Are there independent, well-resourced, and effective institutions within defence and security tasked with building integrity and countering corruption?
8a. Mandate and resources
Niger score: 50/100
There are no compliance or ethics units in place and no effort to establish them.
There is no evidence of such units, but there is evidence that the country is making proactive efforts to establish them.
Compliance and ethics units in the defence sector are in place. But there are extensive weaknesses in both staffing and funding, and expertise or their mandate is unclear.
There are identifiable compliance and ethics units within defence and security that are mandated to handle integrity and corruption in defence, but there are some weaknesses either in staffing and funding, or expertise.
There are identifiable compliance and ethics units within defence and security that are mandated to handle integrity and corruption in defence, and they are suitably staffed and funded.
Defence and security services in Niger include different various institutions: the Niger Armed Forces (FAN), under the Ministry of Defence, are responsible for external security and, in some parts of the country, for internal security. Gendarmerie Nationale (GN), also under the Ministry of Defence, has primary responsibility for rural security. The National Guard of Niger (GNN), under the Ministry of the Interior’s Public Security, Decentralisation, and Customary and Religious Affairs (Ministry of Interior) is responsible for domestic security and the protection of high-level officials and the government buildings. The National Police also fall under the command of the Ministry of Interior and are responsible for urban law enforcement (2).
The Defence Ministry’s internal oversight body is called the Office of the Inspector General of the Armed Forces (IGA/Inspection Générale des Armées) (1). It is responsible for ensuring that all relevant administrative, financial and budgetary rules and standards are applied and respected and that public resources are managed in a transparent, efficient and cost-effective manner. Inspectors work under the supervision of the presidency (3). The IGA has 8 sub-divisions assisted by technical specialists (3).
Similarly, the Ministry of Interior has a General Inspection of Security Services (IGSS) whose mission is to control security services: the National Police, National Guard and the Civil Protection through “skills enhancement and respect for ethics” (4). In addition, two external control mechanisms exist for the police: the direct hierarchy (responsibility of police commanders and field commanders to supervise and train their police officers) and the General Inspectorate of Security Services (IGSS), which is also the internal control mechanism for the Civil Protection and the GN (National Guard). The IGSS, which reports directly to the Ministry of the Interior, conducts fact-finding visits in the field. However, its capacity and the available resources are limited (5).
In 2014, the DCAF initiated a partnership with the IGSS which allowed the institution to reinforce its technical capacity. In 2017, DCAF conducted an institutional audit of the IGSS that highlighted the need for training for IGSS staff to address deficiencies in professional skills necessary for internal control activities. The DCAF started with training on internal control and auditing techniques, as well as risk management and budget (financial) oversight (6).
Finally, it should also be underlined that as the IGA, the IGSS is not provided with unit offices in the field and the approval of fact-finding missions is subject to a specific funding request (3, 7). Therefore, even though compliance and ethics units exist, there are weaknesses connected to staffing and funding that might potentially undermine the efficiency of these institutions.
1. Ministry of Defence, http://www.defense.gouv.ne/index.php/principaux-organismes/organisation/organigramme.
2. Ministry of Interior, http://www.gouv.ne.
3. Interview with senior Ministry of Defence official, June 5, 2018.
4. Seini Seydou Zakaria, “Restitution du rapport d’analyse diagnostic de l’Inspection Générale des services de sécurité (IGSS): Pour l’amélioration de la qualité du service public en matière de sécurité,” (Restitution of the diagnostic analysis report of the General Inspectorate of Security Services (IGSS): for the improvement of the quality of the public service in matters of security), Le Sahel, July 17, 2017, http://lesahel.org/index.php/societe/item/14596-restitution-du-rapport-danalyse-diagnostic-de-linspection-générale-des-services-de-sécurité-igss–pour-lamélioration-de-la-qualité-du-service-public-en-matière-de-sécurité.
5. “Stratégie Opérationnelle. Police de Proximité 2018-2020. Version finale,” (Operational Strategy: Community Policing 2018-2020), Republic of Niger, November 2017.
6. Interview with project manager of an International NGO, May 30, 2018.
7. Interview with senior Ministry of Interior official, May 31, 2018.
Niger score: 25/100
The institutions/ units are under political control or they are misused. The work of the institutions can be shut down by other defence and security institutions.
The institutions/ units may be in the chain of command of the defence and security institutions that they oversee. However they can not be shut down by these institutions.
The institutions/ units are not in the chain of command of the defence and security institutions which they oversee. They report directly to a senior member of the Ministry of Defence (e.g. Chief of Staff).
The IGA depends directly on the Presidency of the Republic (1). Therefore, it is not in the chain of command of the Ministry of Defence that it oversees; however, under the Constitution, the president is also the supreme head of the armed forces. As to the IGSS, it depends directly on the Ministry of Interior (2). Both institutions (IGA and IGSS) depend on funding from their hierarchy to conduct evaluations and audit missions in the field. No information regarding the hypothesis of being shut down by the presidency of the Ministry of Interior was found.
However, as commander-in-chief of the Nigerien armed forces, theoretically, President of the Republic can shut down both units. As noted in 8A, neither the IGA nor the IGSS can be qualified as independent agencies. Furthermore, given funding problems (especially for the IGSS), sufficient independence does not seem to be possible.
1. Interview with senior Ministry of Defence official, June 5, 2018.
2. “Stratégie Opérationnelle. Police de Proximité 2018-2020. Version finale,” (Operational Strategy: Community Policing 2018-2020), Republic of Niger, November 2017.
Niger score: 50/100
These institutions or units are not even aware of corruption risks within their institution.
Staff within the units understand the corruption risks specific to their institutions, but they fail to prepare an effective action plan with appropriate mitigation measures which address the risks.
Staff within the units understand the corruption risks specific to their institutions, but they are not able to address risks appropriately or adequately, either through their own work or by compelling others.
Staff within the units understand the corruption risks specific to their institutions, and are able to address some risks independently. But they are not able to ensure other departments address risks adequately.
Staff within the units understand the corruption risks specific to their institutions. They are able to address risks independently and to ensure that other departments or units handle risks appropriately. Actions to handle risks may include training, oversight, or policy recommendations.
According to an interviewee, the IGA could lead two forms of audit: planned and non-planned. The planned one conducts fact-finding visits to the field throughout the year. However, at the time of data collection in May 2018, the planned audit has not yet been implemented due to a lack of resources, such as fuel (1). The last audit conducted by the IGA in the field took place in 2017 (1). In general, the audit conducted by the IGA includes inspection of the number of personnel, armament, ammunition, cars, fuels, food and health services. According to the interviewee, control of munitions is very important as they may explode if too old (1). The audit control also verifies the training of the personnel, its capacity to use armament and to repair it if necessary (1).
However, it has been reported to the assessor, that a joint IGSS-IGA non-programmed audit is taking place in June 2018 to check corruption risks among the gendarmerie (1). Similar joint missions had already taken place through 2015-2017 (1,2). As a result of one of these joint missions conducted in Agadez in 2016, some security officers were revoked (2). Besides, IGSS and GIZ are also regularly conducting joint missions to raise awareness among the population about corruption risks, which are not audit missions (2).
1 Interview with senior Ministry of Defence official, June 5, 2018.
2. Interview with senior Ministry of Interior official, May 31, 2018.
Compare scores by country
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|Country||8a. Mandate and resources||8b. Independence||8c. Effectiveness|
|Algeria||0 / 100||NA||NA|
|Angola||0 / 100||NA||NA|
|Burkina Faso||50 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Cameroon||50 / 100||0 / 100||50 / 100|
|Cote d'Ivoire||50 / 100||25 / 100||25 / 100|
|Egypt||50 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Ghana||50 / 100||0 / 100||25 / 100|
|Jordan||50 / 100||50 / 100||25 / 100|
|Kuwait||25 / 100||0 / 100||25 / 100|
|Lebanon||50 / 100||50 / 100||25 / 100|
|Mali||50 / 100||NEI||0 / 100|
|Morocco||0 / 100||NA||NA|
|Niger||50 / 100||25 / 100||50 / 100|
|Nigeria||50 / 100||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|Oman||0 / 100||NA||NA|
|Palestine||50 / 100||0 / 100||25 / 100|
|Qatar||0 / 100||NA||NA|
|Saudi Arabia||25 / 100||NA||NA|
|Tunisia||50 / 100||50 / 100||NEI|
|United Arab Emirates||0 / 100||NA||NA|