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Q49.

Is there a policy to make public outcomes of the prosecution of defence services personnel for corrupt activities, and is there evidence of effective prosecutions in recent years?

49a. Policy

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SCORE: 0/100

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49b. Transparency

Score

SCORE: 50/100

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49c. Effectiveness

Score

SCORE: 50/100

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The Prosecutor General’s Office regularly publishes in its annual reports to the parliament the statistics on prosecutions, including the prosecution of Ministry of Defence (MoD) and military officials and staffs. The statistics provide the overall number of criminal proceedings, the type of violation and the outcome of the prosecution process. However, no data are provided on the content of cases [1, 2, 3]. The referral by the MoD to the Prosecution Office of the former minister of defence and several high-level military officials during 2013-2014, and the referral to the Prosecution by the State Supreme Audit Institution (SSAI) of nine officials have been broadly covered by the media and as a result, the public was kept informed about the proceedings of those cases.

Charges are usually made public by the prosecution in response to media attention and often by the defendants, but there is no policy for the proactive release of details on the charges or the hearings conducted by the prosecutors. Details may be made public during trials when prosecutions result in lawsuits [1].

Cases are investigated, but they mainly are a result of political incentives rather than from thorough investigations [1, 2]. Often cases are referred to the prosecution without proper investigation, leading to the cases either being dismissed or ruled in favour of the defendants in the courts [3, 4]. In 2015 the SSAI referred to the prosecution of 12 MoD officials for improper budgeting, procurements, and mismanagement in the implementation of contracts [5]. The MoD rejected the report on claims that it was a political fabrication influenced by the opposition [6].
This fits with the overall trend in corruption investigations, prosecution and trials. In 2015 there were 1492 cases registered from the prosecutor’s office for criminal offences in the field of corruption and 440 persons were indicted, while 212 cases (about 13.9%) were sent to trial. In 2016 there were 1526 cases registered, and 386 people were indicted, while 192 cases were sent for trial [7].

No evidence could be found that there is a formal policy to make public outcomes of prosecutions of defence services personnel available; see the country’s last assessment (1). Rules coded in the Code of Military Justice do not suggest that there is such a policy. According to Art. 41, the procedures and the investigations are secret. Moreover, all persons who are involved in the procedures are bound by professional secrecy (2). In Art. 135, the court can forbid reporting on the proceedings of the cases. Violations of rules can be subject to prosecution (3). There are reports in the media about corruption cases in the military last year, but no information was given if the armed forces proved the information (4), (5).

The outcomes of the prosecution of defence service personnel for corruption activities are generally not made public. A recent report from the US Department of State noted that the Algerian “government did not always provide information on disciplinary or legal action against the police, military, or other security personnel” (1, p. 4). No information was provided on the website of the Defence Ministry (4). No website for the Military Judiciary or evidence of other official communication procedures were found. However, there are reports on the current corruption cases involving five high-ranking military officers in the media (2), (3).

There is no evidence that prosecutions of corruption cases in the defence sectors have been effective. If there have been any effective prosecutions, they have not been made known to the public; see the country’s last assessment (1). The corruption cases of the five high-ranking military members of October 2018 have yet concluded and no assessment of the effectiveness can be made yet (see the answer to question 35). In 2018, there have been discussions that the trials were connected to the scheduled presidential elections in 2019 and possible power struggles (2). In 2019, there was a report that one of the accused was on the run. (3) Arrest warrants against two others were also issued in spring 2019 (4). No other examples of military personnel being prosecuted for bribery or corruption have been found since 2016. Newspaper articles reporting on the five generals compared the case to the trial of General Beloucif who embezzled money from the Department of National Defence’s coffers in the 1990s (5).

Further assessments on the Algerian judiciary suggest that civil trials are not without undue political influence. For example, one observer stated that the intelligence service (DRS) interferes with the work of the judiciary (6). Freedom House noted that the judiciary is vulnerable to government pressure since the president appoints all judges and prosecutors. Additionally, the High Judicial Council is led by the president, who also selects its judges (7).

One prominent civil case provides evidence that obvious cases are not prosecuted. The case of the former Minister of Energy, Chekib Kheli, who was close to former President Bouteflika, was also mentioned in the country’s last assessment. Khelil was accused of being involved in a complex international money-laundering system. In a court case in Italy, it was exposed that he had received bribes of nearly 200 million euros. To the surprise of many, the Algerian Prime Minister Ahmed Ouyahia announced in November of 2017 that the case would be closed (8).

There is no stated policy to make public outcomes of the prosecution of defense personnel. Prosecution cases and their outcomes have been disclosed mainly by the media.

Court documents such as indictments and sentencing are considered public documents; however, in practice access to court hearings and documents is often restricted for the media, even more so for the military courts (1).

Cases are investigated but are not often prosecuted. There are indications for clear undue influence in the decision-making process in recent years; for example, President Dos Santos’ decisions to grant a broad amnesty in 2016 and to shelve more than four years of inspection investigations in 2017 (1). The inspector general of the Angolan Armed Forces (IGFAA), apparently later merged with the inspector general of National Defence, has conducted investigations into corruption-related activities within the defence sector. However, although senior officials were investigated, no prosecutions followed.

Based on the broad amnesty issued by Dos Santos in 2016, several corruption-related investigations based on complaints presented by Rafael Marques and several lawyers were shelved. Furthermore, in September 2017, the inspector general of the state administration, a direct subordinate of the president, shelved all ongoing investigations opened between January 1, 2013, and August 30, 2017 (2).

In 2010, an IGFAA inspection ordered by the president led to the dismissal of Francisco Pereira Furtado the then General Chief of Staff of the Angolan Armed Forces, for alleged involvement in corruption. However, Furtado was not prosecuted, and in 2014 his alleged co-conspirator, Furtado’s arms and logistics director, General Fernando Vasquez Araújo, was later appointed to another top post in the same area of work (3).

In 2011, Rafael Marques filed a criminal complaint at the attorney general’s office against nine powerful generals on allegations of corruption and torture, which included the then inspector-general of the Joint Chief of Staff of the Angolan Armed Forces (it’s unclear whether that post still exists), Carlos Alberto Hendrick da Silva. The complaint was never investigated. Subsequently, the powerful general who retired as an inspector in 2017, was among the plaintiffs in a defamation lawsuit against the journalist (4), (5).

In 2018, President Lourenço ordered an investigation on corrupt practices of the military intelligence chief, General Zé Maria. He has since retired but hasn’t been prosecuted (6).

The Ministry of Defence (MoD) provides a comprehensive Concept on Public Awareness stressing the importance and outlining the scope of public consultations. The main purpose of the document is to define the ways and means of creating a public awareness strategy on the activities of the MoD and the General Staff of the Armed Forces and to increase the level of public awareness on the programs and reforms which are designed to improve and modernize the defence sector. The concept focuses on the importance of public awareness and consultations, specifically in promoting reforms aiming at the transparent and accountable interaction with partners and stakeholders both publicly and institutionally [1]. However, there is no policy specifically designated for making public outcomes of the prosecution of defence service personnel for corrupt activities.

The whole prosecution process is made public, regardless of the position and the rank the person has. Media outlets are very active in providing information on the prosecution process. After a case arrives at the court and the decision is made, it can be obtained at datalex.am website, provided the name of the prosecuted person is available [1].

Cases of prosecution of defence service personnel are widely discussed in the media outlets. As Mediamax reported in February 2018, 1207 criminal cases were revealed in the armed forces in 2017. Corruption cases totalled to 116 in 2017, thirty-six criminal cases that involved seventy-two individuals were sent to court [1].
The PanArmenian news agency also addressed the increase in corruption cases in 2017 [2]. More investigative cases were reported in mediaю [3, 4]. Some extra-parliamentary opposition representatives after the Velvet Revolution have argued that some prosecutions are still politically motivated [5].

There is an informal policy in the defence institution to make outcomes of prosecution publicly available. Corruption-related court processes related to defence services personnel are not always open. In most cases, it is closed and no public information is provided. In some cases, they are associated with “state secrets” (1). Only in exceptional situations are certain parts of the outcomes of prosecution made publicly available, it is done when it is favourable to one of the interest groups in the government, or to punish several individuals from the army (2, 3).
Statistics on prosecutions (number of people and case investigated) are published annually by the military prosecutor, but details of court cases are not available (4).

Only in exceptional situations are certain parts of the outcomes of prosecutions (charges and results of prosecutions) made publicly available, but it is done when it is favourable to one of the interest groups in the government, or to punish several individuals from the army. For example, the charges and results of prosecutions against former Deputy Defence Minister Mehman Salimov and the Commander of the Navy Shahin Sultanov can be an example. The former commander of the Defence Naval Forces, vice-admiral Shahin Sultanov was arrested in 2014. According to the information provided by the Baku Military Court, Sultanov was detained on suspicion of committing fraud and large-scale embezzlement as a detainee (1). Shortly afterwards his arrest was changed to house arrest (2).
In 2016, Baku Court of Grave Crimes completed the trial over the case of Mehman Salimov, former deputy defence minister of Azerbaijan, who is charged with embezzlement and abuse of power. Under the court verdict, Salimov was sentenced to 8 years in prison (3).
In some cases, general information is provided: According to Khanlar Veliyev, military prosecutor, in 2017, 123 criminal cases of corruption and bribery about 146 persons were completed and sent to relevant military courts (4). Nearly twenty former senior officers of the former National Security Ministry have been involved in the investigation. All of them are charged with the creation of a criminal gang, robbery, kidnapping and corruption. Former National Security Minister Eldar Mahmudov led the criminal grouping (5).
But in most cases, the charges and results are closed and no public information is provided. For example, by the order of Zakir Hasanov, the Ministry’s Housing and Utility Department was abolished. In some companies (they have carried out relevant construction work in the ministry), violations of law were discovered and a criminal case was filed against them. The press reports that they are accused of artificial exaggeration of prices and corruption crimes (6). However, the names of those companies were not disclosed.
In the summer of 2015, three senior officials of the Defence Ministry’s Main Military Inspection were arrested. They were charged with corruption. The ministry did not disclose the names and duties of those persons. On the basis of the collected materials, a criminal case has been launched and an investigation has been launched by the Chief Prosecutor’s Office for Combating Corruption under the Prosecutor General’s Office (7). Although three years have elapsed, the public has not been informed about the results of this culpability. Likewise, in exceptional circumstances, the results of trials against military services personnel are made publicly available for the abovementioned reasons (8).

Observations show that corruption-related incidents mostly are not seriously investigated, and the public is not informed about the trial results (1). In some cases, the leadership of the Defence Ministry, the president’s administration and other government agencies interfere in the investigation process, and the criminal case is postponed. Even though some criminal cases are pursued against some officials and the cases that are brought before the courts, the results are not proportionate. For instance, while there were allegations of extortion and blackmail against the former Ministry of State Security Eldar Mahmudov, he was never convicted and has denied wrongdoing (2). Shahin Sultanov case is another instance. The prosecutor asked the court to sentence him to 13 years in prison. However, he was released on probation (3).

Corruption is a criminal offence under the criminal codes in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and perpetrators of such offences are prosecuted by the judicial authorities in BiH, i.e. outside the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina (AFBiH). Disclosure of information on the outcomes of prosecution of offences is the responsibility of the judicial authorities that prosecute them.
The MoD and AFBiH have internal regulations compelling them to inform the public of all important issues in the field of defence, including cases of corruption in the MoD and AFBiH. Internal regulations governing the public relations in the MoD and AFBiH are:
– Public Relations Policy, No. 14-03-3-844/10 dated 10 February 2010, and
– Guidelines for the implementation of PR activities in MoD and AFBiH, No. 14-35-2-815/11 dated 17 February 2011 [1, 2].
The MoD’s General Inspectorate organizes regular annual conferences involving the key staff of the MoD and AFBiH and present the work of inspectors during the year. The conference presents indicators and data on the violation of regulations in general, including the fight against corruption. Representatives of the Defence and Security Commission of the BiH Parliamentary Assembly, the parliamentary military commissioner, representative of the Agency for Coordination of the Fight against Corruption, representatives of the BiH Agency for Investigation and Protection, representative of the BiH Office of the Auditing of Institutions, commander of NATO Staff in Sarajevo and Commander of EUFOR attend. According to the government reviewer, the prosecution of perpetrators of irregularities, which are regulated by the BiH Criminal Code as well as other regulations in BiH are applied in the MoD and AFBiH. The MoD informs the public about activities through a range of content, through regular press conferences, announcements and regular events [3,4].

There is not enough evidence to score this indicator. The MoD informs the public about its activities and irregularties (involving personnel) through a range of content such as regular press conferences, announcements and regular events [1,2]. However, it cannot be estblished whether all other related facts about prosecutions are not made public by the ministry.

Following a poll conducted as part of the USAID’s Justice Project, Bosnia and Herzegovina citizens were not convinced of the honesty in this country’s judiciary. 84.2% of respondents disagree with the assertion that judges and prosecutors are not subject to corruption [1].

The OSCE “Trial Monitoring of Corruption Cases in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Second Assessment” mentions 189 ongoing corruption cases. The same report analyzed the conviction rate of 111 finished cases in 2017-2018, where data shows that there was 33% conviction rate in the three high corruption cases (two convictions of imprisonment which were converted into fine), as well as 74% and 61% conviction rate for medium and low corruption cases. In the summaries of the finalized cases analysed there are no mentions of personnel from the MoD or AFBiH [2].

The existing defence policy of 2004 does not cover issues such as corruption (1). There is no evidence on the existence of an anti-corruption policy that specifically applies to the military. However, the current REN-LAC’s the Open Government Partnership (OGP) against the corruption of the Ministry of Civil Service, Employment and Social Welfare (MCSESW) (2), applies to the defence ministry, as many government institutions have subscribed to it (3). However, there is no evidence, which proves that the OGP applies to the military.

According to the United States Department of State, the gendarmerie is responsible for investigating and prosecuting both the personnel of gendarmerie and the police, but investigation and prosecution reports have never been made public (1). Also, there is no evidence that both the Parliament and the Court of Account, respectively manded by Article 84 and Article 127 of the Constitution (2), as oversight of the defence sector, have already published a report on the management of the military. The ASCE-LC, which has just been provided with constitutional power to investigate and prosecute, is still finding its way in the system. There is no transparency in the processes of such kinds in the defence sector (3). Terrorism has increased the lack of transparency within the military, as they tend to make every issue a defence secret (3).

The internal body in charge of investigating corruption within the security sector is the gendarmerie, according to the United States Department of State. However, none of its reports are published for public access (1), (2). The opacity of the defence sector makes it difficult (if not impossible) to conduct any scrutiny work by recognized public institutions (3). The Supreme Audit Institution, the Parliament and the ASCE-LC, each mandated by the Constitution, to investigate and prosecute cases of corruption, have failed to scrutinize the defence sector through the publishing of a single investigation report. The lack of a real separation of powers (2), the weakness of law enforcement and the poor access to information make the fight against corruption so difficult (4).

There are several legal documents that guide the behaviour of these personnel with respect to corruption. They include:
– Article 134 of the Penal Code, and
– Article 66 of the Constitution (Declaration of Assets by political appointees) [1].

Corruption is criminalised within the penal code of Cameroon (Law No. 67-LF-1 of 12 June 1967). The penal code effectively penalises:
– Offering and receiving bribes (Art. 134),
– Granting of undue exceptions or benefits by a public official (Art. 137),
– Extortion and collusion with public employees (Art. 142 and 160),
– Intent of extortion, collusion or bribery (Art. 161 and 312) and
– Embezzlement (Art. 184) [2] [3].

However, there is no formal policy to make outcomes of the prosecution of defence personnel public. Civilians who are victims of police or gendarmerie offences sometimes do not know the outcomes of disciplinary measures taken against their violators or offenders [4].

There is no official policy on the publication of names of security personnel involved in corrupt practices. However, from time to time the names of junior officers found guilty of corrupt practices are broadcast on the radio and television [1]. As an example, Africa News reported in July 2018 that “The Cameroonian army has been indicted in extrajudicial executions of two women and two young children” [2].

Although the law makes provision for criminal penalties for defence and military personnel, these are hardly enforced, especially when high-profile personalities are involved [1]. Some junior and middle-management officers are sometimes prosecuted for corruption but top-ranking military officers seem to benefit from the impunity related to corruption in the country [2]. It is alleged that Edgard Mebe Ngo’o, the former Minister of Defence, and Colonel Mboutou were involved in a corruption scandal where “Robert Franchitti paid Colonel Mboutou and Maxime Mbangue huge amounts of money in exchange for lucrative Cameroon military contracts” [3] [4], but there is no evidence that they were ever prosecuted. A US State Department Human Rights report observed that the Delegate General of National Security (DGSN) investigated alleged abuses and cases were sent to court. Although the DGSN, Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Justice reported that members of defence and security were sanctioned in 2017, there is no evidence that these sanctions ever took place [1].

According to the US State Department, “The law provides criminal penalties for corruption by officials, although these were seldom enforced…The government did not always effectively address high-profile cases, and officials continued to engage in corrupt practices with impunity. The judiciary was not always free to independently investigate and prosecute corruption cases…Some officers convicted of corruption were relieved of their duties but continued to be paid due to weak oversight, accountability, and enforcement mechanisms for internal disciplining…Civilian authorities maintained some control over the police and gendarmerie, and the government had some mechanisms in place to investigate and punish abuse and corruption. The DGSN and gendarmerie investigated reports of abuse and forwarded cases to the courts. Lesser sanctions were handled internally. The DGSN, Ministry of Defense, and Ministry of Justice claimed members of security forces were sanctioned during the year for committing abuses, but few details were known about investigations or any subsequent accountability” [1].

Cameroon media continue to relate details of an investigation in France concerning suspicions of corruption / bribery between the former defence minister Edgard Mebe Ngo’o and MagForce for defence contracts. The ex-minister and his wife have been arrested and held in Yaounde on charges of corruption [5] [6].

There is no formal policy to publicize the outcomes of the prosecution of defence personnel for corruption. Nevertheless, there is strong evidence showing that cases involving police rackets are effectively prosecuted by military prosecutors for charges of corruption. In July 2018, Le Débat Ivoirien reported that 21 gendarmes had been arrested and been temporarily incarcerated at a military prison in Abidjan to await trial on racketeering charges. The arrests took place as part of the anti-racketeering efforts within the armed forces. The public P
prosecutor, in this case, Ange Kessi, stated that this type of corruption tarnished the public image of the armed forces and would not be tolerated. A military court in Abidjan (MAMA) was scheduled to try them and another 33 accused of corruption in October 2018 (1), (2).

Previously, in May 2018, the General Directorate of Public Administration (Direction Générale de l’Administration) had organized capacity-building workshops to help local anti-racketeering groups to publicly denounce this type of corruption cases. During these workshops, the inspector general of police services and former ministry of national security, Joseph Djable, sent a strong message to racketeers within the Gendarmerie that corrupt practices would be prosecuted to the full extent of the law. The efforts to end racketeering by military and civilian police are often backed (financially) by multilateral organizations and by the executive due to the negative impact they have had on the national economy. The inspector general said that “all civil servants in the police services who are condemned to 6 months of prison will be banned from the police force” (3).

The policy of permanent removal of prosecuted officials from the police force (radiation des effectifs) was confirmed in November 2018 (4).
There is strong evidence that there is an informal policy at defence institutions to make the outcomes of prosecution publicly available, particularly for anti-racketeering efforts.

The reality is that both the process and the results of the prosecution are made publicly available with access to information on the charges and hearings. However, the information released to the public is not exhaustive, as per the criteria for a score of 4.

As shown in 49A, Joseph Djable, sent a strong message to racketeers within the Gendarmerie in May 2018 that corrupt practices would be prosecuted to the full extent of the law. The inspector general said that “all civil servants in the police services who are condemned to 6 months of prison will be deleted from the police force” (1). The accusation, arrest, temporary incarceration and outcome of the anti-racketeering trials by military prosecutors have been made widely available in 2018, perhaps as a sign that the executive is unwilling to tolerate this type of petty corruption (2), (3).

There is evidence that military and civilian police personnel have been investigated and prosecuted on racketeering charges to the full extent of the law in 2018. However, the high level of effectiveness may be attributed to the executive’s strong political will to end such practices. In November 2018, the Military Court of Abidjan (Tribunal Militaire d’Abidjan, TMA), by way of military prosecutor Ange Kessi, ordered the dismantling of 33 illegal roadblocks in rural districts operated by corrupt members of the police forces. Some brigade commanders were involved in these rackets. The dismantling of the roadblocks took place after NGOs and the Transportation Fluidity Office (Office de la Fluidité des Transports) had brought the existence of 33 roadblocks to the attention of the military prosecutor (1).

A biographical article about Ange Kessi in Jeune Afrique (May 2016) explains how he has brought about several changes in terms of prosecuting corruption cases. Kessi has become an iconic figure in Côte d’Ivoire’s judiciary because of his prosecution of crimes committed by defence personnel, including highly sensitive cases of former military commanders such as Wattao and Chérif Ousmane, both of whom supported President Ouattara during the post-election crisis of 2010-2011. The article characterizes Kessi as an activist prosecutor (2):

“From his offices in Tower A of Plateau Administrative City in Abidjan, Colonel Kessi goes through his files every day. They include cases involving the abuse of power, racketeering, murders … On his table he has piled up the proceedings against soldiers, gendarmes, policemen. During trial proceedings and in the field, he has relentlessly tracked the evidence and inconsistencies” (2).

There are cases of effective dismantlement of roadblocks in 2018; the military prosecutors such as Ange Kessi are allowed to investigate politically sensitive cases of corruption that could compromise President Ouattara.

All information regarding the investigation and prosecution of defence personnel for all crimes, especially corruption, is secrets since military courts have exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed by defence personnel (1). Making the information available to the public is punishable by the Military Provisions Law no. 25 (1966) (2). Article 31 of the law stipulate that “the investigation procedures and its results are considered secrets. Members of the prosecution, members of judicial control and their assistants, and all others who are linked to the investigation or attend it because of their job must not disclose any information about it or otherwise, they will be subject to the penalties set out in the law.” On the other hand, Article 71 of the same law stipulates that court session are public, but it gives the court wide discretionary power in giving “exceptions” to make the session secret for reasons of protecting military secrets, public order or for reasons related to moral decency. The court has the right to declare part or all of the session secret, prevent certain individuals from attending the sessions or imposing a media ban. In all cases, there is no public or easily accessible database (e.g. online) for accessing court document especially those on sensitive issues involving, for example, a senior military official in corrupt activities.

No information on prosecutions or outcomes is made publicly available, and the little information available in the public domain is usually through the testimonies of defence lawyers in cases where civilians are involved (1),but this limited level of access is usually unattainable for cases where defence personnel are involved as it will more likely to be deemed by the court as a “military or defence secret”.

According to our sources, there is a complete failure to investigate any corruption activities, even when there is clear evidence. Usually, those who commit these activities are at a high level, and they have the power to bypass any investigations (1), (2), (3), (4).

Court decisions, with restrictions arising from law, have to be made public. [1]

Court judgments and court rulings which have entered into force are to be published on an online platform accessible to everyone.

A published decision discloses the name and personal identification code or date of birth of the accused, except in the case of a minor, whose name is replaced by initials (unless it’s the third criminal offence for the minor). [2]

The orders and demands issued by investigative bodies and Prosecutors’ Offices in the criminal proceedings conducted are binding on everyone and shall be complied with throughout the territory of the Republic of Estonia. [3]

There is a public database anyone can access. [4] Both position and the full name of a criminal offender are published until the punishment is served. After that, the name of the person in official documents is replaced with initials or characters. However, the latter does not always happen and the names are not always deleted, as an Estonian daily, Eesti Päevaleht, shows in an article. [5]

Information concerning punished persons and their sanctions is made public in the criminal records database, a state information system. [1] The court, the extra-judicial body which took the decision, or the Office of the President submits the data to the authorised processor of the database within five working days as of the entry into force of the decision, judgment or ruling. [2] There are no known exceptions for military personnel. The date, location and information on the hearing is published in the database of the Court Hearings. [3] The only exception concerning defence is that defence institutions can have a wider access to different types of personal data when hiring new personnel. The media regularly covers prominent hearings and results of prosecutions involving defence personnel.

Cases are investigated or prosecuted through formal processes and without undue political influence. There is no evidence of cases being influenced externally. Based on a new study, it can be inferred that the court system is objective and fair in Estonia. [1] At the beginning of this year, lawyers and prosecutors evaluated the trustworthiness of Estonia’s court system. 97% of prosecutors, 88% of lawyers and 80% of individuals who have turned to or been to court deemed Estonia’s court system trustworthy. There has been a discussion about whether there should be a separate court to deal with offences related to the military. At the moment, Estonia does not have specialised courts, the only exception being the Administrative Court. More specialised cases will be allocated to judges with special training in the sector. [2]

Access to public information, ensuring transparency, and prevention of corruption risks are among the main directions of the State Anti-Corruption Policy. These issues are addressed in the Anti-Corruption Strategy 2017 and Anti-Corruption Action Plan 2017-2018 which was adopted by the government [1] Public interest and transparency of investigations and prosecutions are key issues of Directives of Criminal Policy Principles adopted by the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) [2]. Corruption related crimes are investigated by the State Security Service (SA). Internal policy documents are not publicly available to confirm whether there is a formal policy of making public outcomes of prosecution for corrupt activities. However, the administration of the SA is responsible to ensure the transparency of processes and activities conducted by the SA [3]. Moreover, in annual reports of the SA [4] cases related to investigations of corrupt activities (including defence personnel) are included. There is evidence that investigations and prosecutions are covered in the media [5].

Article 3 of the Statute of Administration of the State Security Service, states that the administration is obliged to provide public information and publish them proactively. There is a list of information which has to be published quarterly or every year, approved by the minister by Decree #219. This list does not contain specific outcomes of prosecutions.

The results of prosecution of cases of public interest are publicly available in the media and online on the websites of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and Prosecutors Office of Georgia (PoG) [1, 2]. Court hearings usually are open and interested parties can attend all open hearings, as well as access information on the judgements. Summaries and short explanations of judgements on the cases of high public interest are published online on the websites of courts, and the PoG and MoD [1, 2, 3].

According to the government reviewer, both the charges and results of prosecutions are made publicly available [4,5,6,7,8].

From 2015-2017 the majority of publicly known cases were investigated and prosecuted objectively [1, 2]. There is no evidence of undue political influence. Only one case was reportedly identified as politically motivated, with evidence of undue political influence present; the “cables case” which brought charges to five high-ranking officials of the MoD. The Tbilisi Appeal Court convicted them for abuse of their authority [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8].

The military justice system is based upon the Armed Forces Act (1962), Act 105. The act does not provide a publication of the outcomes of prosecution for the public. The same goes for the Armed Forces Regulations, which regulates the procedures used by the tribunals, and does not provide publication of the outcomes of prosecution (1). Military personnel are tried before the military court for the most important breaches of the code of conduct, and before civilian tribunals for the most common prosecutions.

Information on prosecutions is not made publicly available. Neither the MOD or the GAF publish the outcomes of prosecution, the media occasionally cover the most salient cases (1), (2). Ghanaian tribunals do not have a publicly available database of their trials.

This indicator has not been assigned a score due to insufficient information or evidence.

According to the most recent Afrobarometer survey, the judiciary is perceived as the second most corrupt institution after the police (1). In 2015, an investigation led by the prominent Ghanaian journalist, Anas, exposed broad corruption practices in the judiciary system (2); the scandal prompted the Judicial Council to suspend more than 20 court judges and magistrates (3).

There is no clear policy on making the outcomes of prosecutions available [1]. However, the Ministry used to provide information in high-profile cases if that had a political relevance. As the military prosecution office was integrated into the general prosecution system, outcomes should be published both on the website of the ministry and the website of the prosecutor general [1]. Beyond prosecution phase, in high-level cases, both the regional court of appeal [2] or in case of an appeal in the second level the Budapest Regional Court of Appeal can issue press releases [3]. Unfortunately, there is no single page both in case of prosecution office nor in case of the courts of appeal where anybody can browse military-related cases in any format (that can be browsed or researched).
The most visible case recently was the “General case,” a major military corruption case linked to the socialist government between 2002-2010. The case was closed in January 2019, finding thirteen high-level officials including several generals guilty. However, the then state secretary was found innocent and was not convicted [4].

Very limited information is available on the results of military prosecutions. Annual reports consist of some data [1]. However, it is only aggregate information; the online portal of the prosecutor general also publishes the results of high-profile cases [2].

The Institution of the Prosecutor General is highly politicized and subject of criticism in every report on the rule of law and state of democracy in Hungary [1]. The fact a military prosecutor office was integrated limited the institutional independence as well as the transparency. The Venice Commission identified several shortcomings in its Opinion on Act CLXIII of 2011 on the Prosecution Service and Act CLXIV of 2011 on the Status of the Prosecutor General, Prosecutors and other Prosecution Employees and the Prosecution Career of Hungary, adopted on 19 June 2012. In its report, adopted on 27 March 2015, GRECO urged the Hungarian authorities to take additional steps to prevent abuse and increase the independence of the prosecution service by, inter alia, removing the possibility for the prosecutor general to be re-elected. Additionally, GRECO called for disciplinary proceedings against ordinary prosecutors to be made more transparent and for decisions to move cases from one prosecutor to another to be guided by strict legal criteria and justifications. According to the Hungarian Government, the 2017 GRECO Compliance Report acknowledged the progress made by Hungary concerning prosecutors (publication is not yet authorised by the Hungarian authorities, despite calls by GRECO Plenary Meetings) [2]. The Second Compliance Report is pending [1].

A judicial source confirmed in an interview with TI (1) that military courts, rulings and off-stage hearings favour a policy of non-disclosure, as the publication of such sensitive information could compromise national security. A detailed review of Iraq’s Military Criminal Procedures Law (2) further confirms that no formal policy of the disclosure of the outcome of military prosecutions ought to be made public (3).

In an interview with TI, one source (1) identified what he describes as a “rising trend in which investigations are promised, but results a[re] rarely disclosed”.

A report published by HRW (July 2018) underscores the failure of Iraq’s judicial institutions to “investigate [and] punish Security Forces implicated in abuse” of civilians in formerly ISG-occupied territories, lamenting the inaction of judges for having ignored allegations of torture and issuing convictions based on coerced/false confessions (1). News of investigations often slips off of the front pages of Iraqi press after it’s an announcement, with verdicts and prosecutions rarely reached. Iraqi PM Abadi announced in early September his decision to demote Basra’s Operations Commander Jamil Al Shammari, following a parliamentary vote, against the backdrop of civil unrest in Iraq’s oil-rich province of Basra (2), following calls from a handful of parliamentarians. Abadi sought the latter option, opting not to launch a judicial investigation capable of producing clear evidence and a verdict determined by the rule of law.

There is no evidence to suggest that Jordan has a policy to make the outcomes of prosecutions for corrupt activities of defence personnel available to the public. In fact, policy restricts access to information related to defence in general. Information about the defence sector is generally considered classified under Jordan’s Protection of State Secrets and Documents Provisional Law No. 50 [1]. As there is no legal framework to guarantee public access to defence information, there are also no policies to guarantee access to the outcomes of the prosecution of defence services personnel for corrupt activity. Most matters related to defence are considered classified. There has been in the past, cases of corruption within the intelligence services, where outcomes of prosecution were made public. There were several incidents when defence institutions were accused of corruption including the general intelligence services [2]. There were also a few instances of officials within the defence and security sector, such as the head of intelligence services, being put forward for trials and sentencing, which can be perceived as a way to increase the public’s trust in the willingness of the defence sector to counter corruption [3]. However, there is not a clear policy that guarantees public access to outcomes of the prosecution of defence personnel. The incidents where the public were given access to the outcomes of the prosecutions date before the armed forces prohibited the publications of news about them [4].

As previously established, there is generally no transparency in relation to defence matters, and for this reason it is safe to assume that there is no transparency regarding information on prosecutions. Jordan’s Protection of State Secrets and Documents Provisional Law No. 50, considers all matters related to defence as classified [1]. The armed forces prohibited the publication of its news in 2016 [2], immediately off the back of corruption accusations by the public about the chief of the army [3]. These claims were over the Chief attaining a publicly owned piece of land to build a private home. Beyond the accusations, the army chief was not prosecuted, and no investigation took place in relation to these accusations. There is not only no transparency in relation to making the outcomes of prosecutions available, there is a general lack of information around the defence sector in general, stipulated through policies that restrict access to such information and do not allow for defence scrutiny.

There is a complete failure to investigate or prosecute, even in the face of clear evidence, especially when it comes to the armed forces. Over the past few years, whenever accusations of corruption in the armed forces surface, these accusations are either responded to through armed forces statements or through silencing such accusations. Accusations levelled against the chief of the army were neither investigated nor prosecuted [1]. The corruption accusations against the armed forces, brought forward by the association of retired military personnel, which concerned the distribution of food parcels for retired military personnel, [2] were not investigated or prosecuted. Instead the armed forces issued a response statement, which indirectly meant that they had the final say over the matter. In addition to that, there is evidence of journalists and the public being prosecuted for defamation when they speak about Governmental corruption [3]. Therefore, there are many reasons and examples that make it safe to assume that cases of corruption are rarely prosecuted and that the defence sector is immune from such accusations by law, as explained in the above sub-indicators.

No policy document stipulates that prosecution outcomes should be made public.

The courts in Kosovo notify the public through announcements on their websites of upcoming hearing sessions, and provide information with regard to the charges being prosecuted [1]. However, some information is not made public, such as the results of prosecutions. The Prosecution Court releases some superficial information through a press release on its webpage, but information is minimal [2]. Nonetheless, in a move towards transparency, at least the courts are publishing these judgements [3]. All cases are conducted by the existing civil courts in Kosovo [4]. According to the government reviewer, KPC has regulated the policy on personnel corruption activities within the Regulation No. 04-2016 on Institutional Cooperation where it the procedure is regulated in detail.

Apart from the acting Minister of Defence and the former Deputy Minister of Defence who were charged in the famous case of the “Veterans” [1]; and the case of the two Kosovo Security Forces members were indicted for corruption offences [2], there is no other evidence that other defence services personnel of the Ministry of Defence and the Kosovo Security Forces have been subject of investigation or prosecution [3].

The military have the formal power to make the outcomes of prosecutions public, according to article 24 of the military trials’ law (1). However, the problem is that most prosecutions are never completed, and so they almost never have anything to announce. Auditors did not know if there is a written policy about this matter. It is not present in their publicly available laws but it may be present in their internal rules handbook.

The investigations into corruption are drawn out and they almost never result in successful prosecution for the security agencies to make public, officials and activists said (1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6). The security agencies are also tight-lipped about these investigations, and they did not officially tell the public who is being investigated and what charges they are facing. Any information about the individuals involved and their charges, as well as other details of the case, are the byproducts of speculation or informal conversations between activists and journalists with security or auditing officials.

The agencies are only willing to tell the public that they are investigating an issue or a trend, but sometimes lawmakers reveal details of the case.

There is a complete failure to prosecute but they do conduct investigations because of undue political influence, officials said (1, 2, 3 and 4). These investigations appear to be just for show, and they are often drawn out and the security agencies generally do not cooperate with the investigators. Sometimes auditors are explicitly told to kill cases by high-ranking auditing officials close to the Emir or by the security services, to whom fighting corruption is not a priority, officials said. (The officials behind the corrupt practices are often from powerful Kuwaiti tribes, whose happiness and silence the Emir is interested in buying while he tries to keep the instability of the region from affecting Kuwait, the officials said.)

There is no formal policy of the defense institution with regards to publishing outcomes of prosecution of personnel for corrupt activities. [1]

According to the government reviewer, however, Latvia has clearly set policy to make publicly available outcomes of the prosecution for corrupt activities, including in the military. KNAB and State Revenue Service are responsible for investigation and publication of all decisions regarding corruption and conflicts of interest prosecutions, including military, according to Article 31 of the Law on prevention of conflict of interests in the activities of public officials (Par interešu konflikta novēršanu valsts amatpersonu darbībā) [2].

All relevant information is public and available on the KNAB webpage either as press release (in criminal cases) or as a list of adopted decisions of penalties (administrative cases). MOD informs KNAB on all findings of possible corruption and conflicts of interest cases. Information on all KNAB administrative decisions, including military, is publicly available [1].

There is not enough evidence to score this indicator. However, according to the government reviewer, KNAB has effectively investigated and prosecuted respective cases involving the military and the related information is publicly available. Still there is not enough information to establish whether cases are investigated and prosecuted through formal processes without undue political influence.

Defence service personnel are prosecuted by a military court. According to Article 55 of the Code of Military Justice, the outcomes of the prosecutions are publically released. However, the court may prohibit the publication of the proceedings or summary of the prosecution if it deems it necessary (1).

The Military Court prosecution outcomes are published by local media outlets. The prosecutions announcements usually include information about the indicted persons, the trial process and the outcomes (fines, prison sentence, etc.). For example, a summary of the list of results may include the names, initials, or the number of persons tried in front of the court (1). The published results also include the main issues under which indicted personnel were charged such as terrorist activities (2). Some announcements might also be more specific to one prosecution case were they narrate and describe what went on during the hearing (3). Nevertheless, the proceedings are not open to the public, a key feature that human rights organisations such as HRW have called for an increase in the court’s transparency (4).

Cases of corrupt activities are investigated and prosecuted. For example, in July 2018, the Military Court sentenced 14 people involved in bribes acceptance to recruit civilians in the LAF (1). In 2017 the Military Court indicted 7 persons including civilians and former military personnel for being involved in a corruption case linked to the military academy (2). According to journalist Johnny Mounayar during a morning political talk show on a local TV station, he indicated that the 17 officers were prosecuted for corruption and dismissed from the army. The case was not publicized and the LAF blocked any political interference (3). Nevertheless, in 2016, the ALEF, a human rights organization, indicated that the Military Court had been a political tool to suppress individuals (4). HRW has reaffirmed this point in its 2017 report by describing the court as a tool for intimidation (5).

One of the main tasks declared in the anti-corruption defence program is to inform society about the activities of the Ministry of Defence, engage society in anticorruption efforts, make decisions in the defence sector more transparent, and publish more information about breaches of conduct [1,2]. The General Inspector is responsible for investigating possible violations and sending them to law enforcement institutions if necessary [3]. All national court judgements are public and can be found in the Lithuanian court information system [4]. However, the Ministry of Defence does not publish the outcomes of a prosecution, and does not disclose information about potential other criminal cases initiated in the sector. There is no official policy within the Ministry of Defence to specify prosecution outcomes being publicised. According to the government reviewer, the publicly available information about corruption related activities, investigations and prosecutions can be found on the following websites [5,6].

One of the main tasks declared in the anti-corruption defence program is to inform society about the activities of the Ministry of Defence, engage society in anticorruption efforts, make decisions in the defence sector more transparent, and publish more information about breaches of conduct [1,2]. The General Inspector is responsible for investigating possible violations and sending them to law enforcement institutions if necessary [3]. However, the General Inspector does not publish the outcomes of investigations online.
According to the government reviewer, the publicly available information about corruption related activities, investigations and prosecutions can be found on the website of the Lithuanian MoD [5,6].

Corruption cases that occur in any public sector are investigated or prosecuted through formal processes, and regulated by the Law of Criminal Process [1]. The Assessor found no information publicly available about cases of corruption investigated in the defence sector, but there are grounds to believe that were such cases to occur, these would be effectively prosecuted. Consequently, there is not enough evidence to support a score and this indicator is marked ‘Not Enough Information’.

Prosecutions of defence officials for corruption are exceedingly rare. Thus, it is difficult to judge what the policy of the Ministry of Defence is, in practice, towards the disclosure of prosecutions for corruption. In the statute book at least, there is no reference to a policy of disclosure with regard to prosecutions. Although the general statutes for the police and the armed forces stipulate disciplinary procedures and sanctions, there is no mention of whether such cases are automatically made public or not.¹ ²
However, the attitude of the government and the Ministry of Defence towards allegations of corruption can reliably be gauged from how they have reacted to corruption-related scandals in recent years. For instance, in November 2017, it was reported that officials within the Ministry of Defence were on the brink of revealing the identities of several senior security figures implicated in the embezzlement of military food allowances and the drawing of salaries from up to 13,000 ghost employees.³ Rather than have the Ministry of Defence suppress the report, the Ministry of Justice and the Attorney General instructed the Prosecutor General to open an investigation into the allegations.³
Similarly, in February 2016, the identities of four senior military leaders arrested for embezzlement were publicly revealed. Among more than the 20 arrested individuals were:
– Colonel Major Mary Diaar, from MDAC’s finance and equipment division
– Colonel Cheick Hamalla Traoré, from the budget and finance division
– Colonel Satao, from the general staff of the armed forces
– Captain Achofikoi Maïga, from the IT division.³
Meanwhile, in November 2016, the daughter of a military general, who worked as a cook at a police training school, was condemned to five years in prison and ordered to repay 75 million CFA (USD 140,500) to 95 victims.⁴ Sergeant Aminata Kané was found guilty of having solicited bribers to facilitate successful applications for posts in the customs authority, the police, the gendarmerie and the national guard.⁴ Applicants had been “encouraged” to pay between 100,000 CFA and 5 million CFA to secure jobs within the security forces.⁴ This rare prosecution and the details provided, along with previous arrests and investigations, indicate that while the security forces do not have formal policies relating to the disclosure of prosecutions and investigations, the details of such cases are frequently revealed.

Prosecutions of defence officials for corruption are exceedingly rare, despite some legislation in place.1,2 Thus, it is difficult to judge how transparent the Ministry of Defence is, in practice, in the disclosure of prosecutions for corruption. However, the attitude of the government and the Ministry of Defence towards allegations of corruption can reliably be gauged from how they have reacted to corruption-related scandals in recent years. The assessor has found evidence showing that the disclosure of details in relation to corruption investigations and prosecutions is sometimes comprehensive, but at other times is inconsistent and patchy, in keeping with an informal policy.
For instance, in 2011, an army colonel was arrested for allegedly embezzling approximately EUR 457,000 of military funds.⁵ He was detained and suspended from undertaking his military activities, but his identity was not revealed.⁵ By contrast, in February 2016, the identities of four senior military leaders arrested for embezzlement were publicly revealed. Among more than the 20 arrested individuals were:
– Colonel Major Mary Diaar, from MDAC’s finance and equipment division
– Colonel Cheick Hamalla Traoré, from the budget and finance division
– Colonel Satao, from the general staff of the armed forces
– Captain Achofikoi Maïga, from the IT division.³
Meanwhile, in November 2016, the daughter of a military general, who worked as a cook at a police training school, was condemned to five years in prison and ordered to repay 75 million CFA (USD 140,500) to 95 victims.⁴ Sergeant Aminata Kané was found guilty of having solicited bribers to facilitate successful applications for posts in the customs authority, the police, the gendarmerie and the national guard.⁴ Applicants had been “encouraged” to pay between 100,000 CFA and 5 million CFA to secure jobs within the security forces.⁴
Finally, in November 2017, it was reported that officials within the Ministry of Defence were on the brink of revealing the identities of several senior security figures implicated in the embezzlement of military food allowances and the drawing of salaries from up to 13,000 ghost employees.³ Rather have the Ministry of Defence suppress the report, the Ministry of Justice and the Attorney General instructed the Prosecutor General to open an investigation into the allegations.³

Prosecutions of defence officials for corruption are exceedingly rare, despite some legislation in place.1,2 Allegations of corruption within the defence sector are often investigated, although offenders are rarely held accountable. This is frequently due to political considerations and executive interference in the justice system.
The judicial system in Mali is unable to efficiently deliver prosecutions as a result of internal corruption. For example, in December 2013, judicial representatives threatened to hold an indefinite strike due to state interference in arrest warrants against judges accused of corruption.⁶ The same month, four judges and a court clerk were arrested on suspicion of corruption.⁷ A US State Department report also noted that “corruption and limited resources affected the fairness of trials. Bribery and influence peddling were widespread in the courts … There were problems enforcing court orders. Sometimes judges were absent from their assigned areas for months at a time”.⁷ For instance, in 2011, an army colonel was arrested for allegedly embezzling approximately EUR 457,000 of military funds.⁵ He was detained and suspended from undertaking his military activities, but there is no evidence he was subsequently prosecuted.⁵ In February 2016, the identities of four senior military leaders arrested for embezzlement were publicly revealed. Among more than the 20 arrested individuals were:
– Colonel Major Mary Diaar, from MDAC’s finance and equipment division
– Colonel Cheick Hamalla Traoré, from the budget and finance division
– Colonel Satao, from the general staff of the armed forces
– Captain Achofikoi Maïga, from the IT division.³
However, as of April 2018, there have been no reported charges brought against them.
In 2014, defence contracts signed under Defence Minister Soumeylou Boubeye Maïga (Sep 2013 – May 2014) were found to be irregular – according to Malian media, one contract with a Chinese supplier involved supplies invoiced at CFA 600million but budgeted at CFA 3 billion.⁸ ⁹ As a result, the Ministry of Defence cancelled 10 defence contracts, in which several private companies agreed to provide the Malian state with military equipment, and the central court arrested Maïga – it is unclear whether he was tried, charged or fined. But in December 2017, he returned to government to serve as IBK’s Prime Minister, suggesting that the clear failure of oversight and the subsequent arrest had a limited impact on the standing of the president’s ally.
Similarly, there have still been no charges brought against anyone in connection with the controversial off-budget purchase of a new presidential jet for USD35-40 million without parliamentary approval in 2014. Although the scandal caused the IMF to suspend its aid programme and prompted the BVG to conduct an exceptional audit into the purchase, no further action has been taken despite IBK’s promise earlier that year to prioritise fighting corruption.¹⁰ ¹¹
During this exceptional audit, the BVG determined the cost to be CFA 19 billion (around USD40 million), of which CFA 1.4 billion were commissions and fees paid to a broker linked to the president’s friend, Michel Tomi.¹⁰ ¹¹ Moreover, the BVG never received access to the plane’s operating contract, highlighting the limited ability of independent and external audit bodies to perform their functions in the face of opposition from the executive.¹⁰ ¹¹
The one rare case of a prosecution came in November 2016, when the daughter of a military general, who worked as a cook at a police training school, was condemned to five years in prison and ordered to repay 75 million CFA (USD 140,500) to 95 victims.⁴ Sergeant Aminata Kané was found guilty of having solicited bribes to facilitate successful applications for posts in the customs authority, the police, the gendarmerie and the national guard.⁴ Applicants had been “encouraged” to pay between CFA 100,000 and CFA 5 million to secure jobs within the security forces.⁴ However, the isolated prosecution of a lowly sergeant for a case involving USD 140,500 cannot make up for the lack of judicial action in relation to the off-budget purchase of a presidential jet for USD 35-40 million.

There is no formal policy of the Ministry or the army to make the outcomes of the prosecution publicly available. [1][2]

According to the MoD reviewer, Montenegrin legislation (Criminal Law, Law on Protection of Corruption, etc.) contains penal provisions and measures in this regard. The Law on Prevention of Corruption prescribes measures for prevention of conflict of public and private interest and shall regulate restrictions in the exercise of public functions, submission of reports on assets and income by public officials, protection of persons reporting threats to the public interest that indicate the existence of corruption, as well as other issues of importance to the prevention and suppression of corruption. (Article 1) Section VI (articles 102-105) regulates penal provisions for breachment of the Law.

The Criminal Code of Montenegro treats the following criminal offenses as criminal offenses against official duty in Section XXIII: 1) money laundering, Art. 268 of the Criminal Code; 2) violation of equality in performing economic activity, Art. 269; 3) causing bankruptcy, Art. 273 ;4) causing false bankruptcy, Art. 274) abuse of authority in the economy, Art. 276; 6) false balance, art. 278; 7) abuse of assessment, Art. 279; 8) disclosure of a trade secret, Art. 280; 9) disclosure and use of the stock exchange secret, Art. 281; 10) abuse of official position, Art. 416; 11) unscrupulous work in the service, Art. 417; 12) illegal mediation, Art. 422; 13) accepting bribes, Art. 423; 14) giving bribes, Art. 424; 15) disclosure of an official secret, Art. 425; 16) abuse of monopolistic position, Art. 270; 17) abuse of position in business operations, Art. 272; 18) fraud in the service, Article 419 of the Criminal Code.

No information is available on prosecutions of personnel in defence in official publications of the Ministry available on its website, [1] or on the website of the Army of Montenegro. [2]

According to the MoD reviewer, so far there have been no effective prosecutions and convictions for corrupt actions in practice, but if that happens it will be publicly available. This information could not be verified.

Corruption in defence is rarely reported due to the fear of reprisal. [1] Even when it is reported, the prosecution does not investigate such cases. [2][3]
So far, there have been no effective prosecutions and convictions for corrupt practices in practice. If that happens it will be publicly available, according to the MoD reviewer. This information could not be verified.

No evidence of a policy to publicise the outcomes of the prosecution of defence services personnel for corrupt activities was found. The only example of a public outcome of the prosecution of defence services personnel is the Adib case, which dates back to the late 1990s / early 2000s (1)(2). But in that case the outcome of the prosecution made available concerned Captain Adib, a whistleblower, and not the officers he accused of partaking in corruption activities.

As of October 2018 no legal public action was taken against the suspects. The main suspect, General Bennani (a close relation of the King and former general in charge of the Western Sahara region) passed away in 2015 of unrelated causes without having been prosecuted.

The only example of a public outcome of the prosecution of defence services personnel is the Adib case, which dates back to the late 1990s / early 2000s (1)(2).But in that case the outcome of the prosecution made available concerned Captain Adib, a whistleblower, and not the officers he accused of partaking in corruption activities.

As of October 2018 no legal public action was taken against the suspects. The main suspect, General Bennani (a close relation of the King and former general in charge of the Western Sahara region) passed away in 2015 of unrelated causes without having been prosecuted.

The only example of a public outcome of the prosecution of defence services personnel is the Adib case, which dates back to the late 1990s / early 2000s (1)(2). But in that case the outcome of the prosecution made available concerned Captain Adib, a whistleblower, and not the officers he accused of partaking in corruption activities.

As of October 2018 no legal public action was taken against the suspects. The main suspect, General Bennani (a close relation of the King and former general in charge of the Western Sahara region) passed away in 2015 of unrelated causes without having been prosecuted. The Adib case shows that corruption cases within the military are superficially investigated, or receive “show” hearings in which defendants are not punished.

No evidence was found of a formal policy to make public outcomes of the prosecution of defence services personnel for corrupt activities (1, 2). For example, there is no provision in the Military Code of 2003 (3), Chapter 1 (The Military Judicial Police), Articles 46–49, or Chapter III (Prosecution and Criminal Proceedings) about making public the outcome of prosecutions against an officer accused of corruption. This policy probably does not exist.

The results of prosecution are rarely made publicly available, and usually, there is no detailed public information on the charges or the hearing (1,2) .

There is very little public information regarding cases of security and defence personnel’s involvement in cases of corruption. Investigations regarding policemen or military officers are rare (1,2) .

There is no formal policy that the MOD or anti-corruption agencies have to make prosecution outcomes public information. There is an informal practice that does so, but no formal requirement. The recommendations of a presidential probe into military procurement between 2007-2015 was well-publicized. The policy is not clear, but sometimes with particularly egregious offences, there is more publicity. Cases with significant public interest such as the dismissal and or forced retirement of senior officials received a great deal of information available regarding their dismissal and subsequent prosecution (1).

There is no formal policy to make the outcomes of the prosecution of defence personnel public. Although there have been some high-profile prosecutions of defence personnel, the outcomes have not been made public as the trials are ongoing. The recommendations of the Presidential Probe into military procurement between 2007-2015 were well-publicized. This is a recent example which can be seen to demonstrate the degree commitment of the Buhari administration to tackle corruption (1).

Further, although there have been several prosecutions of defence personnel this has not been sustained. A part of the FGN commitment during the Open Government Partnership (OGP) process is to improve dialogue and communication with the public. Some other OGP commitments include: Develop a Permanent Dialogue Mechanism on transparency, accountability and good governance between citizens and government to facilitate a culture of openness, Government-Civil Society to jointly review existing legislation on transparency and accountability issues and make recommendations to the National Assembly; adopt a technology-based citizens’ feedback on projects and programs across transparency and accountability. Sometimes when information regarding prosecutions is made public, significant or critical details may be missing (2).

The mentioned cases were high-profile and unusual. There is no evidence of the same information being provided for all prosecutions.

Currently, several prosecutions are ongoing. The political pressure has been focused on getting convictions, rather than derailing the investigations or the prosecution of top military officials (1).

Formally, there is no specific policy regarding the publication of corrupt activities. However, over the past few years, the Ministry of Defence has openly revealed and strongly condemned several high corruption cases [1]. In line with this approach, it is possible that the adoption of official documents and by-laws within the Ministry of Defence to regulate this approach and publicise criminal prosecutions in order to better inform employees and the general public of these issue may be considered [2].

According the Law on Criminal Procedure [1], all outcomes of the prosecution of defence services personnel for corrupt activities are archived on the Criminal Court website, including details on hearings. As such, the public can follow the processes and Court decisions.
In addition, the results of criminal prosecution procedures for corrupt activities of defence personnel are often reported by the media. High-level corruption cases attracted high-level media coverage and public interest [2]. The verdict for Prime Minister Buckovski was published in numerous media, for example [3].

The case of the former Prime Minister and Defence Minister Vlado Buckovski was lengthy and complex, and saw a delayed prosecution. Buckovski was originally charged in 2007, yet 12 years later, the case was closed because of a 10 year statute of limitations [1].

Recently, there have not been any reports of high-level corruption cases in the area of defence and security [2].

There is no policy in the defence institutions to make outcomes of prosecution publicly available. According to Article 62 in the Basic Statute (1), corruption and bribery within the military and security services fall under the military judiciary exclusively. There is no policy regarding transparency of military courts, nor is there any stipulation on transparency within the Basic Statute (1), (2). According to our sources, there is no policy and no practice of making such information internally available within the different units of the army (3), (4).

No information on prosecutions in military courts is made publicly available. Publishing information on the prosecutions can be criminalized (1), (2). No media reports were found relating to corruption prosecution cases involving defence personnel (3), (4), (5). The open access to the information document on the eGovernment website, Omanuna, states clearly that issues regarding national security remain data protected (6). The military judiciary has no website, and no information or reference is made to the military judiciary activities on the Ministry of Defence website (1).

There is no information on the prosecution of defence services personnel for corruption activities available to the public (1), (2). The effectiveness of the military judiciary is weak. Most cases are superficially investigated without any serious consequences. There are rarely hearings of any kind.

Court proceedings and referrals to military prosecutions are not made public because there are no government procedures or legal provisions to support the publication of the information (1). Outcomes of prosecution are rarely publicly available if the cases are about corruption. Major incidents outside of corruption may result in a public outcome or prosecution (2), (3).

Court proceedings and referrals to the military prosecution are not made public because there are no government procedures or legal provisions to support the publication of such information (1). Prosecution of military personnel for other crimes is usually not publicly available (such as killings, shooting of civilians and attacks against civilians in demonstrations) (2).

Investigations or prosecutions are rare and usually superficial, even in the face of clear evidence (1), (2). There have been many cases of corruption where evidence was publicly available, but the PA has not prosecuted these cases. For instance, the ACC report mentions dozens of corruption cases and hundreds of missing financial records from senior officials (3). None of these issues has been investigated and prosecuted as per the report.
There are several cases of punishment policy towards corrupted security members: For example, the number of punished soldiers was: in 2009, (711), in 2010 (47), in 2011 (87), in 2012 (19), Aman Annual Corruption Report 2012 (p. 29), and in 2014, two members of the Public Prosecution were accused of corruption crimes, and they were referred to the Corruption Crimes Court; one of them holds the position of chief prosecutor and the second was a deputy prosecutor (4).

There is no evidence that there is a policy to make outcomes of prosecution publicly available in this context.

Information about investigations, detention of suspects and indictments filed with the court, related to the defence sector, are published by the news services of the military police [1], the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau [2] and the Prosecutor’s General Office [3]. Some of them are disseminated by the media. Courts do not publish news on sentences and punishments, nor do law enforcement agencies. Some news is published by media; however, due to the lengthy times of trials in Poland, these matters are not followed systematically [4].

In 2015 / 2016 / 2017 The Military Police started 27 / 32 / 49 new and continued 19 / 29 / 27 criminal investigations in corruption cases against military and civilian personnel. 5 / 5 / 14 indictments were filed with the court [1,2,3]. A growing trend may be observed.
In 2016 / 2017 Central Anti-Corruption Bureau started 4 / 5 criminal investigations in corruption cases in defence and security sector [4,5]. The report do not provide sector specific data how many indictments were filed with the court.
Also official statistics on convictions in corruption cases do not provide sector specific data. Some convictions has been reported by media. [6] Study of military courts judgments for the years 2010 – 2015 indicates that 66% (208 out of 297) of defendants in corruption cases were convicted. However, only 2 (1%) of them were sentenced on determinate prison period, the others got suspended prison sentence or non-prison sentence, as fine. [7] In all types of courts the level of determined prison sentences in case of corruption convictions is c. 9% in 2016-2017 [3].
In some high profile cases (as corruption charges against assistant of a former defence minister) media speculates that his arrest was possible only after his political protector was dismissed. (There are no traces of involvement of the former minister in corrupt activities of his assistant) [8]

There is no policy obliging defence institutions to make the outcomes of prosecutions publicly available. Prosecution of military personnel is confidential and almost all data related to the military, including its judicial system and internal processes, are confidential. [1,2]

There is no transparency in relation to the prosecution of defence personnel for corrupt activities. Information about the defence and security sectors are treated as confidential state secrets. There is no information available about prosecutions on any of the governmental websites. [1,2,3]

According to sources within the MoD, cases are investigated but superficially. Internally, the investigation also is superficial, and the hearings of defendants are simply to comply with procedure. [1,2,3]

The Saudi Anti-Corruption Law of 2007 states, authorities are obliged to publish the results of corruption cases “upon the request of the general prosecutor and the approval of the authority considering the case” (1). According to our sources, the legal framework indicates that corruption persecution of officials must be published to the public (2), (3), (4).

According to our sources, the government publishes information about cases, but they do not provide detailed information about the outcome of the prosecution process itself. According to our sources, there is a lack of transparency and enforcement (1), (2), (3).
The Saudi government typically does not release details of investigations or prosecutions relating to public officials, and such cases are primarily covered by the international press rather than local media outlets. The anti-corruption drive led by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in November 2017 did release some details relating to the individuals arrested and the charges against them, including senior military personnel such as then head of the Saudi Arabian National Guard Miteb bin Abdullah, who was accused of embezzlement and conflict of interest. Nonetheless, the government does not widely circulate or publish these details, and the abovementioned charges against Miteb bin Abdullah were again primarily published by international press sources including Reuters based on private discussions with Saudi government officials (4).

According to our sources, there is a lack of effectiveness in the prosecution of corruption cases. The recent crackdown on corruption is politically motivated that aims at strengthening MBS’ position in the royal family as the most powerful person. Cases are superficially investigated (1), (2), (3). The aforementioned anti-corruption campaign led by Mohammed bin Salman has targeted members of the Saudi military and defence establishment. However, this drive has attracted substantial criticism from international rights groups and observers, who have claimed that the detentions and investigations are an attempt by the crown prince to consolidate power, remove potential rivals and seize funds from the detainees to advance his reform programs (4). There is little information published regarding the status of many of the detainees or the penalties against them, and the trials, if there are any, are not public.

Policy for making outcomes of prosecutions public does not exist within the current legislative framework, which regulates the defence system [1, 2].

Information on prosecution outcomes is rarely made public. The archive on the MoD website does not contain any announcements containing information about the outcomes of the prosecution of MoD and SAF personnel or imposed sanctions [1]. Most media reports also stop with news of arrests and the disclosure of corrupt cases.

Since information on the outcomes of trials is not made public, it is difficult to comprehensively assess the effectiveness of prosecuting corrupt cases of defence personnel. Evidence of undue political influence can be seen in certain high-profile cases, such as a famous one involving the current defence minister and the shady origin of the money invested in real estate several years ago. Three prosecutor’s offices declared incompetence over the case; the investigation was stopped and the case closed [1].

Article 108 of the constitution provides that all prosecutions should be publicly available (1). The code of military justice in article 40 grants this same principle, otherwise the results of these prosecutions should be considered null and void. However, the court may order that the debates be held on camera in accordance with the law or whenever it believes that advertising can undermine the army. In all cases judgements must be pronounced publicly (2).

According to our sources, the outcomes of prosecutions are usually made public, but they often lack detail and hearings and charges are not published, which leave a room for speculations and rumours which in turn affect trust in the military judicial system (1,2). The Ministry of Defence does not publish statements and does not communicate about this issue on its website or in the media (3).

According to our sources, some cases have been investigated and prosecuted, but not all of the cases are prosecuted, and many are superficially investigated (1,2). The Anti-Corruption Authority (INLUCC) annual report for the year 2017 mentions that 7 cases of corruption have been transmitted to justice by the Ministry of Defence (3).

According to Ukrainian legislation, the NAPC must publish, annually, a National Report on the Implementation of Anti-Corruption Policy Principles which inter alia includes statistics on corruption cases [1]. It also informs the public about the measures taken to prevent corruption [2]. However, public authorities are not obliged to publish the results of anti-corruption prosecutions [4]. There is no formal policy to publish outcomes of prosecutions, although individuals are entitled [3] to receive information on anti-corruption activities upon filing information requests. There is, however, an informal policy of MoD to make outcomes of prosecution publicly available [5]. In practice, the Corruption detection and prevention unit (department) in MoD is leading/supervising the Working group #5 devoted to anticorruption activities in the framework of Reforms Committee under the supervision of MoD togather with foreign advisers and experts and civil society. The meetings of Working group #5 used to be organized once in a month. Foreign experts and civil society were invited on them. During such meetings the Corruption detection and prevention unit openly reported their activity in MoD Central Staff and situation in regions. They directly described the detected corruption cases in the defence system of Ukraine and their prosecution. Last such meeting was in the end of 2019. Meetings were fully open to public. However, in the majority corruption cases the final punishment was a fine, not a prison sentence. But in general, the number of cases for prosecution the corruption crimes had positive dynamic in Ukraine, at least up to 2018 [5].

Some of the charges and results of prosecution are made publicly available [1, 2, 3], although it is difficult to say what share of the actual charges and results of prosecution are published. On a separate website, information on the court hearings can be found (including date, location and brief information on the charge) [4]. As of April 2018, Ukraine does not have court-martials although there have been attempts to set them up [5].

There are several public institutions responsible for the investigation and prosecution of offences including corruption offences by defence personnel. SAPO prosecutes top-level corruption offences (including defence and security top-level officials) following NABU’s investigation. All other cases are currently prosecuted by the General Prosecutor’s Office (Military Prosecutor’s Office), following investigations conducted by either the SSU or the National Police depending on particular infringement type. The NABU can be seen to be one of the effective and independent institutions tasked to combat corruption and corruption amongst defence personnel as well; it is also one of the first public institutions to investigate high-level corruption cases with active MoD officials involved [1, 2, 3]. There are reasons to doubt SAPO’s independence and effectiveness since its Head was recently accused of corruption [4]. Equally doubtful is the effectiveness of the Military Prosecutor’s Office and Security Service of Ukraine since there is evidence that they subjected to undue political influence [5, 6].

There is no evidence to suggest that there is a policy within the defence institutions to make the outcomes of prosecutions publicly available. Furthermore, there is no evidence of any public information available about the prosecution of cases of corruption within the defence institutions themselves. As previously explained, several laws apply to defence sector personnel concerning corruption and bribes. These include the armed forces-specific Federal Laws No. 6 and 7 of 2004, the UAE Federal Law No. 3 of 1987 (as amended) (the “Penal Code”); the UAE Federal Law No. 21 of 2001 concerning Civil Service; the Dubai Government Human Resources Management Law No. 27 of 2006; and the Abu Dhabi Law No. 1 of 2006 concerning Civil Service in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi (1), (2). Cases of corruption within the army (if they exist) are handled secretly and never made public (4), (5).

There is a total lack of transparency about making the outcomes of the prosecution of defence personnel available to the public. Researchers could not identify a single case of defence corruption made publicly available whether officially by prosecutors or through the media. The websites of the UAE’s official government portal, the Ministry of Defence and official media outlets do not mention a single case of corruption within the defence forces (1), (2), (3). Some information is shared on the government’s website about Public Prosecution, but this information only includes procedures followed, rather than cases or outcomes (4), (5).

This sub-indicator has been marked as Not Applicable, as there is no defence institution policy to make the outcomes of prosecutions publicly available, as set out in 49A, it is irrelevant within this context to assess the policy’s effectiveness as it is non-existent (1), (2).

Country Sort by Country 49a. Policy Sort By Subindicator 49b. Transparency Sort By Subindicator 49c. Effectiveness Sort By Subindicator
Albania 0 / 100 50 / 100 50 / 100
Algeria 0 / 100 25 / 100 0 / 100
Angola 0 / 100 0 / 100 50 / 100
Armenia 0 / 100 100 / 100 75 / 100
Azerbaijan 25 / 100 25 / 100 25 / 100
Bosnia and Herzegovina 75 / 100 NEI 50 / 100
Burkina Faso 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Cameroon 0 / 100 25 / 100 50 / 100
Cote d'Ivoire 50 / 100 50 / 100 75 / 100
Egypt 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Estonia 100 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100
Georgia 100 / 100 100 / 100 75 / 100
Ghana 0 / 100 0 / 100 NEI
Hungary 50 / 100 25 / 100 50 / 100
Iraq 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Jordan 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Kosovo 0 / 100 50 / 100 50 / 100
Kuwait 50 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Latvia 100 / 100 75 / 100 NEI
Lebanon 100 / 100 50 / 100 50 / 100
Lithuania 50 / 100 50 / 100 NEI
Mali 0 / 100 50 / 100 25 / 100
Montenegro 50 / 100 0 / 100 25 / 100
Morocco 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Niger 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Nigeria 0 / 100 50 / 100 50 / 100
North Macedonia 50 / 100 100 / 100 75 / 100
Oman 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Palestine 0 / 100 0 / 100 25 / 100
Poland 0 / 100 50 / 100 75 / 100
Qatar 0 / 100 0 / 100 25 / 100
Saudi Arabia 100 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Serbia 0 / 100 25 / 100 50 / 100
Tunisia 100 / 100 50 / 100 50 / 100
Ukraine 50 / 100 50 / 100 50 / 100
United Arab Emirates 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100

With thanks for support from the UK Department for International Development and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs who have contributed to the Government Defence Integrity Index.

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