Are there mechanisms in place to allow companies to complain about perceived malpractice in procurement, and are companies protected from discrimination when they use these mechanisms?
68a. Complaints mechanisms
Cote d’Ivoire score: 100/100
Companies have no opportunity to complain about perceived malpractice in procurement.
In the case of no formal mechanisms, informal communication channels are used by companies to complain about perceived malpractice in procurement.
Formal mechanisms are in place to allow companies to complain about perceived malpractice in procurement. This may include both a court process and an internal complaints mechanism.
Both Decree No. 2009-260 on the functioning of the ANRMP and Decree No. 2009-259 (Code of Public Procurement) provide for complaint mechanisms for bidding companies. As per Decree No. 2009-260 of 6 August 2009 on the organization and operations of the ANRMP (Portant Organisation et Fonctionnement de l’ANRMP), the ANRMP is tasked with settling and following up on disputes that arise in public procurement (Article 3). In addition, there is a specialized unit (cellule) within the ANRMP that is tasked with recourse and sanctions (Cellule Recours et Sanctions, CRS), which could serve as a mechanism for companies to complain about perceived malpractice (Article 12) (1).
Decree No. 2009-259, the Code of Procurement of 06 August 2009 (Portant Code des marchés publics) also provides bidding companies with several methods through which to lodge complaints about a public procurement process (2).
Ultimately, bidding companies also have recourse to the sub-regional OHADA (Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa) if the ANRMP Recourse and Sanctions Unit fails to rule on cases of perceived malpractice. The OHADA regulations allow companies to take the case to a national court of law.
Articles referenced in the above paragraphs from the Code of Public Procurement states:
Article 3: The Regulatory Authority is tasked with public procurement and public service, including: (1)
– settling disputes arising from the award and execution of public contracts and public service delegations which are the subject of actions brought before it by participants in the public procurement procedure;
– following up on decisions on the settlement of disputes in public procurement;
Article 12: The Regulatory Authority is structured in three (3) specialized units: (1)
– the Studies and Policy Definition Unit
– the Recourse and Sanctions Unit
– the Independent Audits Unit
Article 16: The Recourse and Sanctions Unit is tasked with, among others: (1)
– issuing decisions on disputes arising from the awarding, execution, regulation, control and regulation of public contracts and public service agreements under the conditions referred to in Article 167 of the rules of the public markets;
– imposing sanctions for breach of public procurement regulations and public service agreements against candidates, tenderers, recipients or holders of public contracts or public service agreements, in accordance with the terms and conditions laid down in Articles 184 to 186 of the Code des Marches Publics;
– referring any irregularities found in any public procurement procedure or public service agreement to any contracting authority and, where appropriate, inform the competent administrative or judicial institution.
1. “Décret no.2009-260 du 6 août 2009 portant organisation et fonctionnement de l’Autorité Nationale de Régulation des Marchés Publics (ANRMP)” (Decree no.2009-260 of 6th August 2009 on the organisation and operation of the National Procurement Regulatory Authority), 6 August 2009,
2. “Dé́cret no. 2009-259 du 6 août 2009, Portant Code des marchés publics” (Decree no.2009-259 of 6th August 2009, setting out the Code of Public Procurement), 6 August 2009,
68b. Effectiveness and Accessibility
Cote d’Ivoire score: NEI/100
The complaints mechanisms available to companies are costly and inefficient, and are thus rarely used.
The complaints mechanisms available to companies may be inefficient or expensive, but are occasionally used regardless.
The complaints mechanisms available to companies are efficient and reasonably priced, and are regularly used.
This indicator has not been assigned a score due to insufficient information or evidence.
There are recent (2015-2016) cases in which the ANRMP’s Recourse and Sanctions Unit issued rulings concerning perceived malpractice in the procurement process. However, there was no information on how expensive this type of complaint mechanism is for bidding companies. There is recent (2015-2016) evidence on the ANRMP website attesting to the effectiveness of the ANRMP’s Recourse and Sanctions Unit (Cellule Recours et Sanctions, CRS). However, none of the 10 rulings by the ANRMP Unit involved a public tender with the Ministry of Defence. Due to the confidentiality of defence procurement, as per Article 8 of the 2009 Code of Public Procurement, none of the rulings by the CRS on the ANRMP website involves public tenders with the Ministry of Defence (1). For example, Ruling No. 043/2015/ANRMP/CRS of December 29, 2015, illustrates how a bidding company (KINAN) submitted its bid for a public tender set up by a state agency and later accused the contracting agency of irregularities in the procurement process regarding the supply and installation of furniture, computer equipment, office equipment and various equipment for a professional training centre (Lycée Odienné Professional). Details of the ruling can be downloaded as a pdf on the ANRMP website, along with 9 other rulings (2). Given the recent cases of CRS rulings uploaded to the ANRMP website, it can be said that the mechanism is moderately effective for public procurement. Still, none of the CRS rulings concerned defence contracts.
1. Autorité Nationale de Régulation des Marchés Publics (National Procurement Regulatory Authority) (ANRMP), “Les dix (10) dernières décisions rendues par la Cellule Recours et Sanctions” (The last ten (10) rulings by the Recours and Sanctions Unit), Communications, Accessed on 7 December 2018,
2. “Décision no.043/2015/ANRMP/CRS du 29 décembre 2015 sur le recours de la Société Kinan dénonçant des irrégularités dans l’appel d’offres no.F390/2015/DMP organisé par l’Unité de Gestion du Project (UGP) REC-LPO” (Decision no.043/2015/ANRMP/CRS of 29th December 2015 on the recourse of the Kinan Company denouncing irregularities in inivitation to tender no.F390/2015/DMP by the Project Management Unit (UGP) REC-LPO), 29 December 2015,
Cote d’Ivoire score: 50/100
Companies believe that if they complain they will be unfairly disadvantaged or debarred from future procurements.
Companies rarely complain because they believe that they will be discriminated in future procurement cycles.
For genuine (non-malicious) complaints, companies believe that they will not be discriminated against in future procurements.
The activities of the ANRMP’s Recourse and Sanctions Unit (CRS), which has emboldened companies in Côte d’Ivoire to use it as a vehicle of complaints about cases of perceived malpractice in public procurement. Although the information is dated (13 March 2013), a text written by an Ivorian lawyer (Vincent Bile) was uploaded to the ANRMP website in which he addressed the fact that thanks to the 2009 Code of Public Procurement and Decree Decree No. 2009-260on the organization and operations of the ANRMP, a greater number of companies involved in public procurement in Côte d’Ivoire have gone through the ANRMP’s Recourse and Sanctions Unit (CRS) to denounce cases of malpractice. See the excerpt below:
“If litigation related to public tenders in Côte d’Ivoire does not yet know yet the same frenzy as in Senegal… Ivorian companies that previously did not dare complain for fear of reprisals, are coming out more and more of their torpor to lodge formal complaints with the Recourse and Sanctions Unit (CRS) of the ANRMP. Of only three (3) decisions rendered in 2010 and fourteen (14) decisions in 2011, the CRS has rendered thirty-four (34) decisions in 2012, not to mention that many disputes were dismissed in the context of the preliminary appeals filed with the courts” (1).
An article in Côte d’Ivoire Economie on February 25, 2014, described the change in mentality among companies bidding for public tenders since the creation of the ANRMP in 2009. The author, Germain Tanoh, stated that that they are willing to lodge complaints via the CRS that can lead to the Administrative Chamber of the Supreme Court to settle disputes arising from public procurement. Previously, there was no unit like the CRS that was able to forward cases to the national courts (2). The article states:
“From now on, the regulations in the ANRMP provide companies vying for a public tender in the Ivorian system of the public procurement with the tools to bypass societal evils (corruption, favoritism, fraud, abuse of position, collusion), not only to assert their right in the event of a decision that grieves them, but also to denounce the unethical behavior of the actors involved in public procurement” (2).
Analysts covering the CRS cases describe scenario before and after in which companies have lost their fear of retaliation since the ANRMP was set up.
1. Autorité Nationale de Régulation des Marchés Publics (National Procurement Regulatory Authority) (ANRMP), “La régulation des marchés publics, un processus vers la juridicisation et la juridiciarisation de la commande publique” (The regulation of public tenders, a process towards judicialisation and judiciarisation of public procurement), 13 March 2013,
2. Tanoh, G., “Régulation des marchés publics en Côte d’Ivoire : De la Caisse nationale à l’ANRMP” (Regulation of public procurement in Côte d’Ivoire: from the National Fund to the ANRMP), Côte d’Ivoire Economie via Abidjan.net, 25 February 2014,
Compare scores by country
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|Country||68a. Complaints mechanisms||68b. Effectiveness and Accessibility||68c. Retaliation|
|Albania||100 / 100||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Algeria||100 / 100||50 / 100||0 / 100|
|Angola||100 / 100||0 / 100||50 / 100|
|Argentina||50 / 100||0 / 100||NEI|
|Armenia||100 / 100||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Australia||100 / 100||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Azerbaijan||100 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Bahrain||0 / 100||NA||NA|
|Bangladesh||100 / 100||25 / 100||NEI|
|Belgium||100 / 100||75 / 100||100 / 100|
|Bosnia and Herzegovina||100 / 100||50 / 100||100 / 100|
|Botswana||100 / 100||50 / 100||NEI|
|Brazil||100 / 100||NEI||NEI|
|Burkina Faso||100 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Cameroon||0 / 100||NA||NA|
|Canada||100 / 100||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Chile||100 / 100||50 / 100||75 / 100|
|China||100 / 100||NEI||NEI|
|Colombia||50 / 100||50 / 100||NEI|
|Cote d'Ivoire||100 / 100||NEI||50 / 100|
|Denmark||100 / 100||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Egypt||100 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Estonia||100 / 100||75 / 100||100 / 100|
|Finland||100 / 100||75 / 100||100 / 100|
|France||100 / 100||75 / 100||50 / 100|
|Germany||100 / 100||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Ghana||100 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Greece||100 / 100||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Hungary||25 / 100||50 / 100||50 / 100|
|India||100 / 100||50 / 100||75 / 100|
|Indonesia||100 / 100||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Iran||50 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Iraq||25 / 100||25 / 100||0 / 100|
|Israel||100 / 100||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Italy||100 / 100||50 / 100||100 / 100|
|Japan||100 / 100||NEI||NEI|
|Jordan||0 / 100||NA||NA|
|Kenya||100 / 100||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|Kosovo||100 / 100||50 / 100||100 / 100|
|Kuwait||0 / 100||NA||NA|
|Latvia||100 / 100||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Lebanon||100 / 100||NEI||NEI|
|Lithuania||100 / 100||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Malaysia||100 / 100||50 / 100||50 / 100|
|Mali||100 / 100||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Mexico||100 / 100||100 / 100||NEI|
|Montenegro||75 / 100||50 / 100||50 / 100|
|Morocco||50 / 100||NEI||0 / 100|
|Netherlands||100 / 100||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|New Zealand||100 / 100||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Niger||100 / 100||100 / 100||NEI|
|Nigeria||50 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|North Macedonia||100 / 100||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Norway||100 / 100||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Oman||50 / 100||NA||NA|
|Palestine||100 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Philippines||75 / 100||NEI||100 / 100|
|Poland||75 / 100||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Portugal||100 / 100||50 / 100||50 / 100|
|Qatar||50 / 100||50 / 100||0 / 100|
|Russia||100 / 100||75 / 100||75 / 100|
|Saudi Arabia||100 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Serbia||100 / 100||50 / 100||100 / 100|
|Singapore||100 / 100||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|South Africa||100 / 100||50 / 100||25 / 100|
|South Korea||100 / 100||50 / 100||50 / 100|
|South Sudan||100 / 100||NEI||NEI|
|Spain||100 / 100||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Sudan||25 / 100||0 / 100||NEI|
|Sweden||100 / 100||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Switzerland||50 / 100||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Taiwan||100 / 100||75 / 100||75 / 100|
|Tanzania||100 / 100||50 / 100||NEI|
|Thailand||100 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Tunisia||100 / 100||75 / 100||0 / 100|
|Turkey||100 / 100||50 / 100||0 / 100|
|Uganda||100 / 100||50 / 100||NEI|
|Ukraine||100 / 100||75 / 100||0 / 100|
|United Arab Emirates||0 / 100||NA||NA|
|United Kingdom||100 / 100||75 / 100||100 / 100|
|United States||100 / 100||100 / 100||NEI|
|Venezuela||100 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Zimbabwe||100 / 100||50 / 100||50 / 100|