Is there policing to investigate corruption and organised crime within the defence services and is there evidence of the effectiveness of this policing?
20a. Existence of policing function
Niger score: 50/100
No policing function is exercised over the defence services to investigate corruption or organised crime.
There is a unit within the national police force that deals with organised crime and corruption, which may be authorised to work on issues in the defence sector.
There is a unit within the national police force that deals with organised crime and corruption in the defence services, or there is a unit within the military police with the same mandate.
Internal oversight bodies of the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Interior represent institutions that generally have the mandate to conduct audit missions that could reveal corrupt practices within security and defence forces. The Defence Ministry’s internal oversight body is called the Office of the Inspector General of the Armed Forces (IGA/Inspection Générale des Armées) (1). It is responsible for ensuring that all relevant administrative, financial and budgetary rules and standards are applied and respected and that public resources are managed in a transparent, efficient and cost-effective manner. In turn, the Ministry of Interior has a General Inspection of Security Services (IGSS) whose mission is to control security services: the National Police, National Guard and the Civil Protection through “skills enhancement and respect for ethics” (2). The mandate of the IGSS goes beyond simple administrative control (3) (see questions 8 and 16 for details). The 2003 Military Penal Code (4) addresses corruption in article 228, which states that officers found guilty of corruption, theft or general crime can be dismissed, demoted or imprisoned. The Code provides for a judiciary military police that reports to the Ministry of Defence (article 46). They are charged with finding and following up on all infractions of the law (article 47) at all levels of the armed forces (Article 48) (4).
On a broader level, to fight against organised crime and terrorism, authorities have used the High Authority for the Fight against Corruption and Assimilated Offences – HALCIA, Central Service for the Fight against Terrorism (SCLCT), National Financial Information Processing Unit (CENTIF), the National Commission on the Fight against Human Trafficking (CNCLTP) (5) or the National Commission for the Collection and Control of Illicit Weapons (CNCCAI). However, according to the mandate of these institutions, it is unclear if they can investigate directly within security and defence institutions. It would be plausible to assume that if their findings identified the involvement of military or security personnel, they would be able to refer them to the competent authorities.
In sum, the institutional framework aimed specifically at the investigation of corruption and organised crime within the defence sector is limited. Regardless of the existence of such institutions as CENTIF and CNCLTP, it is not clear how they engage in the investigative process of organised crime within the defence sector.
1. Ministry of Defence, http://www.defense.gouv.ne/index.php/principaux-organismes/organisation/organigramme.
2. Seini Seydou Zakaria, “Restitution du rapport d’analyse diagnostic de l’Inspection Générale des services de sécurité (IGSS): Pour l’amélioration de la qualité du service public en matière de sécurité,” (Restitution of the diagnostic analysis report of the General Inspectorate of Security Services (IGSS): for the improvement of the quality of the public service in matters of security), Le Sahel, July 17, 2017, http://lesahel.org/index.php/societe/item/14596-restitution-du-rapport-danalyse-diagnostic-de-linspection-générale-des-services-de-sécurité-igss–pour-lamélioration-de-la-qualité-du-service-public-en-matière-de-sécurité.
3. Interview with senior Ministry of Defence official, une 5, 2018.
4. “Loi n°2003-010 du 11 mars 2003, portant Code de justice militaire,” (Act 2003-010 of 11th March 2003, setting the Military Code of Justice), Journal Officiel de la République du Niger, n°6, 5 May, 2003, pp. 357-384.
5. “Décret n°2012-082/PRN/MJ déterminant l’organisation, la composition et le fonctionnement de la Commission Nationale de Coordination de Lutte contre la Traite des Personnes (CNCLTP),” (Decree no.2012-082/PRN/MJ on the organisation, composition and functioning of the National Commission on the Fight against Human Trafficking (CNCLTP)), (2012), http://www.justice.gouv.ne/sites/default/files/composition%20et%20le%20fonctionnement%20de%20la%20Commission%20Nationale%20de%20Coordination%20de%20Lutte%20contre%20la%20Traite%20des%20Personnes%20(CNXLPT).pdf.
6. “Country Reports on Terrorism 2016: Niger,” United States Department of State, July 19, 2017, accessed May 17, 2018, http://www.refworld.org/docid/5981e426a.html.
7. “Mali, Niger: paix, sécurité et développement, trois défis à relever. Une coopération et une intervention militaire françaises sans voix discordante,” (Mali, Niger: peace, security and development, three challenges to be met), Sénat: République Française, http://www.senat.fr/ga/ga125/ga1254.html.
8. “Décret n° 2004-262PRN/ME/F du 14 septembre 2004, portant création, organisation et fonctionnement d’une Cellule nationale de traitement des informations financières (CENTIF),” (Decree no.2004-262/PRN/ME/Fl of 14th September 2004, on the creation, establishment and functionning of the National Financial Information Processing Unit (CENTIF)), Journal Officiel spécial n°15 du 16 September 2004.
Niger score: 50/100
These policing functions are subject to considerable and regular undue influence from top military officials or the executive.
These policing functions are nominally independent, but in practice their work or budgets can be interfered with by top military officials or the executive.
These policing functions operate independently of the bodies that they investigate, and their budget is ring-fenced.
It is difficult to assess the extent to which the policing functions of the SCLCT or CENTIF are subject to undue influence from top military officials or the executive. The SCLCT responds to the General Director of the National Police (Directeur général de la Police Nationale) (1). The CENTIF is an Independent administrative authority under the authority of the Minister of Finance. It has financial autonomy and the power of autonomous decision-making on matters that fall within its competence (2). The CENTIF appears to be more independent than SCLCT, yet it is unclear how independent they are from top military officials or the executive.
1. “Mali, Niger: paix, sécurité et développement, trois défis à relever. Une coopération et une intervention militaire françaises sans voix discordante,” (Mali, Niger: peace, security and development, three challenges to be met), Sénat: République Française, http://www.senat.fr/ga/ga125/ga1254.html.
2. “République du Niger Rapport Annuel 2016,” (Republic of Niger 2016 Annual Report), Ministry of Finance, 2016, http://www.centif.ne/sites/default/files/rapport/Rapport_Annuel_2016.pdf.
Niger score: 25/100
There is a complete failure to investigate or prosecute, even in the face of clear evidence.
Cases are superficially investigated, or receive "show" hearings in which defendants are not punished.
Cases are investigated but not often prosecuted. There is clear undue influence in the decision making process, or it may be that only certain types of cases are prosecuted.
Cases are investigated or prosecuted through formal processes, but undue political influence is attempted, and sometimes effective at derailing prosecutions.
Cases are investigated or prosecuted through formal processes and without undue political influence.
Even if there may be cases of involvement of security and defence forces in corruption or organised crime investigated, they are not disclosed publicly (1). However, the 2018 interview with the Ministry of Interior revealed that recently 7 or 8 gendarmes were dismissed because of their involvement in migrant trafficking in the Agadez region. Furthermore, he underlined that under the 2015 law (2) around 200 persons were arrested and 72 were sentenced while others are still awaiting trial (3) .
Another example reveals a case dating back to 2014. That year police officers in the passport service of the National Police had been arrested and detained at the Niamey civil prison for their involvement in passport fraud. The director of Direction de Surveillance du Territoire (DST) and his deputy were both arrested (4).
The results of the activity of institutions fighting against organised crime are visible, even though they do not reveal cases involving security and defence forces. For example, according to its annual report, in 2016, the CENTIF recorded 29 suspicious transaction reports. The processing of reports for that year, including some of those for previous years, allowed the transmission of 27 reports to the Public Prosecutor at the end of 2016 (5). According to 2016 OCRTIS statistics, there were seizes of the following: 1086 cannabis bricks, 379,226 grams of cannabis and 660 cannabis horns; 106 grams of cocaine; 248 grams of Ephedrine; 2,773,125 tablets of Diazepam; 8,157,732 tablets of Tramadol; and, 21 grams of crack cocaine. In addition to these products, OCRTIS seized 331,650 kilograms of counterfeit pharmaceuticals (6). Recently, in June 2018, the OCRTIS managed to dismantle an important network of drug traffickers which led to the seizure of two and a half tones of cannabis resin with a value of more than 4 750 000 Euros (7).
The evidence above demonstrates that the authorities are countering organised crime, but not necessarily within the defence services. In some cases (as in Agadez) the implication of security and defence personnel is revealed and cases are investigated. However, such cases are not systematically prosecuted and disclosed to the public, which may undermine the confidence of the population in the security and defence forces.
1. Interview with Ministry of Justice employee, May 31, 2018.
2. “Loi n° 2015-36 du 26 May sur le trafic illicite des migrants,” (Act no.2015-36 of 26th May 2015 on the smuggling of migrants), Journal Officiel de la République du Niger,
3. “Interview de Mohamad Bazoum: A Agadez, on est passé de 350 migrants par jour à 100 par semaine,” (Interview with Mohamed Bazoum. “In Agadez, we went from 350 migrants per day to 100 per week”), RFI, May 23, 2018, http://www.rfi.fr/emission/20180523-agadez-on-est-passe-350-migrants-jour-100-semaine.
4. “Affaire de faux passeports: Le directeur de la direction de surveillance du territoire DST Ouba Ibrahim et son Adjoint mis aux arrest,” (Case of false passports: The Director of the Territorial Surveillance Directorate DST Ouba Ibrahim and his deputy are arrested), A Niamey, July 22, 2014, http://news.aniamey.com/h/18880.html.
5. “République du Niger Rapport Annuel 2016,” (Republic of Niger 2016 Annual Report), Ministry of Finance, 2016, http://www.centif.ne/sites/default/files/rapport/Rapport_Annuel_2016.pdf.
6. Seini Seydou Zakaria, “29ème Journée internationale de lutte contre l’abus des substances illicites et des drogues,” (29th International Day against the abuse of illicit substances and drugs), Actu Niger, June 27, 2016, https://www.actuniger.com/societe/11790-29ème-journée-internationale-de-lutte-contre-l-abus-des-substances-illicites-et-des-drogues.html.
7. “Niger: démantelement d’un important réseau des trafiquants de drogue à Niamey d’une valeur de plus de 3 milliards de francs,” (Niger: dismantling of a large network of drug traffickers in Niamey worth more than 3 billion francs), ici Niger, June 15, 2018,
Compare scores by country
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|Country||20a. Existence of policing function||20b. Independence||20c. Effectiveness|
|Algeria||50 / 100||25 / 100||25 / 100|
|Angola||50 / 100||0 / 100||50 / 100|
|Burkina Faso||0 / 100||NA||NA|
|Cameroon||50 / 100||0 / 100||50 / 100|
|Cote d'Ivoire||50 / 100||50 / 100||50 / 100|
|Egypt||50 / 100||25 / 100||0 / 100|
|Ghana||100 / 100||50 / 100||50 / 100|
|Jordan||0 / 100||NA||NA|
|Kuwait||50 / 100||0 / 100||25 / 100|
|Lebanon||100 / 100||0 / 100||50 / 100|
|Mali||0 / 100||NA||NA|
|Morocco||25 / 100||0 / 100||50 / 100|
|Niger||50 / 100||50 / 100||25 / 100|
|Nigeria||75 / 100||NEI||50 / 100|
|Oman||0 / 100||NA||NA|
|Palestine||25 / 100||0 / 100||NEI|
|Qatar||50 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Saudi Arabia||0 / 100||NA||NA|
|Tunisia||50 / 100||0 / 100||25 / 100|
|United Arab Emirates||0 / 100||NA||NA|