Skip to sidebar Skip to main

Q36.

Is whistleblowing encouraged by the government, and are whistle-blowers in military and defence ministries afforded adequate protection from reprisal for reporting evidence of corruption, in both law and practice?

36a. Legal provisions

Score

SCORE: 75/100

Assessor Explanation

Assessor Sources

36b. Prioritisation

Score

SCORE: 25/100

Assessor Explanation

Assessor Sources

36c. Effectiveness

Score

SCORE: NA/100

Assessor Explanation

Assessor Sources

Compare scores by country

Please view this page on a larger screen for the full stats.

Relevant comparisons

Albania adopted the Law on Whistleblowing and protection of Whistleblowers in June 2016 [1]. The law provides channels for reporting wrongdoings; procedures for the investigation of disclosures; and procedures for the protection of whistleblowers from retaliation. The law has a broad personal scope and includes all people working in either the public or private sector. This includes defence and security personnel also. However, the law only covers the reporting of suspected acts of corruption, making it rather limited when reporting potential crimes such as a violation of fundamental rights, dangers to public health, public safety or the environment, abuses of public authority, breaches of legal obligation, unauthorised use or waste of public funds or resources, conflicts of interest, etc. [2].
The law includes the protection of identity (Article 15), protection against retribution (Articles 17-18), and a reversed burden of proof regarding retaliation, provided in a bylaw [3], while it does not provide for sanctions of whistleblowers for misguided reporting. The legislation lacks any explicit reference to the waiver of liability for the whistleblower and the right of the whistleblower to refuse participation in wrongdoing.

Guidelines and regulations have been adopted by the High Inspectorate of Declaration and Audit of Assets and Conflicts of Interest (HIDAACI) [1], the Information and Data Protection Commissioner (IDPC) [2] and the Council of Ministers [3].
The Council of Minister’s Decision “On the structure, selection criteria and labour relations of the employees of the responsible unit in public authorities pursuant to the law on whistleblowing and protection of whistleblowers” provides the criteria and competences of the internal reporting units in the public authorities with over 80 employees [3].
Awareness-raising campaigns have been limited to NGO efforts, while little has been done to raise the capabilities of the media to improve reporting on whistleblowing [4].
In 2017, there were 163 responsible units within the public authorities [5]. However, results achieved in the capacity building efforts have been poor. Out of 609 internal reporting units (446 responsible units have been established in the private sector), training was provided to only 32 of them in 2017 [5].

The results achieved with the implementation of the law so far have been very limited. In 2017 there were only seven internal reporting units that have received one or two whistleblower cases, while eight other cases have been directly reported to the HIDAACI. No whistleblower case cases were recorded by the defence and security institutions [1]. This is indicative of a low level of information but also trust in the system.
No sufficient information or encouragement to report wrongdoing by making use of the legislation on whistleblowing is provided to defence personnel [2].

There is legislation on whistleblowing and reporting corruption. There is also evidence that it applies to military and official personnel. Laws mentioned below make explicit reference to the protection of whistleblowers but they only provide limited protection, such as the protection of identity.

Art. 45 of the Anti-Corruption Law concerns the “Protection of witnesses, experts, whistleblowers and victims” and states that the person who resorts to revenge, intimidation or threats against witnesses, experts, whistleblowers shall be punished by imprisonment from six months to five years and a fine between 50,000 DA to 500,000 DA (1). Moreover, order No. 15-02 of July 23, 2015, amending and supplementing the Code of Criminal Procedure specifies that witnesses, experts and victims are protected. It moreover stipulates that witnesses and experts on cases of corruption may benefit from extra procedural measures when their life, physical integrity, or that of their family members are seriously threatened. This includes concealing information on the identity, providing a special phone number, designating a contact point within the security services, provide the person with physical protection, install preventive technical equipment in the house, change his place of residence, provide him with social or financial assistance; place him, if he is a prisoner, in an especially secure area (2).
Both rules do not explicitly refer to the security services but Art. 69 of the Statute of Military Personnel says that the military is subject to the provisions of ordinary criminal law and the Code of Military Justice (3). Therefore it is assumed that the legislation on whistleblowing also applies to the military personnel. In this regard, the social media outlet, El-Khabar, claimed in November 2018 that the Ministry of Defence has begun providing protection for whistleblowers in corruption-related cases as it had only applied the provisions included in the first and second laws to cases related to terrorism (4).

No evidence could be found that the Algerian government is actively encouraging whistleblowing on corruption cases. Training provided by the anti-corruption watchdog agency ONPLC, which is targeted at public officials that are exposed to corruption, do not explicitly address whistleblowing according to the information provided on the ONPLC’s website (1). According to the head of the ONPLC, the first training cycle focused on four themes: the legal and institutional framework for the fight against corruption, transparency of public life, the code of conduct for public officials, and recriminations. The second training covered fraud risks in public procurement and internal control (2), (3). No further information could be found, for example, on guidance or informative material on whistleblowing. No information could be found on whether the Ministry of Defence, in particular, encourages whistleblowing. However, there is information that the Ministry of Defence had begun offering protection for whistleblowers in corruption-related cases (4). But no statements, for example, by the Vice Minister of Defence encouraging whistleblowing could be found.

There are very few indications that defence officials and personnel would trust that they are adequately protected when they report corruption; see the country’s last assessment (1). For example, there are reports of whistleblowers that have reported corruption and hereafter become subject of harassment and prosecution. In 2017, the president of a workers union was sentenced in absentia to six months in prison after he exposed corruption in the state-owned energy company Sonelgaz (2). In another case, a former manager of the public Oran Port Company was demoted and then dismissed after having questioned his superiors about malfunctions and malpractices in connection with the port’s activities (3). Moreover, authorities arrested the brother of a popular Algerian activist known as Amir Dz to stop him from leaking information and documents regarding the proliferation of corruption in the government’s institutions (4). There are also other reports of people that have been harassed, dismissed or prosecuted after reporting corruption while in office (5).

No legal provisions exist that facilitate corruption reporting or protection of whistleblowing. On the contrary, in 2016 new media legislation was enacted that established a media regulatory body, the ERCA (Entidade Reguladora da Comunicação Social de Angola) that reinforces ruling party control over media organizations, social media and the internet (1), (2), (3).

No legal provisions exist that facilitate corruption reporting or protection of whistleblowing. On the contrary, in 2016 new media legislation was enacted that established a media regulatory body, the ERCA (Entidade Reguladora da Comunicação Social de Angola) that reinforces ruling party control over media organizations, social media and the internet (1), (2), (3).

There is a proven track record of whistleblowers being prosecuted by government authorities for exposing and reporting corrupt activity. Well-documented examples are the judicial proceedings against Rafael Marques – 2012 under the charge of defamation in a lawsuit brought by senior military officials whom the journalists had accused of involvement in corruption and torture in the diamond and private security business, and in 2017 under the charges of defamation and outrage in a lawsuit brought by the former attorney general whom Marques had accused of corrupt practices (1), (2), (3).

The Law on Whistleblowing entered into force on January 1, 2018. It frames the rights and responsibilities of whistleblowers and regulates whistleblowing as a public phenomenon. It defines the concept of whistleblowing, the explicit protection of whistleblowers and related persons and procedure of whistleblowing concerning corruption and any other misconduct of public service [1]. Three types of whistleblowing are defined by the Law: internal whistleblowing, external whistleblowing, and whistleblowing to the public/society [2]. Article 10 of the law provides the whistleblowers have a right to protection. So does the related person if proven that he/she is harassed based on the activities by the whistleblower. The whistleblower who reported to the criminal prosecution authorities us subject to protection through the Criminal Procedure Code. Article 11 provides anonymity for the whistleblower and the non-disclosure of his/her personal information to any third body unless approved by the whistleblower. Article 12 of the law sets out the judicial protection provided to whistleblowers and related persons [1]. The legislation on whistleblowing and reporting corruption exists and applies to military and official personnel, as the law regulates the relations of whistleblowers with all state bodies. There is an explicit reference to the protection of whistleblowers, including protection of identity, protection against retribution (Article 10, Clause 2). However, the reversed burden of proof regarding retaliation is not regulated by the law, waiver of liability for the whistleblower exists only in cases of conscientious behaviour, sanctions may be applied in cases of misguided reporting if deliberate unfair actions took place (the information about this should be sent to the Prosecutor’s Office (Article 6, Clause 8)). The law distinguishes between wrongdoing and conscientious behaviour of the whistleblower [1].

Different state agencies and institutions promote the application of the law, and it is not yet clear whether the recent cases of corruption, bribery, and misconduct are related to the application of the Law on Whistleblowing, or if they related to other channels of information [1]. The RA “Law on Whistleblowing System” and the RA Government Decree N272-N of March 15, 2018 “On Adopting the Exemplary Form of Registering and Formulating of Reports of Internal and External Whistleblowing, as well as the Procedure for the Implementation of Protective Measures for the Whistleblower”, by the order of the Minister of Defence the Head of the MoD Human Rights and Integrity Building Center is appointed responsible for internal and external whistleblowing [2].The Center maintains a register of whistleblowing cases, and whistleblowers are protected by law.

Based on the Law on Whistleblowing and Decision N 272-N, On the Definition of Exemplary Form of Registration and Formulation of Reports in the Event of Internal and External Whistleblowing, as well as the Procedure for the Implementation of Protection Measures of the Whistleblower, by the order of the minister of defence, the head of the Centre for Human Rights and Good Behaviour of the MoD was appointed to be responsible for internal and external whistleblowing at the MoD. This gives the Centre for Human Rights and Good Behaviour an opportunity to more effectively ensure the protection of the rights of citizens that whistleblow on corruption cases and ensures the requirements of the law on the protection of the personal data of whistleblowers are upheld [1].
MoD claims, that the content analysis of the calls received by the MoD’s hotline shows that both the military and civil servants use the hotline to alert/blow a whistle about violations of their rights, consequently the personell trust the system. [2].

Like many countries, Azerbaijan is a dangerous country for whistleblowers. Still, a legislative group, the Anti-Corruption Commission is working on the draft law on whistleblowers (1). There is no law to protect whistleblowers in Azerbaijan, but current legislation protects people participating in criminal proceedings. According to the Law on State Protection of Persons Participating in Criminal Proceedings (Article 3) People towards whom the relevant executive authority has made the decision on application of security measures is considered the protected persons (2).
Following are considered as protected persons:
1. Person, who informed law enforcement agency on the crime, or participated in the revealing, prevention or detection of crime;
2. Persons, who considered a victim under the criminal case, his authorized representative, special prosecutor or his representative;
3. Suspected or accused persons, his attorneys and representatives;
4. Civil plaintiff, civil respondent, his representatives;
5. Witnesses;
6. Expert, specialists, translator and witnesses.
Security measures can also be applied toward close relatives of secured persons in the event of influence on close relatives to put pressure on protected people.

Whistleblowing is not encouraged by the government. There is no government messaging on whistleblowing. Mass media, TV channels do not discuss any information about it (1). On the contrary, those reporting on crimes are, in many cases, humiliated, removed from their jobs or are arrested (2).

According to the experts, the protection of those who provide information about the offences in the security and defence sectors is not properly implemented. As there are serious subordination relations with military law. Many servicemen have been arrested for this issue at the Defence Ministry. For example, Colonel-Lieutenant Rasim Muradov was arrested for reporting corrupt crimes at the Defence Ministry’s Peaceful Tabor (1). The Ministry of Defence has anonymous reporting mechanisms such as “Trust line” and “Trust Mail” in military units (2). However, it is always questionable to ensure the safety of the person reporting the crime in the army.

There is a Law on Protection of Whistle-blowers in the institution of Bosnia and Herzegovina explicitly regulating whistleblowing and it applies to military and official personnel and it provides explicate reference to the protection of whistle-blowers with regards to:
1. Pre-emptive protection to employees – before retaliation has occurred;
2. Right of whistle-blowers to refuse participation in wrongdoing,
3. Protection of identity;
but it lacks the following protection mechanisms:
2. Reversed burden of proof regarding retaliation;
3. Waiver of liability for the whistle-blowers;
4. No sanctions for misguided reporting [1].
Under the law, state employees may apply for whistleblower status regardless of whether they have suffered reprisals or only suspect they could occur. However, there must be an “objective prospect” of retaliation. The status does not protect employees from disciplinary and other measures that are not related to their act of whistleblowing [3].
Additionally, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) has established an ethic hotline, where all irregularities can be anonymously reported. In the MoD [2], there is the Office of the Inspector General as a separate organisational unit of MoD, which, according to the Defence Law, Chapter VII, is responsible for taking care of ethics and integrity in the MoD and Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina (AFBiH). Competences/responsibilities and operating procedures of the MoD’s Office of the Inspector General are further regulated in the Guidelines for the work of the Office of the Inspector General and the inspectors in AFBiH No. 04-02-4046/2006 dated 28/07/2006 and Amended Guidelines No. 05-03-32-1-44/10 dated 12/10/2010. Guidelines are a piece of secondary legislation which was passed pursuant to Article 55 of the BiH Defence Law [4]. The Office of the Inspector General deals not only with the handling of reports related to corruption but also other forms of irregularities, including corruption. Office of the Inspector General and inspectors of AFBiH make up the MoD’s and AFBiH’s system of inspectors, which operates as an organised and single whole [4]. The system provides for a total of 16 inspectors, including the MoD’s Inspector General, who has the rank of general, manages the system of inspectors and reports for its work to the MoD. From a total of 16 inspectors, six work in the MoD’s Office of the Inspector General, and nine work in the commands and units of AFBiH throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. The system of inspectors is filled with 15 inspectors or 93.75% of the envisaged number [4]. Conditions for performing the duties of inspectors and the process of appointment of persons to the office of inspectors are defined by the Guidelines for the work of the MoD’s Office of the Inspector General and the inspectors in AFBiH, and all inspectors meet the requirements for performing their duties. The MoD and AFBiH have put in place the e-system “Ethics Line”, through which e-complaints, suggestions and other comments on all MoD’s and AFBiH’s activities can be filed [4]. The system provides adequate and timely consideration of all complaints and suggestions received from anonymous and non-anonymous complainants, two-way communication with them, and the undertaking of appropriate measures. The MoD adopted the Rules on the tracking of complaints and suggestions on MoD’s work and polling on MoD’s services, No. 06-02-3-2308-1/18 dated 02/08/2018. The rules are available on the MoD’s website [4]. The Rules support the implementation of the objectives and activities defined under the Revised Action Plan 1 for the implementation of the BiH Public Administration Reform Strategy, which provides that all interested persons and beneficiaries of MoD’s services may submit complaints and suggestions on MoD’s work [4]. The process of receiving and handling complaints and suggestions, which may also include reports of certain illegal acts, is organised as follows:
– Head of the MoD’s Department for General and Common Affairs ensures the receipt of complaints and suggestions and submits them to the MoD’s Secretary;
– MoD’s Secretary reports to the Minister of Defence and Deputy Ministers of Defence on the complaints and suggestions received, and they jointly determine whether further action is warranted;
– after determining that there is need for further action, the MoD’s Secretary submits the complaints and suggestions for further processing to heads of relevant MoD’s organisational units, which prepare a response, propose or take appropriate action, and report thereof to the MoD’s Secretary;
– MoD’s Secretary reports to the Minister of Defence and Deputy Ministers of Defence on the response and action taken or proposed;
– Minister of Defence and Deputy Ministers of Defence approve the actions and responses to the complaints and suggestions received,
– Responses to the complaints and suggestions which were not filed anonymously are submitted to the complainants within five working days of receipt of complaints and suggestions [4].

Reporting all types of irregularities in MoD and AFBiH, including corruption, is actively encouraged through training that is organized and carried out by inspectors of General Inspectorate of BiH MoD and inspectors of units commands (system of inspectors of BiH MoD and AF), but also within AFBiH Peace Support Operations Training Centre (PSOTC) [1]. The PSOTC organizes courses for non-commissioned officers in the field of corruption prevention and fights against corruption [1].
Aside from the mentioned, training in the subject of the fight against corruption is also performed with specially selected groups that are assessed to be exposed to the greater risk of corruption. For instance, during 2018, the training has been conducted with two such groups that lasted for two hours [2]. One group has 20 participants from the group of officers appointed to assess candidates in the admission phase 2 in the process of assessment of candidates for professional military service. The second group had 64 participants from the group of officers’ candidates for professional military service. The training was conducted in the Center for Professional Development in Travnik by inspectors of the MoD General Inspectorate [2].

Further, the general inspector and other inspectors of the AFBiH General Inspectorate conduct activities of visiting units and commands and informing members of the AFBiH on competences of GI and possibilities of reporting of irregularities. Sometimes it is organized together with representatives of international forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina like it was the case during the visit to the AFBiH Logistics Command and unit for the destruction of surplus weapons, mines and explosives together with EUFOR Commander [1]. The state’s anti-corruption agency, the Agency for the Prevention of Corruption and Coordination of the Fight against Corruption, is by law the institution that grants whistleblower protection and has established a hotline for corruption reporting and campaigns of promoting reporting of corruption and protection for whistleblowers [3].

The MoD has established the electronic reporting of corruption and other irregularities through Internet and application “Ethics Line” as a form of protection of those reporting. This channel enables those reporting to report corruption and other irregularities, to communicate with the MoD inspectors, to deliver information and evidence while remaining anonymous which completely protects their identity. The MoD is one of the first institutions in BiH that established such a way of protecting persons reporting. This application has been used in the MoD since 2013 and the engagement of inspectors was required 307 times through this application since then. For instance, since the beginning of 2018 up to the time of writing of this report, the inspector’s engagement was required through this application 26 times. Out of 26 requests, 24 were anonymous [1].
Furthermore, up to June 2018, General Inspectorate of the MoD received and processed the total of 745 requests received through different channels (letters, personal reporting, phone calls, e-mails, Ethic Line channel). Out of 745 requests, 291 were anonymous and 454 were authorized [1]. The stated data shows that there is confidence in established mechanisms within BiH MoD and that there is also the protection of those reporting for the mechanisms are being applied in practice [1].
In cooperation with The Norwegian Centre for Integrity in the Defence Sector – CIDS, within the recently established project of cooperation of BiH MoD and CIDS in three areas in the following three years (2018-2020):
1) Strengthening of capacities of human resources management;
2) Strengthening of capacities of the public procurement system;
3) Strengthening of capacities of General Inspectorate.

The MoD General Inspectorate organized the workshop on August 30-31, 2018 during which, among other things, the form of the survey questionnaire was created to determine the degree of confidence of those requesting engagement of inspectors. The survey should be conducted at the end of 2018 and during the first quarter of 2019 [1].
Generally, it can be concluded that just enacting regulations and amending them cannot build confidence in a system that most citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina have lost. This further produces some doubts about the effectiveness of the protection system itself [2].
A researcher for Transparency International wrote for Mediacentar Sarajevo that “The national law on the protection of whistleblowers came into force at the beginning of 2014, and according to the latest report by APIK only 16 requests for whistleblower status have been submitted so far, 3 of which were accepted. These small numbers, decidedly disproportionate compared to the perception of corruption in BiH, signal the widespread distrust of potential whistleblowers towards the existing protection model and the institutions that should implement it. (…) It seems that the main weakness of the system of whistleblower protection, regardless of whether it is considered advanced or not, lies in the fact that, in spite of all the claims and guarantees, citizens are not convinced at all. The deep lack of trust in the institutions’ ability to implement the rules also involves whistleblowers because, despite the various protection mechanisms available and the belief that corruption is omnipresent, the number of legally recognised whistleblowers remains residual” [3].

There is no legal framework for whistleblowing that applies to military and civilian officials in Burkina Faso (1), (2), (3).

There is no demonstrative evidence within the online literature showing any priority towards the protection of whistleblowers in Burkina Faso (1), (2), (3).

There is no demonstrative evidence within the online literature showing any effective program towards the protection of whistleblowers in Burkina Faso. The newly adopted anti-corruption laws do not have any provisions on the protection of whistleblowers (1), (2), (3), (4).

The practice of whistleblowing is one that is yet to permeate the socio-political landscape of Cameroon. Although there is no specific legal framework on whistleblowing, the state has put in place organs that could play the role of protecting whistle-blowers. According to the UNCAC Implementation Review (p. 6), “Cameroon has not implemented the provisions on the protection of witnesses and reporting persons. However, Article 3 (3) of the CONAC Decree [4] provides for the anonymity of reporting persons and thereby affords some protection to them” [5]. This suggests some protections are provided to whistleblowers by granting anonymity, although explicit reference to protection of whistleblowers seems to be absent. The absence of specific legislation protecting whistleblowers makes it challenging for citizens, especially those in the public sector, to engage in whistleblowing in terms of reporting corruption for fear of losing their jobs [1] [2] [3]. According to a GAN report (May 2017), civil servants and private-sector employees are not legally protected from recrimination or other negative consequences when they report cases of corruption [6].

The government have put in place a system to report corruption through the mandate of CONAC that provides for the anonymity of reporting persons and thereby affords some protection to whistleblowers [1] [2]. CONAC has anti-corruption units in almost every ministerial department. It has established a free hotline for individuals to report cases of corruption [2,3,4]. However, this practice is not encouraged by the government [2,3,4].

Whistleblowing in Cameroon is limited by several factors. The anti-corruption unit can only investigate but cannot prosecute. This organ was created by the President of the Republic and is answerable to the President with no oversight structure. Members of this body are appointed by and answerable to the President, which means that the President, who is Chief of the Armed Forces, cannot be investigated by this body. In the same vein, NCHRF is answerable to the President. Sometimes the organ does not have the necessary resources to carry out its activities [2]. Media are sometimes suspended by the National Communication Council for playing the role of whistleblowers [1]. There is little evidence that journalists do effectively carry out whistleblowing when it concerns the military and defence personnel as the anti-terrorism law of December 2014 is often used against journalists [3].

Also, according to the 2017 Investment Climate Statement, “The government has introduced anti-corruption mechanisms and measures for all economic actors, but provides little support to “whistleblower” cases and especially non-governmental organizations” [4].

Order No. 660, Article 67 is in place for whistleblowing and reporting of corruption and it applies, in theory, but not explicitly to public officials in the defence sector. The following protections for whistleblowers are not contained in Order No. 660, the reversed burden of proof regarding retaliation; waiver of liability for the whistleblower; no sanctions for misguided reporting; the right of a whistleblower to refuse participation in wrongdoing. According to the UNCAC Implementation Review Group (June 2017), Article 67 of Order No. 660 of 2013 (Ordonnance 2013-660) provides for special protection measures for reporting persons, witnesses, experts, victims and their families. But Côte d’Ivoire is still in the process of developing a formal program for the protection of witnesses and reporting persons, and the law establishing that program is still in draft form (1).

Article 69 of Order No. 660 stipulates that the physical address of the police or the High Authority for Good Governance (HABG) can be used in lieu of the whistleblower’s address, to guarantee his/her protection. And Article 70 of Order No. 660 allows the court or public prosecutor to withhold the name of the whistleblower during a court appearance to guarantee his/her safety (1) and (2). Article 72 of Order No. 660 states that no sentence can be imposed solely based on statements given anonymously and Article 71 describes scenarios in which a protected identity can be disclosed, including where such disclosure is necessary to protect the rights of the defendant. In such cases, the protected person is informed of the decision to disclose his or her identity and is granted ten days to challenge and appeal against the decision in a court of appeal (1), (2). Further, Article 29 (Suite données aux déclarations de soupçons) of Act No. 2005-554 of December 2, 2005, on combating money-laundering contains measures to ensure that the identity of the whistleblower is protected (3). For Global Integrity (African Integrity Indicators 2018, AII 2018) the whistleblower legal protections in Order No. 660 are too generic and not explicitly protecting whistleblowers in the public sector (4).

Whistleblowing has not been especially encouraged by the government since the adoption of Order No. 660 of 2013 (Ordonnance 2013-660). There is no evidence of training or internal campaigns to encourage public officials, especially those at the MoD, to step forward and report cases of corruption. There is no independent unit like the Anti-Racketeering Unit that would specifically handle the claims submitted by whistleblowers in the defence sector. Though Order No. 660 affords whistleblowers (témoins, lanceurs d’alerte, dénonciateurs) a series of new protections that previously did not exist, this does not mean that the government actively encourages the anonymous reporting of corruption. For this sub-indicator, one should factor in that whistleblowing within the military establishment could be perceived by the government itself as politically destabilizing.

According to the 2018 Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI 2018), the fight against corruption features more prominently on the agenda of the OUATTARA government than in previous governments. But despite Order No. 660 in 2013 and the setting up of the High Authority for Good Governance (HABG) in 2014, understaffing may reflect the low priority level of such anti-corruption legislation, including whistleblowing (1):

“A National Plan on Good Governance and the Fight Against Corruption was launched in 2013 together with a new institution, the High Authority for Good Governance (HABG, operating since 2014). The government had also planned to create a Special Tribunal for the Fight Against Corruption, a plan not implemented yet. The institutions meant to oversee the utilization of public funds (Inspecteur General des Finances, Cour des Comptes) are understaffed and thus not effective in preventing abuse and corruption” (1).

The HABG has held awareness-raising campaigns regarding the need for people to report cases of corruption to local authorities. One example is a publicity campaign that HABG carried out in the districts of Soubre, Gagnoa and Divo in September 2018. However, this HABG campaign did not prioritize such actions within the defence or police sector (2). None of the internal communications magazine (Magazine Défense) uploaded to the MoD website in 2016-2017 informed or raised awareness about the importance of whistleblowing and the protections afforded to them under Order No. 660. The topic was not discussed in articles addressing corruption (3), (4), (5), (6).

The legal processes to guarantee the whistleblower’s identity from being revealed are not comprehensive enough, as seen in 36A. Not only would a public official at the MoD doubt that his/her identity would be adequately protected from retaliation, but there are no precedents in Côte d’Ivoire’s defence establishment that could inspire confidence among the MoD personnel willing to report a case of corruption.

In a 2016-2018 progress report on corruption in Côte d’Ivoire, the Open Government Partnership recommended more comprehensive protections for whistleblowers in Côte d’Ivoire’s mining sector. If there is little trust in the legal protections for whistleblowers in mining, the situation for a public official at the MoD would be considerably more tenuous (1). According to Marthe Coulibaly, National Coordinator of the Ivorian Coalition of Human Rights Defenders (CIDDH), individuals who report human rights abuses are often targeted by the authorities and arrested when they talk about issues of corruption. On the sidelines of a human rights conference in Abidjan in December 2017, the National Coordinator stated the following (2):

“It turns out that for some human rights defenders who work on issues that we consider sensitive, such as corruption, transparency, governance, and the issue of extractive industries, we often victims of certain arrests” … “What is expected of the government is better protection,” she added” (2).

Egypt has failed to pass any whistleblower protection legislation whether in the civilian or the defence sectors, except for a provision in the anti-trafficking law (1), but there is still no formal witness protection programme. ِArticle 30 of the Egyptian Penal Code punishes intimidating a witness or coercing them into changing their testimony (2), and the Criminal Procedure Law regulates the giving of testimonies but with no mention of preemptive witness protection (3).

According to our sources, whistleblowing is not encouraged in the armed forces, and there are no guidelines or even commitments to protect any witness or any reporting of corruption activities (1), (2), (3). Successive governments have been very reluctant in passing a whistleblower protection act despite pressure from civil society, UNCAC commitments, and discussing many drafts for standalone witness protection laws since at least 2013 (4) or incorporating provisions for whistleblower protection in other laws such as Criminal Procedures (5) or the anti-trafficking law. This reluctance is evidence of the fact that the protection of witnesses/whistleblowers is not encouraged or prioritized by the government.

Given the lack of legal protections for whistleblowers and the questionable independence of the justice system especially in the parallel military justice system, officials and personnel would have little trust in the ability of the system to protect them if they report corrupt activities. This would be even more the case if they were reporting a senior official, especially if reported by a low-ranking official. According to our sources, there are huge gaps and distrust among military personnel and their officers. Therefore, whistleblowing is weak and does not happen in the military (1), (2), (3).

Personal data in Estonia can only be processed with the consent of the data’s subject, unless otherwise stipulated by law, in accordance with the Personal Data Protection Act. [1] The Estonian Data Protection Inspectorate has very strictly emphasised that this makes the systematic support of whistleblowing impossible in Estonia. It would, according to their assessment, be against the current law. However, law firm Eversheds Sutherland (see the article in Äripäev) has criticised the Estonian Data Protection Inspectorate for interpreting the law incorrectly. [2] According to the Estonian Data Protection Inspectorate, creating a system which allows employees to report about wrongdoings and remain anonymous, is illegal. They base their assessment on the Personal Data Protection Act. Further, at the beginning of 2019, TI Estonia invited the Data Protection Inspectorate to participate in a workshop on whistleblowing with private companies – in order to ascertain their point of view on exactly the data protection vs investigating reports. In light of the soon-to-be-transposed EU directive on whistleblowing, the Inspectorate said that if the organization has previously conducted a legal analysis of why investigating reports is more important than the privacy of the person who is investigated, it can be justified on the basis of “legitimate interest”. [3] In general, the Inspectorate’s point of view is that this needs to be formalized through a legal document. [3]
On the other hand, the Employment Contracts Act stipulates that the employee is obliged, at the request of the employer, to notify the employer of all significant circumstances related to the employment relationship with regard to which the employer has a legitimate interest. [4] For example, when one employee finds out that another employee has committed an act that is harmful to the employer, then the employer has the right to be informed about this. Therefore, the interpretation of the law by the Estonian Data Protection Inspectorate is too narrow.
In accordance with the new Anti-Corruption Law (from 2013), reporting of corrupt activities either in the private or the public sector is an obligation for any public official. [5] This act also ensures the confidentiality of the notifier, except for when the information provided is purposefully incorrect. The fact of notification may also be disclosed with the written consent of the notifier.

Public servants are obliged to report on violations of rules and the law. The emphasis in training is to teach civil servants to act according to the law and report illegal acts. Whistleblowing is hence covered in trainings. [1] Public servants are encouraged to notify violations of any rules, but also violations of ethical codes of conduct, to the General Inspectorate Service at the Estonian Defence Forces. [2]
Individuals working for the Defence Forces can speak to the Inspectorate without following the chain of command. They can speak about the problems they cannot share with their superiors. The Inspectorate is impartial, the specialists in law and the work environment are subordinated to the Inspectorate. However, the Inspectorate is not an external unit, but reports to the Commander of the Defence Forces. [3]

All civil servants have the obligation to report wrongdoings. There are ombudsmen in every military unit who they can turn to, as pointed out by an interviewee, a Member of the Defence Committee. [1] However, civil servants cannot be certain that their confidentiality will be guaranteed when they report about someone due to the hierarchic system of the Defence Forces.
According to another interviewee, a former military flag officer, in most cases, the information about the notifier will be leaked. [2] Whistleblowing is quite a stigmatised practice in the Defence Forces, it has negative connotations due to Estonia’s Soviet past. When a serviceman notifies of wrongdoing by his or her superior, there is a chance that there will be indirect consequences. On the other hand, the question at hand addresses corrupt activity, which is a criminal offence. In that case, the serviceman committing the act, would most probably be prosecuted and eliminated from the Defence Forces. The trust in Estonia’s legal system is high, in fact higher than in the European Union on average. [3] Therefore, servicemen reporting on corruption cases can presume to have some protection of anonymity.

The legal framework for whistleblowing is provided in the Law on Conflict of Interest and Corruption in State Service. According to the law [1], whistleblowing in military, police and the security service system is to be regulated by separate legislation, although no such legislation has been adopted to date.

Whilst there is no specific legislation for the military, police and security services, all personnel can access the online whistleblowing platform [2]. This mechanism guarantees anonymity and protections for whistleblowers, including defence and security personnel. The Law on Conflict of Interest and Corruption in State Service, therefore, applies to all government employees.

The law makes explicit reference to protection of whistleblowers, including: protection of anonymity, protection against retribution, waiver of liability for the whistleblower, no sanctions for misguided reporting, right of the whistleblower to refuse participation in wrongdoing [1,2].

In 2015, whistleblowing issues were part of the short-term (3-5 day) course on building integrity (BI) [1]. Therefore, it could not be considered a comprehensive and detailed guide on procedures and protection of whistleblowing. Hotlines are functioning in the Ministry of Defence (MoD), General Inspection, General Staff and military units, but information, cases and statistics are not publically available [2].

The government reviewer was able to provide more recent information. In 2017-2018, based on the request of the interested parties, the Public Information Division repeatedly provided information on regulatory and practice-related issues of disclosure as well as statistical data in the system of the Ministry. In particular, the General Inspectorate of the Ministry of Defence has been operating a “hot line” for 24 hours. The information (application / complaint) is received through the telephone line, e-mail and “hot line” boxes in the subdivisions of the Georgian Defence Forces, both confidentially and by name. The whistleblowing is encouraged as boxes are located at the entrances and canteens of the checkpoints of the subdivisions of the system of the Ministry. As for the statistical data on disclosure issues, 41 complaints were lodged with the General Inspectorate’s Hotline in 2017-2018, including 2 complaints from the hotline’s box. The statistical information about the disclosure can be published only in depersonalized way and it is provided to every interested body within the deadlines that are defined in the law. The Ministry of Defense realizes that the successful implementation of anti-corruption policies, as well as defense tasks and strategic interests, can only be achieved through the protection of human rights, a system based on good faith and transparency. The steps taken by the Ministry of Defense in recent years in this direction indicate the priority of disclosure issues, as it ensures the recovery of the system and internal management processes, the timely detection of weaknesses and shortcomings.

The lack of specific legislation on whistleblowing in defence determines the ineffectiveness of this protection mechanism. Protection of whistleblowing is not adequately guaranteed by the law [1, 2], therefore the level of confidence is very low. As such, a whistleblowing institution is not developed and used [3, 4, 5].

According to the government reviewer, based on the information of Civil Service Bureau, in 2017, employees of MOD used the web page of whistleblowers – www.mkhileba.gov.ge – and reported their complaints. Furthermore, based on the organizational climate survey, conducted in the Ministry, the 5th question in the questionnaire asked the employees whether they had the possibility to express their different views or report complaints. Most of the respondents answered: “yes or always yes.” [6] Also, as the employees of the Ministry can report, using “black boxes”, to general inspection (the general inspection hotline is always functioning) or their supervisors, there had been cases or reporting of misconduct or unethical behaviour that had some tangible results, even for persons on high positions [7]. As for 2019, 3 email notifications (complains) and 16 telephone notifications (complaints) were made using the General Inspection Hot Line [8].

Ghana’s legislation on whistleblowing, the Whistleblower Act, 2006 (Act 720), applies to military, police, and intelligence personnel (1). Article. 12, explicitly mentions protection for whistleblowers in case of victimisation (including dismission, suspension, declaration of being redundant, denial of promotion, non-motivated transfer, harassment, intimidation, threats and intimidations).

Article. 17.1 states that whistleblowers can obtain police protection for themselves and their families if their life or property “is endangered or likely to be endangered as a result of the disclosure”. According to Article. 18, there are no sanctions for misguided reporting “unless it is proved that the whistleblower knew that the information contained in the disclosure is false and the disclosure was made with malicious intent”.

Furthermore, if after having blown the whistle the whistleblower is subject to adverse actions against them, they can make a complaint to the CHRAJ and obtain a reversal of the action. In this case, the order of the CHRAJ has the same legal effect as a High Court’s order. The whistleblower can also sue in court and obtain legal remedy for the adverse action (2). The CHRAJ can also award the whistleblower with a payment from the Whistleblower Reward Fund and, if the disclosure results in the recovery of an amount of money, the whistleblower may receive a part of it. In June 2018, Ghana’s Parliament passed the Witness Protection Act, 2018 (Act 975) (3). The new law sets out a framework for protecting individuals who serve as witnesses or cooperate with law enforcement agencies in the fight against crime and corruption. Among others, the Witness Protection Act also provides for the creation of a Witness Protection Agency for the administration of a witness protection programme to facilitate the protection of witnesses, experts and their relatives.

Training, information and guidance on the reporting of corruption and protection for whistleblowers are provided by CSOs and Ghanaian public institutions. For instance, in March 2018 a forum organised by the mobile Advocacy and Legal Advice Centre (ALACs) to sensitise the public on reporting cases of corruption saw the participation of a senior CHRAJ’s official, a National Commission for Civic Education’s Officer and members of the local administration (1). In April 2018, the Social Enterprise Development Foundation of West Africa (SEND-Ghana) also organised a similar training that registered the participation of a senior CHRAJ’s official (2).

A whistleblower can disclose the information to several enforcement bodies, such as the Attorney-General, the police, the EOCO, CHRAJ and the Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC) (3), but there is no strong evidence of demonstrative internal encouragement for whistleblowing.

According to the Ghana Anti-Corruption Coalition (GAAC), more protection should be provided to whistleblowers. Currently, the Whistleblower Amendment Act and the Witness Protection Bill are before Parliament for approval. According to the GAAC, their adoption would increase the protection of whistleblowers (1).

In fact, despite the existence of legislation, enforcement bodies where to report, and information campaigns Ghanaians are still reluctant to disclose and report information on cases of corruption (2). There is little trust and a lack of demonstrable evidence that whistleblowers in the armed forces will be given adequate protection if they bring issues of corruption to the public (3), (4). In 2016, the CHRAJ processed six cases of corruption following disclosures of information from whistleblowers (5).

To increase these numbers, the spokesperson of the Ghana Anti-Corruption Coalition (GAAC) called for the implementation of financial incentives, for whistleblowers that set in motion investigations (6).

The legal provisions are described by the CLXV/2015 Act on Whistleblowers [1]. Transparency International Hungary, issued a report on their concerns, with a detailed explanation on why the current legislation is insufficient to provide the necessary protection; however, no adaptation was made to the law [2]. However, there have been some positive developments since 2015. The Ministry of Defence (MoD) adopted an internal instruction (43/2017. (VIII. 17.) HM utasítás) on the development of internal controlling however we have not found any evidence on particular improvements on whistleblowing. Still, current legislation covers issues such as protection of identity, protection against retribution, waiver of liability for the whistleblower and no sanctions for misguided reporting.

There is a widespread assumption in the Hungarian Army that can be described as ” We don’t make it into our own nest”. Training includes anti-corruption to meet international standards, but according to our information, the issue of whistleblowing is not covered by this training [1]. Within the ministry, a Department on Controlling and Integrity Development was established, which directly reports to the minister [2].
The ministry has not received any mail or email to its addresses kept for whistleblowers for reporting cases. Most of the people reported had no information at all about the email and mailbox [3].

A whistleblower law is in place [1] and includes appropriate safeguards. However, personnel may not be confident that the system will protect them adequately. Indeed, interview sources 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7, all suggested that the current system is not effective, and they have no trust in its operation [2, 3, 4, 5, 6].

According to our sources, there is no legal framework that encourages whistleblowing in the military and defence sector. There is a general anti-corruption law (at national level) which, however, cannot be used by military personnel as a whistleblower, as the military has to inform commanders instead of anti-corruption commission (1,2).

There is little evidence of restored faith among various state ministers and officials that encourages whistleblower to step forward with sensitive intel. There have been no official plans or voiced commitment by defence or security officials toward introducing legislation that protects whistleblowers in military and defence institutions (1). It’s difficult to argue that the will for this even exists, given that it could cost certain ministers/high-ranking officials their posts, if they were found guilty of corruption, through tip-offs whistleblowers leak. One interviewee (2) explains that many are reluctant to speak up, out of fear of becoming scapegoats for the crimes untouchable figures in the state perpetrate.

Across the uniformed services, tailored-legislation or policies designed to protect whistleblowers are not in existence. As a former whistleblower told TI in an interview “security leaks have developed into a political phenomenon” the interviewee states (1). “It’s a common tool at the disposal of officials within close proximity to various ministries, even beyond defence, to expose de-classified data that exposes the crimes of the political establishment”. Attempts to criminalise the phenomena have inspired national outcry and fuelled greater mistrust between Iraq’s anti-corruption watchdogs and politicians (2). “Lack of oversight and control of security leaks may also encourage fraudulent whistleblowing as an extension of the primary aim of genuine whistleblowing” (1). No law that determines lawful disclosure from unlawful disclosure has been drafted. The biggest expression of mistrust rose in the latest spate of issue-based protests in the capital and other parts of the country after the government ordered an internet blackout. A local lawyer has filed a lawsuit against the Minister of Communications for the financial losses caused by the imposition of an internet blackout (3).

According to Article 24 of the Integrity and Anti-Corruption Law of 2016, published in the Official Gazette, by the Integrity and Anti-Corruption Commission, the commission pledges that it shall provide needed protection for whistleblowers, witnesses, informants and experts in corruption cases. However, this legislation, although it implicitly applies to the defence sector, does not explicitly extend this protection to the defence sector. In fact, the only mention of the military and public security is related to the commission’s potential request for delegation or secondment or assignment of any of the public security or military officers [1]. Despite the legal protection offered to whistleblowers, implementing this within defence is not straightforward, as there are many regulations and laws that would hinder potential whistleblowers within the defence. These include potential lawsuits against them for defamation, [2] utilising either the 1971 Protection of State Secrets and Classified Documents Law, the 1992 Defence Law, the 1998 Jordan Press Association Law, and the 1999 Press and Publications Law to persecute whistleblowers [3]. Regardless, there is evidence that unit commanders encourage personnel to report any case of corruption and pledge protection for these reporters [4,5,6]. Despite the existence of legislation on the protection of whistleblowers, this does not explicitly apply to the defence sector, and because of the existence of other legislations that could potentially be used against whistleblowers.

Whistleblowing is encouraged through training and guidance, and on different levels of personnel (Commissioned and noncommissioned officers) on the reporting of corruption and protections for whistleblowers. However, the culture of reporting as a whistleblower remains a tabboo in Jordanian culture. Although there is a law to encourage and protect whistleblowers, it is not enforced [1,2,3].

Despite the fact that legislation to protect whistleblowers exists [1], there are many other restrictions within Jordanian legislation that would lead officials and personnel to doubt the protection they may be offered. Fear and lack of trust might be present due to the existence of the 1971 Protection of State Secrets and Classified Documents Law, the 1992 Defence Law, the 1998 Jordan Press Association Law, and the 1999 Press and Publications Law. In general, whistleblowing is not common because of lack of trust and the fear of inability to provide evidence [3,4].

In late 2018, the Kosovo Assembly adopted the Law on Protection of Whistleblowers [1]. Its purpose is to enable the whistleblowing of violations in the public and private sectors and to protect whistleblowers accordingly [2]. This Law also includes public institutions, such as defence and military institutions [3]. This law stipulates that any whistleblower who reports or discloses information in compliance with this law cannot be subject to criminal or civil liability or disciplinary procedures [4]. However, the whistleblower is not obliged to prove the source or authenticity of the information provided. The law stipulates that the whistleblower will not be prejudiced against [4].

In order to prioritise and encourage whistleblowing by state institutions by not limiting scope, only superficial information is available in the 2018 Annual Report of the Anti-Corruption Agency (ACA), published on March 2019 [1]. The report states that the ACA wishes to address issues of whistleblowing in Kosovo as a priority; particularly the initial implementation of the Law No. 06/L-085 on Protection of Whistleblowers, which was adopted by the Kosovo Assembly on December 2018 [2]. Another priority for the ACA was to adopt two sub-legal acts that would contribute to the implementation of the law, including: i) Regulation for receiving, handling and signalling cases at a central level; and ii) Regulation for receiving and handling cases within the ACA [2]. Although the acting Minister of Justice promised in April 2019 that this secondary legislation would be drafted [3], this regulation has not yet been adopted by the Government. The ACA aims to improve the protection of whistle-blowers both on a professional and personal level [2]. However, guidance materials are not available on the Ministry of Justice’s website or the ACA’s website. The ACA is a legally independent body [4] that reports to the Assembly [5], and is independent from the Government.
In its 2019 Report for Kosovo, the European Commission suggested that Kosovo institutions focus on strengthening whistle-blowing mechanisms and protection measures to implement across the country [6]. According to the government reviewer, based on article 3 paragraph 1 under paragraph 1.10 of Law no. 06/L-085 on protection of whistleblowers, the MoD has appointed the official responsible for receiving and handling signals in the MoD/KSF. While the drafting of bylaws provided by this law is not within the competence of the MoD.

Although it is still early to measure whether officials and personnel are sufficiently informed of protections guaranteed by the 2018 Law on Protections of Whistleblowers, the Ministry of Defence responded that its personnel are aware of protections offered by this law [1]. Despite the information provided by the Ministry of Defence, this issue remains vague, given the uncertainty around the management of personal data and necessary protections in place for whistleblowers when reporting corruption claims.

There is legislation on whistleblowing and it does apply to the military, the police and the KNG. The legislation explicitly promises whistleblower protection from any kind of retribution but it is unclear on the issue of identity. Article 2 of the ACA’s law, the body tasked with fighting corruption, outlines the protections in place for the whistleblower including: legal protection, compensation for any damages, protection of identity . The article goes on to place some of the burden of proof on the whistleblowers, demanding whistleblowers to present “serious indications” to prove the veracity of the report (1).

The ACA website, however, explicitly says that the authorities would protect the identity of whistleblowers. It also says that they are willing to monitor their phones based on their personal requests and give them new lines, as well as homes, jobs and a security detail if necessary (2).

Whistleblowing is encouraged by the Government through the ACA’s media messages and the training courses it offers Government agencies, including the defence and security sector. The internal financial departments of the security agencies, which are responsible for safeguarding public funds, do not actively encourage whistleblowing. (1, 2, 3). Their campaigns are rare and half-hearted, mostly because they lack independence as they are under the direct control of the Defence and Interior Ministers, officials and activists said. (4, 5, 6)

On paper, the ACA media and training campaign is flawless, but in practice, it is ineffective. The body was created in 2016 and it has been unable to produce any positive results since it came into existence, and that is because employees are not responding to their efforts, mainly because they believe the ACA can help because they see the Ministry often ignore their requests and those of the SAB.

Earlier this year, the ACA launched a media campaign called “Take Initiative,” whose sole purpose was to reassure witnesses and whistleblowers that they would be protected if they come forward (5).

The campaign included workshops that were held in the military and KNG, according to officials (1 and 2), and also the Interior Ministry, according to a report from the Kuwaiti news outlet, al-Qabas (6).

Few believe that whistleblowers would be protected instead of punished and this is why no one comes forward, officials said (1, 2 and 3). Although the ACA promises protection, many do not believe they are capable of delivering it because their own auditors are often stonewalled by these agencies and the ACA does nothing (publicly or behind the scenes) to support them. As a result, most security and military employees view these efforts as part of a PR campaign, and not a serious crackdown on corruption.

This belief is based on the fact that these auditors failed to crack any of the cases aforementioned in the answer to Q 3A.

The Whistleblowing Law was adopted in 2018. [1] The status of whistleblower can be granted to persons who are in employment or providing services to the company or the institution where the offences are committed. It is anticipated that the new whistleblowing law will concern corruption, fraud, inactivity of officials, negligence or misuse of service, tax evasion, wasting of state money and property, public health, construction, environment, food, safety and public order, violations of human rights and violations in the field of public procurement and in the financial and capital markets sector. The bill stipulates that, from the moment the person has become a whistleblower, he and his relatives will be ensured anonymity. In order to protect against the adverse consequences of whistleblowing, such as dismissal or not granting a vacation, the bill provides for state-guaranteed legal assistance, exemption from costs, interim protection in civil proceedings and administrative proceedings in court, and the waiver of legal liability and appropriate reparation for material loss and moral damages. It is also foreseen that a person will be able to receive advice on the protection of his rights. [1] The MOD had already put in place some mechanisms contained in the whistleblowing law. A unified internal whistleblower system was created in the MOD, including an e-mail address. Information is available to very limited people in the ministry, thus protection is ensured. [2] Information about the introduced system is available on the home page of the MOD. [3]

Moreover, according to the government reviewer, information on the review and results of the screening of the whistleblower reports are publicly available at national level [4]. The MOD also publishes information on screening results of whistleblowers reports in the MOD Public Report (not published yet, will be available at www.mod.gov.lv). In 2019, the MOD received 3 whistleblowers reports.

According to the Whistleblowing law, ministries are obliged to introduce mechanisms of receiving information and protecting whistleblowers (section 6). [1] The contact point for the whistleblowers is the State Chancellery (section 8). [1] Associations and foundations, including trade unions, can also act as contact points and provide assistance to whistleblowers. [1] Training is not provided at the MOD on that issue. According to the government reviewer, the MOD staff, whistleblowers contact points, are trained on implementation and screening of whistleblower reports by State Chancellery. All MOD staff is informed about whistleblowers contact point (included in introductory briefing for new staff). Information on whistleblowing is available on-line. The specific e-mail address (trauksme@mod.gov.lv) is used for all related information. Very limited number of staff has access to that e-mail and reports.

This indicator is marked Not Applicable as it is too early to evaluate the effectiveness of the 2018 law.

In September 2018, the Lebanese Parliament approved a law to protect whistleblowers; it applies to all public administration employees (1). The law was originally submitted in 2010 and approved in 2015 by parliamentary committee (2). Nevertheless, it is problematic as it offers weak protection to individuals. The law required the establishment of the anti-corruption commission that ensures the confidentiality of the individual’s identity. However, the commission has not been established yet (3).

The government has halfheartedly encouraged whistleblowing. In September 2018, State Security with the Ministry of State for Combating Corruption launched a hotline for individuals to report corruption cases by government officials (1). An interviewee from the LTA has confirmed that whistleblowing is not particularly encouraged (2). Furthermore, the Anti-Corruption Commission that is to be responsible for handling the claims is yet to be established (3). The Ministry of State for Administrative Reform has set an anti-corruption strategy for 2018-2023 that includes anti-corruption training for public administration employees and improving oversight (4). The strategy has not been adopted by the government yet (5).

A study done by the LCPS suggests that citizens low trust in government are associated with the high perception of corruption (1). An interviewee confirmed a lack of trust in reporting corruption (2).

The Law on the Protection of Whistleblowers was adopted by Parliament only in November 2017, and came into force from 1 January 2019. This law is applicable to all government institutions, including the Ministry of Defence, military and other official personnel. According to the provisions of the law, whistleblowers are able to report all kinds of offences and law violations related to the public such as public safety, dangers and risks for the environment, human life or health, illicit enrichment, etc. The law foresees and provides explicit protection and rights to whistleblowers, such as the protection of identity, protection against retribution, a waiver of liability for the whistleblower, no sanctions for misguided reporting, the right of the whistleblower to refuse participation in wrongdoing, the right to remuneration for valuable information and compensation and other rights described in the Law on the Protection of Whistleblowers [1]. At the time of writing, the Law was not yet enforced. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Defence operates a hotline and e-mail contact management system, where any individual can report information about soldiers, national security system officials and personnel planned, intended or past offences. The Ministry of Defence guarantees confidentiality [2,3].

The Law on whistleblowers entered into force in 2019. According to the legislation, the main institution responsible for providing the investigation and implementation of the law is the Prosecutor’s Office [1]. The Prosecutor’s Office is an independent non-political institution. Additionally, the Special Investigations Service of the Republic of Lithuania is the main agency responsible for the investigation of civil service offences, which includes whistleblowing [2]. This a well resourced independent unit, based on its structure and extensive scope of its activities [3]. The MoD, the Special Investigations Service and the Prosecutor’s General’s Office have worked together in terms of encouraging whistleblowing in the MoD through training, information, and guidance on the reporting of corruption and protections for whistleblowers [4]. While internal campaigns to promote whistleblowing seem to exist, they appear to be sporadic in nature [5].

There is not sufficient evidence to score this indicator, as the Law on whistleblowers entered into force in January 2019 and it’s still too early to assess the effectiveness of the new system. According to the legislation, the main institution responsible for providing the investigation and implementation of the law is the Prosecutor’s Office [1]. Without this Law, citizens are not willing to report corruption issues. According to Global Corruption report, only 7 percent of the population report suspected corruption [2]. The Prosecutor General’s Office, as a central authority, has EUR 100,000 budget to compensate whisleblowers. Four persons claimed it, but nobody was granted a compensation. The first whisleblower who ‘tested’ the new law could not claim compensation, as she had disclosed corruption prior to the law came into force. (3).

A US Department of State Report from 2013 determined that “[Malian] law provides no protection for public or private employees for lawfully disclosing evidence of illegality” 1. The 2014 Anti-Corruption law does not offer any protection for whistleblowers, regardless of whether they are members of the armed forces, civil servants or ordinary civilians.² Moreover, elements of the Penal Code make it difficult for whistleblowers to come forward without fearing legal reprisals. The code allows for the punishment of those deemed to share information unlawfully: Section 3, article 130 of the Penal Code states:
“Anyone who, by position or profession had secrets entrusted to them, that they then revealed shall be punished by imprisonment of six months to two years and, optionally, a fine of 20 000 to 150 000 francs.
The penalties will apply to members of all jurisdictions guilty of violating the code.
If the offender is a public officer or government official, he will be punished by three months to five years imprisonment and a fine from 20 000 to 240 000 francs. The culprit will become forbidden from any function or public employment for at least five to ten years.
Except as provided above, deletion or opening all correspondence addressed to third parties, in bad faith, shall incur the same penalties.
The attempt of the offence shall be punished as if the offence itself”.³
The article does however state that exemptions can be made when the defendant is obliged by the law to become an informer, although the possible threat of a large fine is likely to deter potential whistle-blowers.³

The lack of legal protections for whistle-blowers in the government’s anti-corruption bill in 2014, coupled with the detention of Oumar Keïta (see 36C), indicates the current administration’s lack of enthusiasm for encouraging whistle-blowing.¹ A Malian journalist told the assessor that there are no whistleblowers from within the system.⁴ Only when people lose their jobs do they start to denounce illicit practices. He added that “if you don’t comply with the deeply embedded illicit practices, you’ll get sacked and be replaced with someone more compliant”.⁴ Furthermore, the incentives are simply not there for people to report abuses: “Malian society judges you by what you have, not how you have obtained it. If you are in a position of power, many of your friends or family will expect you to take advantage of your post”.⁴ A 2015 study notes that “Mali does not have a culture of whistleblowing, and few cases have arisen in which citizens, officials or employees have brought public attention to corrupt practices or general or systematic misconduct in public or private institutions. The situations in which whistleblowing typically takes place do not often materialise in Mali”.² In 2015, UNODC trained 38 Malian officials within the criminal justice system on how to handle the testimonies of victims and witnesses of criminal acts, but there is no explicit indication it focused on people reporting cases of corruption.³

In 2018, the authorities arrested and detained a military sergeant, Oumar Keïta, after a video was posted online in which he made damaging allegations about senior army officials embezzling state funds.¹
A Malian journalist told the assessor that there are no whistleblowers from within system.³ Only when people lose their jobs do they start to denounce illicit practices. He added that “if you don’t comply with the deeply embedded illicit practices, you’ll get sacked and be replaced with someone more compliant”.³ Furthermore, the incentives are simply not there for people to report abuses: “Malian society judges you by what you have, not how you have obtained it. If you are in a position of power, many of your friends or family will expect you to take advantage of your post”.³
This view is supported by a 2015 study which notes that “Mali does not have a culture of whistleblowing, and few cases have arisen in which citizens, officials or employees have brought public attention to corrupt practices or general or systematic misconduct in public or private institutions. The situations in which whistleblowing typically takes place do not often materialise in Mali”.²

Legislation on whistleblowing and reporting corruption exists. The Law on Prevention of Corruption regulates the rights of the whistleblowers and the process of reporting of corruption. [1] This law is applicable to military and official personnel. The law contains explicit reference to the protection of whistle-blowers, including protection of identity, [2] protection against retribution, [3] and reversed burden of proof regarding retaliation. [4] No waiver of liability for the whistle-blower is envisaged by the law. Only whistle-blowers with “good intentions” are protected by the law, while criteria for the assessment of intention are very vague. [5] All public servants are allowed to refuse participation in criminal acts while performing their duty, including army employees. [6]

Whistleblowing is only formally encouraged, therefore procedures exist, but concrete results are lacking, as well as training sessions and campaigns. [1] The Agency for the Prevention of Corruption lacks independence from the executive, [1] and has failed to protect important whistle-blowers reporting corruption, [2] including the former president of the Army Trade Union. [3]

According to the MoD reviewer, whistleblowing is encouraged through training, information, and guidance on the reporting of corruption and protections for whistle-blowers. The Ministry of Defence has appointed a person in the Inspection Department that deals with this issue. This person, within the jurisdiction and assistance of Integrity Department, acts upon reports of corruption and misconduct. Agency for Prevention of corruption has an organizational unit that has the necessary capacity to handle requests. This information could not be verified.

Cases of whistleblowing are extremely rare and whistle-blowers are not adequately protected. The President of the Army Trade Union publicly and repeatedly reported possible corruption [1][2][3] and he was sent into forced retirement by a decision of the Minister, [4][5] due to his discretionary right provided by the Law. [6]

In theory no legislation applicable to military and official personnel exists to facilitate corruption reporting or the protection of whistleblowers. The Regulations on General Discipline of the Moroccan Royal Armed Forces make no mention of it, and no evidence of other official sources providing whistleblowers with protection was found. This lack of evidence can be explained by the secrecy surrounding the internal management of the Moroccan armed forces, as well as by the general context of regular corruption within the Moroccan authorities as denounced by NGOs, such as Transparency International, and interviewees (1)(2)(3).

The last publicly reported case of whistleblowing (Captain Adib Case) not only dates, but was also fraught with obstacles to whistleblowing, a serious lack of protection of the whistleblower and the lack of thorough and independent investigation into the alleged case of corruption highlighted by the whistleblower. As of 2018 the general accused (Bennani) has died of old age without being convicted or prosecuted, and the whistleblower has not been reintegrated into the army (1)(2).

No evidence of more recent cases were found. Given the general context, the outcomes of the Adib Captain case and the secrecy surrounding the armed forces it is likely that this lack of recent case indicate more a fear of potential whistleblowers to publicly speak than a decrease of corruption cases in the Moroccan armed forces. No more recent examples were found (3)(4)(5)(6)(7)(8).

The last publicly reported case of whistleblowing (Captain Adib Case) is not only out-of-date, but was also fraught with obstacles to the whistleblowing, a serious lack of protection for the whistleblower and a lack of thorough and independent investigation into the alleged case of corruption highlighted by the whistleblower. The general accused (Bennani) has died of old age without being convicted or prosecuted, and the whistleblower has not been reintegrated into the army (1).

No evidence of more recent cases were found. Given the general context, the outcomes of the Adib Captain case and the secrecy surrounding the armed forces it is likely that this lack of recent case indicate more a fear of potential whistleblowers to publicly speak than a decrease of corruption cases in the Moroccan armed forces (2).

These elements point to a climate of lack of trust among officials and personnel that they would be provided with adequate protection if they reported corrupt activity.

A 1992 law on illicit enrichment provides for the protection of witnesses but does not explicitly refer to “whistle-blowers” (1). As per Article 8, anyone who has permitted or facilitated the accomplishment of an offence of illicit enrichment shall be prosecuted as an accomplice. However, the person who, before an incident of illicit enrichment has revealed to the judicial authorities the facts constituting such an offence will not be prosecuted. The language of the article is vague and does not explicitly describe the reporting person as a “whistle-blower” (lanceur d’alerte). This can be explained by the fact that the concept of a “whistle-blower” is relatively recent, while the law on illicit enrichment dates back to 1992.
The Code of Military Justice is even vaguer in this respect (4). According to Article 48, in case of crime or offence, military personnel (at any level) may take all necessary measures to detect offences in military jurisdiction committed within military establishments.
The legal framework regarding the status of a person who accepts the bribe is also to be taken into consideration when analysing the effectiveness of whistleblowing institutions. Under Article 132 of the 2003 Public Penal Code (2), an individual who provokes or accepts the principles and conditions of corruption is punished the same way as the person who asks for a bribe. Therefore, some persons who could be involved in the process, but wish to report it, may fear prosecution (3). 
To conclude, if we take a broad definition of a “whistle-blower” as a person who reveals to judicial authorities facts that constitute an offence, art. 8 of 1992 the law on illicit enrichment could be interpreted as referencing “whistle-blowers”. However, the Code of Military Justice regarding “whistle-blowers” is vague (Art. 48 is not clear).

The assessor did not find any evidence that there is a specific policy regarding whistleblowing in security and defence institutions. However, on a broader level, the Nigerien government has policies to encourage it. For example, in 2011, it created a Bureau Informations-Reclamations, (BIR/LCTI) (1) – a mechanism of complaints where citizens involved in cases of possible corruption and an instituted telephone hotline to which instances of corruption could be reported. There are also other institutions like Mediateur de la République (2), Commission Nationale des Droits Humains (CNDH) (3), or HALCIA, which could encourage whistleblowing. However, the mandate of these institutions regarding whistleblowing in military and defence ministries is not clear.

In the absence of centralised statistics, it is difficult to assess how many incidents are reported to the institutions that could receive complaints (HALCIA, BIR/LCTI, IGSS, IGA). It is therefore difficult to determine the effectiveness of the penal chain, meaning how many reports or complaints lead to penalisation. Even though civil servants report cases of corruption to HALCIA, BIR/LCTI, police or gendarmerie, or, directly to the Prosecutor of the Republic, there is still little trust among civil servants working in defence and security and no guarantee of protection, should they report an incident. However, according to interviewees, informal and personnel relations based on confidence between some chiefs of the above-mentioned institutions and high-ranking security and defence officials may contribute to the faster resolution of problems that could be connected to cases of corruption, such as scarcity of fuel or late payment of allowances to soldiers. (1,2). Finally, according to interviewees, the media also play a role in highlighting corruption practices and can be used by citizens to ensure better protection from possible reprisals (3,1).

The Whistleblower Protection Bill was passed into law on the 19th of October 2017. It applies to persons and public officials, corporate bodies private bodies and private individuals. It protects against reprisals, harassment, and financial rewards for people who disclose information. It does not sanction anyone for misguided reporting. There is no explicit reference to military personnel, although they are covered by the wide definition, which includes public officials (1).

The Whistleblower Protection Bill was passed into law on the 19th of October 2017. Before that, the policy was promoted but there was not enough information about how the policy should operate in practice for it to be effective. For example, there was some delay to make financial rewards available to people who disclosed information (1). The law is new, so training on the law is not widely available within the service. However, the precise interplay with military law in terms of priority is yet to be resolved; disclosing information is still routinely criticized irrespective of the content and quality of information. For example, the identities of whistleblowers of human rights abuses or corruption, are not being protected against the risk of action under military law and procedure (2).

Beneficiaries have mostly left the country because they are not confident about the ability of the government to protect them if the information leads to the prosecution of highly connected persons. It is not clear that best practices have been followed in protecting the identity and data of people who disclose information. There is no clear structure on how the identity or life of a person who makes a disclosure will be protected against harm. While persons in the private sector may fear retaliation in the form of victimization and loss of employment, there are no safeguards to provide for protection from government intimidation in the public sector. The provisions allow for the concealment of identity, but there is no proper or effective safeguard for the identity of a person who makes a protected disclosure and who is subsequently identified (1).

The Law on the Protection of Whistleblowers, Article 8, 9 and 10 provides protection related to all six components mentioned in the rubric, with the exception of the protection of witnesses in the cases of necessities [2]. This right can be enforced only by decision of the Court. In the same vein, the Ministry of Defence created its own Rulebook on the Implementation of Procedures for Receipt of Applications from Whistleblowers to support and protect civilian and military personnel in the Ministry of Defence and Army [6]. In conjunction with the law, this Rulebook explicitly encourages and protects possible cases of whistleblowing in the sectors of the defence and the military.

Following a political scandal in 2015 which, thanks to whistleblowers, revealed extensive illegal wiretapping [1], a political deal was enforced to regulate the defence sector. In November 2015 the Macedonian Assembly enacted a national Law on Whistleblowing which entered into force in March 2016 [2]. The Law provides protection for whistleblowers for denouncing against any kind of infringement of the law according to international standards [3]. Following remarks during the Venice Commission outlining the risk of crimes and violations of human rights being concealed due to lack of protection of the potential informer [4], the National Assembly adopted in February 2018 the necessary relevant changes to the Law [5].

In the 2016 Integrity Plan, the Ministry of Defence explicitly aims to reduce the risks of corruption [1]. Moreover, the Plan follows the recommendations of the current State-wide Anti-Corruption Program for 2016-2019, led by the State Commission for the Prevention of Corruption [2], focusing on the prevention of conflicts of interest, the implementation of the Law on the Protection of Whistleblowers, the strengthening of the culture of integrity, and enabling free access to public information thus enhancing transparency. For this purpose the Ministry of Defence has gathered a pool of experts across this field and organises trainings for the Ministry of Defence and Army employees national education centres [1]. However, it was difficult to assess how regularly the Law on Whistleblowers was referred to in any findings [3]. That said, the execution of the Whistleblowers Project is well organised: the Ministry of Defence’s Inspectorate is an independent and well-resourced institution which reports directly to the Ministry of Defence State Secretary [4]. A contact person responsible for coordinating this reporting was appointed to share information regarding the law, refer to the relevant Ministry of Defence Rulebook, and to report cases of crime and corruption [5].

Since the enactment of the Law on the Protection of Whistleblowers in 2016, no single application has been submitted by whistleblowers to the State Commission for the Prevention of Corruption [1] nor to the Ministry of Defence [2]. Critics denounce the insufficient reinforcement of the Law and the lack of systematic and continuous training of authorised personnel within government institutions [3]. Some critics also pointed to the lack of political will to implement this Law; the lack of financial and structural independence of the institutions in charge; and, the limited public awareness regarding the purpose of the Law on the Protection of Whistleblowers [4]. This suggest deep-seated mistrust between employees and officials when it comes to reporting criminal and corruptive cases.

There is no legislation on whistleblowing in Oman (1), (2). There are no legal provisions protecting military or official personnel exposing corruption. Whistleblowing programs and internal bribery policies are developing within private businesses (2), (3), (4). The State General Reserve introduced an internal whistleblowing policy, but there are no other examples of whistleblowing provisions within state institutions (5). There is no information on institutional websites regarding whistleblowing (6), (7), (8). According to our resources, there is no whistleblowing within any of the MoD agencies or the armed forces. Corruption is not seen as a pressing issue (9), (10).

There is no whistleblowing within any of the MoD agencies or the armed forces. Corruption is not seen as a pressing issue that needs prioritization or much attention (1), (2). There is no evidence to suggest government encouragement of whistleblowing. As outlined above, private businesses have developed inhouse internal whistleblowing procedures without state encouragement (3). The only state apparatus to issue an internal whistleblowing policy is the State General Reserve Fund, the largest sovereign wealth fund reporting to the Ministry of Finance (4). The SGRF, received compliance training according to Muscat Daily (4). No information was found of the state encouraging defence personnel to whistleblow. There is no evidence of considerations for a future unit designed to deal with whistleblowing in the defence sector. It is also important to note here that restrictions over freedom of expression in the country could deter potential whistleblowers from disclosing information in fear of accusations of defamation.

According to sources from within the armed forces, there is little trust between personnel and senior officers. Considering the competition between different tribes within the army, trust is very low when it comes to whistleblowing (1), (2).

There is general legislation on whistleblowing and reporting corruption (1). This legislation does not specify, practically, procedures on claims and investigation of corruption. It is weak on both issues, investigating the cases and protections for whistleblowers (2). There is no protection of whistleblowers, including protection of identity, protection against retribution, reversed burden of proof regarding retaliation, waiver of liability for the whistleblower, no sanctions for misguided reporting, the right of the whistleblower to refuse participation in wrongdoing (3).

Whistleblowing is not encouraged by the government. There are a few measures taken to encourage and provide information for armed forces (1). A unit is designated to handle claims with a hotline to receive complaints. This unit is part of the Anti-corruption Commission, and they had a website and a hotline to receive claims and reports on corruption cases (1). Their budget is part of the commission; however, the budget of the commission itself is not available.

There is little trust among officials and personnel that they would be provided adequate protection if they reported corrupt activity (1). There have been some incidents where whistleblowers were denied promotions or even fired for reporting corruption (2).

There is no applicable legislation on military and official personnel that exists to facilitate corruption reporting or protection of whistleblowing. The ombudsman asked the prime minister in 2016 to address the insufficient protection of whistleblowers in the military [1]. The MoND admits that “the current system of legal protection for whistle-blowers in military services is insufficient” [2].

Whistleblowing is not encouraged by the government. There are no general laws in Poland concerning the protection of whistleblowers (only sectoral ones – e.g. in banking law). There are certain incentives to report cases of corruption to law enforcement agencies, e.g. to the Central Anticorruption Bureau. However, this office only provides operational protection of the source of information and the notification can be treated as a notification of crime.
As mentioned by the ombudsman, there are very weak mechanisms for whistleblower protection in the army [1]. Corruption reporting systems inside the institution (including the defence ministry) are not enough for a whistle-blower to feel safe. In 2018, the case of a military police officer was widely commented on in the media. The officer whistleblew about numerous irregularities in the military police, which led to persecution from this institution [2].

There is little trust among officials and personnel that they would be provided adequate protection if they reported corrupt activity. Furthermore, in general, whistleblowing is rare in Poland. It is discouraged by fear of the employer or peer retaliation, the lack of specific protection legislation as well as an ineffective judiciary, which leads to disproportionate risks for potential whistleblowers [1].

Whistleblowing is encouraged in Qatar through the ACTA website, hotline and through advertisements. ACTA can receive calls regarding the military, but due to their lack of authority over the armed forces, these calls must be transferred to the MoD. There is no support for whistleblowing within the armed forces. [1,2]

Whistleblowing in the defence sector is not encouraged by the Government. The information that exists in relation to the protection of whistleblowers does not directly apply to defence institutions. Corruption cases received by the ACTA must be transferred to the MoD and not investigated by ACTA itself. [1,2,3] Research identified one campaign, titled ‘Qatar deserves to be protected from corruption’, launched in 2015, through which Qatar’s public prosecution office encouraged people to report and expose corruption.[4] A fraud hotline was setup by the Qatar Foundation, which allows people to report cases of suspected fraud and corruption. [5]

There are no legal provisions for the protection of witnesses or whistleblowers from within the defence sector. [1] Another source indicated the lack of trust between officials, as many of the armed personnel are not originally Qatari or from Qatari tribes. This means that mistrust can be high amongst the lower ranks. [2]

Nazaha, Saudi Arabia’s main anti-corruption body, has produced regulations which in theory protect whistleblowers (1). However, these laws have in the past been characterized as providing insufficient protection to public and private employees making disclosures of illegality (2). In May 2018, King Salman ordered new protections for employees who report financial and administrative corruption as part of a wider anti-corruption push spearheaded by his son Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (3). No further details were provided relating to the nature of these protections. Furthermore, neither these nor the previous laws make specific reference to protections for military personnel. According to our sources, the current laws encourage military personnel to report corruption cases, and between 2017 and 2018, leaflets were distributed more than once to many units encouraging military personnel to report corruption. Despite mentioning the protection of identity, there is no more information provided in any sources (4), (5).

As above mentioned, Saudi authorities have, since at least November 2017, prioritized cracking down on corruption, although their methods have been criticized for lacking due process and impartiality. The government has started to actively encourage whistleblowing on administrative and financial corruption in the public and private sectors, including introducing new regulations to protect whistleblowers (1). In its inaugural session for the year in September 2018, the Shura Council discussed a new proposal for the protection of whistleblowers (2), (3). The Council approved the draft law the following month (4). In late February 2019, Saudi press sources reported that Nazaha would soon bring the law into effect. The law reportedly has 39 articles to combat crimes by “encouraging and facilitating information sharing and providing protection to informants, witnesses, experts, and victims from any attacks or threats, material or moral harm, or anything that may adversely affect the delivery of such information” (5).

There is no specialized unit to handle whistleblowing claims. However, Nazaha operates a whistleblowing hotline, which stated received at least 100 reports per day. Nazaha also reportedly provides guidance on how to submit a whistleblowing report, as well as bonuses for citizens reporting corruption (6), (7). It has also reportedly organized anti-corruption training courses and workshops, though little information exists regarding the substance of these courses and whether they explicitly address whistleblowing (8). In November 2016, the Austria-based International Anti-Corruption Academy provided a tailor-made anti-corruption training course to Nazaha employees, the themes of which included whistleblower protection (9). According to our sources, there has not been any kind of training on corruption issues within the military, only leaflets encouraging whistleblowing were distributed to different units, mainly financial and administrative units (10), (11).

There are a number of factors to consider with regards to whistleblowing. According to our sources, there is a high level of distrust between military personnel and their officers. Furthermore, in the pulic sector, there is often a high level of distrust between civil personnel and employees (particularly when they are migrant workers) and their managers (who are usually Saudi nationals), and therefore informing about corruption cases is tricky, and personnel of lower rank refrain from complaints about corruption fearing reprisals (1), (2). According to published material on the Nazaha website, whistleblowers can request that their data and identity remain anonymous when submitting a report (3). Recent policies from the Saudi government attempting to protect whistleblowers may have encouraged the practice more widely, despite a strong whistleblowing culture in both the private and public sectors in Saudi Arabia. Nonetheless, given the fact that there is very little information published relating to whistleblowing cases, it is not possible to ascertain how effective these protections are. The abovementioned royal order announced by King Salman in May 2018 directing authorities to provide more protection to whistleblowers reportedly followed reports that some individuals were mistreated after submitting corruption complaints (4). Likely, public officials do not feel entirely safe submitting whistleblowing reports highlighting corrupt activity, given that the abovementioned legislation was adopted relatively recently, and there is limited public awareness regarding legal protections for whistleblowers. However, recent actions taken by the Saudi authorities to encourage whistleblowing may have improved the general feeling of trust in the government’s apparent prioritization of these issues among members of the public. The local daily Saudi Gazette reported that in 2018, Nazaha received 15,591 whistleblower complaints, up from 10,402 in 2017. 74.3% of these reportedly related to financial and administrative corruption, while 28.9% of the complaints related to abuse of power (5). Neither Nazaha nor the Gazette and other local press sources specifies whether any of these complaints relate to the military and defence sectors. Given the information provided to TI DS by the interviewees, it seems unlikely that these high numbers of complaints correspond to the military.

The Law on Whistleblowers Protection was adopted by the National Assembly in December 2014 and came into force in June 2015 [1]. The law states that each institution should further regulate whistleblowing within its ranks with a bylaw, in December 2015, the MoD has adopted a Rulebook on whistleblowing procedure in MoD and SAF [2]. In accordance with the Rulebook, the MoD has designated a person authorised to receive information and conduct the whistleblowing procedure [3].
The Law on Whistleblowers protection is generally comprehensive and covers all the elements necessary for effective whistleblowers protection; however, it requires further clarifications and improvements in certain areas. The law contains provisions on the protection of personal data of whistleblowers (Art. 10), on the prohibition of retaliation by putting them in an unfavourable position (Art. 21).
For instance, an insufficiently clearly defined area, relevant for security and defence sector is the disclosure of classified data through a whistleblowing procedure. In that way, even though they might point at cases of misuse or unlawful acts masked by confidentiality, whistleblowers expose themselves to criminal liability by disclosing classified information. Hence, the protection of whistleblowers in these cases should be further enhanced and harmonized with the Law on Data Secrecy [4].

Encouragement of whistleblowing in the MoD and SAF is the legal obligation of the employer; they have to post the bylaw on a visible place and make it available to all employees [1]. The role of processing claims and conducting whistleblowing procedures belongs to one employee, appointed by the minister of defence [2].

Since November 2017, the authorized person has received nine claims and conducted six procedures. According to its response to the BCSP questionnaire, the MoD does not have systematized data on whistleblowing or the obligation of transferring information to successors; it failed to provide information on claims and procedures prior the appointment of the latest person in November 2017 [1].

Legislation on whistleblowing and reporting corruption exists and applies to military and official personnel. The organic law n°10-2017, dated 7 march 2017, related to the denunciation of corruption and protection of whistleblowers, refers explicitly to the to protection of whistleblowers (1). This law grants the whistleblowers the right of protection of identity (2) and provides criminal sentences for those who disclose the whistleblower’s identity (3). This law provides for protection against retribution (personal protection, administrative protection, legal and psychological support, etc.) (4) The whistleblower enjoys protection from any form of retaliation, discrimination, intimidation or repression. He shall also be protected from any criminal, civil, or administrative measures, or any other measure that could damage him on the occasion of, or in connection with, the denunciation (5). The whistleblower is not required to prove the information he reports. (6) Only whistleblowers who deliberately submit a denunciation to unlawfully harm others are excluded from protection (7).

According to our sources, there are huge efforts by many institutions to encourage whistleblowers, central units, and NGOs, but there is little training and sporadic campaigns to encourage it (1,2). Whistleblowing is encouraged by the Anti-corruption Authority through several measures: organisation of training, workshops and information campaigns, (3) and a toll-free hotline has been set up to receive denunciations (4). According to article 7 of the law protecting whistleblowers, each public structure shall determine the appropriate administrative structure within it, to receive and investigate reports of corruption referred to it by the Anti-corruption Authority, hereafter referred to as the “appropriate administrative structure”. According to the Anti-corruption Authority 2017 report, the Ministry of Defence complied with this obligation (5). However, no evidence of direct communication about whistleblowing by the Ministry of Defence could be found.

The 2017’s INLUCC report shows that the Anti-corruption Authority received 22 denunciations of corruption related to the Ministry of Defence (1). This shows that people are willing to denounce corruption that occurs in the defence sector. However, the publication of the application decrees of the law protecting whistleblowers could leave doubt in the efficacy of the protection that would be given to officials. According to our sources, employees still have fears about reporting corruption practices. Besides that, there are many who feel that they would not be well enough protected in cases of reporting corruption against senior officers or commanders. Despite that, there has been a huge change in the last few years (2,3,4).

The Law On Prevention of Corruption provides the legal framework for whistleblowing which is also applicable to the defence and security personnel [1]. The law provides protection of identity for whistleblowers and protection against retribution, it reverses the burden of proof regarding retaliation [2, 3], provides a waiver of liability for the whistleblower [4], no sanctions for misguided reporting, and the right of the whistleblower to refuse participation in wrongdoing [5]. The MoD Draft Anti-corruption program for 2018-2020 also includes the organization of processing of reports on corruption and assistance to whistleblowers [6].

The MoD Anticorruption Program for 2015-2017 as well as the Draft Anticorruption Program for 2017-2020 set a task to create conditions for whistleblowing, develop briefing notes on whistleblowers protection as well as to provide them to the heads of all departments [1]. In parallel, there is no evidence for whistleblowing being encouraged by the MoD in the form of subject matter training or information campaigns at all. There are several hotlines in the MoD on various subjects. the different lines focus on issues of abuse by officials (theft, illegal obtaining, writing off or purchasing property, payments to servicemen, and remuneration to ATO participants, etc.) [3].

The Law On Prevention of Corruption, which sets the legal framework for whistleblowing [1], was only developed and adopted in 2014. Not much time has passed since then and one cannot say yet whether there is an established practice of whistleblowing in place in Ukraine. There is a lack of information about whistleblowers in the MoD and only a few widely known cases in Ukraine in general [2, 4]. The Law On Prevention of Corruption provides guarantees for whistleblowers. However these mechanisms have not been yet fully established and practised, proper training of officials has not been carried out to the appropriate extent. It is, therefore, possible that whistleblowers will not be able to obtain the guaranteed protection. Instead, to restore violated rights and receive the compensation they have to go to court [3, 4].
The highest level of whistleblowing was between 2014 and 2016 when men from six waves of mobilization served the country. They were the most intolerant to corruption and whistleblew often. Now the percentage of whistleblowing cases for corruption investigation has fallen to around 5% of cases in the MoD, according to an anonymous source.

In the UAE, there is a clear and enforced legal provision for the protection of whistleblowers at the federal level in the country. The general law applies to the military too. For example, Dubai Law 4/2016 on Financial Crimes has some provisions for the protection of whistleblowers concerning certain financial crimes, which is the same law applied in almost all the Emirates (1). At the federal level, the SAI runs a reporting portal through which people can anonymously report fraud or corruption; however, whether these complaints are followed through is questionable (2), (3).

Whistleblowing is encouraged in public and inside units. There are many placards inside the units and offices that encourage personnel to report any corruption and misbehaviour within the units. Although guidance materials and posters are available, training and internal campaigns to promote whistleblowing are nonexistent (1), (2).

There is little trust among officials that whistleblowers would be provided with the necessary protections. However, there are internal cases in which whistleblowers were provided promotions and financial rewards after reporting of corruption activities, such as smuggling activities in cooperation with armed forces, for example, the navy (1), (2). However most of these cases involved expatriate civilians (foreign employees) and not members of the military.

Country Sort by Country 36a. Legal provisions Sort By Subindicator 36b. Prioritisation Sort By Subindicator 36c. Effectiveness Sort By Subindicator
Albania 75 / 100 50 / 100 0 / 100
Algeria 50 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Angola 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Armenia 75 / 100 50 / 100 75 / 100
Azerbaijan 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Bosnia and Herzegovina 75 / 100 100 / 100 50 / 100
Burkina Faso 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Cameroon 0 / 100 25 / 100 0 / 100
Cote d'Ivoire 25 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Egypt 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Estonia 25 / 100 50 / 100 50 / 100
Georgia 50 / 100 50 / 100 50 / 100
Ghana 75 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Hungary 75 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Iraq 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Jordan 25 / 100 25 / 100 0 / 100
Kosovo 75 / 100 25 / 100 NA
Kuwait 50 / 100 25 / 100 0 / 100
Latvia 75 / 100 50 / 100 NA
Lebanon 25 / 100 25 / 100 50 / 100
Lithuania 100 / 100 75 / 100 NEI
Mali 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Montenegro 75 / 100 25 / 100 0 / 100
Morocco 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Niger 25 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Nigeria 25 / 100 25 / 100 0 / 100
North Macedonia 100 / 100 50 / 100 0 / 100
Oman 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Palestine 25 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Poland 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Qatar 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Saudi Arabia 25 / 100 25 / 100 0 / 100
Serbia 75 / 100 25 / 100 50 / 100
Tunisia 50 / 100 50 / 100 50 / 100
Ukraine 100 / 100 25 / 100 50 / 100
United Arab Emirates 50 / 100 25 / 100 50 / 100

With thanks for support from the UK Department for International Development and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs who have contributed to the Government Defence Integrity Index.

Transparency International Defence & Security is a global programme of Transparency International based within Transparency International UK.

Privacy Policy

UK Charity Number 1112842

All rights reserved Transparency International Defence & Security 2021