Political Risk:

Moderate

Score:

59/100

Defence and Security Policy and Policy Transparency

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Q1 50/100

Is there formal provision for effective and independent legislative scrutiny of defence policy?

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Formal rights Score: 50 / 100
The Constitution of the Republic of Poland states in Article 26, paragraph 2, that “the Armed Forces shall observe neutrality regarding political matters and…
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Effectiveness Score: 50 / 100
The Polish Sejm does not have an official prerogative to accept or reject the official security policy. The Act on the Universal Obligation to…
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Independent legislature scrutiny Score: 50 / 100
There is no evidence of undue influence by the executive outside of normal political procedures stemming from the parliamentary system of government. It should…
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Q2 35/100

Does the country have an identifiable and effective parliamentary defence and security committee (or similar such organisations) to exercise oversight?

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Formal rights Score: 75 / 100
The Sejm Committee on National Defence has the formal power to scrutinize and audit any aspect of performance of defence ministry, defence agencies and…
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Expertise Score: 75 / 100
The National Defence Committee consists of 37 permanent MPs. It has four permanent subcommittees (on Polish defence industry and modernisation of the Armed Forces;…
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Responsive policymaking Score: 0 / 100
The Committee does not have the power to accept or reject the official security policy. The Act on the Universal Obligation to Defend the…
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Short-term oversight Score: 25 / 100
The defence committee meets regularly, on average 3 times a month. It gathers information from and discusses defence issues with the representatives of the…
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Long-term oversight Score: 0 / 100
For three and a half years, the defence committee has not conducted any long-term investigation, nor commissioned any investigations into other relevant state institutions…
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Institutional outcomes Score: NA / 100
This indicator has been marked Not Applicable. It is difficult to find examples of direct application of defence committee recommendations by the MoND because…
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Q3 50/100

Is the country’s national defence policy or national security strategy debated and publicly available?

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Scope of involvement Score: 50 / 100
The defence policy or security strategy is debated by the executive, legislature, and the public, but not consistently. There are no public consultations of…
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Scope of debate Score: 50 / 100
Discussion of the defence policy or security strategy focuses primarily on major threats (potential and existing), and the level of defence spending. Debate persists…
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Public consultations Score: 25 / 100
There is regular public debate among academics, journalists, opinion-formers, and CSOs about defence issues [1, 2, 3, 4]. However, the public debate is not…
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Transparency Score: 75 / 100
The public can easily access documents and regularly updated information on all aspects of the defence policy or security strategy. Documents on Polish national…
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Q4 50/100

Do defence and security institutions have a policy, or evidence, of openness towards civil society organisations (CSOs) when dealing with issues of corruption?

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Policy of openness Score: 25 / 100
The rules of cooperation are defined by internal acts that are decisions or ordinances, including those established based on Art. 5b para. 1 of…
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CSO protections Score: 75 / 100
CSOs enjoy a range of protections from government interference and can operate within the country. Although the current ruling majority is not enthusiastic about…
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Practice of openness Score: 50 / 100
The ministry has no practice of creating separate rules for cooperation or programmes with non-governmental organizations for anti-corruption issues. This co-operation is centred around…
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Q5 63/100

Has the country signed up to the following international anti-corruption instruments: UNCAC and the OECD Convention?

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Signatory and Ratification status Score: 100 / 100
Poland has adopted both the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions of 21 November 1997 (ratified by…
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Compliance Score: 25 / 100
Poland has several issues of compliance with the OECD Convention and UNCAC. Regarding the OECD convention: “Poland must make urgent progress on carrying out…
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Q6 75/100

Is there evidence of regular, active public debate on issues of defence? If yes, does the government participate in this debate?

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Public debate Score: 100 / 100
Outside the government, there is regular public debate among academics, journalists, opinion-formers, and CSOs about defence issues. Debate persists on high priority issues for…
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Government engagement in public discourse Score: 50 / 100
The government engages in discussion with the public about defence issues through media briefings, social media [1] and participation in conferences [2]. However, this…
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Q7 88/100

Does the country have an openly stated and effectively implemented anti-corruption policy for the defence sector?

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Anti-corruption policy Score: 100 / 100
There is an openly stated anti-corruption policy which also covers the defence sector. The new Government Anti-Corruption Plan for 2018-2020, which is related to…
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Effective implementation Score: 75 / 100
The plan was introduced in January 2018 [1]. There is no schedule (as milestones) of implementation of the programme, the only deadline for all…
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Q8 58/100

Are there independent, well-resourced, and effective institutions within defence and security tasked with building integrity and countering corruption?

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Mandate and resources Score: 75 / 100
The MoND’s Bureau of Anti-Corruption Procedures had been operating during 2006-2016, and it reported directly to the minister. The Bureau of Anti-Corruption Procedures was…
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Independence Score: 50 / 100
The unit is in the chain of command of the defence and security institutions that it oversees. Its role is limited – the Bureau of…
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Effectiveness Score: 50 / 100
Staff within the units understand the corruption risks specific to their institutions. However, the mandate of the anti-corruption unit has been weakened, as it…
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Q9 NS/100

Does the public trust the institutions of defence and security to tackle the issue of bribery and corruption in their establishments?

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Score: NS / 100
This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. No polls explicitly ask about corruption in the defence sector. The CBOS survey “Opinions…
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Q10 33/100

Are there regular assessments of the areas of greatest corruption risk for ministry and armed forces personnel, and are the findings used as inputs to the anti-corruption policy?

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Risk assessments Score: 50 / 100
Ministry of National defence carries out regular, comprehensive risk assessment as part of its governance procedures. The risk assessment is based on methodology which…
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Regularity Score: 0 / 100
There are no evidences that risk of corruption has been identified and included in the risk register in a frame of general, annual MoD…
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Inputs to anti-corruption policy Score: 50 / 100
There are no evidences that risk of corruption has been identified and included in the risk register in a frame of general, annual MoD…
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Defence Budgets

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Q11 17/100

Does the country have a process for acquisition planning that involves clear oversight, and is it publicly available?

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Acquisition planning process Score: 25 / 100
The long-term plan for the technical modernisation of the armed forces for 2017-2026 has not been adopted yet (2018), which generates problems with the…
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Transparency Score: 25 / 100
The Secretary of State of the MoND directly supervises the acquisitions department, which includes the Inspectorate of Armaments [1]. The Ministry of National Defence,…
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External oversight Score: 0 / 100
The main acquisition planning document is the “Plan of Technical Modernisation of Armed Forces” for 10 years, updated every 4 years. It specifies modernisation…
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Q12 88/100

Is the defence budget transparent, showing key items of expenditure? And it is provided to the legislature in a timely fashion?

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Comprehensiveness Score: 75 / 100
The defence budget approved by parliament contains information on expenditure across four areas: grants, benefits (incl. pensions), current expenses (incl. salaries and purchases of…
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Timeliness Score: 100 / 100
The legislature receives an accurate defence budget proposal approximately three months before the start of the budget year. This leaves enough time for discussion…
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Q13 50/100

Is there a legislative committee (or other appropriate body) responsible for defence budget scrutiny and analysis in an effective way?

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Formal rights Score: 50 / 100
The Parliamentary National Defence Committee has formal rights of scrutiny over the defence budget. According to paragraph 14 of Annex 1 to the Statute…
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Influence on decision-making Score: 50 / 100
The committee submits an opinion during the preparation of the state budget proposal concerning the budget of the Ministry of National Defence [1]. It…
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Q14 83/100

Is the approved defence budget made publicly available? In practice, can citizens, civil society, and the media obtain detailed information on the defence budget?

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Proactive publication Score: 75 / 100
The state budget, including the defence part, is published on the sites of parliament and government [1]. A detailed financial plan (budget order) of…
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Comprehensiveness Score: 75 / 100
The MoD budget order, published on MoD website, contains information disaggregated to the level of main recipients (as types of armed forces), so-called budget…
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Response to information requests Score: 100 / 100
From January 1, 2018 to April 16, 2019 the public information unit of the MoD received only one request concerning budgetary issues, on December…
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Q15 67/100

Are sources of defence income other than from central government allocation (from equipment sales or property disposal, for example) published and scrutinised?

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Transparency Score: 100 / 100
There are two such sources of defence income: – Modernization Fund of the Armed Forces [1]. – Financial surplus of the Military Property Agency…
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Institutional scrutiny Score: 75 / 100
Both aforementioned financial plans, as well as their execution, together with the annual defence budget execution audit, are the subject of an in-depth annual…
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Public scrutiny Score: 25 / 100
There is some superficial public scrutiny performed by the media [1, 2, 3]. There are no signs of CSO scrutiny.
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Q16 50/100

Is there an effective internal audit process for defence ministry expenditure (that is, for example, transparent, conducted by appropriately skilled individuals, and subject to parliamentary oversight)?

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Activity Score: 50 / 100
Internal audits in the defence sector are conducted by the MoD’s Internal Audit Unit (from 2018 it is a part of the Department of…
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Enabling oversight Score: 25 / 100
Relevant external bodies (as. low enforcement agencies and the Financial Disciplinary Committee) are provided with the audit reports only in cases where irregularities or…
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External scrutiny Score: 75 / 100
Internal audit activities are the subject of scrutiny by the Supreme Audit Office through the annual budgetary audit. Internal audit reports are used by…
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Institutional outcomes Score: 50 / 100
The chamber report on the budget implementation in 2017 states that the inspection department had 19 recommendations for the minister. It is not clear…
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Q17 75/100

Is there effective and transparent external auditing of military defence expenditure?

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Activity Score: 100 / 100
The Supreme Audit Office is tasked with budgetary and efficiency auditing of the national and local government programmes and institutions, including the defence sector…
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Independence Score: 75 / 100
The Supreme Audit Office is an independent institution, with its president being elected by the Lower Chamber of the parliament (with the approval of…
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Transparency Score: 75 / 100
Information from audits of the Supreme Audit Office is available to the public, except for the information that requires a national security classification [1,…
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Institutional outcomes Score: 50 / 100
The ministry sometimes addresses audit findings in its practices, but not regularly. Every ministry, including the MoND, addresses audit findings at least twice a…
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Nexus of Defence and National Assets

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Q18 83/100

Is there evidence that the country’s defence institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation and, if so, are these interests publicly stated and subject to scrutiny?

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Legal framework Score: 50 / 100
Under the Constitution of Poland, all public institutions operate within the law. As a result, all activities which are not explicitly enabled by the…
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Defence institutions: Financial or controlling interests in practice Score: 100 / 100
There is no evidence that defence institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses connected with the natural resources industry. Two of Poland’s most…
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Individual defence personnel: Financial or controlling interests in practice Score: 100 / 100
Theoretically, there may be isolated cases of individual defence personnel being involved in businesses relating to the country’s natural resource exploitation. The Professional Soldiers’…
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Transparency Score: NA / 100
There is no evidence that defence institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses connected with the natural resources industry, as such this indicator…
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Scrutiny Score: NA / 100
There is no evidence that defence institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses connected with the natural resources industry, as such this indicator…
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Organised Crime

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Q19 63/100

Is there evidence, for example through media investigations or prosecution reports, of a penetration of organised crime into the defence and security sector? If no, is there evidence that the government is alert and prepared for this risk?

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Penetration of organised crime Score: 75 / 100
The likelihood of the penetration of the defence and security sector by organised crime is low to moderate. There are several reports in the…
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Government response Score: 50 / 100
MoD leaders have not highlighted the risk publicly in the last few years, probably because the risk level is low to moderate. The MoD…
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Q20 83/100

Is there policing to investigate corruption and organised crime within the defence services and is there evidence of the effectiveness of this policing?

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Existence of policing function Score: 100 / 100
The Central Anti-Corruption Bureau operating in Poland since 2006 is tasked with combating corruption in public and economic sector as well as combating activity…
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Independence Score: 75 / 100
The Military Police is directly subordinate to the defence minister and has the highest level of autonomy as the service operating inside the defence…
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Effectiveness Score: 75 / 100
In 2017 the Military Police continued 27 criminal investigations and began 49 new corruption cases against military and civilian personnel. Fourteen indictments were filed…
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Control of Intelligence Services

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Q21 63/100

Are the policies, administration, and budgets of the intelligence services subject to effective and independent oversight?

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Independence Score: 75 / 100
The Parliamentary Intelligence Oversight Committee has formal rights of scrutiny over the intelligence service’s policies, administration, and budgets [1]. Its members have access to…
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Effectiveness Score: 50 / 100
The Parliamentary Intelligence Oversight Committee meets on average 24 times a year [1]; it is active in the field of policy and activity oversight.…
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Q22 25/100

Are senior positions within the intelligence services filled on the basis of objective selection criteria, and are appointees subject to investigation of their suitability and prior conduct?

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Objective selection criteria Score: 25 / 100
The laws on Military Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence Services and their personnel [1, 2] layout the procedures, defining the criteria and qualifications, for appointments to…
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Selection bias Score: 25 / 100
Media commentators point out that in practice, the nomination of senior positions is a political act, with the government usually attempting to bring intelligence…
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Vetting process Score: 25 / 100
Investigation of top candidates’ suitability is questionable, since any doubts may not be thoroughly explained. It seems that during the recruitment procedure, political links…
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Export Controls

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Q23 75/100

Does the government have a well-scrutinised process for arms export decisions that aligns with Articles 7.1.iv, 11.5, and 15.6 of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)?

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Signatory and Ratification Score: 100 / 100
Poland signed the ATT in 2013 and ratified it in December 2014 [1].
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Compliance Score: 100 / 100
Poland implements the treaty in transparent way and the process for arms export decisions is well-scrutinised [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. The country participates…
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Parliamentary scrutiny Score: 25 / 100
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and SIPRI reports are the main sources of information on the size of arms exports. The “Exports of armaments…
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Lobbying in Defence

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Q76 25/100

Does the country regulate lobbying of defence institutions?

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Legal framework Score: 25 / 100
Poland has a framework for regulating lobbying activity, namely The 2005 Lobbying Act (Journal of Laws of 2005 No. 169, item 1414, as amended).…
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Disclosure: Public officials Score: 25 / 100
Public officials in defence institutions are not required to publish or update records of lobbying meetings. Individuals participating in the proceedings are required to…
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Lobbyist registration system Score: 50 / 100
Poland has a mandatory registration system. However, the narrow definition does not cover the activities of many individuals influencing state policy, and thus de…
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Oversight & enforcement Score: 0 / 100
In practice, the lobbying act is not enforced even though the Ministry of Interior and Public Administration is entitled to oversee lobbying activities within…
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