Does the country have an openly stated and effectively implemented anti-corruption policy for the defence sector?
7a. Anti-corruption policy
Cote d’Ivoire score: 100/100
There is no anti-corruption policy, or there is one but it explicitly does not apply to the defence sector.
There is an openly stated anti-corruption policy, but it is unclear if it applies to the defence sector or the government is in process of developing one that applies to the defence sector.
There is an openly stated anti-corruption policy that applies to the defence sector.
There is a general anti-corruption policy, but also a lack of an explicit anti-corruption framework for the defence sector. The existing anti-corruption mechanisms apply only nominally to the defence and security establishment.
The National Plan for Good Governance and Anti-Corruption (Plan national pour la bonne gouvernance et la lutte contre la corruption) was established by the Ouattara administration in 2013 as a broad-based anti-corruption plan. In turn, it led to the setting up of the Haute Autorité pour la Bonne Gouvernance (HABG) in 2014. The HABG oversees one of Côte d’Ivoire’s main anti-corruption initiatives: an asset declaration scheme that affects 4,600 senior politicians and managers at state-owned enterprises.
The Anti-Corruption Brigade (Brigade de lutte contre la corruption, BLC), launched in 2012, and the Anti-Racketeering Unit (Unité de Lutte contre le Racket), implemented since 2012, are additional examples of anti-corruption policy that extend to the security sector. The Anti-Racketeering Unit seeks to end bribes extorted by police agents and their higher-ranking officers at roadblocks in isolated areas. Additionally, the government has established reporting mechanisms for citizens to denounce corrupt acts among the police. However, the effectiveness of such mechanisms appears to be questionable (1).
According to the 2018 Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI 2018), anti-corruption has featured prominently in President Ouattara’s agenda. But some of the anti-corruption mechanisms such as HABG lack teeth and cannot effectively sanction corrupt practices, much less in the highly sensitive defence sector where certain former rebel leaders, known as the COMZONES, have accumulated wealth and power in their local bastions (2). Here is an extract from BTI 2018:
“A National Plan on Good Governance and the Fight Against Corruption was launched in 2013 together with a new institution, the High Authority for Good Governance (HABG, operating since 2014). The government had also planned to create a Special Tribunal for the Fight Against Corruption, a plan not implemented yet. The institutions meant to oversee the utilization of public funds (Inspecteur General des Finances, Cour des Comptes) are understaffed and thus not effective in preventing abuse and corruption.”
1. Chêne, M., “Corruption et Lutte contre la corruption en Côte d’Ivoire” (Corruption and the fight against corruption in Côte d’Ivoire). Anti-Corruption Helpdesk, Transparency International, 14 March 2016, p. 8-9,
7b. Effective implementation
Cote d’Ivoire score: 0/100
There is no action plan to implement the policy, nor have any actions been taken.
There is an action plan at the ministry level but it is superficial, and does not address the institutional weaknesses in the system, OR there efforts to implement an action plan at the national level.
There is an action plan at the ministry level that reflects the institutional weaknesses in the system, but no actions have been taken to implement it.
There is an action plan at the ministry level that reflects the institutional weaknesses in the system. While steps have been taken to implement the plan, it is either behind schedule, or implementation is not addressing the priority items in the action plan.
The action plan at the ministry level reflects the institutional weaknesses in the system, and implementation has progressed according to the estimated timeline.
TThe anti-corruption policies and their associated measures have not been effectively implemented. The reasons include institutional weakness, but also the fact that despite a prominent anti-corruption agenda, the defence establishment remains a threat to national reconciliation. Corruption allegations could, therefore, be perceived as politically destabilizing elements.
As part of Côte d’Ivoire’s 2016-2018 first action plan to improve governance and as a result of its participation in the Open Government Partnership (OGP), the government published a partial self-evaluation report in September 2017 to gauge the effective implementation of transparency agreements, including anti-corruption mechanisms (1).
The report revealed that most ministries had been involved in the self-evaluation (Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Justice, Minister of Economy & Finance, Budget Ministry, Ministry of Industry) except for the Ministry of Defense. The report also highlighted the number of transparency initiatives that had been adopted:
-Order No. 2013-660 of September 20, 2013 (Prévention et Lutte Contre la Corruption et les Infractions Assimilées)
-Order No. 2013-661 of September 20, 2013 (Fixant les attributions, la composition, l’organisation et le fonctionnement de la Haute Autorité pour la Bonne Gouvernance)
-Law No. 2013-867 of December 23, 2013 (Accès à l’information d’intérêt public)
-Decree No. 2014-462 of August 6, 2014 (Portant attributions, organisation et fonctionnement de la Commission d’Accès à l’Information d’intérêt Public et aux Documents Publics, CAIDP)
-Decree No. 2014-787 of December 11, 2014 (Portant nomination des membres du Conseil de la Commission d’Accès à l’Information d’intérêt Public et aux Documents Publics, CAIDP)
However, the performance report did not mention Côte d’Ivoire’s implementation action plans to make the anti-corruption and transparency measures in the defence sector effective. The measures had an implementation timetable that concluded on June 30, 2018 (1).
Furthermore, the military court, general security section of police services, the ministry of security and defence and the Military Civil Committee regularly meet to discuss security issues (2).
Furthermore, the anti-racket unit together with gendarmes conducts field operations to detect and prevent corruption. Security forces caught in the act of corruption are tried by the military court, the anti- racket unit is intensifying the fight through social media platforms. Security forces caught in acts of corruption were given a 3 months suspension (3).
1. Partenariat pour un gouvernement ouvert (Open Government Partnership), “Rapport d’Autoévaluation a mi-parcours” (Interim Self-Evaluation Report), Plan d’Actions National 2016-2018 (2016-18 National Action Plan), September 2017,
2. Koaci.com, “Côte d’Ivoire: Un garde du procureur militaire volait les armes des enquêtes pour les revendre” (Côte d’Ivoire: one of the Military Prosecutor’s guards was stealing the arms under investigation for resale), June 2018,
3. Chrésus, J. “Côte d’Ivoire : Une soixantaine de militaires aux arrêts pour «vente de concours” (Some 60 solider arrested for ‘vente de concours’), Koaci.com, 21 October 2018,
Compare scores by country
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|Country||7a. Anti-corruption policy||7b. Effective implementation|
|Albania||75 / 100||25 / 100|
|Algeria||50 / 100||0 / 100|
|Angola||0 / 100||NA|
|Argentina||75 / 100||50 / 100|
|Armenia||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Australia||25 / 100||NA|
|Azerbaijan||50 / 100||25 / 100|
|Bahrain||50 / 100||NA|
|Bangladesh||0 / 100||NA|
|Belgium||50 / 100||0 / 100|
|Bosnia and Herzegovina||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Botswana||0 / 100||NA|
|Brazil||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Burkina Faso||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|Cameroon||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|Canada||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Chile||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|China||75 / 100||50 / 100|
|Colombia||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|Cote d'Ivoire||100 / 100||0 / 100|
|Denmark||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|Egypt||0 / 100||NA|
|Estonia||75 / 100||NA|
|Finland||25 / 100||NA|
|France||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Germany||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Ghana||50 / 100||25 / 100|
|Greece||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Hungary||75 / 100||50 / 100|
|India||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Indonesia||50 / 100||NA|
|Iran||50 / 100||NA|
|Iraq||25 / 100||0 / 100|
|Israel||50 / 100||75 / 100|
|Italy||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Japan||0 / 100||NA|
|Jordan||50 / 100||NEI|
|Kenya||50 / 100||0 / 100|
|Kosovo||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Kuwait||75 / 100||50 / 100|
|Latvia||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Lebanon||50 / 100||NA|
|Lithuania||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Malaysia||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Mali||0 / 100||NA|
|Mexico||75 / 100||25 / 100|
|Montenegro||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|Morocco||25 / 100||NA|
|Myanmar||0 / 100||NA|
|Netherlands||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|New Zealand||75 / 100||NEI|
|Niger||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|Nigeria||50 / 100||25 / 100|
|North Macedonia||75 / 100||75 / 100|
|Norway||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Oman||0 / 100||NA|
|Palestine||0 / 100||NA|
|Philippines||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Poland||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Portugal||0 / 100||NA|
|Qatar||0 / 100||NA|
|Russia||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|Saudi Arabia||25 / 100||0 / 100|
|Serbia||75 / 100||50 / 100|
|Singapore||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|South Africa||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|South Korea||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|South Sudan||50 / 100||0 / 100|
|Spain||50 / 100||25 / 100|
|Sudan||0 / 100||NA|
|Sweden||25 / 100||NA|
|Switzerland||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Taiwan||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Tanzania||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Thailand||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|Tunisia||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Turkey||0 / 100||NA|
|Uganda||50 / 100||0 / 100|
|Ukraine||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|United Arab Emirates||50 / 100||NA|
|United Kingdom||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|United States||25 / 100||NA|
|Venezuela||25 / 100||0 / 100|
|Zimbabwe||100 / 100||NEI|