Q48.

Does regular anti-corruption training take place for military and civilian personnel?

48a. Comprehensiveness

Score

SCORE: 25/100

Assessor Explanation

Assessor Sources

48b. Regularity

Score

SCORE: 0/100

Assessor Explanation

Assessor Sources

48c. Coverage of personnel

Score

SCORE: 25/100

Assessor Explanation

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No information could be found that anti-corruption training for military or civilian personnel has taken place. A review of the official monthly magazine of the armed forces El-Djeich, which informs the public about activities within the military, including seminars, did not provide any evidence that there have been training between 2016 and 2018 (1). Nor does the website of the armed forces provide such information (2), there are no reports in the media that military personnel have been trained.

The only anti-corruption training that was found was conducted for bureaucrats. In 2016, the ONPLC had anti-corruption training and awareness-raising sessions for public officials and managers. According to the initiators, the training aimed to “master the basic rules of treaty texts, national legislation and regulations, discover the normative framework for the fight against corruption and master the rules and procedures relating to the declaration of assets.” These training should take place over three years (3).
According to the website of the ONPLC, the anti-corruption training targeted 10,000 public officials, mainly managers and employees exposed to corruption risks (4). There is no evidence that civilians working in the defence sector have been part of this training. The only other training within the security sector related to accountability found during the research was human rights training conducted for the Judicial Police from the DGSN and National Gendarmerie by the International Committee of the Red Cross (5).

This question has been scored Not Applicable because no information could be found in military sources that anti-corruption training for the military or civilian personnel has taken place (1), (2).

This question has been scored Not Applicable because no information could be found in military sources that anti-corruption training for military or civilian personnel has taken place (1), (2)

There is no evidence of more than occasional and ad hoc efforts to conduct anti-corruption training for defence personnel or public servants in Angola. Reports on occasional initiatives include the participation of military officials in training in the region, or more recently a training of trainers for ruling party members (1), (2).

There is no evidence of more than occasional and ad hoc efforts to conduct anti-corruption training for defence personnel or public servants in Angola. Reports on occasional initiatives include the participation of military officials in training in the region, or more recently a training of trainers for ruling party members (1), (2).

There is no evidence of more than occasional and ad hoc efforts to conduct anti-corruption training for defence personnel or public servants in Angola. Reports on occasional initiatives include the participation of military officials in training in the region, or more recently a training of trainers for ruling party members (1), (2).

No anti-corruption capacity building for both military and civilian personnel of the defence ministry takes place. The anti-corruption training sessions that often take place concern the gendarmerie, the police and non-defence ministry civilians working on corruption-related issues (1). This would also mean that MoD military and civilian employees do not often come together to discuss corruption; whereas, they are both being appointed regularly. The lack of joint capacity building sessions on corruption, aligning both types of personnel for sharing information and learning about corruption, coupled with the opacity of the MoD (2), results in widespread corruption (3).

UNODC reported that “UNODC technically supports these defence and security forces. Part of this support focuses on capacity building in terms of developing strategies to promote integrity and the fight against corruption within these services” (1). From 22 to 23 March 2017, a national workshop on “Police, Gendarmerie and Customs: integrity and combating corruption” was organized in Ouagadougou, in cooperation with the High Authority for State Control and Anti-Corruption (in French, “Autorité Supérieure de Contrôle de l’Etat et de Lutte contre la Corruption”, ASCE-LC). This workshop gathered Burkinabe national police and gendarmerie officers, as well as officers from customs services. Having participants serving at the border and in internal areas gave the workshop a wider coverage on the national level. This will allow for the development of more realistic and pertinent strategies. Civil society also took part in the workshop. The National Network for the Fight Against Corruption (Réseau National de Lutte Anti-Corruption – REN-LAC) presented the main findings of its research conducted since 2000, and contributed to lead the workshop, along with UNODC and the ASCE-LC.” (1). It is done in an ad hoc manner and only provided by donors.

No evidence was found (1).

The Military Security Division known as SEMIL is charged with training in ethics and the deontology of the military. This unit brings together staff from all the services of the military and is found in all the regions and battalions of the military. The training includes military code of conduct [1]. Ecole Militaire Interarmées (EMIA) is a military academy that trains military officers from entry to mid-career development in different military skills and different departments (army, B.I.R. and gendarmerie) [2]. There is insufficient evidence of how comprehensively corruption and related disciplinary offences are covered during the training in EMIA. However, corruption is not taught as part of regular training within the defence and security sectors and is surely not done so comprehensively and effectively [1] [3]. This can be evidenced by a GAN report of 2017 that states, “Cameroon’s police force is inefficient, poorly trained and plagued by corruption” [4].

Cameroon police and military personnel supporting peacekeeping activities around the world, especially in Africa, undertake mandatory pre-deployment training, including in ethics and peacekeeping operations, corruption, sexual abuse, exploitation, human rights and other international humanitarian law [5]. In addition, there are Concepts of Operations (CONOP) which peacekeepers are to function by. The Status of Force Agreement (SOFA) signed by the home government and the UN handles corruption-related issues. Although corruption is not covered on its own in a course all these elements address corruption and corruption-related issues, according to the Peace Operation Training Institute. During this training, acts of discipline and disciplinary measures are highlighted as the defining elements that constitute the success of these missions [5].

Also, the New York Times has reported, “General Waldhauser pointed out that the American military has provided training on the law of war and ethics to the elite Cameroonian counterterrorism forces fighting Boko Haram. He also said the military was taking its cues from the State Department” [6].

There is no evidence which indicates that there is systematic and thorough anti-corruption training [1] [2]. Corruption is addressed in an ad hoc manner, such as the few courses in ethics and peacekeeping [2] and in the military penal code [3].

Ecole Militaire Interarmées (EMIA) is a military academy that trains military officers from entry to mid-career development in different military skills and different departments (army, B.I.R. and gendarmerie) [4]. There is insufficient evidence of how comprehensively corruption and related disciplinary offences are covered during the training in EMIA. However, corruption is not taught as part of regular training within the defence and security sectors and is surely not done so comprehensively and effectively [3] [5]. This can be evidenced by a GAN report of 2017 that states, “Cameroon’s police force is inefficient, poorly trained and plagued by corruption” [6].

Cameroon police and military personnel supporting peacekeeping activities around the world, especially in Africa, undertake mandatory pre-deployment training, including in ethics and peacekeeping operations, corruption, sexual abuse, exploitation, human rights and other international humanitarian law [2].

Cameroon has for the past four years received training from the United States and France in a wide range of issues to help it combat the Boko Haram threat and maritime insecurity [1] [2]. Furthermore, the International School for Security has refresher courses at Diploma and Master’s levels in peacekeeping and homeland security. Some basic ethical issues such as sexual exploitation and corruption-related issues are covered in some of their courses. However, only a handful of police and gendarmerie officers selected through a competitive entrance exam benefit from such training [3]. Corruption-related issues are also addressed in the pre-deployment training given to the different contingents sent out on peacekeeping missions [3].

Additionally, the New York Times reported, “General Waldhauser pointed out that the American military has provided training on the law of war and ethics to the elite Cameroonian counterterrorism forces fighting Boko Haram. He also said the military was taking its cues from the State Department” [4]. From the report, it seems only elite Cameroonian counterterrorism forces fighting Boko Haram received such training.

Anti-corruption training for military and civilian personnel at the MoD is superficial and appears to cover only general values and standards. There is no evidence that such training addresses more complex issues like reporting cases of corruption. In the aftermath of the post-election crisis of 2010-2011, politics in Côte d’Ivoire were internationalized; and the UN peacekeeping force (UNOCI) organized anti-corruption awareness-raising events along with UNDP and NGOs such as the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and the Bertelsmann’s Foundation. These can be characterized as having been general anti-corruption sessions for the general public and some officers in the Armed Forces. The government has paid for broad-based training, not necessarily on anti-corruption, for several former rebel commanders (COMZONES) and regular soldiers at military academies in Morocco. The sending of high-ranking military personnel and regular soldiers for training abroad is provided for in the 2016-2020 Military Planning Act (Loi de Programmation Militaire, LPM) (1).

In July 2017, Ivorian public television (RTI) uploaded a video to YouTube about a visit by Minister of Defense Hamed Bakayoko and General Sékou Toure to a military academy in southern Morocco (Centre d’Instruction Zone Sud, Dakhla) where 662 Ivorian military officers were being trained. However, there was no reference to anti-corruption training. Instead, the training appeared to be focused on combat techniques (2). Coverage of the event by Ivorian media characterized the training in Morocco as a capacity-building opportunity and an attempt to professionalize the armed forces (3). An example of anti-corruption training for the public administration initiated by civil society groups was done in an August 23, 2018 workshop by the Jeune Chambre Internationale (JCI) of Abidjan. JCI initiated its awareness-raising campaign in May 2018 to inform people dealing with public officials about how corrupt practices are defined in Order No. 2013-660, and the codewords and expressions used to extract bribes such as “Donne pour moi”, “Parle français” or “Fais mon gué”. However, this campaign did not target the MoD, military and civilian personnel (4). The evidence that most of the current training for the MoD personnel, including the training for soldiers in Morocco, does not focus on anti-corruption issues.

Anti-corruption training for military and civilian personnel appears to be mainly driven by multilateral organizations and NGOs. It also appears to be completely ad hoc and the regularity of such training can be described as sporadic. For example, a workshop focused on corruption in public finance was organized by the African Development Bank (AfDB) in Abidjan on 27-28 October 2016. The AfDB event appears to have focused on strengthening the capacity of financial intelligence units in West Africa to fight money laundering and terrorist finance. It illustrates the type of ad hoc anti-corruption training provided by multilateral organizations (1). There is no reference in the interim self-evaluation report on the 2016-2018 National Open Government Action Plan by the Open Government Partnership (Partenariat pour un Gouvernement Ouvert, OGP) to anti-corruption training for military and civilian personnel. Côte d’Ivoire was formally admitted as an OGP member on October 28, 2015. The report refers to scheduled initiatives on governance issues with the Ministry of the Interior (Minstere de l’Intérieur et de la Sécurité) through August 27, 2017, but there are no similar initiatives at the MoD (2).

Another example of the ad hoc and sporadic nature of anti-corruption training is the dissemination workshop organized by the HABG and the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) on November 17, 2015, with public administration officials across government ministries. According to the Secretary-General of the HABG, Yves Yao Kouame, it served to publicize the country’s anti-corruption laws and prevention policies among public officials, including UNCAC, the African Union’s anti-corruption initiative and Order No. 2013-660 (3). Given that most of the evidence for anti-corruption initiatives targeting military personnel are related to the early retirement and ousting of former rebel leaders accused of being behind the soldier uprisings of 2017, a score of 0 for this indicator reflects the lack of regularity of broad-based anti-corruption training for the rest of the military and civilian personnel at the MoD.

It is ad-hoc and sporadic nature of anti-corruption dissemination workshops and awareness-raising initiatives in Côte d’Ivoire. There is no evidence that these events target specific higher-ranking military or civilian personnel, as in the criteria for scores of 4 and 3. There is also no evidence that personnel in high-risk positions benefit from these initiatives, as mentioned in the criteria for a score of 2.

The example mentioned in 48B of the anti-corruption dissemination workshop organized by the HABG and the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) on November 17, 2015, with public administration officials across government ministries illustrates how a general public of civil servants was targeted rather than higher-ranking personnel (1). A second example to illustrate the ad-hoc, sporadic nature of anti-corruption training is the workshop set up by HABG on September 4, 2015, at the headquarters of the Maison de l’Entreprise in Plateau, the business district of Abidjan. The title of the workshop (La vulgarisation des textes relatifs à la prévention et à la lutte contre la corruption et les infractions assimilées) reveals the generalist approach of these anti-corruption events and the fact that it was addressed at a general public (2).

According to our sources, there has not been any training on anti-corruption or transparency. Although some training is organized in Egypt on anti-corruption in other ministries, there are none at the MoD (1), (2), (3), (4).

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable because the country has no regular anti-corruption training for military and civilian personnel.

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable because the country has no regular anti-corruption training for military and civilian personnel.

Despite a public commitment in fighting corruption and building integrity among military personnel, the MOD doesn’t hold any anti-corruption training for its members or for its civil servants (according to the publicly available information, such as GAF and MOD websites and Ghanaian newspapers such as Modern Ghana, Myjoyonline, GhanaWeb, Ghana News Agency, Graphic Online).

The Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff College (GAFCSC), which is the GAF’s training institution, doesn’t include anti-corruption courses in its military programmes (both for senior and junior level) (1). However, individual military personnel might take part in the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Centre’s courses which include anti-corruption training (i.e. Conflict Prevention Course, Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism Course) (2).

On the contrary, the Police service is taking part in the EU-Ghana Anti-Corruption, Rule of Law and Accountability Programme (ARAP) for 2016-2021 (3).

As there is no anti-corruption training, this indicator is marked Not Applicable.

As there is no anti-corruption training, this indicator is marked Not Applicable.

There are several anti-corruption training sessions that take place in Jordan, including a few within the armed forces. Some of these training sessions are organised by the Integrity and Anti-Corruption Commission, and there is some media reporting around them, but that does not extend to defence [1, 2]. The majority of this training took place at the Ministry of Education and the Judicial Council or were organised by foreign embassies [3]. In November 2018, the Integrity and Anti-Corruption Commission published in its news section that a delegate from the general security department visited the Anti-Corruption Commission to understand its work within the framework of anti-corruption training [4]. This piece of news indicates that collaboration between the commission and the general security department is recent and that a training engagement has not been in place before. According to an officer within the armed forces, in the last year, members of the armed forces participated in anti-corruption training. These training sessions were not only for the armed forces, but normally one or two officers participate [5].

Anti-corruption training within the armed forces is conducted as ad-hoc sessions for individuals when the armed forces receive an invitation from an NGO or JIACC [1,2].

In the Jordanian armed forces, there is a unit called ” Moral and Political Guidance” which provide sporadic training which includes ad-hoc mentions of corruption and misuse of power [1,2].

The training that the security agencies receive from external auditors from SAB, ACA or the Finance Ministry tends to brief and attendance is not obligatory, auditors said (1, 2 and 3). The trainings focus on the governmental values of Kuwait, there is discussion on how to spot corrupt practices and how personnel should report them to state auditors or their supervisors. Training sessions do sometimes often discuss international best practices.The personnel in attendance are usually not paying any attention. Auditors who run the training complain frequently that attendees are either on their phone, talking to each other or looking sleepy. Local news media does not follow these workshops because no one takes them seriously.

Anti-corruption courses and workshops take place at least once a month from the ACA, but are not given necessarily at induction or upon entry to a high risk area, auditors said (1, 2 and 3). It is not woven into promotion courses at all levels.

Training is delivered to high ranking military and civilian personnel, the aforementioned sources said (1, 2 and 3).

The LAF does not have specific anti-corruption training continuously conducted for the officers (1). In March 2018, the Directorate for International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights conducted training for anti-corruption; however, the content of it is not publicized (2). It is unclear whether the training included the organisational values and standards, the impact of the organisation, military effectiveness; identification and reporting of corruption, and risk management (2). However, it is important to note that the LAF has taken part in international military education programs with partner nations. The programs, such as the US’s IMET, are tied to best practices in financial management, procurement, and acquisition all emphasize anti-corruption best practices (3). Further, LAF personnel undergo several other training abroad on anticorruption, for example, Legal Aspects of Combating Corruption and Budget Preparation, Execution and Accountability (USA), Governance and Financial Management (Australia), as well as internal training in collaboration with LTA and Institut des Finances Basil Fuleihan with whom LAF signed a cooperation agreement (4). LAF also conducts internal workshops regarding international humanitarian law, anticorruption and code of conduct periodically.

Anti-corruption training is conducted in an ad-hoc manner (1) and by external parties (2). For example, the LAF (1) and the LTA (2) conducted anti-corruption workshops for military personnel. According to the LAF’s Directorate of Orientation, the LAF operates under the general framework of the laws and rules of the military that personnel that are continuously reminded of (3).

Since 2013, the LAF has cooperated with Basel Fleihan institute to conduct training for its officers at the Fouad Chehab Academy for Command and General StaffFor instance, the institute implemented a program to manage public financing and trained a group of 23 adminstrative officers at the Acadmy. (1) Also, trainings are integrated as a small portion of other compliance training modules under the IMET (2)

1. Ethics in Peacekeeping (Williamsburg: Peace Operations Training Institute, 2005) http://cdn.peaceopstraining.org/course_promos/ethics/ethics_english.pdf
2. Recommandations visant à renforcer le programme anti-corruption (Mali), Réforme du secteur public et renforcement des capacités région Afrique [Recommendations aiming to reinforce the anticorruption programme (Mali), Reform of the public sector and reinforcement of the Africa regional capacities] (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2008) http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/MaliwebAnti.pdf
3. Mali unmasked: resistance, collusion, collaboration (Oslo: NOREF, 2013), available at https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/162494/aa8b1177c49658bb15a2a1da1d320ffd.pdf
4. “Calendrier de formation”, Ecole de Maintien de la Paix Alioune Blondin Beye, www.empbamako.org/index.php/Contenu-du-site/2015-02-17-14-53-02.html
5. Moussa Mamadou Bagayoko, “Les débâcles fréquentes de l’armée : – La corruption au sein de l’armée : la gangrène – La hiérarchie militaire doit être revue et corrigée” [The frequent debacles of the army: corrupton at the heart of the army: the gangrene – the military hierarchy must be rethought and corrected], Niarela, 2017, https://niarela.net/societe/les-debacles-frequentes-de-larmee-la-corruption-au-sein-de-larmee-la-gangrene-la-hierarchie-militaire-doit-etre-revue-et-corrigee
6. Rémy Hémez, “2012 : l’étrange défaite de l’armée malienne” [2012: the strange defeat of the Malian army], Ultima Ratio, January 18, 2017, http://ultimaratio-blog.org/archives/8272
7. Mali: Security, Dialogue and Meaningful Reform (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2013) https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/mali/mali-security-dialogue-and-meaningful-reform
8. Henri de Raincourt & Hélène Conway-Mouret, Rapport d’Information fait au nom de la commission des affaires étrangères, de la défense et des forces armées sur l’aide publique au développement au Sahel [Information report in the name of the foreign affairs, defence and armed forces committee on public development aid in the Sahel] (Paris: Sénat français, 2016) http://www.senat.fr/rap/r15-728/r15-728.html
9. La Politique de défense au Mali: Bilan et Perspectives [Defence policy in Mali: Summary and perspectives] (Bonn: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2014), accessed December 2015, http://www.fes-westafrica.org/wp-content/gallery/2013/07/la-politique-de-defence-au-Mali-bilan-et-perspectives-par-Colonel-Major-Adama-DEMBELE.pdf
10. Susanna D. Wing, “Mali: The Politics of a Crisis”, in African Affairs Volume 112, Issue 448 (Oxford: OUP, 2013), 476–485.
11. Martin Van Vliet, “Weak Legislature, Failing MPs, and the Collapse of Democracy in Mali”, in African Affairs Volume 113, Issue 450 (Oxford: OUP, 2013), 45–66.
12. Hubert Ledoux, “Gouvernance et corruption ne vont pas de pair” [Governance and corruption do not go together], Maliactu, January 22, 2016, available at https://revuedepressecorens.wordpress.com/2016/02/02/gouvernance-et-corruption-ne-vont-pas-de-pair/
13. Karolina MacLachlan, Security assistance, corruption and fragile environments: Exploring the case of Mali 2001-2012 (London: Transparency International UK, 2015) http://ti-defence.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/150818-150817-Security-assistance-corruption-and-fragile-environments-Exploring-the-case-of-Mali-2001-2012.pdf
14. Interviewee 5: Security expert working in Bamako, interview with author, Bamako, June 11, 2018.

The assessor found no evidence to suggest that regular training on corruption issues takes place within the Malian army. But other security forces – the national guard, the police and the gendarmerie – are receiving regular, ongoing anticorruption training via the EU’s EUCAP Sahel mission.¹² Evidence from a number of sources indicates there has been widespread corruption in the Malian army for at least the last decade,⁵ ⁶ ⁷ ⁸ ⁹ ¹⁰ ¹¹ indicating that any training mechanisms that are in place are highly ineffective. According to a World Bank report, corruption is commonplace among defence personnel. Indeed, a placement in the army is seen as an asset which generates “flows of illicit income”.² A NOREF report notes that the Malian army lacks “a unified national moral compass to underwrite its military operations”.³
There are two Malian training schools for international missions. The first is the Military Administration School (EMA) in Koulikoro, which provides training for officers from African contingents who carry out administrative or financial duties. The Koulikoro School of Peacekeeping offers courses on human rights and international treaties, but a specific focus on corruption issues is not in place despite the risk corruption poses to security assistance programmes.¹³
The Alioune Blondin Beye school of peacekeeping in Bamako offers some anticorruption training as part of its standard UN peacekeeping modules. Their course on ethics includes teaching on the Code of Conduct, Trafficking and Discipline.¹ However, a specific focus on corruption is missing.¹³ While anticorruption is not explicitly referenced, it is included peripherally in these training courses; “integrity and not soliciting or accepting material reward, honour or gifts” are for example mentioned in training texts.¹ No evidence was found to indicate how much coverage these courses achieve.
The police, gendarmerie and national guard are receiving regular anticorruption training from the EU’s EUCAP Sahel Training Mission.¹² Reforms are designed to create a more effective and transparent human resources system. Training is designed to install a citizen’s ethic into the police to discourage them from preying on the population and demanding bribes.¹² However, a security expert in Bamako confirmed that the EU’s military training mission (EUTM) focuses overwhelmingly on military tactics and contains no anticorruption component.¹⁴ Indeed, the EUTM is operating in Mali at the request of the Malian government. Therefore, it does not have an executive or mentoring mandate. It can only deliver what the Malian authorities want.¹⁴ Transparency International’s (TI) analysis of the previous US-led and French-led training efforts in Mali deemed that these were insufficient:¹³ “US interviewees pointed out that the Defence Institute for International Legal Studies (DIILS) delivered courses on human rights and ethics to the Malian military. However, DIILS would usually focus on human rights and civil/military relations before all other issues, including corruption. While programming in some cases did involve anti-corruption courses, the usual focus was on human rights issues; this was the case in Mali as well”.
TI notes that IMET training incorporates human rights training but does not have an explicit focus on transparency, accountability and counter-corruption (TACC) issues. The report says that “most interviewees argued that standalone counter-corruption courses in the Malian armed forces would not have worked. What was needed was an integrated approach addressing other issues, including civil-military relations and good governance, and encompassing state and social entities apart from the army. Thus tackling corruption needed to be embedded in a comprehensive reform of institutions and processes, as robust institutional systems and better civilian oversight were important mechanisms for decreasing the risk of corruption”.¹³ TI determines that the French training courses similarly did not include a component on tackling corruption.¹³

The assessor found no evidence to suggest that regular training on corruption issues takes place within the Malian army. But other security forces – the national guard, the police and the gendarmerie – are receiving regular, ongoing anticorruption training via the EU’s EUCAP Sahel mission.²
There are two Malian training schools for international missions. The first is the Military Administration School (EMA) in Koulikoro, which provides training for officers from African contingents who carry out administrative or financial duties. The Koulikoro School of Peacekeeping offers courses on human rights and international treaties, but a specific focus on corruption issues is not in place despite the risk corruption poses to security assistance programmes.³
The Alioune Blondin Beye school of peacekeeping in Bamako offers some anticorruption training as part of its standard UN peacekeeping modules. Their course on ethics includes teaching on the Code of Conduct, Trafficking and Discipline.¹ However, a specific focus on corruption is missing.³ While anticorruption is not explicitly referenced, it is included peripherally in these training courses; “integrity and not soliciting or accepting material reward, honour or gifts” are for example mentioned in training texts.¹ No evidence was found to indicate how much coverage these courses achieve.
The police, gendarmerie and national guard are receiving regular anticorruption training from the EU’s EUCAP Sahel Training Mission.² Reforms are designed to create a more effective and transparent human resources system. Training is designed to install a citizen’s ethic into the police to discourage them from preying on the population and demanding bribes.² However, a security expert in Bamako confirmed that the EU’s military training mission (EUTM) focuses overwhelmingly on military tactics and contains no anticorruption component.⁴ Indeed, the EUTM is operating in Mali at the request of the Malian government. Therefore, it does not have an executive or mentoring mandate. It can only deliver what the Malian authorities want.⁴
From the evidence presented, it is unclear if training is targeted at high risk posts, or if it is integrated in any meaningful way.

Over the past years, a number of measures and initiatives have been taken by Moroccan authorities to fight corruption (1)(2)(3)(4)(5).
These include:
⁃ The creation of the ICPC (National Commission for the Fight against Corruption) and its transformation into the National Body for the Fight against Corruption in 2015/2017 (1).
⁃ The launch of a national anti-corruption strategy in 2016 (3)(6).
⁃ The development of an e-gov and e-data strategy with better transparency and access to government policies and administrative documents online, as well as consultations and better dialogue between the authorities and Moroccan citizens (6)(7).
⁃ The creation of an anti-corruption hotline and internet platform (8).

However, the activities of the ICPC and the cases of corruption brought to court concern mainly the police, the customs and local authorities. There is no mention of the military in these sources, and no evidence of an anti-corruption training that specifically targets the military was found in NGO reports or the press.

Since Morocco has no anti-corruption training, this sub-indicator is marked Not Applicable.

Since Morocco has no anti-corruption training, this sub-indicator is marked Not Applicable.

Even though no evidence has been found that there is an explicit programme directly addressing corruption as part of military and civilian personnel training, officers are trained in general ethics and in line with the Military Penal Code, which addresses corruption (Article 228) (1). Furthermore, high-level national authorities pay special attention to fighting corruption. Indeed, the security and defence policy of the Presidential Renaissance Programme for 2016-2021 includes fighting against corruption in the security and defence institutions as part of improving the overall security governance strategy (2). Therefore, the Niger government welcomes different initiatives coming from national and international institutions. Thus, through 2013-2014, HALCIA has been ensuring specific training to police and customs addressing corruption within their services (3). In September 2016 the Abdou Moumouni University of Niger, with the support of Belgium, inaugurated a Master’s Degree Programme entitled Security and Culture of Peace, which is explicitly aimed at Niger military and civil officers (4). It provides in-depth training on a vast range of security and defence issues. According to respondents, matters relating to corruption – such as drugs, arms, and people trafficking – are often discussed in class, even if it is not a defined topic.
The European Union also provides training to Nigerien civil and military servants. Launched in 2012, EUCAP Sahel-Niger provides advice and training to support the Nigerien authorities in strengthening their security capabilities. It contributes to the development of an “integrated, coherent, sustainable, and human rights-based approach among the various Nigerien security agencies in the fight against terrorism and organised [sic] crime” (5). The objective of EUCAP Sahel is “improving the efficiency of the regional mixed command posts to improve the response to crises and the interoperability of security forces; collecting and sharing intelligence between those forces; developing forensic science expertise; training the municipal police of the Agadez region; improving human resources management systems; improving teaching capacity at the security forces’ training centers [sic] and schools; and ensuring that the armed forces act on a sound legal basis in their mission to combat terrorism and trafficking” (5). According to interviewees, training provided by CAP Sahel does not explicitly include “corruption” as a specific course. However, in their classes, experts regularly discuss and actively debate issues of corruption as being directly related to the trafficking of drugs, arms or people (6).
As part of the cooperation between European Union and Germany (GIZ), Niger benefitted from the program to strengthen the capacity of the National Police working along the border with Nigeria, in Maradi, Zinder and Tahoua (November 2014-December 2015) (7).
As part of the bilateral cooperation with the USA, by signing the Joint Country Action Plan (JCAP) in October 2015, Niger engaged in the Security Governance Initiative. The objective of the programme is to contribute to improving decision-making processes that determine the allocation of human, material, and financial resources of the security sector as well as enhancing human resourcing procedures (8), which imply addressing corruption. France is engaged in the countries of the Sahel region (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger) through Operation Barkhane, and also participates in the regular training of Niger’s military personnel, which covers general ethics.
The International Committee of the Red Cross, which plays an important role in Niger, also regularly provides training for the Nigerien military on International Humanitarian Law, where issues of corruption are discussed as part of the training (9). Finally, since 2013, GIZ, through its RECAP project, has been providing support for police capacity building since 2013. Thanks to RECAP, GIZ has become a trusted partner of the IGSS and the DGPN, and more specifically of the ENP/FP, the DSP, DST and the Human Resources Department (HRD). GIZ/RECAP supports the Niger Police in the fields of training, border security and management, human resources management and, more recently, in the fight against corruption (10).

Given the multiple bilateral partners and organizations involved in this type of training (as well as the decentralized nature of the trainings), the scoring for this sub-indicator is tricky. It appears that the regularity of training depends largely on the perception by third parties of new emerging crises, as opposed to an internal procedure that is consistently implemented by Niger’s Ministry of the Interior or HALCIA. Therefore, the regularity is questionable. For example, as per source 2 (April 2016) on the EUCAP Sahel Niger Mission, the organizers have trained over 6,000 members of the Nigerien police forces, as well as members of the military and the judiciary. According to EUCAP, the focus now is on training trainers. The training also seems to focus on regions where there are flare-ups or security threats. “In July 2014 the mission objectives were adjusted in the light of the experience gained in the first two years. During the current mandate, EUCAP is increasing its assistance to Niger’s regions, in particular the Agadez region (establishment of a permanent branch), which is facing the highest number of security threats, to ensure better control of irregular migration and related trafficking, and the Diffa region, which poses a new security challenge.”

In terms of the coverage of personnel that have passed through the training, there is no comprehensive statistic. However, some information can be obtained from the institutions that provided the training. For example, by October 2016, EUCAP Sahel trained over 6000 members of the country’s internal security forces, armed forces and the judiciary (1). According to interviewees, by 2018, this figure may increase up to 10 000. However, a recent audit of the EUCAP Sahel underlined several weaknesses connected to different issues related to training.

There is training provided for anti-corruption issues. The extent or scope of the training offered defers according to the degree of risk relative to certain positions with increased depth provided for more senior officials. Anti-Corruption training is given in the context of the need for values in ethics. The NACS now also imposes a responsibility on heads of departments to incorporate ethics training in their departmental strategies (1), (2).

Training exists for certain posts. NACS includes an obligation to introduce training on anti-corruption, but it is not regular (1), (2).

There is training provided for anti-corruption issues. The extent or scope of the training offered differs according to the degree of risk relative to certain positions with increased depth provided for more senior officials (1), (2).

There is no evidence of anti-corruption training taking place for military or civilian personnel. According to two officers within the Omani armed forces, there has never been any training course that focuses on anti-corruption measures (1), (2). The State Audit Institution seeks to raise awareness and combat corruption across ministries as well as the private sector, examples of educational training with different ministries is posted on the website there is no mention however of training with military or civilian personnel (3). No reference to anti-corruption, or any sort of training is found on either the Ministry of Defence or the Royal Armed Forces website (4), (5). No media reports indicate any internal or external anti-corruption training has taken place involving military or civilian personnel (6), (7).

This sub-indicator has been marked as Not Applicable, as Oman does not have anti-corruption training for military and civilian personnel within the defence and security sectors (1), (2), (3), (4), (5).

This sub-indicator has been marked as Not Applicable, as Oman does not have anti-corruption training for military and civilian personnel within the defence and security sectors (1), (2), (3), (4), (5).

There is anti-corruption training that addresses the connection between corruption and some of the mentioned topics but not all the following topics: organizational values and standards, the impact of the organization, military effectiveness; identification and reporting of corruption, and risk management (1), (2). External organizations such as “AMAN” usually provide this training. This training is for both civilian and military personnel (3).

Anti-corruption training is done an ad hoc manner and only provided by donors or external organizations, funded by foreign donors (1), (2). For example, AMAN and other NGOs help in some agencies if funds are available. The government does not support these types of training courses. Aman’s website contains many of these training courses and sessions (3).

Coverage of anti-corruption training is discretionary and sporadic, and the vast majority of the employees never receive training. Nevertheless, the 2017 ACC report (1) mentions that they have reached 3000 people and organized around 300 activities, these activities are usually public conferences and workshops, but not targeted training courses with the specific goal of fostering anti-corruption measures and knowledge (2), (3).

Anti-corruption training for military and civilian personnel within the defence sector is superficial and rare. [1] As an officer said, ” we have two pieces of training every year that has a module on anti-corruption measures, but that’s all”. [2] In 2013, the Qatari government established the Rule of Law and Anti-Corruption Centre (ROLACC), which aims to ‘promote the latest methods and best practices currently available to address corruption and abuses of the rule of law, through capacity building, training, conferences, and seminars undermining corrupt practices in the region’. [3,4,5] The State Audit Bureau, in collaboration with ROLACC, has organised training on different topics, such as International standards ‘Bribing Public Employees’. [6,7] However, none of these apply to defence personnel. Moreover, the only mention of training provided to defence personnel in the country is not relevant to corruption. For example, the Ministry of Defence signed a three-year contract in 2014 with SERCO to deliver a training course to its officials. [8] Information about the training does not mention anything about anti-corruption.

Anti-corruption training is not regular. It is ad hoc and is part of other training courses, such as administrative or financial training. [1,2]

There are many “moral” training courses or social conversations among officers and soldiers organised by the “Ethical and Moral Guidance Unit”. However, discussion or training on corruption is rare. Most of this training is related to religion and nationality. [1,2]

According to our sources within the army, there has not been any training course on anti-corruption in the last few years; however, civilian personnel confirm that a module on corruption is part of sporadic training courses on administrative technologies has happened. A current member of the Saudi Arabian National Guard stated that he had not undergone any anti-corruption training during his five years of service (1). Therefore, there is no indication that formal or regular anti-corruption training takes place for military and civilian personnel. Saudi Arabia’s “National Strategy for the Protection of Integrity and Combating Corruption” of 2007 stipulated increased training and funding for government bodies tasked with combatting corruption. It also encouraged academic institutions to conduct more research into themes of corruption (2). In August 2018, Nazaha urged government agencies to train their employees on the content of the Code of Conduct, though no reference was made specifically to anti-corruption training (3). According to a Gulf affairs expert, “there is no formal anti-corruption training that takes place on a regular basis for military or civilian personnel” (4).

This sub-indicator ir not applicable because, according to our sources, there have not been any training courses on anti-corruption in the MoD or the KSA army in the last five years.

This sub-indicator ir not applicable because, according to our sources, there have not been any training courses on anti-corruption in the MoD or the KSA army in the last five years.

According to our sources, there have been many courses organised by International NGOs, local NGOs, and INLUCC for the MoD personnel and army officers at medium and senior level (1,2). Several anti-corruption related workshops have been held by the High Academy of War (Ecole supérieure de la Guerre) in the last two years in collaboration with the DCAF Tunisia. These workshops had four subjects: good governance of the security sector in the light of international humanitarian law (3); good governance of the defence sector and crisis communication (4); good governance of the defence sector and the role of the armed forces in a democratic society (5); and legal framework in the fight against corruption and the concepts of whistleblower protection and conflicts of interest (6). Also, a program of cooperation between DCAF and INLUCC exists to support the agency in its interactions with the Ministry of Defence and other actors in the security sector (7). These programs cover organisational value, risk management, and identification of corruption and reporting.

According to our sources, there are efforts to do more training, but there is very sporadic intensive training that does not meet the needs of the MoD and INLUCC. Therefore such training is provided once every promotion or whenever the personnel are targeted by an NGO or a training program provided by an external institute (1,2). Several anti-corruption trainings were held in the last two years (3,4,5,6,7). These trainings were provided to the trainees and officers of the High Academy. The High Academy of War is a higher military education institution whose mission is to train senior officers of the Armed Forces (8). A collaboration between the Ministry of Defence, INLUCC and DCAF should help improve the regularity of these trainings in the near future (7).

The trainings that were held targeted trainees, officers and public officials of the High Academy of War (Ecole Supérieure de la Guerre) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5). According to our sources, other training targets administrative and financial officers within the MoD. (6,7)

There is no evidence of any anti-corruption training taking place within the defence sector. Despite the fact that the UAE has been vehemently expressing its commitment to countering corruption in the country (1), (2), none of these expressed commitments have been of relevance to the defence sector. For instance, the UAE has repeatedly expressed its intention to establish an anti-corruption unit, within the Ministry of Defence; however, there is no evidence of the unit’s establishment (3). Moreover, web-based research in Arabic and English about anti-corruption training in the defence sector and the armed forces does not come up with any results of relevance. There is no evidence to support that anti-corruption training takes place within the defence sector (4), (5).

This sub-indicator has been marked as Not Applicable as there is no evidence of anti-corruption training taking place for military and civilian personnel in the defence sector, and thus assessing its regularity is not relevant to this context (1), (2).

This sub-indicator has been marked as Not Applicable as there is no evidence of anti-corruption training taking place for military and civilian personnel in the defence sector, and thus assessing its coverage of personnel is not relevant to this context (1), (2).

Country Sort by Country 48a. Comprehensiveness Sort By Subindicator 48b. Regularity Sort By Subindicator 48c. Coverage of personnel Sort By Subindicator
Algeria 0 / 100 NA NA
Angola 25 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Burkina Faso 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Cameroon 25 / 100 0 / 100 25 / 100
Cote d'Ivoire 25 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Egypt 0 / 100 NA NA
Ghana 0 / 100 NA NA
Jordan 25 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Kuwait 25 / 100 25 / 100 75 / 100
Lebanon 75 / 100 0 / 100 50 / 100
Mali 0 / 100 25 / 100 50 / 100
Morocco 0 / 100 NA NA
Niger 25 / 100 0 / 100 25 / 100
Nigeria 50 / 100 25 / 100 50 / 100
Oman 0 / 100 NA NA
Palestine 75 / 100 0 / 100 25 / 100
Qatar 25 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Saudi Arabia 25 / 100 NA NA
Tunisia 75 / 100 25 / 100 50 / 100
United Arab Emirates 0 / 100 NA NA

With thanks for support from the UK Department for International Development and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs who have contributed to the Government Defence Integrity Index.

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