the defence procurement cycle are available to potential suppliers but not publicly. On the plap.cn platform, information can be found on calls for tenders, announcements of results, and single-source procurement announcements, as well as on regulations. On the weain.mil.cn platform (weapons procurement) calls for tenders are open, but only bidders or suppliers can access results (see both types of announcements under 军队公告 ). The Weapons and Equipment Quality Management Regulations (2010) set out the various stages and controls involved in contract implementation.

On the two procurement platforms, relevant regulations can be found, as well as many announcements on technical aspects (for instance on the registration of suppliers and reviewers).[1,2]

Transparency during procurement itself only exists in the three aspects listed above (Q58A): calls for tenders, their results (successful bidder for non-weapons-related procurement) and single-source procurement announcements, and these are published in brief and abbreviated forms. [1,2] Transparency is very low, as the public platforms provide only basic technical description of the procurred items and successful bidders (for non-weapons procurement).

On the two procurement platforms, relevant regulations can be found, as well as many announcements on technical aspects (for instance on the registration of suppliers and reviewers). [1,2] However, apart from the final outcome of a tender, there is no other information on implementation. [3,4,5]

The laws related to public procurement in Colombia (Law 80 of 1993, [1] Law 1150 of 2007, [2] Decree 1510 of 2013, [3] and Decree 734 of 2012 [4]) describe the public procurement process that entities must develop in terms of post-recruitment monitoring. All contracts are regulated by the Attorney General, the Prosecutor’s Office, and the Comptroller. Decree 1510 of 2013, [3] related to the public procurement and contracting system, and Decree 734 of 2012 [4] on the general contracting statute, define the cycle and steps that must be carried out during contracting. This includes firstly pre-contract contractual planning, which includes a purchasing plan, investment projects, the definition of foreseeable risks, the budget, and the definition of the selection process for contracting. Secondly the Decrees require disclosure and publicity of the contracting process to SECOP, a part of the Colombian government’s Procurement and Procurement System “Colombia Compra Eficiente” created by Decree 4170 of 2011, [5] which aims to develop and promote public policies and tools, aimed at organisation and coordination of the participants in the contracting and public procurement processes in order to achieve greater efficiency, transparency, and optimisation of State resources. The third step involves the selection of the contracting modality: public bidding, abbreviated selection, merit competition, direct, and minimum amount contracting, and the procedure for each, including the amounts in money and the type of goods and services contracted under each modality. [6]

Decree 734 of 2012 defines the norms that govern asset disposal. Disposal of assets must occur through a public call, and the public entity must carry out prior studies, design specifications, and make a public and open call through the Sociedad Central de Inversiones S.A. (CISA), SECOP, or any promoting entity. Direct sale can occur through an offer in sealed envelope, through public auction, sale by promoters, investment bankers, or goods exchange, and Decree 734 defines the requirements for the presentation of the offers, the evaluation, and the minimum sale price. The OECD finds a series of shortcomings in the state contracting process, related to transparency in the promotion of fair and equitable treatment of suppliers in each of the phases of the contracting cycle. [7] In Colombia there are several business networks dedicated to contracting with the state on food, infrastructure, roads, and security and defence, according to a report by the Office of the Auditor General of the Republic published in the Semana Magazine. [8] There are around 73 business networks that function as consortia, with the aim of applying as sole applicants to public calls. This allows them to contract in sectors different from their area of expertise, and evade sanctions and disqualifications. With regard to integrity, the OECD recommends generating codes of conduct that allow for the reduction of conflicts of interest and risks in the contracting process. In recent years the contracting process has been described as unfair, with many contracts competing under unfair or disadvantageous conditions, allowing direct contracting to prevail. [9] With regard to accessibility, Colombia has a regulatory fragmentation regarding hiring, making it difficult to develop a standard and coherent policy. Colombia is working to strengthen open bidding processes, but direct contracting still prevails, [10] which, according to Decree 1510 of 2013, does not require publishing contract information via SECOP online, but is regulated by other legislation.

In accordance with Law 1150 of 2007, [1] Decree Law 019 of 2012, [2] and Article 19 of Decree 1510 2013, [3] entities are required to publish in the SECOP all documents and administrative acts from the contracting process within three days of their issuance. The successful bid is the one that should be published. For the defence and security sector, Law 1150 of 2007, states that the procurement model for that sector will be direct contracting for the use of the reserved expenses, provided for in Law 1097 of 2006 that regulates those resources. [4] There are a number of exceptions within the publication process, which stipulates that, for direct procurement, this sector is not required to publish the process documents used to purchase goods and services that require reserved expenses, allowing contracts to be made under market conditions without the need to receive several offers. There are 20 types of goods and services which are classified as requiring reserve reservation for their acquisition including: weapons, weapons and spare parts systems, ammunition, equipment and accessories, networks, information and communications systems, ships, naval and river equipment, etc. [3, 5] Law 1219 of 2008 [5] defines a set of guidelines on the formal process of the procurement procedure, but does not develop elements such as asset disposal. The Ministry of Defence has a procurement manual outling the internal procurement functions and procedures, the officials involved, the tasks that by delegation or decentralisation of functions should be carried out, and general aspects of the processes of selection, monitoring, and control of contractual management. [6] It details the entire cycle of acquisitions and contracts, including the disposal of assets. However, with regard to security policy there is not sufficient evidence to verify that the actual purchases and the published procurement plans match in reality.

While there are formal procedures in place, it has not been possible to determine their level of implementation. As such, this indicator is not scored and is marked ‘Not Enough Information’.

The defence procurement cycle from beginning to end is not subject to any legal requirement for public disclosure. Unlike other ministries in Côte d’Ivoire, the Ministry of Defence is not required to publish a national strategic plan for its procurement cycle (Plan National Stratégique de la Chaîne d’Approvisionnement).

The 2009 Code of Public Procurement, Article 18.2, makes it clear that the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of the Interior are exempt from administrative activities such as publication of purchases in the Official Journal for Procurement (Bulletin Officiel des Marchés Publics de la République de Côte d’Ivoire) (1). Art. 18 (2) states, “this program must be published in the Official Public Procurement Bulletin of the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, and on the website of the Administrative Structure responsible for public procurement and if possible, in a newspaper with national circulation.” However, the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Security are exempt from the publication of activities related to national security and defence. This exception also extends to all administrative entities directly engaged in national defence and security activities (1). There is no requirement for public disclosure that applies to purchases made by the Ministries of Defence and Interior.

From 2015-2018 certain aspects of the defence procurement cycle (chaîne d’approvisionnement) are disclosed, though only in a very abbreviated and general way. However, this does not happen as a result of any formal procedures. Additionally, information about the procurement cycle is sometimes revealed by Côte d’Ivoire’s international partners within the context of military partnerships involving the sale or donation of military equipment. For example, France’s Ministry of the Armed Forces publishes this kind of information in its official bulletin (Bulletin Officiel des Armées). In his book on African Armed Forces, Laurent Touchard explains how the Ivorian minister of defence negotiated with his French counterpart the acquisition of military patrol boats (RPB models) in 2016:

“In the logic of ramp-up and modernization, in August 2016, the three RPBs 33 from Raidco were received. In addition, the country wishes to obtain one or two other patrol boats, of size and capacity superior to those of the RPB 33. At the beginning of May, Alain Richard Donwahi and Jean-Yves Le Drian discussed the sale of at least one RPB 45, also manufactured by Raidco” (1).

In 2015, Intellivoire.net published an article about the delivery of an AW139 helicopter model by the Italian company Agusta Westland. However, this model appears to have been acquired by the executive for non-military purposes (2). In September 2018, the Strategic Bureau of Information on Defence Systems published an article about the delivery of eight Caiman or Cayman armoured vehicles in the first quarter of 2018. The seven-ton armoured vehicles were used during a military parade in Abidjan on 7 August 2018. They were assigned to the Gendarmerie Nationale and the Ivorian special forces. No details about the procurement cycle were provided, but the Caimans were produced at Factory No. 140 in Borisov, Belarus (3). On the same delivery of Caiman/Cayman armoured vehicles, Afrique sur 7 published an article on August 11, 2018, that disclosed that the government had embarked on a purchasing frenzy following the lifting of the UN arms embargo. According to the reporter, the Forces Armées de Côte d’Ivoire (FACI) had acquired Mi-24 helicopters, heavy airlifting Antonov models and battle tanks from several countries, including Belarus. This was all part of the modernization effort spearheaded by Minister of Defence Hamed Bakayoko and outlined in the Military Planning Act of 2016-2020. The reporter added that no information on the purchase of the armoured vehicles had been disclosed because of the classified status of such acquisitions:

“This information, long classified as a defense secret, has just been disclosed during the Independence Day. A Russian news agency published in June an article indicating that an African country – without naming it – was going to receive these 4 × 4 Cayman armored vehicles” (4).

Some general information about how armoured vehicles were acquired by Côte d’Ivoire eventually transpire to the public. However, no details about contracts, signoff and asset disposal are officially disclosed due to the absence of formal procedures.

This indicator has not been assigned a score due to insufficient information or evidence.

The defence procurement process is fully formalised and governed by policies and regulations [1, 2, 3]. Overall, the acquisition cycle consist of four phases from assessment of need to sign-off, each phase consisting of a number of steps to ensure that DALO can continuously assess whether the procurement is in line with contractual obligations as well as the legal and financial requirements [4]. The phases of operation and asset disposal are formalised procedures as well (see Q24 and Q25).

Information specifically on the defence procurement cycle is disclosed very briefly and in summary form on the DALO website [1]. Further, at the more general level and as noted in Q11B, information about the acquisition process, tenders, forthcoming equipment, planned investments and so on is available on the DALO website, but description of processes, governing papers etc. is not very detailed [2]. However, research did encounter a high degree of transparency in the dialogue with DALO where information on procedures, documents etc. was made easily available upon request.

Research indicates that there are policies and procedures for each step of the procurement cycle and these are followed in practice [1]. According to a DALO employee, DALO systematically ensure that guidelines are implemented and followed [1]. Further, a long-running Danish National Audit Office audit of the Defence procedures for larger procurements shows stepwise successful implementation of improved procedures [2, 3].

According to our sources, the process of procurement at all levels is, not disclosed internally other than the committee or the commander in charge of the unit. Some procurements and tenders are not known to the majority of employees within the procurement or financial department (1), (2), (3), (4).

Several legal provisions allow and even encourage the secrecy of defence procurements. Examples include the Public Authorities’ Contracts Law no. 182 (2018) which allows the MoD and the MMP to make the procurement processes closed, limited or by direct order with no bidding process (1). As regards to arms procurement, it is not subject to any form of monitoring by the MoF or the CAA as per Law no. 204 (1957) (2). Moreover, Law no. 14 (1967) prohibits the publishing or broadcasting of any information or news about the armed forces and its formations, movement, armaments and personnel, and everything related to military and strategic aspects except after obtaining written approval from the director of the military intelligence department (3).

If they do exist, the policies or procedures for the implementation process of the procurement cycle are not known. (1), (2), (3), (4).

The Procurement Procedure under the purview of the Ministry of Defence is established by the order of the Defence Minister and is in compliance with The Public Procurement Act. [1] It outlines thorough and detailed guidelines for the institutions under the purview of the Ministry of Defence for procurement management. [3] The Procedure lists planning and development of procurement plans, reporting on the development, overview of technical descriptions, signing of contracts, exceptions, supervision and dispute resolution. Transferring of state assets is stipulated in detail by the State Assets Act. [2]

One of the reasons for creating the Estonian Centre for Defence Investment was to increase clarity and transparency in the defence procurement procedure. [1] The Centre’s website publishes a list of priority areas for investments, both in English and in Estonian. [2] The Procurement Procedure – only in Estonian – is made publicly available on the website of the Ministry of Defence [3]. It includes detailed procedures for the entire defence procurement cycle are disclosed, with clear explanation and in disaggregated form. This includes assessment of needs, contract implementation and sign-off, asset disposal; process of awarding contracts, and mechanisms for contract implementation. The State Assets Act that stipulates the transfer of assets, is available in Riigi Teataja, and consolidated texts of Estonian legislation [4].

The Procurement Procedure under the purview of the Ministry of Defence is established by the order of the Defence Minister and is in compliance with The Public Procurement Act. [1] It outlines thorough and detailed guidelines for the institutions under the purview of the Ministry of Defence for procurement management. [2] The Procedure lists planning and development of procurement plans, reporting on the development, overview of technical descriptions, signing of contracts, exceptions, supervision and dispute resolution. Transferring of state assets is stipulated in detail by the State Assets Act. [3] The comprehensive information available on every procurement action conducted by the MOD [4] indicates that all the steps outlined in the Procurement Procedure are followed in practice.

The defence procurement cycle is formalised as it can be established from putting together information in the Government Defence Report and national (sub)strategies and policies related to defence and security, legislation and other regulation, annual budgets and budget amendments, final central state accounts, oversight and inspection reports, parliamentary and ministerial documentation, press releases and project websites, as well as media reports. However, getting the overall picture takes time, requires plenty of research and remains partially disclosed from the public.

According to the National Audit Office’s inspection report (2017), guidance and orders within the defence branch on the lifecycle management of defence capabilitie are based on the general guidance of the state administration, as well as on the legislation on both military and civilian public procurement. The Defence Forces has compiled a relatively wide depiction of the lifecycle management of its capabilities as well as general orders and guidance on lifecycle planning. In addition, the defence branch has developed some additional, systematic internal guidance on the planning of material expenditure and the evaluation of such expenditure.

The aforementioned documents, in addition to the Ministry of Defence’s instruction on defence procurement and to the purchase order of the Defence Forces, have improved the ability to manage material costs and acquisition projects accordingly. In addition, “the overall process of defence branches material projects is in accordance with legislation and guidance of the state administration”. [1] The NAO inspection report also provides a six-phased figure based on the purchase order of the Defence Forces illustrating the lifecycle management from concept to disintegration (concept, definition, planning and development, construction, use and maintenance, disintegration). [2]

Public information about the defence procurement cycle is provided in a scattered manner and parts of it remain undisclosed. According to the website of the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry directs material policy in the branch of administration and pivotal defence material procurement projects, as well as decides on pivotal acquisitions. The Defence Forces HQ leads planning and development in the Defence Forces, including procurement and material management within the given framework.

The Defence Forces prepares and implements procurement. Within the branch of administration, central actors in the procurement are the Directorate of Defence Material Policy (MAJO) and the Directorate of Defence Commercial Policy. The former prepares material policy decision making, guides it and provides statements, whereas the latter prepares major acquisitions (as well as sales and other financially significant matters). [1]

The process relevant to bidders is transparent with clear specification, timelines and budgets, but the evaluation of the needs is not directly clear – although in many cases are they are apparent.

The National Audit Office’s performance inspection report on the planning and management of Defence Forces’ material projects provides further information on the lifecycle management, including a remark on internal audits at the end of each phase of the six-phase model. [2] The Directorate of Defence Material Policy (MAJO) is an expert body consisting of employees of the Ministry of Defence and the Defence Forces. It convenes on a monthly basis and also meets up with the board of AFDA (the Association of Finnish Defence and Aerospace Industries) annually. It provides guidelines to societally, regionally or financially significant development programmes and projects; makes initiatives on the development of material preparedness in long and mid-term; advises the lead of the Ministry in all material policy related matters; composes and maintains the material policy programme of the branch of administration; evaluates matters that impact material policy and prospective changes. [3]

The National Audit Office inspected planning and management of Defence Forces’ material projects in 2017. According to the inspection report, “the overall process of defence branches material projects is in accordance with legislation and guidance of the state administration”. However, NAO gave two recommendations (1) to improve the data breakdown of Defence Forces material expenditure in public documentation and (2) to develop the financial evaluation model and practices of its procurement projects. [1] A follow-up report of the inspection is to be released in 2020.

Decree n°2016-361 of March 25, 2016 on defence and security procurements [1] formalises all procedures for the entire defence procurement cycle, from assessment of needs, through contract implementation and sign-off, through to asset disposal. It also details policies and procedures for each step of the implementation process of the procurement cycle but there are some shortcomings with the implementation: the decree also allows tenders dealing with sensitive issues and material to be handled in a confidential way, outside of the general order for public procurement, without any publicity or competition.

General procurement is formalised by law and disclosed to the public at all steps of the process. Additionally, Decree n°2016-361 on defence and security procurement [1] details policies and procedures for each step of the implementation process of the procurement cycle.

Decree n°2016-361 of March 25, 2016 on defence and security procurements [1] details policies and procedures for each step of the implementation process of the procurement cycle but there are some shortcomings with the implementation: the decree also allows tenders dealing with sensitive issues and material to be handled in a confidential way, outside of the general order for public procurement, without any publicity or competition.

The defence procurement cycle process for all varieties of procurement within the Ministry of Defence is defined in the Customer Product Management regulation (CPM). The process is described in detail and divided into three phases: an analysis phase, a production phase and an in-service phase. It defines the objectives, the specific work stages and the activities and responsibilities of each phase. The process also includes (asset) disposal but only as part of the in-service phase. The CPM is disclosed to the public in several languages on the website of the Federal Office of Bundeswehr Equipment, Information Technology and In-Service Support (BAAINBw). Both the new version, implemented in 2012, and the older version are available on the website. The whole CPM document gives the impression that Germany is striving to increase transparency within procurement processes; for example, it also includes several appendices with additional information, such as terms, definitions and specific information on fast-track procurements [1].

The entire defence procurement cycle, from assessment of needs, to contract implementation and sign-off, all the way to asset disposal, is very formalised, clear and detailed. It details policies and procedures for each step of the implementation process for the procurement cycle and there is evidence that these are followed in practice [2,3].

Generally speaking, military procurement is based on three pillars. The first refers to the procurement process defined in the German Armed Forces’ (Bundeswehr) Customer Product Management regulation (amended in 2012) [1], an internal framework directive on the identification of capability-based requirements, the cost-efficient and timely procurement of operational products and services, and the efficient use of the latter. The industry is involved in all phases of the process within the limits set by public procurement law. The second pillar refers to Bundeswehr Procurement, which is used for the procurement of standard and military goods and services for military operations. It includes weapon system spare parts and procurement through international channels. The third pillar is the procurement of complex services (e.g. maintenance of land-based weapon systems, non-military IT and telecom services, fleet management and clothing) through separate legal entities, some of which are organised as public-private partnerships.

Central military procurement is typically carried out by the Federal Office for Bundeswehr Equipment IT and In-Service Support and the Federal Office for Bundeswehr Infrastructure, Environmental Protection and Services. Non-military security procurement for federal entities is mainly carried out by the Procurement Agency of the Federal Ministry of the Interior, in particular for the Federal Police, customs and the Federal Administration in general. Security procurement at the state level is typically carried out by procurement offices or the requesting agency [4,5,6].

Procedures for the entire defence procurement cycle are disclosed with clear explanations and in disaggregated form. This information includes assessments of needs, contract implementation and sign-off, asset disposal, the process of awarding contracts and mechanisms for contract implementation [1]. However, some information is only available to insiders due to secrecy regulations and not all procedures are published in detail, if at all [2]. It is generally a double-edged sword, because if processes are too transparent, it would go against companies’ interests; for instance, their trade secrets would come out to the public and their competitors. That’s why there are also strong reasons not to make processes too transparent. For example, there is a detailed assessment matrix provided to suppliers, but not to the general public [3,4]. As one analyst put it: ‘Government contracts are usually not published or disclosed to third parties. However, pursuant to the freedom of information acts of the federal and the regional states, everyone (including foreign nationals) has a right of access to official information held by public bodies. This is generally considered to extend to records on past public procurement procedures, including previous contracts. Access is denied in a number of cases, including where disclosure may adversely affect international relations, military and other security interests or public safety and to protect classified information, other official secrets or trade secrets, including third-party confidential information and intellectual property rights. In many cases, the disclosure of previous government contracts will be barred by one of these exemptions’ [5].

However, contract details may be kept secret if the client thinks that ‘disclosure would be contrary to the public interest or impede in particular defence or security interests’ (see Section 35, Paragraph 2 of the VSVgV). Section 6, Paragraph 1 of the VSVgV also states that ‘Clients, applicants, bidders and contractors must mutually maintain the confidentiality of all information and documents’. Section 7 of the same regulation provides further details on the requirements for the protection of classified information by companies [2].

Contracting authorities are bound by the regulations under public procurement law (please also see Q65 for details). There are detailed policies and procedures for each step of the implementation process for the procurement cycle and the Customer Product Management document (CPM) gives the impression that Germany is striving to increase transparency within procurement processes. For example, the CPM also includes several appendices with additional information, such as terms, definitions and specific information on fast-track procurements [1]. In addition, there are internal regulations in the business division of the Ministry of Defence (GB BMVg), which explain the applicable regulations in order to facilitate their implementation. All of these policies and procedures can be found in the CPM [1]. The awarding agencies are also subject to specialist supervision by the Ministry. For example, awarding agencies in the first tier of the supply chain, subordinate to the BMVg, are inspected by the equipment department on the basis of annual inspection plans [2]. The Federal Audit Office (Bundesrechnungshof – BRH) also regularly reviews the award procedures carried out by the GB BMVg. See also Q65 regarding legal protection options.

The armament reports of the BMVg (published twice a year) contain statistical information on the number of reprimands, review procedures and complaint procedures in public award procedures, indicating strong implementation of procurement legislation. Between 2014 and 2019, the rate of review procedures initiated by bidders was 0.8% of 6,832 award procedures. For example in 2019, the BAAINBw awarded 1,134 contracts above the EU thresholds. 88 reprimands occurred (7.8%) and, of that number, only 7 review procedures (0.6%) were initiated by bidders. In all 7 cases, the bidder either withdrew their request for a review procedure to the public procurement tribunal or the decision of the public procurement tribunal was in favour of the BAAINBw [3].

The entire defence procurement cycle is formalised and involves several committees at various levels within the MOD and the GAF. The procedures were harmonized with the introduction of the Public Procurement Act. For instance, both the MOD and the GAF have established tender committees mandated with reviewing and approving the procurement decisions to ensure value for money and enhance transparency. In addition, the MOD established the Audit Committee, which is tasked with ensuring the compliance of the procedures (1).

The procurement of non-hardware items for the armed forces generally conforms to laid down procurement regulations. However, the purchase of military hardware which involves huge amounts of money is generally shrouded in secrecy (2), (3), (4). Details of the procurement cycle are not made publicly available, and exceptions can be raised by the MOD and the GAF to avoid going through the tender process and procure directly to the single-source (5).

Contrary to other Ghanaian public institutions, the MOD procurement cycle is not disclosed to the public. For instance, the Ministry of Health publishes its procurement cycle (standard operating procedures for procurement in the public health sector) (1).

The procurement process of military assets is not completely open. The procurement of non-hardware items for the armed forces generally conforms to laid down procurement regulations. Although winners of major contracts are announced, along with general values of the tenders, specific details of procurement financials, inventory, maintenance and commissions are not disclosed (2), (3), (4), (5).

This indicator has not been assigned a score due to insufficient information or evidence.

The Hellenic National Defence General Staff, Hellenic Army General Staff, Hellenic Navy General Staff and the Hellenic Air Force General Staff conduct the assessment of needs which is not available to the public for security reasons. There is a formalised system of assessing needs based on legislation. The General Directorate for Defence Investments and Armaments is responsible for contract implementation and sign-off. Its mandate is publicly available. There is legislation describing the process and conditions of the disposal of assets to foreign countries [1, 2, 3].

The defence budget is approved by the Government through Parliament at the advice of the Minister of National Defence. The regulations which govern the procurement processes are transparent [2]. Some elements of the defence procurement cycle are disclosed with clear explanation and in disaggregated form, but there is also nothing regarding the assessment of needs. Moreover, the Greek media and public remain suspicious and decisions are questioned. Indeed, speculation over scandals (“skandalologia” in Greek) in the defence sector can dominate public debates from time to time [1].

There are policies and procedures for each step of the implementation process of the procurement cycle, but they lack detail and there are shortcomings with implementation. [1] The two key problems are red tape and inter-service rivalry. The General Directorate for Defence Investments and Armaments is known for excessive bureaucracy, while different branches of the country’s Armed Forces compete for limited resources [3].

The defence procurement cycle is partially done in line with the law on public procurement [1]. The assessment of needs is not entirely formal; different departments might use different processes for procurement. Contract implementation and sign-off are formalised. Asset disposal is partially formalised. However, only the military, non-relevant items are subject to open procurement. The Ministry of Defence (MoD) Defence Economic Bureau and the Department for Economic Planning and Regulation are responsible for preparing and finalising the Annual Procurement Plan. The 2018 procurement plan was approved on 5 March 2018 and amended nine times. The ninth version was only partially identical to the original plan [2]. The military systems are procured in a closed process. Formally the Defence Committee of the Parliament authorises closed procurements, but with the government’s majority, all relevant military procurement is excluded from an open, competitive and transparent procurement process.

The defence procurement cycle for items procured in open procurement is more or less transparent. Information on the annual procurement plan, calls for offers, and results are available on the website of the MoD’s Defence Economic Bureau [1]. However, there is complete secrecy related to major arm and defence procurements.

As noted in 58A the defence procurement cycle is partially formal [1, 2], the assessment of needs is not an entirely formal process. Different departments might use different processes. Contract implementation and sign-off are formalised. Asset disposal is partially the same. In this regard, the implementation of the cycle has shortcomings.

India’s Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) is formalised and publicly available in a 489 page document on the Ministry of Defence (MoD) website [1]. The Defence Procurement Manual (DPM) is also publicly available and consists of element of the procurement cycle [2]. The DPP-2016 encompasses Capital Acquisitions, Defence Services and the Indian Coast Guard. Ordnance Factory Board (OFB), Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs) however, follow their own procurement procedures. The procurement categories are Buy (Indian – IDDM), Buy (Indian), Buy and Make (Indian), Buy and Make and Buy (Global) [3].

The DPP Preamble outlines the complexity of the defence procurement cycle process:

“1. Defence acquisition is not a standard open market commercial form of procurement and has certain unique features such as supplier constraints, technological complexity, foreign suppliers, high cost, foreign exchange implications and geo-political ramifications. While maintaining highest standards of transparency, probity and public accountability, a balance
between competing requirements such as expeditious procurement, high quality standards and appropriate costs needs to be established. As a result, decision making pertaining to defence procurement remains unique and complex” [4].

Given the secrecy of the MoD, it is difficult to guarantee that the DPP is fully implemented at all times given the deficiencies that are apparent in the way contracts are at times processed and executed [5][6][7].

Procurement procedures and guidelines are publicly disclosed [1][2]. Information is publicly available regarding assessment of needs [3]. Procurement tenders for departments with autonomous procurement procedures such as the DRDO and the DPSUs are publicly available to view online via the Central Public Procurement Portal and its ancillary e-portals [4][5].

As discussed previously, the MoD is reticent in public disclosure of full details of approved defence purchase contracts. Purchase name, vendor, value and delivery timelines are available [6]. Total number of procurement contracts, value and branch breakdown is available [7]. Detailed information of works in progress and activities between the agreed parties is not readily available.

As of May 2019, the MoD publicly stated it will adopt a new procurement policy defining the level of indigenous defence equipment and give a higher preference to domestic vendors in contracts [8].

Procurement procedures and guidelines are publicly disclosed [1][2]. Given the secrecy of the MoD however, it is difficult to guarantee that the DPP is fully implemented at all times given the deficiencies that are apparent in the way contracts are at times processed and executed [3][4][5].

There are formal legal procedures in place for arms procurement [1,2] but they currently focus too narrowly on two things: (a) assessment of needs and (b) procurement (purchase). The other stages, such as weapons upgrades and assets disposal, are not addressed under the same regulations. This is because, when iti comes to new procurement, Indonesia limits its focus to the purchase stage instead of taking a life-cycle approach. Furthermore, in the procurement of equipment, the platform is sometimes separated from its weapons due to the different budget sources assigned. For example, there was one contract to procure a submarine and then a separate contract to procure its torpedoes [3,4], making it difficult to pin down the exact amount of the total submarine equipment procurement. Ministry of Defence Regulation No. 31/2018 [2] outlines the mechanism for formulating defence planning as the basis for procurement. The amount of planning is surprisingly huge, a total of 91 documents divided into four long-term, 28 medium-term and 59 short-term (annual planning) documents. This planning is carried out at different levels of bureaucracy at the Ministry of Defence, the TNI, organisational units (in each service) and municipal/operational units (satker). The planning, which is called the strategic plan (renstra), contains the requirements for the procurement, maintenance and repair of weapon systems. The purchasing plan is formulated for a period of five years and includes extensive information on product types and specifications, accompanied by a financial strategy in the Ministry of National Development Planning’s (Bappenas) Strategic Plan. The procurement depends on the availability of the budget defined by the Ministry of Finance. With regard to the mechanism and procedures for procurement, Ministry of Defence Regulation No. 17/2014 [1], which has been adjusted to align with Law No. 16 Year 2012, addresses procurement ethics, the 12 institutions involved (from budget users to contract formers and defence equipment providers), the five stages of procurement (the pre-preparation stage, the preparation stage, the stage of selecting providers, the stage of contract preparation and activation and the stage of implementing and submitting work results), as well as control and supervision. This regulation also provides a flowchart outling the procurement defence equipment, which shows a long and complex process.

Procedures for the entire defence procurement cycle are outlined in Minister of Defence Regulation No. 17/2014 [1] but this is limited to four stages: preparation of procurement, selection of weapons, contract formulation and contract implementation and delivery. Each stage is outlined separately and accompanied by a clear explanation. The overall process, along with the time required to complete each of the four stages, is outlined in a flowchart provided as an attachment to the regulation. Asset disposal is regulated separately. The regulation provides different explanations of the procurement process, which varies depending on the source of finance, whether it is in pure rupiahs, foreign currency, a domestic loan or a foreign loan. Procurement using foreign military sales is regulated separately by Minister of Defence Regulation No. 29/2017 [2].

Procedural details of the procurement cycle of defence equipment are not open to the public, under the pretext of confidentiality. Strategic processes, such as establishing defence needs, are carried out internally and only involve external parties, for example academics, to a limited extent, in the form of focus group discussions [1]. Technical processes, such as translating the needs plan into operational requirements and technical specifications, are completely closed. This lack of transparency is criticised as risky and prone to corruption [2]. The results of the requirement planning are contained in a MEF document in the form of a Minister of Defence Regulation concerning MEF, which is adjusted as needed. Examples of past Minister of Defence Regulations reveal the level of transparency of the procurement plan [3]. Unfortunately, for unknown reasons, the most recent of these, Minister of Defence Regulation No. 6/2019 concerning MEF Alignment Policy, has not yet been found on the Ministry of Defence website. The process of procurement, including awarding contracts and receiving deliveries, is carried out in a more transparent manner. For example, the government provides information to the public about its annual plan [4,5] and, from time to time, the government releases information on milestone achievements. The information provided is limited to the type of weapon system, the cost of procurement (occassionally accompanied by the source of export credits), the chosen provider and delivery time. The post-contract procurement process up to assets disposal is rarely reported.

The defence procurement cycle is not formalised at all but, rather, in practice works through illicit networks [1]. There was an attempt to formalise procurement for the nuclear program through a mechanism known as the Procurement Channel [2], but the channel is deemed to have fallen short of expectations [3].

The defence procurement cycle is not disclosed. Defence procurement itself is only disclosed in a very abbreviated fashion and on an ad-hoc basis [1, 2, 3]. By this is meant, that plans are announced by military leaders for the acquisition of different types of equipment, then snippets of information are disclosed to the public from delivery until operational [3].

The defence procurement cycle is not formal but, rather, works through illicit networks [1]. There was an attempt to formalise procurement for the nuclear program through a mechanism known as the Procurement Channel [2], but the channel is deemed to have fallen short of expectations [3].

In light of poor procurement regulations, procurement procedures, at any given stage in the procurement cycle, are generally not disclosed to the public. There appear to be no formal mechanisms that foster-transparent decision making. An important regulation surfaces in Article 3.3A of ‘Regulations for Implementing Government Contracts’ (1), as part of Iraq’s coverage commitments towards corruption-reduction under OECD’s Iraq Project (2). “The announcement of tenders must be published, at minimum, across three Iraqi broadsheet newspapers, one of which must be published by the MoF”. Contractors are also expected to satisfy their coverage commitments once dues for the opening of a local branch of their foreign firm is paid to the MoP (3). In spite of its weaknesses Iraq’s procurement regime seeks to emulate international standards but mechanisms, though they exist (4), are not always functioning as historical experience in Iraq shows.

As mentioned in 58A, no stage of the procurement cycle is publicly disclosed. The official Directory of Iraqi Tenders (1) features a digitised catalogue of tenders, limited to construction and public services (2), (3). Defence-relevant tenders are not visible anywhere on their directory. Upon closer inspection, the content of individual tenders is inaccessible. Access to such information, a former whistleblower told TI (4) “must be paid for, from the bidder to the ministry and the absence of tender details may suggest that no fees are transacted”. Local papers publish tender announcements of which, some feature across corresponding digital platforms. This does not apply to defence purchases. The sensitive nature that defence tenders contain obliges the government, in fulfilment of its protection of national security, to keep the details private.
Iraq’s Defence and Security Committee held, in late September, a meeting in which it discussed its ability to offer budgetary support to ministries, to enable them to acquire modern security systems (5). The minutes of this meeting as published by the Iraqi parliament did sketch out the enabling process or guiding procedures that would lend credence to that aim. Other details discussed included the need to tighten coordination between intelligence and security personnel, in step with security developments. Guidelines for procurement are at best vague or distilled into a single piece of legislation. In May 2019, Iraq’s ambassador to Russia disclosed at a press conference that a decision for the purchase of the Russian S-400 defence system had been reached. Silence on the matter on the premier’s part raises questions about procurement orders, which are far as the rule of law is concerned, are to be jointly decided between relevant tender committees, procurement and ministerial staff. In direct response to the question regarding tabloid publications of defence tenders, this appears to be bypassed as far as defence procurement is concerned.

An important regulation surfaces in Article 3.3A of ‘Regulations for Implementing Government Contracts’ [4], as part of Iraq’s coverage commitments towards corruption-reduction under OECD’s Iraq Project [1]. “The announcement of tenders must be published, at minimum, across three Iraqi broadsheet newspapers, one of which must be published by the MoF”. Contractors are also expected to satisfy their coverage commitments once dues for for the opening of a local branch of their foreign firm is paid to the MoP [2] In spite of its weaknesses Iraq’s procurement regime, seeks to emulate international standards but mechanisms, though they exist [3] are not always functioning as historical experience in Iraq shows.

The procurement cycle is only partially laid out in the Mandatory Tender Regulations (Contracts of the Defence System). The regulations outline the tendering process and any exemptions from due process as well as contract implementation (1). However, the regulations do not cover assessment of needs or issues surrounding asset disposals.
In an interview with a former general in the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) (2), he said that the defence procurement is very formalised in Israel since the country has many regulations of tenders. The formal procedures are clear and formed in the “duty for tenders” regulations formed in 1993 (1).

Some policies and processes relating to procurement are disclosed to the public (1) (2) (3). The process for procurement is outlined and explained for the public to view. However, aspects such as asset disposals are missing (3), and some items are classified and therefore are not open to public at all (4) (5). In the past few years, it was part of a public debate and now many procurements are publicly debated.

There is some evidence that implementation is followed in practice (1) (2) (3). For instance, non-classified Ministry of Defence tenders are advertised on the Ministry’s website and in newspapers, as required in the Mandatory Tender Regulations (4). For classified procurement or acqusitions not made through public tenders, it is more difficult to assess compliance with legislation given the lack of publicly available information on the subject.

The procurement cycle of defence equipment follows defined procedures, based on an assessment of needs [1]. The procedures for contract implementation and sign-off are subject to the Italian and international relevant legislation on public and defence procurement that formalize the procedures to follow, up to asset disposal [2] [3] [4].

Procedures are formalised by the relevant laws and they are publicly available [1].The public becomes aware of the procurement planning when the Minister of Defence presents the Pluriannual programmatic document to the Parliament [2] and can access more detailed information on specific purchases subject to parliamentary consultations [3] including information on assessment of needs, contract form, award procedure and implementation, planned timeline and budget. Nonetheless, such extensive information is not available for all contracts of the Ministry of Defence [4]. On the website of the ministry it is possible to access information also on the civilian defence procurement [5].

Procedures on implementation steps are detailed [1] [2] [3] [4] and generally followed. When not, the competent authorities can deny the advancements of the procedures [5].

The assessment of needs, building on the National Security Strategy for overarching principles, National Defence Program Guidelines for the longer term, Mid-Term Defence Programs of a five year scope and the budgets for each budget year is formalised (see Q11A). The selection of aircraft is conducted at the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and follows formal procedures, whereas the selection of other types of large equipment is often conducted by the staff of the service branches and follows less formal procedures. Procurement takes place through central procurement and regional procurement. The sum of central and regional procurement in the fiscal year 2017 was approximately 2.4 trillion yen. Approximate percentages of spending on various categories were as follows (due to rounding error, the sum does not add up to 100): Central procurement from domestic sources 48%, central procurement from general imports 2%, central procurement through Foreign Military Sales (FMS) 15%, regional procurement from domestic sources 29%, regional procurement from general imports 5% and regional procurement from FMS 0.3%. [1] For the 2018 fiscal year, central procurement from domestic sources was composed of roughly the same amount by contracts awarded through competitive bidding as by discretionary contracts. FMS is procurement from the US government. [2] Competitive bidding takes place through the electronic bidding system CALS, with set categories of information provided. [2] Discretionary contracts contradict the general principle that contracts should be awarded following open competition, and they must receive special approval by the Minister of Defence. [2] FMS take place within the scope of the Japan-US Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement. Such sales follow formal procedures set by the United States. [2] In cases of domestic procurement, ATLA follows up with supervision and audits during the production. [2] Such supervision / audits are conducted on a random sample of such production contracts. [3] In the case of FMS, the US Military conducts an inspection during the production process, and the Japanese unit receiving the product inspects the product on receipt. [2] Defence equipment is registered in the ledger of national property. The value registered in this ledger is to be reduced each year according to a set formula, although the Board of Audit has indicated that the value assessed is sometimes wrong. [4] An Associate Professor of Commerce who has published several articles on Japanese defence procurement said in an interview that the Japanese Ministry of Defence follows formal procedures in the disposal of defence equipment, but that this information is not made public. [3] It is worth noting that on July 26, 2020, the Japanese Ministry of Defence held its first ever auction of discarded Self-Defence Forces equipment, generating an income of Y5.82 million [5] ($55,000) in sales, including tax. Defence Minister Taro Kono said that, “we have sold (such equipment) as scrap metal until now.” [6] According to a newspaper report, “[i]n the future, Kono said that he anticipated an auction that would generate about 10 billion yen ($93 million) in revenue, the equivalent to one US-made F-35 stealth fighter jet.” [7]

The public has access to documents that outline Japan’s defence strategy and the weapons and equipment it needs to implement it (see Q11B). When the defence authorities select a manufacturer for a type of large defence equipment, such as an aircraft, the products compared and the one selected are made public, but the results of the performance tests and assessment of the products are not. [1] Calls for tender through central procurement are posted on the webpages of ATLA, [2] and these pages have links to the regional SDF organisations that handle regional procurement. [3] The key elements of procurement contracts are made public, but information on the monitoring and assessment of the manufacturing of equipment is generally not (see Q67B). Some of the procedures followed when disposing of assets are not made public, according to an expert on Japanese defence procurement, [4] but calls for tenders to dispose of assets are sometimes posted on the ATLA website. [5] The settlement of asset disposal is registered in the ledger of national assets (see Q24A) and the aggregate income that it generates is made public in the settlement of accounts (see Q24C).

The Mid-Term Defence Program Guidelines (MTDP) are a key link in converting defence strategy into the weapons and equipment that are needed to implement it. The defence budgets specify the procurement and policies that follow from these guidelines for each consecutive year. Defence budgets are made by the Government, in close consultation with the Ministry of Defence, according to a set schedule (see Q11A). The Ministry of Finance found that appropriate tests were conducted and correct budget appropriations were made for all equipment that was procured. The procedure for selecting weapons had been specified to the greatest degree for aircraft. [1] The Defence Minister’s secretariat orders specific defence equipment when it sends a Basic Procurement Plan to the Defence Minister with details of planned arms and equipment procurement during the next fiscal year. ATLA’s ‘Overview of central procurement’ describes twenty-three steps that follow, the last of which is the Ministry’s payment for a delivered product. [2] The procedures of payment and types of contract used are based on the content of the Public Account Law. [3] [4] ATLA and the Regional Defence Bureaus monitor and assess production by domestic defence manufacturers closely. [5] In the case of FMS, the US Government monitors production (see Q67A). The Board of Audit reviewed the procedures for disposal of defence assets by making a case study of the disposal of a helicopter and found that due procedure had been followed. [6] However, it found that the financial value of equipment registered in the ledger of national assets was sometimes wrong (see Q24A). IGO and the Board of Audit make annual inspections and audits that cover parts of the defence procurement cycle. In a regular inspection for FY 2018, IGO conducted 12 on-site inspections including at the Joint Staff and ATLA Aircraft Equipment Research Institute and suggested measures that would increase competition and ensure fairness among bidders. [7] It found that about 80 percent of the monetary base of the procurement contracts covering the last three years at the institutions that it surveyed were of a competitive form [8] and about 90 percent of the staff interviewed were highly aware of the need to prevent collusive bidding. [9] The Board of Audit confirmed the settlement of the government accounts for FY 2018, including those of the MOD. [10] It also proposed improvements affecting procurement, such as increasing efforts to reach agreement with the US Government on repayment of surplus money that Japan had paid to participate in an electronic combat program under FMS and to improve a database that the Ministry was making of cost prices for defence production by introducing new software and making it mandatory for Japanese defence contractors to submit data to it. [11] These reports from IGO and the Board of Audit give no indication that the detailed policies and procedures for implementing procurement are not followed in practice.

Military Supplies System No. 3 of the year 1995 [1] is the closest available law to procurement regulations in Jordan. Whilst the law has a defined formal procedure for defence procurement, this procedure does not cover all important aspects of procurement such as an assessment of needs or contract implementation and sign off. Some elements of the procurement are formalised. These elements include food, clothes, and logistical equipment, however, weapons and ammunition are never publicised [2,3].

Although Jordan has shown some effort to make aspects of its governmental procurement public, evidence points to the fact that the public does not have comprehensive information in relation to procurement [1]. The Directorate of Defence Procurement for the Jordanian Armed Forces sometimes posts tenders and calls for proposals for its needs [2], and there are also attempts to make governmental tenders available online through the Government Tenders Directorate [3]. However, other than e-tenders, the defence does not reveal any information about actual procurement cycles. The procurement procedures of many elements are advertised in an abbreviated format, where assets’ disposal and new purchases are announced — however, there are no references to whom, prices or needs assessments [4,5].

Military Supplies System No. 3 of the year 1995 [1] is the closest available law to procurement regulations in Jordan. Whilst the law has a defined formal procedure for defence procurement, this procedure does not cover all important aspects of procurement such as an assessment of needs or contract implementation and sign off. Some elements of the procurement are formalised. These elements include food, clothes, and logistical equipment, however, weapons and ammunition are never publicised [2,3].

The Ministry of Defence (MOD) outlines the procurement process of major defence equipment on its website. The outlined steps indicate a formalised process, starting with need assessment, followed by market survey, preparation of tender documents, cost-benefit analysis, and finally the contracting process. [1] However, it is not clear whether this defence procurement process is the same for all good and services, or only for major defence equipment. In addition, security experts have reported manipulation of the system by powerful politicians who engage in corrupt procurement deals. [2]

Ministry of Defence (MOD) claims that its procurement process follows regulations provided within the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act (PPADA). [1] The Act covers all aspects of needs assessment, contract implementation, the process of awarding contracts, and asset disposal. Even so, it is hard to tell whether the ministry follows the regulations strictly in all its procurement activities. Moreover, some of the procurement and asset disposal processes at MOD, like all other national security organs, are classified and hence not publicly available. Some of the controversial procurement projects done by the MOD that have been mentioned in section 57 have been done under classified processes.

The new regulations under the Kenya subsidiary legistlation 2020 have provided additional regulations that require more transparency in procurement processes even under classified and restricted tendering processes within national security organs. [2] This includes; setting up of special committees to monitor the processes, developing a list of pre-qualified companies to the cabinet secretary for approval, and also provision for the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority to have oversight on classified tender processes including those within the national security organs. Furthermore, experts suggest that new regulations under the Kenya Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Regulations, 2020 will enhance transparency of procurements, where the National Treasury permits procurements through the Specially Permitted Procurement Procedure, expecially for those tenders that are of public interest or interest of national security. [3]

The regulations provided for the procurement cycle are disaggregated within the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act (PPADA). [1] PPADA was updated with additional regulations, among them procedures on how to carry out classified procurement methods that commonly used by National Security organs. The Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Regulations, 2020, Arrangement of Regulations or ‘Kenya Subsidiary Legislation, 2020’ also details procedures for other methods of procuring goods, works, services, consultancies and contracts as well as disposal of assets. [2]

The use of restricted tendering has been one of the major loopholes in the defence ministry and one that is prone to corruption. Most of the reports of corruption in MODs procurement process have been related to restricted tendering. [3] The subsidiary legistlation 2020 unlike the previous PPADA requires more transparency in procurement processes even under restricted tendering processes. This includes; creating an e-procurement portal, inviting tenders from known suppliers or pre-approved suppliers, advertising the tender and making it known that restricted tender will be applied as well as limiting preparation time for such tenders to ten days. These are new regulations and their impact on the procurement processes in MOD will be only be clear over time.

Each procurement process in Kosovo, which applies to the Defence sector, is conducted through the following eight steps as stipulated by the Public Procurement Regulatory Commission’s (PPRC) Rules and Operational Guidelines for Public Procurement: i) procurement forecast, ii) value forecasting and contract classification, iii) definition of the procurement procedure, iv) preparation of the tender dossier, v) publication, vi) opening and evaluation of tenders, vii) awarding and signing of the contract, and viii) contract management (1).

With respect to the publication of notices of procurement activities, a contracting authority immediately submits to the Public Procurement Regulatory Commission (PPRC) all language versions of any notice (including indicative, contract, and contract award notices) [1]. The Law on Public Procurement stipulates that within two days after the PPRC receives such a notice from a contracting authority, this institution must publish each language version on its website and in the Public Procurement Register [1]. The PPRC can – within the same time limit – demand that the contracting authority rectifies any mistakes and omissions in the notice [1]. The electronic public procurement platform which is managed by the PPRC intends to electronically publish all procurement cycle activities of public institutions. However, the online platform is currently accessible only for users who are registered as economic operators, contracting authorities or sectorial contracting authorities [2], and public citizens do not have access to the documents published on the online platform [3] .

The European Commission has highlighted irregularities and corruption during the procurement cycle in Kosovo [1]. In its 2019 report on Kosovo, the Commission demonstrated that the contracting authorities lack the capacity to draft proper technical specifications, which undermines the quality, efficiency, transparency and effective implementation and oversight of the procurement cycle [1].

The defence procurement cycle is partially formalised. Contract implementation, sign-off and asset disposal are formalised but the assessment of needs is generally missing, officials said (1, 2 and 3).

The public only has access to a total figure for the amount of money made off asset disposal from the Finance Ministry and the total expenditure of the security agencies, but it does not have access to the entire procurement cycle, officials said (1, 2 and 3).

Both the Finance Ministry and the SAB, the bodies that audit and write reports about the security institutions, do not disclose many aspects of the cycle like the assessment needs and the contract implementation.

The public is only aware of some procurement deals — usually the ones involving planes from Western countries, as mentioned in section 58 A.

Many believe that the only reason these deals got attention was because a spurned businessman with political connections and a rival offer stirred up public anger, to prompt an investigation and revoke the deal out of spite.

Since the area is sensitive, it does not get much media attention and security officials declined to speak about the matter but there is evidence nonetheless that there are serious shortcomings based on the basic questions we find lawmakers and auditors asking the Defence and Interior Ministers sometimes, which shows that these institutions are often not following procedures.

The entire defence procurement cycle, from the assessment of needs, to the contract implementation and sign-off, and the asset disposal, is fully formalised. The assessment of needs is identified in the National defence concept [1] and long term planning document covering the period to 2027. The State Audit praised achievements in the long term planning in its report in 2018; [2] contract implementation and asset disposal is formalised. Due to changing security environment after events in Ukraine in 2014, there were several unexpected needs, which were covered by bilateral defence agreements. [3]

In general, the whole defence procurement cycle is transparent. The procurement cycle is disclosed according to both the ‘Public Procurement Law’ and the ‘Defence and Security Procurement Law’. There are, however, shortcomings in transparency.

While often major arms procurement decisions were announced post-factum, for example the decision to procure CVR(T)s in 2014, M109 155mm self-propelled howitzers in 2017, or Stinger man-portable air-defense systems, [1] [2] [3] recently the communication on a major procurement was done prior to the decision being made. There is a recent example where the process of selection and procurement of offroad vehicles was announced with several contenders mentioned (2018). [4] Similarly, transparency has been strenghtened, with more information available online, e.g. a description of the procurement process [5] and a list of expected procurements and centralised procurements. [6] Also, the Minister of Defence has recently admitted that, possibly, the defence sector should provide more explanations in this regard. [7]

According to the government reviewer, examples [1, 2, 3] are government-to-government purchases that are usually announced after the contract signature since there is no competition in the market for such purposes. Example [4], on the other hand, is an open procurement procedure that was organized on competitive bidding principles. Therefore public announcements were made in order to inform the public about the ongoing process.

There are detailed policies and procedures for each step of the implementation process of the procurement cycle defined by the Public procurement law [1] and monitored by the Procurement Monitoring Office, as well as by the Internal Audit and Inspection Depertment of the MOD. There are several internal documents regulating the process. Documents can be obtained upon the request. [2] In order to ensure effective implementation process the MoD has two units, each with a separate mandate: 1) carrying out procurement planning process, and 2) monitoring procurement execution process including analysis of potential risks. [3]

As indicated in Q57, Decrees no. 11573 and 11574 from 1968 are the legal decrees that formalize the LAF’s procurement policy, without foreign military’s assistance that have a different cycle (1). The decrees cover the defence sector’s “mode of contracting, the execution of works and the settlement of expenses” and “contract award, contract execution, special bids, funding and settlement of expenses”, respectively (1). Concerning asset disposal, the decree does not mention it. However, according to a source, disposal of military equipment requires the approval of the Council of Ministers (2).

The defence procurement cycle is disclosed in a very abbreviated format. Only the bidders who applied for the contract are the ones who are present at the time of announcing the accepted bids (1). (فض العروض). Accepted donations or military assistance by foreign countries make headlines without any details; US military assistance to Lebanon is an example of this (2).

Decrees no. 11573 and 11574 from 1968 layout the procedures for each step of the implementation process of the procurement cycle (1), (2), but they lack details on implementation (3).

The first two stages of the defence procurement cycle (procurement plan and contract implementation and sign-off) as per requirements of the Law on Public Procurement in the Defence Sector are fully formalised. Asset disposal in not reported. [1]. The contracting authority shall provide full details of the procurement conditions and procedures, including requirements for the submission and acceptance of applications and tenders, criteria and conditions for the evaluation of tenders, and contract details such as settlement and payment procedures. Although the Law does not explicitly require a needs assessment, it states that every institution (with a few exceptions) should publish their acquisition plans for the coming year before 15 March. All technical specifications should be available at the central public procurement portal. The Law also specifies the procedures for choosing suppliers, stating that the selection commission should consist of at least 3 members, either from the contracting authority or from a different one. External experts may be part of the Commission as well.

According to the government reviewer, the Defence Material Agency organizes meetings with independent experts, institutions or market participants to understand if the products or services are available on the market. Calls are published on the Central Portal of Public Procurement. Moreover, the Defence Material Agency plan and publishes information about potential purchases for 10 years [2]. Detailed information of the purchase, final value of the contract, type of procurement the contract and its amendments are published on CVP IS.

The first two stages of the defence procurement cycle (procurement plan and contract implementation and sign-off) as per requirements of the Law on Public Procurement in the Defence Secutor are fully formalised. Information about asset disposal in not publicly available either on the Ministry of Defence official website or the website of the Defence Resource Agency. [1]. The contracting authority shall provide full details of the procurement conditions and procedures, including requirements for the submission and acceptance of applications and tenders, criteria and conditions for the evaluation of tenders, and contract details such as settlement and payment procedures. However, although the Law does not explicitly require a needs assessment, the newly established Defence Agency publishes plans and priorities on its websites [2]. Additionally, the Agency calls for suppliers, signed contracts and public procurement reports [3].

The evidence that the procurement cycle is followed is provided on the website on the Ministry of Defence (detailed list of all acquisitions), and the Defence Agency (publishing news on each acquisitions on its website) and the Public Procurement agency. The best control in place is transparency but there are also audits performed. There is no reason to believe and implementation is not in place, in particular because more structured information is provided on the official websites.[1] [2].

The defence procurement cycle follows the policies outlined in the ‘Government Procurement Regime’. [1] This legislation outlines the tender process, the design of specifications, and the asset disposal process. There is no information in this legislation or that could be found in other public sources which addresses the assessment of needs. There is also no further set of policies which regulate the procurement cycle in greater detail.

Under the general guidelines issued by the Ministry of Finance, any procurement worth RM500,00 or more must undergo a tender process. International bidders may be involved and would be “invited for supplies and services if there are no locally produced supplies or services available”. Ministries and Departments are required to initially prepare tender specifications. Ministries are required to provide tender specifications, for which a technical committee has to be formed. Furthermore, “specifications should be as detailed as possible to give the bidders a clear idea of what is required or expected. The specifications drawn are functional or performance based although technically detailed specifications are sometimes used. Compliance with acceptable international standards or their equivalent may also be included in the specifications. However, tailored specifications to suit a brand or country are strictly forbidden. The system provides for an objection from potential bidders, a period of 14 days from the date of issue of tender documents on any tailored specifications for local tender and 28 days for an international tender”. [1] The award letter will be send directly to the successful bidder where a contract would be signed. Furthermore, the asset disposal process can be done through various means: selling, exchange-buy; exchange-replacement, gift, and, dispose. Tender needs to be issued for asset disposable with the value of more than RM500,000. The Disposal Inspectorate Board will be set-up the examine and determine the reserved value of the disposable asset. The Board will verify the disposable process and send his recommendation to the respective department. The department, in turn, has within 6 months to dispose the asset either through selling, exchange-buy or total disposal (for aging and unusable assets). All tender process, either procurement or asset disposals, are availabe for public viewing on the website of the Ministry of Finance although the public can only request to view specific tender or disposal process.

Guidelines and procedures for general tenders and procurements are available online. Only some specific processes are available to the public, i.e. procurement advertisement/tender and disposal of non-strategic assets. However, tender processes relating to strategic military procurement are not clearly available to the public. [1] This is due to the fact that, according to Dr Kogila, the military does not want to expose its strategic planning for security reasons. [2] Further information on the regulations guiding procurement rather than the tenders themselves could not be found.

Although guidelines and procedures are available, and by law should be adhered to, there are some problematic issues of implementation. The decision to procure strategic assets may subject to political influence and the financial capacity of the government. Some procurement of military strategic assets like submarines, helicopters, or jet fighters, may not fulfill the standard requirements and specifications of the armed forces. [1] [2] [3]

Evidence suggests that formal procedures for public procurements exist but they are often not applied in practice, mainly due to Article 8 of the Code des Marches Publics, which allows for certain defence purchases to be exempt from standard procurement requirements.
In September 2015, the government introduced a new public procurement code (Code des Marchés Publics et des Délégations de Service Public), replacing the 2008 code. The code provides detailed definitions of all of the various tendering processes available to procurement managers (Article 2).¹ Article 34 outlines that an evaluation of needs must be carried out before issuing any tender for offers.¹ Article 10 lays out the criteria according to which the appropriate procurement process should be selected (open, restricted, negotiated etc).¹ There are also a whole series of articles that state how certain tenders should be conducted. For example, article 55 relates specifically to consultancy tenders, article 56 outlines the selection criteria for individual consultants, article 58 concerns direct contracting by private agreement and article 63 focuses on notice of competitive tendering.¹
However, since article 8 of the Code allows for certain defence purchases to be exempt from standard procurement requirements, such robust procedures are not always followed. When the IMF, the World Bank and the EU suspended their aid programmes to Mali following reports of the off-budget purchase of a new presidential jet in 2014, it was the BVG that audited the account (see Q16C). The BVG determined that the former Minister of Defence, Soumeylou Boubeye Maïga, and the Minister of the Economy incorrectly interpreted a legal clause that allows for certain acquisitions to be off-budget (see Q29A).⁸
The audit found that the government had spent 87.77 billion CFA (USD 163.44 million) on defence items that were not declared in the official budget.⁸ In addition to the presidential jet, which caught all the headlines, the audit also looked at the purchasing of equipment for the armed forces. The report found that 18.59 billion CFA went towards the presidential jet, while a further 69.18 billion CFA was spent on other military equipment, primarily transport vehicles.⁸ The BVG found that the MDAC had failed to respect the 2014 Finance Law requiring it to register these contracts and submit them as part of the annual budget. Moreover, many of the contracts were found to be heavily overpriced, strongly suggesting that these acquisitions involved substantial illicit activity.¹¹
– Lorries that can transport up to 5 tonnes of goods that normally cost 28.5 million CFA were priced at 78 million CFA in the contract.
– Lorries that can transport up to 10 tonnes that normally cost 34 million CFA were priced at 115 million CFA.
– Petrol-tankers that can carry up to 6 cubic metres of fuel, normally costing 29 million CFA were billed at 120 million CFA.
– And petrol-tankers that can carry up to 18 cubic metres of fuel, normally worth 38.5 million CFA were billed at 210 million CFA.¹¹
There is also substantial evidence showing that the MDAC regularly uses imprest accounts as a way of purchasing items without having to comply with procurement requirements. The IMF notes that “The execution of exceptional expenditures is subject to very minimal controls considering the amounts involved. In general, funds are released without prior proofs and receipts. The payment of the advance is subject to simplified controls, focusing primarily on the identity of the payment authorization officer and the amount of the advance. Control of the compliance of the expenditure being carried out, based on supporting documentation for the payment, takes place after the actual disbursement of the funds to a supplier or service provider”.⁴
The IMF also states that there are numerous deficiencies in the controls carried out, “particularly with respect to the imprest accounts of the defence and security forces in Mali”.⁴ It adds that “some imprest accounts receive quite substantial advances that go well beyond their original purpose of ‘minor operating expenditures’. For example, the special imprest account of the Ministry of Defence carries out monthly expenditures exceeding 2.3 billion CFA”.⁴ None of this spending is subject to standard procurement requirements.
There are reports in the Malian media, based on sources within the defence sector, alleging that fraudulent practices are commonplace at the Directorate of Finance and Equipment (DFM).⁵ Defence contracts are not subject to open and competitive tenders: instead they are often awarded to family members or close associates of defence officials.⁵ The acquisitions and sales of fixed assets are not supported by any justification or assessment of needs.⁵
Despite these cases, there is some evidence that the MDAC does occasionally comply with standard procurement requirements. For instance, in 2016, the Minister of Defence issued a public call for tender for a new IT system for the armed forces, which was likely to cost about 1 billion CFA.⁷ However, even in this case, it was unclear why the Defence Minister was issuing a public tender for an IT system that was already operation.⁷
The LOPM, which was passed into law in February 2015, can be considered as an evaluation of needs given that the document specified that it intended to recruit an additional 10,000 soldiers between 2015 and 2019 to plug the major gaps in the armed forces.⁶ The LOPM provides for USD2.3 billion of investment for the armed forces, including plans to purchase helicopters, aeroplanes and uniforms.⁶ Since then the Malian government has gone on to buy two used helicopters (Super Puma S 332 L) and two helicopters from Russia.⁸ ⁹
While these contracts were publically announced and the delivery of the helicopters widely reported, beyond these basic aspects there is no evidence that these deals followed standard procurement procedures. Indeed, there are allegations that many of the military’s recent deals have led to the state losing substantial sums of money through corruption precisely because standard procurement requirements have not been applied.¹⁰

In law, the procurement cycle for the public sector is extensively disclosed (see Q58A). However, defence purchases are often exempt from these requirements, meaning that the cycle is very opaque in reality.
The LOPM, which was passed into law in February 2015, can be considered as an evaluation of needs given that the document specified that it intended to recruit an additional 10,000 solider between 2015 and 2019 to plug the major gaps in the armed forces.⁶ The LOPM provides for USD 2.3 billion of investment for the armed forces, and includes plans to purchase helicopters, aeroplanes and uniforms.⁶ Since then, the Malian government has gone on to buy two helicopters (Super Puma S 332 L) and two helicopters from Russia.⁸ ⁹
However, in neither of these cases did the Ministry of Defence disclose how much it had paid for the helicopters or what criteria had been used to choose the suppliers. There is also substantial evidence showing that the MDAC regularly uses imprest accounts as a way of purchasing items without having to comply with procurement requirements. In 2014, the IMF noted that:
“The execution of exceptional expenditures is subject to very minimal controls considering the amounts involved. In general, funds are released without prior proofs and receipts. The payment of the advance is subject to simplified controls, focusing primarily on the identity of the payment authorisation officer and the amount of the advance. Control of the compliance of the expenditure being carried out, based on supporting documentation for the payment, takes place after the actual disbursement of the funds to a supplier or service provider”.⁴
The IMF also states that there are numerous deficiencies in the controls carried out, “particularly with respect to the imprest accounts of the defence and security forces in Mali”.⁴ It adds that “some imprest accounts receive quite substantial advances that go well beyond their original purpose of ‘minor operating expenditures’. For example, the special imprest account of the Ministry of Defence carries out monthly expenditures exceeding 2.3 billion CFA”.⁴ None of this spending is subject to standard procurement requirements.
There are reports in the Malian media, based on sources within the defence sector, alleging that fraudulent practices are commonplace at the Directorate of Finance and Equipment (DFM).⁵ Defence contracts are not subject to open and competitive tenders: instead they are often awarded to family members or close associates of defence officials.⁵ The acquisitions and sales of fixed assets are not supported by any justification or assessment of needs.⁵

Evidence suggests that formal procedures for public procurements exist but they are often not applied in practice, mainly due to Article 8 of the Code des Marches Publics, which allows for certain defence purchases to be exempt from standard procurement requirements (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10).

Article 17 of the Procurement Law [1] states that the Public Function Secretariat must determine what assets each dependency or entity can acquire, seeking the best conditions in terms of quality, price, and opportunity. These acquisitions must be in accordance with the National Development Plan and the national budget. Article 20 states each dependency and entity must create its own annual purchase plan. Article 22 states they must also set up procurement committees to evaluate these plans and approve the start of procurement procedures. Article 26 establishes the procedure for contracting. The winning bid must be selected in terms of best price, quality, financing, opportunity, and “other relevant criteria.”

The process is undertaken through a bid, an invitation of three individuals, or direct contracting. Articles 28-43 set up the tender process. Articles 44 to 55 address contract execution and implementation. Article 54 states that dependencies and entities can terminate a contract at any time when there is a breach of contract or in cases of general interest. Article 55 states contracts must incorporate conditions for the adequate operation of the purchased assets or services. Article 55bis deals with force majeure and acts of God. Title Four deals with verification of contracts. It states information should be sent to the Public Function Secretariat and that a registry should be set up.

The Secretariat can verify the quality of the assets, but this process is not thoroughly regulated, it is just one article of two paragraphs. There is no specific section regarding asset disposal in the law. It is regulated by Article 131 and 132 of the National Assets Law [3] and the General Rules for the Registration, Affectation, and Final Disposal of Movable Assets of the Federation. [4]

The Annual Procurement, Leasing, and Services Programme must be published on the CompraNet site no later than 31 January of each year, with the exception of information that is of a reserved or confidential nature in the terms established in the General Law of Transparency and Access to Public Information. [1] In the case of SEDENA and SEMAR they can also be found on the official website. [2]

On the CompraNet site there is general information by quarter of the contracts signed by SEDENA, in them the contract number, type of contract, natural or legal person to whom the contract was assigned, date of conclusion of the contract, object of the contract, amount, and start and end date of the contract.

In this regard, no clear and disaggregated explanations of the entire defence sector procurement cycle were found. [3] [4]

In practice, there are shortcomings in the formal application of the procurement and contracting cycle, such as, for example, non-compliance with legal requirements in the contracting of companies, or direct awards without justification, mainly. There is not enough evidence however, to provide a score for this indicator and it is marked ‘Not Enough Information.’

The defence procurement cycle is partially formalised, but it lacks detailed policies and procedures.

The Government never adopted a Regulation for secret procurements, [1] despite the obligation prescribed by the law. [2] Therefore the Ministry implements secret procurements on the basis of its own Regulation, which was not provided upon request. [3]

The Law on Public Procurement does not clearly define procedures related to contract implementation and sign-off, all the way to asset disposal. [4]

Information about the assessment of needs, conducted on an annual basis, in coordination with NATO, according to the government, is classified. [1] Information on contract implementation and sign-off, as well as on asset disposal is also not publicly available, [2] while mechanisms for contract implementation are not regulated and no information is disclosed. [2]

Basic information on spending on confidential procurement is not publicly available. [3]

Information about contracts awarded through open procedures is publicly available for each tender, [4] while only general statistical information on other types of procurements (e.g. small and urgent) is available. [5][6][7][8]

The Law on Public Procurement does not clearly define procedures related to contract implementation and sign-off, all the way to asset disposal. [1]

The Law is not aligned with the 2014 Directives in terms of scope or available procedures and tools, and it is not aligned with the Defence and Security Directive. [1] The procurement process is regulated by the Law, and contracting authorities are obligated to publish contract notices and upload tendering and other procurement-related documents to the public procurement portal.

Assessment of needs is conducted on an annual basis, in coordination with NATO, according to the government, but these documents are secret. [2][3]

Defence and security procurements are exempt from most of the transparency requirements, either by not being included in the list of sectors concerned, or through explicit exemptions. Examples of exemptions include (1):

– Article 86: Procurement contracts for the Armed Forces can be agreed without prior publicity and bidding for tenders.

– Article 129: Procurement contracts for architectural consultancy can be agreed without prior publicity and bidding for tenders.

– Article 171: The National Defence Administration is exempt from the following conditions: budget restraints (Article 6), opening of the offers in public (Articles 17, 36, 46, 63, 104 and 121), publication of the estimated programme, market achievement report and a number of other documents (Article 147), use of electronic exchange procedures for documents and reverse electronic bids (Articles 148, 149 and 151), market audits and controls (Article 165), control over military equipment, weaponry and ammunition procurement contracts (Article 156).

Moreover, a number of military procurement contracts can benefit from the following conditions that usually do not apply: restricted bidding for tenders, no budget limit, no need for an administrative certificate. Based on these elements, there is therefore no evidence that the defence procurement cycle is formalised at all and that there are publicly available policies or procedures for the implementation process of the procurement cycle, which implies corruption risks. Yet, no NGO reports concrete cases of corruption in this situation. One interviewee (2) implied that the complete lack of access to information concerning the armed forces – including for NGOs – and not the absence of potential corruption explained this absence of reports on the subject. No further evidence of a formalised process was found.

No evidence pointing to the disclosure of the defence procurement cycle was found.

There is no evidence that the defence procurement cycle is formalised at all and that there are publicly available policies or procedures for the implementation process of the procurement cycle (See Q58A).

As Myanmar’s military normally handles its affairs internally, the procedures and processes of the Office of the Auditor General as an oversight mechanism lack transparency. The Ministry of Defence usually provides explanations of its defence procurement to Parliament, but not in detail [1].

There is no formal procedure for the public to access information about the defence procurement process. As Myanmar’s military normally handles its affairs internally, the procedures and processes of the Office of the Auditor General as an oversight mechanism lack transparency [1].

In 2016, there was a confrontation between military representatives and MPs from the NLD party due to the violation of asset disposal procedures [1]. As discussed in earlier questions, there is no procurement legislation and no evidence of procedures for procurement.

The Defence Materiel Process (DMP) regulates the decision-making process for defence materials, IT systems and infrastructure costing more than 25 million euros. The DMP is a five-stage process that consists of an analysis of requirements, research, follow-up study (if the materiel cannot be bought off the shelf), preparations for procurement and evaluation (for large, complex projects and those subject to regulations under the Large Project Scheme) [1,2]. Additionally, the Defence and Security Procurement Act details formal procurement procedures for the entirety of a system life cycle, which the Act defines as follows: ‘research and development, industrial development, production, repair, modernisation, modification, maintenance, logistics, training, testing, decommissioning and disposal’ [3].

The Defence and Security Procurement Act mandates that its provisions – including those on transparency and open-source information – apply to the entire life cycle of procured items, from research and development to disposal [1]. Transparency in the DMP process is ensured by the Court of Audit, which oversees the DMP process and provides detailed and clear explanations of the procurement process [2]. The explanations of the phases cover analysis of requirements, research, follow-up study, procurement, implementation and evaluation [2]. Information is provided in a summarised, easy-to-understand form, as well as in a more detailed and extensive form [2,3]. For materiel procurement that is not covered under the DMP scheme, the TenderNed portal details the process for all the different parties involved and the Defence Materiel Organisation provides additional information [4,5]. However, comprehensive information on the entirety of the process is not available for procurement processes that do not fall under the DMP scheme (i.e. if they are valued under 25 million euros).

The Ministry of Defence provides Parliament (and the public) with an annual Defence Project Overview, which details progress stages, strategy/policy framework, changes, timelines, implementation and corresponding parliamentary papers for procurements over 25 million euros in a disaggregated form [6] and, additionally, parliamentary papers on procurement are available to the public [7]. However, a recent report by the Court of Audit scrutinised the last 10 years of defence spending and strongly urged the Ministry of Defence to transition to a more transparent administrative system so that actual expenses in materiel and real estate can be more traceable for the executive, Parliament and audit bodies [8,9].

The annual Defence Project Overview shows evidence of procurement processes working in practice. For each procurement project, the overview shows the needs assessment, connection to overall strategy, the project phase, the budget and planning [1]. Active discussion through parliamentary letters also demonstrates the procurement process in action [2]. For projects not covered by the DMP, the tenders are actively and frequently published online on TenderNed, but there is little evidence to show precisely how the process takes place for procurements under 25 million euros (i.e. how the process takes place behind the scenes) [3,4].

Assessments of needs are conducted by the Ministry of Defence and are informed by the Defence White Paper 2016, in accordance with the Government’s policy objectives identified in the Strategic Defence Policy Statement 2018 [1, 2, 3]. The latter provides a more specific policy basis for defence capabilities to meet Government intentions. The planned investments resulting from these documents are set out in Defence Capability Plans [4]. Guidance on procurement processes are provided by the Government Procurement Rules, the aims of which are to “support suitable and inclusive procurement through the promotion of good practice for procurement planning, approaching the supplier community and contracting” [5]. Projects are delivered in accordance with the Defence Capability Management Framework (CMF), the practical delivery of which is represented by a six-stage capability lifecycle: Policy/Strategy; Definition; Acquisition; Introduction into Service; In Service; and Disposal [6]. A joint system of governance and management is applied for capability projects to reflect the shared responsibilities of the MoD and NZDF, with the former mainly responsible for the first three stages and the NZDF for the latter three [7]. Major capability projects are assigned Integrated Project Teams made up of personnel from the MoD and NZDF, including project specialists and subject matter experts [8].

To assist in standardisation the CMF has common tools and frameworks that are applied across the MoD and NZDF. These include: Benefit Management Framework; Risk framework; Risk management tools; Capability Integration Framework; and Financial and resource management [9]. In the first instance, the CMF must align the Defence’s procurement lifecycle with the Government’s Better Business Case Model by presenting for approval an Indicative Business Case, Detailed Business Case and, finally, an Implementation Business Case [10]. From the evidence examined, it appears that asset disposal is not considered in the Better Business Case Model, though it is part of the capability lifecycle. A close-reading of documents released by the Ministry of Defence on the Protected Vehicle Medium Procurement of June 2020 does not appear to include details of asset disposal (this may be because the vehicles are expected to remain in service for up to 30 years and therefore any discussion of disposal may be slightly presumptive) [11]. This suggests that asset disposal may lie in a grey area as “disposal and sales by tender” are not activities governed by the Government Procurement Rules [12]. Despite the potential for concern, the recent disposal of a former Naval vessel has seen the NZDF actively engage in ensuring best practices are applied [13, 14, 15]. The entire defence procurement process is publicly obtainable via the Ministry of Defence’s website. Information is provided in the Major Projects Report (MPR) about projects through their various stages in the life-cycle from project initiation to the start of the in-service phase. This includes changes in costs, requirements and trade-offs. The latest 2020 report is available on the MoD website. Information on in-service costs and disposal phases is also available, but spread across a number of documents [16].

Detailed procedures, to include the procurement cycle, are publicly disclosed but they are not contained within one document. The Major Projects Reports provided the most comprehensive coverage of the Defence Capability Management Framework, but the publication of the 2019 and 2020 Major Projects Reports were delayed due to Covid-19. Their purpose remains to track “the overall progress and project management of Defence’s major capability projects”. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8]. Assessments of needs are provided in high-level documents such as the Defence White Paper, followed by Defence Capability Plans, the latest of which are the Defence White Paper 2016 and Defence Capability Plan 2019 respectively [9, 10]. Contract implementation and sign-off can be followed via the Government Electronic Tender Service (GETS), which is “designed to promote open, fair competition in the New Zealand government market and meet international trade agreement commitments to provide information about New Zealand government business opportunities” [11]. Tenders listed must abide by the Government Procurement Rules, specifically “Rules 35-45 Approaching the Market” and “Rules 46-54 Awarding the Contract” [12, 13].

Disposal information is publicly available and can be viewed through a number of sources including Annual Reports, GETS, and submissions and evidence to the FADTC webpage. In general, project specific information for the first three stages of the capability lifecycle is usually well established, as their basis is set out in published policy documents, though they may not necessarily be presented in a manner that would initially appear to coincide with the internal procurement mechanism/procedures. This is likely due to the need for a non-specialist to understand the documents. That said, the transparency of procedures tends to decrease as the capability progresses down the capability lifecycle. This is owing to the information becoming operationally sensitive, with the least amount of information available on disposal, which, oddly enough, is probably the least operationally sensitive (judging by recent sales).

All procurements must comply with the Government Procurement Rules (GPR). The GPR contain detailed information on individual policies relevant to particular rules, as well as templates that contain further instructions about how these must be implemented within contracts [1]. Procurements must follow the Better Business Case Model, which is one of the frameworks within the Defence Capability Management Framework. These, and other themes and frameworks operate in conjunction with the Defence Capability Management System (CMS), which is represented in the six-stage process mentioned in Q58A. The Roche Review found the CMS to have strong leadership, inbuilt checks and balances that mitigate risk, a well-defined structure and governance regime, clear delegations, accountabilities, and to be making significant efforts towards greater transparency, alignment, and resourcing [2]. Failure to comply with the Government Procurement Rules and presentation of the Better Business Case Model would result in Cabinet declining capability proposals. Moreover, failure to adhere to policies and procedures within the CMS would draw the ire of the Auditor-General, who would highlight non-compliance within their Briefing to the FADTC (a good example of compliance may be found in the OAG’s 2017/18 Annual Review Briefing to the FADTC) [3].

Initial implementation of the Better Business Case Model is achieved through two products: a Detailed Business Case and a Project Implementation Business Case. A recent example of the former is the Defence Estate Regeneration Portfolio Business Case 2019-2035, which lays out strategic, economic, commercial, financial, and management aspects of the project [4]. Such submissions must be approved by Cabinet and allow the Defence to formally engage with industry [5, 6]. A Project Implementation Business Case must also be approved by Cabinet and permits the Defence to conclude a contract [6]. Detailed guidelines are provided by the Treasury and are similar to a Detailed Business Case format as they revisit and reaffirm what was provided in the latter if nothing has changed [7]. An example may be seen in the Defence Regeneration Implementation Plan 2019-2035 which “sets the process for the implementation of the regeneration of the New Zealand Defence Estate” and provides information on delivery sequencing, capital investment profile, and Defence Capability requirements [8].

The defence procurement cycle is formalised and regulated by two decrees: the 2016 Code for Public Procurement (1) and the 2013 Decree that regulates security and defence acquisitions (2). The assessment of needs is regulated by a yearly acquisition plan defined in Articles 3 and 20. Drawn from the needs identified by the relevant technical departments of the Ministry of Defence, the acquisition plan is flexible and regularly updated. The plan is not available to the public and is classified as “top secret” (2).
Chapter III (Art. 6-13) explains the different qualifications required for candidates; Chapter IV (Art. 14-19) explains subcontracting; Chapter V (Art. 20 – 34) describes the procurement process itself, including provisions on the assessment of needs; Chapter VI (Art. 35 – 39) explains the approval and implementation processes; Chapter VII (Art. 40-41) explains the dematerialisation on the procedures, Chapter VIII (Art.42-49) covers guarantees; Chapter XI (Art. 50-53) covers eventual changes in the process of procurement; Chapter X (Art. 54 – 57) covers cancellation and adjournment, Chapter XI (Art. 58-70) covers payment; Chapter XII (Art.71-75) covers controls and sanctions.

All purchases for the MoD fall under either the 2016 Code for Public Procurement (1) or under the 2013 Decree (2) that regulates security and defence acquisitions. Therefore, acquisitions made under the 2016 Code may be disclosed to the public, but this is not the case for purchases made under the 2013 Decree, which requires confidentiality (Art. 2). Niger has signed military cooperation agreements with international and sub-regional partners. As a result, procurement and equipment donations are often lumped together. Niger’s partners mostly disclose donations. Some important acquisitions like helicopters or planes may be made public through local or international media. For example, on October 27, 2017, France’s Ministry of Defence published a report on its website describing a donation ceremony for a series of armed military vehicles in the presence of Niger’s Minister of Defence, Mohamed Bazoum (3).

The legislation includes policies and procedures for each step of the implementation process of the procurement cycle (1), (2). However, it is difficult to evaluate its effectiveness, and the extent to which these regulations are adhered to cannot be easily determined due to the confidential status of the procurement procedures mentioned in the Art.2 of the 2013 Decree. To sum up, Decree No. 2013/570/PRN/PM formalises the procurement cycle. However, due to the confidentiality of procedures regarding “secret items,” there are possible risks of shortcomings. It also prevents the evaluation of its effectiveness and the extent to which procedures are followed.

The defence procurement cycle is not formalised or disclosed to the public. Occasionally, there may be some limited disclosure for what is considered ‘non-sensitive’ issues notably none critical purchases. There are no formalised processes open to public scrutiny. The distinction is maintained between ‘civilian’ or non-sensitive purchases and weapons purchases (1). The latter provisions of the legislation are neither followed nor made public. It was confirmed by the source that non-sensitive items may be made public. Non-sensitive items may be disclosed under the Appropriations Act under the auspices of the Budget Office. Most recently, the purchase of 12 TUCANO jets by the FGN was covered extensively in the media (1). It is unclear what internal processes were followed in acquiring the weapons as details were only available in the press after the sales negotiation were concluded. This information was confirmed by the source in the MOD. Following the previous TI report, there has been some response by the Nigerian Air Force (NAF); however, the extent to which other limbs of the armed services have modified their processes is unclear. The Chief of the Air Staff, Air Marshal Sadique Abubakar recently stated that following the TI 2015 report “the NAF has since instituted various changes in the procurement process and procedure within the ambit of the Public Procurement Act 2007” (1).

There is no formal requirement which compels the disclosure of defence procurement cycle to the public. While it is agreed that some abridged procurement process exists, it is argued that the wide discretion exercised by senior military officials opens the door to a truncated process which can avoid the formalities required by the 2007 PPA. It is so arbitrary and includes wide discretionary powers that prevent it from being described as a ‘formal’ procedure (1).

The defence procurement cycle is not formalised or disclosed to the public. Occasionally, there may be some limited disclosure for what is considered ‘non-sensitive’ issues, notably none critical purchases. There are no formalised processes open to public scrutiny. The distinction is maintained between ‘civilian’ or non-sensitive purchases and weapons purchases (1). The latter, the provisions of the legislation are neither followed nor made public. It was confirmed by the source that non-sensitive items may be made public. None-sensitive items may be disclosed under the Appropriations Act under the auspices of the Budget Office. Most recently, the purchase of 12 TUCANO jets by the FGN was covered extensively in the media (1). It is unclear what internal processes were followed in acquiring the weapons as details were only available in the press after the sales negotiation were concluded. This information was confirmed by the source in MOD. Following the previous TI report, there has been some response by the Nigerian Air Force (NAF); however, the extent to which other limbs of the armed services have modified their processes is unclear. The Chief of the Air Staff, Air Marshal Sadique Abubakar recently stated that following the TI 2015 report “the NAF has since instituted various changes in the procurement process and procedure within the ambit of the Public Procurement Act 2007” (1). This led to the establishment of a Directorate of Procurement tasked with the responsibility of coordinating all procurement activities in the NAF. The Directorate of Procurement is staffed with well-trained technical and legal personnel to ensure that the NAF obtains value for money spent while at the same time, adhering to the law (1), (2).

“In addition, the NAF is vigorously following through on the government’s directive to deal directly with foreign governments that is (government to government), Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) and authorised Equipment Maintenance Repair Organisations (MROs) in the acquisition of spares and/or maintenance of NAF equipment rather than with some third-party organisations. However, there have been challenges especially in dealing with some governments” (2), (3).

The defence procurement cycle is not formalised or disclosed to the public. Occasionally, there may be some limited disclosure for what is considered ‘non-sensitive’ issues notably none critical purchases. There are no formalised processes open to public scrutiny. The distinction is maintained between ‘civilian’ or non-sensitive purchases and weapons purchases (1). The latter provisions of the legislation are neither followed nor made public.

The defence procurement cycle follows the procedures outlined in the Law on Public Procurement[1] and Law on Public Procurement in the Defence and Security [7]. The procurement plan is prepared at the start of each year in accordance with the approved financial plan for that fiscal year [2]. This Plan is developed on the basis of an appropriate analysis and assessment of needs and on the basis of the approved budget of the Ministry of Defence. The Plan contains the expected timing for starting procurement procedures, the assessed value of contracts and the type of procurement procedure. The plan is approved and signed by the Minister of Defence. The Logistics and Planning Department is responsible for the implementation of the procurement plan. The Department also acts in accordance with the internal Ministry of Defence Rulebook on Public Procurements [3] updated in 2019 [9], and it is this Department’s responsibility to outline when a particular procedure should start [4]. The implementation of the contracts is governed by the Contractual Obligations Law [5] and the Law on Financial Discipline [6] which also govern the payment terms and details. These regulations provide clear guidance from the assessments of needs, contract implementation, sign-off and asset disposal. The whole dossier is available to the public through the Public Procurement Bureau excluding security sensitive/classified items.

The procedures for the defence procurement cycle are underlined in the Law on Public Procurement [1], Law on Public Procurement in the Defence and Security [5] and are, as with every other public procurements, executed through and published on the Electronic Public Procurement System (EPPS) operated by the Bureau for Public Procurement [2]. The needs assessment is carried out internally and not made public, while bidding procedures and the implementation of the contracts are public and are advertised through the EPPS. The annual defence procurement cycle, as well as its Ministry of Defence modifications and updates, are regularly presented on the Ministry of Defence website [3]. Although they are outlined to some level of detail, the procurement cycle remains general and is not explained in depth. This publicity, however, applies only to the non-classified procurements [1, 4]. In the case of classified procurements level of transparency increased when the new Law on Public Procurement was adopted in 2019. Previously, only companies that fulfil certain criteria were invited to participate. Currently, all procurement notices are publicly available, and only the technical specification can be classified. Procurements above a certain value threshold are also published in the European Public Procurement Gazette. [6]

Public procurements executed by the Ministry of Defence are all accessible to the public and are required to be published on the Electronic Public Procurement System operated by the Bureau for Public Procurement. This, however, applies only to the non-classified procurements which are executed according to the article 5 of the Law on Public Procurement (LPP). Procurements which are classified in accordance with the articles 6 and 7 of the LPP are not made public [1].The LPP, Article 2, 82, 99, 100, has provisions that oblige the state procurement entities to consider life cycle in all phases of the process. The Law on Public Procurement in Defence and Security, Article 4,8, 55,56 [2] regulates procurement from the foreign countries. This law provides the basis for full implementation of the life cycle in the procurement from the assessment of needs all the way to asset disposal. The Ministry of Defence developed the Rulebook on Acquisition [4], which is published on the Ministry’s website.

The assessment of needs and contract implementation are laid out in the PRINSIX project model, which ensures a uniform execution of material procurements [1]. The PRINSIX project model also provides information on formal procedures for disposal of assets and material [2, 3]. Procedures for asset disposal are specified by the Instruction on Disposal of Real Estates, Act on Export Control of Strategic Goods, Services and Technology and accompanying regulations [4, 5].

The procurement cycle methodology and project management are disclosed on the Norwegian Defence Material Agency website, which summarises how the military conducts its investments. This includes assessment of needs, contract implementation and sign-off and process of awarding contracts and mechanisms for contract implementation [1, 2]. Details on asset disposals are only available in summary form [3].

The PRINSIX project model provides detailed procedures for each step of the procurement cycle from the assessment of needs to contract implementation [1]. The internal controls include proxy forms with signatures, a quality control by the Acquisition Management Division and controls by the first and second line of the Defence Material Agency [2]. Asset disposal, including sales and destruction of useless and non-saleable material is administered by Defence Asset Disposal Project (Forsvarets avhendingsprosjekt). The available information about formal procedures for asset disposal is less detailed, but the Norwegian Defence Material Agency website states that all sales decisions have to be approved by the Ministry of Defence [3].

There are general guidelines and internal policies for procurement but they are unclear, vague and lack many elements. For example, what to report as corruption cases (single resource) (1), (2). There is no evidence to suggest that a formalized procurement cycle exists for defence purchases and contracts. As previously explained, while a Directorate of Procurement exists within the Ministry of Defence, no further information was found on their website (3), (4). Similarly, there are no policies regarding defence procurement cycles available on the e-Government portal or in media outlets disseminating royal decrees, where defence and security orientated legislation is decided (5), (6), (7).

There is no documented policy, the defence procurement cycle is not disclosed to any party, including the al-Shura council, institutions, or CSOs (1), (2). There is no transparency over defence procurements, with no instances of domestic media outlets writing about recent or past defence procurement (3), (4), (5). Neither the al-Shura, the consultative assembly nor the al-Dawla the State Council has the mandate to scrutinize issues around national security; therefore no information regarding the defence procurement cycle was found on either website (6).

There are general guidelines and internal policies for procurement but they are unclear, vague and lack many elements. For example, what to report as corruption cases (single resource) (1), (2). There is no evidence to suggest that a formalized procurement cycle exists for defence purchases and contracts. As previously explained, while a Directorate of Procurement exists within the Ministry of Defence, no further information was found on their website (3), (4). Similarly, there are no policies regarding defence procurement cycles available on the e-Government portal or in media outlets disseminating royal decrees, where defence and security orientated legislation is decided (5), (6), (7).

The procurement cycle process is formalized in terms of providing requirements for contract execution and disposal of assets so that these instructions are effectively complied with following the law. Acquisition of assets through the General Supplies Directorate is required to be done following the Procurement Law and in accordance with the clear working, procedures announced through the General Supplies Directorate website (1), (2).

The security and national forces procurement cycle is disclosed in the beginning (advertisement) for competition, however without clear explanations. Additionally, many elements from the list in score 4 are absent. This includes the assessment of needs, contract implementation and sign-off, asset disposal; the process of awarding contracts, and mechanisms for contract implementation (1), (2). The main factor in the transparency issue is that neither the government nor the security agencies are compelled to take the least expensive option for the purchase of assets or the highest price for the disposal of assets (3).

Acquisition of assets through the General Supplies Directorate is required to be done following the Procurement Law and in accordance with the clear working, procedures announced through the General Supplies Directorate website (1), (2).

The defence procurement cycle process is formalised through Republic Act 10349, Revised Armed Forces of the Philippines Modernization Program. The acquisition process involves the three stages from the assessment of needs (e.g. project definition and validation); contract negotiation and implementation, to asset disposal (both the AFP and Government Arsenal) [1, 2, 3].

Some elements of the defence procurement cyle are disclosed, albeit not in an entirely disagregated form or with a high level of specificity; this is confirmed by reports and accounts of the procurement process [1, 2, 3, 4, 5].

There are policies and procedures within the implementation process but they are not very specific and are not always followed through [1, 2, 3, 4, 5].

The process of acquiring military equipment is a formal one and described from the stage of identification and generation of needs to implementation and asset disposal. The stage of identifying needs is described in Decision No. 25/MON of 2014 [1]. The stage of acquisition, use and withdrawal of military equipment is described in Decision No. 141/MON of 2017, updated by Decision No. 161/MON of 2018 [2, 3]. This decision is accompanied by multiply detailed regulations, as Decision No. 444/MON of 2013 [4, 5].
The stage of contract implementation is formalised by several procedures described in sub-indicator 67A.
Asset disposal is formalised by the Act on Military Property Agency [6], Council of Ministers’ decree
on the detailed method and procedure for transferring Treasury property for management
or for lending to the Military Property Agency of 2016 [7] and Minister of Defence Decision No. 175/MON of 2017 on procedure of property transfer to the Military Property Agency.[8]

Description of processes is publicly available (see 58A). However their performance and documents produced are in most cases classified or not public. They are disclosed in abbreviated form of document summaries, press releases or reports. The most transparent parts of the cycle are procurement process and tenders for signed off military equipment.
Documents of the analytical-conceptual phase (Feasibility Study, Preliminary Tactical and Technical Assumptions) are either public or the secrecy clause is imposed on all or part of it [1].
Documentation of the procurement procedure is, in principle, public (only certain documents concerning, in particular, technical descriptions or other statutory protected secrets may be secret – e.g. business secrets), if the procurement is based on the Public Procurement Law (c. 50%). In other cases access is limited. [2]
Military Property Agency sells arms and military equipment mostly through tenders (open or limited to companies with necessary licences).[3]

There are detailed procedures for each step of the cycle, as described in 58A. However, important shortcomings happen, such as the cancellation of the analytical-conceptual phase concerning open procurement of fighters and minister’s decision to select F-35 for further acquisition (March 2019) [1].

The defence procurement cycle is formalised under a specific defence procurement legal bill [1]. The defence planning cycle is also formalised [2, 3] and budgeted [4, 5]. The defence procurement cycle falls short of full formalisation as it does not establish needs assessment in any meaningful sense, but contract implementation/sign-off and asset disposal are formalised.

Defence procurement legislation is clear in regards to procedures on contract sign-off, awarding and implementation [1]. However, there is no specification on needs assessment beyond mentioning the needs of contracting entities [1], asset disposal is not mentioned. There is a clear formal process connecting political directives to execution [2, 3], but there is no record of monitoring or systematic monitoring of transparency in defence procurement.

Defence procurement is assessed by the Court of Accounts CA) as the Supreme Audit Institution. The CA has found issues with implementation [1, 2, 3], suggesting procurement stage policies and procedures are acknowledged and implemented but in a limited fashion.

The defence procurement cycle is partially formalized. There are internal guidelines and mechanisms in the armed forces and in other security agencies that regulate the procurement process [1,2]. This is due to the fact that the general state tender regulations and procurement cycles do not apply to the defence and security sectors [3]. There are also policies or procedures in place for the implementation of the procurement cycle. Such guidelines include the mechanism of bidding, the formation of committees, and the delivering of goods, as well as the budgeting. It has become apparent that according to the Government, each department within the defence and security sectors have their own procurement regulations. Defence and security sectors may choose certain bidders or select single suppliers in secret, without making bids and tenders public [3]. These factors demonstrate that there is no procurement cycle that includes all processes from needs to sign-off, and procurement is carried out without following basic international standards of procurement cycles.

Whilst in theory, each defence and security institution should have their own procurement cycle process, in practice, these processes are not formalised, are confidential, and do not follow international standards. Furthermore, defence and security institutions are excluded from state tender law no.24 (2015). [1] There is no evidence of public tenders, and there is no information about defence procurement. This supports the conclusion that the genuine defence procurement cycle is not disclosed. Material on procurement is not available to the public. In many cases, tenders are sent privately to companies that work in the sector, which makes it difficult for new companies to compete. [2,3]

There are internal guidelines and mechanisms in the armed forces and in other security agencies that regulate the procurement process [1,2]. This is due to the fact that the general state tender regulations and procurement cycles do not apply to the defence and security sectors [3]. There are also policies or procedures in place for the implementation of the procurement cycle. Such guidelines include the mechanism of bidding, the formation of committees, and the delivering of goods, as well as the budgeting. It has become apparent that each department within the defence and security sectors has their own procurement regulations that do not necessarily meet international standards [1,2].

Federal Law No. 44 ‘On the Contract System for the Procurement of Goods, Work and Services to Meet State and Municipal Needs’ stipulates the requirement to schedule, approve, implement and monitor the procurement of all non-secret items for governmental institutions [1]. However, the amount of secret state procurement is huge – in 2018, the amount of classified contracts completed under Federal Law No. 44 amounted to 2.4 billion rubles [2].

The procurement cycle for the defence sector is highly formalised. The regulations and legal acts concerning the procurement process include those formalising the planning, norm setting, public control, price setting, licensing of contractors, etc. [3]. According to analysts, Federal Law No. 44 alone sets very strict requirements that are ‘difficult to implement’ [4,5].

Additionally, Federal Law No. 275 ‘On State Defense Order’ [6] enables procurement details to be hidden for a wide range of secret items. Meanwhile, members of State Duma have recently suggested classifying the procurement details for arms, as well as military and special equipment [7]. Also, the procurement cycle of secret items cannot be disclosed to the public [8].

According to Article 4 of Federal Law No. 44 ‘On the Contract System for the Procurement of Goods, Work and Services to Meet State and Municipal Needs’ [1], information on the procurement of goods to meet state needs is published on an official portal ‘Zakupki’ [2]. However, this does not cover the whole cycle and omits the assessment of needs and the stages of a contract’s implementation [2]. Therefore, the public can access only fragmented information about the procurement cycle process.

Federal Law No. 44 ‘On the Contract System for the Procurement of Goods, Work and Services to Meet State and Municipal Needs’ stipulates the requirement to schedule, approve, implement and monitor the procurement of all non-secret items for governmental institutions [1]. The procurement cycle for the defence sector is highly formalised. The regulations and legal acts concerning the procurement process include those formalising the planning, norm setting, public control, price setting, licensing of contractors, etc. [2]. According to analysts, Federal Law No. 44 alone sets very strict requirements that are ‘difficult to implement’ [3,4].

According to our sources, there is a process which defines through regulations procurement within the MoD. However, this process lacks crucial elements, such as competition and internal auditing (1). According to another source, the cycle itself is ambiguous, and in some cases, it is arbitrary, for example, the regulation for oversight on deliverables does not happen, or changes in terms of purchases (2).

The defence procurement cycle is not disclosed to the public. Details of defence acquisitions are typically published after the fact, by international media outlets, rather than local media outlets (1). The procurement cycle is not published outside the MoD finance units. There are regulations, but they not well-defined (2), (3).

The policies and procedures are not clear, and the steps need more clarification. It gives room for different individuals and units to have different procedures and approaches to handling the procurement cycle (1,2).

The pre-procurement phase is formalised by the MoD internal acts and should be directed by the obligations established in the mid-term plans and program budget of the MoD [1]. In the field of procurement planning, the Public Procurement Law (PPL) mandates that the procurement plan denotes the description of the procurement object, estimated procurement value, type of procedure to be used for this procurement, approximate date of initiating the procedure and of signing of contract, approximate time of contract duration and other relevant data if the contracting authority deems it is important for the procedure [2]. Since the PPL changed in 2015, it is no longer necessary to provide reasons and justifications for each procurement and the manner of determining the estimated value [3]. This provision was removed from the law, probably because the practice demonstrated that these justifications were not very informative, but were a burden on the administration. Unfortunately, without this, the public cannot find out the rationale behind the assessment of needs within the institutions. In the post-procurement phase, which is often most problematic, the PPL mandates the publishing of notices on contract changing (2). Separate procurement plans for items concerning defence and security are to be presented directly to the Government which approves them upon consulting the parliament [4]. Asset disposal processes in the MoD are regulated by a bylaw [5]. Final decisions on disposal are taken by the Minister Of Defence or a nominated official.

The practice of the MoD publishing its procurement plans on-line is now established, although sometimes it is delayed. It is unclear whether the procurement planning practice conforms to the rules and planning procedures, or the plans are made to accommodate the common practice of the MoD departments. Mid-term and long-term defence system development plans are not publicly available. Without these documents, the public cannot know if the procurements are in accordance with the strategic plans of the MoD. However, asset disposal, is available to the officials in writing, though justifications are not made public. Public information is available upon request [1].

There are detailed policies and procedures for each step of the implementation process (please refer to the indicator 58A for a description). The MoD regularly publishes public procurement plans, advertises tenders and publishes quarterly reports on awarded contracts, cancelled procurement procedures and contract modifications [1]. Individual tender advertisements are published on MoD’s website and Public Procurement Portal operated by Serbian Public Procurement Office and supplemented with documents requested by the Law (decisions to award contract and notifications on contract signing or decisions to cancel public procurement). Based on these publications, it could be inferred that the MoD does follow own policies and procedures when it comes to public procurement. However, the same cannot be verified for procurement in defence and security, especially for procurement in defence and security exempt from the law, due to low transparency of this process (please refer to the indicator 74 for more details). Public procurement in defence and security and procurement in defence and security exempt from the law are categories of procurement defined in the Public Procurement Law (Please refer to indicator 57A). Apart from the Ministry of Defence, other institutions with security tasks, foremost the Security-Information Agency and the Ministry of Interior can implement procurement falling under these categories.

There is evidence of a formal defence procurement system that includes initial processes such as requirement definition, to the formulation of sourcing strategy, contract design, contract management, as well as the disposal of assets [1, 2]. There is also evidence that these steps are implemented. For example, procurement tenders above S$5,000 are circulated through the open GeBiz portal, which offers tracking of the procurement cycle from the justification offered in the relevant announcement to the final decision regarding the winning bidder [3], although it does not provide information regarding the delivery of the procured item. According to the Ministry of Defence (MINDEF), GeBIZ has grown to serve 16,500 buyers across 143 government agencies and 72,400 suppliers, providing greater control and visibility over government procurement processes and policy implementations [4].

Although it has outlined its procurement policies, MINDEF and the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) have in practice generally refrained from releasing detailed information on its procurement processes. There have been occasional insights, but these are few and far between, with procurement programmes largely performed out of the public view [1, 2]. However, independent analysts have nevertheless noted that Singapore defence planners have been meticulous in ensuring that the defence force’s requirements are being addressed despite these opaque activities [3].

Procurement policies and procedures have been explicitly articulated by the MINDEF and its primary contracting agency Defence Science and Technology Agency (DSTA) [1, 2, 3], and this has generally been practised by both organisations [4]. There may be lapses, but these appear to be the exception rather than the norm and have been publicly identified and addressed [5].

Procurement: which pertains to regular non-strategic items (eg catering, fuel, etc) is largely governed by regular government procurement legislation. This takes the form of the Public Finance Management Act 1999 (PFMA) [1]. The second legislative form of procurement is termed ‘acquisitions” and details larger strategically-vital purchases of major systems, such as naval vessels, armaments, aircraft and so on. This is detailed in the Defence Acquisitions Handbook 1000 (DAHB 1000) [2] which, according to interviewee 2, is the contemporary legislative guidebook on managing these acquisitions as well as regulating corruption risks [3].

Procurement is disclosed following the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) and a competitive tender bidding process is generally followed, with the exception of 57C, where discrepancies occur [1,2]. The PFMA is Acquisitions processes are also followed in accordance with the Special Defence Account, but the efficacy of DAHB 1000 has not yet been significantly tested in this regard [3]. The PFMA is publicly disclosed

With regards to transparency of specific procurements, Interviewee 2 confirmed that the defence procurement cycle, including asset disposal, is conducted in an open and public manner [3]. Little information, however, can be sourced to illustrate, particularly in relation to asset disposals. However, some auction listings of South African National Defence Force (SANDF) vehicles illustrate some degree of openness [4]. This process is theoretically open but is unavailable from public search. It appears as though this process is largely known only to those who actively work in this process.

Procurement is disclosed following the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) and a competitive tender bidding process is generally followed, with the exception of 57C, where discrepancies occur [1].

Acquisitions processes are also followed in accordance with the SDA, but the efficacy of DAHB 1000 has not yet been significantly tested in this regard [2].

The Defence Acquisition Programme Act explains the defence procurement cycle process in detail. The Act requires the Defence Minister to develop a mid-term national defence plan including assessment of needs, contract implementation, sign-off, with approval from the President. It also includes asset disposal processes and each step of the implementation process of a procurement cycle. According to Article 25 of the Act, the Minister of the Defence Acquisition Programme Administration (DAPA) should plan for procuring munitions in accordance with the guidance of the Minister of National Defence. [1] [2]

The Defence Acquisition Programme Act explains the defence procurement cycle process in detail [1]. The Act requires the Defence Minister to develop a mid-term national defence plan including assessment of needs, contract implementation, sign-off, with approval from the President. It also includes asset disposal processes and each step of the implementation process of a procurement cycle. While outcomes of defence purchases are made public via the Defence Electric Procurement System, a website run by the Defence Acquisition Programme Administration (DAPA), the procurement process lacks details. [2,3] The Ministry of National Defence does not disclose the mid-term plan in full detail to the general public, and it only provides the estimated defence budget over the next 5 years, which is abbreviated. However, there was a significant improvement at the DAPA in terms of the transparency of the procurement process. In September 2019, the DAPA adopted a Debriefing Policy, which aims to provide detailed information on contract results to bidders. [4] The satisfaction of defence arms suppliers towards the DAPA significantly increased, and it contributed to enhancing the fairness of the competition. [5]

The Defence Acquisition Programme Act specifies procedures for each step of the implementation process of the procurement cycle. The DAPA is responsible for making a plan for the standardisation of munitions, for ensuring quality and that the suppliers comply with initial requirements at each stage of research and development, and for purchasing. [1] However, there are some shortcomings with implementation. While the Act includes a mandate to conduct pre-research for the assessment of needs, it is not implemented thoroughly in practice. One piece of research points out that the South Korean defence institutions have heavily focused on analysing existing defence procurement data based on previous experience in the pre-research process, which lacks scientific evidence. [2]

There is a formalised process to evaluate and shortlist service providers and suppliers to the Ministry.[1] Contractors are also subject to an evaluation/assessment process that rates managerial competence and ability to deliver services, price range and so forth by a committee. [2] A procurement committee estimates the value of procurement and disposal of assets.[3] Its role includes needs assessments based on criteria established for the specific procurement need, issue bids, preparation of contract documents, the issuing and approval of contract documents, maintenance and archiving of records of public procurement and disposal of assets, preparation of quarterly reports, and coordination of the disposal of assets. Evaluation criteria are based on cost, maintaining and repairing supplies, completion of construction or delivery of services, functional characteristics of the service delivery, including the environmental characteristics of the delivery, and terms of payment. [4]

There is no evidence that detailed policies and procedures for the steps in the procurement cycle are made public.

Moreover, since the Procurement Act was passed in 2019, a review of major media outlets and discussions with contacts in South Sudan reveals that no major weapons purchases have occurred that have been made public, including data on the procurement cycle mentioned in this indicator. Nevertheless, when, in 2013, South Sudan purchased Galil ACE rifles from Israel, the procurement was not transparent and its details were not disclosed to the public, until the information was exposed in a UN report, the latter as reported in Haaretz Newspaper. [1] Similarly, an investigation by the Britain-based Conflict Armament Research (CAR) found that South Sudan has been purchasing European weapons, despite an EU arms embargo, via Uganda. [2] Details of the purchases mentioned in the CAR report lacked transparency and the public was not aware of the transactions until they were exposed in the report. Transparency in the area of weapons purchases therefore is an issue of concern.

There is no evidence that detailed policies and procedures for the steps in the procurement cycle are made public. Since the Procurement Act was passed in 2019, a review of major media outlets and discussions with contacts in South Sudan reveals that no major weapons purchases have occurred that have been made public, including data on the procurement cycle mentioned in this indicator. [1] As cited above, weapons purchases in the past (e.g Galil ACE rifles from Israel and European weapons funneled by Uganda) and the inherent processes of the procurement cycle were not available to the public until exposed by investigative reports authored outside the country. [2] [3]

There are formal procedures for defence procurement. These include Ministerial Order 60/2015 [1], which, when updated, made it more flexible and streamlined the previous Ministerial Order 37/2005, of 30 March [2]; Instruction 2/2011, of 27 January, of the State Secretary of Defence, Regulates the Process of this Planning (called IPREC) and sets the general framework [3]; Instruction 67/2011, of 15 September, of the State Secretary of Defence, Regulates the Process of Acquisition of Material Resources (called IORM) in four phases: conceptual, definition and decision, execution, and service [4]; and Instruction 72/2012, of 2 October, of the State Secretary of Defence, Regulates the Process of Acquisition of Armament and Material and the Management of their Programs [5]. This means that the entire defence procurement cycle is fully formalised, following: 1) assessment of needs; 2) contract implementation and sign-off; and, 3) asset disposal.

Defence planning capabilities were adopted in Spain through Ministerial Order 37/2005, but the three planning cycles carried out between 2005 and 2016 were not used to generate military capabilities, but rather to justify the purchase of the controversial Special Armament Programmes. These programmes “have weighed down military planning and jeopardised the future accounts of the Ministry of Defence”, and caused the failure of this model whose application in Spain was “more formal than real” [1]. These and other constraints ended up in Ministerial Order 60/2015 that updated, streamlined, and made more flexible the previous ministerial order [1].

According to an article published in the journal of the Spanish Ministry of Defence, “(…) in Spain there is no information management system that allows us to obtain data on the total or even partial costs of the life cycle of the weapons systems that we have. The reliability of the information stored in heterogeneous systems is low, the effort required to obtain and process this information, which appears on different storage media and in different formats, is very high, since there are problems related to the collection of the information and its subsequent treatment and storage. In addition, the information we obtain from companies is biased and provided in formats that are very difficult to process” [2]. The author recommends regulating the management of the life cycle and upgrading the procedure included in the Instruction 67/2011 to higher standards such as the ones by NATO and the Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation (OCCAR) [2, 3]. A comparative analysis is provided in pages 26-28.

As outlined in the previous section, the procurement cycle is explained clearly across several ministerial orders and instructions [4]. In these individual documents cycles are disclosed and clearly explained. This includes assessment of needs, contract implementation and sign-off, asset disposal; and the process of awarding contracts, and mechanisms for contract implementation. Overall, some elements of the defence procurement cycle are disclosed with clear explanations and in a disaggregated form; other elements, though openly disclosed, are only summarised or are otherwise less clear.

There are policies and procedures for each step of the implementation process of the procurement cycle. In particular, they are included in Instruction 67/2011, of 15 September (which regulates the process of acquisition of material resources (called IORM) in four phases: conceptual, definition and decision, execution, and service) [1] and Instruction 72/2012 [2].

However, there are shortcomings with implementation. In particular, minor contracts (of small economic volume, de-centralised, and with little publicity) are deemed vulnerable to corruption and irregularities, as per a judicial sentence by the Military Central Court, later confirmed by the Supreme Court [3]. According to the last annual report available from 2018 on statistics of economic affairs in the Ministry of Defence, 14,533 contracts out of a total of 20,139, or 72 per cent, were of less than €300,000 and involved 6,458 out the total of 6,825 companies contracted, or 95 per cent, whilst these contracts only totalled €160.7M out of a total of €3,404M, or 4.7 per cent [4].

A report by the Ministry of Finance found breaches of Law 9/2017, of 8 November, of contracts in the public sector. One of them was the recurrent breach of Article 100.2, as the tender base budget for the contract is not detailed in the specific administrative clauses. This breach was found in 65.4% of the economic value analysed. Another was the non-compliance with Article 101.5 which provides that “the calculation method applied by the contracting authority to calculate the estimated value must appear always in the specifications of specific administrative clauses”. A third type of breach, the non-compliance with Article 118, which relates to minor contracts, “mainly because certain credits (mostly those destined to peacekeeping operations) are not included in the initial budget of the department, or because they arrive late and discontinuously to some units, centers and agencies of the Armed Forces”. Finally, the report also found the breach of the 15th additional provision of the law on “norms relating to the means of communication usable in the procedures regulated in this Law” [5].

Sudan does not have any sector-specific procurement laws that cover defence and security procurement, but Parliament did pass the Sudan Public Procurement, Contracting and Disposal of Public Assets Act of 2010, which, according to Article 2(d), shall be applied to ‘purchases of defence and national security agencies’. However, the actual Arabic text of the legislation available online only expands upon Articles 1-43 [1]. It is not clear whether or not text was ever adapted to expand on the articles following Article 43, which include asset disposal, penalty application, appeals, contract cancellation and ‘other procurement methods’ [1]. Additionally, assessment of needs is not covered in the Act. Finally, there is no evidence on the websites of the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Interior or Ministry of Finance [2,3,4] that the formal procedures required by law are actually used by any of the military or civilian entities active in these sectors.

Note: the transitional government that was established in 2019 has not yet appointed a legislature capable of making or amending laws and the transitional Constitution does not require the popular election of a new legislature until at least late 2022 [5].

The 2010 Public Procurement, Contracting and Disposal of Public Assets Act of the Republic of Sudan is very general. It is not a long document (fewer than 15 pages) and, while it is explicitly applicable to defence and security procurements, there are no specifications provided to guide common types of procurements or to navigate procurement challenges and risks in these sectors [1]. There is no evidence that defence sector procurement is conducted transparently or follows the guidelines set by the Act. Information about Sudan’s defence-specific procurement processes, or about actual procurement processes that are underway or have been completed, could not be found on the websites of the Ministry of Defence [2] (which is no longer in operation), the Ministry of Interior [3] or the Ministry of Finance [4]. In a phone interview in May 2020, one expert on Sudan’s defence sector explained that defence forces are given total financial autonomy to generate their own revenue via their own companies and have been entitled to keep their revenues off-budget [5]. Furthermore, he said, most procurement process that are conducted with central funds do not go through the ministries that should theoretically facilitate the procurement process. There is therefore no way to know how most defence funds are spent. Nevertheless, a number of organisations (see Global Witness, for example) attempt to independently research and verify how some defence forces obtain and spend their resources [6]. The International Budget Partnership’s 2017 Open Budget Survey for Sudan scored Sudan’s transparency 2 out of 100, its public participation 0 out of 100 and its budget oversight 31 out of 100 [7]. Sudan’s security and defence activities are exceptionally secret and opaque.

The Government of Sudan’s general ‘Public Procurement, Contracting and Disposal of Public Assets Act, 2010’ stipulates that each ministry shall be responsible for its own procurement processes [1]. A directorate within the Ministry of Finance is responsible for supervising the implementation of the Act, including the ‘public procurement methods and procedures, formation of procurement committees in the major government units, prohibited actions, review and appeal procedures, ethical behaviour, offences and penalties’ [2]. However, there is no evidence that these formally established procedures are used in practice. A search of the Government of Sudan websites (Ministries of Defence, Interior and Finance), as well as articles about Sudan’s defence sector activities, did not yield any more specific reference to policies or procedures formally required by Sudan’s central government to be implemented during defence procurement cycles; on the contrary, interviews with experts [3,4], as well as a survey of information available on the web, suggest that individual organisations within the defence forces conduct their own procurement processes rather than doing so through formally established channels and processes. The International Budget Partnership’s 2017 Open Budget Survey for Sudan scored Sudan’s transparency 2 out of 100, its public participation 0 out of 100 and its budget oversight 31 out of 100 [5]. Sudan’s security and defence activities are exceptionally secret and opaque.

Defence procurement is planned by the government and the Swedish Armed Forces (SAF). The government and parliament are responsible for the long-term planning of defence procurement. For example, in 2016 the government appointed a public investigation team which delivered their final report in 2018 on the defence organisation’s ‘long-term materiel needs’ [1]. Drawing on government recommendations as well as their own assessments, the SAF then publishes a more detailed stock plan for procurement, displaying the entire cycle from planning and design to procurement and eventually decommission [2]. The plan is approved internally by the SAF and externally by the government. The SAF also lists their asset disposal, including defence materiel, in their annual reports [3]. Procurements for the SAF are managed by the Swedish Defence Material Administration Agency (FMV), which is also organised under the MOD. The government’s formal ordinance [4] and annual regulation letters to FMV [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] detail the agency’s role and responsibilities in the defence procurement cycle. FMV lists tenders and contracts for ongoing and future defence procurements in a publicly available database on their website [10].

The processes and actors involved in defence procurement are publicly disclosed with generally clear explanations, and presented in disaggregated form (see Q58A) [1] [2] [3]. The full defence procurement cycle is also summarised on the SAF website [4]. However, the Swedish Competition Authority (KKV) states that Swedish procurement agencies and public institutions are ‘the worst in the EU’ when it comes to stating the total value of awarded procurement contracts after their signing [5]. A KKV inspection report from 2017, for example, noted that FMV had broken parts of the procurement law at 12 different occasions by not disclosing the final value or winning bidder of defence contracts in their follow-up reports and press releases [6]. Interview data further shows that the SAF and FMV tend to refrain from publicising information on awarded procurement contracts [7].

As noted above (Q58A and Q58B), there are several policies and routine procedures in place for each step of the implementation process of the procurement cycle. However, the Swedish National Audit Office (NAO) has frequently noted some shortcomings with implementation. For example, audits have shown for multiple years in a row that the SAF tends to miscalcuate the total value of their materiel assets and stock supply [1] [2] [3] [4] wich in turn might risk affecting the rest of the procurement cycle. Moreover, KKV investigations [5] and interviewee statements [6] further show that detailed information is severely lacking when it comes to the process of awarding contracts.

The acquisition process is subdivided into several main phases preceding procurement: planning, evaluation and parliamentary deliberation. These first phases involve the Armed Forces Staff, the Armed Forces Logistics Organisation, Armasuisse and Political decision-makers. The project planning is subdivided into long- and medium-term planning, conceptual foundations, requirement analysis (including cost planning) and the development of a project charter. Then, the evaluation phase has a pre-evaluation, the evaluation itself, a verification of suitability for troop use, type selection, and finally the approval of the armament programme. Then the Parliament will deliberate on the proposal based on the programme [1, 5]. The armament programme lays out the reasoning for the requested by providing background, a description of the proposed solution and why this solution was chosen [2, 3, 4]. The framework programme then provides even more detailed explanations on background, strategic reasoning and justification [5]. The different functions are internally separated. For the procurement and introduction, Armasuisse is in charge of the process. Armasuisse is organized into different “comptence sectors”: Command and Control and Reconnaissance Systems, Land Systems, Aeronautical Systems, Purchasing and Cooperations, Science and Technology, and Real Estate. Purchasing and Cooperations are responsible for acquisition management. This includes the negotiation of framework contracts and monitoring compliance [6]. Once the project is tested and considered “Fit for Mission” the Armed Forces Logistic Organisation (AFLO) takes over. The AFLO is in charge of the life cycle management of the equipment and the decisions on decommissioning is also charged with disposal, liquidation or sale of the obsolete material [7]. Article 109 of the Federal Law on the Army and the Military Administration (Militärgesetz) (MG) regulates the liquidation of assets. It assigns the Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport (DDPS) to liquidate army material. The liquidation of bigger weapons systems are submitted by the Federal Council to the Federal Assembly [8]. The Ordinance on the procurement, use and the liquidation of materiel (Materialverordnung VBS) (MatV) regulates in Section 5 the liquidation of materiel. The liquidation has to follow “economic priniciples” (Article 14). The decisions for liquidations that have not to be submitted to the Federal Assembly are taken by the head of the ministry (Article 15.1). If an end-use agreement is signed, armasuisse has to issue permission (Article 15.3). Armasuisse is charged with the actual liquidation of the assets (Article 16) [9]. There is currently no law that specifically regulates the procurement in the defence sector. The one currently in place exempts “the procurement of weapons, ammunition or other war materiel” as well as other procurements with a military purpose (Article 3e BöB) [10]. Civil and military penal law has clear provisions concerning corruption and does also apply to public procurement. A new public procurement law that includes military procurement has been approved in 2019 but has not entered into force yet [11]. The Ordinance on Public Procurement (Verordnung über die Organisation des öffentlichen Beschaffungswesens der Bundesverwaltung) (Org-VöB) mentions Armasuisse as one of the four central procurement organisations (“Zentrale Beschaffungsstelle” Article 9a of Org-Vöb). It regulates delegation competencies for different types of tenders and the responsibilities for the whole process including verification (Annex 2) [12].

There are brochures describing the procurement cycle process in general terms [1, 2]. The information provided in these brochures is clear and broken down into ‘project planning’, ‘evaluation’, ‘parliamentary deliberations’, and ‘Procurement, introduction, utilisation, decommissioning’. However, the information provided is quite vague. Some details on the processes can be inferred by other publicly available information: There is an online portal on public procurement that provides details to publication, different types of tenders, templates and processes for contestation. It also links to the annual report of the central procurement organization of the Swiss Federation and court ruling [3]. Switzerland is among the initial signatories of the World Trade Organization’s plurilateral Agreement on Government Procurement and follows those rules on public tenders [4]. Tenders, as well as the companies they were awarded to, are published on a dedicated website [5].

There are internal rules and procedures for the implementation process of procurements; however, they are not publicly available [1]. Some information around the procurement cycle process is public though: Tenders, as well as the companies they were awarded to, are published on a dedicated website [2]. There is an online portal on public procurement that provides details on different types of tenders, thresholds, and processes for contestation. It links to the annual report of the central procurement organization of the Swiss Federation the reviews the procurements during the previous calendar year. The website also links to the different implementing centres and relevant court rulings. It has a specific section on corruption [3]. The Federal Audit Office has previously published audits of liquidation processes (but outside of the time frame of this study) [4].

By design, Taiwan’s defence procurement cycle follows the logic of the “Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) Process” [1]. In theory, the defence procurement cycle of PPBE should be fully implemented into Taiwan’s defence procurements process [2]. The defence procurement process, includes the assessment of needs, contract implementation & sign-off, and asset disposal.

In the 2017 National Defence Report, there were four parts of defence acquisition [4,5] and these are stated as following:
(1)Military investment program management: The MND integrates weapon acquisition processes and publishes the “Regulation of Military Weapons and Equipment Acquisition” to refine the efficiency and quality of military acquisition procedure.
(2) Program establishment: There are two stages in program establishment. First, the General Staff HQ determines operational requirements, overall defence concept, and the needs of joint operations. In the second stage, planning of acquisition methods containing assessment of domestic production capability, system analysis, overall logistics support, and industrial economic benefits analysis are in the process. An overall acquisition planning report is made to address the acquisition.
(3) National defence effectiveness assessment: An overall assessment of weapons and equipment serviceability, cost assessment over equipment life cycles, and analyses of acquisition priorities are used to evaluate the effectiveness and cost of the acquisition.
(4)Procurement Operations: National defence procurement and contracting must take into account overall factors of quality, cost, and effectiveness, as well as compliance with Government Procurement Act.

Detailed policies and procedures for each step of the implementation process of the procurement cycle are illustrated in the roadmap of the Ten-year Military Build Concept (10年建軍構想) and Five-year Force Build-up Plan (5年兵力整建計畫). Other official documents such as the Quadrennial Defence Reviews (QDR) and National Defence Reports (NDR) are published biennially in order to gather support from the public and from legislators for future resource allocations of defence budgets [1, 2].

There are five parts of procurement information published on the bidding information announcement of Government e-procurement System: (1) Institution information, (2) Procurement information, including case name, procurement procedure, budget amount, involving security or not, (3) Bidding information, including bidding method, contract award method, publication date, (4)Tender obtaining, tendering, and tender opening, and (5)Others, such as contract performance location and duration, general conditions of contract, qualification of supplier, and additional information. [3,4]

Contract award publication contains: (1) Institution information, (2) Published information, (3)Tendering suppliers, (4)Contract items, including case name, contractor, results of evaluation, contract value, and evaluation committees, and (5)Tender award information.[5]

Whilst the procedures themselves are public, there are still specific elements or items are kept as confidential and in secrecy due to Taiwan’s awkward international status quo in the global security environment under the pressure of the P.R.C.; e.g. Indigenous Defence Submarine (IDS) Program [2,6,7,8].

Detailed policies and procedures for each step of the implementation process of the procurement cycle are illustrated in the roadmap of the Ten-year Military Build Concept (10年建軍構想) and Five-year Force Build-up Plan (5年兵力整建計畫); however, there are some shortcomings with implementation due to domestic and international political pressures [1, 2, 3]. Procurement, in practice, only partially follows the logic of PPBE. Deviations in the defence procurement cycle in design result mainly from political pressure by Washington on items, specs, quality, or quantity of systems procured from the U.S. [3].

There is an outline of the formal processes used for procurement [1]. However, there is no public evidence available on actual processes of procurement and disposal, and none on value or type. [2] [3]

The defence procurement cycle is open to exceptions allowing restricted tendering, competitive negotiation, and single-source tendering. Available data from, for example, the Controller and Auditor General reports is far from adequate to allow one to understand the cycle. [1] However, some limited information is available from these reports from the Controller and Auditor General and from the Public Procurement Regulations. [2]

There is not enough information to score this indicator. Though there is an outline of the formal processes used for procurement, there is no information available on actual processes of procurement and disposal and whether there are any implementing guidelines.

In the Public Procurement and Supplies Administration Act 2017, Section 8, it is noted in a broad manner that procurement and supplies administration by a State agency shall be planned in advance in order to ensure its effectiveness and transparency. In Section 18, the assessment of needs is not clearly mentioned since the defined procurement process only includes the drafting of the scope of work or details of supplies to be procured and the drafting of solicitation documents through to the completion of the project. The procedures regarding contract implementation are provided in Chapter 9.

Nonetheless, Section 113 of the Act states that supplies shall be administered in accordance with the Regulations prescribed by the Minister of each ministry, including the Minister of Defence [1]. Correspondingly, according to the Regulations of the Ministry of Defence on Internal Audit 2001, the MoD audits the current status of the procured item, i.e. whether it has been received, registered, deteriorated, damaged, lost or no longer needed by the agency, and reports this to the State Audit Office [2]. Furthermore, the Guidelines for Public Procurement and Supplies Administration describe the whole procurement process from the registration to disposal of supplies [3].

However, according to Watcharothai (2018), the qualification and inspection measurements in the Thai public procurement process do not comply with international standards such as the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) [4]. According to Interviewee 1, a political scientist, the defence procurement cycle is not formalised in a fully clear and transparent manner. Perhaps the worst stage of the cycle in this regard is the contract implementation and sign-off. When the parties bid for the contract, there have been incidents of partisan favoritism, which has benefitted either top military officials or their families or cronies [5].

Even though there is no clear defence procurement cycle defined in the Procurement Act, Section 12 requires state agencies to systematically put together records of reports on considerations, details, procedures and processes of procurement for the purpose of examination of information upon request. In the Act, Section 18, Section 113 and some provisions in Chapter 9 provide a framework for the implementation process of the procurement cycle, which can be customised by state agencies [1]. Nonetheless, regarding the official Code of Conduct for the application of the Public Procurement and Supplies Administration Act 2017, there is a flowchart of the procurement process, which starts from the announcement of procurement plan, includes contraction implementation and ends at the project completion, but does not include key elements such as needs assessment and asset disposal [2]. The Guidelines for Public Procurement and Supplies Administration also describe the whole procurement process from the registration to disposal of supplies [3]. These procedures and regulations which guide procurement are publicly available except for the the procurement of armories and services related to national security by a government-to-government method or by procurement from a foreign country [1].

Nonetheless, it should be noted that, according to Globalsecurity.org (n.d.), individual armed services in Thailand control their own procurement processes, which vary from one agency to another but are structured in the same manner [4]. Therefore, these processes are not always used in practice.

There is no clear defence procurement cycle defined in the Procurement Act. Some provisions in Chapter 9 of the Act provide a framework for the implementation process of the procurement cycle, which can be customised by state agencies [1]. Moreover, according to globalsecurity.org (n.d.), individual armed services in Thailand control their own procurement processes, which vary from one agency to another but are structured in the same manner [2]. Thus, it can be assumed that there are shortcomings in implementation.

According to our sources, since 2014 all procurement of the state’s ministries are formalised. The defence procurement cycle, from the assessment of needs, through contract implementation and sign-off, is formalised by Decree n°1039-2014, dated 13 March 2014, organising public procurement (1). Other legal texts formalise the necessity of making publicly available the process and the necessity of contracting through the online platform Tuneps (2) and procedure for exclusion from public contracts (3). Decree n° 88-36, dated 12 January 1988, on the special the procedure of control of expenditure of the Ministries of Defence and Interior, formalises different contract steps but it lacks detailed policies and procedures for each step of the implementation process of the procurement cycle (4).

According to our sources, there is a formal decree that obliges the state to make public procurement available, including military, but at present, the MoD fails to use these tools and all procurement cycles are still not made public. The reasons behind that, according to our sources, is the that MoD should have exemption because of the sensitivity of the current situation in the country [Political instability and terrorism] (1,2). Decree n°1039-2014, dated 13 March 2014, organising public procurement, as modified by Government Decree No. 416 of 2018, dated 11 May 2018, states the necessity of making publicly available the process and the necessity of contracting through the online platform Tuneps and the obligation of publishing the call for tenders in the press andon the website of the High Commission for public orders since 1 September 2018 for Ministries (3). However, the Ministry of Defence does not seem to use these platforms for the majority of its procurement as of yet (4,5).

As the laws are being implemented there is some unclarity in some articles and in the ongoing development of implementation and monitoring mechanisms. The gaps include the monitoring and evaluation effectivity (1,2).

The Turkish Public Procurement Law is the principal document regulating defence procurement in Turkey [1]. Article 3(b) of the law refers to:

– goods, services and works procurement that the relevant ministry decides is related to defence, security or intelligence, or should be treated confidentially; and
– procurement requiring special security measures during the performance of the contract pursuant to relevant legislation, or those concerning cases in which the basic interests of the state’s security need to be protected.
Article 3(n) of the law refers to goods and services procurement through agreements and contracts, allowing guarantees in advance in order to ensure the provision of urgent requirements that are likely to arise in cases involving defence, security and humanitarian aid issues. Such requirements may arise from either international obligations or for national purposes and are exempt from the law in order for defence procurement to be conducted in a fast and effective manner [1].

This provision constitutes the basis for the directives for each relevant institution, such as the Ministry of National Defence Regulation for Contracting Processes, the Ministry of Defence’s Revolving Fund Regulation and the SSB’s Special Regulation on Finance and Contracting [2,3,4].

Please note that the following state bodies have significant roles in Turkey’s defence procurement cycle:

– During the assessment of needs defined in the National Security and Military Strategy Documents and the Strategic Procurement Document (OYTEP):
• Presidential Cabinet of Ministers: deciding general policy on defence procurement
• The Defence Industry High Coordination Board, chaired by the President and including ministers and the top brass of the military: providing directives for procurement needs
• Turkish General Staff and the Ministry of Defence: deciding needs and requirements
• Defence Industry Executive Committee, chaired by the President: decision-making body on defence procurement

– During the implementation stage defined by Law No. 3238, Law No. 5201 and Law No. 5202 [5,6,7]:
• Ministry of Defence: in charge of procurement for urgent needs
• Presidency of Defence Industries (SSB), attached to the Presidency: the main agency for procurement, exporting and financing
• Turkish Armed Forces Foundation (the umbrella body attached to the Presidency and involving all state-owned giants such as Aselsan, Havelsan, Roketsan, Aspilsan and Asfat)

– During the stage of asset disposal:
• The Ministry of Treasury and Finance
• The Ministry of Defence
• Defence Industry Audit Board: auditing and control of the whole process

As shown above, every stage of the procurement cycle (assessment of needs, implementation and sign off, asset disposal) is considered an executive task and the presidential palace has the final say. There is neither a legislative oversight mechanism nor a civil society monitoring mechanism at any stage of the whole procurement process, except for budgeting.

Interviewee 2 suggested that defence purchases are rarely (if ever) made public, though an aggregate total spend may be disclosed [8]. Interviewee 3 emphasised that, parallel with the transition of the political regime from a parliamentary one to an executive presidency and following the abolishment of the office of the Prime Ministry, the roles and responsibilities of the actors within the defence procurement cycle and their connections have dramatically changed. In addition, he noted that a detailed and persuasive report has not yet been published to explain the new formal setting of the defence procurement cycle [9].

It is not possible for a person in Turkey to obtain information about the whole defence procurement process, which, according to Article 2 of the Defence Industry Security Law (Law No. 5202), is secret and should be protected as a ‘matter of national security’ [1].

The only way for a person to obtain information about the whole procurement process is to apply to the Presidential Communication Centre via online sources or by phone and ask for information in accordance with the Law on the Right to Obtain Information, which is the primary mechanism for transparency in Turkey that enables people to get information about the government’s handling of issues. However, Article 16 of this law notes that ‘Information and documents which qualify as state secrets, whose
disclosure would clearly cause harm to the security of the state or foreign affairs or national
defence and national security, are out of the scope of the right to information provided
herein’. Furthermore, Article 16 also emphasises that ‘Confidential information or documents containing state secrets, which would clearly cause damage to the security of the state, foreign relations, national defence and national security if disclosed, are beyond the scope of the right to information provided herein’ [2].

Interviewee 6 suggested that it is impossible for a civilian to access information about the how the decisions are made in these three stages of the defence procurement process [3]. As explained in 58A, a very small portion of the defense procurement cycle is made public.

Interviewee 6 suggested that the defence procurement cycle outlined in indicator 58A is observed as regulated. However, he said that the biggest deficiency in defence procurement is the fact that there is no legislative oversight mechanism or civil society monitoring mechanism that could conduct compliance auditing to ascertain whether or not a particular case of defence procurement fully meets the technical requirements [1]. He said that the lack of authority at the level of legislature and civil society provides room for the presidential palace to make political decisions on defence procurements [1]. He said that, in this sense, the procurement of S-400s from Russia is not a technical decision, reached with full legislative compliance auditing or through robust debate within civil society, but rather a political decision that President Erdogan made by prioritising his political interests [1]. Open-source research confirms these suggestions. One report, for instance, delivers the same insights [2]. A report written by prominent scholars in Turkey asserted that the procurement of S-400s was Erdogan’s personal choice, not a technical decision [3].

Interviewee 2 suggested that, in Turkey, the belief that corruption is carried out in all state tenders, and in military purchases in the meantime, is common; however, the focus on this issue is limited to corruption, i.e. non-compliance with the current rules, high-price payments and sometimes low-quality products [4].

The defence procurement cycle is partly formalised. The Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets law guides the ministries of defence and security [1]. Further, the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF) Act states that procurement for all services shall be conducted by the chief of staff of the defence forces in liaison with the Ministry of Defence and Veterans Affairs (MoDVA) [2]. According to the Honourable Ssemujju Nganda [3] the defence procurement cycle is a ” privilege of the few”.

The PPDA Act [1] mandates all ministries to be transparent. Some aspects of the defence procurement cycle are disclosed to the public such as asset disposal; process of awarding contracts, and mechanisms for contract implementation. In most cases these are items which are not classifed in nature and their sums are also disclosed. But when it comes to classified expenditure [3], the details in terms of the costs and the bidders are not known to the public. Tthere are concerns regarding transparency in areas where classified procuremet are carried out [2] even among those Members of parliament who sit on the Defence committee [3] .

Policies and procedures for each step of the procurement process are detailed, but there is no evidence that they are applied for instance the policies do not apply to high-value items such as weapons. While the MoDVA website is well designed, with a section for bids and tenders, there are no past or current calls for bids [1]. In most cases, the MoDVA uses the local media when calling for open bids. However, beyond these calls, it is not easy to follow what happens after that. At times the press publishes news about procurement scandals after they have already happened. For example, the local media reported that the MoDVA was embroiled in a fresh procurement scam involving a little-known businessman and Defence officials through collusion and outright plunder in a series of contracts, including the Shs76 billion project at the army’s training school at Kaweweta. It further reported that Kaweweta training school was commissioned on 14 September 2012, and the same year, Mr. Mubiru’s company supplied furniture worth Shs700m without a valid contract or purchase order.
“The justification given that the recruits were about to pass out was insufficient to clearly support it, especially where there were no specifications availed to the end users to base on before receipt (of furniture). Such a loophole shows no value for money,” reads the report signed by former Deputy Chief of Defence Forces Lieutenant General Charles Angina. According to the press, General Angina’s team revealed that in some instances the companies started work before the bidding opened and would be awarded contracts halfway through the project to formalise the process. The J2E was also awarded Phase Two of the Kaweweta project at Sh26.3 billion and received an advance payment of 88 per cent of the contract sum, but the works stalled with “no cause for delay by the contractor.” The same company, under a separate bid, was awarded another contract worth Shs6.4 billion for emergency water works at Kaweweta. The works were meant to start on 30 July 2014 but did not. The excuse given was that the works would disrupt the training of recruits, but the same company was contracted again for Shs3.6b to build a parade ground at Kaweweta and received Shs2.6b in advance. Again, the works did not start and in the meantime works for the project’s Phase Two and Three were running concurrently.
“The contractor began works without a contract. In a letter dated November 29, 2013 to Commander Engineering Brigade, the Joint Chief of Staff (JCOS) instructed for urgent initiation of the works to provide critical infrastructure requirements,” the probe report further states. On February 4, 2015, the UPDF Engineering Brigade wrote to the MoDVA Permanent Secretary through the Joint Chief of Staff, showing the costs for critical works in Phase 3, estimated at Shs21.9 billion. “This was in conformity with the Engineering Brigade estimates prepared in January 2015 and received by the Contracts Committee on 22 June 2015. This raises concern why they took long to be delivered,” the investigators noted. On 3 July 2015, the MoDVA used restricted domestic bidding and issued bidding documents to four contractors. They were approved by the Contracts Committee on 30 June 2015, but out of the four, J2E Investment Corporation was rated the best and lower bidder at Shs28.6 billion. However, the investigations found that the bid was Shs6.7 billion above the reserve price set by the Engineering Brigade [2]. According to one MP [3], the MoDVA only follow procurement policies when it comes to things like “fuel, vehicles with little money but not those with huge sums of money like weapons.”

There are two types of military procurement: centralized (carried out by the MoD) and decentralized (carried out by military units, universities, etc.) [1]. If the information for a particular good or service is classified (battle tanks, ammunition, etc.), the particular good or service is to be procured using procedures for classified procurements which is provided by the Law of Ukraine “On State Defence Order” [1]. If the information for a particular good or service is not classified (food, fuel, uniform etc.), then this particular good or service is to be procured using open procurements which are provided by the Law “On Public Procurements” [1]. The entire defence procurement cycle – from an assessment of needs [2,3,4,5], through contract implementation [2,3,6], sign-off [7,8,9] to asset disposal [10] – is formalised, although some cycle phases might be provided by different pieces of legislation for classified and non-classified procurements.
In practice, the defence procurement cycle has few shortcomings. For example, procedures of the State Defence Order envisage the following steps: AFU Services send their needs assessment to the General Staff (GS); GS accumulates Services` needs and sends the draft of State Defence Order (SDO) to the MoD; the MoD, in turn, adds its own needs, completes the SDO, makes few necessary changes and sends it to the NSDC; the NSDC Defence Procurement Committee considers the SDO, the Secretary NSDC`s First Deputy who is responsible for defence procurement, approves this documents after consideration as well as some additional changes, and finally sends it to the VRU Committee of Security and Defence for consideration. To conclude, when the GS receives back the approved SDO, several aspects look different from the initial request, and some are not required by the GS/Services procurement at all. This situation is illustrated by the corvette Vinnytsia`s repair in dock in 2017 [1], procurement of Bohdan-2251 MEDEVAC vehicles in 2017 [2] as well as Saxon armoured vehicles procurement in 2015 [3].

Assessment of needs, the process of awarding contracts and contract implementation for classified procurements are classified phases. Moreover, classified plans are not published, though directive/ordinances that approved certain plans and programs are published with hidden annexes.
For non-classified procurement, information on the assessment of needs [1, 2, 3, 4, 5], the process of awarding contracts (with detailed information) [6], and the contract implementation (with detailed information) [5], is publicly available. Additionally, sign-off and assets disposal processes are the same for military property which is procured both using classified or open procedures. The results on the sign-off of the military property are not publicly available. However, both the CMU [7] and the MoD [8] publish online information on the units of military property (quantity, year of production, quality, initial cost, location etc.) subjected to disposal. The MoD, for example, announces the competitive selection of business entities to conduct the evaluation of military property subjected to disposal [9] and the corresponding results [10]. The sales of military property are to be conducted by business entities which are authorized by the CMU [11]. These business entities publish on their websites the corresponding announcements [12, 13] on particular sales; the MoD also does that but not regularly [14]. At the same time, not all business entities have websites therefore it is impossible to check whether they placed corresponding ads (“Tekhvoienservis”). Others do have websites but do not publish any sale ads, and the reasons for that remain unclear (whether it is because they do not sell anything, or because they do not make this information publicly available (“Spetstechnoexport”).
The annual procurement plan, annexe to the annual plan and their amendments are published online as determined by Article 4 of the Law of Ukraine “On public procurement” (published on the website of the Authorised body for procurements within five days from their approval). Such procurement plans are placed under “Public procurements” on the website of the MoD.

In practice, the defence procurement cycle has few shortcomings. For example, procedures of the State Defence Order envisage the following steps: AFU Services send their needs assessment to the General Staff (GS); GS accumulates Services’ needs and sends the draft of State Defence Order (SDO) to the MoD; the MoD, in turn, adds its own needs, completes the SDO, makes few necessary changes and sends it to the NSDC; the NSDC Defence Procurement Committee considers the SDO, the Secretary NSDC’s First Deputy who is responsible for defence procurement, approves this documents after consideration as well as some additional changes, and finally sends it to the VRU Committee of Security and Defence for consideration. To conclude, when the GS receives approved SDO, several aspects are different from the initial request, some are not required by the GS/Services procurement. This situation is illustrated by the corvette Vinnytsia’s repair in dock in 2017 [1], the procurement of Bohdan-2251 MEDEVAC vehicles in 2017 [2] as well as Saxon armoured vehicles procurement in 2015 [3].

Some elements of the defence procurement cycle are formalized through procurement, but there is no evidence that there is legislation in practice. In the UAE, defence sector procurement is partially privatized and managed by the Tawazun Economic Council, which is owned by the Tawazun Holding LLC (1), (2).

The UAE has no public reports disclosing its procurement cycle at any stage. It considered secret and confidential data that must not be shared outside the units. Furthermore, the majority of procurement run through state-owned companies and third parties. It is hard to obtain and to trace information on the procurement cycle (1), (2).

Although some policies and procedures are formalized for the procurement cycle, it is not always followed in practice (1), (2).

The defence procurement cycle is formalised as the CADMID cycle, and comprises six acquisition phases: Concept, Assessment, Demonstration, Manufacture, In-Service, and Dispose (CADMIT for the provision of services) [1, 2]. The 6 phases are laid out as follows:

Concept
• Produce a statement of the outputs that users require from the system, framed as a User Requirements Document (URD);
• Form the delivery team;
• Involve industry;
• Identify technology and procurement options for meeting the requirement that merit further investigations;
• Obtain funding and agree plan for the Assessment (in detail) and subsequent stages (in outline), identifying performance, cost and time boundaries within which it is to be conducted;
• Initiate the Through Life Management Plan (TLMP);
• Continuously monitor concept maturity and, when appropriate, construct and submit an Initial Gate Business Case seeking approval for the Assessment Stage within time, cost and performance boundaries.

Assessment
• Produce the System Requirements Document (SRD), defining what the system must do to meet user needs as stated in the URD;
• Establish and maintain the linkage between user and system requirements;
• Identify the most cost-effective technological and procurement solution;
• Reduce the risk to a level consistent with delivering an acceptable level of system performance to tightly controlled time and cost parameters;
• Refine the TLMP, including detailed plans for the Demonstration phase;
• Continuously monitor project maturity and, when appropriate, construct a Main Gate Business Case seeking approval for the project within tightly defined performance, time and cost boundaries.

Demonstration
• Eliminate progressively the development risk and fix performance targets for manufacture, ensuring there is consistency between the final selected solution and the SRD and URD;
• Place Contract(s) to meet the SRD;
• Demonstrate the ability to produce integrated capability.

Manufacture:
• Deliver the solution to the military requirement within the time and cost limits;
• Conduct System Acceptance to confirm that the system satisfies the SRD and URD, as agreed at Main Gate;
• Transfer the lead customer function to the User, for equipment.

In-Service
• Confirm the Defence capability provided by the system is available for operational use, to the extent defined at Main Gate, and declare the In-Service Date (ISD);
• Provide effective support to the front line;
• Maintain levels of performance within agreed parameters, whilst driving down the cost of annual ownership;
• Carry out any agreed upgrades or improvements, refits or acquisition increments.

Disposal
• Carry out plans for efficient, effective and safe disposal of the equipment.

One of the strengths of CADMID is that it each phase relies on executing the plan established in the previous phase which ensures solid progression and interaction between the different phases. It also means that thinking about later stages, such as Disposal, has to be done at the outset, during the Concept phase to ensure all the pieces fit together [3].

The Ministry of Defence publishes an annual Defence Equipment Plan, which sets out spending plans for procurement over a 10 year period and outlines requirements and achievements since the previous Equipment Plan, as well as plans for asset disposal [1]. The process for awarding and implementing xontracts is outlined in chapter 16 of the DSPCR, although this process has been amended in a number of amendments, in reaction to exiting the EU, to cease advertising contracts on an EU portal [2, 3].

In addition, Defence uses the Defence Sourcing Portal (DSP – which replaced Defence contracts Online) to create and publish all notices (PINs, VTNs, Contract Award Notices) [4]. The DSP provides a single point of input for all the types of notices that will be used. Specifically, the DSP provides:
a) drafting templates for all Find a Tender and contracts Finder notices and access to MOD DSP notice templates;
b) the ability to post notices to the correct advertising websites (i.e. DSP, Find a Tender and contracts Finder) depending on the nature of the requirement; and
c) a central Opportunity Listing on the DSP to point suppliers to published notices or to publish DSP specific notices, as appropriate.

There are some exceptions to advertising/publishing notices containing information about requirements and procurement decisions on DSP, Find a Tender or contracts Finder. Some examples are Nuclear, Biological or Chemical, Highly Sensitive Classified Projects, Memoranda of Understanding with other nations (MOUs) and Urgent Capability Requirements (UCRs).

There are detailed policies and procedures for each step of the implementation process of the procurement cycle that can be found within CADMID and the Defence Equipment Plan [1, 2]. These policies are also subject to the oversight of the NAO which produces a report on the Equipment Plan, and the Public Accounts Committee holds hearings on the subject [3]. However, the NAO has repeatedly flagged the unaffordability of the Defence Equipment Plan. ‘for the fourth successive year, the Equipment Plan remains unaffordable. However, the Department has still not established a reliable basis to assess the affordability of equipment projects, and its estimate of the funding shortfall in the 2020–2030 Plan is likely to understate the growing financial pressures that it faces. The plan does not include the full costs of the capabilities that the department is developing, it continues to make over-optimistic or inconsistent adjustments to reduce cost forecasts and is likely to have underestimated the risks across long-term equipment projects.

In addition, the Department has not resolved weaknesses in its quality assurance of the plan’s affordability assessment. While the Department has made some improvements to its approach and the presentation of the plan over the years, it has not fully addressed the inconsistencies which undermine the reliability and comparability of its assessment’ [4,5].

The procurement cycle is divided into three processes: the defence acquisition process, the JCIDS process (as outlined in Q11) and the PPBE process (as outlined in Q60A). The procurement cycle is governed by various pieces of legislation and further regulated by DoD directives and instructions. The planning, solicitation, evaluation and award procedures are outlined in the U.S. Code [1]. The PPBE guides the strategic planning and assessment of needs, following on from the National Defense Strategy, which is documented in the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). The DPG outlines the goals and objectives as well as the fiscal constraints for each military department. The PPBE is the process which allocates the resources for acquisitions [2,3].

The Adaptive Acquisition Framework supports the acquisition process and provides six pathways through which acquisitions can take place, e.g. urgent capability acquisition. The traditional acquisition process for major defence acquisition programmes is the ‘Major Capability Acquisition’ process, which has five phases, from ‘Materiel Solution Analysis’ (MSA) to ‘Operations & Support’ (O&S). The MSA process assesses potential solutions for a needed capability [4]. The MSA phase starts with Materiel Development Decisions (MDD), which is the entry point into the major capability acquisition process [5]. The process ends with sustainment and disposal or demilitarisation. DoD Instruction 5000.85 outlines all the related procedures that regulate the Major Capability Acquisition Process [6]. For the other five pathways, the process from needs assessment to disposal is largely similar, for example, see ‘Acquisition of Services’ [7].

Guidance for contract implementation, in terms of planning, solicitation, evaluation and award procedures, is provided for under the U.S. Code, Title 10 [1]. Asset disposal, as outlined in Q24, is governed by the U.S. Code, Title 10, Chapter 153 [8].

All the legislation, guidance and instructions outlined in 58A are publicly available. The ‘Operation of the Adaptive Acquisition Framework’ provides a list of references, which outline the processes in further detail [1]. The Defense Acquisition University, the corporate university of the DoD, provides an encylopaedia of acquisition (Acquipedia) and additional resources on the acquisition process for the public [2].

For each of the acquisition pathways outlined in the ‘Adaptive Acquisition Framework’, there are detailed procedures for each of the phases [1]. For example, the Major Capability Acquisition process has five phases, each of which involves various procedures, reviews and decisions [2]. In practice, there is evidence that the agencies within the DoD bypass the formal acquisition process, for example, in the case of the new M1A2 SEPV3 Army tank, as outlined in a 2018 POGO investigation [3]. This POGO investigation suggests there is a systematic and well-known approach to avoiding the Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) due to the number of stringent milestones and oversight required.

Venezuela has no specific legislation governing security and defence procurement. Acquisitions and contracts more generally are governed by the Public Procurement Law (LCP), the Administrative Procedures Law (LPA), and the Organic Law of Public Goods (LOBP). Asset disposal is regulated by the LOBP [1]. Meanwhile, Article 38 of the LCP states that public entities must send the schedule for all purchased assets, works to be hired, and services to be retained to the National Procurement Service in the last quarter of the year – with the exception of procurement classified due to national security reasons [2].

The signing and implemetation of contracts, including their control and oversight, is regulated by the Public Procurement Law (Article 136). Closure of contracts is regulated by Articles 148 (provisional reception), 150 (definitive reception), and 151 (payment and definitive closure of contract). The procurement cycle for public-sector bodies is formalized in the LCP and other legal instruments within the LRP, LOBP and LPA. The LCP establishes a contract-planning principle to be reported by each entity.

The public is able to easily access descriptions of procedures regulating the procurement cycle: these are available online [1]. However, it is unclear how transparent specific procurement cases are and whether these procedures are still utilised in defence procurement, since documents related to military purchases include nothing but numbers, and the Ministry of the People’s Power for Defence (MPPD) has not publicly disclosed any information on its procurement cycle over the last few years [2,3,4,5].

The law provides very general provisions related to “making information available to all interested parties” (Article 53 of the Public Procurement Law), and also states that information related to national security can remain confidential. According to Article 38 of the LCP [1], public entities are required to inform the National Contractors Service (SNC) of procurement planning for the fiscal year, except for cases that are classified for reasons of state security.

This indicator is marked ‘Not Enough Information’. The MPPD issued its strategic plan for 2015-2019, which is a reference document for assessing procurement and procurement needs that should be planned for each fiscal year [1]. In the latest budget, published for 2016, resources are set aside on an aggregate basis for the procurement of services and of resources for the operation of the sector [2], and there are no available documents including projected values or details of purchases for subsequent years. Therefore, it is impossible to determine what procurement and contracting processes were carried out, whether these correspond to the needs identified in the strategic plan, and whether there was compliance with tendering procedures and final contract awards.

According to the Defence Sector Procurement Manual, the Defence Sector Procurement Committee (CCSD) must ensure that the contracting unit complies with formal procedures for the approval of procurement applications [3]. Organisations and experts that monitor the public administration, and defence sector management in particular, have reported violations of established procedures – on the basis of limited information on some of the procurement and contracting activities carried out by this sector, obtained from unofficial sources [4,5]. The lack of concrete evidence on this issue problematises scoring of this indicator.

There is a procurement directorate within the Zimbabwe Defence Forces which deals with needs assessments, procurements and contracts and also deals with disposal of ‘excess to requirements’ or ‘unusable’ equipment. The procedure of implementing the processes involved in each stage of the cycle is determined by internal manuals within the Procurement Directorate. It ensures compliance with the Procurement Act [1, 2].

The Procurement Act includes detailed procedures for the entire cycle. It requires all accounting officers of government departments, statutory bodies and state-owned entities to provide information to the Procurement Board, which in turn must submit an overall report on procurement to the minister of defence before being tabled in Parliament. Once a report has been tabled before Parliament, it becomes accessible to the general public. This is the process through which the public can be aware of the defence procurement cycle process [1]. In practice, most defence procurements and contracts do not even get to be submitted to the Procurement Board as they are handled within the Ministry of Defence or directly by military brigades [2].

The Procurement Directorate within the military has manuals outlining accounting and procurement procedures, in part, to ensure compliance with the Public Procurement and Disposal Act. However, these procedures are allegedly bent to suit the interests of those in charge of the department. In most cases, the departments are usually headed by senior commanders at the rank of brigadier general, and they have a lot of political influence which can be used [1, 2, 3].