Political Risk:
Critical
Score:
12/100
1
0/100
Is there formal provision for effective and independent legislative scrutiny of defence policy?
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Between 2018 and July 26, 2023, under the Constitution adopted in 2010, the Nigerien National Assembly (NA) held formal rights to oversee government actions,…
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Between 2018 and July 26, 2023, the National Assembly (NA) debated issues of defense and national security and attempted to influence government policy through…
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Between 2018 and July 26, 2023, the NA actively engaged in debates and decisions on critical defense and security issues, as seen in its…
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2
0/100
Does the country have an identifiable and effective parliamentary defence and security committee (or similar such organisations) to exercise oversight?
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For the period from 2018 to July 26, 2023, the National Assembly had a Security and Defense Committee (Commission de la Défense et de…
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Since July 2023, there has not been a National Assembly’s Security and Defense Committee. Before that (2018 to July 26, 2023), the Committee received…
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Given that national institutions, including the National Assembly, were dissolved on July 26, 2023, the score is NA. From 2018 until the dissolution of…
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Given that national institutions, including the National Assembly, were dissolved on July 26, 2023, the score is NA. Chapter III of the Internal Rules…
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Article 30, line 7 of the Internal Rules grants the Commission the authority to conduct investigations into policies within its jurisdiction [1]. However, according…
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The National Assembly’s ability to exert institutional influence on defense policy remained limited between 2018 and July 26, 2023. According to interviewees, deputies were…
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3
19/100
Is the country’s national defence policy or national security strategy debated and publicly available?
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Between 2018 and July 26, 2023, Niger’s defense and security policy was debated by the executive, legislature, and segments of the public. During this…
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During the period from 2018 to July 26, 2023, Niger witnessed active debate on key security and defense issues involving civil society organizations, the…
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Between 2018 and July 26, 2023, Niger undertook some public consultations on defense and security policy, but these were largely organized through state-led or…
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Before the military coup of July 26, 2023, the overall defense objectives were explicitly stated in the Constitution, which is publicly available. Article 66…
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4
17/100
Do defence and security institutions have a policy, or evidence, of openness towards civil society organisations (CSOs) when dealing with issues of corruption?
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Niger’s anti-corruption efforts have evolved through institutional reforms and policy initiatives. The High Authority to Combat Corruption and Related Infractions (HALCIA) was established in…
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Historically, there is an important number of CSOs in Niger [1], but only one is focused specifically on the issues regarding the fight against…
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In Niger, engagement between civil society organizations (CSOs) and defense institutions remains extremely limited, particularly on issues related to corruption. A 2020 audit of…
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5
63/100
Has the country signed up to the following international anti-corruption instruments: UNCAC and the OECD Convention?
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Niger is not a defense exporter. The United Nations Convention against Corruption was ratified by the Parliament of Niger through Act No. 2008-26 of…
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Prior to 26 July 2023, Niger had only minor compliance issues with the UNCAC. The UNCAC establishes obligations for governments with regard to preventive…
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6
0/100
Is there evidence of regular, active public debate on issues of defence? If yes, does the government participate in this debate?
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From 2018 to July 2023, public debate on defense issues in Niger occurred intermittently, often triggered by high-priority events. The Islamic State-led attacks in…
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From 2018 until July 26, 2023, the government of Niger maintained intermittent engagement in public discussions on defense issues, although the depth, consistency, and…
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7
0/100
Does the country have an openly stated and effectively implemented anti-corruption policy for the defence sector?
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Niger’s anti-corruption initiatives reflect a gradual evolution of institutional frameworks. In 2011, the government established HALCIA, the High Authority to Combat Corruption and Related…
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The National Strategy to Fight Corruption, adopted in 2018, included an action plan aimed at combating corruption across various sectors. However, no specific actions…
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8
25/100
Are there independent, well-resourced, and effective institutions within defence and security tasked with building integrity and countering corruption?
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Niger’s defense and security services comprise several key institutions, each with distinct responsibilities. The Niger Armed Forces (FAN), operating under the Ministry of Defense,…
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The IGA reports directly to the Chief of State rather than falling under the chain of command of the Ministry of Defense, while the…
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While the IGA and IGSS demonstrate an awareness of corruption risks, such as those at road checkpoints, they lack the capacity to prepare and…
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9
NS/100
Does the public trust the institutions of defence and security to tackle the issue of bribery and corruption in their establishments?
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This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. The 2020 corruption scandal within Niger’s Ministry of Defense significantly damaged public trust in…
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10
0/100
Are there regular assessments of the areas of greatest corruption risk for ministry and armed forces personnel, and are the findings used as inputs to the anti-corruption policy?
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No corruption risk assessments have been conducted in the Ministry of defence or the Ministry of Interior. [1][2]
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Risk assessments were not conducted, the section is left as not applicable. [1][2]
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Risk assessments were not conducted, the section is left as not applicable [1][2]
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11
8/100
Does the country have a process for acquisition planning that involves clear oversight, and is it publicly available?
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The government has a process for acquisition planning as a result of the programming act of the Ministry of Defense. According to art. 20…
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According to art. 20 of the 2013 decree on defense and security procurement the acquisition plan is not subject to publication and is classified…
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Given the confidentiality of the procurement procedures [1] it is unlikely that the acquisition plan is subject to any oversight. Given that the National…
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12
13/100
Is the defence budget transparent, showing key items of expenditure? And it is provided to the legislature in a timely fashion?
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The Nigerien defense budget is published as part of the annual financial law and made accessible through the Official Journal. However, the budget is…
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The National Assembly was responsible for analyzing the national budget and overseeing its drafting and approval. According to the World Bank, the budget discussion…
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13
0/100
Is there a legislative committee (or other appropriate body) responsible for defence budget scrutiny and analysis in an effective way?
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Since the military coup of July 26, 2023, there is no legislative committee responsible for scrutinizing the defense budget, as the National Assembly (NA)…
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Since the military coup of July 26, 2023, there has been no legislative committee responsible for scrutinizing the defence budget, as the National Assembly…
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14
17/100
Is the approved defence budget made publicly available? In practice, can citizens, civil society, and the media obtain detailed information on the defence budget?
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The approved financial law is regularly published for the public in the Official Journal While it provides some budgetary explanations, these are generalized and…
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The Nigerien defence budget is published annually as part of the financial law, accessible in the Official Journal in both printed and online formats.…
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Information on the defence budget published in the Official Journal is generally accessible to the public through the National Archives. However, detailed unpublished information…
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15
0/100
Are sources of defence income other than from central government allocation (from equipment sales or property disposal, for example) published and scrutinised?
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There is no defense industry in Niger, nor does the military own revenue-generating property managed by the defense sector. Prior to the military coup…
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Institutional scrutiny of non-central government sources of defense funding in Niger is theoretically ensured by oversight bodies within the Ministry of Defense, primarily the…
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Before the military coup of July 26, 2023, public scrutiny of defense funding in Niger was limited but not completely absent. Civil society organizations…
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16
0/100
Is there an effective internal audit process for defence ministry expenditure (that is, for example, transparent, conducted by appropriately skilled individuals, and subject to parliamentary oversight)?
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There is limited evidence to suggest that an effective internal audit process exists for the Ministry of Defence’s expenditure in Niger. The defence Ministry’s…
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The National Assembly’s standing committee on defence and security was tasked with overseeing the work of ministries responsible for national defence and security policy…
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According to interviewees, audit reports, if they were ever produced, were not shared with any external organizations, such as HALCIA, Transparency International, or UNODC…
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No information on precise institutional outcomes as a result of the internal audit has been found. The scandal that broke out following the audit…
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17
0/100
Is there effective and transparent external auditing of military defence expenditure?
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The Court of Accounts (Cour des Comptes) serves as Niger’s highest financial oversight institution, established under Article 141 of the 2010 Constitution and governed…
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Before the military coup of July 26, 2023, both the National Audit Office (Cour des Comptes) and the State Inspectorate General (Inspection Générale d’État)…
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Despite the presence of formal oversight institutions, structural and political barriers continue to undermine the transparency and effectiveness of external audits on military expenditures.…
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The Ministry of Defense in Niger has historically failed to effectively address audit findings, either ignoring them or implementing only minor procedural adjustments without…
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18
10/100
Is there evidence that the country’s defence institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation and, if so, are these interests publicly stated and subject to scrutiny?
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Niger, a leading global producer of uranium and a significant player in the gold and oil sectors does not have a clear legal framework…
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Since the military coup of July 26, 2023, and the subsequent strengthening of Niger’s diplomatic ties with Russia, concerns have been raised regarding potential…
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From 2017 to 2024, Niger has experienced a marked transition in the visibility and documentation of individual defence personnel’s financial or controlling interests in…
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Since the military coup on July 26, 2023, and Niger’s growing security and economic ties with Russia [1][2], concerns have emerged regarding the potential…
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Since the military coup on July 26, 2023, and Niger’s increasing alignment with Russia [1][2], concerns have grown regarding the potential involvement of defense…
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19
25/100
Is there evidence, for example through media investigations or prosecution reports, of a penetration of organised crime into the defence and security sector? If no, is there evidence that the government is alert and prepared for this risk?
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The extent to which organized crime has penetrated the Nigerien defense and security sector is challenging to assess. However, the scale of trafficking activities…
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Niger faces significant challenges from transnational organizsed crime due to its strategic location at the crossroads of trafficking routes for drugs, weapons, and migrants,…
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20
0/100
Is there policing to investigate corruption and organised crime within the defence services and is there evidence of the effectiveness of this policing?
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Internal oversight bodies within the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior play critical roles in auditing and ensuring accountability within Niger’s security…
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Evaluating the extent to which the policing functions of the Central Service for the Fight against Terrorism (SCLCT) and the National Financial Information Processing…
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Historical patterns of corruption and lack of accountability exist in Niger. The 2020 audit by the Inspector General of the Armed Forces exposed €116…
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21
0/100
Are the policies, administration, and budgets of the intelligence services subject to effective and independent oversight?
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Prior to the coup, the Security and Defence Committee (Commission de la Défense et de la Sécurité) of the National Assembly served as an…
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The effectiveness of oversight over Niger’s intelligence services is severely limited. While the Security and Defense Committee of the National Assembly was formally mandated…
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22
NEI/100
Are senior positions within the intelligence services filled on the basis of objective selection criteria, and are appointees subject to investigation of their suitability and prior conduct?
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Recruitment information for senior intelligence posts cannot be sourced. It is also worth noting that the intelligence services information is covert and therefore not…
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There is not enough evidence available on the recruitment of senior intelligence posts to score this indicator. [1] [2]
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There is not enough evidence available on the recruitment of senior intelligence posts to score this indicator. [1] [2]
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23
63/100
Does the government have a well-scrutinised process for arms export decisions that aligns with Articles 7.1.iv, 11.5, and 15.6 of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)?
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Niger signed the ATT on 24th March 2014 and ratified on July 24, 2015 [1]. The ATT establishes a framework for preventing and eradicating…
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Niger ratified the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) on July 24, 2015 [1]. The treaty obligates States Parties to demonstrate compliance through initial and annual…
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Niger is not an arms exporter, and therefore this sub-indicator is scored as Not Applicable. [1].
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Niger lacks specific laws or regulations governing lobbying of defence institutions, as confirmed by the absence of documented lobbying activity in SIPRI [1] and…
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Niger does not have legislation that regulates lobbying in the defence sector.[1] [2]
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Niger does not have legislation that regulates lobbying in the defence sector.[1] [2]
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Niger does not have legislation that regulates lobbying in the defence sector.[1] [2]
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Defence and Security Policy and Policy Transparency
Q1
NA/100
Is there formal provision for effective and independent legislative scrutiny of defence policy?
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Q2
NA/100
Does the country have an identifiable and effective parliamentary defence and security committee (or similar such organisations) to exercise oversight?
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Q3
NA/100
Is the country’s national defence policy or national security strategy debated and publicly available?
View Question
Q4
NA/100
Do defence and security institutions have a policy, or evidence, of openness towards civil society organisations (CSOs) when dealing with issues of corruption?
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Q5
NA/100
Has the country signed up to the following international anti-corruption instruments: UNCAC and the OECD Convention?
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Q6
NA/100
Is there evidence of regular, active public debate on issues of defence? If yes, does the government participate in this debate?
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Q7
NA/100
Does the country have an openly stated and effectively implemented anti-corruption policy for the defence sector?
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Q8
NA/100
Are there independent, well-resourced, and effective institutions within defence and security tasked with building integrity and countering corruption?
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Q9
NA/100
Does the public trust the institutions of defence and security to tackle the issue of bribery and corruption in their establishments?
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Q10
NA/100
Are there regular assessments of the areas of greatest corruption risk for ministry and armed forces personnel, and are the findings used as inputs to the anti-corruption policy?
View QuestionDefence Budgets
Q11
NA/100
Does the country have a process for acquisition planning that involves clear oversight, and is it publicly available?
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Q12
NA/100
Is the defence budget transparent, showing key items of expenditure? And it is provided to the legislature in a timely fashion?
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Q13
NA/100
Is there a legislative committee (or other appropriate body) responsible for defence budget scrutiny and analysis in an effective way?
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Q14
NA/100
Is the approved defence budget made publicly available? In practice, can citizens, civil society, and the media obtain detailed information on the defence budget?
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Q15
NA/100
Are sources of defence income other than from central government allocation (from equipment sales or property disposal, for example) published and scrutinised?
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Q16
NA/100
Is there an effective internal audit process for defence ministry expenditure (that is, for example, transparent, conducted by appropriately skilled individuals, and subject to parliamentary oversight)?
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Q17
NA/100
Is there effective and transparent external auditing of military defence expenditure?
View QuestionNexus of Defence and National Assets
Q18
NA/100
Is there evidence that the country’s defence institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation and, if so, are these interests publicly stated and subject to scrutiny?
View QuestionOrganised Crime
Q19
NA/100
Is there evidence, for example through media investigations or prosecution reports, of a penetration of organised crime into the defence and security sector? If no, is there evidence that the government is alert and prepared for this risk?
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Q20
NA/100
Is there policing to investigate corruption and organised crime within the defence services and is there evidence of the effectiveness of this policing?
View QuestionControl of Intelligence Services
Q21
NA/100
Are the policies, administration, and budgets of the intelligence services subject to effective and independent oversight?
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Q22
NA/100
Are senior positions within the intelligence services filled on the basis of objective selection criteria, and are appointees subject to investigation of their suitability and prior conduct?
View QuestionExport Controls
Q23
NA/100