1
58/100
Is there formal provision for effective and independent legislative scrutiny of defence policy?
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Following a constitutional reform in 2016, revised in 2020, the Parliament is now bicameral. The Ivorian Parliament (with its two chambers) has formal rights…
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Parliament attempts to control Ivorian defence policy, particularly when laws are being adopted. The National Assembly adopted a military programming law in 2016. This…
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The army has very little influence on parliamentary debates and few contacts with parliamentarians. However, the executive can influence Parliament. Indeed, the close ties…
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2
17/100
Does the country have an identifiable and effective parliamentary defence and security committee (or similar such organisations) to exercise oversight?
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There is a special committee on security and defence within both chambers of the Ivorian Parliament [1]. According to the rules of procedure of…
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Some members of the committee, due to their affiliation with the former rebellion, have expertise in the defence sector, but they are in the…
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In practice, the constitutional and regulatory powers granted to Parliament and specialised committees (Security and Defence Committee) are not used, and the committee does…
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In practice, the committee exercises very limited control over defence policy. It plays its role in reviewing and adopting defence policy legislation, but there…
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To date, no long-term investigation by any institution is known. [1] [2]
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No sources report on the implementation by the ministry of the committee’s recommendations. [1] [2]
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3
25/100
Is the country’s national defence policy or national security strategy debated and publicly available?
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Defence policy and security strategy have been the subject of broader debate for the past decade. In 2012, security sector reform (SSR) provided Côte…
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Debate is limited to certain types of issues. Statements by the Ministry of Defence and the Presidency focus mainly on the threats facing the…
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There has been no formal consultation process involving the public in the last five years [1][2].
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Information and documents exist, but in practice their availability is hampered by administrative measures. There are several types of administrative measures. In most cases,…
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4
33/100
Do defence and security institutions have a policy, or evidence, of openness towards civil society organisations (CSOs) when dealing with issues of corruption?
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There is no known official or unofficial policy dedicated to CSOs working in the defence sector. Defence and security management has few links with…
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The situation is ambiguous for CSOs, whose rights are recognised and respected depending on their proximity to the authorities. Some CSOs have access to…
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The beginnings of collaboration between the government and CSOs can be seen in partnerships with organisations such as the Institute for Security Studies (ISS),…
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5
75/100
Has the country signed up to the following international anti-corruption instruments: UNCAC and the OECD Convention?
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6
50/100
Is there evidence of regular, active public debate on issues of defence? If yes, does the government participate in this debate?
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In addition to the government initiative, a debate on security issues has been ongoing for several years between civil society and the government, as…
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For a long time, defence issues were considered too sensitive to be debated “in public”, and any initiative of this kind was perceived as…
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7
50/100
Does the country have an openly stated and effectively implemented anti-corruption policy for the defence sector?
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The HACG has developed a national strategic plan to fight corruption for 2021-2023 [1]. This plan mentions the security services and the gendarmerie as…
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There is a ministerial-level action plan that addresses the institutional weaknesses of the system, but no steps have been taken to implement it [1].…
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8
33/100
Are there independent, well-resourced, and effective institutions within defence and security tasked with building integrity and countering corruption?
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Within the office of the Minister of Defence, there is a specialised unit responsible for monitoring and evaluation, as well as a unit dedicated…
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The specialised units responsible for monitoring and evaluation, major reforms and the Inspectorate General of the Armed Forces are placed under the authority of…
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The effectiveness of these institutions is not supported by concrete results, probably due to their lack of independence from the military hierarchy. No information…
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9
NA/100
Does the public trust the institutions of defence and security to tackle the issue of bribery and corruption in their establishments?
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This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. Since the early 2020s, the authorities have committed to a zero-tolerance policy towards all…
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10
0/100
Are there regular assessments of the areas of greatest corruption risk for ministry and armed forces personnel, and are the findings used as inputs to the anti-corruption policy?
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There is no information to indicate that corruption risk assessments are carried out within the Ministry of Defence [1] [2].
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No risk assessment has been carried out, so this indicator is marked as not applicable. [1] [2]
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No risk assessment has been carried out, so this indicator is marked as not applicable. [1] [2]
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11
0/100
Does the country have a process for acquisition planning that involves clear oversight, and is it publicly available?
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Public procurement in the defence and security sector is excluded from Public Procurement Law 2019-679 of 24 July 2019 on the Public Procurement Code.…
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There is no clear process for planning acquisitions in Côte d’Ivoire, as most public procurement is controlled by the Ministry of Defence. Some information…
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Strictly speaking, there is no independent and systematic external oversight mechanism for the defence procurement planning process in Côte d’Ivoire. No audit court, civil…
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12
75/100
Is the defence budget transparent, showing key items of expenditure? And it is provided to the legislature in a timely fashion?
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The defence budget is detailed in the Finance Act, on pages 11 to 26. It is divided into different categories specifying allocations for general…
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In accordance with Article 112 of the Ivorian Constitution, the government must submit the draft budget to Parliament before the end of the second…
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13
63/100
Is there a legislative committee (or other appropriate body) responsible for defence budget scrutiny and analysis in an effective way?
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Both houses of Parliament have a security and defence committee, which is in principle responsible for the upstream oversight of security and defence issues…
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The defence and security committees, together with the economic and financial affairs committees, analyse the defence budget but do not exercise the oversight powers…
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14
25/100
Is the approved defence budget made publicly available? In practice, can citizens, civil society, and the media obtain detailed information on the defence budget?
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The defence budget is included in the Finance Act, where the various expenditure items are detailed over ten pages per programme. The budget is…
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Most items in the defence budget are published in detail and debates in both chambers are open to the public. Sensitive issues such as…
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In Côte d’Ivoire, Article 9 of Law No. 2013-867 of 23 December 2013 on access to public information provides for significant exceptions for information…
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15
33/100
Are sources of defence income other than from central government allocation (from equipment sales or property disposal, for example) published and scrutinised?
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Article 3 of the Finance Act establishes the origin of budgetary resources. Thus, the resources of the draft state budget consist of: general budget…
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Oversight is exercised by several institutions, including the General State Inspectorate (IGE). The IGE is the supreme body for administrative oversight, audit, inspection and…
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There are no control mechanisms outside the government and administrative sphere. [1] [2].
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16
6/100
Is there an effective internal audit process for defence ministry expenditure (that is, for example, transparent, conducted by appropriately skilled individuals, and subject to parliamentary oversight)?
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Within the Ministry of Defence, there is a General Inspectorate and a General Control of Defence Administration and Finance (CGAFD), whose main task is…
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The CGAFD or IGA may make recommendations to improve the management and performance of the audited services. However, the available sources do not explicitly…
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The CGAFD or the IGA may make recommendations to improve the management and performance of the audited services. However, the available sources do not…
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There is no information indicating that the ministry has taken the recommendations into account, or even that recommendations have been issued by this unit.…
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17
50/100
Is there effective and transparent external auditing of military defence expenditure?
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In Côte d’Ivoire, the Ministry of Defence’s expenditure is subject to external audits carried out by the Court of Auditors, an independent institution responsible…
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The Court of Auditors of Côte d’Ivoire is legally independent from the Ministry of Defence and the executive branch [1]. It has its own…
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There is no documentation attesting to the existence of a specific audit of the Ministry of Defence, but the Court of Auditors conducts budget…
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Some recommendations are taken into account by the government in general, but there is no information indicating that recommendations made on defence spending have…
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18
35/100
Is there evidence that the country’s defence institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation and, if so, are these interests publicly stated and subject to scrutiny?
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The Ivorian Constitution and defence legislation do not contain any clear and explicit prohibition specifically prohibiting defence institutions from holding financial or controlling interests…
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No cases of defence institutions being involved in commercial activities related to the exploitation of the country’s natural resources have been reported in the…
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There may be isolated cases of defence personnel involved in commercial activities related to the exploitation of the country’s natural resources [1]. For example,…
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There is no evidence that these interests are publicly declared, although asset declarations are mandatory for civil servants [1]. This could also be explained…
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There is no evidence that these interests are publicly declared, although asset declarations are mandatory for civil servants [1]. There is therefore no evidence…
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19
63/100
Is there evidence, for example through media investigations or prosecution reports, of a penetration of organised crime into the defence and security sector? If no, is there evidence that the government is alert and prepared for this risk?
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In Côte d’Ivoire, cases of members of the armed forces, more specifically the gendarmerie, have been reported for their involvement in drug trafficking [1]…
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The government has taken the full measure of these criminal activities and the possible collusion of the security forces in the face of such…
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20
50/100
Is there policing to investigate corruption and organised crime within the defence services and is there evidence of the effectiveness of this policing?
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The Anti-Corruption Brigade (BLC), which reports to the Ministry of Justice, is responsible for investigating corruption at the national level, including in public institutions.…
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The BLC’s budget, staffing and tasks are approved by the Ministry of Justice and, ultimately, through the government budget process, over which the executive…
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There is very little evidence of cases that have been investigated and/or prosecuted by these units. Two gendarmes were prosecuted for corruption by the…
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21
0/100
Are the policies, administration, and budgets of the intelligence services subject to effective and independent oversight?
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In Côte d’Ivoire, there is no institution responsible for overseeing the policies, administration and budgets of the intelligence services. Intelligence functions are attached to…
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There is no known institution that oversees the policies, administration and budgets of the intelligence services. No part of Parliament or any committee has…
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22
0/100
Are senior positions within the intelligence services filled on the basis of objective selection criteria, and are appointees subject to investigation of their suitability and prior conduct?
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There is no evidence of objective selection criteria guiding the appointment of senior intelligence service officials. The process remains unknown. For example, the selection…
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The assessment found no specific information on this issue. The selection of intelligence service heads is discretionary. Counter-terrorism has reinforced the discretionary nature of…
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The process remains opaque, as it is left to the discretion of the authorities responsible for appointments. National security and sometimes state security considerations…
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23
100/100
Does the government have a well-scrutinised process for arms export decisions that aligns with Articles 7.1.iv, 11.5, and 15.6 of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)?
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The country signed the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) on 3 June 2013 and ratified it on 26February 2015. [1]
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The government has adopted a strategy for reforming the national security sector based on all dimensions of human security. In accordance with the provisions…
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Côte d’Ivoire is not an arms exporter [1]. This sub-indicator is therefore rated ‘Not applicable’.
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The country does not have a legislative or regulatory framework governing pressure groups, although there is an ordinance regulating CSOs. CSOs include non-political, non-profit,…
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The country has no specific legislation on pressure groups, so this sub-indicator is marked as Not Applicable [1, 2].
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The country has no specific legislation on pressure groups, so this sub-indicator is marked as Not Applicable [1, 2].
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The country has no specific legislation on pressure groups, so this sub-indicator is marked as Not Applicable [1, 2].
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Defence and Security Policy and Policy Transparency
Q1
NA/100
Is there formal provision for effective and independent legislative scrutiny of defence policy?
View Question
Q2
NA/100
Does the country have an identifiable and effective parliamentary defence and security committee (or similar such organisations) to exercise oversight?
View Question
Q3
NA/100
Is the country’s national defence policy or national security strategy debated and publicly available?
View Question
Q4
NA/100
Do defence and security institutions have a policy, or evidence, of openness towards civil society organisations (CSOs) when dealing with issues of corruption?
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Q5
NA/100
Has the country signed up to the following international anti-corruption instruments: UNCAC and the OECD Convention?
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Q6
NA/100
Is there evidence of regular, active public debate on issues of defence? If yes, does the government participate in this debate?
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Q7
NA/100
Does the country have an openly stated and effectively implemented anti-corruption policy for the defence sector?
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Q8
NA/100
Are there independent, well-resourced, and effective institutions within defence and security tasked with building integrity and countering corruption?
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Q9
NA/100
Does the public trust the institutions of defence and security to tackle the issue of bribery and corruption in their establishments?
View Question
Q10
NA/100
Are there regular assessments of the areas of greatest corruption risk for ministry and armed forces personnel, and are the findings used as inputs to the anti-corruption policy?
View QuestionDefence Budgets
Q11
NA/100
Does the country have a process for acquisition planning that involves clear oversight, and is it publicly available?
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Q12
NA/100
Is the defence budget transparent, showing key items of expenditure? And it is provided to the legislature in a timely fashion?
View Question
Q13
NA/100
Is there a legislative committee (or other appropriate body) responsible for defence budget scrutiny and analysis in an effective way?
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Q14
NA/100
Is the approved defence budget made publicly available? In practice, can citizens, civil society, and the media obtain detailed information on the defence budget?
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Q15
NA/100
Are sources of defence income other than from central government allocation (from equipment sales or property disposal, for example) published and scrutinised?
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Q16
NA/100
Is there an effective internal audit process for defence ministry expenditure (that is, for example, transparent, conducted by appropriately skilled individuals, and subject to parliamentary oversight)?
View Question
Q17
NA/100
Is there effective and transparent external auditing of military defence expenditure?
View QuestionNexus of Defence and National Assets
Q18
NA/100
Is there evidence that the country’s defence institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation and, if so, are these interests publicly stated and subject to scrutiny?
View QuestionOrganised Crime
Q19
NA/100
Is there evidence, for example through media investigations or prosecution reports, of a penetration of organised crime into the defence and security sector? If no, is there evidence that the government is alert and prepared for this risk?
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Q20
NA/100
Is there policing to investigate corruption and organised crime within the defence services and is there evidence of the effectiveness of this policing?
View QuestionControl of Intelligence Services
Q21
NA/100
Are the policies, administration, and budgets of the intelligence services subject to effective and independent oversight?
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Q22
NA/100
Are senior positions within the intelligence services filled on the basis of objective selection criteria, and are appointees subject to investigation of their suitability and prior conduct?
View QuestionExport Controls
Q23
NA/100