Do defence and security institutions have a policy, or evidence, of openness towards civil society organisations (CSOs) when dealing with issues of corruption?
4a. Policy of openness
Niger score: 0/100
There is no formal or informal policy that requires openness towards CSOs in the defence sector.
There is a policy that requires defence and security institutions to be open towards CSOs. However, there is no explicit mention of how to do that.
There is a policy that requires defence and security institutions to be open towards CSOs and the establishment of mechanisms to that end (e.g. consultation and sharing of information).
The Niger defence and security institutions include the Niger Armed Forces (FAN), Gendarmerie Nationale, which are under the tutelage of the Ministry of Defence, whereas the National Guard and the National Police fall under the command of the Ministry of Interior (1, 2). None of these institutions has an explicit, clear and formal policy directly requiring openness towards Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) when dealing with issues of corruption, though there is an anti-corruption policy at a broader level.
The president, who is also the supreme head of the armed forces, has voiced his commitment to countering corruption in public institutions (3,4) and has demonstrated his openness to cooperation with CSOs, including the local branch of Transparency International (5). Besides, one of the most important instruments designed to fight corruption while working with civil society (media, parliamentarians, NGOs (6,7)) may be the High Authority Against Corruption and Similar Crimes (HALCIA), created by a decree in 2011 (8). In December 2016, the government adopted a new anti-corruption bill (9), which granted the HALCIA more powers (including a right of self-referral; the lifting of bank secrecy; the direct transmission of reports to the public prosecutor and the opening of a judicial inquiry). In April 2017, the government of Niger had recovered more than USD 5 million in bank accounts, real estate and property (8).
In sum, there is a policy to fight corruption on a broader level, but no specific and clear policy regarding the defence and security sector. Though, some evidence of openness to cooperation with CSOs is present at very high levels (through, for example, the acknowledgement of the role of Transparency International).
1. Ministry of Defence, http://www.defense.gouv.ne/index.php/principaux-organismes/organisation/organigramme.
2. Ministry of Interior, http://www.gouv.ne.
3. A.Y. Barma, “Mahamadou Issoufou: Je m`engage à mener un combat résolu contre la corruption,” (Mahamadou Issoufou: “I pledge to resolutely fight against corruption”), NewsAniamey, April 3, 2016, http://news.aniamey.com/h/71875.html.
4. “Niger: le président Issoufou fait la chasse aux maires voleurs de produits vivriers,” (Niger: President Issoufou hunts mayors stealing food products), RFI, 30 April 30, 2017,
5. “Lutte contre la Corruption au Niger: Des instructions fermes pour mener une lutte implacable contre le phénomène,” (Fighting corruption in Niger: Firm instructions to wage a relentless fight against the phenomenon), A Niamey, April 16, 2016, http://news.aniamey.com/h/72087.html.
6. Interview with senior official of the State Agency, 4 June 4, 2018.
7. Interview with senior official of the State Agency, May 31, 2018.
8. “Sahel programmeme Results and Activities // Progress Report,” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, June 2017, http://www.unodc.org/documents/westandcentralafrica//UNODC_Sahel_programmeme_Results_and_Activities_-_June_2017.pdf.
9. “Loi n° 2016-44 du 06 décembre 2016, portant création, missions, attributions, composition, organisation et fonctionnement de la Haute autorité de lutte contre la corruption et les infractions assimilées,” (Act no.2016-44 of 6th December 2016, setting out the creation, mission, attributes, composition, organisation and functioning of the High Authority Against Corruption and Similar Crimes),
4b. CSO protections
Niger score: 50/100
There is very little or no space for civil society organisations to operate within the country. Independent CSOs may be accused of / charged with treason, espionage, subversion, foreign interference, or terrorism.
CSOs are allowed to operate within the country, but the government uses manifestly restrictive laws to silence them or establishes burdensome registration and tax requirements.
CSOs enjoy a range of protections from government interference, and are able to operate within the country. However, they experience or fear potential reprisals by government.
CSOs enjoy a range of protections from government interference, and are able to operate without intimidation from the government. However, they may not have complete access or freedoms in some sensitive areas.
CSOs enjoy a range of protections (e.g. rights to freedom of expression or freedom of association) from government interference, and are able to operate openly and without intimidation from the government.
There are several important CSOs in Niger (1), but only one is focused specifically on the fight against corruption. The Nigerien Association for the Fight Against Corruption (ANLC) was created in 2001 and became a section of Transparency International in 2002. It provides for a variety of activities: legal assistance, research and awareness-raising actions against corruption (2). The assessor identified no specific sanctions against CSOs (3). However, other civil society leaders have recently been sanctioned. Following the 2018 financial law, which was adopted in November 2017, a series of demonstrations had been taking place through November 2017 – March 2018. On 25 March 2018, protests in Niamey were forbidden by the authorities due to alleged security concerns (the demonstration was planned to begin in the evening, from 16h) (4). Despite the decision of the authorities, civil society leaders decided to protest and were arrested (5). Therefore, given the existence of a large variety of CSOs in Niger, it is plausible to suggest by global standards, they enjoy relatively good protection from the government. However, this protection appears to be waived when the authorities consider activities a threat to public security.
To sum up, despite the government crackdown to target the demonstrators active between November 2017 and March 2018, authorities did not restrict the general activity of the CSOs through burdensome registration or tax requirements. Besides, CSOs in Niger are allowed to operate freely, including ANLC/TI.
1. Philippe Lavigne and Aide Delville, “Internationale et sociétés civiles au Niger,” (International aid and civil society in Niger), Paris: Karthala-APAD-IRD, 2015.
2. Official web site of the Nigerien Association for the Fight Against Corruption (ANLC),
3. Yann-Cédric Quéro, “Etude sur la corruption et trafic d’influence dans les services de la Police Nationale au Niger,” (Study on corruption and influence peddling in the Nigerien National Police Service), Projet GIZ-RECAP Niger, November 15, 2017.
4. “Niger: comment les manifestations contre la loi des finances tournent à l’insurrection!,” (Niger: How protests against finance law turn to uprisings), Niger Inter, March 26, 2018,
5. “Au Niger, 23 manifestants et leaders de la société civile arrêtés,” (In Niger, 23 protesters and civil society leaders are arrested), RFI, March 26, 2018, http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20180326-niger-arrestations-manifestants-leaders-societe-civile.
4c. Practice of openness
Niger score: 25/100
Requests by CSOs to work with the defence sector are denied.
There has been some consideration of engaging CSOs and meetings may have taken place with the defence sector, but they tend to take place with CSOs that are either very supportive of, or are explicitly funded by, the government. OR CSO activity is extremely minimal in this area, and defence and security institutions rarely engage for this reason.
Defence and security institutions are seeking (or are beginning to seek) CSO engagement from a range of CSOs, but not on corruption issues.
Defence and security institutions are open towards CSOs but have infrequently or superficially worked on issues of corruption. The military does not engage with CSOs on corruption issues.
Defence and security institutions have specifically worked with CSOs on corruption issues on a regular and/or in depth basis. This includes not only civilian representative of government (head of internal audit, PR person), but also military representatives.
Defence and security institutions are beginning to seek CSOs engagement. However, police institutions seem to be more open than the military and they are trying to cooperate with CSOs on corruption issues. There are several examples to support this claim, which are detailed below.
The United States Institute for Peace is piloting a project entitled “Dialogue on Justice and Security”. It is focused on a district of Niamey, known to be a high-crime area. In collaboration with a local NGO and a steering committee made up of community representatives, they organised different meetings with the police, the mayor, students and other stakeholders (1). Another example is the cooperation between the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces DCAF and the police that resulted in the adoption of an Ethics and Deontology Guide in 2015 (3,4,5), based on a 2011 decree (2).
When compared to the police, defence institutions seem to be less open to civil society organisations. However, some initiatives should also be noted. For example, HALCIA cooperated through 2013-2014 with defence and security institutions through workshops aiming to raise awareness of corruption issues among security and defence forces (6). No evidence has been found that the cooperation continues up to date. Defence and security institutions may seek to collaborate with CSOs, but not specifically on the issues of corruption. For example, the Nigerien Network for Nonviolent Conflict Management (GENOVICO) supported by National Democratic Institute (NDI) launched in January 2017 a national observatory on security governance. Composed of twelve CSOs, it is supposed to act as a think-tank for control and monitoring of security governance. A security official from the Ministry of Interior attended the launch ceremony (7).
1. “Stratégie Opérationnelle. Police de Proximité 2018-2020. Version finale,” (Operational Strategy: Community Policing 2018-2020), Republic of Niger, November 2017.
2. Décret n°2011-164/PCSRD/MI/S/D/AR du 31 mars 2011 portant Code d’éthique et de déontologie de la Police Nationale, (Decree no.2011/164/PCSRD/MI/S/D/AR of 31st March 2011, setting out the Code of Ethics and Conduct for the Nigerien National Police), (2011).
3. “La Police nationale se dote d’un Guide d’Ethique et de Déontologie,” (The National Police adopts a Guide of Ethics and Conduct), A Niamey, November 6, 2015, http://news.aniamey.com/h/60115.html.
4. “Stratégie Opérationnelle. Police de Proximité 2018-2020. Version finale,” (Operational Strategy: Community Policing 2018-2020), Republic of Niger, November 2017.
5. Seini Seydou Zakaria, “Restitution du rapport d’analyse diagnostic de l’Inspection Générale des services de sécurité (IGSS): Pour l’amélioration de la qualité du service public en matière de sécurité,” (Restitution of the diagnostic analysis report of the General Inspectorate of Security Services (IGSS): for the improvement of the quality of the public service in matters of security), Le Sahel, May 17, 2017, http://lesahel.org/index.php/societe/item/14596-restitution-du-rapport-danalyse-diagnostic-de-linspection-générale-des-services-de-sécurité-igss–pour-lamélioration-de-la-qualité-du-service-public-en-matière-de-sécurité.
6. “La HALCIA rencontre le personnel de la police et de la Gendarmerie Nationale,” (The HALCIA meets with National Police and Gendarmerie staff), Africa Time, March 6, 2013, http://fr.africatime.com/articles/la-halcia-rencontre-le-personnel-de-la-police-et-de-la-gendarmerie-nationale.
7. “Plusieurs organisations de la société civile créent un observatoire sur la gouvernance de la sécurité,” (Several civil society organizations set up an observatory on security governance), Actu Niger, January 2017, https://actuniger.com/societe/12532-niger-plusieurs-organisations-de-la-societe-civile-creent-un-observatoire-sur-la-gouvernance-de-la-securite.html.
Compare scores by country
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|Country||4a. Policy of openness||4b. CSO protections||4c. Practice of openness|
|Algeria||0 / 100||0 / 100||25 / 100|
|Angola||0 / 100||25 / 100||25 / 100|
|Burkina Faso||50 / 100||75 / 100||25 / 100|
|Cameroon||0 / 100||25 / 100||25 / 100|
|Cote d'Ivoire||0 / 100||75 / 100||25 / 100|
|Egypt||0 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Ghana||0 / 100||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Jordan||0 / 100||25 / 100||25 / 100|
|Kuwait||0 / 100||25 / 100||25 / 100|
|Lebanon||25 / 100||75 / 100||75 / 100|
|Mali||25 / 100||50 / 100||50 / 100|
|Morocco||0 / 100||50 / 100||0 / 100|
|Niger||0 / 100||50 / 100||25 / 100|
|Nigeria||0 / 100||25 / 100||50 / 100|
|Oman||0 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Palestine||0 / 100||75 / 100||25 / 100|
|Qatar||0 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Saudi Arabia||0 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Tunisia||25 / 100||25 / 100||25 / 100|
|United Arab Emirates||0 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|