The Information and Communication Code clearly explains how the public can access any public information. A citizen has to do is make a verbal or written request to the competent administration [1]. This provision also applies to defence and security information to which public access is permitted. The code specifies that “a public body may refuse to allow consultation or communication of an administrative document whose consultation or communication is likely to infringe on defence secrecy or foreign policy” [2]. The information covered by defence secrecy and its classifications are specified by law [3]. When the information is public, the officer is required to make it available to the requesting citizen within five days [4]. In the event that the administration refuses to make the information available, the user has the right to appeal. S/he can file a complaint with the High Authority for Audio-visual and Communication (HAAC) or the courts [5].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. The government applies a system of classification of information within a clear legal framework to ensure that information is adequately protected. [1] [2][3] In Benin, the protection of national security information is mainly based on the Law No. 2019-05, which organizesdefence secrecy. This law establishes a framework for the management, classification and security of sensitive information in order to preserve the sovereignty and security of the State. It specifies classification levels (such as “confidential,” “secret,” and “top secret”), security protocols for storing and transferring information, and penalties for unauthorized disclosure . [1].

It is difficult for the public to have access to information related to defence [1]. Despite the Information and Communication Code, which authorises the provision of public information, citizens have difficulty obtaining information from the defence and security services [1]. Often, the information requested is classified as a defence secret [1]. Or the administration hides behind this pretext for not providing the requested information [2].

In Burundi, there is no legislation or guide on access to information in the Defence sector. [1] [2]

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
Access to information on Burundi’s Defence sector is informal. It’s all about building a long-term relationship of trust with those who hold the information. In this way, they can provide it to you anonymously, and you provide them with every guarantee of confidentiality. If not, there is a Burundi National Defence Force website which provides formal information, including holidays, some of the texts governing the BNDF, but does not provide solid information such as the procurement process within the army, the recruitment procedure, or any other information that might be considered sensitive. [1]

It should be noted that the public rarely accesses or receives information about the Defence and security forces. When some information is given, it’s information that calls on those who want it to get themselves enrolled, for example, or the participation of the country’s authorities in military ceremonies such as graduations at military academy. [1] [2]

There is a legislation and application guidelines that regulate access to information on the defence sector. Indeed, this is one of the responsibilities of the Communication Division of the Cameroon Ministry of Defence. According to Decree no. 2001/177 of 25 July 2001 on the organisation of the Ministry of Defence, the division’s mission is to manage the department’s relations with the public and private media; carry out the information activities assigned by the Minister; ensure, in accordance with the Minister’s directives, the coherence of the information and communication activities carried out by the organisations and services of the Ministry of Defence; and contribute to a better understanding of the activities of the Ministry of Defence.[1] Regarding the tasks of Mindef’s communication division, the legislation in force in this case, specifically the 2001 decree sets out certain provisions on access to information. However, the public cannot appeal against decisions made by MINDEF or the Presidency. Although a body, the National Conmmunication Council, exists to there is examine decisions on access to information, it does not have the authority, given its prerogatives[2], to appeal a decision relating to defence, due to the sovereign nature of this ministry.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
Cameron lacks a comprehensive, clearly defined scheme for classifying state secrets. Theroretically, there is a presidential decision (instruction présidentielle) that organies information within the Defence sector from “public”, to “restricted”, “secret” and “very confidential”.[1] The said presidential decision also vaguely states why some information might be considered very confidential, secret, or restrictive. However, two issues arise: explanations for classification in the instruction présidentielle are not sufficiently clear and precise, are not publicly available, and the Ministry of Defence tends to not follow these explanations. This results in a situation where they classify a large amount of information as “secret”. Either they formally classify the information as secret, or when approached by a researcher, journalist or MP, they tend to respond to most questions by saying the information is secret, even when it does not appear to be the case.[2]

There is no Freedom of Information law or similar legislative framework that clearly sets out the procedures for citizens to request information on the defence sector.[1] [2] Most information on expenditure and equipment purchases is classified as a defence secret and can only be disclosed with the authorisation of the President of the Republic. Requests for defence-related documents in Cameroon are often met with silence or delays, with no appeal mechanism, and journalists are frequently denied access citing confidentiality reasons. Public officials often deny requests on the grounds of protecting national security or other political interests.[3][4]

As mentioned above, there are four categories of documents relating to national defence: “Protected Name”, “Restricted Distribution”, “Confidential Defence” and “Secret Defence”. In Côte d’Ivoire, the laws governing access to information of public interest define the documents concerned, the information and documents that may be disclosed and, above all, the information and documents that may not be disclosed. Certain provisions concern national defence issues. Thus, public information or documents may not be communicated or consulted if their disclosure would undermine: the secrecy of the deliberations of the government and executive authorities; national defence secrecy; the conduct of the State’s foreign policy; State security, public safety or the safety of individuals. The text also provides for criminal penalties [1, 2, 3]. An independent administrative authority known as the Commission for Access to Information of Public Interest and Public Documents, abbreviated to CAIDP, is established to ensure compliance with and enforcement of the provisions of this law.
A decree specifies the general principles set out in the above-mentioned law. This decree concerns the IAHRC. It determines its powers, organisation and functioning. The IAHRC is empowered to issue injunctions and impose penalties. If the organisation concerned does not comply with its decision, it may impose a fine, the amount of which is set by decree of the Council of Ministers [3].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
The classification of documents that can and cannot be consulted is provided for by law. The legal framework, whether legislative or regulatory, is precise. It provides for an independent administrative authority responsible for ensuring compliance with and enforcement of the provisions of the law. Here are some of the provisions in Article 3: Every natural or legal person has the right to access, without discrimination, information of public interest and public documents held by public bodies. Article 4 stipulates that public bodies are required to make public the information and public documents they hold. [1] [2]

There is no specific procedure for requesting information that allows citizens to access information relating to the defence sector. In general, access to information in the defence sector is limited, as much of the information relating to defence is classified as “defence secret” or “confidential”, which restricts access to the public and sometimes even to certain authorities. The quasi-judicial nature of the Ministry of Defence makes information sensitive, and the civil war has heightened the culture of secrecy [1, 2].

The established mechanisms aim to guarantee citizens’ access to public information through publication or formal requests. The Right to Information Act (RTI), 2019 (Act 989) asserts this, drawing its foundation from the 1992 constitution’s paragraph (f) of Article 21 and the provisions outlined in Act 989. (1) Despite the fact that the Security and Intelligence Agencies Act, 2020 (Act 1030) prohibits the release of sensitive defence information to the public, this has been captured in Section 9(2) of the RTI: “Subject to Article 135 of the 1992 Constitution, information created by or in the custody of the Ghana Armed Forces or the security and intelligence agencies established under the Security and Intelligence Agencies Act, 2020 (Act 1030) that is likely to threaten the security of the State is exempt information.” There is information indicating how classified information are categorised and there are no provisions made for how the public can access defence information in Ghana. (2) (3) (4) (5)

In accordance with Article 21 of the 1992 constitution, Section 9(2) of the Right to Information Act (RTI), 2019 (Act 989) stipulates adequate measures to ensure information protection. Moreover, Article 135 of the 1992 Constitution gives the Supreme Court the jurisdiction to determine whether the release of a public document may be prejudicial to the security of the state or maybe inimical to public interest. (1) (2) (3) (4)

The public should have been able to access information through avenues created by the Right to Information Act (RTI), 2019 (Act 989). However, the Act’s implementation regime has fallen short of providing the public with the information it requires from public institutions. (1) When the Minister of Information, Fatimatu Abubakar, briefed the parliament on the progress of the RTI Act’s implementation, he faced challenges such as limited cooperation from public institutions, inadequate financial resources, and bureaucratic practices that hindered the timely response to information requests. (2) Information concerning the defence sector is restricted to the public by the Security and Intelligence Agencies Act, 2020 (Act 1030). (3) (4)

Kenya has a robust legal framework governing access to information, as outlined in Article 35 of the Constitution and the Access to Information Act of 2016. These laws allow citizens to request information from state institutions, including the defence sector. However, in practice, access to defence-related information remains limited. Kenya Defence Force Media personnel have confirmed that while they receive information requests, they often decline them on the grounds of national security [1].
The public can access unclassified information posted on MoD websites and their social media handles. Audit reports, compliance checks, and annual performance reports are available with other institution websites such as the Office of the Auditor General, PPRA, and Parliament respectively [2]. However, there are no clear mechanisms for the public to appeal decisions regarding access to MoD information [3]. While Article 35 empowers citizens to request information, restrictions apply when the requested information is classified [3].

To improve transparency, the Cabinet Secretary for Defence met with the Ombudsman and stated that the MoD had opened channels for complaints both internally and externally under the existing chain of command, as outlined in the Kenya Defence Forces Act of 2012. He further expressed support for the placement of a Commission for Administrative Justice (CAJ) liaison officer within the ministry to facilitate access to information and proposed joint training sessions and legislative reviews [4].
Despite these commitments, access to defence-related information remains subject to legal limitations. Sessional Paper No. 3 of 2023 outlines restrictions based on national security considerations, referencing Article 24 of the Constitution, Section 6 of the Access to Information Act, and Sections 43 and 49 of the Kenya Defence Forces Act [5]. In 2020, even the Auditor General had to seek court intervention to audit defence spending, highlighting the significant barriers to accessing military financial records [6].

Mechanisms for public access to defence information are limited due to classification of information. Section 49(5 a-d) outlines four categories of classified information: top secret, secret, confidential, and restricted. Top secret refers to information whose unauthorised disclosure would cause exceptionally grave damage to national security. Secret denotes information whose unauthorised disclosure would cause serious injury to national security [1]. Confidential describes information whose unauthorised disclosure would be prejudicial to the state’s interests. Restricted applies to information requiring security protection other than that determined to be top secret, secret, or confidential [2].

The MoD publishes non-classified information on its website. However, there are limits to accessing classified information. “Classified information” is defined as any information of a particular security classification whose unauthorized disclosure would prejudice national security [1].
In practice, citizens’ attempts to access specific defence information are routinely denied under national security exemptions. A 2023 Freedom of Information case documented that MoD withheld staffing figures and procurement data citing security. Appeals via court have not been successful, illustrating practical limits to access.

There are no mechanisms in place that lay out systematically how information from the defence sector can be assessed.[1] However, Liberia is a party to the Declaration of the Table Mountain and has enacted the Freedom of Information Act.[2] Consistent with this development, information officers have been deployed by the Independent Information Commission to Ministries, Agencies and Commissions to facilitate access to informaton. However, Chapter 4.0 on the Freedom of Information maintains that information relating to National Defence, Security and International Relations, a document or record is exempted from disclosure or public access if its disclosure would cause injury or substantial harm to the security, defence or international relations of the Republic of Liberia, and shall not be disclosed.[3]

There is little evidence to confirm whether a system is in place that enables the appropriate classification of government information. While Liberia has undertaken efforts to reform its security sector, including the development of the National Security Strategy (NSS) in 2008 and its subsequent revisions, these documents primarily outline strategic objectives without providing detailed guidelines on information classification.[1]
There is no specific legislation that defines classification levels (e.g., Confidential, Secret, Top Secret) or outlines procedures for handling classified information.[2][3] Without a legal framework, there is no established oversight body to monitor the classification process, leading to potential misuse or over-classification of information.

Most ministries and agencies of the defence have websites and other channels of public information. However, materials provided are not updated and are not in real time. The Ministry of National Defense maintains an official website and has initiated media engagement activities. For instance, in 2023, the Ministry organised a workshop aimed at fostering better relationships with the media and improving the dissemination of military information. Despite these initiatives, the frequency and regularity of press briefings remain inconsistent, and updates to the website are often delayed.[1]
Liberia’s Freedom of Information (FOI) Act provides a legal basis for public access to government information. However, the implementation of this law within the defence sector has been limited. The Freedom of Information Act is rarely used, and the government responds slowly, if at all, to information requests submitted. Transparency guidelines for public procurement processes are not fully enforced, and procurement is an area where corruption is pervasive. Commitments made under the Open Government Partnership are not supported by the requisite political will.[3]

Out of respect for the principle of good governance, since March 2018, the Ministry of Defense has joined the United Nations Systems Peacebuilding Fund Program, IDIRC component (Democratic, Integrity, Representative and Credible Institutions, UNESCO component). This means that the ministry is committed to informing the public of its activities [1]. But this position remains theoretical [2]. The current command of the armed forces is not really disposed to a policy of wide openness with regard to information. It hides behind the imperative of “defense secrecy” to prevent the public from accessing information even if it is not sensitive [2]. Moreover, there is no legislation requiring the armed forces to be transparent about information that concerns them [3]. All the more so since no specific legislation exists regarding access to information in the defence sector.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
Decree No. 20.204/2011 on the Code of Conduct of the Malagasy Army of June 28, 2011 stipulates in its article 22 that “the soldier must take all useful measures, in order to inform users about the acts and procedures falling within his jurisdiction taking into account the requirements of article 19 of this code”[1]. This is a certain desire for transparency in terms of information. And precisely regarding article 19 of the same code, he calls on the military to demonstrate confidentiality. This article 19 specifies in particular that “in the exercise of his functions, the soldier is required to preserve the secret of national defence, professional secrecy and intelligence or information linked to the service unless legal obligations require him to communicate .As such, he must take appropriate measures to guarantee the security and confidentiality of the information for which he is responsible or of which he is aware” [2]. Such a system does not always allow the military to know which information is likely to be classified as “defence secret” and which is not. This legal framework seems too vague and the military does not always risk providing information about their institution. Moreover, the current military command comes from promotions having done part of their training either in China or in Russia. Thus, the top brass are not willing to promote a policy allowing easy access to information [3].

There is no legislation requiring the armed forces to be transparent about information that concerns them and no specific legislation exists regarding access to information in the defence sector. The public only has access to detailed information on the defense budget in the finance law.The only information the public can access about the armed forces is that which the military is willing to give. On this point, the Malagasy army well deserves its description of “Great Mute” [1]. And this despite an official discourse according to which transparency must guide the activities of the armed forces. Most journalists report difficulties in obtaining information that they can then relay for the benefit of the public [2]. However, without the press, it is almost impossible for the population to have information about the armed forces.

There is no specific legislation in the defence sector governing access to information. However, there is a Directorate of Information and Public Relations (DIRPA) attached to the Ministry of Defence and responsible for managing all communication in the defence and security sector. Mechanisms for access to information in the defence sector in Mali are generally limited. Defence information is often classified for reasons of national security. This can hamper public and CSO access to detailed and accurate data.[1] DIRPA does not provide guidance on classified information. However, the DIRPA is the structure responsible for bringing to the attention of the media and the public the information that the military hierarchy considers it should bring to their attention. This information is available on the website of the defense and security forces in the DIRPA section.[2]

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
Mali has neither a right to information (RTI) law or a state secrets law. The only classification that seems to exist is that which classifies certain information as defence secrets or in the essential interest of the State. Information in this category is beyond the reach of the public and to most institutions. However, the dissemination of information considered normal is subject to the discretionary power of the holde, who very often divides it up according to a discretionary selection.[1] Decree No. 2023-275 PT-RM of May 3, 2023 which is retroactive to 2020 excludes works, supply, and service contracts related to defence and security excluded from the scope of the Public Procurement Code, which also impact the disclosure of information on this topic.[2]

Mechanisms for accessing information in the defence sector in Mali are generally limited. The information and public relations department sometimes relays certain information and communicates on certain aspects, but information related to defence is often classified for reasons of national security. This can hinder access by the public and CSOs to detailed and precise data.[1][2]

In terms of legal framework, access to information is governed by the Right to Information Law [1], which establishes all the principles; and information on defence and security is protected by the State Secrets Law [2], the Military Crimes Law [3] and the Right to Information Law [1] and other ordinary military legislation. According to the Mozambican FOIA, the request for information is addressed to the manager or civil servant with competences in the field of document, information and archive management, and the applicant must identify himself/herself duly, presenting the type of information requested [1]. The restrictions and limits on access to information are as follows: state secret; legal secrecy; confidential information of other state and international organisations; professional secrecy; bank secrecy; private personal data; protection of victims, whistle-blowers and witnesses; commercial or industrial secret; secrets relating to literary, artistic or scientific property; information relating to a criminal proceeding and strategic projects for the security of society and the state [4]. However, the legislation does not mention if people can appeal those decisions.

There is an Information Classifier that guides the classification of information in the Public Administration Sector and in the Defence and Security Sector, governed by Decree No. 84/2019, of December 26, which establishes the National State Archives System (SNAE) and contains the Classified Information Classifier, with the respective levels of restriction and access: Restricted, Confidential, Secret and State Secret [1, 2]. This system is complemented by the State Secrets Act [2] and the Right to Information Act [3].

The citizens are unlikely to access defence sector information, even when requested in accordance with the access to information law. Current legal framework (i.e., the State Secrets Law [1], the Military Crimes Law [2], the Right to Information Law [3], and the Classifier of Classified Information in Public Administration [4]) and reports on monitoring access to information in public institutions demonstrate that citizens are unable to access the information requested by law [5].

Niger’s legal framework provides for access to public information and administrative documents, including those relating to the defence sector. The 2011 Ordonnance N° 2011-22 formally distinguishes between “communicable” and “noncommunicable” administrative documents, implying the existence of a level of state secrecy in defence matters [1]. Under this law, officials must justify refusals to disclose documents in writing citizens have the right to appeal denials through the office of the Médiateur de la République (Articles 27–31).
However, significant weaknesses remain. The law lacks a fully detailed method for classifying administrative documents and there is no active, independent external review body empowered to audit classification decisions or oversee appeals beyond the administrative level. Articles 12–14 provide some structure for classification, but these provisions are not sufficiently detailed to meet international best practices on transparency.
Moreover, following the military coup of July 26, 2023, the situation regarding transparency, particularly in defence matters, has worsened. According to the International Crisis Group’s 2023 report, access to defence-related information has further declined, with military authorities tightening control over security and budgetary information, undermining even the limited gains previously made [2].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
As defined in the 2011 Ordonnance administrative documents are separated into “communicable” and “noncommunicable” (publically accessible and confidential) which implies a level of state secrecy. The law establishes procedures for accessing them and paying related costs. Officials are required to provide the legal grounds for denial of a request which must be notified in writing; requesters are able to appeal’ [1].

Information not classified as confidential was relatively accessible to the public through 2018 to July 26, 2023 [1]. The availability of various reports from international organizations on Niger’s security and defense sectors further supports this. However, the military coup drastically altered this situation, as the public now lacks access to reliable information. Much of the information communicated by defense and security officials is often false or misleading [2]. Since the coup, the information environment has deteriorated sharply, particularly regarding the security and defence sectors. The military authorities have asserted tight control over public discourse, drastically limiting the flow of accurate or verifiable information. Statements issued by security or defence officials often serve political messaging purposes, and have repeatedly been found to be inaccurate, misleading, or intentionally vague.
This erosion of transparency is not incidental—it is structural and strategic, aimed at consolidating control and suppressing scrutiny.

Nigeria enacted a Freedom of Information (FOI) Act, 2011 as an entrenchment to give every citizen the right to request public records or information within the custody of a government institution [1]. The FOI is an essential legislation to aid the quest for transparency, accountability, good governance and democratic participation in Nigeria.
However, the FOIA also includes broad national security exemptions under Section 11, which empower agencies to withhold information if disclosure is considered detrimental to defence or foreign policy. There is no publicly available classification system that defines how defence information is categorised (e.g., secret, confidential), nor are there detailed criteria for determining what is withheld [2], which means information that can undermine the defence and security of the country can be denied under this provision [3].
While the Act allows for internal appeals to the agency head and judicial review via the Federal High Court [Sections 7 and 20], in practice these routes may involve high legal costs and low success rates. There is no independent administrative appeal body, such as an information ombudsman, to handle complaints [4].

Various laws and rules operate to protect classified information and official secrets in the public service in Nigeria [1]. These include the Official Secrets Act (OSA), the Criminal Code, the Penal Code, the Evidence Act, and Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and Nigeria Data Protection Act (2023). Classified documents are categorised based upon the level of their security risk. Nigeria’s public Service Rules provides for documents that are categorised as classified documents or correspondence. “Classified Correspondence” means correspondence which has been graded Restricted, Confidential, Secret or Top Secret [2]. For instance, the OSA prohibits the unauthorised transmission of any information which has been classified by any government branch as being prejudicial to the security of Nigeria [3]. However, the FOIA supersedes the OSA which forbade the unauthorized transmission, obtaining, reproduction, or retention of any classified matter. The FOIA applies not only to public institutions but also to private organizations providing public services, performing public functions or utilizing public funds [4]. In recent times, some sensitive government documents have found their way to the public space, which revealed mismanagement of funds, abuse of office, outrageous spending, and corruption, among others. One of them was a leaked memo revealing that the Secretary to the Government of the Federation (SGF) in Nigeria, George Akume, wrote to Nigerian President Bola Ahmed Tinubu, requesting the sum of N1 billion for the activities of the national minimum wage committee [5]. The leakage of the document considered by government as sensitive triggered debate within the media whether the FOIA complements or contradicts the Official Secrets Act [6]. On July 2024, the SGF warned communication managers across all Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) against leaking official secrets. The reality, however is that while the essence of FOI Act is to ensure access to information, the official secrets act was aimed at restricting the disclosure of information.

The Nigeria public often access information from the defence sector usually form press releases, media chats and information made available on their social media outfits [1]. Sometimes request for certain information may be delayed, if at all, released. During a seminar on Repositioning the Defence and Security Sector to be more Responsible and Accountable in Nigeria’s Democracy”, participants drawn from civil society organisations, media and academia, noted that “ambiguity, outdated and needless complexity of key provisions in the existing laws like Freedom of Information (FOI) Act 2011 hamper deeper engagement and successful civilian oversight” of the defence and security sector [2]. In addition, certain information may be outrightly denied on grounds of national security, citing Section 11 of the FOI Act [3]. Apart from specfic information of the FOI Act which restricts public acccess to information in the Defence sector, there are other contradictory legal provisions of the Official Secrete Act, Procurement Act and Criminal Code.[4]

There is no legislation or implementing guidelines that clearly stipulate access to information for the defence sector.[1] There have been plans to adopt a general law on access to information since 2021, but the law has not yet been passed by the Parliament. [2]

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

The protection of national defence information is subject to a strict legal regime. It applies to all Senegalese citizens (civilian or military) and to foreigners who, without having the capacity to do so, disclose or disseminate, whether maliciously or not, information relating to national defence. [1] The draft general law on access to information provides for exceptions to access to information: confidential information received from a third party or concerning a third party; information that could harm public security and national defence; information relating to proceedings pending before a court and which have not been the subject of a court decision; information the disclosure of which would be seriously prejudicial to national interests. [2] Crimes and offenses against national defence are punishable under articles 60 and subsequent of the Senegalese Penal Code, in particular article 64, which covers any person who, “without the intention of treason or espionage, brings to the attention of an unqualified person or the public military information not made public by the competent authority…”. All documents relating to the preparation and conduct of operations not made public by the General Staff of the Armed Forces fall into this category. Their distribution or disclosure is punishable by law. [3]

The public is rarely able to access information from the defence sector. There is no legislation guiding information request for the defence sector. In Senegal Armed Forces, the Information and Public Relations Directorate (DIRPA) is a command communication tool, acting as an interface between the Armed Forces and the general public via the public and private media but the information published by this body is carefully selected by the Ministry rather than being information demanded by the public. [1][2]

The Department of Defence’s Policy on the Conduct of Counter Intelligence establishes the framework for information classification on a scale of (a) restricted; (b) confidential; (c) secret; or (d) top secret. [1] The Promotion of Access to Information Act allows citizens to request access to a broad range of information held by government bodies, but section 41 of the Act allows for the refusal of requests for records if it were to prejudice the defence of the Republic. [2] The Department of Defence has a Promotion of Access to Information Manual providing guidance on how to access departmental information including the necessary forms required to request information. This includes guidance on the internal appeal process and the access to courts as the final arbitrator once internal appeals have been exhausted. [3] This score is warranted given the thoroughness of the guidelines on access to information. While information may be refused in practice, the guidelines are clear in outlining what may be refused which is a standard practice for militaries that certain material is sensitive.

The Department of Defence’s Policy on the Conduct of Counter Intelligence establishes the framework for information classification on a scale of (a) restricted; (b) confidential; (c) secret; or (d) top secret. [1] In addition to the PCCI, the South African government’s system for the classification of information is guided by a clear legal framework. This system is governed by several pieces of legislation and policies aimed at safeguarding national security including the Protection of State Information Act, [2] Minimum Information Security Standards (MISS), and the National Strategic Intelligence Act. [3]

Little is publicly known about the responsiveness of the Department of Defence to requests for information using the Promotion of Access to Information Act. However, the Department’s delayed response to a request for access to information submitted by the main opposition party in relation to a Russian vessel docking at a naval base is illustrative of a lack of responsiveness to information requests as well as a willingness to use “national security” justifications to withhold information. [1] The Inspector-General of Intelligence likewise admonished the Department for unlawful conduct arising from the Department’s failure to make full and proper disclosure of the docking in question in contravention of the Intelligence Services Oversight Act. [2] Responses by the Minister of Defence to parliamentary questions are generally prompt although at times limited in substance. [3]

In 2012, South Sudan enacted the Right of Access to Information Bill, establishing a legal framework that allows citizens to request information from both public and private entities. This act is applicable to the defence and security sectors unless the information borders on national security as stipulated in Article 30 (1) of the Act. Article 7 (1) of the law specifies that, subject to the provisions of Chapters II and IV, anyone requesting information from a public body has the right to: [1]
(a) be informed if the public body possesses a record containing the requested information or from which it can be derived, and
(b) if such a record exists, to have the information provided to them. [2]
Noteworthy, in 2021, the South Sudan Information Commission launched Regulations on Access to Information to enhance tackled issues on existing legal frameworks and the critical role of access to information in ensuring transparency and accountability by public institutions.[3] However, despite the efforts made to enhance freedom of information, the country has not established a body that can review which information is accessible or not. Furthermore, the law does not spell out what categories of classified information exists or mention of how specifically defence information can be accessed by members of the public.

Although the law gives citizens the right to information, it classifies information that can or cannot be released through this law. For example, Article 30, is very clear that “A Public Body may refuse to indicate whether or not it holds a Record or refuse to communicate information, where to do so would likely cause serious prejudice to national defence and security” [1]. Although there is no classification of information in the Right to Access information Bill, attempts to describe classified information can be found in the SPLA Act of 2009 especially section 61 (2). [2]

While there is an existing law that promotes freedom of information [1], and ongoing civic education efforts [2], there is lack of evidence that information pertaining to defence sector is available. For example, the validated security sector policy documents are not readily available for public scrutiny. Also, most of the published reports that offer insight into the defence sector activities are often because of investigative reports [3] and not the Right to Access Information law. In addition, the Ministry of Defence and Veteran is not well detailed and only has very brief summary on aims & objectives, doctrine, about SPLA, welfare, contracts and contact details of the ministry which does not offer any insight on the day-to-day activities or other relevant information. [4] This problem can also be attributed to the lack of public awareness of their right to information and to test the law have hampered the effectiveness of the law.

The Access to Information Act (2005) which allows citizens to access information from public bodies including the military. However, the access to information act excludes access to classified information tied to defence and national security. Section 4(2) of the Act specifies that access to information may be denied where the information is deemed classified for purposes of national security, sovereignty, or public interest. Section 33 explicitly allows the government to withhold information classified as sensitive to the security or defence of the state [1]. There are also no clear guidelines on categorising classified information or appealing decisions regarding denied access. The public also lacks an independent external appeal body with authority to review access to classified defence information. While Section 43 establishes a process for individuals to appeal decisions that deny access to information, national security-related information often falls outside the scope of such appeals.

The classification of defence information in Uganda presents a substantial obstacle to public and civil society oversight, often justified under the pretext of national security. This practice is governed by a formal legal framework, most notably the Official Secrets Act (1964) and the Access to Information Act (2005), which together establish a legal basis and procedural structure for classifying information. The Official Secrets Act empowers the state to designate specific information related to national security, defence, intelligence, and infrastructure as “official secrets,” with Sections 2, 3, 4, and 7 outlining broad definitions of classified information and severe penalties for unauthorized disclosure. However, the Act lacks clarity on procedural safeguards or standardized criteria for classification, leaving significant discretion to state actors [2].
Similarly, the Access to Information Act (2005), while intended to promote transparency, includes broad exemptions for information related to defence and national security. Sections 4, 26, 27, and 43 provide for refusal of access if disclosure is deemed likely to prejudice national security, but these exemptions are often invoked without clear justification or recourse, contributing to an opaque classification environment. There is no widely accessible public register or formal explanation of what constitutes classified information, leading to limited public understanding of classification boundaries and rationale [1] [3].
This vague and expansive approach to classification extends to operational plans, intelligence assessments, sensitive procurement processes, and large portions of the defence budget—particularly those associated with covert or classified projects. While the Public Finance Management Act requires a specialized three-member committee to review classified defence budgets, the small size and limited transparency of this body raise questions about its effectiveness and independence[4].
While Uganda does possess a formal classification framework, the lack of clarity, procedural transparency, and oversight severely limits its legitimacy and effectiveness in balancing national security with democratic accountability.

The Access to Information Act (2005) grants the public the right to request information, but exemptions for national security and classified information under Section 26 severely limit what can be disclosed about defence matters. In addition, the Official Secrets Act (1964) broadly classifies most defence-related information as sensitive, further restricting access. Oversight bodies such as the Ministry of Defence and Veteran Affairs rarely publish detailed reports or expenditures related to defence. Classified budgets are approved as single-line items, without detailed scrutiny.
The Access to Information Law, 2005 in Part III (section 23 – 34) lists exemptions which are too wide in scope and contradict the constitution.
These exemptions, which include cabinet minutes and those of its committees, limit the enjoyment of the right to information by restricting access to vital records. Also, according to section 3 (d) of the Access to Information Act, every citizen is supposed to access information easily and in a timely manner. The Act provides for a maximum of 21 days within which a citizen’s information request is responded to. However, the delayed release of information due to fear and/or bureaucracy have made the right to information impracticable in some circumstance. [3] [4]

While the constitution of Zimbabwe provides on citizens right to obtain or to be furnished with public information [1], there is no legal framework which guides on accessing information from the defence institutions/sector [3]. The Official Secrets Act give the defence forces power to withhold information deemed to be classified information [4]. Again, Section 4(1c-d) prohibits any person with classified state information not to share it and the defence forces do hold classified information which is not for the public [3].
The Freedom of Information Act [Chapter 10:33] does not apply to the defence sector. None can demand to access information from the defence forces. The defence forces, only releases information it sees fit for the public, but it cannot be pressurised even by any court in Zimbabwe to release information to the public [3].

Defence sector information is confined and classified within the barracks, and the classification of information in the defence sector is guided by the Official Secrets Act. [1] Much of the information is not meant for the public to access it. It is regarded as classified information. [2] The defence sector is largely regarded as a security sensitive sector where information on and about the defence sector is difficult to access and is not easily shared with the media. [2] The Freedom of Information Act [Chapter 10:33] does not apply to the defence sector.

The public does not easily get information from the defence sector [1]. The media or any member of the public do not get information on defence sector itemised expenditures [2]. If the media tries to clandestinely do any investigations on the defence sector, it is threatened to stop reporting [2]. The media can request information from the defence forces through the Public Relations unit, who do not respond on time and when they do, they do not provide the needed information [3].