As institution, the “Minsitry of Defence” is not the beneficiary owner of any commercial business [1]. These same principles apply to the military, which in accordance with Law No. 2020. In any case, the military personnel is not authorized to be involved in an activity which could be a source of remuneration. All this to avoid conflicts of interest and ensure their total independence [2]. The direct participation of defense and security institutions (armed forces and police) in commercial enterprises can raise important questions in terms of transparency, management of conflicts of interest and regulation of public finances. There is no clear or widespread evidence that the Ministry of Defense and Security in Benin directly owns or manages commercial enterprises.

Benin laws don’t allow national defence and security institutions to have any beneficial ownership of commercial businesses so this indicator is marked Not Applicable. [1][2]

The bulk of the commercial business held by the Defence and security institutions is made up of officers’ and non-commissioned officers’ messes, which are cabarets, but they do not total 10% of the Defence budget [1] [2]

The army’s commercial affairs, which rely mainly on cabarets, are publicly declared. They can be found in the monthly army revenue reports. [1] The finances associated with these commercial activities are also transparent, and return rigorously to the army coffers, with the exception of the cabarets, which have been placed under the responsibility of individual. A large proportion of the army’s commercial revenues are therefore managed transparently, with the exception of these businesses, which have been placed in the hands of individuals. [1] [2] Reports on the operations of these cases held by the army are provided to anyone who requests them and justifies why they need them.

Defence and security institutions in Cameroon are involved in commercial ventures across sectors such as transportation, agriculture, real estate, and construction, yet details about these activities remain largely unclear.[1][2] Some enterprises, like military-run farms and logistics companies, generate additional funding or provide opportunities for personnel but lack public scrutiny. Military-linked businesses in construction and infrastructure are occasionally documented in public records, yet they operate without comprehensive financial disclosures or independent audits. The absence of a legal framework requiring transparency worsens governance issues, including the risks of mismanagement and corruption.[3]

In Cameroon, the financial and operational transparency of military-owned businesses is significantly lacking. While there are indications that defence institutions and high-ranking officials maintain beneficial ownership in sectors such as construction, telecommunications, and real estate, these relationships are not formally disclosed. There is no publicly available documentation on the existence, operations, or financial performance of such businesses.[1] Public scrutiny is further hampered by the lack of independent audits or external reviews. Despite some governance reforms targeting other public sectors, the defence sector remains exempt from comparable oversight mechanisms. Reports confirm that the Ministry of Defence does not include details of commercial ventures in its publicly available budget documents, leaving these enterprises beyond the reach of transparency or accountability measures [2].

Defence institutions do not hold shares in certain commercial companies. However, it has been noted that, despite its public service mission, the army has certain commercial assets. This is particularly true of certain properties such as hotels [3]. These offer services to a specific clientele or are created for reasons of prestige [1, 2].

Since February 2025, the Ivorian army has owned a hotel, but no reports on its financial results have yet been published. With the exception of this hotel, the Ministry of Defence does not own any other commercial enterprises, although other hotels are expected to be built [1, 2].

The Defence Industries Holding Company (DIHOC) Limited serves as the primary platform of commercial ventures by the Ghana Armed Forces. It is a limited liability company that was incorporated in 2010 under the Company Act of 1963 (Act 179). (1) The company’s primary aim is to attract investors for strategic partnerships in establishing factories across various sectors, including garment, footwear, printing and publishing, automobile assembly, electrical and electronic engineering, pharmaceuticals, agro-processing and cattle rearing, mechanical and civil engineering, shipbuilding, ammunition and explosive ordnance manufacturing, and housing, including hotel management. The board of DIHOC includes high-ranking officials such as the Chief of Defence Staff, the Chief Director of the Ministry of Defence, and the Director General in Charge of Legal Affairs. The commercial worth of the DIHOC is less than 10% of the annual budget of the GAF. (2) 

The operations of ventures under DIHOC are not fully transparent. A search on the internet reveals a lack of information regarding board memberships or the overall management structure. These ventures include 360 Defence Builders Ghana Limited and DIHOC-Primesec Ghana Limited, both focused on constructing vertical and horizontal infrastructure; DIHOC Black Swan International Limited, which specialises in manufacturing small-calibre ammunition; and DIHOC Kenaki Manufacturing Company Limited (DIKMAC), responsible for assembling armoured vehicles, including armoured bullion vans and weapons. (1) While Senior Military Officers serving and retired are rumoured to be involved in the venture, this cannot be validated due to the existing level of transparency. The financial outcomes of these ventures are not publicly declared. (2)

The Ministry of Defence (MOD) in Kenya has been allocated a total budget of KES 168.09 billion for the 2024/2025 fiscal year [1]. This allocation funds various institutions under the MOD, including specialised entities such as the Kenya Ordnance Factories Corporation (KOFC), National Defence University-Kenya (NDU-K), Kenya Shipyards Limited (KSL), National Air Support Department (NASD), the National Security Telecommunications Service (NSTS), and the Kenya Space Agency (KSA). Below is a breakdown of specific budget allocations and their percentages of the total MOD budget:
• Kenya Ordnance Factories Corporation (KOFC): As a state corporation under the MOD, KOFC’s budget is included within the Ministry’s overall financial plan. While its specific allocation is not separately detailed, KOFC primarily focuses on manufacturing military equipment, and its funding is integrated into the MOD’s broader budget.
• National Defence University-Kenya (NDU-K): NDU-K, responsible for training military and security professionals, has been allocated KES 389.1 million, representing approximately 0.23% of the MOD’s total budget [2].
• National Air Support Department (NASD): NASD, which provides aerial support for military and security operations, has received KES 231 million, accounting for about 0.14% of the MOD’s total budget [3].
• Kenya Shipyards Limited (KSL): KSL, responsible for constructing and maintaining ships for military use, has been allocated KES 1.5 billion, making up approximately 0.89% of the MOD’s total budget [4].
• Kenya Space Agency (KSA): The specific budget allocation for KSA is not publicly available. However, as an institution focused on space exploration, research, and satellite technology development, its funding is typically integrated into the broader national science and technology budget.
• National Security Telecommunications Service (NSTS): Similarly, the budget allocation for NSTS, which manages secure communications for national security, is not explicitly stated in publicly available sources [5].

The Ministry carries a comprehensive mandate that encompasses the management and oversight of several key institutions critical to national security and technological advancement. These include the Kenya Ordnance Factories Corporation (KOFC), which is responsible for the production of defence materials and equipment. The National Defence University-Kenya (NDU-K) serves as a premier institution for higher learning in defence and strategic studies, fostering skills and knowledge essential for national security. Additionally, the Ministry oversees the Kenya Space Agency (KSA), which spearheads the country’s efforts in space exploration and satellite technology, contributing to both national security and scientific research. Kenya Shipyards Limited (KSL) is another crucial entity under the ministry’s management, focusing on shipbuilding and repair services, thus supporting naval capabilities and maritime security. The National Air Support Department (NASD) provides vital air support services, enhancing the operational readiness and logistical capabilities of national defence forces. Lastly, the National Security Telecommunications Service (NSTS) ensures secure and reliable communication channels for defence and security operations. Through these diverse functions, the ministry plays a pivotal role in safeguarding national interests and promoting technological innovation [1].
In 2021, The National Security Council approved the creation of Ulinzi Construction Company [2]. Kenya is poised to host the Africa Cup of Nations in 2027, and there are plans to handover the construction and renovations of stadiums to KDF. The four Stadia to be handed over are the Nyayo Stadium, Moi International Sports Centre Kasarani, Kipchoge Keino Stadium and a new stadium dubbed Talanta Sports City [3]

Ownership of commercial businesses is publicly declared, with details of their operations and finances being transparent, fully disclosed, and with standards of governance equivalent to publicly owned commercial enterprises [1]. This information is constrained digitally under the Business Registration Services and competent authorities have access to the full beneficial ownership register.

Little information is available on defence and security investments in the private sector, which accounts for 1% of its budget. ​As of now, there is no publicly available evidence indicating that Liberia’s national defence and security institutions hold beneficial ownership in commercial businesses.[1][3]
Additionally, in August 2023, Liberia enacted the Beneficial Ownership Disclosure Regulation for Domestic Entities, requiring all legal entities formed or registered in the country to disclose information about their beneficial owners. This regulation mandates the collection, processing, verification, publication, and accessibility of beneficial ownership information, overseen by the Liberia Business Registry (LBR).[2]
A 2021 analysis by FrontPage Africa reviewed Liberia’s State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and their economic footprint—covering over 20 entities across sectors, such as port services, electricity, oil & gas, water, agriculture, etc. It makes no mention of any defence or security agencies owning or controlling these commercial entities.[3]
Despite this, it remains unclear whether defence institutions currently have beneficial ownership in commercial businesses.

Not applicable since the government of Liberia is the sole provider of revenue and financing for all security and defence activity, and national defence and security institutions do not have any beneficial ownership of commercial businesses.[1][2][3]

Defence and security institutions do not hold ownership shares in commercial companies [1] [2].

Defence and security institutions do not hold ownership shares in commercial companies so this indicator is marked Non Applicable. [1] [2]

The law formally prohibits defence and security institutions, in accordance with their mission, from owning shares in commercial companies. Moreover, the staff of defence and security institutions may not, in accordance with their statutes, engage in profit-making activities of any kind whatsoever.[1][2][3] There is no evidence of defence and ownership of commercial businesses.

The national defence and security institutions do not hold effective ownership of commercial enterprises, However, the State itself owns 100% of the Central Military Workshops.[1] These Central Military Workshops of Markala, as they are called today, are an industrial complex Military workshops specialised in metal, in the manufacture of frames, tanks, trailers, vats, water towers, agricultural equipment, irrigation valves, bins, barges, office furniture, beds, cabinets, etc. They specialise in mechanics, including manufacture and repair of all mechanical parts in cast iron, bronze, or steel; the casting in foundry based on models or sketches; the adaptation of diesel engines to gasoline, and the repair of vehicles of all types. They are at the service of the defence and security forces.

The defence institutions have interests in businesses and commercial activities such as private security services, civil construction, demining, explosives manufacturing, among other activities [1]. The interests are significant, in some cases such as the Proindicus SA case, where the Monte Binga Company, belonging to the Ministry of National Defence, held a 50% stake in the shareholder structure [2].

The national defence and security institutions have properties and commercial businesses, through companies under their tutelage. While transparency is plausible, because these businesses are publicly declared, details of their operations and finances are opaque, such is the case of the Monte Binga Company [4], which belongs to the Ministry of National Defence, or Dalo Construções [3], which belongs to the Police Force [1]. Their commercial purpose is published in the Official Gazette (Official Publication of the Mozambican State) and they are governed by the Commercial Code [5] and the legislation governing the State Business Sector [6], being subject to declaring income and paying taxes.

Before the military coup of July 26, 2023, the legal framework did not provide for the ownership of private businesses by the military. Neither the Constitution [1] nor the Military Penal Code [2] authorized defense institutions to hold beneficial ownership in commercial enterprises. Additionally, Section 6, Article 129 of the Public Penal Code strictly regulates the involvement of public officials in private business, imposing sanctions ranging from 100,000 FCFA to 1 million FCFA and a minimum of two years of imprisonment for violations [3].
Following the dissolution of the Constitution, there is no clear legal framework explicitly restricting military ownership of commercial businesses. However, there is no public evidence to suggest that defense institutions own or control major commercial enterprises.

Before the military coup of July 26, 2023, Niger’s legal framework prohibited defense institutions from owning commercial businesses, as stipulated in the Constitution [1] and the Military Penal Code [2]. Furthermore, Section 6, Article 129 of the Public Penal Code imposed strict regulations and penalties on public officials engaging in private business, with sanctions ranging from 100,000 FCFA to 1 million FCFA and a minimum of two years of imprisonment for violations [3]. However, following the dissolution of the Constitution, there is no clear legal framework explicitly restricting military ownership of commercial enterprises. In the current military-led administration, the absence of legal restrictions creates an environment where such ownership could exist without public accountability. Given the lack of oversight and transparency, it is not possible to confirm nor exclude the existence of military-owned businesses, particularly in sectors like procurement, infrastructure, or resource extraction, where defense institutions often have significant influence.
Additionally, the secrecy surrounding military financial management, as reinforced by the February 2024 decree [4], further limits public scrutiny over potential military-affiliated economic activities. The lack of financial oversight, combined with documented corruption and procurement fraud cases in the defense sector, suggests that military-run businesses could be operating off the record, without any form of transparency or disclosure.

Nigeria’s Ministry of Defence owns some commercial establishments such as the Defence Industries Corporation of Nigeria, (DICON), Defence Health Maintenance Limited, Nigerian Army Welfare Holdings Ltd, Nigerian Army Properties Limited (NAPL) Group, Post-Service Housing Development Limited (PHDL), Command Guest House (CGH) Limited, Nigerian Army Drug Manufacturing Company (NADMACO) Limited, Nigerian Army Farm and Ranches Limited (NAFARL), Nigerian Army Driving School (NADS), Nigerian Army Green Security (NAGS) Limited, Air Force parastatal AESTL and the Nigerian Naval Dockyard, among others [1]. There are budget allocations to some of these ventures but their returns and other transactions are rarely captured in the audit report. It is challenging to confirm /get evidence of the %, but a scrutiny of the budget shows that much is budget for the Defence comes from the federal allocation. Moreover, “there is concern by some security experts and stakeholders that the growing penchant for the establishment of commercial ventures could be a black hole that sucks defence funding without a trace or accountability” [2].

The list of Nigeria’s defence commercial ventures is in the public domain, such as the activities of the DICON [1]. Sometimes, these defence commercial ventures or operations are publicly declared such as when DICON manufactured a mine-resistant, ambush protected (MRAP) vehicles known as Ezugwu MRAP. The first batch of 25 Ezugwu vehicles were delivered to the Nigerian Army in December 2019 [2]. A piece or unit of the Ezugwu MRAP goes for about Two Hundred and Fifty Million Naira [3]. However, some other business operations are rarely made public. Thus, returns on them are rarely made public or even audited. For instance, the real estate schemes by the Nigerian military have blossomed into money-making ventures [4].
In June 2022, the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) raided a property in Wuse 2, Abuja, where billions of naira and foreign currency were stashed. Initial reports speculated that the funds belonged to former Chief of Army Staff, Lt. Gen. Tukur Buratai. However, a subsequent statement from the ICPC clarified that the money and the property belonged to a military contractor. The agency arrested Kabiru Sallau, the Managing Director of K Salam Construction Company Nigeria Limited, on suspicion of money laundering [5].
While some commercial activities, such as DICON’s manufacturing efforts, are periodically disclosed, the broader landscape of defence-related business operations remains largely shielded from public scrutiny.

In Senegal, defence and security institutions do not owned commercial businesses, but depend entirely on public funding from the state either it is the police, the army or the gendarmerie. [1] The culture of military professionalism that has developed in Senegal is the result of a deliberate, long-term effort to inculcate the values of service, meritocracy and respect for democratic values. This does not go hand in hand with business or commercial considerations. [2]

National defence and security institutions do not hold beneficial ownership of commercial enterprises, as this is prohibited by the Law n°1963/21 of February 5, 1963 replacing Title I of Book I of the Code of Military Justice, so this indicator is marked Not Applicable. [1]

The Department of Defence does not have beneficial ownership in any known commercial businesses of significance. The two major state-owned enterprises in the defence sector are fully owned by the state rather than Department. This includes Armscor, mandated with the acquisition and disposal of armaments on behalf of the Department of Defence, [1] and Denel, the state-owned arms manufacturer overseen by the Department of Public Enterprise. [2]

The Department of Defence does not have beneficial ownership in any known commercial businesses of significance. The two major state-owned enterprises in the defence sector are fully owned by the state rather than Department [1] [2].

South Sudanese defence and security agencies have been named in different reports over their involvement (or are believed to own) in commercial interests in Mining, Oil, provision of security services and trade [1]. For example, the Global Witness report indicated that security and political elites facilitating the loss of millions from the state owned because ‘the company is almost entirely unregulated and has fallen under the direct control of the President and his inner circle, including the head of South Sudan’s Internal Security Bureau, who sits on the Company’s board [2]. While it is not clear the exact percentage of the defence budget is involved; both the Sentry and Global witness reports indicate that millions of dollars are involved.

Transparency is limited when it comes to commercial benefits defence and security agents are involved in. Reports have described the commercial operations of the military and its officers as opaque and not transparent. [1] [2] [3]

The National Enterprise Corporation (NEC), the commercial arm of the Uganda People’s Defence Force, operates extensive business interests across agriculture (e.g., Nakasongola sunflower and maize farms), manufacturing (footwear, steel, textiles, armoured vehicles, UAVs, explosives), construction (barracks, schools, MoDHQ), and services (accommodation, transport) [1][2].
One of the examples to enable illustrations is the large farm in Nakasongola district that grows maize, beans and sunflowers. There is Magamaga Industries which produces footwear, leather goods, and textiles and Karama Steel Industries which manufactures steel products, like nails, wire, and roofing materials. Several construction companies exist among these including UPDF Engineering Brigade which undertakes construction projects, like road building, bridge construction, and building development; Uganda Defence Forces Construction Company (UDFCC) participates in construction projects, like housing developments, schools, and healthcare facilities; and UPDF Building Brigade does the construction of military infrastructure, like barracks, training facilities, and military housing [2][4].

The defence and security institutions own bullet making industries, and armoured vehicle assembling plants [3]. Given that NEC’s ventures involve large-scale projects and span multiple sectors, it is reasonable to estimate that their commercial operations account for more than 10% of the defence budget. However, a verified financial breakdown is not publicly available.

The National Enterprise Corporation (NEC), as a state-owned commercial arm of the Ministry of Defence and Veteran Affairs (MoDVA), demonstrates a commendable degree of financial transparency through several mechanisms. The fact that its operations are publicly declared, coupled with the President’s appointment of directors and the Auditor General’s audit of its accounts, establishes a foundation for accountability. These processes ensure that the corporation’s activities are subject to external scrutiny and oversight [1].
Furthermore, the reports from the Inspectorate of Government revealed that no complaints were lodged against NEC for the year 2022, reinforcing the perception of financial integrity. These reports, specifically highlighting NEC as a “beacon of integrity” in the public sector, suggest that the corporation adheres to ethical governance practices and maintains transparent financial operations [3]. The absence of complaints, particularly concerning financial impropriety, speaks to a commitment to accountability and responsible management of public resources. [2]
While the absence of complaints and positive reports from the Inspectorate of Government are strong indicators of transparency, it’s essential to acknowledge that transparency is a continuous process. Ongoing vigilance and adherence to best practices are crucial to maintain public trust. The combination of external audits, presidential appointments, and positive reports from oversight bodies provides a robust framework for financial transparency within NEC. Therefore, based on the available information, it is reasonable to conclude that NEC’s finances are managed with a significant degree of transparency [1].

There is widespread of military involvement in beneficial ownership of commercial businesses such as mining ventures [1,3,4]. The Chiadzwa diamond mining is a case in point where the military is reportedly having shares with diamond mining companies [3,4]. However, such businesses are not meant to benefit the defence sector as an institution, but to benefit individual senior commanders within the defence sector [2]. There is no information available as to how much % equivalent to defence budget, but commercial businesses are major enterprise, justifying the score.

There is no legal framework that mandates transparency of commercial business. The operation of such businesses is not transparent, but it is all about individuals within the defence sector in particular senior commanders. [1] It is also important to note that the defence sector chiefs are supported by both the government and the ruling political party, ZANU-PF in operating their businesses [1][2] There is no transparency in military involvement and operation in private commercial businesses because the companies which are reported to be linked to the military business in gold mining are only reported in the media. [3]