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Q65.

Are tender boards subject to regulations and codes of conduct and are their decisions subject to independent audit to ensure due process and fairness?

65a. Conflicts of interest

Score

SCORE: 75/100

Assessor Explanation

Assessor Sources

65b. Audit Trail

Score

SCORE: 100/100

Assessor Explanation

Assessor Sources

65c. Transparency

Score

SCORE: 100/100

Assessor Explanation

Assessor Sources

65d. Scrutiny

Score

SCORE: 0/100

Assessor Explanation

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The Law on the Conflict of Interest provides for the management of conflict of interest for the officials involved in decision making on contracts and similar acts, which includes procurement officials [1].
The law defines also the types of conflict of interest that include:
­ actual conflict of interest,
­ apparent conflict of interest,
­ potential conflict of interest,
­ case by case conflict of interest,
­ continuing conflict of interest,
­ passive ownership of shares or parts of capital.
Private interests include:
­ possible negotiations for employment,
­ property rights and obligations of any kind,
­ every other legal- civil relationship,
­ gifts, promises, favours, preferential treatment,
­ engagements in private activity for the purpose of profit or any kind of activity that creates income,
­ prior engagements,
­ relationships,
­ of family or cohabitation,
­ recognized [relationships] of friendship or enmity [1].
The law on the rules of ethics in the public administration also provides additional clauses on the conflict of interest [2]
Tender boards are established by the contracting authorities following the Law on Public Procurement (LPP) [3] and rules adopted by government decision [4, 5]. The LPP provides for the obligation of the contracting authorities to avoid and manage the conflict of interest [3]. The procurement rules adopted by Decision of Council of Ministers provide for clauses to avoid conflict of interest for officials employed in procurement and for officials that participate in tender boards [4, 5].
However, no specific codes of conducts exist that target public procurement officials.
According to the Law on Declaration of Assets, financial high and mid-level officials of the public administration are obliged to file financial disclosure of incomes and assets on an annual basis. However, the lower-level officials that may be involved in tender procedure do not bear this obligation [6].
Training of various aspects and stages of procurements are organised by the PPA and ASPA [7, 8, 9]. Training is conducted on an annual basis [10].
Additionally, several manuals on procurements published by the APP provide for instructions on procurement officials on a range of issues [11].

There is not enough information to score this indicator. The Ministry of Finance and Economy (MoF) has issued regulations on standard auditing trail applicable to all spending entities, which applies to the defence and security sector too [1]. Additionally, the MoD has adopted a regulation on auditing defence procurements [2]. However, there is no information on the enforcement and effectiveness of these procedures.

Tender board legislation, regulations, manuals, training, are publically available and are regularly published on the relevant websites [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7].

There is not enough information to score this indicator.The MoD has adopted a regulation on auditing defence procurements [1]. However, there is no information on the enforcement and effectiveness of these procedures.

The Public Procurement Law stipulates some regulations with regards to tender boards. According to Art. 165 of the Public Procurement Law, a tender board is set up within each contracting department to carry out an a priori external audit of public procurement. The regional tender boards are composed of the minister concerned, a representative of the contracting department, two representatives of the Finance Ministry, a representative of the ministry concerned by the service, and a representative of the Minister of Trade (Art. 171). Formally, Art. 88 of the 2016 Public Procurement Law, states that a code of ethics and professional conduct for officials involved in the control, award and performance of public contracts shall be written (1). The code specifies that public officials should withdraw from the public procurement process, when a situation arises where the public official’s interests are competing or contradictory to the interests of the contracting authority (2). This is the only professional restriction mentioned in the code. The ONPLC has provided training for public officials exposed to fraud risks in the public procurement process during the last years (3), (4). No information could be found whether this also includes officials involved in defence procurements processes.

News articles suggest that it is very difficult for the oversight agency, the Court of Auditors, to access a comprehensive audit trail. The Ministry of Defence was reportedly not very cooperative in providing information to the auditors and just provided general information (1). According to another source, the ministry only presented limited information and no justification why it did not provide more information (2). Annual reports from the Court of Auditors are not published online but sent to the President of the Republic, the President of the Council of the Nation, the President of the APN and the Prime Minister (3), which makes it difficult to assess the information that the Court of Auditors received from the military. The Open Budget Survey of 2017 also says that the Court of Auditors is weak in overseeing the government (4).

This indicator has not been assigned a score due to insufficient information or evidence.

Chapter 3, of the 2016 Public Procurement Law formally provides information on the tendering procedure, including what kind of tenders are possible: open tenders with minimum capacity requirements, restricted tender calls, competitive tenders, and mutual agreement after consultation (1). International finance institutions have remarked about a lack of transparency in public procurement. Based on the World Bank’s Benchmarking Public Procurement report, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) noted that Algeria does not provide adequate and transparent information to the bidders. Moreover, the existing legal framework and procedures seemingly do not guarantee a competitive and transparent evaluation process (2), (3). A report on the defence sector notes that tenders related to defence and security are restricted (4)

News articles suggest that it is very difficult for the oversight agency, the Court of Auditors, to access a comprehensive audit trail. The Ministry of Defence was reportedly not very cooperative in providing information to the auditors and just provided general information (1). According to another source, the ministry only presented limited information and no justification why it did not provide more information (2). Annual reports from the Court of Auditors are not published online but sent to the President of the Republic, the President of the Council of the Nation, the President of the APN and the Prime Minister (3), which makes it difficult to assess the information that the Court of Auditors received from the military. The Open Budget Survey of 2017 also says that the Court of Auditors is weak in overseeing the government (4).

Members of assessment committees for public tenders must fill statements of impartiality, confidentiality and independence. However, there is no evidence so far that comprehensive training has been provided. The rollout of training measures for officials on public procurement and tender board members is very recent, under new regulations enacted in April 2018 to create Public Procurement Units (UCPs) and procurement managers within the ministries, under the supervision of the National Public Procurement Service (SNCP). The unit officials should be trained and are tasked with implementing the public procurement legislation at the ministerial level (1), (2).

There is a limited audit trail that appears in opinions from the audit court; though very few have been published on defence and security procurement (1).

Direct awards appear to be the norm in the defence and security sector (1), (2).

The audit court examines the formal compliance with the Public Procurement Law, including the justification for the procurement method chosen. Scrutiny regarding potential violations of the Law on Public Probity that may arise from conflicts of interest with the selected companies are rare and superficial (1).

Officials who have responsibilities in the design of specifications are subject to general national regulations, the public ethics law, and provisions regarding conflict of interest. However, there are no codes of ethics that refer specifically to the subject, nor mandatory annual training in this regard. The preparation of the basic specifications and conditions is the responsibility of the contracting jurisdiction. They must use the document “Single Specification of General Terms and Conditions” established by provision 63/2016 of the National Contracting Office, mandatory for all jurisdictions of the EP. That document also establishes the impossibility of contracting with agents and officials of the National Public Sector with companies in which they had sufficient participation, in accordance with the provisions of the Public Ethics Law. [1] [2] [3] Also, as of 2017, conflicts of interest have been regulated by decree. [4] [5] People who have a family or other relationship with the EP or an official with competence to approve or grant contracts, can contract with the National State, but must report their situation in a sworn statement. All personnel must annually submit the “Affidavit on the absence of incompatibilities and/or conflicts of interest” (Resolution 818/09). Despite the existing legal and ethical framework, the press points out the poor implementation of transparency mechanisms in the presentation of declarations regarding conflicts of interest of public officials. With regard to training, although these are offered to all staff members, mainly through INAP or the Anti-Corruption Office, they are voluntary and are not carried out regularly. [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]

There is no evidence of the existence of a registry of officials who have participated in the selection of suppliers and design of the specifications, but about audits on the process and adjudication. The function of the audit of the processes is in the hands of the Audit Unit of the jurisdiction, in addition to SIGEN and AGN, who can perform control mechanisms according to their work schedules. [1] [2] [3] [4] The audits carried out can be accessed on the website of the Ministry of Defence. In these situations, audits carried out on public bidding procedures and other contracting mechanisms are observed, both from the different Forces and from the Ministry itself. [5] [6] [7] But there is no record on individuals involved in the procurement and contracting processes.

After preparation of terms of reference by a contracting jurisdiction, the call for applicants is published on the electronic portal. [1] Different offers are received and an evaluation commission issues an opinion that is made available to the contracting party for its decision. Regulation establishes that members of commission for each individual procedure should be appointed by the highest authority of the contracting jurisdiction or entity, excluding those who have competence to authorise the call or to approve the process. [2] The Law of Ethics [3] and provisions regarding conflicts of interest are also applicable. [4] [5] [6] Public tenders and other procurement mechanisms for all state agencies can be found on the government COMPR.AR website, with some exceptions established under law. Results of the evaluation and offers are also published online and communicated to all bidders, who can challenge these results within 3 days (with a security deposit). Whether there are specific codes of conduct and regulations for the tenders is unclear. [7]

There is no evidence of the existence of a registry of officials who have participated in the selection of suppliers and design of the specifications, but about audits on the process and adjudication. The function of the audit of the processes is in the hands of the Audit Unit of the jurisdiction, in addition to SIGEN and AGN, who can perform control mechanisms according to their work schedules. [1] [2] [3] [4] The audits carried out can be accessed on the website of the Ministry of Defence. In these situations, audits carried out on public bidding procedures and other contracting mechanisms are observed, both from the different Forces and from the Ministry itself. [5] [6] [7] There are no records on individuals involved in the procurement and contracting processes. There is also no evidence of of further scrutiny or audits, barring the standard oversight agency (AUI), which is the government’s internal scrutiny agency.

The Procurement Coordinators are subject to more detailed regulation by the Decree N 526-Ն, that define each of the roles the involved persons have in the procurement process [1]. Overall, all the members of a procurement decision body are subject to the Law on Public Service that stipulates the cases and situations of conflict of interest within public institutions [2].
Decree N 759-Ն provides detailed information on the training of the procurement coordinator. Thus, the Coordinator should undergo an attestation every three years. The length of the attestation should not be less than 12 hours, and 30% of the training should be through practical assignments. The designated body responsible for the training should provide a plan and the topics for training until March 15 of the current year [3]. The conflict of interest is fixed at the stage of the announcement and opening the bids, while a form of conflict of interest is signed by each member of the tender board [4].

The Armenian Legislation does not provide a separate procedure or regulation on a comprehensive audit trail. Public procurement, defence procurement as an essential part of it, outlines principles and mechanisms to ensure the integrity and curb corruption in public procurement (integrity, transparency, oversight, and control). [1] The tender specifications are defined by the responsible subdivision, and the winner is determined by the Evaluation Commission. Everything is documented and can be audited. Following relevant laws in Armenia, there are provided institutes of internal and external audits with their degrees of independence. On September 3, 2018, a session of the Audit Chamber took place. The chamber discussed the procurement by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) (containing state secrets for the supply of military equipment, armament, and ammunition), formation and use of extra-budgetary funds, the financial-economic activity of foundations established in the defence sector established by the state. Tasks have been approved for each direction [2]. The Ministry of Finance should examine announced competitions using the Decision of the Government No 1454-N [3].

The Law on Procurement sets out general provisions on the transparency of the tender boards [1]. Decree N 526-Ն, defines those designated participants of the procurement processes, the procedure to compose the tender board, the scope of responsibilities of the latter, etc. [2]. In particular, Article 26 of the law provides that a tender board is composed through the order of the head of the Customer Institution. The board is responsible for approving announcements and invitation to tenders and biddings, making changes in the announcements, making clarifications on the procurement process, opening and assessing the bids, selecting the winner of the bidding. A crucial role is attributed to the Secretary of tender boards who is not a member of the board but rather is appointed by the act on composing the tender board. The scope of responsibilities of the secretary includes organizing and facilitating the work of the tender board, receiving and registering the bids, developing all the necessary documents for conducting the purchase. The secretary is also responsible to assure the provisions of the Law on Procurement are in place and duly followed. However, in the Law on Procurements, there are no prescribed responsible persons (officials).

There is no external, ex-ante mechanism of verification of tender specifications.
Some internal or ex-post mechanisms exist only. Internal mechanism includes verification of specification prepared by relevant MoD department by tender committee. Ex-post verification includes internal and external audit mechanisms. [1].

Officials in charge of procurement decisions are subject to rules on conflicts of interest, but financial disclosure reports are not required. Officials who design Australian government tender specifications and evaluate the vast majority of defence procurement decisions are government officials. Depending on if these government officials are civilian or military, they are subject to different regulations. For civilians who are members of the Australian Public Service (APS), the Australian Public Service Code of Conduct applies, which contains specific duties for public servants regarding conflicts of interest: “An APS employee must: a) take reasonable steps to avoid any conflict of interest (real or apparent) in connection with the employee’s APS employment; and (b) disclose details of any material personal interest of the employee in connection with the employee’s APS employment” [1]. There are also specific obligations with regards to post-separation employment for (former) APS members [2]. Military employees of the Australian Defence Force, who often have official responsibilities over less complex procurements, are subject to much more stringent and specific conflict of interest rules under the Military Personnel Manual and associated Defence Instructions [3, 4], including for post-separation employment [5]. These conflict or interest rules and regulations, applying “especially [to defence personnel] involved in procurement and contract management” are communicated clearly in informational and training material [6].

Based on public reports from the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO), audit trails exist at least some of the time and oversight agencies do have access to these audit trails. In a report, “Defence’s Procurement of Fuels, Petroleum, Oils, Lubricants, and Card Services” outlining the results of a performance audit, ANAO said: “Defence’s Endorsement to Proceed and Tender Evaluation Plan required the maintenance of an audit trail. The Tender Evaluation Plan stated that: ‘To maintain an audit trail, records of the evaluation process will be kept and include reasons justifying decisions made by each [Tender Evaluation Working Group] as well as the [Tender Evaluation Board] in relation to each of the evaluation criteria assessed'” [1]. As part of this report, ANAO reviewed whether the audit trail was sufficient (concluding that it was not) [1, p24-25]. The ANAO has full authority to request and access any information in the performance of an audit that is necessary, including a procurement decision audit trail [2]. However, the Commonwealth Procurement Rules [3] and Defence Procurement Policy Manual [4] (DPPM) do not contain any specific obligation or guidance to maintain a strong audit trail in procurement. It is possible the Complex Procurement Guide alluded to in the DPPM [4, p11] or other non-public documents include such an obligation or guidance, but these are not accessible.

Though there is no tender board code of conduct as such, the codes of conduct for civilian (the Australian Public Service Code of Conduct [1]) and military (Military Personnel Manual [2] and Defence Instructions PERS 25-6: Conflicts of interest and declaration of conflicts of interest [3]) are fully publicly available. Some documents which may contain more insight into tender board decision-making regulations in specific circumstances, such as the Complex Procurement Guide alluded to in the Defence Procurement Policy Manual, are not publicly available.

The Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) may chose to verify particular specifications of a tender process as part of its performance audit process [1]. When these occur, they are robust (as in a performance audit of fuel and oils where ANAO evaluated whether documentation had been sufficient [2]). However, given limited resources, ANAO can only carry out a certain number of audits in the defence portfolio per year, and only some of these focus on the tender process [3].

There are ethical conduct rules for procurement officials. The information was provided on the website of the State Service for Antimonopoly Policy and Consumer Protection under the Ministry of Economy. The site also publishes the contact information of the person responsible for ethical conduct (1). Article 38 of the Law on Public Procurement is called “Responsibility of the tender commission”. According to this Article (38.1), the Chairman and members of the Tender Commission shall act objectively and impartially while performing their duties as defined in this law. According to Article 38.2, if the Tender Commission demonstrates impartiality, each of the plaintiffs may apply to the relevant executive authority or the court. If those authorities confirm that they have been violated during the preparation and conduct of the tender, the results of the tender are cancelled and the procuring entity holds a new tender for that matter. In this case, the chairperson and other members of the commission may not be chairpersons or members of any tender commission for three years (2).
Article 13 of the Law on Public Procurement is the “Contradiction of Interests in Public Procurement”. This article regulates conflicts of interest arising during the tender (2). Natig Jafarli believes that there is almost no free and competitive bidding. In most cases, the winner of the tender is declared as a result of certain assignments coming from the president’s administration. The tenders related to the defence and security sector are essentially the same (3). The recent tender at the Ministry of Emergency Situations is an example (4). There are no reports about training for people responsible for conducting tenders. State agencies do not provide information on this.

Audit trails are formally available, but they are very general, and they are not implemented for the defence and security sector. The Chamber of Accounts, State Service for Antimonopoly Policy and Consumer Rights Protection’s activities in this direction is unclear (1). There are no reports or surveys on the tender process in defence. The tenders for the military and security sector and any information about individuals involved those tenders are not reflected on the official website of the procurement agency.

There is little information about the procedures for organizing the tender boards, procedures, activities and so on. At the same time according to official information, the chairman of the tender commission is appointed one of the officials (eg deputy head), excluding the first person of the procurement organisation. Members of the commission should consist of experts from the procurement organisation. If the purchasing organisation does not have relevant specialists in the procurement subject, the competent representatives of the related organizations will also be included. Additionally, the tender commission should include representatives of the Ministry of Finance and Economy when the estimated bid price is 1,000,000 manats and in budget-funded organizations more than 300,000 manats (1).
The text of the Codes of Conduct for Procurement Officials was provided on the website of the State Service for Antimonopoly Policy and Consumer Protection under the Ministry of Economy. The site also publishes the contact information of the person responsible for ethical conduct (2). However, this document is not comprehensive and does not cover the behaviour of those participating in tenders.

Article 38 of the Law on Public Procurement is called “Responsibility of the tender commission”. According to this Article (38.1), the Chairman and members of the Tender Commission shall act objectively and impartially while performing their duties as defined in this Law. According to Article 38.2, if the Tender Commission demonstrates impartiality, each of the plaintiffs may apply to the relevant executive authority or the court. If those authorities confirm that they have been violated during the preparation and conduct of the tender, the results of the tender are cancelled and the procuring entity holds a new tender for that matter. In this case, the chairperson and other members of the commission may not be chairpersons or members of any tender commission for three years (1).

Personnel who are in charge of tender boards design and regulations are mostly the same for all procurements within the Ministry of Defence (MoD). Based on our sources, there are no regulations for the conflict of interests or code of conduct specifically for the procurement committee [1, 2]. As one source confirms, most of the members of these committees are non-Bahraini (expats who are believed to have no conflict of interests in general), and they have no special process when they are assigned as members of these committees or when they are hired. They are mostly from the financial department and their authority is limited and superficial (bureaucratic process only). The committees are a routine part of the procurement process that no one pays much attention to conflict of interests as most of the members are non-Bahraini [2]. The general assumption is that members of these committees have no conflict of interest.

According to interviewees, there is no auditing or an oversight mechanism in place to ensure suppliers, design of the tender or the specification of such tender. This also means that there is no external oversight or a body to report to that is mandated to scrutinize that tender board [1, 2].

As outlined in 65A and 65B, and according to our sources, tender boards are not transparent and do have a potential risk of corruption [1, 2].

There is no external body to scrutinize the tender boards or an external mechanism to ensure transparency or specifications of a tender board [1, 2].

Tender committees operate under the DP-35 rules [1], which do not include any provisions on conflicts of interest or codes of conduct.

According to the Defence Audit Manual [1], tender specifications, as well as documents on the selection of suppliers and awarding of contracts, are auditable documents. The extent to which the DAD exercises its power to search for audit trails cannot be ascertained. There is not enough publicly available evidence to score this indicator, therefore it is marked ‘Not Enough Information’.

While DP-35 [1] is available online, provisions on conflicts of interest and codes of conduct are not publicly available, nor there is any assessment report available to conclude that these are transparent.

Neither Parliament nor the Defence Audit Directorate scrutinises the competition procedure [1]. There is no evidence of external verification.

Articles 9 and 10 of the law of 13 August 2011 explicitly forbid any conflict of interest [1]. Personnel of Belgian Defence have to abide by a deontological code [2]. Any military staff working directly or indirectly in procurement has to sign a formal declaration that she or he had read and understood the code [3]. This includes positions on tender boards. Training is provided when taking-up post (a military officer stays on a post for 2-5 years), or when appointed to sit on a tender board [4]. There is no information on whether board members are required to file financial disclosure reports.

The adjudicators shall keep a record of the progress of all procurement procedures, whether or not they are conducted by electronic means [1]. To this end, they shall ensure that they keep sufficient documentation to justify the decisions taken at all stages of the procurement procedure, in particular documents concerning exchanges with economic operators and internal deliberations, preparation of contract documents, dialogue or negotiation where appropriate, selection and award of the contract. These documents shall be kept for at least ten years from the date of conclusion of the contract and in any event until the expiry of the guarantee period, without prejudice to the provisions of laws, decrees and ordinances relating to archives. This includes details of specific individuals involved, such as the personnel acting as the contacting person of the economic operators and who they report to [2].

Articles 22, 23 and 24 of the law of public procurement of defence and security stipulates the regulations of tender boards and, including on which tender should be accepted [1]. Personnel of Belgian Defence has to abide by a code of conduct [2]. Any military staff working directly or indirectly in procurement has to sign a formal declaration that she or he had read and understood the code [3]. This code is available in summary to the public on the website of Belgian Defence [4].

The appropriateness of the tender specifications is verified internally within DGMR and the internal control office of the Budget Department (BFC) [1]. They are subject to a complaints procedure by economic operators to the Conseil d’Etat if judged inappropriate, as stipulated in the law of 17 June 2013 [2].

During general audits, the Federal Internal Audit agency (FIA) examines whether the public contracts of the federal departments are awarded and executed in a regular manner, i.e. in accordance with the regulations, instructions, procedures and contractual provisions [3].

Conduct and procedures governing the tender committee are regulated by the Public Procurement Law (PPL) and the Rulebook on Financial and Materiel Operations of the Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces [1]. The Rulebook contains provisions relating to the prohibition of receiving gifts from contractors or suppliers [2, 3]. Moreover, in February 2020 a Draft Code of Ethics for Participants in the Procurement and Sale Procedure at the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina has been developed [5]. Additionally, there are legal provisions in place preventing members of the Board for Tenders from having business relationships with bidders. This matter is regulated in Article 52 of the PPL (Disqualification on Grounds of Conflict of Interest or Bribery).
The Rulebook on Forming and the work of the Public Procurement Committee (tender board) specifies that the contracting authority takes into account that the majority of members knows the legislation on procurements and that at least one member has the necessary expertise. However, there is no mention of what is the means of verification of knowledge or expertise [4].

Board members are required to confirm the absence of conflicts of interest in writing, but there are no other requirements or procedures. Written records of procurement procedures are kept by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) [1, 2]. According to the Rulebook on Forming and the Work of the Public Procurement Committee (tender board), the tender board has to keep minutes of their meetings, as well as minutes from the opening of offers. The tender board is formed from a decision signed by the minister, and all the documentation is signed and stamped [1].

The procurement proces in the MoD BiH has some 50 formal steps (without counting potential complaints), with 16 of them being in the the hands of the political leadership or the menmbers of their cabinets.[3] There is however no analysis or publicly available evidence to ensure that the audit trail is fully complete and that all individuals involved are mentioned.

The Council of Ministers (CoM) adopted the Rulebook on Forming and the Work of the Public Procurement Committee. This rulebook is publicly available and defines the formation and work of the tender boards [1].

There is no clearly defined external verification of specifications of the tender. Potential bidders may file a complaint that the specification favours one producer or bidder and thus diminishes competition [1].

According to the government reviewer, however, all specifications are made in accordance with the PPL, meaning that they are made without favouritism and that if the contracting authority refers to a specific manufacturer in the sense of the requirement or quality, the “or equivalent” and description of the said product are added to the specifications. The contracting authority respects the above principle and generally describes the products without specifying the manufacturer. External verification is also a check by the audit (internal or external), and the check itself is a publication on the portal where the tenderers submit comments on the same, and the contracting authority changes the specifications with the modification of the existing tender documentation. All of these factors are an aspect of external verification of specifications. There were cases in which the tenderers made comments of this kind, but the contracting authority always approached changes to the tender documentation, but in principle, the specifications are made without favour with a description of what is required by setting minimum requirements in the form of technical conditions, warranty period, standards. This can be proven by several examples and the best form of verification is certainly the audit, as well as the tenderers’ comments, which are transparent on the e-procurement portal, where the contracting authority approaches the resolution of each issue and informs all participants in the procurement process.

Furthermore, according to the government reviewer, the MoD aims to define the needs for the preparing documentation meeting the needs of the MoD and AFBiH while creating the conditions for the participation of large numbers of potential bidders. Evidence of a properly verified tenders (correct commitment) is the small number (in relation to the procedures carried out) of appeals lodged with the TD, appeals against the decisions on selection and annulment, as well as decisions made by the PRB in favour of the MoD.

The Bostwana Procurement Code of Ethics provides inter alia that, as stipulated by Sections 3 and 8 of the PPAD Act defining the scope of application of the Act, and in line with the requirements of Section 90 whereby all procurement and disposal operatives shall sign and abide by a code of Ethics, this Code of Ethics shall apply to the staff of a) all entities of the central Government which are involved in public procurement or the disposal of public assets, whether they are located abroad or within Botswana; (b) all land boards; (c) all parastatals, statutory organizations and local authorities, and all other Entities covered in accordance with the provisions of Section 8, except where exempted by the Minister by notice published in the Gazette.
Accordingly, this code applies to all such practitioners who may be involved wholly or partially in any phase of the procurement or disposal process, including but not limited to procurement planning, market research, technical, project management, financial, legal, economics, logistics etc [1,2]. PPADB Regulations apply equally to defence procurement. There are no exclusive Regulations for defence procurement.

Tender Boards are subject to regulations and codes of conduct. Their decisions are subject to an independent audit to ensure due process and fairness. This is supported by section 18 of the PPADB provides for records of procuring entity:
(1) A procuring entity shall maintain records of its procurement proceedings for a period of seven years from the later date of any of the following-
(a) the decision to terminate the procurement action; or
(b) the contract award; or
(c) completion of the contract or the settlement of the dispute, whichever comes earlier, and thereafter for an additional year where a contract is ongoing or is challenged.
(2) The records of the procurement process of a Ministerial Committee shall be open for inspection by the Board during working hours [1,2]. These records include details of the specific officials. Politicians are not involved in the bid awarding process.The involvement of politicians is prohiited in terms of the law.

Section 19 of the PPADB Act provides the following in the spirit of transparency:
(1) Procuring entities of the Defence Force, Police Service, and other security organs of the State may conduct their procurement through an open or restricted list basis.
(2) Where the procuring entities referred to in sub-regulation (1) procure through restricted bidding, they shall-
(a) obtain prior written approval of the Board;
(b) first, commit themselves to a progressive reduction in procurement through the restricted list; and
(c) obtain the consent of the Board to the procurement procedures that shall apply to each category of procurement activity on the restricted lists.
(3) Unless otherwise provided, under the Act or these Regulations, the Defence Force, Police Service and other security organs of the State shall comply with the provisions of these Regulations [1,2]. In Botswana, the PPADB and other procurement administration bodies are subject to Regulations and Codes of conduct/Their decisions are subject to an independent audit to ensure due process and fairness. These regulations and codes are pubicly available.

There is not enough information to score this indicator.There is internal scrutiny followed by external institutions such as DCEC, the Auditor General and the Judiciary [1,2]. However, it cannot be determined if verification that the particular specifications of the tender are appropriate is part of the process.

The rules for forming a tender board for acquisitions are determined in Article 51 of the Procurement Law 8.666/93 [1]. The rules stipulate a one-year maximum term in the position, and the head of the institution appoints the members. Training is offered for officials involved in tender board roles regularly. Those training courses cover the Code of Conduct related to conflict of interest. In the case of the Army, the Inspectorates of Accountability and Finances (ICFEx) are responsible for this training [2]. There is also a general Code of Conduct of federal public servants that explicitly determines measures against conflict of interest [3].

The Court of Auditors (TCU) is responsible for overseeing these commissions, on its website, there is evidence that it does oversee and question legal acts made by tender boards of the federal government. However, there is no evidence of periodic oversight over tender boards of defence institutions [1, 2]. The Court of Auditors can request an audit trail for the tender process, e.g. TCU is investigating the current vice-president for possible irregularities in a public bidding undertaken while he was an on duty military offical [3].

Tender boards are regulated by the Public Procurement Law. Their composition is public, and some of their duties, they shall evaluate and answer impugnation requests, and are the ones responsible for the decision of appeals [1, 2, 3]. According to a document written by the National School for Public Administration (ENAP – Escola Nacional de Administração Pública), tender boards have a one year duration, and all of its members are co-responsible for the decisions – independently of assigning a ‘presidency’ for the tender board. The tender board is responsible for receiving all the demanded documents stipulated in the Public Call, for evaluating and judging them. It is not a responsibility of the public tender: to annulate or revoke a public bidding; to homologate the public bidding – these are competencies of the agency that requested the public bidding. However, their decisions are not easily accessible to the general public; there is good horizontal transparency, though, since external control agencies can easily access these documents and decisions.

There is some scrutiny made by internal control agencies and the TCU, but it is not done regularly, nor focused on defence matters [1, 2].

According to Article 36 (1) & (2) of Decree No. 0049 (2017), “are not eligible to make a bid for public contracts and delegated public services, for reason of conflicts of interest: – Organizations/ enterprises in which tender board members have financial and personal interests that could undermine the transparency and integrity of the procurement and contracting process; – Individuals or enterprises that are somehow linked to the consultants that have elaborated all or part of the tender documents for the actual open competition or consultation” (1).

According to the United States Department of State, many NGOs have pointed out an “overwhelming corruption of civil servants” indifferent sectors, including procurement (2). It is necessary to admit that there are lots of conflicts of interest in government procurement as a whole (3). There is no evidence that tender board members are provided with capacity building opportunities either, particularly on conflicts of interest related matters.

In Burkina Faso, audits are carried out by a sub-technical committee, which makes its report available for the main committee after the audit (Article 109) (1). The main committee officially grants the contract to the best offerer, based on the report of the sub-technical committee. Given, the opacity of the defence sector (2), this report is likely to escape to any audit (if only there is one) by oversight institutions, such as the Parliament, the Supreme Audit Institution, and the ASCE-LC. Again, government institutions are well-known for not sharing their information (3), (4) (5), and oversight institutions have already shown their weakness for controlling them (3), (4), (5), (6). Such an environment is not in favour of oversight agencies to access a comprehensive audit trail.

The ARCOP aims at regulating public procurement and contracting, by establishing and enhancing bidding rules and criteria, ensuring access to public contracts and promoting equality of chance among bidders (1). Both the military code of conduct displayed in Law No. 038 (2016) and the tender board regulation, in Law No. 039, though clear, are not made transparent in military procurement. Yet, according to Pyman, Wilson and Scott (2009), “historical evidence and current patterns show that the military procurement is highly susceptible to corruption because of limited scrutiny, audits and massive overpayments” (2). It is difficult to determine to what extent the regulation of the ARCOP applies to the defence sector (1), (2), (3), (4), (5).

Articles 100 and above of Decree No. 0049 (2017) contains a section about audits. Audits are expected to take place immediately after the deadline of the receipt of tenders indicated in the calls for tenders. In Burkina Faso, audits are carried out by a sub-technical committee. The sub-technical committee makes its report available for the main committee after the audit (Article 109) (1). The main committee officially grants the contract to the best offerer, based on the report of the sub-technical committee. Given, the opacity of the defence sector (2), this report is likely to escape to any audit (if only there is one) by oversight institutions, such as the Parliament, the Supreme Audit Institution, and the ASCE-LC. Again, government institutions are well-known for not sharing their information (3), (4) (5), and oversight institutions have already shown their weakness for controlling them (3), (4), (5), (6).

Articles 4 and 71 of the Procurement Code (2018) clearly state that defence and security-related procurement are “Special Contracts and are not subject to tenders or OTC markets and the consideration of any public procurement commission under this Code” [1].

TI Helpdesk states, “generally contracts under US$10,000 are awarded by individual ministries, institutions and municipal councils with little or no oversight from the National Procurement Regulation Agency (ARMP) or the Ministry of Public Procurement” [2]. This would seem to cover stationery items, and this suggests there is no oversight for such items either.

Articles 4 and 71 of the Procurement Code (2018) clearly state that defence and security-related procurement are “Special Contracts and are not subject to tenders or OTC markets and the consideration of any public procurement commission under this Code” [1].

TI Helpdesk states, “generally contracts under US$10,000 are awarded by individual ministries, institutions and municipal councils with little or no oversight from the National Procurement Regulation Agency (ARMP) or the Ministry of Public Procurement” [2]. This would seem to cover stationery items, and this suggests there is no oversight for such items either.

Articles 4 and 71 of the Procurement Code (2018) clearly state that defence and security-related procurement are “Special Contracts and are not subject to tenders or OTC markets and the consideration of any public procurement commission under this Code” [1].

TI Helpdesk states, “generally contracts under US$10,000 are awarded by individual ministries, institutions and municipal councils with little or no oversight from the National Procurement Regulation Agency (ARMP) or the Ministry of Public Procurement” [2]. This would seem to cover stationery items, and this suggests there is no oversight for such items either.

Articles 4 and 71 of the Procurement Code (2018) clearly state that defence and security-related procurement are “Special Contracts and are not subject to tenders or OTC markets and the consideration of any public procurement commission under this Code” [1].

TI Helpdesk states, “generally contracts under US$10,000 are awarded by individual ministries, institutions and municipal councils with little or no oversight from the National Procurement Regulation Agency (ARMP) or the Ministry of Public Procurement” [2]. This would seem to cover stationery items, and this suggests there is no oversight for such items either.

There are robust Conflict of Interest reporting mechanisms throughout the Canadian Public Service and employees are expected to report these either at the time of employment or whenever they may arise. [1] Also, the Code of Conduct for Procurement provides for public servants and vendors a clear statement of mutual expectation to ensure a common understanding among all participants in procurement. [2] The Canadian International Trade Tribunal (CITT) is authorised to hear complaints under the Agreement on International Trade (AIT) and if suppliers are dissatisfied with the outcomes they are able to seek recourse through the federal courts and/or the provincial superior courts. [3] The Government of Canada’s Contracting Policy (Sec. 16.11.5) also states that: “Contracting authorities should, before signing a contract, require the selected consultant or professional to sign a declaration, either as part of the contract or separately, stating that no pecuniary interest in the business of any third party exists that would affect objectivity in carrying out the contract.” [4] An evaluation of the Certification Program for Procurement and Material Management Communities in the Government of Canada, which is managed by the Acquired Services and Assets Sector Communities Management Office within the Office of the Comptroller General (OCG) at the Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS), was conducted by the TBS Internal Audit and Evaluation Bureau in 2018. The report decribes training-related issues, including that, since 2006, only 5.9% of those enrolled had been certified, and proposes recommendations. [5]

Contracts are posted clearly online, as well as any amendments or updates to the contracts as well as any fluctuation in the dollar amount(s) associated with the contracts. [1] Furthermore, as noted above, there are clear mechanisms for disputes/dispute resolution through judicial channels as well as through the Office of the Procurement Ombudsman for contracts valued below $26,400 for goods and $105,700 for services). [2] A Report by the Auditor General of Canada stated that organizations, including PSPC, did not always implement fraud risk controls, and that there were “instances where evidence of the review was missing from the contract file” (paragraph 1.68) [3] There is “Contact Information” provided within tender notices, but no clear indication on which officials (including, if any, politicians) are involved in tender award decisions (ie. notices) making it difficult for oversight agencies to independently access a comprehensive audit trail. [1] Information on audit trail might be available (by email request) within Audit and evaluation reports at Public Services and Procurement Canada [4]. As PSPC is currently not a participating department for public Access to Information and Privacy (ATIP) online requests, information that might provide a more comprehensive audit trail on officials involved is currently not accessible through this mechanism. [5]

Codes of conduct are transparent, as are all similar bodies within the Canadian Public Service. [1] [2] Any real or perceived conflict of interest could result in the termination of contracts. [3] With respect to tender approval regulation, the section for Procurement Review Committee Requirements and Approval Process in the Supply Manual in Annex 3.5 “has been removed as per Policy Notification 138 – Changes to the Procurement Review Policy”. [4] [5]

The public notices of each procurement initiative lay out the required specifications for each tender, and these are subject to public scrutiny (i.e. from the media) as well as scrutiny from other contract bidders. [1] [2] There is some external verification, for example by the Office of the Auditor General (OAG) of Canada, that particular specifications of tenders are appropriate. Verification by the OAG is published as reports to Parliament which include reports relating to Public Services and Procurement Canada [3] and to National Defence. [4] External verification is not comprehensive if tender board regulations are only partially transparent (see Q65C).

The regulation and oversight of tender boards for procurement and acquisitions in the defence sector are decentralised and fragmented within different agencies and branches of the armed forces, which makes it difficult the delimit clear and unique schemes to prevent conflict of interest and guarantee transparency. In 2016, a new law on probity in the public function and the prevention of conflicts of interests was enacted [1], and although it included the general officers and superior officers of the armed forces, it did not involve members of tender boards and other professionals that assist in the processes of acquisition and procurement. In 2017, Supreme Decree No. 606 reinforced the causes and procedures related to the inabilities to participate as a supplier of defence agencies, but it did not specifically address potential conflicts of interests by members of the tender boards and associated technical and professional staff [2]. For instance, the army organised a Standing Committee for Procurement (CPAE) that works as an advisory body for the commander in chief, in charge of evaluating and proposing the acquisition of assets, goods and services for amounts equal to or greater than US$500,000. The CPAE is composed of ten permanent members, five of which have voting rights (officials of the Major General State), and it can integrate specialists for technical matters. The CPAE was created at the initiative of the army and is regulated by a Command Order (“Orden de Comando”, last version December 29th, 2011). Although it was expected to give the acquisition processes high levels of transparency, objectivity and scientific rigour, there are no known regulations or codes of conducts designed to avoid conflicts of interest with its members. Moreover, there is no access to the cited Command Order or other regulations.

There is no evidence of comprehensive audits to tender boards and officials involved in selecting suppliers and designing tender specification. There is some evidence of external audit to the procurement systems in the Estado Mayor Conjunto (EMCO) and the branches of the military, but the information is superficial [1]. In 2017, the Ministry of National Defence (MDN) compromised the performance of biannual audits of procurement and contracting processes in the institutions of the armed forces and the MDN, both those regulated by the law on administrative contracts (Law No. 19.886) and those charged to the Restricted Law of Copper (Law No. 13.196). However, there is no information concerning the findings of these audits. On the other hand, taking into account the audits performed by the General Comptroller’s Office (CGR), some of them have specifically addressed possible irregularities in bidding processes in the Chilean Air Force (2014), the EMCO (2014) and the Chilean Army (2015) [2]. One of the audits referred to the conflict of interests and lack of probity and transparency of the sub-secretary for the armed forces in the MDN (2014). Although there is evidence that audits of the processes of acquisitions and procurement have increased since 2010 [3], it is not possible to evaluate their content and main findings. The reviewer requested information from the army about regulations, codes of conduct and oversight of the members of the Standing Committee for Procurement (CPAE), without receiving any response.

There is very little transparency in the operation and regulation of the bidding boards and their associated members. Tender boards regulations and codes of conduct are not published [1, 2, 3, 4].

As outlined in 63A and 63C, the 2017 White Paper referenced in this answer is an aspirational policy document, not a law [1]. There is no evidence that scrutiny to ensure that tender specifications are aligned with the White Paper would take place.

Article 33 of the Regulations on the Competitive Procurement of Equipment stipulates the following illegal activities of individuals involved in tender board processes: failure to conduct competitive equipment procurement without justified reasons, failure to release procurement information within the prescribed scope, failure to implement procurement in accordance with the approved equipment procurement plan, intervening in the process and colluding with bidding parts, and violating regulations in determining the winning party. There is no further information on whether they have to submit conflicts of interest statements or on their training. [1,2]

There is no transparency in the audit trails in tender boards. The only information available is public announcements by companies and research institutions announcing that they passed the audit as part of the SASTIND licensing system, which is evidence that the licensing system under the procurement regulations is implemented. [1,2,3] However, there is no other public information on the operation of tender boards.

Τhere are no regulations regarding the transparency of tender boards. The actual procurement decision-making process is very secretive by design. [1,2]

There is no external verification of tender requirements and specifications. The procurement process is managed by the CMC Equipment Development Department without external (non-military) scrutiny.

The defense sector is governed by the same regulations related to conflicts of interest in the bidding process as the entire public sector in Colombia. Decree 1510 of 2013 in its Article 27 states that the evaluation committees (bidding boards) will be made up of public servants or individuals and that they will be subject to the system of legal prohibitions regarding disqualifications, incompatibilities, and conflicts of interest. [1] Article 84 of Law 734 of 2002 identifies ten grounds for impediment and recusal for public servants who exercise disciplinary action, [2] and Artcle 11 of Law 1437 of 2011 identifies 16 types of conflicts of interest and grounds for impediment and recusal in public servants who carry out administrative actions, investigations, probes, or who pronounce final decisions. [3] Law 1150 of 2007 introduces transparency measures in public administration contracting processes, [4] and Article 8 of Law 80 of 1993 defines a series of inabilities and incompatibilities in the hiring process. [5] For its part, the Army Recruitment Manual, [6] based on the previous regulations, defines a series of procedures and actions related to inabilities, incompatibilities, and conflicts of interest, and the Code of Good Governance of the National Police also identifies conflicts of interest. [7] All these regulations clearly stipulate restrictions related to the official’s professional activity, including the degree of familiarity between the public official and the bidder, the relationship between the public official and business companies that submit proposals of offers, if the individual belonged or has exercised functions at the managerial level in the contracting entity, among others. The Political Constitution of Colombia in its Article 122 defines that public officials must declare their assets and income. [8] There is no evidence that this normative provision applies to all the people who are part of the evaluation committees, however.

The Action Group for Institutional Transparency (GATRI) monitors and evalutes procurement in the defence sector and collects information with regard to the contracting and management of resources, verification and evaluation of contractual processes, and can make criminal, fiscal, or disciplinary complaints as a result of internal audits, working with the General Inspectors of the Armed Forces and the Ministry. [1] The Ministry of Defence’s Procurement Manual does not clearly specify the obligation to publicly submit audit records that demonstrate the participation of officials in the selection of suppliers and the design of specifications, although the Manual does specify roles, functions, and profiles to be fulfilled by such officials for selection, in the context of the contractual process. The extent of an audit trail in defence procurement is unclear and therefore, this indicator cannot be scored. As such, it is marked ‘Not Enough Information.’

Regarding transparency, the regulations and codes of conduct of the evaluation committees (bidding boards) are contained in different regulations: Decree 1510 of 2013, [1] Law 734 of 2002, [2] Law 1437 of 2011, [3] Law 1150 of 2007, [4] Law 80 of 1993, [5] and the Manual of Contracting for national defence and its executing units, [6] which are all easily accessible. There is no evidence, however, of the publication of reports or documents on the Ministry of Defence’s website, nor on the Military Forces websites, that show inability and incompatibilities of officials belonging to the evaluation committees or documents or tools to prevent conflict of interest. [7, 8] With regard to the technical, economic evaluations of the contractual proposals, the documents relating to these aspects are published to SECOP I. [9] There is no evidence that the results of internal audits of the evaluation committees of the procurement proposals are public.

There is Not Enough Information to score this indicator. The Comptroller General is authorized to perform audits of tenders. Article 4 of Decree 267 of 2000 states that the Comptroller can supervise expenses of the entire Executive Branch. [1] This means that it can scrutinise tenders undertaken by all of Colombia’s public entities. The released audits are published on the website of the entity, and show compliance with the contractual rules throughout the process of awarding a contract, selection of proponents, implementation, and closure. From the findings, the Comptroller’s Office generates a series of improvement actions. From 2016 to 2019, approximately 30 audits related to the defence sector have been published. [2] There are, however, no specific requirements on what external audits should look like.

The 2009 Code of Public Procurement provides for the National Authority for Regulation of Public Contracts and the Special Commission tasked with opening and evaluating bids to prevent conflicts of interest among public officials and also among bidders (soumissionnaires). The latter works as a de facto tender board. The 2009 Code of Public Procurement (Décret n° 2009-259, Portant Code des marchés publics) outlines the public procurement procedures that public officials must follow. It also formulates the requirements for the purchase of goods and services. All ministries, public sector agencies and institutions fall within its scope except for contracts involving national defence and security that require secrecy (Art. 8). For other contracts at the MoD not subject to secrecy, the 2009 Code of Public Procurement does seem to apply (1). Article 12 in the 2009 Code provides for a National Authority of Regulation of Public Contracts (Autorité Nationale de Régulation des Marchés Publics, ANRMP) tasked with ensuring the application of the general principles governing public procurement, training public officials in public procurement, monitoring the procurement information system and conducting audits of public tenders (1).

In Section 2 (Organes charges de la passation des marchés), Article 43, the 2009 Code outlines the role of the Special Commission tasked with opening and evaluating bids (Commission d’ouverture des plis et de jugement des offres). As per Article 44 (Principes et règles de fonctionnement de la Commission), the members of this Commission are required to be independent and to work in the public interest. In the event of a conflict of interest among its members, the individual is required to inform the Commission President (1).

Article 44 states:
“Any member with interests in a bidding or acquainted with company facts that could compromise the Commission’s independence, is required to inform the President and/or other members of the Commission. The member of the Commission referred to in the preceding paragraph shall abstain from taking part in the work of the Commission and is subject to the penalties provided for in Article 183 of this Code” (1).

The 2009 Code assigns the Special Commission with the role of a tender board.

The audit trails (external verification) that would provide information on how suppliers were selected or how the public tender was designed are not available for the Ministry of Defence on the ANRMP website. The most recent annual report for the ANRMP dates to 2013 and is therefore beyond the scope of this questionnaire (1). Likewise, the page on the ANRMP website dedicated to companies banned from future public tenders (Liste Rouge), does not contain details on projects that were cancelled by the Ministry of Defence (2). However, on March 22, 2018, the ANRMP launched an Expression of Interest notice (Avis à manifestations d’intérêt) to select an auditor that would be tasked with carrying independent audits by the different contracting authorities for the year 2017. The auditor would verify the conduct of procedures for the award, execution, payment and control of public contracts under the 2009 Code of Public Procurement. The details of the Expression of Interest can be downloaded on the ANRMP website (3).

The activities of the Special Commission tasked with evaluating bids, as per Articles 43-45 of the 2009 Code of Public Procurement, are required to be secret. The 2009 Code of Public Procurement, Section 2 (Organes charges de la passation des marchés), Article 43, describes the role of the Special Commission tasked with opening and evaluating bids (Commission d’ouverture des plis et de jugement des offres). Article 43 details who is eligible to become a member of the Commission, depending on the nature of the contracting authority and the purpose of the public tender (1). Article 44 (Principes et règles de fonctionnement de la Commission) contains guidelines for the members of the Commission, including their probity and complete independence, as well as their commitment to work in the public interest. Any member with a conflict of interest in a public tender must inform the President of the Special Commission. Article 44 also establishes a minimum number of members (quorum) for the Commission (1). Article 45 (Déroulement des séances et décisions de la Commission) lists the procedures that the Special Commission must follow when it conducts its meetings. Section 3, Article 45, stipulates that the meetings of the Special Commission are confidential. Hence, there is no transparency surrounding the activities of this de facto tender board (1).

Art. 45, Section 3. The Commission’s debates are secret. The members of the Commission and the persons who attend it in an advisory capacity are bound by professional secrecy. Documents and writings of any kind relating to a competitive bidding procedure may have no other use than their purpose, and persons who, by virtue of their duties, may be brought to know or keep it, are also bound by professional secrecy. No member may be disciplined prosecuted for statements made and votes cast during such meetings (1).

Evidence from the legal framework suggests there is de jure no transparency required of the Special Commission tasked with reviewing public tenders. The activities of the Special Commission are required to be secret.

Evidence dating to March 22, 2018, that the ANRMP published an Expression of Interest notice to verify that public tenders in 2017 complied with the provisions in the 2009 Code of Public Procurement. The bidding auditing company would have actual access to the details on tender specifications, the selection of suppliers and the final tender award for all public procurement in 2017 (1).

In theory, the National Authority of Regulation of Public Contracts (ANRMP) is tasked with carrying out audits of public tender procedures, as per Art. 15, Section 4, of the 2009 Code of Public Procurement:

“Article 15 – National Authority of Regulation of Public Contracts
The National Authority of Regulation of Public Contracts is tasked with: (2)
Ensuring the application and respect of the general principles governing public contracts;
2. Training actors in the fields of public procurement;
3. Monitoring and ensuring the proper functioning of the public procurement information system;
4. Conducting audits on public markets.” (1).

Research show no indications that a specific policy exists for procurement officials who prevent conflicts of interests [1]. This was confirmed by a DALO employee [2]. Of related relevance, research found that the DALO website contains an information page on policies that briefly spells out guidelines for employees’ reception of gifts, participation in private events and contact with suppliers [3]. These apply to all DALO employees and are based on the general Code of Conduct for public employees [4]. Research did indicate that a specific DALO policy on reception of gifts exists, but this is not publicly available and does not regulate conflicts of interests in defence tenders as such [5]. A ministerial circular letter regulates the obtainment and processing of tender bids made from current or former employees of the combine of Ministry of Defence [6]. According to the provision, such bids must be approved by the relevant governing authority and bidders are required to fully disclose their history and terms of employment within the Defence. Further, DALO officials are subject to the general national legislation and guidelines on incapacity and good governance which includes stipulations on the declaration of incapacity in case of conflict of interests [7, 8]. Also applicable to the public sector in general, officials with a leading position (above pay bracket 38), are required to notify their superior prior to accepting a role in the board of directors in stock-based cooperations etc. Decisions on whether or not the activity is compatible with the position is made on a concrete evaluation made by the Ministry of Defence after presentation to the Ministry of Finance [9, 2]. As all public officials are by law allowed to undertake secondary employment (“bibeskæftigelse”), this is prohibited if the secondary employment involves the risk of conflict of interests [10]. Research indicates no training of officials to prevent conflict of interests [11].

The IT system used within the Defence logs every action in the case work and as such there is a trail of every official’s involvement in the case work. The officials involved in larger cases appear in the procurement announcement in the Supplement to the Official Journal of the EU [1, 2].

Research could not identify publicly available internal tender board procedures, [1]. However, relevant legislation covering the area is fully transparent and publicly available (see for instance Q65A above) [2]. Further, DALO proved to be helpful and ready to provide comprehensive information when research assessed questions about procurement. This can be said to constitute, or at least promote, transparency.

The law on public tenders includes a section on technical specifications, however none of these regulations impose external verification measures [1]. Research found no indications that external verification of tender specifications is undertaken [2], and this was confirmed by a DALO employee [3]. However, many tenders are passed by external consultants – most often the attourneys to the state (“Kammeradvokaten”) – and adjusted to the appropriate wording [3].

Article 26 of the Public Authorities’ Contracts Law no. 182 (2018) and Article 136 of its executive regulations state that no employee in the entity involved in the procurement can apply for a tender either directly or indirectly. Further, the entity is not allowed to buy anything from the employee or ask them to carry out paid activities. However, neither the law nor the executive regulation mention anything about the provision of regular training to avoid conflict of interest (1), (2), (3).

It is difficult to assess whether there is an audit trail due to a lack of information, but even if there was an audit trail, access to it through oversight mechanisms would be severely restricted as a result of the wide exceptions granted to the defence sector in law (1), (2), (3).

According to our source, there is no transparency in Tender boards. The boards, even if they advertised publicly, in many cases, the source is known beforehand. Moreover, the process and the outcome are not made public and no justifications given on the selection of the source (1), (2). Articles 28-31 of Public Authorities’ Contract Law no. 182 of 2018 and Articles 15-17 and 22-28 of the law’s executive regulations address tender boards regulations (3). However, most of these regulations are unlikely to be strictly applied to the defence sector since the same law allows for tenders to be secret or single-sourced for “national security” reasons (Article 5) or in cases of necessity (Article 8). Furthermore, most ministerial websites have a section for tenders (including the Ministry of Military Production) except the Ministry of Defence which indicates the lack of transparency of tender board procedures (4), (5), (6).

There are wide exceptions granted to the defence sector provided for in the law, making external verification of tender specifications nearly impossible. For example, Law no. 204 of 1957 grants arms purchases all sorts of exceptions from any form of ex-ante scrutiny from the MoF or ex-post scrutiny from the CAA (1); the Public Authorities’ Contract Law no. 182 of 2018 grants the MOD and the MMP the power to make bidding processes secret (2); the president who almost always comes from a military background has the power to appoint and sack the president of the CAA. Al-Sisi exercised this power the only time in the history of the CAA that its president openly questioned the privileges granted to the security and defence sector in avoiding scrutiny (3).

The guidelines for ethical standards of conduct for the Procurement Committee are established by the Officials Code of Ethics, applicable to all government officials in Estonia. [1] The Code defines conflict of interest and stipulates which activities are prohibited in order to avoid corrupt activities, e.g. how to avoid conflicts of interest when leaving a public post. In addition, the Anti-Corruption Act [2] and Civil Service Act [3] regulate possible conflicts of interest. A candidate for a public position may be asked about economic and other interests for the purposes of the Anti-corruption Act. Training on ethics is provided to officials, but not regularly. [4]

In 2016, the institutions under the Ministry of Defence were assessed as the governmental entities that most violated the principles of transparency and verifiability. [1] The National Audit Office has received multiple recommendations from different institutions for conducting a more detailed and thorough audit. The Auditor General has admitted that the National Audit Office lacks specialised audits on specific issues. [2] Therefore, there is no comprehensive audit trail. The audits scrutinising the decisions by the tender boards are irregular and do not go into detail.

The Procurement Procedure is made public. As stipulated by the Public Procurement Plan, [1] the Procurement Procedure gives an overview of the areas of responsibility and timelines. It describes the procurement procedure in the Defence Investment Centre, but does not provide an overview of the code of conduct of the tender board. [2]

In 2016, the institutions under the Ministry of Defence were assessed as the governmental entities that most violated the principles of transparency and verifiability. [1] The National Audit Office has received multiple recommendations from different institutions for conducting a more detailed and thorough audit. The Auditor General has admitted that the National Audit Office lacks specialised audits on specific issues. [2] Therefore, there is no comprehensive audit trail. The audits scrutinising the decisions by the tender boards are irregular and do not go into detail.

The procurement process of the Defence Forces, inter alia the compilation of calls for bids and the comparison of the offers, is instructed in the purchase order of the Defence Forces. Offers are evaluated by named experts against the commercial, technical, and other requirements specified in the calls for bids. In the setting of the requirements, procurement legislation and other legislation relevant in terms of the object of the acquisition are taken into account.

Apart from incapacity provisions provided in law, no particular code of conduct for comparing the offers exist. The National Audit Office of Finland and the Finnish Competition and Consumer Authority have the right to inspect and monitor the procurement process of the Defence Forces and decisions concerning acquisition to the extent they deem appropriate. [1] This means that if there is or can be the appearance of a conflict of interest (for whatever professional or personal reason), the individual is by law obliged to recuse themselves.

The offers are evaluated by named experts against the commercial, technical, and other requirements specified in the calls for bids. In the setting of the requirements, procurement legislation and other legislation relevant in terms of the object of the acquisition have been taken into account. Apart from incapacity provisions provided in law, no particular code of conduct for comparing the offers exist. The National Audit Office of Finland and the Finnish Competition and Consumer Authority have the right to inspect and monitor the procurement process of the Defence Forces and decisions concerning acquisition to the extent they deem appropriate. [1]

Politicians are typically not involved in procurement decisions, but in very large procurements they make the formal decision, based on a proposal by the defence minister based on the FDF’s choice. Internal records of who was involved in which project are kept, in detail, but they are not public.

There is no public transparency over tender board procedures. Research could not identify any further information on this subject.

The National Audit Office of Finland and the Finnish Competition and Consumer Authority have the right to inspect and monitor the procurement process of the Defence Forces and decisions concerning acquisition to the extent they deem appropriate. [1] Verification is done internally as part of the procurement process.

Officials with a role in designing tender specifications, or in tender board decisions, are subject to general regulations that are designed to prevent conflict of interest: public agents, French or foreign, corrupted or corrupting, can face up to 10 years in prison and up to one million Euros in fines (or double the amount gained in the transaction), as stated in the “Sapin 2” law on transparency and anti-corruption of 2016. [1] According to Article 48 of Order n°2015-899 of July 23, 2015, people who create a situation of conflict of interest are excluded from public procurement. Conflict of interest is defined as “any situation in which a person who participates in or is likely to influence the outcome of the procurement process has, directly or indirectly, a financial, economic or other personal interest that could compromise his or her impartiality or its independence in the context of the public procurement procedure.” [2]

As a result of the 2016 Law on anti-corruption, a Decree on the management of financial instruments held by certain soldiers (audit agents for instance) of December 3, 2019, finalised the implementation of prevention and ethical control tools for the Ministry covering the most exposed positions of responsibility. While “declarations of interest” aim to prevent any conflict of interest for the agent and “declarations of assets” prevent the risk of undue enrichment during the term of a mandate or function, this decree supplements the existing one for certain civilians (secretary general for administration, general delegate for armaments) and for certain soldiers (chief of the defense staff and government commissioners in armaments companies). This is aimed at avoiding any “insider trading” by entrusting the public agent’s portfolio to a manager so that he cannot interfere in the purchases or sales of his securities. [3] [4]
This decree is currently awaiting the minister’s signature. [3]

Although no mention of a proper “training” was found for tender boards specifically, a charter of procurement does exists within the Ministry. [5]

In its investigations, the Cour des Comptes can have access, “a posteriori” and upon request to the MOAF, to an audit trail detailing individuals involved in setting tender specifications, supplier selection and contract awards. [1]
This information is not available to the public, media or CSOs. [2]

There is no Code of Conduct for tender boards. The existing legislation, the “Sapin 2” law [1] and order Order n°2015-899 of July 23, 2015 [2] are only partially transparent in the sense that specific rules apply to defence and security markets (Decree n°2016-361 of March 25, 2016 [3]), allowing non competitive and “non-publicised” (ie confidential) bidding.
In 2013, Cour des comptes criticised this lack of transparency in defence and security public procurement, specifically pointing at naval material maintenance contracts systematically granted to a French naval company, DCNS (82% of the time), most of them being signed without prior competition or publicity. [4]
More recent examples, such as the Balard case (favouritism in the choice of contractors for the building of the Ministry of Defence headquarters in 2015 [5]) and the ICS case currently being investigated by the PNF (overcharging of aerial transportation by a subcontractor of the Ministry of Defence being awarded contracts without proper competition [6]), show that transparency is far from being a steady component of defence and security tender boards and public procurement.

Members of the Defence Committees of the National Assembly and the Senate, or even mere parliamentarians part of an information mission can request information about competition procedure or purchase, but according to an expert interviewed (1), the ministry will only provide redacted versions of the contracts, as defence and security contracts can, by law, be awarded without competition and publicity.

The Cour des Comptes, however, has the power to scrutinize the cases of single/sole/restricted competition procedure selected or purchase. (2). The Court also states that scrutiny by the General Control of the Armies (CGA) “seems limited”. It adds: “The organization in place therefore allows, at any time, to ensure that the buyer obtains the services requested by the staffs at the best cost. It is based solely on the qualities of the buyers in place and not on governance rules that would ensure a balance of power in the procurement process. This situation is neither sound in terms of management and risk nor in line with the objectives of improving the quality of public spending” (page 18).
Within the ministry of Defence, there is a Costs Investigation Division (BEDC), with 32 investigators, in charge of verifying the margins and costs of providers holding a monopoly situation, but the Court regrets the lack of means (only 32 investigators when the American equivalent has 4000 and the British 390 investigators), of independence towards hierarchy at the ministry and of investigative powers (pages 21-22).

More recently, the Court published a report in January 2019 about the externalisation process of the French army, specifically within the framework of the Barkhane operation in Sahel (3). The Court denouncing “anomalies” in the signature and execution of contracts, faulty traceability in the payments made by the army, impediments to equal treatment of candidates, “weak monitoring” of contracts, “serious security risks” on Russian Mi-8 chartered helicopters, and even “threats and intimidation” on the military in charge of the purchases.

The contracting authorities are bound by the regulations under public procurement law, in particular the Act against Restraints of Competition (GWB), the Procurement Regulation (VgV), the Regulation on Sub-Threshold Procurement (UVgO) and the Procurement Ordinance for the Defence and Security Sector (VSVgV). Officials who are involved in designing tender specification or in tender board decisions are subject to regulations or codes of conduct that are designed to prevent conflicts of interest. Procurement officials are subject to restrictions on professional activity (e.g. shareholders of contracting firms, board members, advisors or company officers of private firms, post-employment positions/interests, etc.) and are required to file financial disclosure reports to demonstrate that neither the official nor their family have financial conflicts of interest in their work. Annual training is provided to procurement officials to avoid conflicts of interest [2,3].

This is described in great detail in Section 6 of the VgV (‘Avoiding Conflicts of Interest’): ‘Members of governing bodies or employees of the contracting authority or of a procurement service provider acting on behalf of the contracting authority who have a conflict of interest shall not participate in a procurement procedure. A conflict of interest shall be presumed to exist where the persons referred to in paragraph 1: 1) are candidates or tenderers, 2) advise or otherwise assist a candidate or tenderer or or represent them as legal representatives or only in the procurement procedure, 3) work for (a) a candidate or tenderer for remuneration or as a member of the Board of Directors, Supervisory Board or similar body, or (b) a company involved in the award procedure if this company also has business relationships with the client and the candidate or tenderer at the same time, unless there is no conflict of interest for the persons or the activities do not affect the decisions in the award procedure. (4) The presumption of Paragraph 3 shall also apply to persons whose relatives fulfil the requirements under Paragraph 3, numbers 1 to 3. Relatives are fiancés, spouses, life partners, family members and in-laws related by direct descent, siblings, children of siblings, spouses and life partners of siblings and siblings of spouses and life partners, siblings of parents as well as foster parents and foster children [4].

There is a comprehensive audit trail of which officials were involved in selecting suppliers and designing tender specification [1,2]. There is external verification that the particular specifications that have been included are necessary. There is an audit trail of which officials (including politicians) are involved in tender award decisions [3].

The client’s right to determine performance is limited by the requirement of product neutrality. A specific (not product-neutral) tender must be justified by the subject of the order. The justification must result from understandable, objective and order-related reasons. These can be checked as part of a review procedure before the procurement chamber [4].

Compliance with the procurement regulations by the federal in-house companies under​​ the BMVg, e.g. Army Repair Logistics (HIL GmbH), LH Bundeswehr Bekleidungsgesellschaft mbH (LHBw GmbH), the BwFuhrparkService GmbH and BWI Informationstechnik GmbH (BWI IT GmbH), is monitored for the shareholder by the BAAINBw [5].

Tender boards regulations and codes of conduct are partially transparent [1]. All arms reports go to Parliament [2,3,4]. As of January 2006, award procedures that are subject to publication are no longer published in the Federal Tender Gazette/German Tender Gazette, but on the central internet portal of the Federal Government (www.bund.de). If questions arise about a specific invitation to tender, the tendering contracting authority must be contacted directly. General information – on the award procedure, for instance – is transparent and can be found in the brochure entitled ‘The Bundeswehr as a Customer’ [5].

There is some external verification that the particular specifications of the tender are appropriate. However, there appears to be a lack of evidence of tender board decisions being audited [1,2]. Furthermore, according to Articles 155ff and 171ff of the Act against Restraints of Competition, there is also the possibility of an independent review of the decision of the tender boards to ensure a fair process [3]. There are various ISO certifications that are regularly checked or audited by external bodies. But these are not explicitly procurement issues and there is no information available regarding who is responsible for external auditing. In the end, there is no authority in public procurement law that generally checks compliance. Bidders must report violations – in line with the expression ‘where there’s no plaintiff, there’s no judge’. Still, critics argue that there is a lack of a central control and coordination of tenders [4].

The Public Procurement Act (2003), does account and provide checks for the conduct of officials. Although not explicitly linked to the GAF, this is guides all members of Ghanaian public offices. Furthermore, the powers of the Public Accounts Committee of Parliament are part of the systems in place that are designed to check the conduct of officials of the Defence Tender Board (DTC) which is often headed by the sector minister or his deputy (1), (2).

Studies of other sectors have shown that conflicts of interest are pervasive in procurement in Ghana. Defence procurement is particularly opaque, so there’s no evidence that the DTC is checked for conflicts of interest (3).

It’s very difficult for oversight agencies to access a comprehensive audit trail, particularly regarding hardware (1), (2).

There is hardly any transparency at least from the perspectives of CSOs and most parliamentarians, particularly from opposition members, and the Parliamentary Select Committee on Defence and Interior (1), (2).

There is some verification by oversight agencies that the particular specifications of the tender are appropriate, but it is not comprehensive (1), (2). This is due in part to an incomplete audit trail.

Officials involved in tender board decisions are subject to regulations and a code of conduct which are designed to prevent conflicts of interest [1, 2]. Procurement officials may be subject to some vague restrictions on professional activity but no training is provided. Although conflict of interest legislation was first introduced in 2016 with Law 4440/201647, regulating both the period “before” and “after” taking up a senior public official position, the legal framework is rather ambiguous and without clear provisions on sanctions [3]. According to Law 4622/2019, the cooling-off period after taking office is only a year (Article 73). However, senior public officials, including procurement officials, their spouses, partners and children, are required to submit a declaration of financial interest for three years from the date of termination of their duties (Article 73) [3].

There is some audit trail of which officials were involved in selecting suppliers and designing tender specification however, this doesn’t always extend to tender award decisions nor include politicians [1, 2, 3].

Tender board regulations and codes of conduct are fully transparent. The Ministry of Defence’s General Directorate for Defence Investments and Armaments has produced a register of defence material manufacturers according to Law 3433/2006 and Law 3978/2011 [1]. Potential suppliers are obliged to offer the relevant information before joining the register. Executive Order 3/2008 sets terms and conditions for training, compliance and implementation [2].

There is no external verification that the particular specifications of the tender are appropriate. The Tender committee, consisting of MOD personnel, is responsible to approve specifications (Article 86 of Law 3978/2011) [1, 2].

The Ministry of Defence (MoD) has a multi-level procurement system. However, in former consultations with Deputy State Secretary Siklósi in 2017, he has highlighted that due to the minimal level of procurements the central unit responsible for procurements is understaffed and has no experience in managing high-value procurements. There is no evidence available that suggests tender members/ officials get any appropriate anti-corruption training.
Despite this fact, from the second half of 2017 until 2018, the MoD has announced more development and procurement of weapon systems then the total volume for the last decade. The Defence Procurement Directorate of the Bureau for Defence Economy is responsible for managing the tender cycle [1]. The officials of the bureau are subject to the Code of Military Ethics. According to source 6 [2], tender boards are put together on an ad hoc basis depending on the subject of the procurement consisting the members of the Defence Procurement Directorate, the responsible branch of the army and representatives of the political leadership. Members of the evaluation committee have to provide a declaration of property, a declaration in writing concerning conflict of interest in respect of the given procedure. There is a code of conduct available and restrictions on professional activity. Depending on the procurements, regulations vary but the most relevant law from a military perspective is the XXX/2016 Law on Defence and Security related procurements [3]. According to the legislation, the board should consist of at least three people and has to provide a written evaluation of the bids. Although according to the law members of the evaluation committee should be independent of the contractor (ministry), source 6 highlighted this is rarely the case.

For major military procurements, there is no audit trail [1]. Neither the total value of the procurements have been made public recently, nor any details relating to an internal audit procedure.

There is no public information on the operation and composition of tender boards availble online. Source 6 described their operation as ad hoc and non transparent [1].

The 320/2015. (X. 30) government decree on the monitoring and authorisation of public procurements does not require the scrutiny of the specification of public procurements [1]. The scrutiny outlined in the decree only focuses on legal issues. Moreover, procurement related to miltiary equipment and sensitive items are exempt from this decree [1].

Officials with a role in designing tender specification, or in tender board decisions, are subject to clear regulations and codes of conduct that are designed to prevent conflict of interest [1]. The 2017 Manual for Procurement of Goods outlines the Code of Integrity for Public Procurement (CIPP) and states that:

“Procuring authorities as well as bidders, suppliers, contractors and consultants should observe the highest standard of ethics and should not indulge in the following prohibited practices, either directly or indirectly, at any stage during the procurement process or during execution of resultant contracts:
i) Corrupt practice
ii) Fraudulent practice
iii) Anti-competitive practice
iv) Coercive practice
v) Conflict of interest
vi) Obstructive practice” [2]

There is evidence of procurement officials undergoing training at the National Institute of Financial Management. Training provided is ‘basic’ and advanced, and is delivered throughout the year [3][4]. Procurement officials are prohibited from having financial or business transactions with a bidding firm, therefore any professional activity. They are obliged suo-moto to proactively declare any conflicts of interest [5].

Tender boards are subject to regular auditing by the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG). The Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) conducts regular review meetings and conducts a technical examination of public procurement. It consults the Ministry and the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI). It is unclear if the audit trail comprehensively states names of all officials, including politicians, who were involved in tender award decisions [1][2].

Tender board regulations, codes of conduct and procedures seem to be fully transparent [1][2][3][4].

Tender boards are subject to regular auditing by CAG. The CVC conducts regular review meetings and conducts a technical examination of public procurement. It consults the Ministry and the CBI. [1][2].

The tender specifications for arms procurement are formulated by the Commitment-Making Officials (Pejabat Pembuat Komitmen, PPK) as the Indonesian tender board committee, in accordance with technical specification requirements and the list of prospective suppliers provided by the Directorate General of Defence Strength (Ditjen Kuathan) as the manager of weapon systems (pembina alutsista) [1]. Members of the PPK are assigned by the Minister of Defence (as Budget User, PA) or the Ministry of Defence Secretary General, Chief of TNI and each force’s Chief of Staff (as Proxy of Budget User, KPA), as detailed in Article 7 of Minister of Defence Regulation 16/2019 [2]. They are required to sign the Integrity Pact, hold procurement certification, never been involved in collusion, corruption, and nepotism, as well as not serve as a financial manager (see Article 9 of the same regulation) [2]. In 2015, the government mandated that all officials ranked Echelon-III and above – which includes civil servant procurement officials – must submit reports on the assets of state civil apparatus (LHKASN) [3]. One interviewee said that, since 2018, military personnel of a level equivalent to Echelon III are subject to mandatory asset reports [4], which implies that military personnel serving as members of the PPK are also included in this. However, no regulation can be found to support the interviewee’s statement. Members of the PPK receive annual technical training on good governance and general services in procurement procedures from the Agency for Education and Training Ministry of Defence (Badiklat) [5,6]. The training includes additional lectures from the KPK on corruption and criminal acts of corruption (tindak pidana korupsi) related to goods and service procurement. Every year, around 30 procurement personnel with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel or Colonel, or of a level equivalent to Echelon III, have to attend the three-month, in-house course.

There is not enough evidence to score this indicator; as such, it is marked ‘Not Enough Information’.The PPK and the procurement committee are subject to supervision carried out by the Inspectorate in the form of a pre-audit of the evaluation results of the bid and a pre-audit before signing contracts. The first pre-audit checks the qualification assessment, bid evaluation, negotiation and readiness to implement a Procurement Evaluation Team (Tim Evaluasi Pengadaan/TEP) hearing (if necessary). The second pre-audit checks the fairness of prices, conformity of technical specifications and completeness/accuracy of contract clauses. In the case of a procurement contract worth over 100 billion rupiahs, a meeting is conducted by the TEP (see Article 51 of Minister of Defence Regulation No. 16/2019) [1]. The TEP is formed by the Minister of Defence to provide recommendations for deciding prospective winners. The audits are conducted in accordance with regulations [2]. It is unclear from the information available if there is an audit trail that oversight agencies can access, which details all officials involved in the tender process and award decisions.

The regulation on procurement [1] does not contain any standalone articles that address tender board regulations or codes of conduct, but there is an obligation to submit an Integrity Pact and fulfil the requirements of the Procurement Certificate. Compliance with PPK requirements is supervised internally by the PA/KPA. The assignment of personnel in PPK and ULP in arms procurement is not usually announced, especially if the procurement is not included in the General Procurement Plan Information System (Sistem Informasi Rencana Umum Pengadaan/SiRUP) list in the LKPP. This makes the information difficult for the public to access. Our interviewee cannot confirm the existence of a code of conduct [2].

There selection of defence equipment technical specifications. The first is the supervision of specification modification by the PPK and the second is the supervision/audit by internal auditors. However, the PPK (the committee that carries out the procurement process), which determines the technical specifications, also acts as supervisor for the Technical Specification Relevance Test. The PPK determines the technical specifications, which are tested if the Technical Specification Relevance Test is deemed necessary, i.e. if a technical specification is more than one year old or needs to be validated according to the User Technical Guidance. The technical specification testing is carried out with the latest technological developments and in compliance with the operational requirements and it involves carrying out an analysis of possible uses of the domestic product, as detailed in Article 13 of Minister of Defence Regulation No. 16/2019 [1]. The Technical Specification Relevance Test is carried out by the Technical Specification Evaluation Team appointed by the PPK. The audit is part of the monitoring required by Article 69 of the Minister of Defence Regulation No. 16/2019 [1], which is conducted internally by the Inspectorate General of the Ministry of Defence as in-house auditor. One interviewee said that internal verification is required in special cases, for instance, when there are urgent procurement needs under time constraints, making it difficult to find a fair price [2]. The urgent procurement is carried out by inviting the Financial and Development Supervisory Agency of the Republic of Indonesia (BPKP) to assess the fairness of prices. In addition, it is also carried out by inviting the LKPP to provide suggestions regarding the procurement mechanism or process.

The primary regulation governing tender boards is the Law on Tenders of the Armed Forces. This law allows for the setting up of a tenders committee and specifies the duties of the tender committee; there are no provisions in it governing the behaviours of the officials who have a role in designing tender specifications [1]. The transaction concluded in the tenders regulation is also governed by the Civil Code; this code specifies provisions with regards to the conclusion of a contract, not provisions related to tendering [2]. Officials are not known to be subject to any code of conduct to prevent conflict of interest.

While the General Inspection Organisation (GIO) can supervise and inspect the administrations of the armed forces [1], there is no evidence that audits of these institutions have taken place. There are no indications that audits of tender boards in the defence sector are undertaken. There is no audit trail detailing individuals involved in setting tender specifications, supplier selection and tender award [2, 3, 4].

Tender board regulations are only partially transparent. There is a procedure for the armed forces to follow, and this is set out in the tender law for the armed forces, which is publically available, but, there is no code of conduct related to tender procedures [1].

While the General Inspection Organisation (GIO) can supervise and inspect the administrations of the armed forces [1], there is no evidence that audits of these institutions have taken place. There are no indications that audits of tender boards in the defence sector are undertaken. There is no audit trail detailing individuals involved in setting tender specifications, supplier selection and tender award [2, 3, 4].

Before tenders can be issued/uploaded on the relevant company site and or, the Iraqi Tenders Directory, the product in pursuit must be studied and measured against a needs assessment. Under the ‘Government Contracts Implementation Instructions’ guide (1), each state ministry bears responsibility for publishing tenders specific to them, that tender committees advertise across three official newspapers. These matters are handled by specialised committees formed for that purpose. Suppliers must be registered and vetted by respective authorities. Fair competition is important to the process to regulate and prevent political preferences from skewing bidding opportunities for suppliers. A procurement official told Transparency International “in spite of these rulings, procurement rules are poorly drafted” (2). While a code of conduct specific to the security/military sector could not be tracked online, the procurement official stated that a code of conduct does exist and prohibits conflicts of interest. “Officials are expected to report wrongdoings which does not always happen to protect benefactors” (2). A lawyer interview for the assessment added that successful bidders “could be anyone with the highest authority inside the respective ministry acting to secure kickbacks” (3). This is corroborated in one report which labels regulations and the associated tendering process as “opaque” and “not specifically the result of government policy” (4). The evidence presented puts into serious doubt the existence of tender board regulations and the need for training; prescribed into law, but not necessarily upheld in resolution to conflicts of interest.

Responsibility to ensure procurement methods do not unfairly discriminate against any firm falls under the tender bid-evaluation committees established inside each ministry for this purpose (5). Their powers extend to conducting audits, but officials, as the guide states, should, at a minimum, be a third-ranking ministerial procurement official and ought to have undergone specialised training provided by the COI and Iraq’s Anti-Corruption Academy (6). Furthermore, failure by state employees — which applies to tender officials, by extension — to report the abuse of power is considered a crime under Article 247 of the Penal Code (MoJ). One interviewee (7) rejects the assessment that procedures are abided by, citing substantive difficulties that face anti-graft watchdog bodies and inspector general’s placed inside ministry’s to prevent, detect and report irregularities related to financial activities and the procurement process. Inspector General’s face recurrent accusations of ineffectualness, lacking the most basic prerequisite as graft-bodies; independence and defending the interests of political parties (8), (9).

GI’s have defended themselves against such charges and COI head Hassan al-Yasiri, recently stood against calls to abolish the IG system (10). The interviewee (3) added that the evaluation process is confidential (in Article 7 of Implementing Regulation for Governmental Contracts) particularly as far as defence contracts are concerned, disputing the extent to which procurement procedures and regulations are abided. “There are shadowy networks that operate through sub-contractors and non-state actors, who are not bound by legal obligations,” the interviewee (3) told TI.

Preference, when it comes to the awarding of tenders, under Iraqi law, ought to be granted to SOEs which can “distort competition” (4). Government-issued tender in energy offers firm evidence of this, wherein projects have not materialised because funds have been siphoned or incompetent labour force or ghost firms have been awarded the tender.

Regulations and tender specifications adopted by the MoD internal tender committee are not subject to external verification. As Transparency International’s 2015 assessment notes, the responsibility for auditing defence sector tendering falls to the IG (1). The objectivity of GOI investigations and audits has been widely questioned (2). Raed Jouhi, the acting GI in Iraq’s MoD, served as the GOI for the Ministry of Planning and Foreign Affairs prior to his appointment in October 2016, which raises questions over his ability to preserve independence from the political parties attached to the ministries he has previously served (1). While the IG is intended to file audit reports, internal oversight of tendering and tender specifications are not guided by legal criteria.

“Responsibility to ensure procurement methods do not unfairly discriminate against any one firm, falls under the tender bid-evaluation committees established inside each ministry for this purpose” (1). Their powers extend to conducting audits, but officials, as the guide states, should, at a minimum, be a third-ranking ministerial procurement official and ought to have undergone specialised training provided by the COI and Iraq’s Anti-Corruption Academy (2), (3), (4). Furthermore, failure by state employees — which applies to tender officials — to report the abuse of power is considered a crime under Article 247 of the Penal Code (MoJ). One interviewee (5) rejects the assessment that procedures are abided by, citing substantive difficulties that face anti-graft watchdog bodies and inspector general’s placed inside ministry’s to prevent, detect and report irregularities related to financial activities and the procurement process. IG’s face recurrent accusations of ineffectualness, lacking the most basic prerequisite as graft-bodies; independence and defending the interests of political parties. GI’s have defended themselves against such charges and COI head Hassan al-Yasiri, recently stood against calls to abolish the IG system (6). The interviewee added that the evaluation process is confidential (under Article 7 of Implementing Regulation for Governmental Contracts) particularly as far as defence contracts are concerned, disputing the extent to which procurement procedures and regulations abide. “There are shadowy networks that operate through sub-contractors and non-state actors, who are not bound by legal obligations,” the interviewee (5) told TI.

Regulations and tender specifications adopted by MoD internal tender committee are not subject to external verification. As Transparency International’s 2015 assessment notes, the responsibility for auditing defence sector tendering falls to the IG [1]. The objectivity of GOI investigations and audits has been widely questioned [2] Raed Jouhi, the acting GI in Iraq’s MoD, served as as the GOI for the Ministry of Planning and foreign affairs prior to his appointment in October 2016 which raises questions over his ability to preserve independence from the political parties attached to the ministries he has previously served [1] While the IG is intended to file audit reports, internal oversight of tendering and tender specifications are not guided beneath a legal criteria.

Ministry of Defence tenders are regulated by the Tender Law and its provisions in relation to conflicts of interest. Officials with a role in designing tender specification, or in tender board decisions, are subject to regulations that are designed to prevent conflict of interest (1). Tender approval requires two signatures with appropriate level of authority and then it will go to another stage of approval by a higher authority. Procurement officials are subject to restrictions on professional activity (e.g., shareholders of contracting firms, board member, advisor, or company officer of private firm, post-employment, etc.) but are not required to file financial disclosure reports. Before they can hold their position, tender board members, as well as the members of committees who approve exemptions from tenders, are required to answer a questionnaire regarding conflicts of interest, in which they specify information regarding their activities, and the relevant activities of their relatives. Before a nomination for boards and committees is approved, the nominee’s answers to the questionnaire are reviewed in order to ensure that they have no conflict of interest. If a nominee is found to have a potential conflict of interest regarding a certain aspect of the committee’s work, the member is replaced on the board by a deputy (2). This also applies for the Tender Exemption Committee, although it should be noted than in this case, the member appoints a deputy themself, which may not wholly avoid the risk of a conflict of interest (3).
Annual training is provided to procurement officials to avoid conflicts of interest (4). The case of Brigadier General Rami Dotan in 1990 was a rare case in which Dotan found a gap in the system that allowed him to use the tender process for his personal profit (5). These gaps were identified and closed and the system reinforced (6). However the internal procedures and checks and balances are not transparent to the public.

There is a comprehensive audit trail of which officials were involved in selecting suppliers and designing tender specification (1) (2). There is external verification that the particular specifications that have been included are necessary. There is an audit trail of which officials (including politicians) are involved in tender award decisions. Decisions of the committee are recorded in official minutes which are signed by committee members, providing a reliable audit trial of the members involved (3).

The tender boards regulations and codes of conduct are public available and transparent (1) (2) (3). The Ministry of Defence provides a lot of information about processes and results, however it seems that it does not take place on a regular basis (1).

Tender specifications undergo an examination by the oversight unit within the administration of procurement, and in certain cases by the legal department. As to external scrutiny of the specifications – after the specifications have been approved within the MOD they are published to the public for questions and comments. Comments are taken into account and sometimes lead to changes and adjustments of the tender (1). However, there remains no mechanism for external scrutiny of tender specifications by a designated body with the expertise to exercise informed oversight.

The Italian legislation forbids the presence of any conflict of interest in any phase of tenders. Article 42 of the Code for Public Procurement (article 42 [1] prohibits the presence of personnel that might be directly involved in any of the contract to be performed. More specifically, there is a case of conflict of interest if there is a direct involvement of the personnel of the public administration with one of the entities participating in the call for tenders, or an indirect involvement (spouse, partner, cohabitee, relatives and in-laws up to second degree, or of people with whom the public servant has habitual relationships) as pursuant to art. 7 Decree of the President of the Republic 13 April 2013, n. 62 [2]. In addition, according to Art. 77 of the Code for public procurement, the sole commissioner responsible for the management of the contract for all its phases cannot perform any other administrative activity or cover any other technical role related to the contract (s)he is responsible for [3].

As indicated in the Three Year plan for the prevention of corruption of the ministry of Defence [4] all members of the tender’s board need to present a “substitutive declaration on conflict of interest” (Dichiarazione sostitutiva sul conflitto di interessi) to be presented and checked before the appointment is conferred. Should any conflict of interest arise during any of the tender’s phases, administrative case-law clarifies that all members of the tender’s board need to be substituted [5].

Board members also receive specialist training on corruption and transparency, as indicated in the three-year anticorruption plan for roles with high risk of corruption [6].

Trails of administrative, judicial and economic aspects of contracts are performed by the analysis service of industrial and benchmarking costs according to art. 84 of the decree of the President of the Republic 90/2010 [1] and Legislative decree 66/2010 [2]. Among the five persons carrying out the analysis service, law provides for the presence of two magistrates. However, no further information on the work of the service is publicly accessible on the website of the ministry. Nevertheless, on the website of the Ministry of Defence the composition of tender boards are specified therefore it is possible to trace which officials were involved in selecting suppliers and designing tender specification [3] [4] [5].

It is also possible to publicly acces documents pertaining: the exclusion, admission and selection of the economic actors; the authorisation to award contracts and post information acts on the results of the awarding porcedures [6].

In relation to the audit trail, in the contracts [7] of the administration there is the mention of the necessity, for the supplier, to present electronic invoices, persuant to Decree n. 55 of 3 April 2013 of the Ministry of Economy and Finance [8]. Payments are made within 60 days, by means of traceble payment methods, as mentioned in law 136/2010 [9]. On the website of the Ministry of Defence it is possible to access annual summary of the amounts paid for each contract [10], but no further document is publicly accessible.

Information on the code of conduct of members of the tender boards is publicly available. Nonetheless, given the fact that different legislations apply, one cannot find all relevant documentations on the website of the Ministry of Defence [1] [2] [3] [4]

Administrative and accounting controls have to be performed for all acts generating financial effects for the budget of the State, as regulated by art. 5 of legislative decree n. 123/2011 [1].

Controls over the legitimacy of contracts are performed by the Court of Auditors, particularly for contracts awarded with a negotiated procedure [2]. In addition, the Court of Auditors has control processes over all contracts with a value exceeding the threshold in the defence sector, as identified by EU legislation [3] [4].

Additional controls are performed by the national anticorruption authority as indicated in the “regulation on the performance of supervision activities on public contracts” of 2018 [5]. Scrutiny of tender specifications also occurs in advance of contract award. It also includes assessing the appropriateness of procedures and the suitability of the foreseen economic efforts.

Different types of defence equipment are selected through different procedures. The Ministry of Finance found that the procedures for selecting major types of equipment by the Ministry of Defence was most formalised for aircraft. [1] Chiefs of Staff will propose to purchase a type of aircraft to the Minister of Defence (MOD). The Minister will consult with an advisory committee chaired by the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defence, with members from among the relevant Chiefs of Staff and the Ministry, and thereafter request tenders from qualified businesses. The Minister can also ask the US government for a tender. After tenders have been received and considered, the Chiefs of Staff will propose to select one of them, and the Minister, after consulting with the advisory committee, will select a tender and order aircraft from the business that submitted it. Other major categories of equipment are often selected by the staff of a service branch, with a less comprehensive assessment of bids. [2] In addition, major equipment procuring institutions, such as the Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency (ATLA) [3] and Japan’s eight Regional Defence Bureaus, establish tender boards that select bids submitted in competitive bidding as well as through discretionary forms of bidding (single source or restricted competition). [4] All personnel who work with procurement must follow the instructions of a Circular that aims to ensure fairness. Specifically, they must not make call for tender documents that favor a certain bidder, [5] they must inform the head of their institution if they meet representatives of defence equipment producers, and if they have favoured some businesses over others, they must take corrective measures such as cancelling a tender or sharing information equally with all businesses. [6] They must reject any pressure to favour a specific business, and report to the head of their institution if they are exposed to pressure from the business. [7] All officials of the Ministry of Defence [8] and the Self-Defence Force (SDF), [9] whether or not they work with procurement, are in principle banned from having executive positions or being consultants for companies or other for-profit organisations, or from running such an organisation themselves (see Q33A). Article 65 of the SDF Law regulates post-separation employment for the large majority of permanently employed SDF personnel, both civil servants in the MOD and SDF officials (uniformed personnel). [10] Both retired civil servants in the MOD and retired SDF officials are banned from providing services to help a current or former employee of their agency find a job in a private company. They may not provide information with the purpose of becoming employed or request reemployment by a company with which their agency has a conflict of interest. They may not request services from the part of their agency in which they have been employed for two years after retirement. SDF personnel must in addition file a report to the Minister of Defence if they are reemployed by certain categories of businesses. [11] There are, however, some exceptions to these rules on post-separation employment. The Ministry may assist employees with a mandatory retirement age below 60 to find a new job. [12] Several laws and ordinances in a list of such documents dealing with procurement in the Compliance Guidance (for supervisors) were searched, and no such rules were found that apply specifically to officials with a role in designing tender specifications. [13] Among the laws and ordinances searched, the most extensive rules about financial disclosure are found in the SDF Personnel Ethics Act. Officials at the rank of Major or above must report every third month of any items of a value above Y5,000 that they have received from a business operator. [14] SDF personnel at the rank of Deputy Director General or above must submit an annual report of their stock transactions [15] and of their gross income. The latter must include information about their timber income and payment of gift tax. [16] Members of the Tender Monitoring Boards, which perform an oversight function in procuring institutions such as the Regional Defence Bureaus [17] may not deal with matters in which they or any kinsman of the third degree of consanguinity has an interest. To provide personnel with the necessary training to meet all these challenges, the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defence has issued instructions that all personnel who work with procurement are to receive training in preventing collusive bidding at least once a year. [18] However, only officials of a high rank are obliged to file financial disclosure reports.

Information on which officials were involved in selecting suppliers, designing tender specifications and awarding contracts is not disclosed to the public. This information is not found on the MOD homepages on central procurement [1] or of the Regional Defence Bureaus [2] or in the reports of the Tender Monitoring Boards. [3] Other evidence indicates that oversight organisations can receive this information from several institutions. A circular specifies which executives are to participate in the selection of aircraft, whereas this is not clear for the selection of equipment by the staff offices (see Q65A). An audit trail might therefore be more difficult to trace in the latter organisations. Each of the nine Regional Defence Bureaus have established Tender Monitoring Boards, which are to examine the process of awarding qualification to bid, selection of a winning bidder as well as selection of the winner of a discretionary contract. [4] If there is suspicion of collusive bidding, they are to interview the head of the procuring institution, and if necessary, the head of the regional defence bureau as well. [5] An examination of a random sample of Tender Monitoring Boards of the Regional Defence Bureaus showed that they generally meet to examine tenders once every third month. [3] Reports from these boards that are made public are redacted, but audit organisations should be able to trace an audit trail with the aid of the tender boards. However, a search of the websites of the MOD, [6] ATLA [7] and the three Staff Offices [8] [9] [10] showed no evidence that they have tender monitoring boards. Without confirmation that these institutions have tender boards, it cannot be assumed that oversight agencies will be able to gain access to a comprehensive audit trail. Given the lack of available information on this issue, this indicator cannot be scored and is marked ‘Not Enough Information’.

As pointed out in a report by the Ministry of Finance, procedures for the selection of aircraft by the Ministry of Defence [1] require the setting of more comprehensive requirements and a more thorough assessment of tenders than for selection of other equipment by the service branch staffs. [2] Aircraft procurement procedures are often subject to outside political pressure as well, often within the US-Japan alliance (see Q75). For other types of equipment, although performance tests are conducted, the assessment of tenders is less comprehensive. Rules or considerations not made open may play a role, and the process is not fully transparent. [3] Circulars that apply to staff who work with procurement emphasise treating businesses with fairness [4] and avoiding collusive bidding. [5] They can be downloaded from the webpages of the MOD. Two categories of documents with regulations for the tender monitoring boards can be downloaded from the MOD’s database for laws and ordinances. They are the circular “On guidelines for the establishment of Tender Monitoring Boards” [6] and a set of largely identical regulations for tender monitoring boards in the different Regional Defence Bureaus, of which the regulations for the Hokkaido Tender Monitoring Board are representative. [7] According to the Circular on Tender Monitoring Boards, these boards are to examine the process of awarding qualification to bid, selection of a winning bidder as well as selection of the winner of a discretionary contract (see Q65B). Furthermore, rules emphasise that board members are to behave fairly [7] and not reveal secrets they learn as members of the board. Meetings are to be closed and the following is to be made public through the Regional Defence Bureau’s public information counter and its homepages: names and occupations of the board members, the agenda items of its meetings and the content of the opinions, advice and reports submitted by the board to the head of the Regional Defence Bureau. More detailed rules for implementing the circular can be issued by the Director General of the Bureau of Defence Buildup Planning, MOD and the head of the Regional Defence Bureau. The regulations for the Hokkaido Tender Monitoring Board are based on the Circular on Tender Monitoring Boards. The regulations for Hokkaido stipulate how frequently meetings should be held and how far in advance of meetings board members should receive different types of documents. The board can express its opinions and give advice to the head of the Regional Defence Bureau, primarily about the process of awarding applicants the qualification to bid, of selecting winning bidders and of selecting winners of discretionary contracts. One article gives details on how a secretariat is to be set up for the board. Other rules for the operation of the board are to be decided by its chairperson and for the operation of the secretariat by the head of the secretariat. The degree of transparency thus varies for different categories of tender boards.

A circular on procuring aircraft provides some procedures for external verification of tender specifications, whereas two circulars on procurement by the MSDF provide none. There are therefore good grounds to believe that the procedure for determining tender specifications is not publicly known in full. However, one example (see Q63C) indicates that tender specifications are determined before a procurement is put into the budget. Disagreement between the MSDF staff and the internal bureaus of the MOD about what type of multipurpose helicopter the MSDF needed in order to perform its duties seems to have caused a stalemate which led to no such helicopters being procured during FY2014 – FY2018, even though it was stipulated in the MTDP for those years that Japan was to procure such helicopters. In line with this, a professor who is an expert on Japanese defence procurement answered at interview that the assessment of whether procurement meets the requirements set in the National Defence Program Guidelines is primarily done through Diet deliberation and when the Ministry of Finance checks budget requests. [1] During the years covered by this research, the Ministry of Finance made the draft of the budget proposal, based on budget requests from the MOD and other government agencies (see Q12B). The Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy (CEFP), a committee that gives advice to the Prime Minister, assessed the economic aspects of the budget proposal. The ruling parties LDP and Komeito also considered the budget proposal and could propose changes to bring it in line with the strategy followed and other requirements. After the Cabinet had adopted the budget proposal it was assessed by the Diet committees responsible for defence affairs and for the budget. All general account budget proposals, which include the defence budget, for the years covered by this research were passed by the Diet without amendments (see Q13B). Nevertheless, the Security Committee, Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee and the Budget Committee in each House of the Diet discussed the strategic rationale for specific procurements (see Q13B and Q2D). According to a circular on aircraft procurement, each Chief of Staff may invite business operators to provide information and opinions necessary for determining operational requirements, the required performance and a request for proposals for a procurement. Before holding a meeting where businesses can provide such information, the Ministry of Defence is to post a notice with information about the meeting on its website. [2] Rules about procurement by the MSDF are available in two lengthy circulars. One of the circulars presents instructions on how to determine the performance required of equipment to be procured [3] and who is to sit on a committee that determines the required performance of equipment. [4] The other describes rules for how to place an order for procurement. [5] No participation by parties outside the MSDF in assessing tender specifications is mentioned in either of these two circulars. Before a procuring institution within the Ministry of Defence can place an order for procurement, it must make a Basic Procurement Plan for the Fiscal Year beginning on April 1 with a list of the equipment that it plans to procure and submit it to the Minister of Defence before the 20th in the preceding month (March). [6] This will allow the Minister to check that the procurement is in line with the strategy and requirements that underlie the procurement plans that have gone into the budget. To place an order for procurement, an institution must thereafter submit a request and a document with technical specifications to an official for Treasury obligation. [7] Selection of a contract party that will deliver the equipment takes place after this. [8] Inadequacies with the procurement may be raised after the contract has been signed. This includes inadequacies with the technical specifications, in which case the Commissioner of ATLA is to consult with the institution that requested the procurement about changing the procurement contract. [9] In addition, the official for Treasury at ATLA is to consult with the institution that requested the procurement before approving texts, drawings, photographs or model products made by the contracting business operator according to the technical specifications for the procurement order. [10] The Tender Monitoring Boards (see Q65B), assess the bidding process and selection of winners of open competition contracts and discretionary contracts and discuss cases of suspected collusion. This provides an assessment, after the bidding process is over, of whether the specifications of the tender were appropriate for promoting fair competition. All Regional Defence Bureaus have tender monitoring boards, but evidence of having such boards was not found for all procuring institutions (see Q65B). None of the Councils listed on the homepages of the MOD operate as a third party council that stands above the Tender Monitoring Boards. Thus, political actors, such as the ruling parties and Members of the Diet, provide some verification that procurement plans are aligned with the strategy and requirements. Business operators give information and opinions that can provide some external verification that tender specifications for aircraft are appropriate. The Minister of Defence approves the Basic Procurement Plan and therefore also provides some verification from the perspective of a political representative. When a procuring institution places an order for procurement, it must attach tender specifications, and there will thus be grounds to stop orders that are not in line with the Basic Procurement Plan. A dispute resolution mechanism allows ATLA or the ordering institution to intervene if the tender specifications turn out to be inadequate. Tender monitoring boards provide assessment that the tender specifications promote competition. This process ensures that many aspects of the tender specifications, including alignment with the strategy and requirements, are considered by various actors external to the SDF. Procedures for external verification were not found for all tender specifications, although, as noted, additional external verification may be conducted without being publicly known.

Military Supplies Law No. 3 of the year 1995, and Military Works System No. 4 of the year 1995, which are the main legislations concerned with defence procurement in Jordan, do not include any reference to either corruption or conflict of interest [1, 2]. It has already been established that in 2017, the Jordanian Armed Forces announced the launch of their Code of Conduct and the Ethics of Senior Officers [3]. However, the Code of Conduct is not available online or to the public. Media reporting around the Code of Conduct mentions that it includes regulations on bribery, gifts and hospitality, and conflicts of interest [4]. The Armed Forces Radio Station, Jaysh FM, produced a video and launched it on its YouTube channel about the Code of Conduct. The video includes some information about the Code of Conduct [5], however, it is, to a great extent, a combination of Law No. 35 of the year 1966, Officers Service Law of the Armed Forces, issued in accordance with article 126 of the Jordanian Constitution [6], and the Military Penal Code. It is important to note here that there are articles within Law No. 35 of the year 1966, Officers Service Law of the Armed Forces, that sanction specific practices which could potentially lead to conflict of interest. Law No. 35 of the year 1966, applies to military defence personnel, and this could imply that civilian personnel such as those sitting on tender boards are not subject to the same law. Although Law No. 35 of the year 1966, sanctions practices that could potentially constitute conflict of interest, this does not mean that this applies to civilian personnel, neither does it mean that it applies to tender boards specifically.

There are no oversight mechanisms for defence, whether in relation to decisions, budgets, expenditure or purchases and contracting. For this reason, it is impossible to assess oversight in relation to audit trails, as defence institutions are not subject to oversight in the first place. Even though there are governmental entities that could be mandated with providing oversight for defence procurement, such as the Audit Bureau, the Ministry of Finance, the Parliament’s Financial Committee and the integrity and anti-corruption commission [1, 2, 3, 4, 5], none of these entities have oversight power for defence procurement.

There are no specific regulations and codes of conduct that are concerned with the conduct of tender boards. Despite the fact that Military Supplies System No. 3 of the year 1995, and Military Works Law No. 4 of the year 1995, provide some guidance in relation to tenders, there is no evidence that this guidance is utilised in practice, because there is a complete lack of transparency in relation to armed forces tenders. In 2016, the Jordanian Armed Forces prohibited publishing news or information about the force, except for official statements by the media spokesperson for the armed forces [3,4]. In addition to that, most defence matters are considered classified information by law, such as the 1971 Protection of State Secrets and Classified Documents Law and the 1992 Defence Law. This lack of transparency in relation to defence institutions in Jordan, as well as the lack of tender board regulations and code of conduct, justify the marking of this sub-indicator as Not Applicable.

There are no oversight mechanisms for defence, whether in relation to decisions, budgets, expenditure or purchases and contracting. For this reason, it is impossible to assess oversight in relation to audit trails, as defence institutions are not subject to oversight in the first place. Even though there are governmental entities that could be mandated with providing oversight for defence procurement, such as the Audit Bureau, the Ministry of Finance, the Parliament’s Financial Committee and the integrity and anti-corruption commission [1, 2, 3, 4, 5], none of these entities have oversight power for defence procurement.

All persons participating in public procurement and asset disposal activities which includes those in Ministry of Defence (MOD) are required to comply not only with the various laws governing procurement but also the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act Code of Ethics (which covers precisely issues of conflict of interest. [1] The Code comprehensively addresses the issues of conflict of interest and limitations that exist in entering into procurement contracts. Part IV of the Code of Ethics also has provisions on compliance and monitoring of the code.

The Public Procurement and Assest Disposal Regulation of 2020 sets financial sanctions to public procurement officials who violate code of ethics, which includes a fine not exceeding four million shillings or imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years, or to both. [2] The Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (PPRA) conducts and develops training modules on various legal and regulatory regimes including code of ethics that govern the procurement system, and conducts regular training for procurement officials in public service which presumably covers MOD. [3]

While PPOA trains a significant number of individuals (in 2015/2016 financial year it trained close to 5000 participants), it was not clear from the information whether MOD tendering staff were targeted or have in the past been trained despite MOD constantly appearing in the Procurement Administrative Board more time than other procuring entities. [4]

Furthermore, the moment, the MOD, through its website, provides limited information on procurement training.

Part VI of The Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Regulations, 2020 which came into effect on July 2, 2020, sets out the procedure on general procurement and asset disposal principles. [1] The regulations require procurement entities to develop a comprehensive procurement plan that details the goods, services works that are required, costs, suppliers, among others.

In addition, the regulations set out provisions for establishement of an electronic procurement system to be hosted in a state portal. The portal will in addition to having the procurement plan for each procurment entitity will host among others tender evaluation, tender specifications, processes, regulations, digital signatures, tender awards, administrative review of tender and disputes, requisitions and invoicing. This system, when implemented, will enhance transparency in procurement processes. This system will by far be more comprehensive than the previous processes under the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act of 2015. [2]

Furthermore, the new regulations also provide strict procedures in restricted tendering processes which has been exploited by defence and security institutions to cover for corrupt procurement processes. Nevertheless, existing procurement mechanisms are not comprehensive in providing oversite for defence and security entitities, including the Ministry of Defence. The Auditor-General has the constitutional mandate to conduct an annual audit of national security organs including MOD and KDF. [3] However, as one of the major security organs, audit reports are more often than not are classified since they are considered as sensitive audits. This means there is no audit trail or oversight mechanisms that can be reviewed. As a result, audit reports of the MOD are often redacted to protect matters of national security. [4] Thus, information on the audit trails of officials in tender award decisions are at the moment hardly available.[5]

Procurement entities of government and state entities including Ministry of Defence tender boards are established, governed and regulated according to procedures set out in Part IV of the new PPADA Act including the updated Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Regulation of 2020 Arrangement of Regulations. These regulations are transparent and available for download, both on the Kenya Law [1] and the PPRA website. [2]

Allthough the majority of Ministry of Defence (MOD) decisions are often shielded from scrutiny, some of the decisions especially on low-value procurements can be, and have in the past been, scrutinised by the Public Procurement Administrative Review Board. [1] However, high-value tenders, especially those within restricted tender processes, have not been subjected to scrutiny from those outside defence. In the case of irregularities, such tender process have usually been investigated by Office of the Auditor-General and at times Defence and Foreign Relations parliamentary committee. [2]

In the past there have been reports of flawed procurement decisions in the ministry, as reported by local media. These reports have often revolved around issues of direct or restricted tendering. [2] Besides, parliament has in the past established that the ministry’s accounting officials have bypassed lawful procurement procedures in acquisition of military goods. [3] This points to the fact that no external verification is conducted before procurement.

The Procurement Code of Ethics in Kosovo was approved by the Public Procurement Regulatory Commission (PPRC) in March 2017 [1]. The Code of Ethics is applicable to the relevant officials who are involved, directly or indirectly, in the process of selecting economic operator(s) for the provision of services, goods, equipment, projects, work, consultancy or other such requirements – all of which are obtained through procurement activities funded by the state budget and other public funds, following the rules established by the Law on Public Procurement in Kosovo [2].
The Code of Ethics contains a detailed article on the conflicts of interest as an area that might cause conflict between public officials’ duties and their private interests [2]. The conflicts of interest outlined in this document are defined by any situation where contracting authorities or staff members of the procurement service, acting on behalf of the contracting authority, are involved in a procurement procedure that could influence the outcome through which the officials could have, directly or indirectly, a personal financial benefit, economic or otherwise, that could compromise their impartiality in the context of the procurement procedure [2]. Furthermore, the Code of Ethics described the conflicts of interests manifested by the procurement officials as: an intentional lack of transparency; subjective decision-making; lack of accountability, monitoring and auditing; and lack regulations to settle emerging conflicts of interest [2]. Procurement officers should act in a manner, which is consistent with their responsibilities to their position and should exercise particular attention to avoid any conflict of interest which may be detrimental to their organisation [2].
Procurement officials in charge of conducting procurement activities must respect the following regulations as stipulated by the Procurement Code of Ethics: i) refrain from showing favouritism or being influenced by economic operators by accepting gifts, gratuities, loans or favours; ii) refrain from requiring economic operators to pay to be included in an approved or preferred supplier list; (iii) refrain from requesting donations of goods or services from economic operators; iv) respect fairness and equal treatment during the selection of tenderers in addition to being objective and fair in setting the selection and award criteria; v) refrain from the exertion of undue influence, abuse of power or opportunism; vi) refrain from drawing Terms of Reference or technical specifications, which could lead to giving privilege or unfair competitive advantage to any potential tenderer; vii) refrain from engaging with tenderers and potential contractors in any social activity that might give the impression of bribe or favouritism; viii) refrain from business meetings with contractors out of office hours; and ix) promote public procurement values with economic operators and professional and industrial bodies [2].
With regard to reports on file disclosures, the Code of Ethics stipulates that in case an individual believes that he/she may have a conflict of interest, the individual should promptly disclose the conflict to a senior officer in the organisation [2]. Such an individual should refrain from participating in any way in the matter to which the conflict relates, until the conflict has been resolved [2].
Training for procurement officials to avoid conflicts of interest is organised by the PPRC in cooperation with the Kosovo Institute for Public Administration (KIPA). For instance, in November 2018, a training was held on anti-corruption measures, integrity and conflicts of interest in public procurement [3]. There is no evidence to suggest this training is delivered on annual basis; however, the Training Department within the PPRC prepares the training strategy as well as programmes, modules and trainings on public procurement on a yearly basis [2].
Apart from these regulations for the procurement officials and tender evaluation committees, there are some additional rules when it comes to security and defence-related procurements. The Regulation on Procurement for Defence and Security Purposes stipulates that any official of a Kosovo institution involved in procurements covered by this Regulation must hold a security clearance at the level required by the relevant clearance institution [4].

There is not enough evidence to score this indicator.

The National Audit Office’s (NAO) 2018 Audit Report on the Ministry of Defence evidenced issues and challenges in the defence procurement processes in Kosovo [1]. However, the NAO does not provide in-depth auditing of defence procurements in Kosovo. The most challenging issues within the Ministry of Defence, as evidenced by the NAO, are the failure to oversee security measures; delays in the delivery of goods by the economic operator without fines imposed; and poor drafting of technical specifications for capital projects by the Security Forces [1].

The Procurement Code of Ethics that determines the conduct of procurement officials and members of the tender evaluation committees is fully available on the Public Procurement Regulatory Commission’s (PPRC) website [1]. In addition, the Rules and Operational Guidelines for Public Procurement that reference procurement officials and tender evaluation committees are also available on the PPRC’s website [1]. Furthermore, the Declarations under Oath of the procurement officers, the members of the tender evaluation committees, and for the employers of the PPRC, the Central Procurement Agency (CPA) and the Procurement Review Body (PRB) are also available on this same website [1].

The National Audit Office’s (NAO) 2018 Audit Report on the Ministry of Defence evidenced issues and challenges in the defence procurement processes in Kosovo [1]. However, the NAO does not provide in-depth auditing of defence procurements in Kosovo.

The defence and security officials who authorise purchases are officers and they are subject to the code of conduct of the police and the military – as well as other laws applicable to all Government employees. An auditor who has access to security purchases said that generally there is a tender board process but it is not always undertaken, particularly when the purchase is considered sensitive (1). Officials are most sensitive about cyber spyware, the auditor said, but not traditional weapons.

According to article 14 of the military law and 15 of the police law, they are forbidden from getting involved in any kind of commerce, legal or otherwise, and from giving away information or engaging in behavior that “does not befit the dignity” of these institutions (2 and 3). Violations are to be be investigated by military prosecutors and could be referred to military trial, if the matter is too grave to be resolved by a disciplinary committee. But there is no clear criteria that establishes what violations need to be addressed by a military court. Similar laws apply to the KNG, an auditor said (1). These officers are also subject to articles 4, 5, 8 and 9 of the law to combat conflict of interest in the Government say that defence and security employees, like other Government employees, should never have a financial conflict of interest that could benefit in any way from their work (4). Even the families of the these the officials cannot run or own a business that might benefit from their connection to the Gvernment. The above procedure falls under the control of public prosecutors. These officers are also subject to Law no. 2 of 2016, which established the ACA and gave it the power to require the financial disclosures of all Government employees, including the defence and security officials (5).

Despite the powers in law, it is almost impossible for auditors to access any information about most defence purchases and the ones that they do access tend to be superficial, and they are only granted access after many months, if not years (1,2).

There is no information made available about the tender boards.

The SAB often complains that it is sidelined by certain agencies and that some bodies even attempt to mislead them by giving them conflicting information, officials said (1,2).

Officials involved in designing tender specifications and taking decisions are subject to regulations designed to prevent conflicts of interest, including restrictions on professional activity which they have to certify. [1] [2] [3] They are required to file financial disclosure reports to demonstrate, inter alia, that neither they nor their family have financial conflicts of interest (available online from the State Revenue Service [4]). Training is provided to procurement officials to avoid conflicts of interest.

There is not enough information regarding audit trails specifically that can be found to provide a score for this indicator.

Decisions of the tender boards (procurement commissions) can be challenged in the Procurement Monitoring Bureau and in court. [1] [2] The list of the complaints and decisions taken are available online. [3] Procurements are also subject to audits by the State Audit Office, as demonstrated by a recent comprehensive audit (2017). [4] At the same time, most of the checks seem to be based on complaints and they do not cover all cases in detail, and do not appear to assess the role of politicians.

Tender board regulations and codes of conduct are explicitly defined in the legislation, including the minimum number of members, procedures of establishment and operation, voting procedures, etc. Protocols of the tender boards are public so far as they do not contain proposals of the contenders and classified information. [1] [2]

There is no publicly available information on external verification.

According to the government reviewer, all technical specifications are available for comments to industry during the stage of market research usually. After market research, the technical specifications are reviewed. There is a formal process established for complaining during procurement also. All interested bidders can submit complaints to the procurement authority and to the Procurement Monitoring Bureau (if unsatisfied with decision of procurement board) until the bid submission. There is no external verification possible since only NAF has the military/technical expertise to provide such verification.

Research found neither evidence of specifications and regulations for codes of conduct (that are designed to prevent conflict of interest for procurement or tender committee officials) (1), (2) nor specific annual training to procurement officials to avoid conflicts of interest (3).
Nevertheless, in the case of sole-source bidding, the LAF’s J4 (Logistics branch) has the authority to seek tenders considered vital by the LAF command. In these cases, the GDA must be notified a posteriori (4). These are often the cases when purchases with short turn arounds and from a specific vendor (for example, Colt for the purchase of M-4 carbines) are required. On the other hand, in instances where open tenders and bids are required, the J4 has to inform the GDA a priori of the LAF’s intent to open bidding (4). Afterwards, the GDA has to inform and seek approval from the MoD of said tender(4). If approval is given, it is communicated to the GDA, which then confers said approval to the LAF’s J-4. Stakeholder units (or units affected directly by the procurement decision in question) and the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) then work with J4 to ensure their mission parameters are met by the tender or bid in question (4).

The LAF has a comprehensive audit trail in selecting suppliers and designing tender specification (1). It also has an external verification process with the country’s audit bodies, including the Court of Audit (2). While the system may be in place, in reality, there is only a minimal audit process in place (3), (4). Bidders can and do complain directly to the Ministry of Defence to protest irregularities when they do occur, but this process remains wholely within the LAF/MoD ecosystem (3). Although this phenomenon is not unique to the LAF, it is widespread across all ministries (3).

Decree no. 11573 spells out the Tender Committee’s roles during the bidding process some of which are checking the legality of bidders’ documents, ensuring they meet the requirements, and examining the accounts (1). However, Decrees no. 11574 and 11573 do not detail the Code of Conduct and the committee’s organization (1), (2). On the other hand, a LAF source described the bidding process as “great work that all but creates a perfect system to reform bidding” in Lebanon (3).

The LAF has a comprehensive audit trail in selecting suppliers and designing tender specifications (1). It also has an external verification process with the country’s audit bodies including the Court of Audit (2). While the system may be in place, in reality, there is only a minimal audit process in place (3), (4). Bidders can and do complain directly to the Ministry of Defence to protest irregularities when they do occur, but this process remains wholely within the LAF/MoD ecosystem (3). Although this phenomenon is not unique to the LAF, it is widespread across all ministries (3).

According to the Law on Public Procurement in Defence Sector, the tender board works in accordance with rules of procedure approved by the organisation which has created the board [1]. Codes of conduct directed to all staff and personnel also apply to tender boards [2, 3]. They address conflicts of interest and how to manage them, the principles of impartiality, accountability and justice. For example, the code of ethics for public officials stipulates that officials shall behave impeccably and shall not accept any gifts, money, services or other privileges from individuals or organisations, as this may lead to public or private conflict of interests [3]. Any wrongdoings or a failure to comply with this law may result in inspection and disciplinary reaction. Moreover, board members must declare their private interests, and this information can be made publicly available. The Corruption Risk Analysis performed by the Special Investigation Service in 2017 in the defence procurement sector notes a number of violations, including the absence of verification of conflict of interests declarations; lack of signed declarations of confidentiality; and the participation of procurement commission members being under direct supervision of the Head of the Commission [4].With regard to training, the Action Plan of the National Anti-Corruption Programme, adopted by the Government, provides for training for a number of officials, including in the field of public procurement, to be carried out by the Public Procurement Agency, Special Investigation Service and other responsible parties, that need to take place on a regular basis [5].

There is no publicly available information on audit trails that detail officials involved in selectiing suppliers/ tender awards, as such we are unable to assign a score for this indicator. In 2017, a new regulation was approved regarding the selection of contracting authorities, their verification and evaluation procedures. However, evaluation of procurements are usually based more on potential risk factors, so it depend on notifications, complaints or media coverage indicating that there might have been certain law infringements.

Regulations and codes of conducts applicable to tender boards are publicly available online and they underline the importance of transparency and fairness [1, 2]. The Law on Public Procurement in Defence Sector also states that tender board members shall be of impeccable reputation, and it gives the right to Public Procurement Office to request information about the members of tender boards such as explanations about their procurement decisions and related actions [3]. Lastly, while regulations and codes of conduct are available online, their practice itself is more problematic.

Contracting authorities might be subject to planned or operational inspections. These are mostly associated to identified risk factors as well [1]. There is no external verification to audit whether the particular specifications that have been included in these inspections are actually necessary.

To avoid conflicts of interest, evaluation is normally done by two separate committees, the Technical Evaluation Committee and the Financial Evaluation Committee. Officials involved in the committees are subject to a code of conduct to prevent conflict of interest, without which they would be subject to the Malaysia Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) Act 2009 for abuse of power. [1] They were also provided with adequate training on the issue where periodcally a MACC officer would deliver seminar talks to the ministry on related isssues. Under the Act, non-disclosure of interest might also be punishable through fines and imprisonment. A tender evaluation report will then be submitted to the Procurement Boards of Ministries/Departments (Agency Procurement Boards) for consideration and decision. The tender boards are chaired by the Defence Minister. Other members of the board include the Defence Secretary General and the Secretary-General of the Finance Ministry or a representative. In cases where the tender value is above RM100 million for works and RM50 million for supplies and services, the tenders are then be sent to the Agency Procurement Boards of the Ministry of Finance for final decision. [2] Board members are also required to submit financial disclosure before being appointed (Please note that all government officersare required to declare their financial resources and assets every five years)

There are specific processes, which tender or procurements boards have to adhere to based on the Ministry of Finance’s directives. The process is audited by the Internal Auditor at the Ministry, and the Auditor General’s (AG) Office. [1]

Tender Boards are not subject to clear disclosure requirements, e.g. how they decide in awarding tender. It is also not clear whether members of the boards are subject to some specific code of conduct or regulation, except they are only required to declare any clash of interest oin the procurement exercises. For security reasons, the decisions for strategic arms procurements are also not disclosed to the public. According to Dr Kogila Balakrishnan, [1] this is to prevent the information from being disclosed to unwanted sources. All those involved in the board’s decision are bound by the Official Secrets Act 1972 (OSA) that is tied to their job as a government officer. It is therefore, not publically transparent on the process,

The procurement board tender and procurement process is scrutinised under various laws and regulations. Members of the board are bound by the Official Secrets Act 1972 to the non-disclosure of the information until the government official announces its decision. The process is also regulated by the MACC Act 2009. Any shortcomings of the process should be highlighted by the internal audits and the Auditor General’s Office in their report presented to Parliament’s Public Account Committe. There have been reports, however, that the procurement process has been circumvented by unethical processes such as the deal being exempted from undergoing value management checks. This has happened when the procurement of a startegic military asset was done under an offset budget, which is not subject to the rigorous tendering process. [1] [2]

Officials with a role in designing tender specification, or in tender board decisions, are subject to regulations or codes of conduct that are designed to prevent conflict of interest.
Article 11 of the General Statute for Civil Servants, which entered into force in 2002 and was lightly amended in 2014, states that:
“It is forbidden for a civil servant to possess, by themselves or via an intermediary of any kind, interests, of a nature that could compromise their independence, in a business that is either subject to the control of their organisation or in any form of relationship with that organisation. A Decree issued by the Council of Ministers states that private commercial activities, which could violate the dignity and the interests of the functioning of the public administration, are prohibited for civil servants”.¹
Article 3 of the code sets out the fundamental principles of public procurement processes, which officials must adhere to. Among them are:
– free access to tendering for public contracts
– the equal treatment of candidates
– the transparency of procedures, and through that, the rationality, modernity and traceability of procedures.¹
Moreover, all public servants are legally obliged to declare their assets to the state, under the Law concerning the prevention and repression of illicit enrichment.2 Officials who do not comply with this requirement can be suspended from undertaking their functions for up to five years.³
Finally, there is evidence that officials responsible for overseeing the handling of public contracts undergo annual training to avoid conflicts of interest.⁴ ⁵ ⁶ In February 2016, the oversight body ARMDS put out a call for qualified experts to apply to lead modules as part of its 2016 training programme.⁴ In August 2017, a media article reported on a four-day training programme in which 90 people working in public procurement participated.⁵ The article also notes that during 2016, ARMDS trained 1,446 civil servants working in procurement in the regions of Bamako, Kayes, Koulikoro, Sikasso, Ségou and Mopti.⁵ In 2018, ARMDS again put out a public tender inviting applications to lead its annual training programme.⁶ ARMDS specified that the programme would entail 31 training sessions and was intended to be for 1,396 procurement officials.⁶ The programmes are designed to reinforce officials’ abilities to oversee and regulate public tendering processes and awards and ensure good governance.

An assessment of the quality of audit trails gathered by the ARMDS reveals numerous gaps in most cases, making it very difficult for oversight agencies to ascertain which individuals were responsible for awarding contracts. In November 2016, London-based audit company Grant Thornton conducted an assessment of the ARMDS’s audit practices.¹ It found evidence of poor record keeping that often makes it impossible to identify the key individuals involved in awarding specific public contracts. Firstly, it noted the frequent absence of signatures from members of the tender boards attesting to the non-existence of any conflicts of interest.¹ It also cited that in many cases, there had been no publication of the result of the tender, leaving it unclear to the public which company had been successful.¹ Similarly, it recorded that, of the open competitive tenders it had analysed, 54% of them failed to obtain the signatures of the contract holder, the contracting authority or the stamp of approval from the financial controller.¹ Such absences leave gaping holes in the audit trail. Grant Thornton said that such gaps were found in 11 of the 19 administrative bodies it assessed.¹ These failings are in clear breach of article 16 of Mali’s Procurement Code, which states that these signatures and stamps have to be obtained within three days of the contract being awarded.² Moreover, in 2016, the ARMDS found that it was wholly unable to audit the Ministry of Defence’s finances for 2014 because of the lack of documents provided by the ministry. It added that only 41% of the account documents submitted by various government ministries for the 2014 financial year were in accordance with the legal requirements.³

Officials with a role in designing tender specification, or in tender board decisions, are generally subject to clear and transparent regulations or codes of conduct that are designed to prevent conflicts of interest. However, defence contracts are frequently exempt from the standard requirements and can be conducted in secret, making it impossible to know what regulations and restrictions, if any, apply to these tender boards. Article 11 of the General Statute for Civil Servants,² which entered into force in 2002 and was amended in 2014, states that:
“It is forbidden for a civil servant to possess, by themselves or via an intermediary of any kind, interests, of a nature that could compromise their independence, in a business that is either subject to the control of their organisation or in any form of relationship with that organisation. A Decree issued by the Council of Ministers states that private commercial activities, which could violate the dignity and the interests of the functioning of the public administration, are prohibited for civil servants”.²
Meanwhile, the new public procurement code (Code des Marchés Publics et des Délégations de Service Public) directs procurement authorities to be aware of corruption related risks and outlines various procedures and conditions to mitigate these risks.¹ Article 29 is dedicated to mitigating the risks of corruption. Entitled “De l’engagement de la lutte contre la corruption” (Concerning the commitment to fight against corruption), the article stipulates that: “Offers and submissions must contain a commitment by the candidate or tenderer to:
– neither grant nor promise to grant to any person involved in the process of awarding a contract an improper advantage, financial or otherwise, directly or via an intermediary, with the intention of securing the contract.
– inform the contracting authority of any payment, advantage or privilege accorded to the benefit of any person, acting as an intermediary or an agent, to recompense them for any service provided.
– to respect, in general, legal provisions, notably those outlawing acts of passive corruption or trading of favours or any constituting offences of this nature”.¹
Article 3 of the code sets out the fundamental principles of public procurement processes, which officials must adhere to. Among them are:
– free access to the tendering of public contracts
– the equal treatment of candidates
– transparency of procedures, and through that, the rationality, modernity and traceability of procedures.¹
Moreover, all public servants, including public procurement officers, are legally obliged to declare their assets to the state, under the Law concerning the prevention and repression of illicit enrichment.³ Officials who do not comply with this requirement can be suspended from undertaking their functions for up to five years.⁴
There are also a whole series of articles that state how certain tenders should be conducted. In terms of selection criteria, article 75 makes clear that decisions will be made based on economic, financial, and technical criteria, which may vary from one tender to the next.¹ But, generally, price, usage costs, quality, technical value, post-sale services, technical assistance, the delivery period, and the schedule of payment will all heavily inform the choice. Indeed, the article concludes by stating that if the contracting authority has to prioritise only one criteria, it should be the price.¹
By contrast, the fact that many defence-related purchases are exempt from the standard procurement regulations means that it is unclear what rules apply in these instances. As Article 8 of the Code says: “This decree does not apply to contracts for works, supplies or services when they relate to the needs of national defence or security, which require secrecy or for which the protection of essential national interests is incompatible with the publication of such contracts. The system under which these contracts operate is fixed by decree of the Council of Ministers” (1).¹

In 2016, the ARMDS found that it was wholly unable to audit the Ministry of Defence’s finances for 2014 because of the lack of documents provided by the ministry. It added that only 41% of the account documents submitted by various government ministries for the 2014 financial year were in accordance with the legal requirements. (1)

The LAASSP states that each agency must have a Procurement, Leasing, and Services Committee (C.A.A.S) that must be governed under the principles of legality, transparency, and accountability. [1]

As such there is no specific code of conduct for the members of this collegiate body of SEDENA and SEMAR, in any case they must adhere to the Code of Conduct of the public servants of the Ministry of National Defence and therefore to the Code of Ethics of Public Servants of the Federal Government. In accordance with the National Anticorruption System, all public servants are obliged to “present declarations of patrimonial situation and interests, under promise to tell the truth and before the Secretariats or their respective internal control body. They must also present their annual tax statement.” [2]

The respective Ethics and Conflict of Interest Prevention Units and the Internal Control Bodies have the obligation to include training programmes on the prevention of conflict of interest and issues of ethics and integrity in each agency. [3] [4]

Although the SFP has a registry of public servants of the Federal Public Administration who intervene in public contracting procedures, the granting of licenses, permits, concessions, authorisations, alienation of assets, etc., from the year 2015 to date, [1] in the cases of SEDENA and SEMAR, there is no information on the relevant officials. [2] Given that the extent of an audit trail in defence procurement is unclear and therefore, this indicator cannot be scored. As such, this indicator is marked ‘Not Enough Information.’

The regulations and codes of conduct applicable to procurement committees are public. The information on their meetings however is not transparent. In this regard, the Integration and Operation Manual of the SEDENA Acquisitions, Leasing, and Services Committee states that “the documentation that makes up the files of the matters presented in the plenary session of the Committee must be kept by the Technical Secretary for a period of time of three years, counted from the date of receipt, in accordance with the provisions of the Transparency Law and the General Guidelines for the Classification and Declassification of Information of the Dependencies and Entities of the Federal Public Administration.” [1]

Article 29 of the Procurement Law [1] states that before the tender, entities can publish the draft bid through CompraNet, for 10 working days, in order to receive comments from the public. There seems to be no other form of “external oversight.”

Officials in tender board decisions are subject to regulations or codes of conduct that are designed to prevent conflicts of interest. Procurement officials are not allowed to be employed by or in any other manner engage with a company that obtained a tender, or with connected entities, within two years. [1]

However, members of tender boards are not required to file financial disclosure reports, but instead are required to report any conflict of interest if it occurs before making any decision in the relevant case. [2] According to the MoD reviewer, all members of the commission also sign a Statement of Non-existence of Conflict of Interest, the essential content of which is that there is no economic or any other interest that may jeopardize the objectivity of the participants in the public procurement procedure. Also, the Public Procurement Commission must, by the Law on Public Procurement, prescribe actions in a specific procurement procedure, with obligatory observance of the principles of competition and equality, which regulate the procedure of ensuring competition and prevention of conflicts of interest in public procurement procedures.

Training for some procurement officials is occasionally provided, but is does not target conflict of interest issues. [3]

When the State Audit Institution conducts an audit of defence institutions, it is provided with all the documents that it requests. [1] At least in some cases, audit trails are missing, but it is not clear whether it is a prevailing practice, having in mind that audits are conducted very rarely. One of reports of the Institution underlines that it could not identify the act on the basis of which two secret procurements were conducted, and that it was not possible to identify procedures and reporting for these cases. [2]

Tender board regulations are transparent – prescribed by the Law [1] or bylaws, [2][3] and no additional procedures exist. [4]

According to the MoD reviewer, in all procurement precedures, professional military personnel and officers who are members of public procurement commissions are subject to regulations or codes of conduct designed to prevent conflicts of interest (Code of Military Ethics and Code of Ethics for Civil Servants and Employees). All members of the Commission also sign a Statement of Non-existence of Conflict of Interest, the essential content of which is that there is no economic or any other interest that may jeopardize the objectivity of the participants in the public procurement procedure.

The State Audit Institution very rarely scrutinises particular procurements of the Ministry. It conducts an annual revision of the state budget, which also includes the budget of the Ministry of Defence, but the last in-depth revision focused on the expenditures of the Ministry itself was in 2008. [1] In addition to that, the State Audit Institution conducted an audit of the internal financial controls and procurement system of the Ministry of Defence in 2014 [1] and an audit of the management and use of the Ministry of Defence’s property in 2017. [2][3]

The revised version of the Code of Public Procurement Contracts (2013)(1)(2) makes no mention of independent scrutiny and audit of tender boards, although tender boards are used for defence procurement.
– Articles 35 to 45 explain in great detail the work of the tender board. These procedures can be considered as a code of conduct.
– Article 142 states, however, that audit and controls are only undertaken for procurement contracts with local authorities, and makes no mention of tender boards concerning the armed forces.
No evidence was found that the Code of Public Procurement Contracts has been translated into concrete regulation, especially concerning independent scrutiny and audit of tender boards.

So far, the limited activities of the National Commission Against Corruption and the National Body Against Corruption have not concerned the development of an independent and transparent procedure for the audit of tender boards and practices concerning armed forces procurement (3)(4)(5)(6)(7).

This lack of evidence of independent scrutiny and audit of tender boards might indicate a lack of transparency which could imply corruption risks.

No evidence was found of an audit trail detailing individuals involved in setting tender specifications, supplier selection and tender award concerning contracts benefitting the armed forces (1)(2).

No evidence was found confirming the access of oversight bodies or initiatives such as the National Audit Office or the Government’s anti-corruption platform to a comprehensive audit trail (3)(4)(5).

Interviewees expressed concerns about the actual presence of oversight mechanisms (internal or external) beyond the King’s own control concerning contracts benefiting the Moroccan armed forces (6)(7).

This lack of evidence might indicate a lack of transparency which could imply corruption risks.

There is limited transparency of tender board procedures and it is unclear whether this extends to contracts benefiting the armed forces in theory and in practice.

Articles 35 to 45 of the 2013 version of the Code of Public Procurement Contracts explain in great detail the work of the tender board. These procedures detailed can be considered as a code of conduct. Article 142 states, however, that audits and controls are only undertaken for procurement contracts with local authorities, and makes no mention of tender boards concerning the armed forces (1)(2). No evidence was found that the Code of Public Procurement Contracts has been translated into concrete regulation, especially concerning tender board procedures. There is no evidence that this applies to contracts benefiting the armed forces.

So far, the limited activities of the National Commission Against Corruption and the National Body Against Corruption have not concerned the development of tender board procedures concerning armed forces procurement (3)(4). No further sources relating to tender boards was found.
This lack of evidence of might indicate a lack of transparency which could imply corruption risks.

There is no evidence that external verification of tender specifications takes place.

There are regulations issued by the Directorate of Procurement, which manages the tender process in the military [1]. But nepotism and bribery prevail [1]. A spokeperson for Justice for Myanmar said that the military officials in charge of procurement purchase goods from the companies they run and own. ‘This corruption and conflict of interest is by design,’ he said [2].

There is an internal audit mechanism exercised by the Office of the Auditor General [1]. This process is not well specified and cannot be accessed by the public. The tender board of the military traces the contractor companies’ account transactions [2]. Nevertheless, according to the Union Auditor General Law, the Auditor General does not have the right to audit the military [3].

MPs have criticised the fact that they cannot scrutinise the Myanmar military’s budget or defence procurement effectively. They also criticised the fact that the Office of the Auditor General’s annual report lacks transparency [1].

There is an internal audit mechanism exercised by the Office of the Auditor General, however, external actors are prohibited from auditing the defence sector [1].

Procurement officials, including those involved in tenders, are subject to the Code of Conduct for civilian personnel, which restricts (financial) conflicts of interest, unauthorised ancillary activities, and bribery [1]. In addition to this standard Code of Conduct, there is a procurement manual that is not public – SG A/919 Defence Procurement Manual (Chapter 12 – ‘Integrity aspects’) [2]. An additional Code of Conduct, which applies to all public administration personnel, details specific guidelines for procurement officials (see Section 4.1.6). These guidelines highlight basic principles on integrity, fair competition and conflicts of interest [3]. Financial disclosure reports are not required, though personnel are vetted for financial risks upon entry into the Ministry of Defence. The COID’s annual report describes a number of integrity training workshops that were conducted with the Defence Materiel Organisation throughout the year and during induction training [4].

The Central Government Audit Service, which audits all government organisations, including those involved in defence tenders, states that audit trails can be deduced and derived from documents provided by the MoD to the Service but that they are not always comprehensive [1]. However, the Service also states that more attention will be allocated to strengthening audit trails [1].

The Code of Conduct that applies to civilian and military defence personnel covers personnel who work as tender officials [1]. However, there is a procurement manual that is not public – SG A/919 Defence Procurement Manual, in which Chapter 12 covers integrity issues [2].
The Ministry of Defence has an internal regulation on procurement and tender (“Aanwijzing HDBV 018 Inkopen en aanbesteden”) referring to the Ministry’s policy on integrity. [3]

Procurement processes are overseen by the Central Government Audit Service and the Netherlands Court of Audit, however, while these bodies can monitor, question and recommend, they do not verify (in advance) whether the decisions of the tender board are appropriate [1,2]. The most recent annual audit report of the Central Government Audit Service shows that there is currently a project underway to monitor key controls in the MoD’s procurement processes [3].

Officials on tender boards are, like all employees, subject to regulations and codes of conduct (there is no separate code of conduct for procurement officials) [1]. Ministry employees, Board members, and senior NZDF staff are required to declare any conflicts of interest. These declarations are audited as part of the annual audit by the Auditor-General, who has wide powers of investigation under the Public Finance Act [2, 3]. The Ministry’s Tender Board includes representation from the Central Agencies [3]. Procurement officials are not automatically restricted in their professional activity, but in every case this must be disclosed so that they may be if a conflict of interest is identified. The board’s work is governed by a formal Evaluation Plan, which lays out the methodology to be used. In practice, there are specific checks in this system and methodology to ensure fair assessment such as the clear division of evaluation work streams, each working on operational, technical, and financial aspects of the tender responses. The Acquisition Review Board that finalises the outcome is independent of these separate evaluations, which allows an objective review of the results to be brought forth. In all cases a clear process of due diligence is undertaken. The outcome of the process is notified, and all review documents are carefully archived should they be requested at any stage. Such documentation is “official information” pursuant to the provisions of the Official Information Act 1982. Ministry and NZDF governance committees regularly begin by asking those present to declare if they have any potential or actual conflicts of interest, in relation to the matters to be discussed in the meeting. This is recorded in the minutes of the meeting. If any conflicts are identified, when the substantive agenda item comes up, the individual may be asked to leave the room for the discussion, which is also recorded in the meeting minutes.

All project management staff involved in procurement at the Ministry of Defence are made aware of the Government Rules of Sourcing, which are incorporated into the Ministry’s Procurement Policy. All ministry staff must sign the Ministry Code of Conduct and disclose any conflicts of interest as part of their employment contract. In the NZDF the Defence Commercial Services (DCS) have a role in ensuring correct processes and transparency are maintained when engaging civilian contractors, awarding contracts for work and the like. This includes the review of contracts by an independent board prior to the contracts being awarded [3]. Moreover, Ministry of Defence employees are subject to the Public Service Commissioner’s Standards of Integrity and Conduct (the Code), as stipulated within the Public Service Act 2020 [4]. Detailed information is freely available online and every state servant is expected to abide by the code [5]. Model Standards set out the minimum requirement of expectations, and specifically note that private interests that may give rise to a conflict of interest must be disclosed, explicitly referred to and recorded in contractual agreements, monitored, and frequently updated. According to the Model Standards for managing conflicts of interests, senior members are expected to set an example and are held to a higher account “given their level of influence on decisions about matters of public significance or value and their higher public profile” [6]. The NZDF is not covered by the State Services Commissioner’s Standards of Integrity and Conduct as it is deemed to be a non-public service department. [7] However, the NZDF is mandated to comply with the New Zealand Government Procurement Rules (the Rules) and adhere to the good practice guidance provided by the Office of the Auditor General. In all cases, the Defence Force must ensure that its procurement activities are beyond reproach and to adhere to the five Principles of Government Procurement and the Government Procurement Charter, specifically: a) plan and manage for great results; b) be fair to all suppliers; c) get the right supplier; d) get the best deal for everyone; and e) play by the rules. In accordance with the rules, the Defence Force has in place policies that safeguard the integrity of their procurement activities and processes to ensure that procurement decisions can be justified, remain impartial, and are fair, transparent and reasonable. In addition, the NZDF must be able to show that it has applied sound judgement to manage any conflicts of interest. [8] Civilian employees are held to account by the Code of Conduct issued by the Chief of Defence Force, which includes specific standards with regards to conflicts of interest and solicitation or acceptance of gifts, rewards or gratuities [8, 9].

Governance and oversight of the procurement process was achieved through the revised governance structure in November 2017. This established a Capability Governance Board (CGB) as an overall escalation point for the capability portfolio holding overall responsibility. The Capability Management Group (CMG) provides assurance to the CGB and focuses on operational portfolio management and activities. Project Boards and Common Capability Project Boards report to the CMG. Integrated Project Teams (IPT) are responsible for all elements of Capability Definition, Acquisition and Introduction into Service. The Project Boards hold the IPT leaders to account. The IPTs include a policy lead, requirements lead, acquisition lead, and capability integration lead, supported by subject matter experts, project managers and project coordinators [1]. This process ensures a clear audit trail as all personnel/staff involved are identified and hold responsibility. The Treasury and the OAG (or Audit NZ when operating under the direction of the OAG) are involved in reviewing the tender process at various stages of the procurement cycle. It is highly unlikely that any politicians would be involved in tender boards given the obvious potential for a conflict of interest.

The Cabinet Manual sets out guidance for members of Parliament and explicitly states (2.6) that ministers must consider all types of interests when assessing whether any of their personal interests may conflict with or be perceived to conflict with their ministerial responsibilities. This includes pecuniary interests, family interests, or close associates interests. Ministers should also take care to ensure that they do not become associated with non-governmental organisations where they are a lobby group. If there is an actual or perceived conflict of interest, the member must declare it to Cabinet. They must then withdraw themselves from the discussion and ensure they do not receive any relevant documentation on the issue, and then transfer their ministerial duties to another minister. [2] Independent Probity Auditors are engaged to provide a higher level of assurance. The Tender Board’s work is governed by a formal Evaluation Plan, which lays out the methodology to be used. In practice, there are specific checks in this system and methodology to ensure fair assessment, such as the clear division of evaluation work streams, each working on operational, technical, and financial aspects of the tender responses. The Acquisition Review Board that finalises the outcome is independent of these separate evaluations, which allows an objective review of the results to be brought forth. In all cases a clear process of due diligence is undertaken. The outcome of the process is notified, and all review documents are carefully archived should they be requested at any stage. Such documentation is “official information” pursuant to the provisions of the Official Information Act 1982 [3, 4].

The OAG releases information on managing conflicts of interest as stipulated under Section 21 of the Public Audit Act 2001 [1]. While the Auditor-General has no “explicit statuary role with regard to conflicts of interest”, it is the independent auditor of the MoD and NZDF and as part of that process examines “an organisation’s systems and processes for managing conflicts of interest” and as such it is applicable to those organisations [2]. Independent Probity Auditors are engaged to provide a higher level of assurance. Legal advice is provided by an external law firm and specific tender evaluation training is provided prior to the process. The board’s work is governed by a formal Evaluation Plan, which lays out the methodology to be used. In practice, there are specific checks in this system and methodology to ensure fair assessment such as the clear division of evaluation work streams, each working on operational, technical, and financial aspects of the tender responses. The Acquisition Review Board that finalises the outcome is independent of these separate evaluations, which allows an objective review of the results to be brought forth. In all cases a clear process of due diligence is undertaken. The outcome of the process is notified, and all review documents are carefully archived should they be requested at any stage. Such documentation is “official information” pursuant to the provisions of the Official Information Act 1982.

The Tender Boards must comply with the Government’s Principles of Procurement, Rules, and Charter – all of which are made public [3]. The NZDF’s internal procurement policy is detailed in the Defence Force Orders for Procurement (DFO 52 Volume 2), which is not public [4]. These orders include the policies and processes specifically related to the work of the tender boards (Procurement Assurance Boards (PABs)). According to the NZDF, “PABs provide independent assurance that applications to procure comply with the Government Principles and Charter, the Rules, and NZDF procurement policy, and ensure that the NZDF’s ethical and probity obligations have been met. All procurements must represent public value and submissions must demonstrate that proposals meet the form, fit and function required” [5].

Due to the heightened risk inherent in Military procurements, the Ministry of Defence’s Tender Board includes representation from Central Agencies, the presence of which ensures the process undergoes external scrutiny. Additionally, high risk projects are subject to ongoing monitoring by the Central Agencies, who report tri-annually to Cabinet on these projects. Following its submission to Cabinet, the reports were publicly published, subject to redactions under the Official Information Act, on the Treasury’s website, but this practice ended in June 2017 due to “changes in ministerial priorities” [1, 2, 3]. High risk projects are also subject to Gateway Reviews, undertaken by an external panel and reporting to the Project’s Senior Responsible Owners, and Independent Quality Assurance reviews. As Defence procurements, specifically of weapon systems, inherently carry high-risk, Defence procurements regularly fall under Gateway reviews once a risk profile assessment has been submitted. These reviews provide an independent third level of assurance on the project at critical points prior to Cabinet consideration, however Gateway is not an audit and cannot stop a project or programme [4, 5]. Gateway Reviews 1-4 are not publicly released, though Review 5 (Operational Review & Benefits Realisation) is made available to all government agencies via the Public Service Intranet. Details about the Gateway Review are available on the Treasury website [6]. Extracts of select Gateway Reviews were provided in the independent Review of Defence Procurement [7]. The Government’s three phase Business Case model also ensures that external scrutiny is provided. This is particularly so in the second-stage Detailed Business Case whereat the information is presented to Cabinet for approval to continue. [8]

According to Art. 28-29 of the 2013 Decree, tender boards can be formed for negotiations. Typically, they comprise of between three and five experts, who are chosen according to their expertise in the procurement area for which they are responsible. One expert is the representative of the beneficiary service (1). Art. 29 of the Decree mentions that tender board members are to be nominated in line with a principle that avoids any conflict of interests. If the conflict of interests is proven, the member board should be immediately replaced; otherwise, the tender board will be cancelled.

According to Art. 30 of the 2013 Decree (1), tender boards are subject to regulations and codes of conduct. Before the beginning of the procurement process, tender board members have to sign documents stating that they will follow the regulations of the Code of Ethics designed to prevent conflict of interest (2) as well as to respect the confidentiality of information regarding the procurement process even after the end of the contract or its cancellation. The assessor found no evidence of specific training for members of the tender board. As per Articles 28–30 of Decree No. 2013/570/PRN/PM, there are no training requirements for members of the tender board. However, Article 28 mentions that members must have proven expertise in the procurement area for which they are responsible and that, as per Article 30, they must sign a code of ethics. 

Article 28: “The person responsible for public procurement is assisted by a tender board, the president of which it appoints according to the nature of the order. The tender board further comprises of three (3) experts chosen because of their proven expertise in the procurement area in question or because of their negotiation skills, including a representative of the recipient” (1).
(Consultant translation: French to English)

Article 30: “Before the tender board begins its work, members must sign certificates of commitment whereby each member certifies that they have read and understood the regulations as laid down in the Code of Ethics, as well as the offences and sanctions provided for in this Decree” (1).
(Consultant translation: French to English)

Article 35 of the 2013 Decree provides for a posteriori control: “Contracts negotiated by direct agreement in the context of the present decree are subject to a posteriori control in the conditions defined in articles 77 and 78 below” (1). However, there are no specifications on how this control can be exercised. The assessor found no evidence that there is an audit trail detailing individuals involved in setting tender specifications, supplier selection and tender award.
More broadly, the procurement oversight mechanism is a formalised process. According to Art. 71 of the 2013 decree on public procurement regarding defence and security: “[w]ithout prejudice to controls that may be carried out by the State Inspector General (Inspection Générale d’Etat), contracts concluded under this decree are subject to a semester inspection by the Inspector General of the Army (Inspecteur General des Armés) or his counterpart for the other corps. This control is accompanied by a detailed and confidential report sent to the President of the Republic and to the Prime Minister” (1). According to an interviewee, since 2016, there has been no control conducted by the inspector general of the army (2).
In sum, even though the existent procurement oversight mechanism is a formalised process, there are no specifications in the articles 77 and 78 on how the posteriori control can be exercised. Also, the assessor found no evidence that there is an audit trail detailing individuals involved in setting tender specifications, supplier selection and tender award.

There is transparency about the procedures of the tender board and the Code of Ethics. The system of ethics is available on the website of the Regulatory Agency on Public Procurements (1), as well as tender board regulations, covered by Chapter V, Art. 20-34 of the 2013 Decree (2). Members of the tender board are required by Article 30 of Decree No. 2013/570/PRN/PM to respect the confidentiality of the information they handle during a procurement decision.

Article 30 states:
“… and by which they equally commit to protect the confidentiality of the information provided or relevant to the negotiation of the procurement process following the expiry or termination of the contract” (2).
(Consultant translation French to English)

Article 30 states:
“…et par lequel il s’engage également à respecter la confidentialité des informations fournies ou relatives à la négociation du marché après l’expiration du contrat ou sa résiliation.”

Article 35 of the 2013 Decree provides for a posteriori control: “Contracts negotiated by direct agreement in the context of the present decree are subject to a posteriori control in the conditions defined in articles 77 and 78 below” (1). However, there are no specifications on how this control can be exercised. The assessor found no evidence that there is an audit trail detailing individuals involved in setting tender specifications, supplier selection and tender award.
More broadly, the procurement oversight mechanism is a formalised process. According to Art. 71 of the 2013 decree on public procurement regarding defence and security: “[w]ithout prejudice to controls that may be carried out by the State Inspector General (Inspection Générale d’Etat), contracts concluded under this decree are subject to a semester inspection by the Inspector General of the Army (Inspecteur General des Armés) or his counterpart for the other corps. This control is accompanied by a detailed and confidential report sent to the President of the Republic and to the Prime Minister” (1). According to an interviewee, since 2016, there has been no control conducted by the inspector general of the army (2).
In sum, even though the existent procurement oversight mechanism is a formalised process, there are no specifications in the articles 77 and 78 on how the posteriori control can be exercised. Also, the assessor found no evidence that there is an audit trail detailing individuals involved in setting tender specifications, supplier selection and tender award.

While conflict rules do exist as a part of departmental guidelines, adherence to the rules is difficult to determine as senior military officials have control over the acquisition process at the very highest levels (1). Oversight of the military heads on the issue of acquisitions is not transparent; so it is difficult to determine to what extent conflict of interest rules are followed (1). “Although the PPA contains extensive rules designed to maintain integrity in the procurement system, which appear on their face to be in accordance with the requirements of international best practice, it appears from interviews conducted with Nigerian procurement officials in July 2011, that the enforcement of these integrity related provisions is sadly lacking and that conflicts of interest pervade the procurement process, under which contracts are awarded to persons in which the decision-makers have an interest” (3). The HSLi contract award which was recently terminated by the president suggests that conflict of interests where public officials are connected to companies awarded contracts by the government do occur.

Depending on the threshold, the Bureau of Public Procurement may need to give a certificate of “no objection” which ought to be an independent assessment of the recommendation by the Tenders Board. However, this assumes that the BPP certificate is obtained. Although an audit trail may exist within the MOD, for example, it is not easy for an external body such as the BPP or auditor-general to have oversight of the audit trail within the MOD (1). Oversight agencies such as the Auditor General’s Office have limited powers to request documents and interview defence personnel. Furthermore, the auditor general’s most recent report to the Senate states that many ministries and agencies have not submitted any financial reports for many years. It follows from this that there is a paucity of information about the audit trail available to the oversight agencies. “The Senate Committee on Public Accounts on Thursday reprimanded the outgoing Auditor-General of the Federation (AuGF), Samuel Ukura, over what it described as his flagrant negligence of duty on the audited annual reports of Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) between 2009 and 2014” (1). In response, “Ukura said reports forwarded to the Senate on annual reports of the various government agencies were based on available documents on findings made” (2). The difficulties that many government departments have at keeping accurate records were discussed with the source. The source highlighted, that manual or physical record-keeping is still the norm even where a computerised system exists. Information is not always consistently maintained which affects the integrity and transparency of the process and physical or manual storage of records.

“At present, high-ranking politicians are able to influence the outcome of the procurement process by putting undue pressure on civil servants who feel unable to refuse to bend to this pressure. This means that in practice, the procurement process is manipulated such that contracts are awarded to persons or firms in which the politician has an interest “(1). The tender board procedures are not transparent. “There is no transparency to the tender board procedures. High Ranking officers play a role in the process which is highly influential and can result in significant by pass of published procedures” (2).

Oversight agencies such as the Auditor General’s Office have limited powers to request documents and interview defence personnel. Furthermore, the auditor general’s most recent report to the Senate states that many ministries and agencies have not submitted any financial reports for many years. It follows from this that there is a paucity of information about the audit trail available to the oversight agencies (1).

Tender Boards are subject to regulations stipulated in the Law on Public Procurement [1] and the Code of Ethics when carrying out public procurement procedures [2]. The Law stipulates that tender Boards are established at the start of the procurement procedure and comprise of a president and members, selected depending on the subject of the procurement and according to their competence. External experts are appointed as well to help the boards with the procedure; but the experts have no rights to make decisions (Article 30) [1]. Importantly, the board members need to be trained for carrying out activities in the field of public procurement in accordance with the Law and have an appropriate certificate for passing the exam for public procurement personnel (Article 29a-2). Lastly, they are obliged to act in accordance with the Code of Ethics for Public Procurements (Article 29 -2) [2]. The Code specifies that public procurement procedures will be follow the law, without any biased or personal interest (Article 2). The Code forbids any conflict of personal financial interest and the public interest (Article 5-2). Based on this, members of the commission are obliged to sign a Statement confirming their lack of any conflict of interest (Article 62) [2] but are not required to file financial disclosure reports. Article 62 of the Code specifically refers to the Law on Conflict of Interest which thoroughly describes and regulates these situations [3].

There is not enough information to score this indicator, due to the lack of information regarding whether audit trails exist and can be found.

Officials from the Ministry of Defence Logistics Department, the Internal Audi Department and the State Audit Office can “audit everything” including procurement. This includes minutes of opening tenders, statements of conflict of interest and notifications to bidders [1]. Members of the Commission on Defence and Security are obliged to sign a statement confirming their lack of any conflict of interest (Article 62). The certificate of audit professionals can be found on the State Audit Office website, which shows the requirements for personnel [2].

The regulations and the Code of Ethics are fully transparent. The procedures for bidding and awarding public procurement are clear and announced using the Electronic System for Public Procurement (EPPS), hosted by the Bureau of Public Procurement [1]. The use of the electronic system is mandatory for all published listings. The Bureau also publicises the Code.

There is no clear external verification that the particular specifications that have been included are necessary. External experts’ role is only assisting with/in the procedure but not deciding on its content; they have no right to decide on it (article 30/1). They are also obliged to write a report in regard to the procedure and its specifications. It is a part of the final report regarding the procedure (article 30/2).

The Acquisition Regulations for the Defence Sector refer to the Public Administration Act, which regulates rules of impartiality for public officials [1, 2]. The act states that a public official shall be disqualified from preparing the basis for a decision or from making any decision in an administrative case if there is any conflict of interests. Neither the official nor his or her family can be a party to the case. Officials are obliged to provide the employer with any relevant information in this regard [3]. It is up to the employer to decide what sanctions will apply if an employee contravenes the rules. The Employee Handbook for the Norwegian Armed Forces – Part F adapts the rules of impartiality to military personnel [4]. The handbook provides an example of a conflict of interests, when the official has interests in a private enterprise negotiating a procurement contract with the Norwegian Armed Forces. Although the Ethical Guidelines for Contact with Business and Industry in the Defence Sector apply to all employees in the defence sector, they may be seen as a kind of code of conduct for procurement officials, including tender board officials [5]. The document states that officials shall act in a manner that does not raise doubts about their impartiality; they shall not place themselves in situations liable to influence their official actions; and they must not take part in discussions and decisions on cases in which they themselves or people close to them have special personal or financial interests. There are no additional restrictions in place that are specific to procurement officials. There is regular training for procurement officials on issues concerning conflicts of interests [6]. The Armed Forces is a member of TI and the Norwegian division of TI is often involved in such training [7]. For example, in August 2020 the Defence Material Agency is organising a seminar on conflicts of interest for personnel in contact with business and industry, which the Norwegian division of TI will support with its expertise.

There is a comprehensive audit trial of which officials were involved in the tender process, including selection of suppliers, designing tender specifications and tender award decisions. The documentation is kept in the archives in the Norwegian Defence Material Agency [1]. Politicians are not a part of the process administered by the Defence Material Agency [1]. It is therefore unclear if there is an audit trial of which politicians were involved in tender award decisions. However, this is largely because politicians are only very rarely involved in tender awards; most investment decisions are delegated to the Armed Forces and Norwegian Defence Material Agency [2].

All documents mentioned in Indicator 65A, including the Acquisition Regulations for the Defence Sector and the Employee Handbook for the Norwegian Armed Forces and Ethical Guidelines for Contact with Business and Industry in the Defence Sector, are publicly available [1,2,3,4,5].

The Norwegian government has a mandatory system of external audit (qualification control) for all major investment within state institutions (except oil and gas). Over the course of the five-stage cycle of procurement, external audits are performed after the concept stage and the pre-project stage [1] [2].The external audit system is managed by the Ministry of Finance which has framework agreements with 7 consultancy companies to undertake the external audits on different projects.
Audits scrutinise the decision documents and calculate the most likely total cost for the project. They identify risks and the governance aspects. They also recommend the different cost buffers (contingencies) [3]. Large investments normally require parliamentary approval and the major findings from the external audits are noted when they are presented to the legislature [3]

According to a senior financial auditor within the MoD, officials with a role in designing tenders are not subject to any regulations, but they have to form a committee that avoids conflict of interest according to tenders’ internal regulations (1), (2). The committee consists of members from the MoF, MoD, and an officer of the designated unit, and the financial department of the agency, in other cases members, join the committee based on the types of contracts and purchases.

There is no oversight mechanism for personnel or officers who design and set the tenders information about defence and military procurement (1), (2).

Although there is little to no information about the defence and military procurement, our sources confirm that there is a lack of transparency on the tenders board. In many cases, competitors are not provided with the same information or the selection is biased (1), (2).

There is no oversight mechanism for personnel or officers who design and set the tenders information about defence and military procurement (1), (2).

Staff with a role in designing tender specifications are subject to regulations or codes of conduct that are designed to prevent conflict of interest, as well as prevent bribery and disclosing of data (1). However, officials may not be restricted in selecting specific suppliers and contractors. This process is avoided by writing that “the least price does not guarantee the bid.” The code of conduct includes not disclosing bidders information, their prices, not accept bribery and money and also revealing conflicts of interest (2). Training is provided to procurement officials to avoid conflicts of interest, but it is not regularly conducted, and the training is superficial (1).

It s difficult to access every detail as the system has some significant gaps in connecting data, officials, and their activities (1). They face challenges with military records. The details are minimal and mostly written under “Nathriyat,” which means offset expenses, it is not clear what those costs are. Further, military purchases do not have a detailed explanation of why the assets were purchased (2).

Transparency in tender and procurement procedures is vague, and it is impossible to access information on the tenders’ activities (1). However, the Code of Conduct for all security personnel is available online (2).

The SAABC and other auditing departments are allowed access to information in order to conduct monitoring and oversight (1).

The Government Procurement Reform Act specifically notes that members of the Bid and Awards Committee (BAC) must have unquestionable integrity and be proficient in procurement [1, 2]. The act also allows the invitation of a third party observer to monitor how the government conducts its procurement activities. The BAC is required to invite at least two observers (one from a duly recognised private group in a sector/discipline relevant to the procurement at hand and one from a non-government organisation who sits in on all stages of the procurement process) in addition to a representative of the COA [1, 2]. It stipulates that observers must not have any direct or indirect interest in the contract being bid upon [1, 2]. Training is provided by the Government Procurement Policy Board (GPPB) to BAC members on technical writing and planning, but not necessarily on how to avoid conflicts of interests [1, 2]. Within six months of designation, the BAC, its Secretariat and technical working group members should have completed a minimum of eight hours of procurement training [3].

The BAC Secretariat is required to prepare a Procurement Monitoring Report that covers major activities from pre-procurement conference to acceptance/turnover, including the standard and actual time for each activity [1]. However the report, which is subject to external audit, does not identify the officials involved in the procurement process [2, 3].

The Government Procurement Law added two entities to ensure transparency and accountability. First, it created an electronic portal that serves as the primary and definitive source of information on government procurement (PhilGEPS, the Philippine Government Electronic Procurement System) which mandates suppliers, contractors, manufacturers, distributors, and consultants to register in the conduct of procurement business [1]. Second, it establishmed the Government Procurement Policy Board (GPPB), an inter-agency body that formulates and amends public procurement policies [2]. Regulations and a code of conduct related to procurement are publicly available on the GPPB website [3].

As noted in 65A, the BAC is required to invite at least two observers (one from a duly recognised private group in a sector or discipline relevant to the procurement at hand and one from a non-government organisation who sits in on all stages of the procurement process) in addition to a representative of the COA [1]. Further, the law requires that observers must not have any direct or indirect interest in the contract to be bid [1]. The COA is good at identifying and reporting procurement irregularities but it is up to the Ombudsman to file a case [2].

Members of tender boards and other staff taking part in the procurement procedure are required to submit a conflict of interest declaration. False statements are subject to criminal liability (if the procurement is based on the Public Procurement Act) [1] or disciplinary actions (other procurements). Officials who take part in the various stages of procurement preparation are not obligated to submit a declaration.
All officers and high profile civil servants are required to submit annual asset declarations and are subject to restrictions concerning shares in private companies, commercial activities or extra jobs [2, 3]. Officers dealing with procurements and contracting are subject to additional restrictions concerning employment after they leave the military [2]. Civilian personnel of the armed forces are not obligated to submit declarations nor are they the subject of any restrictions. All procuring and contracting personnel are subject to the code of conduct based on Decision 145/MON regulating contacts with contractors and conflict of interest issues [4]. Training on conflict of interests is sometimes provided for procurement personnel.

Audit trial is possible on the procurement stage. The procurement protocol usually contains necessary information on decisions undertaken by the tender committee.
Audit trial is difficult for the earlier stages, namely for designing of tender specification. The technical specification is based on technical-tactical requirement which are usually prepared by designated bodies and it is impossible to connect specific items of specification with specific individuals. No influence of politicians is traced in specification or tender protocol. [1, 2, 3].

Tender boards regulations, based on the Public Procurement Law and the MoND’s Decision No.367/MON as well as codes of conduct are mainly transparent [1, 2, 3].

Only part of specifications are verified by the MoD anti-corruption unit before formal announcement of tenders.

The decree-law that regulates defence procurement defers to the Public Procurement Code concerning conflicts of interest in tender boards. The Public Procurement Code itself regulates tender boards [1] and provides a template declaration on the absence of conflicts of interest by individuals participating in tender boards [2], but poses no restrictions on their professional activity. There is some quantifiable evidence of training provided to officials involved in procurement, but tender boards are designated by management, and there is no requirement of expertise in procurement procedures.

Tender boards are required to document procedures, including elected or nominated officials participating in decision-making [1]. There is extensive evidence provided by CA’s audits on tender boards, including tender board meeting minutes and decisions [2].

The Public Procurement Code regulates tender boards [1], and existing public workers’ regulations on conduct are fully applicable to defence staff [2]. These are made publicly available as parts of cited legislation.

The comprehensiveness of external verification was severely limited by the prevalence of contracts below the €350,000 threshold requiring ex-ante review by the CA (refer to Q64A) [1]. In practice, ex-ante review requires buyers to send contracts to the CA for approval, which is required for award. However, the CA’s mandate is strictly to perform an evaluation of legality and financial conformity with existing budgeted expenses. The appropriateness of tender specifications is evaluated ex-post and does not encompass all contracts [2]. In June 2021, a new bill will enter into force moving the threshold for ex-ante review by the CA to €750,000 [3].

There is little to no information about defence and military procurement. There are internal tender boards that bidders have access to. Such boards are present within the premises of the procurement department and on a restricted online platform. [1,2] Besides that, officers who manage and supervise the tender specifications are subject to an ethical code, and brief training courses (whenever organized, once or twice a year) that have one module on anti-corruption (which is quite superficial in nature).

As there are no official oversight mechanisms (external) and minimal internal oversights, access to data by these units is limited to non-existent. [1] Besides that, there are vague guidelines regarding the establishment of committees of procurement, and individuals who design the tenders and their specifications. [2]

As the tender board is restricted, one can conclude that there is no transparency. In many cases, tender boards contain a call for bidding, but the procurement unit have decided in advance which supplier will receive the tender. [1]

As there are no official oversight mechanisms (external) and minimal internal oversights, access to data by these units is limited to non-existent. [1] Besides that, there are vague guidelines regarding the establishment of committees of procurement, and individuals who design the tenders and their specifications. [2]

Article 31, Clause 1.9 of Federal Law No. 44 clearly defines and prohibits conflicts of interest among all participants of state order contracts [1]. Also, Article 51, Clause 2(г) obliges all contracting parties to provide a declaration proving that they are not violating the conflict of interest clause [1].

Article 36, Clause 6 defines the limitations for tender board membership. It states that close relatives of tender participants or those with a personal interest in the outcome of the contractors’ selection cannot be members of the tender board.

However, conflicts of interest are common in defence procurement [2,3].
According to Article 9, the ordering party shall take measures to maintain and improve professional education in the procurement sphere [1]. Also, Article 39, Clause 5 obliges the ordering party to ensure the tender boards are formed of specialists with a high level of qualification in procurement [1]. That means that some training is required for procurement officials. But the only evidence of this is the MoD general instructional guidelines ‘on typical conflict-of-interest situations’ in the army [4].

Internally, Minister of Defence Decree No. 695 describes the internal control of procurement [1]. Article 18 allows the oversight commission to check the reasonability of prices, relevancy of tenders, etc. [1]. However, there is no information about the dates, locations or results of such checks [2].

According to Government Decree No. 728, the Federal Antimonopoly Service (FAS) is appointed to implement state control over defense procurement [3]. According to Article 15.2, in order to control all public procurement (except secret items), the FAS can carry out scheduled and unscheduled inspections, place administrative charges, initiate active search measures and revise pricing methodology [4]. The FAS is formally independent from the military or other interested parties.

Most of the audit trail is only available for non-classified tenders, which are believed to account for only one third of all defence procurements [5].

There is a publicly available Code of Conduct for MoD civilian personnel and ethical regulations for military personnel [1]. Both apply to the MoD tender boards. The MoD regulation for the board on conflict of interest is also available at the MoD website [2].

According to Article 98 of Federal Law No. 44, non-secret tenders are externally audited by the Accounts Chamber and auditing bodies at regional and municipal levels [1]. They check, analyse and evaluate the information about legitimacy, reasonability, relevancy, timeliness and efficiency of state procurement spending [1].

Sources report, there is a tender board that is designed from members of different agencies such as MoF, MoD, and GAMI. The members have to declare any conflict of interest and sign code of conduct (1), (2).
According to a Gulf affairs expert, “Tender boards are subject to regulations and codes of conduct; however, decisions are rarely subject to independent audit. Typically, decisions to carry out audits are driven more by political interests, than a desire to eliminate corruption” (3).

Although the Ministry of Finance does have a mandate to provide oversight and is legally required to review all contracts valued at SAR 5 million (approximately USD 1.3 million) and above, or contracts with execution periods of more than one year, the MoF has no authority over MoD purchases. In the Tender board, there are observer members from the MoD, and that’s the only oversight mechanism the MoF has (1), (2).

The Government Procurement Law states that all government bids must be announced in the official gazette Umm al-Qoura (Arabic), in two local newspapers, as well as in electronic media (1). However, as mentioned above, the procedures and inner workings of tender boards in Saudi Arabia are not transparent or made publicly available (2), (3).

Although the Ministry of Finance does have a mandate to provide oversight and is legally required to review all contracts valued at SAR 5 million (approximately USD 1.3 million) and above, or contracts with execution periods of more than one year, the MoF has no authority over MoD purchases. In the Tender board, there are observer members from the MoD, and that’s the only oversight mechanism the MoF has (1), (2).

The Public Procurement Law comprises several provisions to prevent parties involved in public procurement on behalf of contracting authority from being in a conflict of interest. The Law defines a conflict of interest as a situation when a representative of the contracting authority or a person related to him/her is involved in management, owns more than 1% of shares or is in any way professionally engaged by, or has business connections with the bidding company [1]. Contracting authorities are explicitly forbidden from signing a contract with bidders when a conflict of interest is present [1]. Furthermore, persons who took part in the procurement planning and tender documents preparation are prohibited from submitting a bid or cooperating with bidders [2]. There is also a provision banning contracting authority staff involved in procurement or persons related to them from accepting any type of professional engagement (including becoming stakeholders) with suppliers up to two years after their engagement with the contracting authority was terminated [3]. The Law precisely regulates establishment and competences of tender boards, prescribing that one member has to have a degree in law or to be a public procurement officer. In high-value procedures, a tender board is requested to include a public procurement officer [4]. The public procurement officer is a civil servant with adequate prior training and certificate, provided by the Public Procurement Office [5]. The official handbook for public procurement officers’ certification exam encompasses a particular chapter dedicated to the prevention of corruption and conflict of interest [6]. In 2014, the MoD reported having 45 certified public procurement officers and estimated this was in accordance with their needs [7].
The MoD’s rulebook regulating public procurement and internal plan for corruption prevention also apply to procurement in the field of defence and security which are exempt from the Law [8, 9]. The Internal Plan reaffirms the legislative interdiction of employees involved in procurement planning and tender documentation preparation to cooperate with bidders or act as one [10]. Moreover, the internal plan states that “professional members of Ministry of Defence and Serbian Armed Forces” are not allowed to start a professional engagement with bidders taking part in the MoD’s and SAF’s procurement procedures for two years after leaving the previous position [11]. There is no evidence that training programs have taken place after 2014.

The regulative framework requires a comprehensive audit trail of tender boards’ composition and activities. The Public Procurement Law obliges contracting authorities to register all activities during planing, tendering and contract execution and to keep all relevant documentation for 10 years after the contract expiry or 5 years five years after decision on cancelling procurement procedure [1]. All communication during the public procurement procedure must proceed in writing [2]. The law foresees a written decision on setting up a tender board, followed by an obligation of tender board members to sign declarations that they are not in a conflict of interest [3]. This means there is a written trail revealing which persons were part of the tender board. Furthermore, the minutes of a bids opening have to be signed by members of tender boards and representatives of bidders who attended the opening [4]. The minutes have to encompass names of all persons who were present during the opening [4]. The aforementioned legislative provisions are reaffirmed in the Rulebook Regulating Public Procurement Procedure in the MoD and SAF, which also applies to procurement in the field of defence exempt from the Law [5]. The Rulebook specifically requires members of tender boards to sign the unified report on the evaluation of bids [6]. Tender boards prepare a draft decision on contract awards, which is signed by the responsible person in the organisational unit implementing procurement [7]. Additionally, the Internal Plan for Corruption Prevention in the MoD and SAF emphasises that the Internal Audit will in the course of reviewing public procurement verify if communication was indeed in written form [8]. Several procurement procedures implemented by the MoD in the period 2015-2017 were subject to civil supervision in accordance with the law (contract value over 1,000,000,000 dinars). The civil supervisors’ reports are available at the Public Procurement Office’s website and are helpful as a secondary trail [9]. These reports confirm that in given cases the required documents (decision on setting up tender board, signed statements about absence of conflict of interest, minutes of bid opening, etc.) were produced.

Tender board regulations are provided by the Public Procurement Law and Rulebook Regulating Public Procurement Procedure in the MoD and SAF, which are publicly available. The handbook for the exam for public procurement officers is also available at the Public Procurement Office’s website [1].

Contracting authorities are obliged by law to submit quarterly reports on implemented procurement to the Public Procurement Office (PPO). [1] In addition, the PPO can request detailed reports on individual tenders or contracts. [2] State Audit Institution (SAI) could ask for any document pertaining to procurement procedures in its audit. [3] However, the SAI has not audited annual financial reports of the MoD since 2013.

All Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) personnel are subject to regulations that are designed to eliminate conflicts of interest. For example, personnel must make mandatory indebtedness and investment declarations annually, within 14 days of financial embarrassment, and within seven days following the purchase or sale or private local/overseas assets, which likewise applies to tender/procurement officials [1]. There are also clear regulations that outline requirements for government procurement officials to conduct procurement transparently and impartially that avoids conflicts of interest [2, 3].

There is no publicly released information on audit processes for government spending, although there is clear legislation that contract authorisation is limited to a select group of senior officials [1], with external oversight from the Auditor-General’s Office (AGO) [2]. Moreover, although the MINDEF and the Defence Science and Technology Agency (DSTA) do not release audit information to the public, there is a robust framework of internal checklists that suggest that audit processes have been meticulously tracked [3]. For example, procurement officials are carefully selected and are required to undergo stringent background checks and regular self-declarations of any conflict of interest, indicating evidence of an audit trail [4].

As stated earlier, there are government-wide regulations and codes of conduct that specifically applies to procurement officials [1]. The Government Procurement Regulations clearly stipulate the types of tender processes, the conduct of procurement, and other pertinent provisions. For example, it clearly states that a contracting authority shall conduct procurement in a transparent and impartial manner that is consistent with regulations, avoids conflicts of interest, and prevents corrupt practices [2].

There is evidence that there has been some degree of external verification on MINDEF and Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) tenders, although these largely relate to lower-tier activities in terms of value such as essential services and maintenance [1]. The Auditor-General’s Office (AGO) provides external oversight, but there is no evidence to indicate that major defence procurement programmes have been subject to external verification.

Regulation 16A8.4 of the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) states that if any supply chain management official, or any role player, close family member, partner or associate of that official has any private or business interest in a contract to be awarded, the official must disclose that interest and withdraw from participating in the process [1].

The Framework for Supply Chain Management (SCM) [2] defined in the PFMA is fulfilled by a code of conduct enacted by SCM practice note 4 of 2003, which specifically addresses conflicts of interest [3]. The National Treasury has an established ‘academy’ to train officials on procurement legislation, specifically the PFMA.

Under National Treasury regulations relating to the Framework for Supply Chain Management, bid evaluation and bid adjudication committees are required to maintain complete records of all deliberations and decisions. These are available for both internal audit departments and the auditor-general [1].

All tender-related regulations and codes of conduct are made publicly and easily available by National Treasury [1].

The auditor-general is tasked with this role of conducting external audits/verification of tender processes/awards [1]. They are considered to be generally robust.

Procurement officers designing tender specifications and making tender board decisions are subject to the Code of Conduct for the DAPA’s officials, which includes guidelines on preventing conflicts of interest. Article 5.3 of the Code outlines restrictions on officers’ activities, such as giving advice to a related party for personal gains or representing an institution or organisation related to his or her duty. Officers are prohibited from investing in the stock market related to defence arms producers by using information acquired while performing his or her duty, based on Article 12 of the Code of Conduct. Officers are subject to filing financial disclosure reports with their current stock holdings twice a year. Anti-corruption training with guidance on avoiding conflicts of interest is conducted annually for officers. [1]

An internal audit on defence contracts is conducted by the Inspector General within the DAPA. [1] Occasionally, the Board of Audit and Investigation (BAI) conducts an audit regarding tender award decisions when necessary (see Q75), but it is not conducted on a regular basis. [2] [3]
Moreover, every important decision making on procurements are pre-reviewed by the steering committee(방위사업추진위원회) and functional committee(분과위원회), members of which consist of people in government, parliament, and civilian experts. [4] [5]

The public can access the Code of Conduct for tender boards in full detail through the Office of Legislation website. [1]

While the internal audit offices within the DAPA and the BAI conduct an audit of tender board decisions, there is no evidence of external verification regarding the audit. [1] [2]

Members of the board, the governing body of the Procurement Authority (which is yet to be established), are obliged to disclose conflict of interest issues. [1] Members of the Procuring Entity, which tenders contracts, are also obliged to also disclose any conflicts of interest. [2] The Procurement Act, however, does not mention professional restrictions or talk of training for officials.

There are several processes in the selection and design of tender specifications that leave an audit trail. For instance, the bid process must list a number of criteria, including price for obtaining bid notices. [1] The Request for Proposals process, when opened for solicitation, must list the price of the award the government will dispense. [2] In circumstances where a bidder is aggrieved, they may seek redress via the Accounting Officer of the procuring unit. [3] The review process by the Accounting Officer involves looking at prices. Every department is also obliged to have an internal audit unit, which is tasked with disclosing audits to the Auditor General. [4] The Procuring Authority, in its Annual Performance Report, must include audited findings and complaints investigated. [5] It is also obligated to maintain links with relevant “oversight” agencies with related interest in public procurement, [5] which in this case is the Public Accounts Committee and the Finance Committee of the legislature. Nevertheless, politicians are not involved in the tender award decisions. Their role is to offer oversight.

As listed in the Procurement Act, the regulations and codes of conduct are fully transparent throughout the bidding cycle. Bids are listed publicly, prices are outlined, the board must comply with a code of ethics, accounts are subject to an audit, and there is a process for redress. [1] [2] All these are supposed to be public per the Act.

The Procuring Authority is obligated to maintain links with relevant “oversight” agencies with related interest in public procurement. [1] In this case, these could be the Public Accounts Committee, the Auditor General, and the Finance Committee of the legislature.

Order DEF/2021/2011 regulates centralised contracting and sets the composition and powers of the Contracting Boards of the Ministry of Defence, the Defence Staff, and the Armies. Members of all boards are specified and are military public workers of the Ministry of Defense. However, Article 7 opens the door to the participation in board meetings of specialised advisors, with voice but without vote [1]. No requisites are mentioned for such advisors, including any eventual relationship with contrating firms. Instruction 23/2020 of the Secretary of Defence, on the Ethical Code and Code of Conduct of personnel related to purchasing, which affects to both military and civilian staff in the purchasing areas of the Ministry of Defence, deals in Section 3 with conflict of interests. It defines conflicts of interest as situations that may compromise impartiality and independence, and “applicable to all personnel of the Ministry of Defense that directly or indirectly is related to the actions, procedures, processes and phases of the purchasing function defined in the annex, from the planning phase in which the need is defined, its operational and technical requirements, and the purchasing strategy, up to the contracting, execution and reception phases; as well as the disposal of obsolete or useless materials for their use to the extent that each of the points of the same affects them. Likewise, it will be applicable to suppliers, contractors and collaborating companies of the Ministry of Defense, who directly or indirectly have a relationship with the actions, procedures, processes and phases of the purchasing function” [2].

The Ministry of Defence acknowledges that “proving the non-existence of conflicts of interest in a generic and permanent way over time is not possible, since situations are changing, the conflict of interest must be assessed by each public employee on a case-by-case basis, inhibiting actions that may be affected. See “responsible statements” of absence of conflicts of interest in relation to the provisions of art. 24 of Directive 2014/24 / EU on public procurement and articles 64 and 71 of Law 9/2017 of November 8, on Public Sector Contracts.” [3] When asked about the type of specific training that procurement officers receive to identify cases of corruption and to report potential malpractices, the answer by a representative of the Ministry of Defence was that these officers belong to the Intendance Corps of the Navy and the Armies, their training being established in the respective study plans, and also that there are perfection courses on procurement. No details and no reference to the mandatory character of such courses or their periodicity were provided when the question was asked again [4]. However, an official answer from the Ministry of Defence to the very same question poser through the Portal of Transparency recognised that: “Currently there is no specific training plan for procurement officials in order to avoid conflicts of interest beyond the permanent updating to which every public worker is obliged to know and comply with the rules and instructions related to their scope of action.” [3]

Section 3 of Chapter 2 of Law 24/2011 (Articles 31-37) regulates and details the process of adjudication of contracts [1], but there is no external audit trail of which politicians are involved in tender award decisions.

Tender board regulations are fully transparent, as stated in Law 24/2011, of Contracts in the Public Sector in the Areas of Defence and Security [1].

No “external” or independent verification (from the contracting body) in advance of contract award is mentioned in Law 24/2011, of contracts in the public sector in the domain of defense and security. The general law on public contracts (Law 9/2017) has numerous references to independent and external scrutiny, but Art. 5 of the law clearly states that contracts related to defence and security, which are object of Law 24/2011, are excluded from the scope of Law 9/2007 [2]. External scrutiny after the contract is awarded is done by the Court of Audits.

Public external audits by the Court of Audits do happen on occasional, and affect very selected contracts (see previous sections). On the other hand, external scrutiny may be hampered by lack of publicity or lack of regulation. As indicated in Law 24/2011, a number of contracts may fall outside of the scope of the law (Article 7), or the information regarding certain contracts may not be disclosed (Article 35) [1]. The latter are often contracts negotiated without publicity, and they represent a significant percentage of the total economic value of contracts by the Ministry of Defence, as mentioned previously. Moreover, Article 23.3 of Law 24/2011 states that “minor contracts”, works contracts for amounts less than €50,000 and supply and services contracts for amounts less than €18,000, excluding, in both cases, the value-added tax (VAT), may be awarded directly by the body of contracting to any entrepreneur who can act and fulfill the rest of the requirements as demanded in the Law [1]. In 2018, 3.1 per cent of the total economic volume of contracts corresponded to minor contracts [3], whilst figures were higher in the two previous years: 23.7 per cent in 2017 [4] and 11.4 per cent in 2016 [5].

In November 2014, the Defence Commission of the Spanish Parliament voted against an audit on the Special Armaments Programmes (PEAs), by far the most famous case entailing both the higher costs in procurement in the history of Spain and known by continuous financial problems and overrun costs. The only votes against were of the political party in the government, with the majority in the commission [6].

GAN Integrity’s Sudan report, published on its Risk and Compliance Portal, summarises as follows: ‘Public procurement in Sudan presents companies with a very high risk of corruption. A system of patronage, cronyism and nepotism distorts the market competition’ [1]. A phone interview with an expert on Sudan’s defence sector [2] confirmed that the government ministries and armed forces probably do not use tender boards for defence and security acquisitions, despite some guidance for tendering being set forth in the 2010 Public Procurement Act [3]. The expert said that even the Ministry of Finance has had to depend on Sudanese companies informally stepping in to procure simple items for it, including fuel. In such circumstances, it is clear that the officials in charge of procurement are not even creating tenders and are entirely free of regulation and codes of conduct preventing conflicts of interest.

A 2017 report by Transparency International states that the ‘lack of transparency and information [about contracting processes] allows for a discretionary administration of the public finances and makes it difficult for anti-corruption watchdogs and for other branches of government, such as the legislature of the auditor general, to scrutinise how money is spent’ [1]. This implies a lack of any systemic creation of audit trails that could be used by oversight agencies to monitor tendering processes. In a phone interview, an expert on Sudan’s defence sector said that, although an anti-corruption commission has started some investigations (not necessarily specific to procurement issues) since the ousting of President Bashir in April 2019, these are largely ‘political operations having little to do with due justice. Committee members are politicians, not people with legal or technical backgrounds, and it is headed by a military man’ [2]. The International Budget Partnership’s 2017 Open Budget Survey for Sudan scored Sudan’s transparency 2 out of 100, its public participation 0 out of 100 and its budget oversight 31 out of 100 [3]. Sudan’s security and defence activities are exceptionally secret and opaque.

Since there is no evidence that tender boards are actually used in Sudan’s defence sector (for example, the Ministries of Defence, Interior and Finance do not list solicitations, awards or any other procurement-specific information on their websites [1,2,3]), it follows that there is no transparency in the selection of providers of defence items and services. In a phone interview, one expert on Sudan’s defence sector said that he believes that tender boards are not used at all to make purchases for Sudan’s defence sector [4]. The International Budget Partnership’s 2017 Open Budget Survey for Sudan scored Sudan’s transparency 2 out of 100, its public participation 0 out of 100 and its budget oversight 31 out of 100 [5]. Sudan’s security and defence activities are exceptionally secret and opaque.

Since tenders, to the extent that they are used in the defence sector, are not easily accessible either to the public or to ministries or oversight bodies, it follows that there is no external verification that the particular specifications of tenders are appropriate. The Ministry of Finance website lists a link to pages entitled ‘Procurement’, but the pages are empty [1].

Swedish Defence Materiel Administration Agency (FMV) officials with a role in designing tender specification, or in tender board decisions, are subject to regulations and codes of conduct designed to prevent conflict of interest. Procurement officials are subject to ‘internal regulations’ that cover – albeit vaugely – ‘conflicts of interest, additional employment, shareholding, travel, and representation’ and also undergo some anti-corruption training on a regular basis [1] [2]. FMV staff are also expected to comply with the agency’s brief statement on ‘Ethics and social responsibility’ [3]. According to law [4], FMV staff are required to file financial disclosure reports to demonstrate that neither the official nor his or her family have financial conflicts of interest in their work.

There is a comprehensive audit trail, audited by the Swedish National Audit Office (NAO) [1], of which officials and politicians were involved in selecting suppliers, designing tender specifications, and awarding contracts. Specific procurements are also investigated by the Competition Authority (KKV) [2]. For this assessment, FMV have however themselves refused to share information concerning the transparency of their tender boards.

The FMV tender boards’ ‘internal regulations’ and other/related codes of conduct are only summarised online [1] and not otherwise made publicly available, but may be requested under the Law on Public Access to Official Documents [2].

FMV summarises the procurement process in eight brief steps [1]. Among these, steps 1 and 2 involve ‘compiling material’ for the tender and then ‘advertising’ it. Steps 4 and 5, moreover, involve ‘assessing possible suppliers’, and ‘reviewing tender bids’. No indication is given that an ‘external verification’ of appropriate tender specifications is part of the FMV’s own process. Their call for tenders are however published on the EU Bulletin Board and Tenders Electronic Daily database which means it is safe to assume they have been scrutinized to follow at least EU level regulations however, there is no evidence of additional scrutiny.

The Code of Conduct for Federal Personnel (COC) applies to officials deciding on tenders and summarizes existing rules for government employees. It discusses gifts and invitations, as well as illegal behaviour or transgression of rules [1]. Title 19 Article 322 of the Swiss Criminal Code is about bribery. It explicitly includes members of the armed forces. It orders penalties for active and passive bribery of Swiss government officials with financial penalties or imprisonment of up to five years [2]. The military’s penal code contains corruption specific rules on active and passive bribery as well as on unfaithful business management (Section 9) [3]. The Federal Personnel Act (BPG) prohibits federal employees from accepting gifts within the framework of their duties (Article 21.3 BPG) [4]. The ordinance clarifies a threshold of “social common” gifts that are allowed and some situations where a total prohibition applies (in the case of procurement procedures) (Article 93 Bundespersonalverordnung) (BPV) [5]. Article 22a of the BPG clarifies the obligation of federal employees to bring breaches of rules or misconduct to the attention of the relevant authorities (superiors, criminal prosecution or Swiss Federal Audit Office) (Article 22a BPG). In case they do so in good faith they are protected from negative professional consequences for doing so (Article 22a, 5 BPG) [4]. The BPG, as well as the BPV, contain provisions on private enterprise for government officials. The BPG prohibits employees from remunerated work for third parties if it is “in violation of their duty of loyalty [Treuepflicht]” (Article 20). The law also opens up the option of making certain types of secondary employment subject to prior approval if they might affect the ability of the employee to do her/his work (Article 23) [4]. The BPV requests that paid secondary jobs have to be reported to the superior, and if a conflict of interest cannot be ruled out, approval has to be denied (Article 91). The ordinance also states that employees have to recuse themselves if there is the potential of a conflict of interest in relation to another activity they conduct, including any kind of business (Article 94a) [5]. These rules are also referenced and reiterated in the Codex for federal employees [1]. There is no indication for a stricter or different regime is applied to procurement officials than for the federal personnel in general. The research did not uncover the existence of any specific or regular training on the conflict on interests for these officials.

The FDF provides data on a yearly basis on procurement procedures for all ministries [1]. Tendering procedures are subject to the oversight mechanisms in place for all federal spending including oversight by the Parliament [2], SFAO and the internal audit at the DDPS [3, 4]. The SFAO has to draft a report on each audit it has completed and submit it to the Finance Delegation (Article 14.1 FKG). The office can publish that report once the finance delegation has dealt with it (Article 14.2, FKG) [5]. Not all specific reports are published. However, they are generally covered by the Freedom of Information Act [6]. The internal audit of the DDPS also publishes some of its reports. The DDPS also has an independent internal audit department that publishes its reports since 2015 [7]. The parliamentarian oversight provides yearly and occasional reports that are available online [8]. Parliamentarians have criticized, in the past, a lack of transparency and a late inclusion in the process, and the high number of negotiated procedures. The government maintains that information can be obtained via request and that the DDPS follows international standards and has a well-established oversight system [2]. However, it is not publicly available knowledge whether the audit trail includes all officials involved in the process.

The publicly avaialble COC applies to officials deciding on tenders and summarizes existing rules for government employees. However, this is a general document and not specific to procurment. [1]. The COC summarizes the rules from the Swiss Penal Code [2, 3] and the Personnel Act (BPG) [4] The ordinance on federal personnel details those rules [5]. Switzerland is among the initial signatories of the World Trade Organization’s plurilateral Agreement on Government Procurement and follows the rules set out by the agreement on public tenders [6]. The website of the BKB informs on the procedures [7]. Tenders are public with the exception of the regular negotiated procedure, which still requires a public announcement of the awarded contract, and the negotiated procedure respectively the procedure by invitation under Chapter 3 of the Ordinance on Public Procurement (VöB) [8].

The FDF provides data on a yearly basis on procurement procedures for all ministries [1]. Tendering procedures are subject to the oversight mechanisms in place for all federal spending, including oversight by the Parliament, [2] SFAO and the internal audit at the DDPS [3, 4]. The SFAO has to draft a report on each audit it has completed and submit it to the finance delegation (Article 14.1 FKG). The office can publish that report once the finance delegation has dealt with it (Article 14.2, FKG) [5]. The internal audit of the DDPS also publishes some of its reports. The DDPS also has an independent internal audit department that publishes its reports since 2015 [6]. Parliamentarian oversight provides yearly and occasional reports that are available online [7]. For the non-publicly awarded tenders, the DDPS internal audit reviewed in a recent report the practice using negotiated procedures. It saw a substantial increase in legal verification of negotiated procedures peaking at 97% of all procedures being scrutinized on their legality [3].

Mechanisms for “Conflicts of interest” are covered by laws and acts of the “Government Procurement Act” and the “Enforcement Rules of the Government Procurement Act” [1, 2]. Financial disclosure reports are essential for certain positions and ranks [1]. Annual training is provided to procurement officials to avoid conflicts of interest. Qualifications for integrity and ethics and trainings on avoiding conflicts of interest are well measured and monitored for procurement officials on an annual basis [2]. Procurement officials are subject to restrictions on professional activites (e.g., shareholders of contracting firms, board members, advisors, or company officers of private firm, post-employment, etc.) and are required to file financial disclosure reports to demonstrate that neither the official nor his/her family have financial conflicts of interest in their work.

There is an audit trail of which officials are involved in selecting suppliers and designing tender specification. Audit trails for officials from the Ministry of National Defence, Public Construction Commission (or other government agencies involved in selecting suppliers and designing tender specification), are required by the “Government Procurement Act” and “Audit Act” [1, 2, 3, 4]. The decisions of Procurement Evaluation Committees, published on a notice of contract award, also outlines officials involved in the process. [5]. Politicians have no role to play, but an insufficient supply of information still tends to lead to fraud [6].

Tender board regulations of conduct are fully transparent. The public can access relevant information from the internet. Regulations and codes of conduct for tender boards are covered by laws and regulations. Tender board regulations and codes of conduct are fully coordinated by the “Government Procurement Act” and “Audit Act” [1, 2, 3, 4].

The “Regulations Governing the Organization of Procurement Evaluation Committee” regulates timing of establishment, tasks, organization, qualification, behaviour prohibition, name list announcement of committee. The “Regulations for Review by Procurement Evaluation Committee” outlines the process of reviewing, content of meeting record, different opinions, confidential regulations and conflict interest [5, 6].

External verifications by the LY or CY to examine tender specifications are regulated by the “Government Procurement Act”, “Audit Act”, and “Regulations for Coverage and Handling of Special Military Procurement” [1, 2, 3]. However, measures to ensure scrutiny or due diligence in defence procurements are not comprehensive and this leads to suspicion, speculation, and fraud in certain cases [4].

The Code of Ethics and Conduct for the Public Service addresses conflict of interest for public servants, but calls for self-reporting. Officials are advised to raise any conflict of interest they have with their superiors. Otherwise, training in ethical and anti-corruption issues is a key function of the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau, and covers the defence forces. The Public Procurement Act Regulations 2013 do not specifically address conflict of interest. [1] [2]

Legally, the tender process should be overseen by the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority, and reflected in that agency’s Annual Performance Evaluation Report. [1] However, in the reports reviewed, there is no mention of the quality of the procurement processes in the defence sector. Another channel, the oversight of the Standing Committee for Foreign Affairs, Defence, and Security also fails to provide any oversight of the procurement undertaken by tender boards. Finally, the Controller and Auditor General has been able to provide limited oversight, identifying some failures of tender boards in the Tanzania People’s Defence Forces. However, these do not relate to especially strategic or valuable procurement. [2] [3]

While general Tender Board procedures are laid out in the Public Procurement Act Regulations 2013, it is not clear how this operates in practice in the defence and security sector, especially given that the regulations makes critical exemptions for the sector, allowing competitive negotiation, single source tendering, and ‘open’ and ‘restricted’ tendering. Given the lack of any detail on the sector in the Annual Performance Evaluation Reports of the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority, the limited oversight given by the Controller and Auditor General, and the lack of effective oversight from parliament, it can be concluded that there is no transparency in the operation of tender boards. [1] [2] [3]

There is very limited scrutiny from the Controller and Auditor General’s Office. [1] The Public Procurement Regulatory Authority reports indicate no oversight, as the sector is never mentioned. [2]

There are no regulations or codes of conduct on conflict of interest prevention that are specifically designed for tender officials. The procurement officers in the Ministry of Defence are subject solely to vague regulations covering conflict of interest prevention, such as the Code of Conduct on Corruption Prevention and Suppression within the ministry, which applies to all officials, and the procurement regulations of the Ministry of Finance, which only restrict the procurement officials and tendering officials from being the procurement inspectors [1].

According to the Code of Conduct on Corruption Prevention and Suppression, implemented by the Royal Thai Armed Forces Headquarters, anti-corruption training should be conducted annually at all military levels, including for procurement officials, but the training does not specifically focus on the conflicts of interest that might occur among procurement officials [2]. In addition, according to the Public Procurement and Supplies Administration Act 2017, Section 49, the Comptroller-General’s Department also has the duty to put in place training programmes for promoting and developing officials’ knowledge and expertise in relation to public procurement and supplies administration, including the procurement officers in the MoD [3].

According to the Public Procurement and Supplies Administration Act 2017, Section 8, information on procurement and supplies administration must be systematically retained for the purpose of audits [1]. In addition, the E-Tendering and E-Auction systems have been introduced and are being operated, helping public procurement bodies to collect statistics and other significant pieces of information on matters such as selecting suppliers, designing tender specification and tender award decisions.

However, there are some problems in the public procurement audit system, including failure to report the edited public procurement plan and its summary to the OAG within the time specified [2]. Additionally, according to the Office of Internal Audit, analysis reports on the risk of conflicts of interest, which provide internal audit trial information on defence procurement, must be submitted by the Royal Thai Armed Forces Headquarters to the State Audit Council [3]. However, by policy, even though there are detailed records of the tender process (especially for e-bidding), there is no evidence in the audit trail of which officials were involved in selecting suppliers, designing tender specifications or tender award decisions [4].

Defence procurement is generally subject to internal audit, with additional reports submitted to the State Audit Council; therefore, the tendering system is partially transparent [1]. According to Interviewee 1, a political scientist, tender boards are subject to regulations and codes but these are not effectively enforced. It has been very challenging to obtain independent and transparent audits to ensure due process and fairness [2]. Apparently, there is no evidence of regulations or codes of conduct for tender boards specifically; there is only the Guidelines for Internal Audit under the Public Procurement and Supplies Administration Act 2017, which apply to all state agencies, with some sections referring superficially to the tender board procedures [3].

According to the Regulations of the Ministry of Defence on Internal Audit 2010, defence procurement (including the tendering process) may be subject mainly to internal audit, but it is still externally scrutinised by the State Audit Office [1]. However, according to the Public Procurement and Supplies Administration Act 2017, Section 7, in cases of military procurement related to national security, the real authority in terms of decision-making belongs solely to the Minister of Defence and the Defence Council. Additional scrutiny by no more than three external experts is allowed, but the external experts must be professionals who have a high level of expertise in the defence sector [2,3]. According to Interviewee 2, a military expert, there is no external verification that the particular specifications of the tender are appropriate as the ministry has full control over its internal audit [4].

According to our sources, the procurement officials are subject to sign a code of conduct and reveal any assets, as well as revealing if any of their relatives are on any of the tender lists (1). Besides that, they receive periodic training on tender and procurement. This training is done in collaboration with NGOs or with the Anti-corruption commission (2,3). The Decree n°1039-2014, dated 13 March 2014, Organising Public Procurement, provides for obligations and sanctions for officials involved in the procurement process (4). These officials are also subject to the code of conduct of the public officials (5). A national program for the training of these officials is established by the National Observatory for Procurement (6.)

Procurements are subject to prior control at each stage of the procedure. There is an audit trail of officials who are members of the commision or the procurement committee. At the same time, there are not audit trail of commisions that award tenders. The public buyer is required to submit any of the following to the prior confirmation of the Procurement Control Commission and the Supreme Audit and Procurement Audit Commission:
– bid evaluation reports and jury board reports and pre-election reports for calls for tenders preceded by a preselection
– negotiated market projects
– draft amendments relating to the contracts under its jurisdiction, unless the amount of the contract including the riders exceeds the threshold of its competence,
– the draft final regulations of the markets within its competence,
– any problem or dispute relating to the preparation, the award, the execution and settlement of contracts under its jurisdiction, (1).
Several commissions at the level of the Presidency of Government and the Ministry of Defence are in charge of examining the regularity of the tendering procedures, the fairness, and transparency of the procurement procedures, and ensuring the acceptability of its administrative and financial techniques (2). A special commission exists within the Ministry of Defence which is in charge of examining all the steps of secret procurement. Any file submitted for the opinion of the special commission must be accompanied by a report, with circumstances established and signed by the agents responsible for the march. Limited control is exercised by the service of expenses control on this procurement (3). According to our sources, there are some audit trails which are not subject to external verifications (4,5).

Tender board regulations and codes of conduct are only partially transparent when it comes to military procurement procedures. Although the regulations and policies exist, they are not publicly available and not transparent. The names and strructures of committees are also non tranaparent as the public expenditure controller has no authority (observer status) (3,4). The Decree n°1039-2014, dated 13 March 2014, Organising Public Procurement, provides for several transparency procedures (publication in the press, the website of public procurement including tender boards). This decree also provides that the procurement must be done through the transparent internet platform Tuneps, starting from 1 September 2018 (1). However, the Ministry of Defence does not yet appear to use this platform for its activities (2). According to our sources, although most Government agencies use the online platform, the MoD do no use it. There is an informal agreement not to use it at this stage for security reasons(3,4). Therefore, the tender boards lack a great deal of transaprency.

According to our sources, there is no external verification mechanism for the specifications of tenders. The internal procurement officials are the only verification mechanisms available.

Interviewee 4 suggested that officials who are involved in designing tender specifications or in tender board decisions are subject to regulations or codes of conduct that are designed to prevent conflicts of interest. He also said that the military has expert boards to test the effectiveness and efficiency of the systems, equipments/good and services contracted. If these expert boards find something suspicious or identify procurements that have performance or qualification problems, then the Ministry of Defence may initiate an administrative investigation or call for a legal investigation to be carried out by the prosecutors. He also emphasised that, in early October every year, tender officials receive training with the aim of updating the knowledge of tender officials and internal auditors about changed legislation, regulations and procedures [1].

Interviewee 4 also suggested that procurement officials may be subject to some vague restrictions on professional activity, such as the guidance (and therefore tacit influence) of the commander in charge of that particular military unit, as well as some informal directives they receive from the Ministry of Defence. He therefore said that this is a very delicate post that most finance officers prefer not to be appointed to [1].

The fundamental punitive regulation against corruption in public tenders/bids (covering bids/procurements in the field of defence/security) is Article 235 of the Turkish Criminal Code (TCK) [2]. See below for the full translation of the article:

ARTICLE 235-(1) Any person involved in mischief during tenders relating to the purchase or sale of goods and services on behalf of public institutions or corporations is punished with 5 to 12 years’ imprisonment.
(2) The following acts are regarded as involvement in mischief during a tender;
a) Executing fraudulent acts;
1. Preventing persons who possess the required qualifications and credentials from participating in the tender,
2. Facilitating the participation of persons lacking the required qualifications and conditions in the tender,
3. Arranging the disqualification of offered goods from the evaluation even though they comply with the
bid specifications,
4. Arranging the consideration of goods that do not comply with the bid specifications in the evaluations.
b) Facilitating the access of third parties to information that is to be kept confidential according to tender law or bid specifications during submission of bids.
c) Preventing persons who possess the required qualifications and credentials from participating in the tender by using force, threats or acts contrary to the law.
d) Concluding open or secret agreements among the bidders or those willing to participate in the tender with
the intention of affecting the bid contract conditions and especially the contract price.
(3) In case a damage or loss is suffered by a public institution or corporation due to involvement in mischief
during a tender, the punishment to be imposed is increased by half. Non-quantification of the accrued loss shall not suppress the application of the provisions of this subsection.
(4) Any authorised person who gains an unjust benefit through involvement in mischief during a tender shall also be convicted for this offence.
(5) The provisions of the above subsections are also applied to auctions or bids realised through intermediaries of public institutions or corporations and the purchase/sale of goods or services performed on behalf of professional organisations in the statute of public institution, companies incorporated with the participation of public institutions or corporations, or professional organisations in the statute of public institution, or foundations operating within this frame, associations or cooperatives serving the public interest [2].

Section 2 of Law No. 4734 on Public Procurement [1] regulates procurement and prequalification notices and the issuance of tender documents and details the documents that should be included. Article 27 of this law stipulates that the tender documents must include the administrative specifications, which also cover the instructions to tenderers, the technical specifications, which also cover the project work, the draft contract and all other required documents and information [1]. These administrative specifications in the law are clearly defined, meaning that the legislation has fair and strong mechanisms to conduct oversight of both the tender boards and the bidders.

Interviewee 6 suggested that the procurement law is very strict in terms of anti-corruption and integrity-related issues and that all audit reports of the contracts fulfilled under the category of ‘Urgent Needs’ must be sent to the Ministry of Defence within a month [2], in accordance with the Ministry of Defence’s Regulation for Contracting [3]. In this sense, he emphasised that all audit trails of procurements conducted by the Ministry of Defence under the category of the ‘Urgent Needs’ can easily be traced, from the tender design to tender award. However, with regard to the audit trails of tenders designed and awarded by the SSB, he said it is not possible to talk about fully transparent processes [2].

Interviewees 3 and 4 suggested that regulations and codes of conduct for tender boards are only partially transparent [1,2]. Open-source research suggests that the calls for tenders for minor projects are transparently shared through the government’s EKAP online bidding platform and the official websites of the Ministry of Defence and Force Commands [3,4] and that all calls for the defence procurement bids of the military units are available to the public and firms. As we can see from the bids available online, there is no mention of regulations or codes of conduct applied to procurement officials.

However, as explained above, when it comes to major multi-million-dollar defence procurements, mostly managed by the SSB, we do not see the same level of transparency or the same inclination by the government to opt for open competition to avoid single-sourcing. In terms of the implementation of tenders, with Law No. 4734 on Public Procurement, the spending of taxpayer money for public prosperity has been based on the principles of transparency, equality, competition, participation and productivity. From 2002 to the present, there have been over 100 changes made to the law and the law’s legislative purpose has been abandoned by government officials. The fundamentals of Law No. 4734 can be summarised with the open procurement method and procurements made with certain requests, however there are exceptions, in which case there are special negotiated procedures [5]. Although these exceptions are only for special circumstances, most of Turkey’s procurements are violations of the law. In addition, public procurements are conducted with imperfect competition, causing monopoly among businesses [6]. However, Interviewee 6 suggested that the most common violation of Law No. 4734 is the fact that the majority of defence/security-related tenders are conducted behind closed doors, absolutely hidden from the public [7].

Chapter 3 of the Law on Public Procurement, which is about the Public Procurement Authority, Review of Complaints and Settlement of Disputes, clearly explains the role of the Public Procurement Authority (the internal executive auditing body attached to the Ministry of Treasury and Finance) during the implementation of and after the tenders [1]. The articles in this chapter, which explain how complaints should be submitted and how disputes should be settled [1], are clear and provide a good legislative background for a corruption-free and high-integrity defence/security environment.

However, as explained before, only the CoA, as the primary external auditing body, can conduct full scrutiny over public procurements. Nonetheless, Article 3 of the Law on Public Procurement covers ‘goods, services and works procurement which the relevant ministry decides are related to defence, security or intelligence or need to be treated confidentially, or procurements requiring special security measures during the performance of the contract pursuant to relevant legislation, or those concerning cases in which the basic interests of the state’s security needs to be protected’ [1]. This article enables the government to declare almost any procurement in the field of defence/security a state secret and a matter of national security. However, as seen in the CoA’s 2018 performance report regarding the Ministry of Defence, the CoA can scrutinise the tenders and spending of military canteens and markets run by military units within military facilities, but not all of them [2].

These officials are normally appointed based on their education and areas of expertise. Section 91U (2) of the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets (PPDA) Act [1] states:
“that a member of a Contracts Committee, a member of a procurement and disposal unit, a member of the governing body of a procuring and disposing entity, or a member of the Board of Survey who has a conflict of interest with respect to a procurement or disposal shall not:
(a) take part in any procurement or disposal proceedings; and (b) after a procurement or disposal contract is entered into, take part in any decision relating to the procurement or disposal contract.”

Furthermore, Section 37 (6) of the PPDA Act [2] states “that all members of the Evaluation Committee shall sign the Code of Ethics provided under the regulation made under this Act, declaring that they do not have a conflict of interest in the procurement requirement.” All the public officers are supposed to declare their sources of income/wealth [3]. However, the Ministry of Defence and Veterans Affairs Procurement Audit Report F/Y 2016/17 [4] reported the failure by the Procurement and Disposal Unit to state the bid validity period in the required format. The audit revealed that some of the solicitation documents issued by the Entity did not state the date of expiry of bid validity as required under Regulation 52 (1) of the PPDA (Rules and Methods for Procurement of Supplies Works and Non-Consultancy Services) Regulations, 2014 [5]. The bid validity period as stated in the total number of days which was noted in ten (10) out of the forty (40) sampled procurements worth UGX 3,463,363,270 which could potentially be interpreted as a conflict of interest. It is not known whether any anti-corruption training occurs for procurement officials.

There is evidence that the PPDA tracks audits. However, there is inadequate evidence to show that the law is adhered to. Section 31 of the PPDA [1] spells out the functions of a Procurement and Disposal Unit. It states that a Procurement and Disposal Unit shall:
“(a) manage all procurement or disposal activities of the procuring and disposing entity except adjudication and the award of contracts; (b) support the functioning of the Contracts Committee; (c) implement the decisions of the Contracts Committee; (d) liaise directly with the Authority on matters within its jurisdiction; (e) act as a secretariat to the Contracts Committee; (f) plan the procurement and disposal activities of the procuring and disposing entity; (g) recommend procurement and disposal procedures; (h) check and prepare statements of requirements; (i) prepare bid documents; (j) prepare advertisements of bid opportunities; (k) issue bidding documents; (l) maintain a providers list; (m) prepare contract documents; (n) issue approved contract documents;(o) maintain and archive records of the procurement and disposal process; (p) prepare monthly reports for the Contracts Committee; (q) co-ordinate the procurement and disposal activities of all the departments of the procuring and disposing entity; (r) prepare any other such reports as may be required from time to time” [1].

Since the defence and security procurement are above scrutiny[1], there is limited transparency including with regards to the codes of conduct and regulations which govern the tender and contract award processes. There is occasionally some transparency because the oversight bodies publish some of their audits on the sector.

There is not enough information to score this indicator. Given the secrecy in which defence and security matters are taken in the country [1, 2], there is no way one can verify whether there is external verification or not. Several attempts were made to meet the Procurement Disposal Unit of the Ministry of Defence and Veterans Affairs through the army spokesperson, but all were in vain.

Classified procurement:
Procurement of goods and services which constitute state secrets are conducted without open competition, there is no tendering procedure for that [16]. The General Staff of the AFU officials, who draft needs and priorities in terms of procuring military goods, are subjected to the Ukrainian anti-corruption legislation [2] and the MoD Code of Conduct which includes provisions on conflict of interests [3]. The MoD Department responsible for procurement of armaments is the MoD Department of Military-Technical Cooperation, Development of Arms and Military Equipment [4] and its employees are subjected to e-declarations [5], where they have to declare their income and interests.

Non-classified procurement:
Members of the MoD Tender Committee [6] are subject to the Ukrainian anti-corruption legislation [2] which also includes provisions on conflict of interests. Moreover, the MoD Code of Conduct approved by the Minister of Defence in 2017 also applies to members of the MoD Tender Committee and also includes provisions on conflict of interests [3]. There are also specific requirements for public service positions of category “A” [7], “Б” and “В” [8]. It is worth noting that positions with a mandate in procurement are those of categories “Б” and “В”, but there are no requirements envisaged by Ukrainian legislation specifically for these positions. However, the MoD Code of Conduct still covers matters of conflict of interests and post-separation also for officials in procurement [3]. The MoD Department responsible for procurement of non-classified goods and services is the MoD Department of Public Procurement and Supply of Material Resources [9] and its employees are also subjected to e-declarations [10], where they have to declare their income and interests. There is evidence that educational courses on anti-corruption in procurement are conducted, but for a more diverse audience [11, 12].

The training of procurement officials in MoD on all the issues (not only on conflict of interests) is provided according to the demands of Civil Service Law and with the help of international technical assistance received by Ukraine’s MoD (more information can be found in the answer for 66D). However, according to the annual performance appraisal procedure (obligatory for all civil servants each year) all civil servants (the majority of procurement officials in MoD are civil servants) are forming their training schedule for the next year in agreement with their direct supervisor. The whole procedure is described in the Law on Civil Service [13] and additional regulations of National Civil Service Agency of Ukraine. Additionaly the Corruption prevention and detection unit in MoD provides additional consultations and materials for all MoD employees, including all major issues. Conflict of interests is also one of them [14].

Technical specifications for goods and services are developed by different units depending on the particular good or service and signed by the Minister following the approval of several other departments [1]. For public procurement, structural subdivisions of the MoD and the General Staff of the AFU suggest procurement procedures that are needed and the MoD tender committee approves the annual procurement plan, which specifies the type of procurement procedure [2]. The composition of the tender committee is made public by an MoD order [3] and tender documentation on each procurement including an indication of the type of procurement. The head of the tender committee is also disclosed on the Prozorro website [4]. According to Ukrainian legislation, documents are to be stored for at least three years [5]. There is no evidence of external verification for particular tender specifications, although the MoD developed several technical specifications in cooperation with volunteers and private enterprises [6]. All the officials involved in the activities of Tender Committee of the MoD are clearly listed in the Minister’s decree. All their responsibilities and duties are very specifically detailed in the MoD instruction/order about the Tender Committee. The link to the existing list of Tender Committee members and the current MoD order on Tender Committee is provided [7].

Tender board regulations [1], as well as their composition [2], are transparent. The Code of Conduct is publicly available [3].

There is no evidence of external verification for particular tender specifications, although the MoD developed several technical specifications in cooperation with volunteers and private enterprises [1].

Since defence procurement is privately managed, tender boards as previously established do not exist publicly (1), (2). There are no rules on conflict of interests for privately managed tender boards.

Since defence procurement is privately managed, tender boards are not subject to oversight by government entities (1), (2).

Defence procurement is privately managed, and there is no transparency of tender boards procedures (1), (2).

Since defence procurement is privately managed, tender boards are not subject to oversight by government entities (1), (2).

Civilians working for tender boards are bound by the Civil Service Management Code which requires them to declare conflicts of interests to senior management, who then decide how to proceed [1]. Similarly, MoD policy requires personnel to report conflicts of interests to their superiors [2]. The Commercial Policy Statement on Tender Evaluation states that tender officials must ensure “must ensure fairness, equality and impartiality during the (tender) process” [3]. It also states that the conduct of tender officials “should not foster any conflict between their official duty and their private interest” [3]. Through the online Fraud Bribery & Corruption training, staff are signposted to Conflicts of Interest policy [4], however there is no indication of how regularly this is done or the degree to which it is enforced.

The Commercial Policy Statement on Tender Preparation and Process Management requires tender boards to “maintain full records of the Pre-Contract Award Evaluation (PCAE) activity in order to assist the debriefing of unsuccessful tenderers, maintain a proper audit trail and plan risk management activities” [1]. At the same time, the Tender Process Commercial Policy Statement states that tender boards must “record key decisions throughout the process in the Contract file minute” [2]. Furthermore, the Defence Equipment and Support organisation maintains an electronic register to capture declarations of interest and serves as an additional audit trail [3]. Tender decisions are made by civil servants, however, should there be a direction from a senior official or the Minister that in relations to tender, this is done in writing to ensure an audit trail. Written direction is given to the accounting officer who passess the relevant material on to the Comptroller and Auditor General in the NAO for audit purposes [4].

Chapter 16 of the DCSPR provides regulations for Tender Boards and is fully accessible [1]. Tender Boards are also bound by the Civil Service Management Code, which is also accessible [2].

User requirements are set by the military capability customer, and then the Delivery Agent works up detailed technical requirements specifications and multiple independent functions involved in procurement teams, ensuring a ‘separation of powers’ between commercial, finance and technical leads. In the case of inappropriate specifications, the market itself (i.e. the companies bidding and competing against one another) willl raise concerns that there inappropriate requirements and can file a challenge under procurement law in this case. [1, 2] However, there is no evidence that these specifications are subject to external and formalised audit.

Most of the ethical conduct regulations on procurement focus on relations with the contractor. The Procurement Integrity Act outlines regulations with regard to safeguarding during contracting and FAR Part 3.101 ‘Standards of Conduct’, which applies to defence procurement, states that ‘the general rule is to avoid strictly any conflict of interest or even the appearance of conflict of interest in Government-contractor relationships’ [1]. The Procurement Integrity Act prohibits the involvement of personnel who have been contacted by/contact a bid offeror regarding non-Federal employment and prohibits agency officials from accepting compensation from a contractor [2]. It is not clear that contracting officers are subject to an additional level of restrictions on their personal activities or to more thorough conflict of interest standards. A former contracting officer cannot accept compensation from a successful contractor as an employee or consultant for 1 year after the former official was involved in the contract award. If a contracting officer is handling high-value procurements, they are deemed high risk, as outlined in Q37. Public financial disclosures are required if the position is classified above G-15 in the General Schedule (the civilian government employee pay scale) [3]. However, given that this position is ‘generally reserved for top-level positions such as supervisors, high-level technical specialists, and top professionals holding advanced degrees’, it is not thought that this would include contracting officers.

It is not clear from publicly available resources that procurement officials and contracting officers are subject to restrictions on professional activity or are required to file additional financial disclosures. All personnel in the acquisition force are mandated to undertake annual ethics training.

According to Steven Aftergood, the DFARS does leave an audit trail which is helpful to auditors and investigators [1]. There is no evidence of this via publicly available sources. It is not clear if this involves politicians.

Outside of the Procurement Integrity Act, and the standards of conduct outlined in the FAR [1,2], there is no further evidence of specific tender board regulations and additional codes of conduct.

As outlined in Q11, the Joint Capability Integration & Development System (JCIDS) is the process used for identifying and prioritising military capability requirements. It constitutes one third of the acquisition process, alongside the ‘Defense Acquisition System’ and the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution process (PPBE). The JCIDS involves the ‘Capability Based Assessment’ (CBA) process [1,2,3]. It is not clear whether there is an oversight function that scrutinises contract specifications against the CBA, which would suggest that there is no system to ensure that tender specifications match needs assessments.

Officials of the Defence Sector Procurement Committee (CCSD) are not regulated by any specific regulations other than the Military Discipline Law, the Organic Code of Military Justice (COJM), and the Ethics Code for public servants.

According to the latest designation published in the Official Gazette on the members of the CCSD, all are military officers [1], so their conduct would be governed by the Military Discipline Act and the COJM. Within these legal instruments, serious misconduct, offences against military administration, the use of resources for personal use, and misuse of resources are all considered major offences [2, 3]. However, these are general rules that apply to all military officers, and there is no specific regulation preventing conflicts of interest that may affect the contracting processes of committee members.

Given that this committee is controlled by military officials and considering the existence of private military companies that are suppliers to the defence sector [4], there is a high risk that conflicts of interest will arise that are not governed by any regulation.

This indicator is marked ‘Not Enough Information’. External controls are blocked by a judicial decision which prevents easy access to fiscal control documents and defence sector audits. Internal controls have a wide-ranging discretion that blocks requests for the publication of audits and reports by external entities, petitions from civil society, and parliamentary oversight. As such, there is no possible access to details of procurement processes and respective contract awards.

The Supreme Court’s decision to grant “sui generi” control to the Office of the Comptroller General of the National Bolivarian Armed Forces (CONGEFANB) diminished the external control capacity of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (CGR) [1], which has itself likewise shown no signs of demanding information and audits from the Ministry of the People’s Power for Defence (MPPD). Regarding the difficulty of access to information on parliamentary oversight, the decision to nullify the National Assembly’s legislative capacity allowed all public authorities, including the MPPD, to be exempted from being held accountable to the legislative power established by the constitution [2]. Given the difficulty in accessing information on this issue, this indicator cannot be scored.

Procurement processes are opaque to the extent that it is impossible to access public information on contracts acquired, procurement methods, and compliance with contractors’ requirements [1]. The CCSD has published some documents that serve as guidelines for contracting processes, and the appointment of the members of this committee was announced in the Official Gazette [2, 3]; however, it is not possible to access information on the contracting program for the fiscal year or awards made [4, 5]. Information on the management of the MPPD has been completely unknown since 2015, when it stopped submitting accountability reports and budgets to the National Assembly. As a result, neither the legislative branch nor civil society have had access to any kind of information. In addition, it has been impossible to find information demonstrating the processes through which contracting boards are formed and the actions that they are carrying out. The CCSD’s portal is limited to displaying the laws that regulate the contracting processes.

External controls have been blocked by a judicial decision which prevents easy access to fiscal control documents and defence sector audits. As such, there is no possible access to details of procurement processes and respective contract awards. The Supreme Court’s decision to grant “sui generi” control to the Office of the Comptroller General of the National Bolivarian Armed Forces (CONGEFANB) diminished the external control capacity of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (CGR) [1], which has itself likewise shown no signs of demanding information and audits from the Ministry of the People’s Power for Defence MPPD. Regarding the difficulty of access to information on parliamentary oversight, the decision to nullify the National Assembly’s legislative capacity allowed all public authorities, including the MPPD, to be exempted from being held accountable to the legislative power established by the constitution [2].

Officers responsible for procurement attend internal procurement courses before being posted to their various units. In this respect, the officers are aware of the procedures they ought to follow when conducting procurement processes. However, officers who have overriding authority over procurement; including, the head of the procurement department, is usually a brigadier general or even more senior ranked officers who can sway or influence the conduct of lower-ranked procurement officers to act against stipulated procedures [1]. Other than the rules and regulations provided for in the Public Procurement and Disposal Act and the Public Entities Corporate Governance Act, there is no specific code of conduct for procurement in the defence sector even though officers commanding specific units from time to time issues unit standing orders that determine conduct [1, 2, 3]. The net effect of this discretionary conduct is that the conduct outlined in the Public Entities Corporate Governance Act may be violated. The Public Procurement and Disposal Act also prohibits conflict of interest, including procurement officers.

Any public procurement entity, under the terms of the Public Procurement and Disposal Act, is supposed to keep a record of the process clearly marked in a file in respect of each of the bidders. Part of this information must be made available to losing bidders. The rest of the information must be made available to auditors [1]. In practice, Zimbabwe’s military procurements are murky such that little information is made available to oversight institutions. The Office of the Auditor General’s (OAG) Report for 2017 points out that the issue of a paper trail is a challenge in the Ministry of Defence [2].

All public procurement entities, are under the terms of the Public Procurement and Disposal Act, obliged to keep records of the procurement process and disclose information of bid failures to unsuccessful bidders within a reasonable time: all the information relating to the relevant files, and scores must be made available to any interested entities upon request only after the completion of the tender process [1]. The Public Procurement and Disposal Act also provides regulations for establishing a public procurement code of conduct, one which, according to military sources does not usually apply in military procurement [2]. In practice, military procurement records are not available for review by members of the public and even oversight institutions such as the OAG and the Parliament [3]. There are no specific provisions in the act that explicitly refer to the defence sector.

There is some external verification that the particular specifications of the tender are appropriate, but it is not comprehensive. Reviews of tender and procurement procedures are usually done after the fact with the only exception being on special sensitive or valuable contracts. On paper, tender records are kept for access by any interested parties after the procurement and tendering or bidding process has been completed. In practice, defence tender documents are rarely made available for scrutiny, even after the tendering process [1, 2, 3].

Country Sort by Country 65a. Conflicts of interest Sort By Subindicator 65b. Audit Trail Sort By Subindicator 65c. Transparency Sort By Subindicator 65d. Scrutiny Sort By Subindicator
Albania 100 / 100 NEI 100 / 100 NEI
Algeria 25 / 100 25 / 100 NEI 0 / 100
Angola 25 / 100 25 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Argentina 25 / 100 0 / 100 25 / 100 0 / 100
Armenia 25 / 100 0 / 100 50 / 100 0 / 100
Australia 75 / 100 50 / 100 75 / 100 50 / 100
Azerbaijan 25 / 100 0 / 100 50 / 100 25 / 100
Bahrain 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Bangladesh 0 / 100 NEI 0 / 100 0 / 100
Belgium 75 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100 75 / 100
Bosnia and Herzegovina 25 / 100 50 / 100 100 / 100 25 / 100
Botswana 25 / 100 50 / 100 100 / 100 NEI
Brazil 50 / 100 50 / 100 50 / 100 25 / 100
Burkina Faso 0 / 100 25 / 100 0 / 100 50 / 100
Cameroon 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Canada 75 / 100 50 / 100 50 / 100 50 / 100
Chile 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
China 25 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Colombia 25 / 100 NEI 50 / 100 NEI
Cote d'Ivoire 25 / 100 50 / 100 0 / 100 50 / 100
Denmark 25 / 100 75 / 100 75 / 100 0 / 100
Egypt 25 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Estonia 25 / 100 0 / 100 25 / 100 25 / 100
Finland 50 / 100 75 / 100 0 / 100 50 / 100
France 25 / 100 75 / 100 50 / 100 50 / 100
Germany 100 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100 50 / 100
Ghana 25 / 100 25 / 100 0 / 100 50 / 100
Greece 50 / 100 50 / 100 100 / 100 0 / 100
Hungary 25 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
India 75 / 100 50 / 100 100 / 100 50 / 100
Indonesia 50 / 100 NEI 0 / 100 50 / 100
Iran 0 / 100 0 / 100 50 / 100 0 / 100
Iraq 25 / 100 25 / 100 25 / 100 0 / 100
Israel 75 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100 0 / 100
Italy 100 / 100 75 / 100 50 / 100 100 / 100
Japan 75 / 100 NEI 50 / 100 50 / 100
Jordan 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Kenya 50 / 100 0 / 100 100 / 100 0 / 100
Kosovo 75 / 100 NEI 100 / 100 50 / 100
Kuwait 100 / 100 25 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Latvia 100 / 100 NEI 100 / 100 0 / 100
Lebanon 0 / 100 50 / 100 50 / 100 50 / 100
Lithuania 75 / 100 NEI 100 / 100 0 / 100
Malaysia 100 / 100 50 / 100 0 / 100 50 / 100
Mali 50 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 50 / 100
Mexico 25 / 100 NEI 100 / 100 0 / 100
Montenegro 50 / 100 50 / 100 100 / 100 0 / 100
Morocco 0 / 100 0 / 100 50 / 100 0 / 100
Myanmar 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Netherlands 50 / 100 75 / 100 50 / 100 0 / 100
New Zealand 100 / 100 100 / 100 50 / 100 100 / 100
Niger 25 / 100 0 / 100 100 / 100 0 / 100
Nigeria 0 / 100 25 / 100 0 / 100 25 / 100
North Macedonia 75 / 100 NEI 50 / 100 0 / 100
Norway 75 / 100 75 / 100 100 / 100 50 / 100
Oman 25 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Palestine 50 / 100 25 / 100 0 / 100 50 / 100
Philippines 50 / 100 0 / 100 100 / 100 50 / 100
Poland 50 / 100 50 / 100 100 / 100 50 / 100
Portugal 50 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100 50 / 100
Qatar 25 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Russia 50 / 100 25 / 100 100 / 100 50 / 100
Saudi Arabia 25 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Serbia 25 / 100 75 / 100 100 / 100 25 / 100
Singapore 100 / 100 75 / 100 100 / 100 50 / 100
South Africa 75 / 100 75 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100
South Korea 100 / 100 50 / 100 100 / 100 0 / 100
South Sudan 25 / 100 50 / 100 100 / 100 0 / 100
Spain 25 / 100 50 / 100 100 / 100 25 / 100
Sudan 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Sweden 100 / 100 100 / 100 50 / 100 0 / 100
Switzerland 75 / 100 50 / 100 75 / 100 75 / 100
Taiwan 100 / 100 75 / 100 100 / 100 0 / 100
Tanzania 50 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 25 / 100
Thailand 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Tunisia 50 / 100 50 / 100 50 / 100 0 / 100
Turkey 50 / 100 50 / 100 0 / 100 25 / 100
Uganda 25 / 100 50 / 100 0 / 100 NEI
Ukraine 50 / 100 75 / 100 100 / 100 0 / 100
United Arab Emirates 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
United Kingdom 50 / 100 75 / 100 100 / 100 50 / 100
United States 50 / 100 50 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Venezuela 0 / 100 NEI 0 / 100 0 / 100
Zimbabwe 0 / 100 25 / 100 0 / 100 50 / 100

With thanks for support from the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs who have contributed to the Government Defence Integrity Index.

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