Are sources of defence income other than from central government allocation (from equipment sales or property disposal, for example) published and scrutinised?
Niger score: 0/100
There is no publication of non-central government sources of funding, or the information that is published is considered unreliable.
There is only selective publication of income sources, and no information released on amounts received or the allocation of this income.
There is full publication of income sources, but there may be little or no release of information about amounts received or the allocation of this income, or there may be full publication but only of selected income sources.
There is full publication of all sources of income, the amounts received, but inadequate information on the allocation of income.
There is full publication of all sources of income, the amounts received, and the allocation of this income.
There is no defence industry in Niger, and the military does not own any property that could provide it with additional income or revenue (1). However, Niger receives important assistance from its main international partners. The type of assistance depends on the partner and may come in the form of military and police specialised training or gifts like armament, ammunition, military equipment etc. The cooperation is set up on a bilateral level – with the United States, France and Germany – as the main partners, and on a multilateral level – mainly with the European Union and the United Nations (2). The information regarding the content of the cooperation is accessible on the websites of Niger’s partners as well as in reports by think-tanks working on the Sahel region (2); it is also occasionally published in press-releases (4, 5) or provided in official interviews with Nigerien ministers or high-ranking civil servants (6). Information on the provided assistance is centralised in the Office of the Chief of the General Staff of the Armies (Etat Major des Armées), but it is not accessible to the public.
(1. “Perspective monde: Exportations d’armes ($US constant 1990): Niger,” (Export of weapons (US $ constant 1990), Université de Sherbrook, http://perspective.usherbrooke.ca/bilan/servlet/BMTendanceStatPays?langue=fr&codePays=NER&codeStat=MS.MIL.XPRT.KD&codeStat2=x.
2. Georges Berghezan, “Militaires occidentaux au Niger: présence contestée, utilité à démontrer,” (Western soldiers in Niger: disputed presence, usefulness to be seen), Groupe de recherche et d’information sur la paix et la sécurité (GRIP), November 7, 2016,
3. Antonin Tisseron, “Quand la France ne fait plus rêver L’exemple du Niger,” (When France is no longer dreaming: the example of Niger), Groupe de recherche et d’information sur la paix et la sécurité (GRIP), July 14, 2016, https://www.grip.org/fr/node/2065.
4. “Niger: don allemand de matériel roulant aux Forces de défense pour lutter contre le terrorisme,” (Niger: German donation of rolling stock to the Defence Forces to fight against terrorism), French China, January 21, 2018, http://french.china.org.cn/foreign/txt/2018-01/21/content_50259649.htm.
5. “Les Etats-Unis équipent l’armée nigérienne pour lutter contre le terrorisme,” (The United States are equipping the Nigerien army to fight against terrorism), French China, December 9, 2017, http://french.china.org.cn/foreign/txt/2017-12/09/content_50095421.htm.
6. “Interview de M. Kalla Moutari, ministre de la Défense Nationale: “Nous avons tiré la leçon toute simple selon laquelle en mutualisant leurs forces, les pays africains peuvent venir à bout de ces mouvements terroristes,” (Interview with M. Kalla Moutari, Minister of Defense: “We have learned the simple lesson that that by joining forces, African countries can overcome these terrorist movements”), Tam Taminfo, February 8, 2018,
15b. Institutional scrutiny
Niger score: 25/100
There is no institutional scrutiny of non-central government sources of funding.
Any institutional scrutiny that is conducted on non-central government sources of funding suffers from political influence so as to be unreliable.
Mechanisms of scrutiny are in place and administered by the internal audit office within the defence ministry. However, the supreme audit institution does not conduct scrutiny of non-central government funding.
Mechanisms of scrutiny are in place and administered involving a central government department such as the supreme audit institution. However, the internal audit office within the defence ministry may either fail to scrutinise funding, or may not be allowed to release findings.
Mechanisms of scrutiny are in place and administered by a central government department, i.e., supreme audit institution, and the internal audit office within the defence ministry.
The Defence Ministry’s internal oversight body – the Office of the Inspector General of the Armed Forces (IGA) – provides a scrutiny mechanism (1). Depending on the Presidency (see question 8), it ensures that all relevant administrative, financial and budgetary rules and standards are applied and respected and that public resources are managed in a transparent, efficient and cost-effective manner (2). Within the Ministry of Defence, there is also the Office of the Inspector General (IGS, Inspection Générale des Services), which acts as a control structure within the internal administration of the Ministry (1). Its equivalent also exists in other Ministries.
1. Ministry of Defence, http://www.defense.gouv.ne/index.php/principaux-organismes/organisation/organigramme.
2. “Chapter 8: Niger,” Gouvernance du secteur de la sécurité en Afrique de l’Ouest francophone: bilan et perspectives, (Governance of the security sector in francophone West Africa: assessment and prospects), Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, (DCAF), 2010, https://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/bm_WestAfrica_bryden_fr_0.pdf.
15c. Public scrutiny
Niger score: 0/100
Public scrutiny of non-central government sources of funding is minimal or non-existent.
There is some scrutiny by the public, including media and CSOs, but it may not be in-depth or consistent.
There is considerable and consistent scrutiny by the public, including media and CSOs.
Civil Society Organisations (CSO) occasionally participate in defence and security debates. For example, every year, AEC organises a forum “Session Budgetaire Citoyenne” to discuss upcoming financial law, where defence and security budget is also debated (1). Sometimes, the criticism provided by some organisations may lead to the arrests of their leaders (see the example provided in question 4, sub-section CSO protections). Therefore, even if a debate is taking place, defence and security policies remain the government’s prerogative.
The debate also concerns mainly sources coming from the central government. At the same time, assistance from cooperation with its main international partners may be considered as an important source of income from non-central government sources. As explained previously (see Q3), the extent of international military presence in Niger remains unclear.
1. “Budget 2018: Une mobilisation citoyenne s’impose,” (2018 Budget: citizen mobilisation is essential), Niger Diaspora, October 20, 2017, https://www.nigerdiaspora.net/index.php/politique-niger/2390-budget-2018-une-mobilisation-citoyenne-s-impose.
Compare scores by country
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|Country||15a. Transparency||15b. Institutional scrutiny||15c. Public scrutiny|
|Algeria||0 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Angola||0 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Burkina Faso||0 / 100||25 / 100||25 / 100|
|Cameroon||0 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Cote d'Ivoire||0 / 100||0 / 100||50 / 100|
|Egypt||0 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Ghana||25 / 100||50 / 100||0 / 100|
|Jordan||0 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Kuwait||25 / 100||75 / 100||0 / 100|
|Lebanon||25 / 100||50 / 100||0 / 100|
|Mali||0 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Morocco||25 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Niger||0 / 100||25 / 100||0 / 100|
|Nigeria||0 / 100||50 / 100||0 / 100|
|Oman||0 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Palestine||25 / 100||25 / 100||0 / 100|
|Qatar||0 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Saudi Arabia||0 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Tunisia||50 / 100||75 / 100||0 / 100|
|United Arab Emirates||0 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|