The actual spending are published in quarterly report on budgetary rexecution but are not very detailed. There is some explanation provided but it is superficial. The actual spending published are not presented in details concerning acquisition of defense and security equipment.[1]

In the quarterly reports, the vast majority of of actual defence spend is not includeds. The Court of Auditors and the National Assembly are competent to control the entire budget, but on the expenses covered by secrecy, it is not clear how effective this oversight. [1] [2]

There is no aggregated document with actual defence spending for the year, only the quarterly reports with scarce information on the MoD. [1]

No explanation on variances between the budget and actual spending has been publicly provided in the last 5 years. [1]

Quarterly reports on actual spending are not made available to the published on the execution of the budget which include some informationon the Ministry of Defence’s expenditure divided in 4 categories (personnel, equipment, . However, no explanation is included. However, the last report published was for the first term of 2022. [1][2]

Only little information is published in the quarterly reports. [1][2]

Quarterly reports published on the execution of the budget which include some information on the Ministry of Defence’s expenditure but the last report published was for the first term of 2022 and it was publlished 12th October 2022.[1] [2]

The last report was published in 2022 and no explanation of the variances was inclluded. [1] [2]

In Cameroon, the government does not proactively publish comprehensive data on defence spending. Although budget documents are occasionally released, they generally lack detailed and disaggregated reports on actual expenditures throughout the fiscal year. The State Budget Execution Report for the Fiscal Year 2023 does not provide information on the Ministry of Defence’s actual expenditure.[1] Information on defence spending is typically only available upon request, reflecting a reactive approach to transparency rather than a proactive one.[2] This limited level of transparency significantly hinders legislators, civil society, and the public from holding government officials accountable for the proper use of defense resources.[3]

No information on actual defence spending is published in Cameroon, so this indicator is marked Non-Applicable.[1][2][3]

No information on actual defence spending is published in Cameroon, so this indicator is marked Non-Applicable.[1][2][3]

No information on actual defence spending is published in Cameroon, so this indicator is marked Non-Applicable.[1][2][3]

In Côte d’Ivoire, current defence expenditure is included in budget implementation reports, but the level of detail is limited. The Ivorian government regularly publishes budget implementation reports, notably through the Settlement Act and the reports of the Court of Auditors. These documents provide overall information on public revenue and expenditure, including that allocated to the defence sector. For example, the report presenting the Settlement Act for the year 2023 indicates that total authorised expenditure amounted to 11,792.6 billion CFA francs, representing an execution rate of 93.5%. However, these reports do not specifically detail expenditure by ministry, making it difficult to analyse the Ministry of Defence’s expenditure accurately [1, 2].

The vast majority of actual defence expenditure is not made public. Sometimes, only the total value of the Minisetre is disclosed, without further details [1, 2].

The reports, although providing very little detail on current expenditure, were published within 12 months of the end of the budget year [1, 2].

The discrepancies between the published defence budget and actual expenditure are not explained [1, 2].

A review of the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) for the Ministry of Defence indicates that it is primarily a forward-looking, planned expenditure document. While the MTEF for 2024–2027 provides a breakdown of projected spending into key components—such as Compensation of Employees (CoE), Goods and Services, Capital Expenditure (CAPEX), Internally Generated Funds (IGFs), and Grants and Loans—it does not provide a detailed reconciliation of these projections with actual expenditure outcomes for previous years (1). Although the MTEF includes historical figures for 2021 to 2023 alongside projections, these are not accompanied by a clear narrative explaining deviations between planned and actual expenditure.
In contrast, the Report of the Parliamentary Select Committee on Defence and Interior (PSCDI) on the 2023 Annual Budget Estimates of the Ministry of Defence presents aggregated expenditure figures that appear to reflect actual spending for certain categories. However, these are provided in a summarised form, without detailed explanations for each component or project-level disaggregation (2).
Independent verification of actual defence expenditure is provided through the Auditor General’s annual reports, which audit the Ministry’s financial statements and assess compliance with the Public Financial Management Act. These reports often flag discrepancies, arrears, and procurement compliance issues. However, while these audits verify figures and compliance, they do not always provide a fully disaggregated, publicly accessible breakdown of actual defence spending at the project or contract level (3).

As part of their annual reports, the Parliamentary Select Committee on Defence and Interior comprehensively reviews the defence expenditure for the financial year, provides a report on these expenses, and makes recommendations for their implementation. Typically, the financial performance of the MOD falls into three categories: employee compensation, goods and services, and capital expenditure. (1) These figures are also presented in budget performance and Auditor General’s reports, which disclose most MOD expenditures from 2021 to 2023 (2)(3).

Because of their sensitive nature, some aspects are unavailable to the committee and therefore do not appear in the report. Therefore, the PSCDI plays a robust oversight role over the MOD’s budget before the plenary passes it. (2) There is also a detailed report of the actual expenditure of the MOD from 2021 to 2023 demonstrating a full disclosure of military expenditure annually. (3) While oversight mechanisms exist through the PSCDI, the Ministry of Finance, and the Office of the Auditor General, the depth and effectiveness of scrutiny over the entire budget, including classified items, is not clearly documented in publicly available sources.

Details of the reports are typically published between the eleventh and twelfth month, as the 2022 spending was made available in December 2023. (1) (2)

The variances of the actual expenditure and budget are included in the MTEF (2). The document gives a highlight of the various budgetary allocations from 2021 to 2023. The 2021 budget indicates an allocation of Gh₵ 2.102 billion with Gh₵ 1.501 billion for Compensation of Employees (CoE), Gh₵ 46.974 million for Goods and Services, Gh₵ 193.925 million for Capital Expenditure (CAPEX), Gh₵ 25.731 million for Internally Generated Funds (IGFs) and Gh₵ 334.909 million for Grants/Loans. However, Gh₵ 1.687 billion was released, which included Compensation of Employees (CoE), Goods and Services and Capital Expenditure (CAPEX) amounting to GH¢1.513b, GH¢33.947m and GH¢139.847m, respectively. Similarly, for the 2022 financial year, an amount of GH¢2.244b was planned for expenditure that comprised GH¢1.800b for Compensation of Employees (CoE), GH¢35.148m for Goods and Services, GH¢196.905m for Capital Expenditure (CAPEX), GH¢29.904m for Internally Generated Funds (IGFs) and GH¢181.597m for Grants/Loans. However, by the end of the financial year, GH¢2.247b was spent, consisting of Compensation of Employees (CoE) of GH¢2.194b, Goods and Services of GH¢7.269m, GH¢17.348m for Capital Expenditure (CAPEX) and GH¢28.376m for Internally Generated Funds (IGF).(2) There is no detailed narrative explaining the reasons for over/under-spending. (1)(2)

The Ministry of Defence produces an annual report on budget allocation and expenditure, broken down into National Defence, Civic Aid, National Space Management, General Administration, Planning and Support Services. However, this report lacks both detailed explanations for experts and clear, concise summaries for non-experts.
The ministry prepares Annual Performance Reports Annually as required by law [1]. This Annual Performance Report for FY 2022/23 for the ministry complies with Article 153 (4)(b) of the Constitution of Kenya 2010 [2] and Section 10 (h) of the Kenya Defence Forces Act, 2012 [3]. It requires the Cabinet Secretary for Defence to report to the President and Parliament on the ministry’s expenditure, work, and achievements. The report is based on the Ministerial Performance Contract, Strategic Plan, Work Plan, Procurement Plan, Cash Flow Projections, and Government Policy Guidelines. It highlights key deliverables, challenges faced, and recommendations for improving defence to meet national security goals [3].

The Budget Policy Statement (BPS) provides only headline allocations for defence, without line-item details on operations, procurement, or intelligence, which are withheld on national security grounds [1]. For example, in August 2024, Defence Cabinet Secretary Aden Duale explicitly declined to disclose how the KDF spent KSh 135 billion, citing security sensitivities [2]. While aggregate defence figures are included in budget documents such as the 2023/24 Supplementary Estimates, the vast majority of actual defence spending is not made publicly available, with expenditure remaining opaque beyond top-line allocations.

Kenya’s financial year runs from July 1st of the current calendar year to June 30th of the following year. The budget-making process begins in August of the current financial year and concludes in December of the following financial year. A financial year serves as the accounting and budgeting period for governments and encompasses financial reporting. It is also known as a fiscal year or, occasionally, a budget year. In Kenya, a financial year is divided into four quarters, each spanning three months. The first quarter runs from July 1st to September 30th, the second quarter from October 1st to December 31st, the third quarter from January 1st to March 31st, and the fourth quarter from April 1st to June 30th.The budget process in Kenya allows for public participation at various stages and occurs at both the national and county levels [1].
The Annual Performance Report for FY 2022/23 for the Ministry of Defence complies with Article 153 (4)(b) of the Constitution of Kenya 2010 and Section 10 (h) of the Kenya Defence Forces Act, 2012 [2]. It requires the Cabinet Secretary for Defence to report to the President and Parliament on the Ministry’s expenditure, work, and achievements [2]. There is no clear evidence that the Ministry of Defence consistently submits or publishes its performance reports within six months of the fiscal year’s end. Also, it is unclear when the report is exactly published or whether the legal timelines are kept [3]. Therefore, the highest score is not met.

Aden Duale, the Defence Cabinet Secretary, refused to provide a detailed breakdown of KDF’s expenditure for the 2022/2023 financial year when he appeared before the National Assembly’s Committee on Defence and Foreign Relations. According to the report presented to the committee, the Cabinet Secretary only disclosed that KDF spent
• Ksh98 billion on emoluments and salaries
• Ksh28 billion on operational costs of military bases, including food
• Ksh1.7 billion on maintenance of major parts and equipment
• Ksh1 billion on civil aid
• Ksh1 billion on border security
• Ksh4 billion on modernization of KDF equipment [1].

However, the breakdowns are not publicly provided hence it is difficult to ascertain any variances for discussion. The MoD has refused to provide the breakdown on security grounds [3, 4].

Liberia publishes certain budget documents, including the Executive Budget Proposal, Enacted Budget, and In-Year Reports. However, these documents often lack detailed disaggregation specific to defence and security expenditures. Figures on actual spending are released occasionally and not done in a systematic and proactive manner. Also, figures or data released are not as comprehensive. Instead, a comprehensive data on actual spending are often obtained following a period of audit, internal and external.[1][2] For instance, the GAC’s 2024 report on the Executive Protection Service, uncovered US$15.7 million in undocumented spending on Special Operations and Intelligence Services.[3] Similarly, a 2020 GAC audit flagged the Defence Ministry’s US$5.8 million unsupported expenditures for FY2013–2017.[4] These findings confirm that comprehensive figures are typically the product of reactive audits.
The Citizens Budget, intended to present budget information in an accessible format for non-experts, has been produced but scored 42 out of 100 in the 2023 Open Budget Survey, indicating room for improvement in clarity and comprehensiveness [5]

This information is not available as standalone data on the defence sector. However, similar information be gathered from the consolidated funds account financial statements produced by the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning (MoFDP).[1] As in the case of the overall national budget, the Armed Forces of Liberia’s budget is embedded in the Ministry of National Defense budget which means that armed forces spending is not readily available [2].
While the majority of actual defence spending is disclosed, there are notable gaps:
– In-Year Reports: These reports are published and include information on actual expenditures. However, they may not provide detailed breakdowns specific to defence spending.
– Audit Reports: The General Auditing Commission conducts audits, but some reports have been designated for internal use only, limiting public access.
– Oversight is primarily conducted by the legislature’s Public Accounts Committees (PAC), but the effectiveness of this oversight can be hindered by limited access to comprehensive audit information.[3]

Timely reporting is poor. Much of the spending reports available were triggered by auditors, and they are accessible more than twelve months after the fiscal year.[1][2] For instance, the 2021 Year-End Report was published but scored 60 out of 100, suggesting that while available, it may lack comprehensive details.[3] Some audit reports have not been published within the recommended 18 months after the end of the fiscal year, reducing their effectiveness in providing timely insights into actual spending.

The Year-End Reports provide some information on variances between budgeted and actual spendings.[1] However, the explanations for these variances are often limited in detail. Instances of overspending, such as the NSA’s budget excess, were not accompanied by detailed explanations or justifications, and the required statements of excess expenditure were not submitted to the Legislature or the Office of the President, as mandated by the Public Financial Management Act.[2][3]

Regarding actual expenditures on defence and security, only those that are included in the finance laws are known. No details and no explanations are generally provided when it comes to actual expenditures during the budget year. The Settlement Act may contain some details on actual expenditures but it is not published until a few years after the adoption of the finance laws, the last published was for the 2020 fiscal year. The quarterly budget implementation reports include very few information on the Ministry of Defense, mainly pictures of realisation, and no figure on actual spending is included. [1][2]

Actual expenditure of the Ministry of Defence is not published. [1][2]

Actual expenditure of the Ministry of Defence is not published. [1][2]

Actual expenditure of the Ministry of Defence is not published. [1][2]

Quarterly reports on the execution of the budget are published and some highly aggregated information is available for the Minisitry of Defence. No explanation is provided.[1][2]

The information available is divided in the same functions that in the finance law : General administration of the army ( personnel, goods ans services, investments, acquisitions), military operations, training , transmissions and the militray inspectorate. However, figures available for these functions are aggregated and not detailed.[1][2]

The last quaterly report for the fiscal year 2024 was published in April 2025, four months later.[1][2]

Variances between the published budget and actual expenditure are not explained at all.[1][2]

Details of actual expenditure on defence and security In the General State Account and in the General State Budget Implementation Instruments are proactively published in a disaggregated manner [1]. The data presented are always accompanied by a detailed explanation of their implementation, but they have some shortcomings, because they are presented in an excessively broad or general way in some parts [2]. The details of defence and security expenditure are published in the General State Account, in the execution of the State Budget and in the balance sheet of the Economic and Social Plan, in a very general way [3]. In the State budget, general aspects are the value of the allocated allocation and the percentage in relation to GDP, while specific aspects are the expenditure summary, investment priorities and acquisitions, in comparison with the allocated budget allocation, the product indicators and the budget by activity, which appear disintegrated [4].

The Ministry of Economy and Finance publishes economic and social management instruments that disclose the vast majority of actual defence expenditure [1,2,3]. However, for security reasons, certain legitimate sensitive areas and operational matters may be exempt from full disclosure, as permitted by the Law on State Secrets and the Law on the Right to Information [4].
Defence spending is presented in the General State Account and other Economic and Social Management Instruments, which are discussed in Parliament and published by the Ministry of Economy and Finance [1]. Despite these classified exceptions, oversight of the entire budget is still mandated and carried out by appropriate authorities [5].

The General State Account is the main document used to present the State’s financial statements [1]. According to Law No. 9/2002, the SISTAFE Law (Introduces the Electronic State Financial Administration System, similar to financial e-gov), the Government must provide information on the implementation of the Economic and Social Plan and the General State Budget to the Assembly of the Republic every six months, within 45 days of the end of the semester [2]. With regard to the State Budget, the Government must also provide information on its implementation to the Assembly of the Republic every three months [1].
In practice, the final General State Account is submitted to the Assembly and made public within six months of the end of the financial year as assessed by the Open Budget Partnershup (End-Year Report) [3].

In terms of comparison against budget, despite the variations between the published budget and actual expenditure, detailed data on general expenditures are provided throughout the budget year in several key documents: the State General Account [1], the Budget Execution Report [2], the Economic and Social Plan Balance Sheet [3], and, when necessary, the Rectifying Budget.
According to the 2023 Open Budget Survey [4], Mozambique’s budget execution documents do provide explanations for significant variances between planned and actual spending in most sectors [5].
However, the level of detail varies, explanations are more comprehensive for economic and social sectors, while in the defence sector, operational expenditures are classified as State and Military Secrets [4].

While Niger’s defense budget is formally published as part of the annual financial law in the Official Journal, the level of transparency remains extremely limited. The published budget is highly aggregated, providing only generalized budgetary explanations without a meaningful breakdown of defense and security expenditures [1]. Large portions of the defense budget remain undisclosed, and no clear justification is provided for these omissions, raising serious concerns about financial opacity and accountability.
The situation has worsened significantly following the military coup of July 26, 2023. A decree issued in February 23, 2024 by the ruling military authorities abolished the law that previously mandated oversight of defense expenditures. This decision completely removes military spending from public scrutiny, eliminating both preemptive (a priori) and retrospective (a posteriori) controls over defense finances [2] . As for actual spending, quaterly budgetary execution reports are published but there is no mention of the defence sector allocation. on actual spending [1]. The recent decree has institutionalized financial secrecy in the defense sector, further deepening governance and corruption risks. [3]

In Niger, no detailed information on actual defence spending is publicly available, making comprehensive financial transparency non-existent, so this indicator is marked Not Applicable. [4] While the defence budget is formally included in the annual financial law [1], it is presented in an aggregated format, lacking specific breakdowns of expenditures related to operations, procurement, or personnel costs. Additionally, a recent military decree has further eliminated legal provisions requiring oversight of defence spending, effectively removing defence expenditures from public scrutiny altogether. [2]

In Niger, no actual spending data for defence is made publicly available, making it impossible to assess the timeliness of reporting, so this indicator is marked Not Applicable. While the defence budget is included in the annual financial law [1], it is presented in an aggregated form without detailed expenditure breakdowns, meaning there is no public access to real-time or periodic updates on actual spending. Moreover, following the military coup of July 26, 2023, a new decree abolished legal oversight mechanisms for defence expenditures, further institutionalizing financial opacity [2]. With defence spending now completely exempt from public scrutiny, there are no published reports or disclosures that could be evaluated for their timeliness.

In Niger, no actual spending data for defense is publicly available, making it impossible to compare actual expenditures against the approved budget, so this indicator is marked Not Applicable.While the defense budget is published annually in the financial law, it is highly aggregated and lacks detailed expenditure breakdowns, preventing any meaningful financial analysis [1]. Following the military coup of July 26, 2023, the government issued a decree abolishing legal oversight mechanisms for defense spending, further entrenching secrecy and the absence of financial accountability [2]. As a result, there is no publicly accessible data on actual defense expenditures, making budget comparisons impossible.

While Nigeria’s defence budget and allocations are publicly accessible (e.g., via BudgIT’s dashboard), these reflect planned funding, not actual expenditure [1]. Real outturn data, covering how defence funds were spent, are infrequently disclosed in detail. There is no public publication on actual spending or quarterly/mid-year reports on Defence budget, just as there is no public available audited report on Defence actual spending. The Defence actual spending is shrouded in secrecy with minimal/weak oversight. There is no publicly available report or quarterly/bi-annual update on the actual spending either [4].
Although some information on military expenditure is available, this information is not disclosed by official sources [2].

Budget Implementation Reports (BIRs) from the Budget Office do cover capital releases and utilisation rates but do not provide full breakdowns for defence in an accessible manner. In many years, defence capital funds fall below 85% utilisation, but personnel and overhead spending remain unverified outside the Ministry [3].

There is no public publication on actual spending or quarterly/mid-year reports on Defence budget, just as there is no public available audited report on Defence actual spending. The Defence actual spending is shrouded in secrecy with minimal/weak oversight. There is no publicly available report or quarterly/bi-annual update on the actual spending either [1]. Although some information on military expenditure is available, this information is not disclosed by official sources [2].
Therefore this indicator is marked Not Applicable.

There is no public publication on actual spending or quarterly/mid-year reports on Defence budget, just as there is no public available audited report on Defence actual spending. The Defence actual spending is shrouded in secrecy with minimal/weak oversight. There is no publicly available report or quarterly/bi-annual update on the actual spending either [1]. Although some information on military expenditure is available, this information is not disclosed by official sources [2].
Therefore this indicator is marked Not Applicable.

There is no public publication on actual spending or quarterly/mid-year reports on Defence budget, just as there is no public available audited report on Defence actual spending. The Defence actual spending is shrouded in secrecy with minimal/weak oversight. There is no publicly available report or quarterly/bi-annual update on the actual spending either [1]. Although some information on military expenditure is available, this information is not disclosed by official sources [2].
Therefore this indicator is marked Not Applicable.

Just as the budget is voted without debate in the National Assembly, the Ministry’s annual expenditure report is not made available to the public in details. [1] In the budget execution report for the first quarter of 2024, the expenditure details of the Ministry of Armed Forces are not included. [2] . The budget includes a Performance Framework comprising specific objectives, expected results, actions and indicators. This is a three-year programming of appropriations: multiannual budgeting over three years in which only the nature of certain expenditure such as salaries, goods and services and capital transfers appears, without any specific details on the nature of the expenditure. [3]

In Senegal, no information on actual spending is published in the budget execution quarterly reports. [1] However some information is included in the Court of Auditors’s reports (Cour des Comptes) but not in details. [2]

The report of on budget execution for the 2022 fiscal year was only published in 2024, i.e. more than two years later. [1]

Disscrepancies between the published budget and actual expenditure are not explained. [1] [2] [3] .

Actual expenditure against budget allocations is reflected in the Department of Defence’s Annual Report in disaggregated form. In cases of significant deviations, this is accompanied with explanations and expenditures are generally accessible through budget explanations. [1] In year reporting on budget performance is shared with relevant parliamentary committees. [2]

Most of the Department of Defence’s spending is disclosed and publicly available with the exception of sensitive areas. [1] By comparison, budget allocations for the State Security Agency are only disclosure as a line item. [2] Although the Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence can be provided this information in closed sessions, the effectiveness of oversight is doubtful considering known challenges with the politicisation of the parliamentary oversight function as well as complaints from the Auditor-General over a lack of full access to all areas of spending. [3]

According to National Treasury Guidelines, departments are required to submit draft annual reports to the Auditor-General by 31 May, two months after the end of the financial year. Thereafter, annual reports should be the executive authority by 31 August and tabled in Parliament by September 30. [1] The Department of Defence has complied with this timeline, tabling relevant Annual Reports in Parliament in September less than six months following the end of the financial year. [2]

Variance between actual expenditure and budgets are explained in detail in the Department of Defence’s Annual Report. [1]

The annual budget publishes estimates that give an idea of the amount the defence ministry intends to spend in a financial year. However, this information is too general. Only overall estimates are provided but not in fine details. For example, the 2023 -2024 approved budget has only five pages of budget for the Ministry of Defence (pages 439 to 444) [1]. The challenge often comes with expenditure where the military tends to spend more than it was allocated in the budget raising concerns over whether the estimates provided for in the budget are accurate. [2] Reports on actual spending are not made available to the public at all. [3]

There are audit reports published online from the National Audit Chamber and they include reports of auditing done on the Ministry of Defence and Veteran Affairs. One would expect that these reports would provide deeper insight on the actual spending by the defence ministry. However, the information contained is not sufficient to conclude that a thorough audit was conducted. For example, in the 2023-2024 audit plan conducted by the National Audit Chamber, only procurement of food rations by the Ministries of Interior and Defence were included. [1]. However, since reports on actual spending are not made available to the public at all, this indicator is scored Not Applicable.

There is no comprehensive publication of actual defence spending in South Sudan during the budget year. While high-level figures (e.g., total defence allocation and capital expenditure) are sometimes published—such as the 2023/24 draft budget revealing SSP 143.3 billion for defence with SSP 6.7 billion earmarked for capital—detailed, audited expenditure data are never made public [1]. The last time more granular budget information was revealed was in that 2023/24 draft; however, it remains limited to aggregate allocations and lacks any follow-up reporting on actual spending, transaction-level detail, or in-year budget execution—meaning legislators and the public receive no accounting of how much was actually spent or on what items [2]. Since reports on actual spending are not made available to the public at all, this indicator is scored Not Applicable.

The Ministry of Defence and Veteran Affairs has come under scrutiny for being one of the departments with huge variances between the published budget and the actual expenditure. Perhaps the most striking example was an attempt to revive a contract for vehicles and communications equipment that had previously been thwarted. In this contract the Ministry was single sourcing from Ater’s Lou Trading company the supply of goods and services valued at 12.5 billion SSP yet the budget for goods and services in the Ministry for the entire year was 1.4 billion SSP. [1] This single contract would therefore exceed approved military spending by a factor of ten, surpassing the government’s entire 9.3 billion SSP budget for goods and services. [1] Similar trends have been flagged by the Ministry of Finance in the recent years. [2]
However, no further data on these variances is available. Therefore, this indicator is marked Not Applicable.

MoF’s Budget Portal and Vote Performance Reports offer disaggregated spending data within the financial year, often broken down by major line items or programs. This allows tracking of actual MoD expenditure [1]. These reports typically do include some narrative or brief reasoning (e.g., underperformance due to delayed releases or procurement bottlenecks), but the depth of explanation varies and is often limited, more suited for technical users than the general public.
The availability of the Auditor General’s report, Vote Performance Reports, and Budget Framework Papers provides a foundation for oversight, offering data on actual defence expenditures [2][3]. However, these documents, when analysed, can reveal trends, discrepancies, and areas of potential concern. The availability of audit reports and budget documents is a positive step, but without robust public engagement and improved transparency, the scrutiny of defence spending remains partially superficial [4]. The gap between the availability of information and its effective utilisation by the public and oversight bodies is a critical factor in determining the true depth and impact of scrutiny. Therefore, while not entirely superficial, the current system requires significant enhancements to ensure genuine accountability and transparency in defence spending.

The Auditor General’s report to the parliament provides data on spending of the defence. Other important documents are Vote: 004 Ministry of Defence Quarter 3: Vote Performance Report FY2023/2024, and Vote: 004 Ministry of Defence, Vote Budget Framework Paper FY2023/24 are comprehensive [1,2,3]
However, there is no information on the classified budget. An open budget survey conducted by the International Budget Partnership in Uganda indicated that public participation in the national budget is 15 percent, budget oversight stands at 57 percent, and transparency stands at 59 percent [4].

The details of the actual spending are part of the Budget Performance Report, which is published at the beginning of the new financial year [1,2,3]. Uganda has continued to increase its openness and timeliness of budget, although it is not always consistent [4].

In the FY 2021/2022 the MoDVA had a total budget of UGX. 4,168Tn which was all warranted. Out of this, UGX. 4.167Tn was spent by the entity resulting in an unspent balance of UGX [1]., 236Bn representing an absorption level of 99.9%. The auditor was not able to confirm the extent to which planned activities were implemented since the work plans did not have KPIs to facilitate the measurement of performance.
In the FY 2022/2023 the MoDVA had a total budget of UGX.4.287Tn out of which UGX.3.813Tn was warranted resulting in a shortfall of UGX.0.474Bn representing an 89% performance. Out of the total warrants of UGX.3.813Tn availed to the entity during the year, UGX.3.812Tn was utilised resulting in unutilised warrants of UGX.0.657Bn representing 99.98%. The auditor was not able to confirm the extent to which planned activities were implemented since the work plans did not have KPIs to facilitate measurement of performance.

While the Public Finance Management Act legally mandates the government to account for public expenditure, including that of the defence sector [1], actual defence expenditure is not fully published or transparently itemised. The Ministry of Finance presents a total allocation to the Ministry of Defence in the annual national budget documents, but there is no follow-up publication of detailed, itemised actual spending [2].
More importantly, post-expenditure reports, which would show what was actually spent versus what was planned, are not made publicly available, particularly for the defence sector.
While the law technically requires reporting, actual military expenditure is not broken down, verified, or subject to public oversight, and the figures presented by the Minister of Finance do not allow for detailed scrutiny or tracking of defence spending throughout the year.

Section 217 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013) establishes the Defence Forces Service Commission to support effective governance of the defence sector [1]. However, in practice, actual defence expenditures are not published in detail, making it difficult to assess how the Ministry of Defence allocates or spends its substantial budget.
While the national defence budget is often among the highest allocations compared to other ministries, there is no itemised or functional breakdown showing how funds are spent, such as on salaries, logistics, procurement, or welfare [2]. This opacity has serious implications: despite the sizeable defence allocation, reports show that soldiers frequently experience food insecurity and inadequate living conditions, suggesting a disconnect between approved funding and its actual use on the ground [3][4].
This indicates a serious lack of transparency and accountability in actual spending, where even the most basic expenditures like rations and salaries are not verifiably reaching intended beneficiaries.

The Constitution of Zimbabwe requires the Minister of Finance to allocate and be responsible in presenting the budget in parliament. The presentation of the budget happens in November every year [1]. While this presentation outlines planned allocations for the upcoming fiscal year, there is no publicly available documentation that details actual defence spending within twelve months of the end of the financial year. The Ministry of Finance does not publish a consolidated end-of-year expenditure report that would include a breakdown of actual spending by ministry, including defence. Additionally, no mid-year or year-end reviews for defence expenditure are made available on official government platforms or through parliamentary publications.
This means that, even beyond the lack of itemisation in the budget [2], there is no mechanism for verifying whether allocated funds were actually spent as planned, and no timely publication.

While there are budget variances on what is always spend by the defence forces versus what is spend in the year, is available, the Minister of Finance does not present the details on what caused such variances in terms of spending by the defence forces [1]. Total figures on variances are presented but there is no clear justification as to why such variances occur against what was budgeted. Thus neither the Auditor General report nor the Minister of Finance report has such justification in terms of budget variances [1,2].