Skip to sidebar Skip to main

29.

In law, are off-budget military expenditures permitted, and if so, are they exceptional occurrences that are well-controlled? In practice, are there any off-budget military expenditures? If so, does evidence suggest this involves illicit economic activity?

29a. Permitted exceptions

Score

SCORE: 100/100

Assessor Explanation

Assessor Sources

29b. Recording mechanisms

Score

SCORE: NA/100

Assessor Explanation

Assessor Sources

29c. Prevalence

Score

SCORE: 100/100

Assessor Explanation

Assessor Sources

Compare scores by country

Please view this page on a larger screen for the full stats.

Relevant comparisons

Benin’s Organic Law on finance laws explicitly prohibits off-budget spending, in accordance with the principle of budgetary universality [1]. State expenditures, including those related to defense and security, are generally provided for in the national budget [2]. This means that all any expenditures must be planned and approved within the national budget. This rule aims to ensure transparent budgetary control and avoid unjustified or uncontrolled expenditure, which helps guarantee a certain accountability in the management of public finances.

There is no evidence of off-budget expenditures so this indicator is marked Not Applicable. All expenditures are previously provided and authorized by the budget [1]. However, out-of-budget expenses are incurred in cases of force majeure. In this case, everything is done by derogation procedure and on an emergency basis through treasury payment orders. This is are an exceptional measure for the disbursement of public funds charged to provisional accounts, to be regularized at a later date by a warrant for charging to the budget once the relevant appropriations have been made available. [1][2] [3].

In Benin off-budget expenditures happen rarely and in exceptional situations. The political violences of 2021, the COVID-19 situation and terrorism attacks are part of these exceptional cases. For example, in the management of Covid-19, billions were spent outside the State budget, according to the report by the Cour des Comptes [1]. The Minister of Finance justifies this by the unpredictability of the crisis, the health emergency and the response measures adopted by the pandemic management committee [2].

Off-budget military expenditures are not covered by the law and do not appear in official documents. [1][2][3][4]

Off budget expenditures are not recorded anywhere. The only way to get an idea of these expenditures is to intelligently approach the military authorities concerned and ask them questions about them, knowing that they only provide partial information or sometimes say nothing at all. [1] [2]

Off-budget military spending is rare. This happens when there are specific security dynamics such as the interventions of the Burundian army in international missions. [1] [2]

Cameroonian law allows off-budget military spending, especially for national security purposes. These expenditures are legally permitted under specific security-related conditions.[1][2] However, the legal framework governing these off-budget funds are often vague and lacks strict enforcement, allowing frequent use without sufficient oversight.[3] Although such spendings are sanctioned, the absence of clear regulations and enforcement mechanisms makes these off-budget funds susceptible to misuse and reduces transparency. This often leads to the regular bypassing of budget controls, raising concerns about accountability in the military sector.[4] Therefore, while the law permits off-budget expenditures for national security, the absence of strict regulatory oversight and clear enforcement leads to misuse and opacity, causing serious accountability issues.

In Cameroon, off-budget military expenditures are legally allowed for national security needs, but the transparency around these funds is limited. While exceptions to budget rules are permitted for defence, the conditions for their use are vague. This lack of clarity weakens oversight, leading to potential misuse. Although off-budget expenditures are recorded, reporting is often aggregated, providing minimal detail and making independent scrutiny difficult. Regulatory mechanisms for monitoring these expenditures are weak, resulting in financial irregularities with limited accountability. Evidence indicates that these funds are often diverted for unrelated purposes, fostering a culture of corruption.[1][2].

In Cameroon, off-budget military expenditures are prevalent and often linked to corruption, including fund misappropriation and illicit economic activities. Significant parts of the defence budget are diverted without explanation, raising concerns about the use of off-budget mechanisms to hide illegal transactions, which undermine financial integrity and point to broader governance problems. These off-budget expenditures are less scrutinised than official budget allocations and are often associated with high-ranking officials misusing military resources for personal gain, particularly in defence procurement. Emergency procurement, especially in conflict zones like the north and east, bypasses standard financial procedures, making accountability difficult and funding illicit activities such as unauthorised defence operations and private security businesses. The lack of formal oversight, weak legal frameworks, and limited involvement of audit bodies like the Supreme State Audit Office exacerbate the risks linked to these illicit economic activities.1][2]

In Côte d’Ivoire, legislation strictly prohibits public expenditure not authorised by a finance law. Articles 4 and 52 of the LOLF (organic law on finance laws) prohibit off-budget expenditure, except in exceptional cases subject to proper control (such as national emergencies or force majeure), which must then be regularised [1]. Furthermore, at the regional level, Directive No. 06/2009/CM/UEMOA on finance laws in the WAEMU reinforces this principle in Article 58, which stipulates that all expenditure must comply with the procedures and authorisations established by finance laws and their implementing texts [2]. There is no specific mention of defence expenditure.

If expenditure is incurred without budgetary authorisation (e.g. in cases of force majeure), it must be regularised in an amending finance law or in the next finance law, then entered in the State accounts, but as an operation to be regularised, and not directly in the corresponding budget [1]. In reality, some off-budget expenditure does not appear to be recorded in the budget. For example, in 2024, the PPA-CI parliamentary group rejected the 2023 budget settlement law, raising concerns about unjustified expenditure and deviations from initial forecasts [3]. However, no information is available on off-budget expenditure related to the defence sector [2].

No off-budget military expenditure has been recorded in the last five years, but this also appears to be a result of the opacity of the sector and legislature’s limited access to information [1, 2].

Off-budget exceptions are permitted for the Ghana Armed Forces. This typically covers expenditures not included in the regular budget, often related to classified operations, urgent defence needs, or special projects. Such spending is generally kept confidential due to national security concerns. (1) Additionally, recent activities by the Defence Industries Holding Company Limited (DIHOC) could provide off-budget sources for the Ghana Armed Forces. DIHOC’s strategic focus facilitates “collaborations between the private sector and the military for socio-economic and development projects, alongside the military’s traditional roles, thereby laying the foundation for accelerated industrial development and growth in the country.” (2)

Off-budget spending by the Ghana Armed Forces, which may include funding for classified operations, urgent defence needs, or special projects, is excluded from the formal budgetary process to maintain confidentiality and safeguard national security. (1) (2)

While off-budget military expenditures do occur, the frequency remains unclear because such expenditures are deliberately excluded from the official budget and are not subject to public disclosure or parliamentary scrutiny. (1) (2)

The Public Finance Management (PFM) Act No. 18 of 2012 establishes the framework for planning, budgeting, implementing, and evaluating the use of public funds in Kenya. It also outlines specific offences and penalties for violations of financial regulations, which can lead to prosecution.
Off-budget expenditures are generally not permitted by law, except in exceptional cases with special authorisations. The Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act (PPADA) provides guidelines for procuring non-budgeted items [1]. Additionally, the Public Audit Act requires public officers to justify any expenditures not included in the budget, including off-budget expenditures that were not pre-approved by Parliament.
Internal audit guidelines mandate that financial transactions in national government entities must follow the standard chart of accounts approved by the National Treasury. Approved expenditure estimates are the basis for the financial year’s accounts, and each entry must be accompanied by supporting documentation with clear details and narrations, in accordance with Regulations 99(1), (2), and (3). While the Office of the Auditor General (OAG) is responsible for auditing financial statements under the Constitution, internal auditors must review these statements before submission. The Public Finance Management Act Regulations further require internal auditors to assess the effectiveness of both financial and non-financial performance management systems within national government entities [2].

In the financial year ending June 2022, the OAG flagged the Ministry of Defence for signing contracts that exceeded the actual funds allocated for the respective projects. This resulted in an unbudgeted expenditure of Kshs. 1,429,858,358. The OAG found this to be in violation of Section 53(8) of the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act, 2015, which prohibits an accounting officer from initiating any procurement proceedings unless sufficient funds are available and reflected in the approved budget estimates [1]. Similarly the OAG report for 2023-2024 highlights “the Ministry of Defence had the highest outstanding payments of Kshs.22.9 Billion, representing 17.6% of the Kshs.130.3 Billion owed by MDAs” [2].

Off-budget expenditures are rare and discouraged. They typically occur during emergencies, such as banditry attacks or floods [1]. In the financial year ending June 2022, the OAG flagged the Ministry of Defence for signing contracts that exceeded the actual funds allocated for the respective projects. This resulted in an unbudgeted expenditure of Kshs. 1,429,858,358. The OAG found this to be in violation of Section 53(8) of the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act, 2015, which prohibits an accounting officer from initiating any procurement proceedings unless sufficient funds are available and reflected in the approved budget estimates [3].
The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) learned that the Ministry of Defence overspent its budget by Kshs 1.43 billion on various projects. Principal Secretary Hon. Patrick Mariru faced questions from the Hon. John Mbadi-led Committee about these unbudgeted expenditures. Auditor’s reports revealed that the Ministry spent Kshs 424 million over budget on a Level Five hospital for Correctional Services. The project’s total cost was Kshs 824.93 million, despite only Kshs 400 million being allocated [2].
Members of Parliament approved the Public Finance Management, National Peace Support Operations Funds Regulations 2023 [2]. The Sh.7 billion fund will enable Kenya to contribute Sh.1 billion to the United Nations Peace Support Operations Missions. This fund is expected to finance contingent-owned equipment and other assets, enhancing Kenya’s UN Peacekeeping capability [4]. The fund was created because the Ministry of Defence (MOD) previously had to draw money from consolidated funds, requiring parliamentary appropriations, which complicated supporting peace operations. This new fund allows the MOD to be more flexible and agile in supporting operations. However, concerns were raised about potential risks. Mitigation measures include allowing the Auditor General to audit the fund [3].

Liberia’s Public Financial Management (PFM) Law of 2009, as amended in 2019 and cited as the Amended and Restated Public Financial Management Law of 2019, contains clear provisions governing any expenditure in excess of appropriations. Section 24 specifies that such overspending is permitted only in ‘exceptional circumstances,’ and requires the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning (MFDP) to submit a statement of the excess expenditure to the Legislature. Following review by the Legislature’s Public Accounts Committee (PAC), the Legislature must decide by Resolution whether to allow the expenditure, and the amounts must then be included in a supplementary appropriation bill for formal appropriation.
The law is explicit on three counts: a) if an audit report on the public accounts identifies expenditure exceeding an appropriation, the minister shall request the Legislature to regularise the exceeding amount in annual or supplemental budget; b) this request shall be an action plan of the line ministry or budgetary institution; c) expenditure exceeding an appropriation may be regularised only if it is made for urgent and unforeseen purpose.[1][2] Therefore, off-budget expenditures are permitted by law, but only for very limited and exceptional circumstances, such as urgent and unforeseen purposes, and they must be formally regularised by the Legislature through a supplementary appropriation bill after review by the Public Accounts Committee.

Liberia’s Public Financial Management (PFM) Act of 2009 mandates that all government revenues and expenditures be included in the national budget. The Act requires comprehensive reporting of all financial activities, including donor funding, to ensure transparency and accountability. The off-budget expenditure is recorded accordingly in the respective budget per the regulations stipulated in section 61: 2 and 3. It requires that overspending be duly accounted for in the appropriate budget.[1][2] The Amended and Restated PFM Regulations 2019 support these requirements by specifying the implementing frameworks for full budget coverage.[3]
However, in practice, official budget documents, such as the 2022 and 2024 National Budget Books,[4][5] do not include clearly labelled line items for off-budget or “secret” military expenditures. This suggests that, notwithstanding the legal mandate for inclusion, such expenditures are not publicly recorded in the budget.

Off-budget expenditures in Liberia’s security sector — including the National Security Agency (NSA) — have been documented in multiple audit reports and media investigations.[1][2][3] For instance, in the Fiscal Year 2024, the Liberian government reportedly incurred off-budget expenditures totaling approximately US$15.6 million between January and August 2024. Notably, US$2.5 million was allocated to covert operations through the National Security Agency (NSA), and US$2.3 million was categorised as “unexplained miscellaneous” expenses. These expenditures were not initially accounted for in the approved budget, raising concerns about transparency.
However, while such cases demonstrate substantial off-budget spending in the broader security sector, available evidence does not confirm that these expenditures directly involved the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) or other military units. No public evidence was found linking these expenditures to illicit economic activities; rather, they appear to be official disbursements made outside the initial appropriation cycle (some later reported to the Legislature.[2][3]

Decree No. 2005-003 relating to general regulations on the accounting of budgetary execution of public bodies, in its article 167, stipulates that “commitments are limited, either to the amount of appropriations opened, or to the amounts of program authorizations regularly authorized by the budget documents”. This means that off-budget spending and extra-budgetary spending are not permitted by law [1].

In practice, however, extra-budgetary spending exists, including in the defence sector. A Ministry like that of Defence can commit public resources even if it does not have a corresponding budget line. In this case, it convenes a tripartite meeting with the Ministry of Finance and the Directorate of Financial Control. If it obtains the agreement of these two institutions, it can use funds from other ministries which have not been committed by these institutions.[1] [2} Off-budget expenditure is therefore not officially recorded in the initial budget but may appear in the amending finance law.

Off-budget military expenditures remain occasional and depend on the security context of the moment [1]. It is the government that decides on these expenditures according to the specific needs of the security forces. However, sources do not always indicate whether they are significant or not [2]. However, these expenditures concern non-illicit activities [3].

Off-budget expenditure is prohibited by law.[1][2][3][4] Any expenditure forecast for emergency reasons must be included in the finance law.[5] However, in practice, it happens that urgency requires extra-budgetary expenditure that must subsequently be regularized in a corrective finance law before the end of the budget year. [6]

Off-budget military spending is a practice that had already been identified and it has become more salient as a result of the total opacity surrounding spending in the defence and security sector.[1] The basic texts limit off-budget expenditure, but in practice, this practice tends to be accentuated for reasons of national defence and activities or programmes placed under the seal of defence secrecy or essential state interests. The law requires that these off-budget expenses be reintegrated when they occur in a supplementary finance law. Supplementary finance laws (or budgetary collectives) are the only laws that allow for significant changes during the year to the provisions of the initial finance law, particularly concerning the ceilings for expenditure in the State budget and the general data on the balanced budget. However,the auditor’s office had previously pointed out that the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Finance had broken the law by incorrectly interpreting Article 8 of the Code of Public Contracts and Public Service Delegations, which was updated in 2015 and ambiguously stated that: “This decree does not apply to works, supply and service contracts, when they concern national defence and security needs requiring secrecy or for which the protection of the essential interests of the State is incompatible with advertising measures”. This warning does not seem to have been heeded, as the same erroneous interpretation continues to be the norm[2]. A decree was even issued in May 2023 to provide a more general framework for Article 8 of the Public Procurement Code. This decree excludes works, service and supply contracts in the defence sector from the scope of the public procurement code on the grounds of defence secrecy and the essential interests of the State.[3]

Military spending outside the budget is occasional, and it is either commonplace or the extent of this widespread practice remains unclear. Moreover, it is currently impossible to find in the defence budget a breakdown or information on the cost to the Malian taxpayer of the men from the Wagner group operating in Mali. Some media have put forward the sum of 10 million dollars a month, but there has never been any official communication to this effect, and the amount paid by the Malian state to this private military group remains unclear.[1][2][3][4]

The off-budget expenditures are not permitted by law. Article 130(1) of the Constitution of the Republic establishes that the State Budget must be prepared, approved, and executed with transparency and under the principle of publicity [1]. In addition, the SISTAFE Law (Lei do Sistema de Administração Financeira do Estado, Law No. 9/2002, as amended) stipulates that all public revenues and expenditures must be included in the approved State Budget, and no expenditure may be executed outside of it without prior legal authorisation [2]. The Economic and Social Plan and the State Budget allocate resources judiciously and strategically based on the principles of transparency, good governance and combating corruption in the management of public funds [1] and the constitutional principle of annual publicity [2]. However, there is a “black budget”, which in Mozambique is called the “Blue Bag”, used for financial operations in the Intelligence Services and other operations in the Defence and Security Sector [3]. The number of financial resources used for this purpose is unknown, but national researchers have pointed out that it has been growing, taking into account the military, police and Intelligence operations that are carried out to contain subversive demonstrations and confront the terrorist insurgency in Cabo Delgado [4, 5]. In the event of off-budget demands or new budgetary demands, there is a rectifying budget approved by law, as happened in November 2020 [6], when Parliament approved an increase in expenditure on the Security Forces and the fight against Covid-19 [7].

Off budget expenditures are hardly made public, except through general pronouncements in which round figures are provided without breaking them into budget lines [1]. Furthermore, the Administrative Tribunal did not note any extra-budgetary speding by the military in 2019 and 2021 [2, 3].

There has been some off-budget military expenditure, but this involves legitimate economic activity, such as personnel expenditure and the acquisition of defence products, especially since the start of counter-insurgency operations in Cabo Delgado, in the context of the operations to combat the terrorist insurgency that has affected the province since 2017 [1]. The expenditure is recorded in the General State Account [2], which is made available by the Ministry of Economy and Finance [3], in accordance with the rules for implementing the Economic and Social Plan and State Budget – PESOE [4] for each year.

Following the military coup of July 26, 2023, and the suspension of the Constitution, there is no legal framework defining exceptions for off-budget military expenditures. [1] However, the February 2024 presidential decree effectively removed all financial oversight over defense spending, allowing unrestricted off-budget expenditures without institutional control. [2]

There is no evidence that off-budget military expenditures are officially recorded in Niger’s budget. Following the military coup of July 26, 2023, and the February 2024 presidential decree, military expenditures are exempt from standard budgetary controls and reporting requirements. [1][2]

There is substantial evidence of off-budget military expenditures in Niger, often linked to illicit economic activity. Investigations, including audits by the Inspection Générale des Armées and reports from international investigative bodies, have revealed widespread embezzlement and corruption in defense procurement. The “MDN Gate” scandal, for instance, uncovered the embezzlement of over 78 billion CFA francs through fraudulent defense contracts, involving shell companies, fake competitive bidding processes, and non-delivery of procured military equipment. Additionally, an audit of the Ministry of Defense between 2017 and 2019 found that 71.8 billion CFA francs (approximately 120 million USD) were misappropriated, with funds siphoned through offshore companies, including Halltown Business LLP, which facilitated illicit financial transactions [1] Following the military coup of July 26, 2023, and the February 2024 presidential decree, which removed financial oversight of military expenditures, off-budget military spending has become even more opaque, allowing defense funds to be allocated without accountability or transparency [2].

Off-budget expenditures are permitted by law. However, Section 15 (2) of the Public Procurment Act (PPA), 2007 provides that procurement of special goods, works and services involving national defence or national security requires seeking the President’s express approval.

Off -budget expenditures are permitted in law as part of the special intervention funds that would be appear in subsequent year or later years [1,2]. However, off-budget military expenditures are usually not recorded in the official national budget, meaning they escape standard budgetary processes and oversight. [3]. More often than not, such expenditures are channelled through “security votes,” which are special allocations justified under national security needs. Security votes are classified and excluded from detailed public or legislative scrutiny, allowing funds to be diverted for military or intelligence purposes without formal documentation in the budget. The total extent to which the funds are committed to military activity is difficult to determine [4].

Nigeria has seen a dramatic increase in its defence spending in recent years [1]. The increased budgetary allocation to the security sector is borne out of the understanding that more funding is required to combat insecurity by boosting the military’s capabilities, especially through the purchase of military hardware and platforms. Although Nigeria’s defence budget has been on the increase, extra budgetary or off-budget spending in the MDAs, including in the defence sector, still happen occasionally [2,3]. The inherent opacity of off-budget military transactions appeals to some armed forces, such as Mozambique, Nigeria and South Sudan, given the culture of secrecy that often surrounds the military sector [4].

Military expenditure outside the budget is authorised by law within the framework of general or extended exceptions. These expenses are well controlled, even if they are not made public. They are unforeseen operations at the time of the budget vote, and are sometimes classified as defencesecrets. [1] The allocation and management of the political and special funds of the Presidency of the Republic serve as an instrument of adjustment for the President in the face of emergencies and other state priorities. The nature of these funds implies the need to maintain a certain degree of secrecy. Indeed, for geopolitical and/or geostrategic reasons, Senegal may need to provide military assistance or support to an African country. In such cases, it is impossible to make public the nature of the support and the beneficiary country or president on behalf of the State of Senegal. [2] [3]

All off-budget military expenditure is recorded in the respective budgets, even if it is not declared when the budget is voted. As a reminder, the Ministry of defence budget is voted without debate in the National Assembly. Moreover, all presidents have beneftted from these special funds, which are managed without any rules of transparency. The current president will have 11 billion every year from 2024 to 2029. However, the institution of these funds is secret in the budget of the Republic of Senegal and therefore not officially recorded . [1][2][3]

Off-budget military spending is occasional, but not a widespread phenomenon. A whole year can go by without any off-budget expenditure. It’s only in cases of force majeure that these practices are used and the idea is not to make it a rule. [1] [2]

South African law does not permit off-budget military expenditures. The Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) No. 1 of 1999 establishes strict rules for budgetary transparency and control. It requires all departments, including the Department of Defence, to disclose actual revenues and expenditures in audited annual financial statements. [1] These are submitted to Parliament and scrutinised by the Auditor-General.
Although there are no formal off-budget items disclosed, there is no dedicated mechanism or system specifically designed to track or detect the existence of off-budget military spending, beyond what is caught through routine auditing.

There is no evidence of the South African Department of Defence engaging in off-budget expenditures. All military spending is required by law to be included in the national budget and reported publicly. The Auditor-General annually audits the Department’s financial statements and has not identified any off-budget or irregular expenditures related to off-the-books military operations or procurement. [1][2] Therefore, this indicator is marked Not Applicable.

Annual audit reports by the Auditor-General and the Department of Defence’s performance and financial disclosures show no indication of off-budget expenditures. The comprehensive reporting system under the PFMA and scrutiny by parliamentary committees further reduce the likelihood of such expenditures. No reports from civil society, media, or independent audits in the past five years have pointed to off-budget military activity. [1][2]
The overall transparency and regularity of South Africa’s financial reporting, especially under the scrutiny of the Auditor-General and Parliament, support that off-budget expenditures are not prevalent and are very unlikely to occur without detection.

Both the SPLA Act 2009 [1] and the NSS Act 2014 [2] do not mention anything on off -budget expenditures and whether they are legal or not may need an interpretation of the Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets Act, 2018. Section 36 of the Act emphasizes the need for defence and security establishments to comply with its provisions. However, in Section 36 (2) allows for procurement based on a dual list. It is this loophole that single sourcing and off -budget expenditures can be explained. [3] However this section also does not explicitly mention off -budget expenditures.

Despite the absence of clear mention of off-the-books spending in South Sudan’s procurement laws [1] [2], military expenditures remain shrouded in opacity, making it challenging to trace any records of off-budget allocations. In the 2023 financial year, the defence budget surged by 78%, [3] yet the budget breakdown merely offered general expenditure figures without specifying what portion was allocated to off-budget spending. Investigative reports have uncovered ongoing defence equipment purchases, even under sanctions, [4] suggesting that the government continues to engage in off-budget expenditures, albeit without proper documentation.

In addition to procuring weapons despite sanctions [1], the defence ministry and the National Security Services have continued to engage in illicit economic activities [1] and sponsoring numerous irregular forces, including militias operated by the National Security Service and proxy forces with official knowledge. A U.S. State department report found that “Security forces and irregular armed groups routinely solicited payments from aid workers for safe passage on land and river routes using official and unofficial checkpoints.” [2]
Reports also indicate that some organized forces, including the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army-In Opposition (SPLA-IO), are engaged in staging roadblocks. As of January 2025, there were approximately 50 illegal checkpoints along the Nile River, operated by both SSPDF and SPLA-IO [3].

Under the Public Finance and Management Act (2015), off-budget military expenditure is not permitted by law. If the Ministry of Defence wants money, it presents a budget in parliament and is debated and passed. If an emergency needs money, supplementary budgets are brought to parliament, and the money is approved. Therefore, issues of off-budget military expenditures are not permitted by law. As per the Public Finance Management Act (2015) all government expenditures have to be appropriated and approved to avoid illicit expenditure and corruption. Section 26 of the Public Finance Management Act, 2015 gives the president powers to approve emergency expenditures without parliamentary approval. [1,2]

There is no public evidence to prove off-budget military expenditures.[1][2] Therefore, this indicator is marked as Not Applicable.

There is no public evidence to prove off-budget military expenditures. However, the MoDVA requests supplementary budgets from Parliament more often. In the 23rd Edition of the Uganda Economic Update of the World Bank, supplementary spending amounted to Shs4.54 trillion, or 8.9 percent of the budget for the 2023/24 financial year.[1] The State House is also requested UGX100Bn for classified expenditure, the Ministry of Defence has requested UGX1Bn for the construction of the Military Museum.[2]. However, the extent to which this is a regular practice is unclear.

The budget for all state institutions, including the defence forces is approved by parliament, and this is guided by Section 299 of the 2013 Constitution of Zimbabwe and centrally monitored by the treasury [1]. Section 299 of the constitution states that Parliament must monitor and oversee expenditure by the State and all Commissions and institutions and agencies of government at every level, including statutory bodies, government-controlled entities, and this includes the defence forces [1]. The Public Finance Management Act does not allow off-budget expenditure [2].

Although the Public Finance Management Act (2010) does not permit any form of off-budget expenditure [1], in practice, the Zimbabwean defence forces engage in off-budget spending to support undisclosed operations and procurements [2]. Investigative reporting has revealed that the military has been involved in murky procurement deals amounting to tens of millions of US dollars, well beyond the officially allocated defence budget [2]. These expenditures are not recorded in the official annual national budget, making them difficult to track or subject to scrutiny.

Although off-budget military expenditure is not legally provided for under Zimbabwe’s Public Finance Management Act [2], in practice, such spending does occur regularly and is not disclosed to oversight bodies or the public. While precise figures and details are unavailable, partly due to the classified nature of these activities, there is evidence suggesting that the defence forces are internally and covertly deployed in costly operations, particularly those aimed at supporting or protecting the ruling party, ZANU-PF [1] [3].

Country Sort by Country 29a. Permitted exceptions Sort By Subindicator 29b. Recording mechanisms Sort By Subindicator 29c. Prevalence Sort By Subindicator
Benin 100 / 100 NA 100 / 100
Burundi 0 / 100 0 / 100 100 / 100
Cameroon 50 / 100 25 / 100 0 / 100
Cote d'Ivoire 50 / 100 0 / 100 100 / 100
Ghana 50 / 100 0 / 100 50 / 100
Kenya 50 / 100 50 / 100 75 / 100
Liberia 50 / 100 0 / 100 50 / 100
Madagascar 100 / 100 25 / 100 50 / 100
Mali 50 / 100 0 / 100 50 / 100
Mozambique 100 / 100 50 / 100 25 / 100
Niger 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Nigeria 0 / 100 0 / 100 50 / 100
Senegal 50 / 100 0 / 100 50 / 100
South Africa 100 / 100 NA 100 / 100
South Sudan 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Uganda 100 / 100 NA 50 / 100
Zimbabwe 100 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100

With thanks for support from the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs who have contributed to the Government Defence Integrity Index.

Transparency International Defence & Security is a global programme of Transparency International based within Transparency International UK.

Privacy Policy

UK Charity Number 1112842

All rights reserved Transparency International Defence & Security 2026