The previous law on the fight against corruption did not mention facilitation payments and the law was repealed in 2020 [1]. Facilitation payment are therefore not criminalised in Benin.

After interviewing military officers and specialists and checking on internet, it has not been possible to find cases of facilitation payments investigated or prosecuted through formal process. [1][2].

It is difficult to find a case of facilitation payments investigated or prosecuted through formal process as the legislation does not mention this. However, without giving details, interviewees stated that this practice occassionally occur in the defence and security sector, but are not widespread. [1][2][3]

Law no. 1/12 of 18 April 2006 on measures to prevent and punish corruption and related offences clearly and strictly prohibits in its article 63 any “offers, promises, gifts, presents or advantages of any kind whatsoever to induce a public official to do or refrain from doing any act in the performance of his official duties. ” . However, the term of facilitation payment is not used. Sanctions include 5 to 10 years of prison and fines.[1]

Cases relating to facilitation payments are often investigated, but no prosecutions are subsequently brought. There are strong influences that prevent such prosecutions from taking place [1] [2].

Facilitation payments are widespread in the Defence and security sector [1]. It often happens that in order to benefit from a particular service within the army, such as participation in a peacekeeping mission, individuals are obliged to pay certain sums to decision-makers .. These are, of course, unofficial and unauthorized payments made to the various human resources managers.. Indeed, participation in peacekeeping missions enables soldiers, whose pay is generally low, to earn more money. As a soldier on a peacekeeping mission receives an average of 600 US dollars a month they don’t hesitate to pay $300 once to earn $600 over several months [1] [2].

In Cameroon, facilitation payments are strictly prohibited by law, including the Penal Code and the 2006 Law on the Fight Against Corruption. These laws criminalize bribery and offer clear definitions and penalties for corrupt practices, including facilitation payments, which are seen as small bribes intended to expedite bureaucratic processes. The Penal Code, as part of the broader legal framework, defines bribery and other forms of corruption, establishing penalties for those found guilty of offering or accepting facilitation payments. [1]

Despite the legal framework that criminalizes facilitation payments, effective measures to discourage such payments remain weak due to inconsistent enforcement and the broader corruption environment. The 2006 Law on the Fight Against Corruption and the Penal Code criminalize bribery, including facilitation payments, with clear penalties for violators. However, the application of these laws is undermined by systemic corruption, limited resources, and a lack of political will, which prevent effective deterrence. Although there have been some prosecutions for corruption, these are infrequent and not solely related to facilitation payments. High-profile cases do not consistently result in significant convictions or deterrence [1] [2]. While these laws exist, enforcement remains inconsistent. The absence of credible and consistent enforcement mechanisms, combined with weak institutions and limited resources for law enforcement, contributes to the persistence of bribery in administrative processes. Interviews with government officials and anti-corruption experts highlight that even when corruption cases are exposed, they often do not lead to systemic change. There is also evidence suggesting undue influence in decision-making processes, as public officials involved in corruption often face lenient penalties or are not prosecuted at all. This creates a culture of impunity, where corruption continues without significant consequences [1] [2].

Facilitation payments are prevalent in Cameroon, particularly in the military and law enforcement sectors. Although there are formal anti-corruption measures, including the 2006 Law on the Fight Against Corruption, these have limited impact due to weak enforcement and systemic corruption. The law is not effectively applied, and there is a lack of accountability for those involved in corruption. The military, for instance, often experiences violations of anti-corruption codes with little to no repercussions due to inefficiency and political reluctance [1] [2]. While the legal framework exists, its application is inconsistent, and the overall capacity to address corruption is constrained by institutional weaknesses and lack of internal controls. Transparency is lacking, and individuals involved in corrupt practices are often protected, allowing a culture of impunity to persist. This environment enables the continued prevalence of facilitation payments as a means to bypass bureaucratic obstacles and expedite procedures [1] [2].

Bribes paid to public officials are prohibited by the French Penal Code and by Order No. 2013-660 of 20 September 2013 on the prevention and punishment of corruption and other offences, although there is no specific mention of facilitation payments [1, 2].

There are a few examples of cases that have been brought to justice [1]. The government has also taken measures to combat this form of corruption [3]. Toll-free numbers have been set up to enable citizens to report acts of corruption committed by law enforcement and security officials, particularly in cases of racketeering on public roads [2].

Facilitation payments are commonplace in the defence and security sector, as the government itself acknowledges. However, measures have been taken to prosecute those who engage in this practice [1, 2]. No reports or official information have been published since then to show whether these practices have decreased since the campaign.

Section 240 of the Criminal Offences Act 1960 (Act 29) specifies that giving or receiving bribes is an offense, and this applies to public officers, including military personnel. (1) The Code of Service Discipline and the Armed Forces Regulations explicitly denounce any form of facilitation by military officers, making facilitation payments illegal. (2) (3)

Formal legal processes have been enforced in cases of facilitation payments among personnel. For instance, a court case is currently underway involving certain members of the armed forces who are being sued for allegedly collecting GHS 136, 000 from a group of individuals with the promise to facilitate their recruitment into the Ghana Armed Forces and other security services. There is no instance or evidence to suggest that there is undue interference in formal legal processes of the GAF. (1) (2) (3) (4)

The security sector is not immune from widespread recruitment scams which, in some cases, involve serving personnel. An instance is a recruitment scam by an officer who was alleged to have collected a sum of GH₵136, 000 from 22 persons with the promise of securing them employment into the security sector. (1) These cases ae usually widespread involving uniformed personnel it is however sometimes difficult to unearth because it becomes a case only when such processes fail then victims may demand justice if not for that such cases may remain in the dark. (2) (3)

The KDF Act 2012 empowers the Defence forces to fulfil their mandate by upholding the Bill of Rights, values, and principles under Articles 10(2), 232(1), and 238(2) of the Constitution [1]. Under its guiding principles, the Defence Forces strive for the highest standards of professionalism and discipline among their members; prevent corruption and promote transparency and accountability; comply with constitutional standards of human rights and fundamental freedoms; train staff to the highest standards of competence and integrity; respect human rights, fundamental freedoms, and dignity; and ensure that recruitment reflects the diversity of the Kenyan people in equitable proportions.
The same law addresses corruption and economic crimes. It states that any person who engages in corruption, malpractices, or any act or omission while on duty for selfish purposes or gains, or causes loss by their dereliction of duty, commits an offence. Upon conviction, they shall be punished as required by the Penal Code (Cap. 63), [2] the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, 2003 (No. 3 of 2003), the law relating to public procurement and disposal of public property, or any other written law. The offence under subsection (1) shall be triable in civil courts [3].

Cases involving the Kenyan military are generally investigated and prosecuted through formal processes. However, the extent of political influence on these processes remains unclear. While some independent commentators express concerns over potential undue political interference, others argue that the military justice system maintains a degree of autonomy [1]. The effectiveness of these formal processes in ensuring accountability within the military has been scrutinised, particularly in high-profile cases [2].
The Ministry of Defence has made efforts to enhance transparency and accountability within the military justice system. These efforts include reforms aimed at strengthening the independence of military courts and improving oversight mechanisms [3]. Nevertheless, the complex relationship between civilian and military authorities in Kenya continues to pose challenges for ensuring fully impartial investigations and prosecutions.
Major Ibrahim Juma Wasike of the Kenya Defence Forces was sentenced to five years and eight months in prison by a Court Martial at Lang’ata Barracks on 20th January 2023 for recruitment malpractices. The Court Martial, led by Principal Magistrate Agnes Wahito, found Major Wasike guilty of two counts: Colluding with Job Lukale Maina to obtain Kshs. 100,000 from Mr. Colley Njeru under the false pretense of recruiting Mr. Kevin Gitonga Munene into the KDF during the February 2021 recruitment; colluding with Job Lukale Maina to obtain Kshs. 60,263 via MPESA from Mr. Colley Njeru under the same false pretense [2].

The effectiveness of measures to discourage facilitation payments in the Kenya Military is a nuanced issue. While facilitation payments are illegal in Kenya, as in most countries, their prevalence in the defence and security sector is not clearly established. Kenya Defence Forces have implemented anti-corruption measures, including anti-corruption messaging in service publications [1]. The U.S. Department of State reports that cases of corruption in the military are generally investigated or prosecuted through formal processes without undue political influence [2, 3]. Despite these efforts, the full extent of facilitation payments and their prevention in the Kenyan military context remains unclear due to limited public information and the sensitive nature of defence operations.

The law is unambiguous about gifts or facilitation payment. The code of conduct for public official prohibits gifts to public official or any other form of pay for play.[1][2] The Code of Conduct forbids gifts/bribes in connection with official duties (Part IX), and the Amended LACC Act (2022), plus the Whistleblower Act (2022) provide investigative powers and protected reporting channels that apply across the public sector, including defence institutions as public bodies.
The Penal Law (Title 26) criminalises classic facilitation conduct in multiple ways: §12.50 (Bribery) and related provisions cover offering, giving, agreeing to give, soliciting, accepting, or agreeing to accept a thing of value for an official act or breach of duty; §12.52 (Unlawful compensation for assistance in government matters) covers paid “help” on matters subject to an official’s decision; and §12.53 (Trading in public office and political endorsement) addresses benefits exchanged for appointment, employment, advancement, or retention.

While some cases related to facilitation payments and corruption have been investigated, including high-profile ones like that of former Defence Minister Brownie Samukai, the evidence suggests political interference and selective prosecution. Samukai, former Minister of Defence, was convicted of embezzling funds, but the timing and handling of his prosecution have raised questions about political motivations. Some commentators argue it was convenient to prosecute him to serve a political purpose rather than as a systemic stance against corruption.[1] In 2020 the Ministry of National Defense publicly warned that no bribes would be accepted for AFL recruitment and threatened action against personnel who solicit payments. However, this is a preventive measure, not proof of sanctions applied.[2].
Recent enforcement against small-payment corruption is documented e.g., the Liberia National Police dismissed/suspended officers over roadside extortion in January 2025, demonstrating that sanctions facilitation-payment are applied.[3]. There is no publicly documented AFL cases (disciplinary or prosecutorial) involving facilitation payments.
Lower-ranking personnel are more frequently prosecuted, while senior or politically connected officials often evade accountability.[4] Therefore, there may be an inconsistent and selective enforcement regarding facilitation of payments.

Prevalence is high across Liberia’s public service. For instance, Afrobarometer and the 2024 Investment Climate Statements: Liberia show widespread exposure to bribe-like, facilitation-type payments in day-to-day services and in winning public contracts.
In March 2020 the Ministry of National Defense publicly warned that no money is required for AFL recruitment, urged the public not to pay, and threatened legal action against anyone soliciting such payments.[1][2][3]. This indicates a recognised risk in recruitment, although it does not quantify prevalence or document subsequent enforcement.

Article 19 of Law No. 2016-020 on the Fight against Corruption clearly indicates that four paragraphs are inserted after Article 175.2 of the Malagasy Penal Code which stipulate that facilitation payments are illegal. [1].

Cases of facilitation payments exist, particularly for entry into military schools. They have been reported by the press, even though they are rare [1]. Other sources of information also provide evidence of other cases, particularly concerning the re-enlistment of people wishing to join active service in the army [2]. The measures taken, including sanctions, do not always succeed in discouraging facilitation payments. Indeed, the military hierarchy does not always initiate prosecutions in the event of flagrant offences or when a case has become public and been brought to the attention of a wide audience [3].

The case of a military man who offered a few thousand euros to join the active service of the army

The Penal Code clearly prohibits facilitation payments, and such a practice is considered illegal because it unduly remunerates a public official for carrying out formalities that should be obtained through normal legal channels. Indeed, Article 108 of the Penal Code provides that Civil servants, their clerks or agents who, with fraudulent intent, order to collect and demand or receive what they know is not due for duties, taxes, contributions, income, wages or salaries will be punished by:
– two to five years imprisonment if the total amount unduly demanded or received or whose collection was ordered was equal to or less than 50,000 FCFA;
– five to ten years imprisonment, if the total amount unduly demanded or received or whose collection ordered was equal to or greater than 50,000 FCFA.
The attempt to commit this offence will be punished as the offence itself.[1]

There is not enough evidence to score this indicator.
In accordance with the law, when the payment of a facility is made, it gives rise, in principle to the imposition of sanctions against the offender. [1] Investigations in this matter are not current and may not go all the way. However, it has not been possible to validate this information using other sources.

There is not enough evidence to score this indicator. No sources on the extent of facilitation payments could be found despite research and requests. [1][2]

Under the Anti-Corruption Law [1], the Public Probity Law [2], the Statute of State Officials and Agents [3] and the Statute of Military Personnel of the Armed Defence Forces of Mozambique [4], facilitation payments are strictly and clearly illegal.

The cases of grand corruption and bribery are investigated or prosecuted through formal proceedings, based on the Disciplinary Regulations of the Armed Forces of Defence of Mozambique [1] and the Law on Military Crimes [2]. The “Dívidas Ocultas” [2] case and the cases of military and civilian personnel of the Ministry of Defence and military units who were convicted of corruption and bribery, resorted to formal proceedings and ordinary courts [3]. However, not all cases are necessarily investigated or prosecuted, for instance, lower-level corruption, such as soldiers demanding bribes or the issue of ghost soldiers, has not led to known legal consequences [4]. Additionally, the case of General Atanásio Salvador M’tumuke, former Minister of National Defence, remains investigated and unprosecuted, despite allegations of his involvement in irregular defence contracts and financial mismanagement during his tenure, and there is no publicly available information indicating that authorities have pursued any formal inquiry into his actions [5].

There are occurrences of payments and facilitation in the Defence and Security Sector, facilitated by the direct adjustment model established by the Regulation for the Contracting of Public Works, Supply of Goods and Provision of Services to the State. This regulation establishes that there is no need for notice, advertising or public tender for the execution of confidential military works, uniforms and their accessories, acquisition, repair and maintenance of military equipment and equipment for the exclusive use of the Armed Forces and Police [1]. Normally, the details of direct awarding are not in the public domain because it is information classified under the legislation on military secrets and state secrets, a fact that contributes to the Armed Forces being considered more honest institutions in studies on governance and corruption in Mozambique until 2017, before the beginning of the insurgency and the increase in military spending on counter-insurgency operations [2, 3]. Scoring 180 countries around the world, Mozambique has a score of 25 this year, with a change of -1 since last year, meaning it ranks 145 out of 180 countries [4]. Thus the Defence Sector is not immune to acts of corruption and bribery.

While neither the 2003 Military Penal Code [1] nor the Public Penal Code [2] explicitly mention facilitation payments (paiement de faveur, paiement de facilitation), the legal framework does provide some general provisions that could encompass such practices. Article 130 of the Public Penal Code criminalizes the solicitation or acceptance of bribes, offering of gifts, or misuse of public office for personal gain. Although the law does not specifically address facilitation payments, these provisions suggest that such payments would fall under broader anti-corruption regulations. Evidence reflects the existence of anti-corruption laws but their insufficient clarity regarding facilitation payments

The absence of an explicit legal provision addressing facilitation payments creates significant ambiguity in enforcement [1][2]. Without a clear legal definition, authorities may struggle to differentiate between facilitation payments and other forms of bribery, leading to inconsistent application of anti-corruption laws. This gap weakens deterrence efforts, as there is no well-defined basis for investigating, prosecuting, or penalizing facilitation payments within the military and defense sector. Furthermore, enforcement mechanisms against corruption in Niger have historically been weak, with limited public records of successful prosecutions. The lack of transparency in the judicial process, combined with the prevailing culture of impunity, further reduces the likelihood that facilitation payments are effectively addressed. A striking illustration of this systemic failure is the 2020 Ministry of Defence corruption scandal, which exposed large-scale embezzlement of public funds within the armed forces. An official audit revealed that between 2014 and 2019 military procurement contracts were falsified, overpriced, or completely undelivered. Senior officials were implicated, including two former defence ministers, prominent businessmen, and a general. Yet, despite the magnitude of the fraud, the case never resulted in full judicial accountability. The case concluded not with a court ruling, but through a confidential transaction, bypassing any meaningful judicial review [3]. This undermines the credibility of governance reforms led by the current military regime and demonstrates how anti-corruption efforts are politically manipulated and selectively applied.

Assessing the precise extent of facilitation payments in Niger remains challenging due to the lack of comprehensive data and the opaque nature of such transactions. However, existing research and anecdotal evidence suggest that the practice is widespread, particularly in sectors where officials interact frequently with the public. The police, for instance, have been identified as especially vulnerable to this phenomenon, as officers often solicit small bribes in exchange for expediting administrative processes or overlooking minor infractions [1]. Beyond law enforcement, facilitation payments are commonly reported in various government services, including customs, licensing, and procurement, where delays and bureaucratic inefficiencies create opportunities for officials to demand informal payments. Paying an official to smoothen an administrative procedure has become an entrenched practice, reflecting both systemic inefficiencies and the normalization of informal exchanges in governance structures. Moreover, the historical and cultural dimensions of facilitation “gifts” play a significant role in perpetuating the practice. Researchers studying corruption in Niger have noted that traditional gift-giving customs often blur the line between legitimate social practices and corrupt transactions [2]. In this context, facilitation payments may not always be perceived as outright bribery but rather as an informal means of navigating bureaucratic processes. Given the widespread nature of facilitation payments and the challenges in distinguishing them from traditional exchanges, the issue remains deeply ingrained in the country’s governance system. The absence of strong enforcement mechanisms further exacerbates the problem, allowing the practice to persist across multiple sectors

There are laws prohibiting public officers from taking bribes in Nigeria, including the Criminal Code, the Fifth Schedule, Part 1 of the Nigerian Constitution (as amended), and Section 5 of the Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal Act, 2004 [1]. More importantly, facilitation payments, are not permissible under Nigerian law [2]. Although there is no specific provision dealing with facilitation payments, the scope of the Criminal Code Section 98 and the ICPC Act are sufficiently wide to cover facilitation payments. The law states that payments to any person for corrupt purposes, whether directly or indirectly through third parties, are prohibited by law. Section 18 of the ICPC Act 2000 provides that any person who offers to any public official or being a public official solicits counsels or accepts any gratification as an inducement or reward is guilty of an offence and shall on conviction be liable to five years imprisonment [3].

It is important to note that the ICPC and EFCC have been actively working to strengthen their investigative and prosecutorial capacities. They have undertaken various initiatives to raise awareness about the dangers of corruption, including facilitation payments, and to encourage reporting of such incidents to enable appropriate prosecution of those found guilty [1,2]. However, there is no known case of investigation or successful prosecution of breaches regarding facilitation payment in Nigeria [3]. Lack of any single conviction is partly due to the limitations anti-corruption agencies face in obtaining convictions against high-profile public officials allegedly involved in defence procurement fraud [4]. Hamza Abdullahi, a witness of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), has narrated how N4.6 billion from the arms deal was traced to the son of Attahiru Bafarawa, a former governor of Sokoto.

Accepting or giving gifts as well as facilitation payments are illegal in Nigeria, and individuals can be penalised with up to 7 years’ imprisonment. Despite its prohibition, enforcement by anti-corruption agencies remains weak [1]. In practice, giving gifts, bribery and facilitation payments are unlawful practices that firms and business people have used to gain inroad or advantage in defence procurement process in Nigeria [2]. During an investigation in 2020 by the EFCC of a case of arms’ procurement fraud totalling N35bn at the Ministry of Defence, a suspect, Donald Peterson, who is the Managing Director of Richfield Technologies Limited, one of the companies awarded contracts by the ministry, disclosed that he paid money to some government officials for the contracts awarded. Among them is Chief Mike Oghiadomhe, who he paid via cheques of N100,000,000 for the N1.02m communication contract. He also paid the sum of $240,000 cash to Mike Oghiadomhe junior for his father and a former Minister of Defence, Adetokunbo Kayode, for facilitating the contracts [3]. Given the opacity of procurement contract in the defence sector, it is difficult to assess the extent of prevalence of this illicit practice.

Facilitation payments are not legal in Senegal because they are prohibited by: the Senegal Civil & Commercial Obligations Code the 2003, the United Nations Convention against Corruption, known as the Merida Convention, to which Senegal is a signatory, In accordance with article 68 [1] of resolution 58/4, the United Nations Convention against Corruption entered into force on 14 December 2005. [1]
Under articles 156, 157 and 157 of the Senegalese Penal Code, it is strictly forbidden for public officials to solicit or demand gifts, presents, funds or payment with a view to facilitating or accomplishing, or refraining from accomplishing, a task relating to their duties. This prohibition applies to all civil servants or public officers, all collectors of duties, contributions or public funds, their clerks or agents. Violation of these provisions will result in imprisonment of between two [2] and ten (10) years for the accused and imprisonment of between one [1] and five [5] years for their clerks or agents; a fine of between 250,000 and 500,000 francs will always be imposed, in accordance with article 156. [2]

There is not enough information to score this indicator. No information is available on law enforcement in cases of faciliation payments.[1][2]

Facilitation payments in the defence and security sector are very rare because there is no know case for now [1] [2] . However, General Moussa Fall, commander of the territorial gendarmerie, issued a call to order to his troops. In an internal memo, he denounced the existence of ‘funds opened in the name of the unit without any legal basis.’ These are bribes collected by gendarmes in charge of road checks, paid by certain motorists to avoid a hefty fine. ‘A racket organised by brigade commanders and their deputies,’ the memo points out. The document mentions three funds, uncovered within three different brigades, which can amount to up to 200,000 CFA francs (just over £160) per week. [3]

The Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act is comprehensive in its definition of illicit gratifications and criminalises offering, receiving, or soliciting gratifications that amounts to an abuse of a position of authority. [1] This includes giving or receiving money, gifts in various forms, the avoidance of loss or penalties, any right or privilege, honours and employment opportunities among others.

Though corruption cases are investigated (e.g., by the Military Police or SIU), enforcement against facilitation payments specifically is rare. A 2022 presentation from the SANDF Provost Marshal General indicated that only one case had led to successful prosecution over the prior five years, and it did not involve facilitation payments but rather high-level corrupt procurement. [1] The failure to prosecute former President Jacob Zuma in relation to the infamous “Arms Deal” likewise shows a lack of effective enforcement as widely acknowledged by independent commentators. [2] Likewise, civil society organisations have expressed disappointment in the slow pace of prosecutions related to state capture under former President Zuma. [3]

While the Department of Defence has faced significant corruption cases (amounting to over R2 billion in 2022), these largely involve procurement and large fraud schemes, not facilitation or petty bribery. [1] There is no documented evidence of a routine culture of small facilitation payments, for example, payments for service or personnel processing, in the defence sector.

Larger corruption cases are handled through formal investigations by the Military Police or the Anti-Corruption Unit and reported to Parliament [2]. The absence of public reporting on facilitation payments, combined with the focus on larger-scale cases, suggests that facilitation payments are rare or locally isolated, but not systemic.

The SPLM Act of 2009 clearly discourages any involvement in facilitation payments. Specifically, Section 73 (c) on Nepotism and Corrupt Practices states that, “receives or retains any property in respect of which an offence under paragraph (a) has been committed, knowingly or having reason to believe the same to have been misappropriated or converted.” Section 73 (a) talks about Any SPLA personnel who: promotes, recruits, employs or rewards any person on grounds of personal relationship. [1]

Information regarding the prosecution of defence ministry officers for corruption remains largely unavailable to the public. While local and regional media often report on officers being implicated or even dismissed for corrupt activities, the details of their prosecution processes have not been disclosed [1], [2]. According to Gan Integrity, enforcement laws against corrupt offences in South Sudan is low and this could cover the issue of facilitation payments. [3]

Information regarding the prosecution of defence ministry officers for corruption remains largely unavailable to the public. While local and regional media often report on officers being implicated or even dismissed for corrupt activities, the details of their prosecution processes have not been disclosed. [1] [2]. According to Gan Integrity, although gifts are prohibited under South Sudan’s laws, minimal enforcement results in gifts and facilitation payments being widespread. [3]

Section 176 (b) of the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF) Act 2005 states that a person who is subject to military law who improperly demands or accepts compensation, consideration or personal advantage in respect of the performance of any military duty or respect of any matter relating to the Defence Forces commits an offence and is, on conviction, liable to imprisonment not exceeding seven years. [1]

The UPDF court martial serves as the primary judicial body for these cases, imposing penalties that range from imprisonment to dismissal[1]. Within the UPDF, enforcement of corruption, including what might constitute a facilitation payment, is managed through formal investigations and prosecutions, primarily via the General Court Martial (GCM).
A recent case involved the arrest of a man in Kabale for attempting to bribe his way into the UPDF during a recruitment exercise, offering 1 million UGX to facilitate entry [2]. Similarly, eight individuals were arrested over forgery and bribery in UPDF recruitment, underscoring the military’s intolerance of corrupt shortcuts even in entry processes [4].

However, the jurisdiction of the military court system has been subject to scrutiny. A landmark ruling by Uganda’s Supreme Court in 2025 declared military trials of civilians unconstitutional, a decision widely regarded as a victory for human rights and due process. Despite that ruling, parliament passed the UPDF (Amendment) Bill 2025 on May 20, authorizing military courts to try civilians under specified conditions—e.g., accompanying military units or possessing firearms [5] [6]
While this ruling does not affect UPDF personnel directly, it raises broader concerns about military judicial oversight and whether alternative accountability mechanisms should be considered for certain cases, particularly those involving mixed civilian-military interactions. The UPDF legal department maintains that cases are handled through formal judicial processes without undue political influence, but continued scrutiny by human rights organizations and legal experts underscores the need for ongoing oversight to ensure military judicial processes align with constitutional and human rights standards.[3]

The prevalence of facilitation payments in the UPDF is difficult to quantify due to the secretive nature of such transactions [1][4]. The UPDF also tries to fight corruption in its own enterprises. For example, it is written on the website of the National Enterprise Corporation (NEC) that the institution maintains a strict Zero Tolerance Policy on all acts of bribery and corruption. Please be cautioned that facilitation payment and requests are illegal, and strictly prohibited on our premises[3]. There are ways to complain via Phone No: 0782 484 885 and Email: nec@nec.go.ug. However, corruption, including facilitation payments is a significant challenge in UPDF affecting its effectiveness and integrity. President Museveni who is the Commander-in-Chief accused the UPDF of engaging in corruption. [1] [3]

Zimbabwe’s statutory provisions against corruption—including bribery and facilitation payments—are primarily contained in the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act and the Anti-Corruption Commission Act. These laws apply to public officials generally, which would include military personnel when acting in official capacities, though there is no explicit defence-sector legislation addressing such offences.
For example, several Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission (ZACC) convictions, including a senior CIO officer sentenced for extortion, demonstrate that bribery facilitation is criminalised and enforced among government officials, including security personnel [3]. However, because the Defence Act itself lacks provisions specifically criminalising facilitation payments or stipulating sanctions for military officials that abuse their assignment authority [4], the strength of enforcement is weaker within the defence branch.

Some cases are investigated, and succesfully prosecuted. However, this is not consistent , especially in the defence sector. For instance, a senior CIO officer sentenced for extortion, demonstrate that bribery facilitation is criminalised and enforced among government officials, including security personnel [3]. However, because the Defence Act itself lacks provisions specifically criminalising facilitation payments or stipulating sanctions for military officials that abuse their assignment authority [4], the strength of enforcement is weaker within the defence branch.

Facilitation payments occur very often, especially at the beginning of the year when tenders to supply army food are done [1]. Some of these are politically connected [1,2]. It is a network of corruption which ties with the political system [1]. These fees may facilitate procurement and tender for the supply of army food rations, clothing [1,2].