Political Risk:
Very High
Score:
22/100
Defence and Security Policy and Policy Transparency
Q1
8/100
Is there formal provision for effective and independent legislative scrutiny of defence policy?
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According to the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) the National People’s Congress (NPC) supervises the Central Military Commission (CMC). The CMC…
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The Chinese President and Premier present the broad goals of China’s Defence Policy in work reports to the NPC’s annual sessions and to Party…
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Although the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) role in military issues has increased alongside the professionalisation of China’s armed forces, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)…
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Q2
0/100
Does the country have an identifiable and effective parliamentary defence and security committee (or similar such organisations) to exercise oversight?
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The National People’s Congress (NPC) does not have a parliamentary defence and security committee or a similar institution that facilitates parliamentary oversight over national…
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No parliamentary committee or similar institution exists. As such, this indicator is scored ‘Not Applicable’.
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No parliamentary committee or similar institution exists. As such, this indicator is scored ‘Not Applicable’.
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No parliamentary committee or similar institution exists. As such, this indicator is scored ‘Not Applicable’.
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No parliamentary committee or similar institution exists. As such, this indicator is scored ‘Not Applicable’.
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No parliamentary committee or similar institution exists. As such, this indicator is scored ‘Not Applicable’.
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Q3
31/100
Is the country’s national defence policy or national security strategy debated and publicly available?
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There are elements of a public discussion on defence policy taking place in China, but this is rather fragmented and does not involve debate…
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The scope of the debate on national defence in China focuses mainly on key rivals (USA, Japan), internal threats (Xinjiang separatism and terrorism) and…
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The concept of “Consultative Authoritarianism” has been used to describe consultation processes within the Chinese regime involving policymakers from different ministries and organisations, as…
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The CCP publishes information on defence policy through state controlled media and in White Papers (every 3-4 years). The information available is selective and…
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Q4
8/100
Do defence and security institutions have a policy, or evidence, of openness towards civil society organisations (CSOs) when dealing with issues of corruption?
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Overall, although CSOs are allowed to develop public activities around non-politically sensitive areas, they are actively discouraged from operating in the field of corruption.…
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The Chinese government imposes considerable restrictions on the registration and operation of both domestic and international Civil Society Organisations. The Charity Law and the…
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There are no autonomous CSOs in China working in the field of corruption so there is no practice of openness towards them. Efforts to…
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Q5
25/100
Has the country signed up to the following international anti-corruption instruments: UNCAC and the OECD Convention?
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China is the 5th largest defence supplier in the world [3] but has not signed the OECD convention. [2] China has ratified the UNCAC…
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This indicator has been marked Not Applicable because China is a significant exporter of defence materials and has not signed the OECD Convention. Given…
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Q6
50/100
Is there evidence of regular, active public debate on issues of defence? If yes, does the government participate in this debate?
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There is regular debate on issues of defence outside the government and the military establishment, involving researchers and think tanks, journalists and the public…
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The Chinese Ministry of Defence holds regular press conferences and publishes White papers to communicate its position on varous issues of defence. [1,2] The…
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Q7
63/100
Does the country have an openly stated and effectively implemented anti-corruption policy for the defence sector?
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After Xi Jinping’s rise to power in 2012, the CCP launched an extensive anti-corruption crackdown in the government and the military. In the last…
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There is no public information on how the policy is translated into a concrete action plan by the MoD, although internal guidelines most definitely…
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Q8
50/100
Are there independent, well-resourced, and effective institutions within defence and security tasked with building integrity and countering corruption?
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Anticorruption in China has a different rationale and institutional design than in the West. China’s anticorruption is not based on the rule of law…
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Discipline Inspection Commissions in the Army are under the political control of the Party. This is not a failure in the system but the…
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Measuring effectiveness when the political influence on anticorruption efforts is strong and institutionalised is difficult. There is clear evidence of specialisation of Discipline Inspection…
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Q9
NS/100
Does the public trust the institutions of defence and security to tackle the issue of bribery and corruption in their establishments?
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This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. Accurate information on Chinese public opinion is difficult to obtain due to censorship and…
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Q10
0/100
Are there regular assessments of the areas of greatest corruption risk for ministry and armed forces personnel, and are the findings used as inputs to the anti-corruption policy?
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The government and the army have not published information on risk assessments in the defence sector. Since 2016, however, there has been an intensification…
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This indicator has been scored Not Applicable, as there is no evidence that risk assessments are conducted.
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This indicator has been scored Not Applicable, as there is no evidence that risk assessments are conducted.
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Defence Budgets
Q11
25/100
Does the country have a process for acquisition planning that involves clear oversight, and is it publicly available?
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Broadly, acquisitions planning follows the national security priorities as analysed in White Papers that are periodically published. Acquisitions decisions are made by the Central…
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Transparency in the decision making process is limited but there are two sources of information evaluating acquisition planning: 1) the White Papers published by…
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The acquisition planning process is controlled by the CMC, with no external oversight. The NPC does not have any formal role in approving the…
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Q12
38/100
Is the defence budget transparent, showing key items of expenditure? And it is provided to the legislature in a timely fashion?
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Although China publishes its defence budget on an annual basis, this contains basic and highly aggregated figures, especially in relation to foreign acquisitions, military…
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There is no publicly available information as to how long in advance the NPC receives the annual defence budget, but it is ratified in…
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Q13
0/100
Is there a legislative committee (or other appropriate body) responsible for defence budget scrutiny and analysis in an effective way?
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Q14
8/100
Is the approved defence budget made publicly available? In practice, can citizens, civil society, and the media obtain detailed information on the defence budget?
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The defence budget is not proactively published. It becomes available to the public once officially approved by China’s rubber-stamp parliament, the National People’s Congress.…
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The Ministry of Defence announces China’s defence budget, which is then further circulated on Chinese media, but this budget only contains the total amount…
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It is not possible for citizens, civil society or the media to obtain information on the military budget other than that provided by the…
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Q15
17/100
Are sources of defence income other than from central government allocation (from equipment sales or property disposal, for example) published and scrutinised?
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The government and the army publish only the centrally allocated defence budget. There is no transparency regarding the army’s alternative sources of income from…
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At the central level, all sources of income are scrutinized internally by the PLA’s Audit Office under the Central Military Commission (中央军委审计署). [1,2] There…
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There is no scrutiny of the military’s budget and sources of income, as most army-related affairs are considered politically sensitive areas. Chinese media report…
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Q16
42/100
Is there an effective internal audit process for defence ministry expenditure (that is, for example, transparent, conducted by appropriately skilled individuals, and subject to parliamentary oversight)?
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The Central Military Commission has a specialised division for internal audits, the CMC Audit Office（军委审计署）. In the last 7 years, high-profile cases of corruption…
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This indicator is marked Not Applicable, as there is no oversight of the internal audit function.
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There is no external scrutiny of the internal audit function.
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Information on institutional outcomes is not scrutinised so this evaluation depends on the numbers provided by the PLA. In the most recent version of…
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Q17
0/100
Is there effective and transparent external auditing of military defence expenditure?
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There is no external auditing of defence expenditure. The body in charge of audits is the Audit Office of the Central Military Commission. [1]…
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This indicator is scored ‘Not Applicable’ as there is no external auditing of defence expenditure.
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This indicator is scored ‘Not Applicable’ as there is no external auditing of defence expenditure.
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This indicator is scored ‘Not Applicable’ as there is no external auditing of defence expenditure.
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Nexus of Defence and National Assets
Q18
NEI/100
Is there evidence that the country’s defence institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation and, if so, are these interests publicly stated and subject to scrutiny?
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China’s Military has undergone two major rounds of divestiture, one in the late 1990s and one in the late 2010s. Until the late 1990s,…
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It appears that after two divestitures the PLA has no direct controlling or financial interests related to natural resource exploitation. As noted in the…
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It appears that after two divestitures the PLA has no direct controlling or financial interests related to natural resource exploitation. As noted in the…
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Although there is no evidence that such interests exist currently, there is clear evidence that they existed in the past (for instance in the…
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In China’s authoritarian political system, there is no such thing as independent scrutiny. The CCP has the ability and mechanisms (Central Commission for Discipline…
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Organised Crime
Q19
50/100
Is there evidence, for example through media investigations or prosecution reports, of a penetration of organised crime into the defence and security sector? If no, is there evidence that the government is alert and prepared for this risk?
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Up to the late 1990s, entire PLA units were involved in organised crime-style operations, such as smuggling, drug trafficking and prostitution. [1] Since then,…
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The CCP is aware of the possibility of organised crime penetration, as PLA units in the past have been involved in various illicit activities.…
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Q20
25/100
Is there policing to investigate corruption and organised crime within the defence services and is there evidence of the effectiveness of this policing?
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The Commission for Discipline Inspection (CDI) of the Central Military Commission (CMC) (中央军委纪律检查委员会) is in charge of investigating corruption and wrongdoing in the PLA…
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The system of internal policing is different to the Armed Forces of other countries, as it answers to the Chinese Communist Party. The Commission…
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Cases are investigated and suspects are prosecuted. The 2019 White Paper on China’s Defence provides evidence of the implementation of the anticorruption policing, noting…
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Control of Intelligence Services
Q21
0/100
Are the policies, administration, and budgets of the intelligence services subject to effective and independent oversight?
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Q22
0/100
Are senior positions within the intelligence services filled on the basis of objective selection criteria, and are appointees subject to investigation of their suitability and prior conduct?
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As with all senior political positions in China, the selection criteria are unclear. Studies on personnel management in the Chinese Communist Party note that…
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All senior political appointments including those in the Chinese intelligence apparatus are managed by the nomenklatura system of tthe Chinese Communist Party. Party membership…
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There is no available information regarding vetting processes in China’s intelligence services and, therefore, this indicator is scored ‘Not Enough Information’.
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Export Controls
Q23
50/100
Does the government have a well-scrutinised process for arms export decisions that aligns with Articles 7.1.iv, 11.5, and 15.6 of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)?
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China signed up to the ATT and completed its accession to the ATT in July 2020. [1] Despite having domestic regulations on arms exports,…
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This indicator is scored ‘Not Applicable’ as the treaty only entered into force on 6 July 2020, so it is too early to measure…
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The National People’s Congress does not debate arms exports. This is entirely controlled by the executive with no parliamentary scrutiny whatsoever. (Articles 13-19)
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Lobbying in Defence
China does not have a a framework to regulate lobbying in general and in the defence sector in particular. Lobbying takes place, involving both…
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This indicator is scored ‘Not Applicable’ as China does not have a framework to regulate lobbying.
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This indicator is scored ‘Not Applicable’ as China does not have a framework to regulate lobbying.
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This indicator is scored ‘Not Applicable’ as China does not have a framework to regulate lobbying.
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