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41.

Is there an established, independent, transparent, and objective appointment system for the selection of military personnel at middle and top management level?

41a. Formal process

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SCORE: 50/100

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41b. Scrutiny

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SCORE: 0/100

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41c. Transparency

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SCORE: 0/100

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Objective eligibility criteria exist for the middle and top management level. There are rank, diploma, qualification and morality criteria defined for each position [1]. But there is no established, independant and transparent appointment system for the selection of military personnel at those positions. Generally, appointments are made at the discretion of the authorities from among those who meet the criteria [2]. Under these conditions, some officers believe that informal criteria (religion, friendship, political proximity, family relationship…) determine the choice [3].

There is no external scrutiny of the appointments of military personnel at middle and top management. [1][2][3]

Little to no information is released about the appointment process [1]. The President of the Republic has the discretionary power to appoint to middle and top management level in defense and security institutions. [2]. [3]

There is no formal process for assigning military personnel [1]. This is at the discretion of three individuals: the head of the national defence force, the Minister of National Defence and the President of the Republic [2]. Article 96 of the Organic Law states that command roles are assigned based on merit and competence, while ensuring ethnic and religious balance is maintained [3]. The 2018 constitution abolished the ethnic quota system that had been in place since the end of the civil war and practice, this grants the new president expanded responsibilities as he can appoint ministers without taking the representation of different parties and ethnic groups into account [4]. Moreover, according to Article 10 of the Organic Law, the President, as the Supreme Commander of the National Defence Force, is responsible for appointing its senior officials [3].

There is provision for external approval by the Senate for the positions of Chief of Army Staff and Deputy Chief of Army Staff [2]. In practice, it is extremely rare for the Senate to contradict the choice of the President of the Republic, it is rather a formal process [1]. The Senate formally exercises this control but in reality it systematically approves the will of the President of the Republic without any effort to question it [1].

There is very little information relayed on the appointments other than the publication of the decrees concerning the appointments without any reference to the selection criteria. [1] [2].

Cameroon does not have an established, independent, transparent, and objective appointment system for selecting military personnel at middle and top management levels. The existing system lacks clear institutional safeguards to ensure transparency and meritocracy, leaving it vulnerable to nepotism and favouritism. Although some formal processes are in place, their implementation is often compromised by political influence and insufficient oversight. Appointments at senior levels in the military are frequently influenced by political considerations, ethnic affiliations, and personal networks rather than merit-based criteria. Although regulations outline guidelines for military promotions and assignments, these are not consistently enforced, and there is no independent oversight to ensure the integrity of the process. [1] [2] [3].The military appointment system is controlled by a small group of senior officials, and there is little transparency about the criteria or processes used, which fosters an environment where favoritism and external influence can thrive. Political and personal connections often determine appointments, undermining institutional trust and efficiency [1] [2].

Military appointments in Cameroon lack meaningful external scrutiny. While some high-profile positions may undergo superficial audits or occasional parliamentary review, these processes are neither systematic nor rigorous [2]. Indeed, in Cameroon, military appointments are predominantly governed by the discretionary authority of the President of the Republic. These powers of appointment are codified in the Constitution, specifically in Article 8, paragraph 10[1] Such extensive powers enable the President to make appointments without accountability and, crucially, without the presence of an external control mechanism.

There is a significant lack of transparency in the appointment process, with political and personal affiliations often influencing selections, sidelining merit and expertise [1] [2]. Studies highlight systemic inefficiencies and the detrimental role of favoritism in the appointment process, further undermining transparency and institutional credibility [2].

The conditions for appointment to the armed forces are defined. Law No. 2016-1109 (on the military service code) of 16 February 2016 contains provisions on the system for appointing military personnel and the special commissions involved in the process [1]. In addition, the criteria are based on military training, military qualifications, ranks and seniority in rank. All of this is analysed by a promotion committee [1, 2]. The authorities strive to align positions with ranks and attempt, through human resources departments, to define job descriptions. However, appointments remain subject to influence, especially since, while the conditions for access to a given rank are defined, those relating to the corresponding functions are not. In concrete terms, a captain may be considered a company commander, but it is the chief who will choose which of the captains will fill that position [1, 2].

Appointments in the defence sector are not subject to any external control. The President of the Republic, as supreme commander of the armed forces, retains full control over appointments to senior positions [1, 2].

The conditions for appointment are sometimes public. They have been repeated by commanders during meetings with their soldiers, and messages have often been sent to remind them. Appointments to posts were purely discretionary [1, 2, 3].

There is an established procedure for the selection or appointment of military personnel at the middle and top management levels. The Armed Forces Regulations Act, Volume 1, Chapter 11, (11.01) establishes the authority and the conditions for promotion. (1) At the top managerial level, those who are of the rank of Colonel equivalent and above shall be made by cabinet with the advice of the Armed Forces Council (2). There is no explicit external audit of senior-level appointments or parliamentary oversight over the promotion of senior officers.

There is external scrutiny of appointments for higher-ranking officers, equivalent to Colonel and above. These appointments require cabinet approval upon the advice of the Armed Forces Council, in accordance with the Armed Forces Regulations Act. According to Article 212 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana, the President appoints the Chief of Defence Staff, the head of the Ghana Armed Forces, in consultation with the Council of State (1)(3). An example is the appointment of the various service chiefs of the Ghana Armed Forces took place in March of 2025 as reported by Joy News by the President of Ghana, John Mahama. These appointments made were pending the approval of the Council of State who are supposed to scrutinize the appointments and give approval or not. (2) Despite these legal provisions, there is no explicit external audit of senior-level appointments or parliamentary oversight over the promotion of senior officers. (1) (2)

There are no clearly stated processes for the selection of military personnel at middle and top management level. New appointments are communicated publicly but information regarding the processes leading to such appointments are not publicly available. For the purposes of officers below the rank of Colonel it is stated in the Armed Forces Regulation Act under Chapter 12 that duration of service and suitability for promotion as may be decided by their Commanding Officer may apply as basis for promotion. (1)(2)

Article 241 of the Constitution establishes the Defence Forces and Defence Council. The Defence Forces Consists of the Kenya Army, The Kenya Airforce and the Kenya Navy. The composition of the Defence Forces reflect ethnic diversity of the people of Kenya. The Council is established in section 6 and it consists of the Cabinet Secretary Defence who serves as Chairperson, the Chief of the Kenya Defence Forces, three commanders of the Defence forces and the Principal Secretary of Defence. The Defence Council is responsible for overall policy control, supervision of the KDF and functions prescribed by national legislation. Section 23 of the Act dictates that the Chief of the Defence Forces, the Vice Chief of the Defence Forces and the three Service Commanders shall be appointed by the President on the recommendation of the Defence Council. These officers are required to meet the requirements of Chapter 6 of the Constitution, which is about Leadership and Integrity [1].
Recent evidence shows that Kenya’s appointment process for senior defence leadership appears to follow legal procedures with minimal undue political interference. For instance, a General succeeded Kibochi as CDF in April 2023. His appointment, while initially raising some debate, was ultimately accepted with little contention, reflecting institutional acceptance of the vetting and recommendation process [2]. While one article noted that President Ruto “defied party expectations” in reshuffling military leadership—indicating some political independence in military appointments — this deviation appears to reflect merit-based rather than politically driven decisions [3].

Kenya’s military appointment system for middle and top management positions faces challenges in transparency and independence. While some oversight mechanisms exist, the process could benefit from increased objectivity and external scrutiny. According to Mutua, “the appointment process for high-ranking military officials in Kenya involves a combination of internal recommendations and executive approval, but lacks comprehensive external scrutiny” [1].

Parliament plays a role in scrutinising very high-level appointments, but this oversight is limited. Omondi notes, “while parliamentary vetting exists for top military positions, the process often lacks depth and fails to adequately challenge potential appointees on their qualifications and vision” 2. However, the military conducts its own thorough internal scrutiny. Boards deliberate extensively on candidates, evaluating each step meticulously, guided by KDF Act Section 23 and Section 9.

The military also considers ethnic representation, ensuring diversity at each rank. Every aspect is carefully considered and reviewed to maintain fairness and inclusivity [3]. Despite these internal processes, external audits of the appointment process are inconsistent and often limited in scope.

Information on promotions is publicly available and posted on the MoD website [1]. The information accompanying the promotion always notes down the process undertaken. For Instance, on 2 May 2024, there were over seven promotion and a press statement noted “on the advice of the Defence Council Chaired by Cabinet Secretary for Defence, the President upheld the Council’s recommendations and made various promotions, postings and appointments a oof the KDF” [2].

The Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) operates under a formal framework for promotions and appointments, as delineated in the National Defense Act of 2008, the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), and the AFL’s Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). However, the use of these frameworks and merit-based system can be politicised by higher-ranking roles in the Ministry. For instance, some officers commissioning ceremony was delayed without any justifiable reason while others were smooth and accelerated.[1][2][3][4]
Regarding the merit-based system, the career trajectory of Brigadier General (Retired) Geraldine Janet George, Liberia’s first female Minister of Defence, offers insight into the AFL’s promotion dynamics. Enlisted in 2006 as part of the AFL’s restructuring, she ascended through various ranks. Her progression underscores the AFL’s capacity to develop personnel through structured training and mentorship programs.[5]
Despite this, the AFL lacks publicly accessible information detailing the internal mechanisms governing promotions and appointments, particularly at middle and senior management levels.

Article 54(e) of the Liberian Constitution requires that senior military appointments, including the Chief of Staff, be made by the President with the consent of the Senate.[1] In principle, this establishes external scrutiny. However, in practice, the confirmation process has tended to be rarely contested, which limits the extent of parliamentary oversight.[2] Changes in senior leadership have sometimes occurred outside of regular succession norms, with appointees moving into other government or security-related roles, and new candidates being elevated to top positions.[3] These patterns indicate that while external scrutiny formally exists, it is not consistently rigorous. Instead, appointments are influenced by executive with parliamentary confirmation serving more as a formality than a balance

The process involving the appointment is not publicly available. Also, there is no specific information on the way appointments and promotion are carried out. The system of communication is done through inter-office memorandum.[1] The paperwork is essentially to review and approve the process, but it is not intended for the public.[2][3]

Officially, the appointment of military personnel to occupy senior and middle management positions still falls within the sovereign power of the executive. Article 117 of the law establishing the General Status of the Military stipulates that “employment is distinct from rank, it is at the disposal of the Government. Appointments to senior military posts are made by decree of the President of the Republic taken in the Council of Ministers. The corresponding functions are terminated under the same conditions” [1]. Thus, senior management positions are considered political positions and the appointment depends closely on the will of political leaders [2]. No committee participates in nominations.

At management level, no external scrutiny is involved in the appointments of Defense personnel. It’s always a matter between the military [1][2].

Almost no information is released regarding the nomination process [1]. The State prefers to communicate on its recruitment policy for people appointed to senior positions, including the military, without giving details [2].

The system for appointing military personnel to occupy senior and middle management positions is, in principle, subject to criteria set out in the ordinance on the general status of military personnel.[1] In addition to the rating criteria that can serve as a basis for appointments, the discretionary powers of the President of the Republic, the Ministers of Defense or Security and the heads of staff remain a reality in appointments.[2]
Also, appointments and promotions are made definitively:
– by decree issued in the Council of Ministers for General Officers, General Commissioners and Firefighter General Officers;
– by decree of the President of the Republic for other Officers, other Commissioners and other Firefighter Officers;
– by order of the supervising minister for Non-Commissioned Officers, Police Non-Commissioned Officers and Firefighter Non-Commissioned Officers;
– by decision of the Chief of Staff of the Army or the Director of Service for Non-Commissioned Soldiers, Non-Commissioned Police Officers and Non-Commissioned Sappers, with the authorisation of the supervising minister [3].
Appointments and promotions may be made, on a temporary basis, either to fulfill functions of limited duration or in time of war. The rank held in this capacity includes all the rights, advantages and prerogatives attached to said rank, it has no effect on the rank in the seniority and advancement list.[4]
Furthermore, appointments and promotions may be made, exceptionally, to reward outstanding actions and exceptional services without consideration of the minimum length and diploma of service set for access to the immediately higher rank.
In recognition of the sacrifice made, the Soldier who died in operation, on active duty or the wounded Soldier proposed for final reform is promoted, exceptionally or posthumously, to the immediately higher rank and may benefit, in addition to this promotion, from an honorary distinction.[5]

There is no external control over the appointments of military personnel at middle and senior management level.[1] However, parliament is informed of these appointments.[1][2]

Nominations are generally published and are accessible to the public.[1] However, the criteria and considerations on which these nominations were based remain unavailable.

Although the Military Statute [1] and the Performance Management System in Public Administration (SIGEDAP) [2] guides the process, the appointments do not always apply objective job descriptions and standardised assessment processes [3]. Decisions may be unjustifiable based on objective criteria, or promotion boards may have members from within the chain of command. However, this is not a widespread or common practice [3]. In the case of General Officers, normally, promotion and appointment occurring due to political confinement is made by the President of the Republic, as Commander-in-Chief of the Defence and Security Forces [4].

There is no external scrutiny of the appointments of military personnel at middle and top managemen because the process is based on political trust and military competence [1], where General Officers are promoted/appointed by the President of the Republic, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution of the Republic [2]. According to the Statute of State Agents and Employees in force in Mozambique, in the staffing of public institutions (civil, military and paramilitary) there are positions that must be filled by personnel trusted by those who appoint them [3] (Annex II of Decree No. 64/98, of 3 December) [4]. These positions are filled according to the level of political or technical trust that the decision-maker has in relation to the appointee and the respective salaries were established by Decree No. 64/98, of December 3, revised by Decree No. 54/2009 of September 8, which establishes the principles and rules for the organisation and structuring of the Career and Remuneration System, abbreviated as SCR [5].

According to the General Statute of State Agents and Officials and the Statute of Military Personnel of the Armed Forces of Defence of Mozambique, the system of appointment and selection of military personnel for middle and senior management positions must be objective, transparent and independent, based on the principles of functioning of public administration in Mozambique (equality, proportionality; justice, impartiality, ethics and good faith) [1, 2]. But, in fact, the process is based on political trust and competence [3], where General Officers are promoted/appointed by the President of the Republic, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution of the Republic [4]. In the process of appointment to middle and senior positions, the system is not always transparent, the principle of political trust and other unclear and subjective criteria have dominated such as trust, patrimonialism, militar families or seniority [3].

Before the military coup of July 26, 2023, military appointments in Niger were regulated through formal structures outlined in the legal framework. [1][4] The National Defense Council (Conseil Supérieur de la Défense Nationale) and the National Security Council (Conseil National de Sécurité) (Articles 63–65) acted as advisory bodies to the President, who, as Supreme Head of the Armed Forces, retained the final authority over promotions and appointments. The Superior Council was specifically tasked with advising on high-level military nominations and officer promotions, ensuring some degree of institutional oversight [1]. Following the military takeover, although these structures were weakened or sidelined, they were not formally abolished. Appointments at middle and senior management levels continue to be carried out through a formal system governed by existing regulations [4]. However, in practice promotions and appointments have increasingly been affected by external influences, including political loyalty considerations [2][3]. There is also a lack of transparent selection criteria, and decisions are often opaque and the civil service does not participate in military appointments, leaving the process entirely internal to military and political leadership. Thus, while a formal appointment system exists on paper, its application has been compromised by political interference and lack of transparency.

Before the military coup of July 26, 2023, the National Assembly did not provide external scrutiny over military appointments at middle and top management levels [1][2]. While the National Defense Council (Conseil Supérieur de la Défense Nationale) and the National Security Council (Conseil National de Sécurité) advised the President on high-level military nominations and promotions, their role was purely consultative, and no parliamentary oversight mechanism existed to independently review or challenge these decisions. With the dissolution of the National Assembly following the military coup, any remaining possibility for institutional oversight was completely eliminated. Appointments are now made exclusively by the military leadership, without any external review or accountability mechanisms.

While the formal process for military appointments remains opaque, some information on promotions and appointments does become available through informal channels. This information is often fragmented, inconsistent, and reliant on rumors, making it difficult to establish a clear understanding of the actual selection criteria. Personal connections within the military play a significant role in promotions, which is further reinforced by the extended family structures and social networks prevalent in Niger [1]. Despite the lack of transparency regarding the appointment process itself, the results of military promotions and nominations are regularly made public [2][3]. These announcements are broadcasted through state media and other news outlets, ensuring that the outcomes of these decisions are known to the public, even if the rationale behind them remains unclear. Some information on military appointments is available through informal channels, and the results of nominations are publicly disseminated, but the process itself remains unclear.

The 1999 Constitution (as amended) Section 218 and Section 18 (1) of the Armed Forces Act (2004) empowers the President to appoint all heads of the armed forces, with the Constitution giving the Senate confirmatory powers. Although the President in his appointment of service chiefs, is expected to reflect the Federal Character Principle, notwithstanding, going by the history of service chiefs’ appointments in Nigeria, political and ethnic contemplations gain significance. For instance, severe criticisms trailed the decision of former President Buhari to appoint Major General Farouk Yahaya (North-West) as the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) instead of the most senior Army officer, Major General Ben Ahanotu, from the Southeast [1]. Regarding other officers other than the Service chiefs, there are promotion councils for each arm of the service – Army, Air Force and Navy. These are made up of senior members of the Armed Forces. Officers are appointed to a commission on the recommendation of a Board of Officers created by the relevant Service Chief. Promotion is subject to success in promotional examination and subsequent approval of the various councils of the respective arms of the Nigerian military [2]. Although it is claimed that promotions are based on open competitive examinations, but appointments are made based on political or ethnic considerations.

Given the powers vested on the National Assembly to legislate on defence matters in the country, the legislature establishes committees to carry its oversight function of the defence and security sector. Both the House of Representatives and the Senate have their respective committees on defence, Army, Airforce and Navy [1, 2]. Any matter relating to appointment in which a personnel member feels unjustly treated, may resort in petitioning the concerned committee of the NASS. Although the National Assembly has a residual power to vet and confirm appointments, this does not constitute an effective check and balance on the exercise of the executive power to appoint [1]. Appointment of high-profile position in the military, particularly Service Chiefs, is the exclusive reserved of the executive. However, their appointment is subject to the confirmation by the NASS [3].

Given that the appointment of service chiefs is the prerogative of the President, considerations that informed the selection of the final candidate is usually opaque, thereby leading to allegations that primordial and ethnic sentiments take precedence over objective criteria in the process [1]. The aftermath of the successive Nigerian presidents’ choices of service chiefs which subsequently lead to the compulsory retirement of senior generals have continued to raise public concerns. President Tinubu’s recent appointment of service chiefs, reportedly led to the exit of over 100 Generals, air vice marshals, and admirals [2].
Beyond the selection of service chiefs, opacity extends to other critical military personnel processes, including recruitment and international deployments. In 2014, CISLAC, through a widely circulated publication, exposed various secrecy issues in the recruitment process and the selection of peacekeepers within the Nigerian Army. The report highlighted concerns over the lack of clear vetting mechanisms and the potential for favoritism, which could undermine Nigeria’s contributions to UN peacekeeping missions [3].

The Senior Defence Official is responsible for preparing and coordinating measures within the Ministry, under the authority of the Minister, to ensure optimum security and continuity of the State in the event of a crisis, serious event, emergency or war. According to Decree 2023 – 450 of 6 March 2023 setting out the profile and duties of the senior defence official, he or she is chosen according to the following criteria: be a civilian civil servant in the A hierarchy or a colonel-level military officer with at least three [3] years’ seniority, active or retired; have held a strategic position in the field of defence and security for at least fifteen (15) years or have held senior management, supervisory or advisory positions in the public administration; have the necessary predispositions for the job; [1] . In Senegal, there is an independent, transparent and objective method for selecting military personnel at middle and senior management level, and this applies to everyone. [2] . The system for appointing military personnel to middle and senior management positions applies objective job descriptions and standardised appraisal processes, but promotion boards are open and representatives from other branches of the armed forces and the civil service are also represented. [3] [4]

General appointments in Senegal are subject to external review. The latter chooses according to criteria from among the colonels who meet the conditions for appointment. However, Parliament is not involved in decisions relating to very high-level appointments in the army. [1] . The Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces is assisted by a general or senior officer with the title of Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces appointed by presidential decree. The Army Staff is headed by a general or senior officer chosen from among those belonging to the Army and appointed by decree. The Army Staff is headed by a general or superior officer, chosen from among those belonging to the Army and also appointed by decree. The Maritime Staff is headed by a general or superior officer chosen from among those belonging to the Maritime Army and appointed by decree. [2] The President of the Republic, who embodies executive power, is the supreme commander of the armed forces and it is he who has appointed two members of the military to the posts of Minister of Defence and Minister of the Interior. Some members of the military are also appointed ambassadors by the executive branch by presidential decree. [5] [2]

The President of the Republic, who embodies executive power, is the supreme commander of the armed forces and it is he who has appointed two members of the military to the posts of Minister of Defence and Minister of the Interior. Some members of the military are also appointed ambassadors by the executive branch by presidential decree. [3]

Some information on the appointment process is publicly available and includes the selection criteria for each rank. [1] In addition to material resources, President Macky Sall has always worked to strengthen the human resources of the military institution. His latest appointments before his departure and the promotions within the Army are in line with this strengthening, which is necessary for any army that wants to perform well [2] .

A 2022 review of senior management appointments found significant deficiencies in the appointment processes for senior military officials indicating that “Qualifications, experience and seniority are not considered when staffing, placement and promotions are implemented.” [1] This aligns with similar findings by the Public Service Commission showing frequent irregularities in the appointment of senior officials in the public sector. [2]

The Defence Force Service Commission established under Section 62 of the Defence Amendment Act of 2010 is mandated to set the conditions of service for the defence sector, make recommendations to the Minister of Defence, and monitor the implementation of policy related to personnel practices. [1] In practice, the Commission is under-funded, under-staffed and lacks the legally required number of commissioners undermining its ability to provide oversight of employment practices in the defence sector. [2] While parliamentary committees are empowered to scrutinise senior appointments, this does not happen in practice and appointments are not reported to Parliament.

Information on appointment processes and selection criteria are not publicly available including in the Defence Act and associated regulations. [1]

The SPLA Act of 2009 prescribes the criteria of appointment for both middle and top uniformed and civilian management. For example, Section 18 (12) on the Functions, Powers and Duties of the Chief of General Staff provides that the appointment of branch directors, are recommended to the Commander -in-Chief, by the Chief of General Staff and appointed in consultation with the Minister. [2] Section 32 (2) also provides the criteria for the appointment of civilian staff. [3]. Other positions including promotions are not spelt out in public and in the recent years the peace agreements have called for the inclusion of opposition fighters into the Army making the process more political than formal. [4]

Although the SPLA Act of 2009 [1] outlines a formal process for the appointment of middle and top management in the military, there is no evidence that these appointments are thoroughly scrutinized. For example, in the recent integration of opposition fighters into the military, [2] no public information is available to confirm whether those absorbed into middle and top management were appointed in accordance with the 2009 Act. Furthermore, a review of the activities of the Committee on Defence and Veterans Affairs did not reveal any discussions related to the military shake-up. [3] Under the R-ARCSS framework specifically, this has been challenging to implement. The individual parties have the prerogative of selecting and nominating their officers for appointment in the ranks and file of the organised forces.

Appointments made for middle and top military officials is often made through presidential decrees which are made public through mainstream media [1] [2]. The criteria for such appointment is not made public at the time making it difficult to establish the level of transparency.

While the UPDF has established a structured promotion system with clearly defined criteria and legal frameworks, the practical application of these processes does not always adhere strictly to objective job descriptions and standardised assessment procedures. The promotion boards, tasked with selecting personnel for middle and top management levels based on merit, may sometimes make decisions that appear unjustifiable when assessed against purely objective criteria. Furthermore, the composition of promotion boards, often including members from within the chain of command, raises concerns about potential bias and the lack of independent oversight. [1]
However, it is important to acknowledge that deviations from objective standards are not considered widespread or common practice within the UPDF. The established promotion criteria and legal provisions serve as a strong foundation for merit-based advancement. The instances where subjective factors influence decisions should be viewed as exceptions rather than the norm [2]. The UPDF’s commitment to building a capable leadership cadre through structured promotion processes remains a core principle. Nevertheless, addressing the potential for subjective bias and enhancing transparency in promotion decisions are crucial for maintaining the integrity and credibility within the UPDF. Strengthening independent oversight mechanisms and ensuring consistent application of objective assessment tools would further reinforce the merit-based culture within the military [2].

The UPDF Act sets clear provisions for promotions in the army. The UPDF Act does not provide any provisions for external scrutiny. All the appointments in the army are conducted and confirmed by the army leadership. Unlike other security organs like police and prisons, the appointed army officers are not subject to parliamentary approvals. The commander-in-chief can decide when and who to appoint, and to what rank and position. [1,2,3]

The Uganda Peoples’ Defence Forces (UPDF) outlines its promotion and appointment procedures within the Uganda Peoples’ Defence Forces Act, 2005. Sections 55 to 64 of this Act detail the criteria and processes for promotions, encompassing factors such as length of service, training, examination results, and confidential reports from commanding officers. The Act specifies that promotions for officers require the signature of the President or an authorized representative, while promotions for militants necessitate the signature of the Chief of Defence Forces or an authorised individual [1].
However, public access to these detailed promotion and appointment procedures is limited. The official UPDF website provides general information about the force but lacks specific content regarding promotion criteria or processes. Similarly, the Ministry of Defence and Veteran Affairs website offers insights into the UPDF’s mission and structure but does not elaborate on internal promotion mechanisms. For example, the promotion of Muhoozi Kainerugaba to military chief sparked a concern from the opposition lawmaker Ibrahim Ssemujju Nganda that President Museveni was treating Uganda as a personal family enterprise. He condemned the appointment and said Ugandans needed to oppose the family dynasty. Retired senior army officers have described promotions within the army as lacking in transparency and tinged with ethnic consideration [2][3].
While the UPDF Act establishes a framework for promotions, the absence of publicly accessible, detailed information on the implementation of these processes raises concerns about transparency. This lack of accessible information makes it challenging to assess the objectivity and fairness of promotions within the UPDF.

The appointment of commanders of the defence forces is determined by the Constitution of Zimbabwe [1]. The President has the authority to appoint the Commander of the Defence Forces, the Commander of the Army, and the Commander of the Air Force, in consultation with the Minister of Defence [2]. These high-level appointments are further governed by the Defence Act [3], which also outlines the framework for the promotion of other ranks.
In practice, the promotion of middle and junior officers is initiated at the battalion and brigade level. Commanding officers at these levels identify and recommend individuals for promotion based on service performance, time in rank, and operational needs. These recommendations are then submitted to Army Headquarters (HQ) for ratification, ensuring that promotions are aligned with broader military requirements and formal approval processes [3] [4].
While the legal framework provides the structure for promotions, the actual practice reflects a bottom-up system for lower ranks, combined with a centralised validation process through the Army HQ. This helps maintain some consistency, although the final decisions for senior appointments remain highly centralised under presidential authority [1][2].

There is no scrutiny during and after the appointment of commanders of the military because section 216 (3) of constitution of Zimbabwe and section 7 (1) and (2) of the defence act provides only the president to appoint with the consultation with the Minister of Defence [1,2]. Parliament is not involved and cannot challenge and or discuss the appointment of commanders in the military [1]. The Defence Act allows the president to make such appointments [3].

There is no transparency especially on how the process of promotion and or appointment is done, only the president makes such appointments as per section 216 (3) of constitution of Zimbabwe and section 7 (1) and (2) of the Defence Act [1,2,3]. It is the President’s decision to promote and no one else can question and or seek to engage the president on his/her decision [1].

Country Sort by Country 41a. Formal process Sort By Subindicator 41b. Scrutiny Sort By Subindicator 41c. Transparency Sort By Subindicator
Benin 50 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Burundi 0 / 100 50 / 100 0 / 100
Cameroon 0 / 100 25 / 100 0 / 100
Cote d'Ivoire 75 / 100 0 / 100 50 / 100
Ghana 75 / 100 25 / 100 0 / 100
Kenya 100 / 100 75 / 100 50 / 100
Liberia 75 / 100 25 / 100 25 / 100
Madagascar 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Mali 75 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Mozambique 50 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Niger 25 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Nigeria 25 / 100 50 / 100 0 / 100
Senegal 75 / 100 25 / 100 50 / 100
South Africa 25 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
South Sudan 50 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Uganda 50 / 100 25 / 100 25 / 100
Zimbabwe 25 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100

With thanks for support from the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs who have contributed to the Government Defence Integrity Index.

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