Is there a legislative committee (or other appropriate body) responsible for defence budget scrutiny and analysis in an effective way?
13a. Formal rights
Cote d’Ivoire score: 50/100
No such legislative committee exists, or it lacks any formal powers over the defence budget.
There is a defence committee with formal rights of scrutiny of the defence budget, but lacks some of the powers listed in score 4.
There is a defence committee with extensive formal rights of scrutiny of the defence budget. The committee has the power to scrutinise any aspect of budget and expenditures. The committee is in a position to require expert witnesses to appear in front of it.
On January 4, 2016, the attending members of the CSD voted unanimously in favour of adopting the current LPM for the period 2016-2020. The NA website reported about CSD approval on its website, with statements by Minister of Defence Paul Koffi Koffi describing the document as an instrument tasked with deeply reforming the defence sector. He added that the LPM had been designed to professionalize the Army by 2020 via reductions in armed services personnel (1). According to Ivorian media, the CSD approved the reduction of armed services personnel from the current level of 41,515 to 40,000 in 2020. The rationalization of military expenditure will affect the Forces Armées de Côte d’Ivoire (FACI), while the number of police agents in the Gendarmerie Nationale will be increased until it reaches a ratio of one police agent per 1,000 inhabitants (2). Minister Koffi Koffi personally defended the objectives of the LPM 2016-2020 in front of the members of the CSD on January 4, 2016, as confirmed by a radio interview with RFI. During the interview, the minister argued in favour of reducing personnel in front of NA members of the Commission, stating that more money would be allocated to investments than to operational costs in the future (3).
At a brown bag lunch co-organized by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung on January 28, 2016, at UNOCI headquarters in Abidjan, CSD Secretary Kouassi Kramo discussed the oversight role of the CSD concerning the adoption and implementation of LPM 2016-2020. Kramo stated that it was the first time that the CSD had managed to participate in the drafting stages of this type of legislation and that the CSD had taken part in the debates of the Conseil National de Sécurité (CNS) (4).
“To introduce the process leading to the adoption of this law, the NA member (Kramo) referred to how legislation is voted in the National Assembly. Once the Office of the National Assembly has received the Military Planning Bill and the President of the National Assembly has forwarded it to the Standing Committee (Committee on Security and Defence, CSD), one of the six standing committees, it is submitted for consideration. At this stage, the minister of defence goes before the CSD to present the law on programming. This presentation enables the CSD to formulate amendments, after which the law is passed in a plenary session. Concerning monitoring, the programming law provides for monitoring mechanisms in Articles 19 and 20. To this end, the Government will have to submit an annual report on the implementation of the said law during the voting of the budget law. Moreover, the oversight function devolved to the National Assembly enables it to set up a periodic consultation framework with the minister of defence (institutional exchanges), to invite the minister to parliamentary questions and to lead field visits. He stressed that the vote of the military programming law is a first in Ivory Coast.”
1. National Assembly of Côte d’Ivoire, “Réforme de l’Armée : La loi de programmation militaire 2016-2020 votée” (Army Reform: The 2016-2020 Military Planning Act passes), 4 January 2016,
2. Djedjed, C. “Défense et sécurité: Les effectifs de l’armée bientôt réduits” (Defence and security: army personnel numbers soon reduced), Linfodrome.com, 5 January 2016.
3. “Côte d’Ivoire: baisse des effectifs au sein de l’armée” (Côte d’Ivoire: reduction of army personnel numbers), RFI, 6 January 2016, http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20160106-cote-ivoire-koffi-koffi-defense-armee-reduction
4. Brown Bag Lunch 31, “Loi de programmation militaire 2016 – 2020: quel rôle pour la Commission de la Sécurité et de la Défense (CSD) de l’Assemblée Nationale de Côte d’Ivoire?” (Military Planning Act 2016-22020: what is the role of the Côte d’Ivoire National Assembly’s Security and Defence Committee (CSD)?). Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 28 January 2016, http://www.fes-cotedivoire.org/pages/thematiques/culture-politique/dialogue-national.php
13b. Influence on decision-making
Cote d’Ivoire score: 50/100
The defence committee has no impact on defence budget decision-making.
The committee reviews the defence budget, but fails to take advantage of its formal powers of scrutiny. It may exercise informal influence over the budget in the case of no formal powers.
The committee reviews the defence budget and attempts to influence budgetary decisions through formal mechanisms, but these attempts are limited.
The committee performs all the functions of score 4, but this may not be in a timely fashion or there may be clear instances where the committee fails to scrutinise effectively aspects of the budget before the start of the fiscal year.
The committee has introduced amendments to the budget and there is evidence that in some instances these have resulted in changes to the budget. The committee engages in mid-year expenditure review and can strike out expenditures before they are incurred.
The Commission de Sécurité et de Défense (CSD) reviewed the LPM 2016-2020, voting unanimously in favour of its adoption on January 4, 2016. Though it is vested with basic formal rights to scrutinize the LPM, it appears that CSD attempts to influence the budgetary decisions are nonetheless subject to outside influence.
At a workshop at Yamoussoukro on 24 May 2017, CSD President Sidiki Konate stated that the soldier mutinies in Bouaké and other Ivorian cities in January 2017 had served to intimidate members of the NA in their attempt to implement the LPM 2016-2020, which foresees a reduction in armed services personnel. The workshop (co-organized by UNDP, the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and USAID) sought to train the members of the CSD to improve their scrutiny of defence-related legislation. The workshop itself indicates that the CSD may have oversight deficits resulting from outside influence (1).
At a brown bag lunch co-organized by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung on January 28, 2016, at UNOCI headquarters in Abidjan, CSD Secretary Kouassi Kramo discussed the oversight role of the CSD concerning the adoption and implementation of LPM 2016-2020. Kramo stated that it was the first time that the CSD had managed to participate in the drafting of this type of legislation and taken part in the legislative debates of the Conseil National de Sécurité (CNS). Again, the fact that a panel talk was organized to discuss the CSD oversight role suggests an external influence on its decision making (2).
1. Koffi, A., “Sidiki Konaté (Président CDS): Les mutineries a répétition nous interpellent tous” (Repeated mutinies challenge us all), L’informateur, 25 May 2017,
2. Brown Bag Lunch 31, “Loi de programmation militaire 2016 – 2020 : quel rôle pour la Commission de la Sécurité et de la Défense (CSD) de l’Assemblée Nationale de Côte d’Ivoire?” (Military Planning Act 2016-22020: what is the role of the Côte d’Ivoire National Assembly’s Security and Defence Committee (CSD)?). Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 28 January 2016, http://www.fes-cotedivoire.org/pages/thematiques/culture-politique/dialogue-national.php
Compare scores by country
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|Country||13a. Formal rights||13b. Influence on decision-making|
|Albania||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|Algeria||0 / 100||NA|
|Angola||25 / 100||0 / 100|
|Argentina||0 / 100||NA|
|Armenia||75 / 100||50 / 100|
|Australia||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Azerbaijan||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Bahrain||0 / 100||NA|
|Bangladesh||25 / 100||0 / 100|
|Belgium||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Bosnia and Herzegovina||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Botswana||50 / 100||0 / 100|
|Brazil||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|Burkina Faso||50 / 100||50 / 100|
|Cameroon||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Canada||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|Chile||50 / 100||50 / 100|
|China||0 / 100||NA|
|Colombia||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|Cote d'Ivoire||50 / 100||50 / 100|
|Denmark||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Egypt||0 / 100||NA|
|Estonia||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Finland||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|France||75 / 100||75 / 100|
|Germany||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Ghana||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|Greece||50 / 100||0 / 100|
|Hungary||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|India||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Indonesia||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Iran||0 / 100||NA|
|Iraq||50 / 100||25 / 100|
|Israel||50 / 100||50 / 100|
|Italy||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Japan||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Jordan||0 / 100||NA|
|Kenya||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Kosovo||50 / 100||0 / 100|
|Kuwait||75 / 100||0 / 100|
|Latvia||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Lebanon||25 / 100||25 / 100|
|Lithuania||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Malaysia||50 / 100||NA|
|Mali||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|Mexico||75 / 100||0 / 100|
|Montenegro||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|Morocco||0 / 100||NA|
|Myanmar||50 / 100||25 / 100|
|Netherlands||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|New Zealand||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Niger||50 / 100||0 / 100|
|Nigeria||50 / 100||50 / 100|
|North Macedonia||50 / 100||50 / 100|
|Norway||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Oman||0 / 100||NA|
|Palestine||0 / 100||NA|
|Philippines||50 / 100||50 / 100|
|Poland||50 / 100||50 / 100|
|Portugal||50 / 100||0 / 100|
|Qatar||0 / 100||NA|
|Russia||100 / 100||0 / 100|
|Saudi Arabia||0 / 100||NA|
|Serbia||100 / 100||0 / 100|
|Singapore||50 / 100||25 / 100|
|South Africa||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|South Korea||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|South Sudan||100 / 100||NEI|
|Spain||75 / 100||50 / 100|
|Sudan||0 / 100||NA|
|Sweden||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Switzerland||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Taiwan||75 / 100||50 / 100|
|Tanzania||50 / 100||50 / 100|
|Thailand||50 / 100||0 / 100|
|Tunisia||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|Turkey||50 / 100||0 / 100|
|Uganda||50 / 100||50 / 100|
|Ukraine||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|United Arab Emirates||0 / 100||NA|
|United Kingdom||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|United States||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Venezuela||0 / 100||NA|
|Zimbabwe||50 / 100||25 / 100|