Are procurement requirements derived from a national defence and security strategy, and are procurement decisions well-audited? Are defence purchases based on clearly identified and quantified requirements?
63a. Procurement requirements
Niger score: 0/100
It is impossible to assess whether procurement requirements derive from a national defence and security strategy, even if a national strategy exists. There is no formal procedure in place for defining purchase requirements. Or the defence strategy may be secret so it is impossible to verify how procurement requirements are derived.
Procurement requirements are in theory formally derived from a national defence and security strategy. The strategy is likely to be weak, vague or insufficient to derive procurement requirements.
Procurement requirements are in part derived from a national defence and security strategy. If the strategy is weak, vague or not sufficient to derive procurement requirements, work to quantify the need for significant purchases is occasionally conducted.
Procurement requirements are derived from a national defence and security strategy, but there may be occasions where procurements are not justified based on the national strategy.
Procurement requirements are derived from a national defence and security strategy, and there is logical flow down from strategy to individual procurement with no exceptions.
Niger’s procurement needs are primarily based on strategic security concerns and their efforts to contain the armed groups that have sprung up along its borders with Mali, Algeria, Libya and Nigeria. Niger is impacted directly by the crises in Libya, Mali and Nigeria, and is facing a growing threat of insurgency along its borders. The country contributes to the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) to fight the Boko Haram insurgency in the Lake Chad and is a key contributor to G5-Sahel, which also includes Burkina-Faso, Mali, Mauritania and Chad.
Given that public information about procurements is restricted, it is difficult to evaluate if requirements are derived from a national defence and security strategy. However, due to the growing threats, Niger is facing, it is likely to be the case. It should also be noted that the new National Security and Defence Strategy (PNSD) is still under review (2) and had not been published yet, as of July 2018. The strategy currently in use for development and security dates back to 2011 (SDS Sahel-Niger) (3).
1. “Presentation du programme de Renaissance II du President Issoufou Mahamadou 2016-2021,” (Presentation of President Issoufou Mahamadou’s 2016-2021 Renaissance II programme), Tam Taminfo March 18, 2016, http://www.tamtaminfo.com/presentation-du-programme-de-renaissance-ii-du-president-issoufou-mahamadou-2016-2021/.
2. “Forum national de la Sécurité et de la Défense: Vers l’élaboration de la Politique nationale de sécurité et défense (PNSD),” (National Forum for Security and Defence: Towards the development of the National Security and Defence Policy (NSDP)), Le Sahel, December 2017.
3. “Secrétariat Exécutif de la Stratégie pour la Développement et la Sécurité dans les Zones Sahélo-Saharienne du Niger,” Cabinet du Premier Ministre, (Executive Secretariat of the Strategy for Development and Security in Niger’s Sahelo-Saharan areas), Office of the Prime Minister, 2011, https://www.ipinst.org/images/pdfs/sds_version_francaise.pdf.
Niger score: 0/100
There is no scrutiny of actual purchases.
Scrutiny is occasionally conducted by a number of legally or constitutionally mandated oversight mechanisms (e.g. the parliamentary oversight committee, the inspector general, or the national audit office) to confirm that procurement is done in line with national security strategy or that work is undertaken to quantify the need for purchases.
There is active scrutiny conducted by a number of legally or constitutionally mandated oversight mechanisms (e.g. the parliamentary oversight committee, the inspector general, or the national audit office) to confirm that procurement is in line with national security strategy or that work is undertaken to quantify the need for purchases.
An interviewee stated that the last time the Inspector General of the Army conducted oversight of procurement was in 2016. As for the Security and Defence Commission in the Lower House (NA), it is not involved in the oversight of procurements or the consideration of procurement needs. Additionally, the assessor did not find evidence of additional legislative scrutiny of actual purchases (1), (2).
1. “Resolution n°2 du 22 mars 2017 portant Règlement Intérieur de l’Assemblée Nationale,” (Resolution no.2 of 22nd March 2017, setting out the regulations for the National Assembly of Niger), National Assembly, March 2017, http://www.assemblee.ne/images/Documents/REGLEMENT_INTERIEUR_ANN_2017.pdf
2. Interview with member of the National Assembly, May 24, 2018.
Niger score: 50/100
Purchases often are outside of the national strategy and appear to be opportunistic in nature.
The Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces base at least their major purchases on the clearly identified requirements, but there are opportunistic and unplanned purchases.
The Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces systematically base all purchases on clearly identified and quantified requirements.
The inspector general of the army lacks resources to carry out field missions, so auditing is not conducted to establish whether purchases are always made based on clearly identified requirements (1). It is also plausible that Niger’s authorities do not have a complete and precise picture of the requirements for equipment and operational capabilities of its personnel, which rapidly evolves in the context of insecurity and recurrent attacks. Therefore, even though significant acquisitions are likely to be made as part of the strategic concerns (2,3) actual purchases might not always correspond to exact needs.
1. Interview with senior Ministry of Defence official, June 5, 2018.
2. Laurent Touchard, “Pourquoi le Niger a acheté un avion de renseignement à 10 millions d’euros,” (Why Niger bought an intelligence aircraft for 10 million euros), Jeune Afrique, October 23, 2014, http://www.jeuneafrique.com/41767/politique/pourquoi-le-niger-a-achet-un-avion-de-renseignement-10-millions-d-euros/.
3. “Niger: les Gazelle sortent du bois. L’armée nigérienne dispose désormais de ses premiers avions de chasse,” (Niger: the Gazelles come out of the woods. The Nigerien army now has its first fighter aircraft), Tam Taminfo, April 2, 2013, http://www.tamtaminfo.com/larmee-nigerienne-dispose-desormais-de-ses-premiers-avions-de-chasse/.
Compare scores by country
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|Country||63a. Procurement requirements||63b. Scrutiny||63c. Purchases|
|Algeria||0 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Angola||25 / 100||0 / 100||50 / 100|
|Burkina Faso||25 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Cameroon||0 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Cote d'Ivoire||0 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Egypt||0 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Ghana||0 / 100||50 / 100||0 / 100|
|Jordan||0 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Kuwait||25 / 100||50 / 100||50 / 100|
|Lebanon||25 / 100||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Mali||0 / 100||50 / 100||0 / 100|
|Morocco||0 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Niger||0 / 100||0 / 100||50 / 100|
|Nigeria||0 / 100||50 / 100||0 / 100|
|Oman||0 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Palestine||25 / 100||50 / 100||50 / 100|
|Qatar||0 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Saudi Arabia||0 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Tunisia||0 / 100||50 / 100||50 / 100|
|United Arab Emirates||25 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|