This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

There is no use of private military contractors by the AAF [1, 2]. Some civilian contractors are deployed with the troops in activities with the country and these [civilian] contractors are subject to a similar level of scrutiny as the armed forces [2].
Albania has legislation on private security companies, but the MoD has not used them for the protection of military installations. The MoD has no policy or directive for their employment by the military [3]. Moreover, there is a distinction between Private Military Companies and Private Security Companies which is made based on the type of services they provide. The underlying distinction is that Private Military Companies are contracted primarily to provide services in war and conflict, including combat operations, strategic planning, intelligence collection, operational and logistical support, training, procurement and maintenance [4].
The Private Security Companies in Albania engage mostly in providing security services that fit mostly with the activity of the law enforcement agencies (3). Based on the type of services that Private Military Companies provide, there are none of these types of companies in Albania and no specific regulatory framework. This is the reason why the PSCs in Albania are licenced by the State Police [3, 5].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Since the MoD doesn’t make use of private companies and given that the State Police is charged with licensing the PSCs, the Ministry of Defence or the General Staff of the Armed Forces do not need to engage in scrutiny activities [1, 2].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

There are no policies in place, due to the lack of contractual relations between the MoD and the relevant private security actors, [1, 2].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Algeria has not signed the Montreux Document (1). There are some controls over the use of private military contractors defined in national legislation. According to this newspaper article (2), the field of security companies is governed by Legislative Decree No. 16-93 (1993), which lays down the conditions for carrying out the activities of guarding and transporting cash and sensitive products. The decree stipulates that the security companies can only protect property that has been defined before (Art. 2) and approved in advance (Art. 5). According to Art. 6, the security companies are not allowed to undertake their activities in the public sphere (3). Usually, security companies have secured the premises of companies, including energy companies (2); also see the country’s last assessment (6). Decree No. 16-93, does not mention any corruption policy. It is likely that the anti-corruption law (4) also applies to security firms, but as has been mentioned before it is not fully implemented (5). No information could be found that the military contracts private security firms.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Legislative Decree No. 16-93 of December 1993 does not mention any regulations with regards to scrutiny. It also does not mention which authority authorizes the activities of security companies (1). There is also, no evidence on the website of the two parliamentary chambers scrutinizing the activities of security companies (2), (3). Since security provisions are very sensitive issues, it seems likely that private security companies are overseen by a state authority, but no information could be found regarding this.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

No evidence could be found that policies and laws are not applied to PMC’s. A recent newspaper article on security companies in Algeria does not mention any violations of the laws or sanctions that have been applied to private security firms (1). It is, however, unclear what sanctions would apply. Legislative Decree No. 16-93 of December 4, 1993, does not mention what sanctions apply if regulations are not followed (2). Decrees connected to the issue, such as Executive Decree No. 94-65 of March 19, 1994, which lays down the procedures for issuing licenses and arms to companies for the security and transport of funds does not mention any sanctions either (3). Executive Decree No. 95-396 of November 30, 1995, on the procedures for importing firearms on behalf of security companies and the transport of sensitive funds, does not include sanctions (4). Even though no sanctions could be found in the laws, it seems very likely that there are sanctions in place. With the provision of security being such a sensitive issue and that the security forces play such an important role in the country, it seems unlikely that the government would not sanction any violations related to national security.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

The Angolan government used private military companies during the civil war. The private security industry was first regulated in 1992, though with little effective oversight and arms control. Angola was among the founding drafters of the 2008 Montreux document and has since passed new domestic legislation on PMSCs, the 2014 law on private security companies (Law 10/14 that replaced the previous 1992 law) and the respective 2017 regulations that established norms for arms use and staff training. However, neither the 2014 law or the 2017 regulations include any provision to establish preventive measures against corruption (1), (2), (3).

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

According to the 2014 law on private security companies and the regulations passed in 2017, the National Police is tasked with oversight at the national and provincial level. However, oversight and monitoring tasks are limited in scope, mainly to verify compliance with authorization procedures, office installation and staff training requirements at the beginning of a company’s activity, and again after three years of activity (1), (2).

According to Rafael Marques, who has documented human rights abuses committed by private security companies engaged by diamond companies in the Cuango area in Lunda Norte for more than a decade, impunity has been the norm, both regarding severe human rights abuses committed by private security companies, and to violations of anti-corruption laws by senior officials engaged in private businesses in the diamond and private security sector (3).

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

There is little evidence of effective oversight of private security companies by the police, though regulations were enacted in 2017. One of the challenges is to enforce a ban on weapons of war from being used by private security companies (1), (2). A Lusa /Diário de Notícias report from November 7, 2017, states “the new regulation stipulates that private security companies may use and carry semi-automatic guns of a calibre not exceeding 7.65mm, pistols of a calibre of less than 9mm and semiautomatic shotguns” (1).

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. In Argentina there is no evidence that there are private military contractors, nor that foreign companies operate in the country. In this sense, there is no specific policy or legislation in this area. However, it is worth mentioning that there is a National Necessity and Urgency Decree in relation to private security and custody services (Decree 1002/99) that is mainly within the framework of Internal Security and not Defence and that they even have the Argentine Chamber of Security and Research Companies. [1] Within the framework of the United Nations, the topic is addressed by the Working Group on the use of mercenaries in the orbit of the Human Rights Council, [2] [3] where Argentina is one of the 47 members elected by the General Assembly and whose term ends in 2021. The international legal framework is the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing, and Training of Mercenaries that entered into force in 2001 [4] and the Montreux Document, signed in 2008. Argentina has not joined them yet. [5]

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. There is only state supervision over private security companies, not private military contractors, although these are generally opaque and scrutiny is weak. [1] Regarding the former, each province has specific legislation applicable in the framework of Decree 1002 of 1999. [2] In turn, the aforementioned decree establishes as a screening authority the Ministry of Internal Security of the Ministry of Interior, keeping a record of these companies, costing compliance with staff requirements and granting credential.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. Lorenc Valcarse emphasises that, together with the development of private security companies, their instances of corporate representation were consolidated and an extensive state control system was put into operation that includes specific laws, control bodies, and articulation with the police force. [1] This is because the State recognises them as a “minor partner,” that is, complementary and subordinate to the tasks of the State Police. Supervision is at the provincial level as they are regulated frameworks according to autonomous legislation and there is no federal law. According to the Report of The Inter-American Dialogue, private security companies in Latin America are not adequately supervised nor do they proactively account for cases of irregularities, crimes, and corruption, although there are rules for licensing and registration. [2]

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. Armenia does not have any private military contractors (PMCs), and therefore, there is no regulation concerning private military and security companies. The country is not a signatory of the Montreaux document [1].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. Armenia does not have PMCs [1].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. According to the Law on Defence, only Armenian armed forces ensure the protection of the country [1]. The Law on Private Guarding Activity was adopted in 2012 and only relates to legal entities. The law does not have any clauses that allow private companies to engage with the defence sector [2].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

While experts have stated in articles [1] and studies [2, 3] that Australia has been judicious in its employment of private military contractors and private security companies (PMCs) relative to major allies such as the U.S., U.K., and Canada, it has increasingly relied on PMCs to provide diplomatic compound and base protection in areas of military operations [3, p508-510]. Access to policies regarding contracting PMCs is sparse, but a 2015 study found that “There appears to be little formal policy on [PMCs]… Internal ADF policy specifies that private contractors employed by Defence will only be non-armed; however, the policy is neither detailed nor widely promulgated” [2, p24]. As contractors of Defence and the Australian government, PMCs are subject to Fraud Control policies [4] and criminal sanctions related to corrupt activities in the Criminal Code Act 1995 (such as a prohibition against bribery of Commonwealth public officials [5] and abuse of public office. Commonwealth public officials include contractors providing services to the Australian government, such as PMCs [6]. Australia has been extensively involved in the international regulation of PMCs, including by being a founding signatory to the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers and the Montreux Document, which set up a self-regulatory regime and clarify state responsibilities for PMCs, respectively [2, p44-49]. However, the high level of international diplomatic engagement on PMC regulation serves also to throw into relief the low level of domestic regulation of PMCs [2].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Scrutiny of private military contractors and private security companies (PMCs) does not appear to be institutionalised, and has only recently occurred when major scandal has erupted. A 2015 paper on the Australian government and PMCs claimed that “private security has been discussed in Parliament on just one occasion—and then only very briefly” [1]. More recently, Parliament has more extensively debated contracting private security providers [2] after investigative reporting alleged major problems surrounding a contract awarded to Paladin, the PMC that provides security at off-shore immigrant detention centres [3]. There also do not appear to be any government audits carried out on the use of PMCs in areas of operations, though there was a 2017 Australian National Audit Office audit [4] and an ongoing audit (at time of writing) in response to the Paladin controversy concerning contract management and procurement processes for PMC-provided security services at off-shore immigrant detention centres [5]. It is unclear if there is any Defence institution or policy providing scrutiny over the use of PMCs in areas of operations [6].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Due partially to the level of secrecy surrounding the employment of private military contractors and private security companies (PMCs) in areas of military operations [1], and also to the relatively limited use of PMCs [2], it is unclear how strong regulatory and criminal policies are and if they are well-enforced. The controversy surrounding the awarding of off-shore migrant detention centre security services to the PMC Paladin paint a bleak picture as far as the enforcement of effective sanctions on PMCs. Paladin was fined more than 1000 times for various failures in contract performance, and external audits raised red flags as to how the contract was awarded in the first place, yet Paladin was rewarded by having its contract renewed several times [3]. There have been no contemporary cases of PMCs being accused of criminal behaviour [4], so it is unclear how well-enforced these are. The quality of the Australian justice system is considered high, and enforcement not politically influenced; however, there is a history of draconian secrecy around off-shore detention centres, which hamstrings attempts at inquiry [5].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Private military companies (PMCs) and private security services are not forbidden in Azerbaijan. The Law on Military Service states that (Article 36.2) on a contractual basis, foreigners and stateless persons are admitted to the actual military service (1). Foreigners and stateless persons can serve up to three years on a contract basis. At the end of this period, a new agreement will be concluded with the parties’ consent (38.1.5). But the law does not specify particular preventive measures to foreign contractors. For the people in this category, the decision defines almost minimal requirements: identification document, application, document on education (at least secondary) and photos. Both men and women, aged 19-40, can start contractual military service (36.1.1).
There is no information about local private military companies. At the same time, militarized security services operate within several state agencies. For example, the Militarized Security Department (MSD) was established in 1997 as part of the Ministry of Communications and registered in the Ministry of Justice. The MSD carries out work for the protection of communication facilities and exercises control over fire safety (2).
There are reports of some international private military companies operating in Azerbaijan. For example, beginning in July 2004, Blackwater forces were contracted to work in Azerbaijan, where they would quietly train a force modelled after the Navy SEALs and establish a base at the north of the Iranian border as part of a major U.S. strategy in the region (3). An investigation found that an American mercenary attempted to sell a modified crop-duster aircraft to Azerbaijan’s military, contravening US law on defence exports. Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not respond to a request for comment (4, 5).
There is a law “On non-state (private) protection activities” in the country (6). According to the media, there are more than 20 private security companies in the country (7). There is some news of French companies’ military cooperation with Azerbaijan. Naval Group, French industrial group is currently discussing with the Azerbaijani authorities to propose a version of its Offshore Patrol Vessel 90 (OPV 90), a sea-proven design adapted to the specific needs of the Naval Forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan (8).

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

There are no laws that deal directly with PMCs in Azerbaijan. There is no information on the activities of PMCs in Azerbaijan. Any parliamentary oversight of PMCs has not happened so far. There is no legislation regulating the activities of private military companies (1). The activities of private security companies are widely spread. There is also a special law on this (2); however, there is no strong control over them (1).

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

There is no evidence on enforcement that covers the data collection period for this iteration of the GDI.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Bahrain is not a signatory of The Montreux Document [1]. There is a law for private security companies, but not private military contractors. Based on sources reviewed, there are no policies or regulations that regulate private military contractors (PMC) at all, and the king and the minister rule on the issue by decree [2, 3]. It means that PMCs are not forbidden, and the king and minister of defence regulate the issue by decree.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

As 56A indicates, there are no policies or laws with regards to PMCs. Following a search of official government websites, there is no data available on the issue. The Parliament and councils do not scrutinize the work or decrees of PMCs as they are considered a defence and security issue (i.e. confidential) [1, 2].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

As 56A indicates, there are no policies or laws with regards to PMCs [1, 2]. Following a search of official government websites, there is no data available on the issue. As there are no laws, the enforcement mechanism of decrees and the conditions/regulations of decree/agreements with PMCs is not clear.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Private companies set up by retired military officials have been dominating Bangladesh’s security businesses for a long time. They operate simply by obtaining trade licences from city corporations or municipality authorities [1]. In 2008, a government effort to enact a law and rules for private security services was met with resistance from powerful companies [2], many of whose chairmen and managing directors were also retired major generals. In 2015, the Bangladesh Security Owner’s Association was formed to liaise with the authorities [3].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

There is no evidence of any policies regulating PMCs in Bangladesh. It appears that such companies are not subject to any scrutiny by the government or Parliament.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

There is no evidence of any policies regulating PMCs in Bangladesh.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. Belgium is a signatory of the Montreux Document, which lays out good practices and guidelines for the employment of PMCs, and has ratified the International Convetion against Recruitement, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries [1, 2].

The law on the prohibition of private militias of 29 July 1934 prohibits each ‘private milita or other organisation of private individuals which aims to use violence or replace the army or police [or] join them in their actions’ [3]. The prohibition does not apply to companies and services legally contributing to private security.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. There is no evidence of the employment of private military contractors [1, 2].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. There is no evidence of the employment of private military contractors [1, 2].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Neither private military contractors nor private security providers are employed by defence institutions. According to the laws that define the defence sector, it is forbidden to engage external persons/companies to perform military duties [1, 2].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Neither private military contractors nor private security providers are employed by defence institutions. According to the laws that define the defence sector, it is forbidden to engage external persons/companies to perform military duties [1, 2].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Neither private military contractors nor private security providers are employed by defence institutions. According to the laws that define the defence sector, it is forbidden to engage external persons/companies to perform military duties [1, 2].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI as Botswana’s legal framework makes no provision for private military contractors [1,2]. Botswana has not signed the Montreaux Document.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. Botswana’s legal framework makes no provision for private military contractors [1,2]. As such, there are also no provisions for oversight of these actors. The Montreux Document is the first international document to reaffirm the international legal obligations of States regarding the activities of private military and security companies. It also contains a series of best practices designed to help States take appropriate measures to comply with their obligations under international law. Botswana is not a Party to the Montreux Document.[3]

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. Botswana’s legal framework makes no provision for private military contractors [1,2].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

The country has no legal device prohibiting the Ministry of Defence from hiring private military contractors; however, according to a Transparency Report released by the Ministry of Defence in 2017, there is no history of these types of contracts in Brazil. The only private companies present within the armed forces are utilized to do cleaning and other basic services [1].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

There is no evidence of the hiring of private military contractors by the Brazilian government, but all companies that sell products or services to and for the government need to be registered via a federal record and are subject to internal and external control [1, 2].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

There is no evidence of the hiring of private military contractors by the Brazilian government, but all companies that sell products or services to and for the government need to be registered via a federal record and are subject to internal and external control [1, 2].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Cameroon prohibits PMC from operating within the country [1]. Accordng to the ICRC, Cameroon’s Military Manual states, “Mercenaries who take part in military operations for private gain shall not be considered as combatants and consequently are not entitled to prisoner-of-war status… Mercenaries do not benefit from the protection of the law of armed conflict and international humanitarian law” [1]. The lack of legal protections provided to mercenaries suggests they are not permitted to operate by law. However, there are Israeli intelligence officers who train Presidential Guards and part of the Rapid Intervention Unit (BIR). Their status is not scrutinised as they operate under the direct discretion of the President of the Republic [2].

Though Cameroon prohibits PMC from operating within the country, private security guards are allowed to function by law [3]. Cameroon has an estimated forty-plus private security companies with over 70,000 private guards [4]. The Government’s closure of several unlicensed companies in 2016 made many scramble to meet the new requirements established by the 16th September 2015 Presidential Decree [3].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Private military companies are not permitted to operate in the country [1] and are not subject to any form of scrutiny if they exist.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Private military companies are not permitted to operate in the country [1].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. In the past, private military contractors (PMCs) were used on an ad hoc basis to make up for gaps in duties and capabilities of the Canadian Forces. This was particularly relevant in the context of Canada’s mission in Afghanistan (Canada’s combat role ended in 2011 and its subsequent training misison ended in 2014). [1] [2] Within Canada’s Defence Policy adopted in 2017, there is no explicit reference to PMCs in either a positive or negative way, which does not prevent their use. [3] There is no dedicated government department that is tasked with the implementation of the Montreux Document on PMSCs. [4] Canada is not a State Party of the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries. [5][6]

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. As with all Government Contracts and Procurement initiatives, PMCs are required to compete in a competitive bidding process through the Government of Canada’s ‘Buy and Sell’ system. [1] However, these laws do not specifically refer to PMCs in an explicit manner, only stating that they are contracted as services and treated as such. Such a process occurred in 2017 for ‘Special Intelligence Advisors’ [2] and requires the obtention of government-approved security clearance at the appropriate level. As such, scrutiny would largely take place on the front end of the contract approval process, and during renewal. However, public and media scrutiny is likely heightened due to the profile and public image such contractors maintain. [3] The Executrek Program does not make mention of PMCs or PMSCs but does mention “employers, supervisors, and human resources professionals” more broadly, [4]

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. Enforcement could come as a result of a breach in the contract and/or the failure to renew the contract, [1] and in the event of gross misconduct there is the potential for criminal prosecution, likely through the Criminal Code of Canada, as PMCs fall outside the jurisdiction of Military Law. [2] While there are no specific regulations for PMCs, there are metrics through other aspects of the Canadian Criminal Code that could be used to enforce such violations.Canada’s use of PMCs (or PMSCs) has been a topic of criticism by the media. [3]

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

There is no evidence of the use of private military contractors (PMCs) or their training in the Chilean Armed Forces. In terms of policies and regulation, Chile has experience regulating, but the private security sector regulation of Private Military Companies is varied [1, 2]. Law 17.798 on Arms Control sanctions all individuals who organise, finance or create private militias, raising penalties if the offender is an active or retired member of the armed forces. Likewise, Decree-Law 3.607 prohibits, based on the national interest, any person to provide or offer private vigilance, including the performance of surveillance. Chile was among the first Latin American countries to adhere to the Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies on 6 April 2009, confirming the interest in deepening action in the multilateral sphere on this issue. Scholars have noted that the country should develop specific articles to further regulate the activities of PMCs [3, 4, 5, 6]. In addition, corruption-related offences have not been included in regulations and policies. In 2018, in the Regional Meeting of the Montreux Document Forum, representatives from Chile, Costa Rica and other countries specifically discussed perspectives and experiences for the application of their respective legal frameworks for the supervision of PMCs, a process that is still under development in Chile [7].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

There are some regulations for the private security sector but not for the PMCs. For one, the Montreux Document is not binding, and therefore it does not bind the PMCs that sign it [1]. However, there is no evidence that PMCs have been used in the Chilean defence sector, and there is a perception that there is internal control in this respect [2]. On the other hand, except for the illegality of the private militias by Law 17.798 on Arms Control, there no evidence of systematic scrutiny in this respect [3, 4]. Likewise, there is little capacity to handle the movement of Chilean individuals working in foreign companies, most of them contracting with US PMCs abroad. In Chile, the majority of Chilean-based PMCs workers are former military or retired police, as they use the private security market as a form of reincorporation into the job market. The private military market does not participate in internal operations in the Chilean defence sector.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Given the limited regulation and the low salience of the issue, there is very little evidence of violations of the use of PMCs [1]. There are cases in which irregularities have been found, but the issues are related to private security and not the military sector, and sanctions have been applied [2]. However, it should be noted that law and regulations do not incorporate the criteria of extraterritoriality, and they only apply to PMCs in Chilean territory and not individuals working for PMCs that contract with companies abroad [3, 4, 5].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

China has ratified the Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies. [1] In 2010 it issued the “Regulations on the Administration of Security Services” (保安服务管理条例) which govern the operation of security companies (SCs). The Regulations provide very broad provisions on the operation of SCs but without any specific reference to corruption. They mainly cover registration and operational issues, security guard training and supervision. However, the PLA and the PAP do not employ private military contractors. As a result, there is no specific set of regulations and no official organ that manages their relationship. According to a China-based expert on Chinese Foreign Policy, China’s security footprint abroad is very limited so there is no demand for such services yet by China’s military. The interviewee also commented that, although these companies are created by ex-army and police officers, the quality of security services offered is very low. [2]

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

China’s Armed Forces do not employ Private Contractors. The 2010 “Regulations on the Administration of Security Services” stipulate that Security Companies are under the Supervision of the Ministry of Public Security (公安部) but these companies are usually employed by state and private enterprises. There is no specific reference to PMCs (or their supervision if they were to be deployed) and anticorruption measures. [1]

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

China’s Armed Forces do not employ PMCs so there are no instances of misconduct to evaluate enforcement. [1]

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. There is evidence of the presence of private military contractors conducting legal and illegal military operations in the interior of the country for more than 20 years. [1] According to López, [2] in the 80s and 90s some private security companies were identified that contracted with paramilitary groups and/or drug traffickers. The objective was to carry out military training to combat guerrilla groups and maintain illicit businesses. López found that “the main reason why paramilitaries and drug traffickers hire CMP is because they are in an ongoing armed conflict against which they cannot fight militarily, nor can they request the protection of the State, so they need training help and support in the supply of weapons.” [2] It is also evident that private companies directly linked to the extraction of natural resources in Colombia hired these military companies to protect facilities from guerrilla attacks. [2] In the 1990s, the Colombian State consolidated a process of cooperation with the United States through Plan Colombia to eradicate drug trafficking in the country. This controversial initiative consisted of military and diplomatic aid to fight leftist guerrilla groups and drug cartels, for which CMPs from the United States were hired. [3] To carry out this plan, agreements were signed between the two countries, defining a number of military and civilian contractors that would participate in said policy. The process began in 2000 with the arrival of 500 soldiers and 300 civilian contractors. In 2004, the cap was violated and 800 soldiers and 600 contractors arrived, although in 2001 in Colombia there were around 1,000 people between the military and contractors, and in 2009 an agreement was reached to allow the installation of seven military bases. [1] Currently, and according to the Base Structure Report, [4] the United States Army has one military building remaining in Colombia, but it does not report the number of military and/or civilians serving in the country. The Colombian State does not have effective control of the military and civilian personnel in the country, nor of the scope of its operations on the ground, according to reports. [1,3] As such, there are no official records on violations of International Humanitarian Law, human rights, or corruption related to the CMPs, which makes it difficult to define and measure the responsibility for their actions. “The main factors for this lack of recognition is that the CMPs are not recognized by the Colombian government as an actor related to the conflict and very few civil society or human rights organisations are aware of their influence and, on the other hand, the victim registry does not identify the victims produced by the CMPs” according to reports. [3] There is a lack of legislation regulating actions of the CMPs on topics such as: the type of service contracted, the definition of the contracting process, the selection protocols, the conditions of the contracts, and the supervision and definition of responsibilities of these actors in the framework of the accompanying military operations. The cooperation of the United States with the Colombian Government remains post-conflict. Cooperation has expanded to include a financial support fund, strengthening of local governments, substitution of illicit crops, assistance to victims of the conflict, etc.; international narcotics control and law enforcement programs to deliver resources to the Military Forces and the Police for the fight against drug trafficking; organised transnational anti-drug and anti-crime programs including intelligence support, equipment improvement, and facility construction; a military financing program for military engineer units for projects in rural areas; an anti-proliferation, anti-terrorism, and de-mining program in former conflict zones; and the international military training and education program. [5] Given the above, a policy regarding the use of CMP is evident, but does not specify prevention measures.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. The relevant legislation for the supervision of the CMPs is stipulated in Decree 356 of 1994 which lays down the statute for the provision of private security and surveillance services by individuals. [1] There is also a Decree no. 2355 of 2006 which structures the Superintendency of Surveillance and Private Security as a national, technical, and affiliated body to the Ministry of Defence, which will be in charge of carrying out inspection, surveillance, and control actions of the undertakings providing such services. This entity regulates and authorizes, advises, and coordinates, informs, instructs, inspects, investigates, and sanctions, as well as conducting administrative processes to companies that provide surveillance and private security services. [3] According to Interviewee 5, [4] since the creation of this entity the main role that it has played has been in the implementation of administrative procedures for obtaining licenses for the bearing of arms or for the creation of private security companies. Interviewee 5 states that these procedures are not developed in a thorough way, since the individuals and companies that request licenses for the bearing of weapons are not evaluated in depth. [4] In column of the magazine Semana, María Jimena Duzán reports that the Superintendency of Surveillance and Private Security had been investigated for cases of bribes in exchange for licenses ranging from armor to operating permits for surveillance companies. [5] Since 2009 an attempt has been made to reform the current regulations of the Superintendency of Security and Surveillance, but this has not succeeded.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. With regard to the application of the legislation relating to the use of CMPCs, it is clear that there is a frequent breakdown of such legislation in Colombia. In 2019, the Superintendent of Surveillance reported that in Colombia there are 800 companies operating throughout the country, at least 200 of which are illegal (30%). [1] Those that are operating illegally do not pay policies, they do not guarantee training to their employees, or labor rights. The Superintendent stated that 120 sanctions have been imposed to date, but for these to have the desired impact it is necessary for contractors and service providers to comply with fees and licenses. [2] Another of the non-regulatory scandals and the low application of effective sanctioans is related to sanctions imposed on the “private security cartel” in 2017, during which time companies pretended to be to procure contracts, but in reality they all belonged to the same business group called SMG, generating anti-competitive practices. The sanctions imposed by the Superintendency of Industry and Commerce amounted to $14 billion pesos. This sanction generated controversy in public opinion, since no disqualification of the contract was contemplated, so fines were simply one more cost to the business. [2, 3] The Superintendency of Surveillance compiles a list of companies registered for the manufacture, marketing, import, lease, and installation of private security equipment, but it gives only the social reason, economic activity, management, and the city where the company islocated located, not sanctions, contracts, amounts contracted, or any other aspects of regulation and control. [4]

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Côte d’Ivoire imposes some controls on the use of private military contractors (PMCs). But it does not implement the Montreaux Document and the legislation applicable to PMCs is inconsistent. The legislative framework is focused more on private security companies (PSCs) contracted to transport cash domestically rather than on international PMCs. Finally, there is no evidence of corruption offences for PMCs and PSCs. Law No. 2016-1109 (Portant Code de la Fonction Militaire) of February 16, 2016, is the updated Code of Conduct for the Armed Forces of Côte d’Ivoire that repealed the previous Act No. 095-695 (Portant Code de la Fonction Militaire) of September 7, 1995. The provisions in Law No. 2016-1109 that cover aspects of recruitment are in Chapter 2 (Recrutement), Articles 60-67. Though Articles 60 and 62 mention ‘commissioned soldiers’ (militaires commissionnés), it is not in the sense of PMCs that are contracted for a specific project (1).

Côte d’Ivoire is not a participating member of the Montreaux Document (MC) that regulates PMCs and establishes legal standards. As a result, the country does not have a 100% clear set of legal obligations and good practices to regulate PMCs and PSCs (2). Still, it can be described as having certain controls on the use of PMCs, known in French as an SMP (Société Militaire Privée). The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has recommended that Member States become part of the MC within the sub-regional Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform and Governance to regulate the industry efficiently. ECOWAS specifically targets private security companies in its Conflict Prevention Framework document (2).

According to a 2016 DCAF report on the private security industry in West Africa, the boom in PSCs reflects a spike in the demand by individual and corporate clients. The DCAF report distinguishes between PSCs and the PMCs that offer services to the armed forces. It reports that Côte d’Ivoire only regulates the way cash and goods are transported in the country by PSCs. Additionally, the country’s legislation does not mention international PMCs or multinationals that operate domestically. The report characterizes the 2016 situation as follows:

“In Côte d’Ivoire, the generalized insecurity created by the civil war resulted in what Edem Comlan characterizes as the ‘quasi-anarchic’ growth of the private security industry. Mirroring the imperatives of the wider SSR process, he identifies the need for increased transparency and accountability of private security arrangements while at the same time acknowledging the requirement to be mindful of the sensitivities around an industry that has gone some way to addressing rampant domestic unemployment, notably providing a reintegration option for ex-combatants” (3).

Côte d’Ivoire is not part of the Montreaux Document and has not implemented the ECOWAS recommendations regarding PMCs and PSCs.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

There is a lack of a real legal framework or policy for the use of PMCs and PSCs. Although there are several controls through other legislation that are not specific to the MoD, such scrutiny appears to be very weak.

Ivorian media have reported widely in 2018 on the existence of foreign combatants that were integrated into the armed forces after the post-election crisis of 2010-2011. However, most of these were not part of PMCs (Société Militaire Privée, SMP), but sub-regional combatants that joined Ivorian rebel forces and eventually settled in Côte d’Ivoire (1), (2).

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Evidence shows that there are only a few controls on the use of PMCs and PSCs, but no consistent legal framework or policy. Therefore, there is little evidence that the policies are enforced. According to a 2018 report by Middle East Eye, Islamist terror in North and West Africa has become a new business line for private military contractors, including in Côte d’Ivoire. In the Sahel, Ukrainian military outfitters are working directly with international organizations. For example, Ukrainian Helicopters, tasked with medical evacuations, has worked with the international MINUSMA peacekeeping force in Mali. The company has also been allegedly hired in Côte d’Ivoire. The report highlights another Ukrainian military contractor, Omega Consulting Group, that has opened an office in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, to hire combat soldiers (1).

In a March 2018, an article in Afrique sur 7 reported about uprisings in January and May 2017 by 8,400 former rebel combatants who had become part of the country’s armed forces following the post-election crisis of 2010-2011. Many of them, according to the report, were private hires who had joined the former Forces Nouvelles (FN) and later joined the armed and security forces, among them foreign soldiers who had forged identification papers (2). In November 2018, Ivoirecho confirmed the government suspicion that many of the 8,400 soldiers behind the uprisings in the barracks of Bouaké in 2017 were, in fact, foreign soldiers who could not prove Ivorian citizenship. Army Chief of Staff General Sékou Toure launched an identification campaign that led to a new list from which these soldiers were eliminated. This was programmed simultaneously with the early retirement schemes. Both initiatives have proven successful in reducing the number of soldiers in the armed forces, one of the pillars of the 2016-2020 Military Planning Act (LPM) (3), (4).

The only instance in which the government has acted on the status of members of the armed forces was for being non-Ivorian, but these were not sanctions imposed for use of PMCs, but because of the nationality of the combatants.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Denmark does not have legislation or clear policies regulating or forbidding the use of PMCs. Denmark has, however, signed the Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies in 2009 [1]. Because the document is not legally binding, it cannot be identified as a Danish regulation, law or clear policy on use of PMCs [2]. Research indicates that the Danish military does not employ PMCs [3, 4]. However, there is evidence that Danish forces occasionally deal with PMCs as part of their international mission performance. In 2017, when asked by the Foreign Affairs Committee about Danish interaction with PMCs in relation to the military operations against ISIS, the Minister of Defence reported that Danish forces have cooperated with American PMCs on surveillance systems and counter-IED training in Iraq [3]. Further, Danish forces have made indirect use of services provided by American PMCs (who were part of the official American force structure) as these have managed the access control and guard of the coalition HQ in Baghdad, and provided transportation and protection of staff and personnel the Green Zone. At the Arifjan base in Kuwait, a similar situation of indirect use has taken place. Further, the Danish Minister of Defence informed that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has used PMC guarding, transport and personnel protection services for ministry employees in Iraq and Syria [3]. In sum, there are no regulations on the use of PMCs and no evidence of direct Danish Defence employment of PMCs. However, research indicates that Danish forces cannot avoid direct or indirect contact and collaboration with such companies during deployment in international coalitions. Research found no regulations on this sort of direct or indirect collaboration [5]. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has, however, emloyed such PMCs. Although outside the direct scope of this assessment, research found no evidence of legislation or regulations pertaining to this [6]. Research also reviewed the parliamentary debates regarding the military use of PMCs and the civilian employment of PMCs in war zones or area of conflicts. No such debate was found during the parliamentary years 2016-2020 [7]. This indicates that legislation is not imminent and perhaps that the signing of the Montreux Document is regarded as being sufficient.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

The country has no policies or laws on the use of PMCs.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

The country has no policies or laws on the use of PMCs.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Private military contractors are banned by the Constitution and only the state has the right to establish armed forces. Article 200 of the Constitution states that “no individual, organization, entity, or group shall be allowed to create military or quasi-military squadrons, groups or organizations” (1). The law, however, allows for the establishment of security companies (such as G4S) that are regulated by the Ministry of Interior, and are normally only allowed to carry light weapons where the personnel are not allowed to keep them off duty. These companies do not carry out military operations.

This is indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

This is indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

There is no legal framework or policy for using PMCs in Estonia and Estonia’s Defence Forces have never involved PMCs either. [1] The Constitution of Estonia stipulates that the associations and federations which possess weapons, are organised in accordance with military principles, or hold exercises of military nature, require prior permission. [2] This also applies to private military companies. [3] Furthermore, the Weapons Act, with principal changes approved in 2018, regulates the activities of companies that deal with weapons in general, including military weapons. [4] Estonia officially supported the Montreux Document in 2016. [5] There are no more specific laws applicable to private military companies.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

There is no evidence of scrutiny of PMCs in the context of operations. In accordance with the Weapons Act, companies whose activities are related to handling military weapons need a special permit. [1] A special committee is responsible for issuing, changing, stopping and invalidating the permit. Different institutions exercise supervision over the handling and producing of military weapons, but the scrutiny involves mainly safety regulations and handling military weapons, and are not related to the conditions of procurement contracts or corruption issues. However, not all private military contractors handle weapons (for example, consulting firms). The Military Service Act does not cover the issue of private military contractors in any case. [2] Therefore, the law only partly covers the addressed issue.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

There is no legal framework or policy for using PMCs in Estonia and Estonia’s Defence Forces have never involved PMCs. [1]

This indicator is not assigined a score in the GDI.

Finland is a signatory to Montreaux Document [1]. Further, according to a written response provided by the Headquarters of the Defence Forces, the Defence Forces has stakeholder cooperation in relation to which internal norms have been issued. Stakeholder cooperation is regulated by legislation in force and processes, such as Act on Security Clearance [2,3].The country uses PMCs for VIP protection services for state officials/VIPs. Finland also uses contractors for a wide range of servicing functions for national defence (for example all major depot maintenance for the army), but the same laws govern those employees as others.

This indicator is not assigined a score in the GDI.

According to a written response provided by the Headquarters of the Defence Forces, the Defence Forces has stakeholder cooperation in relation to which internal norms have been issued. Stakeholder cooperation is regulated by legislation in force and processes it enables, such as Act on Security Clearance [1,2].

This indicator is not assigined a score in the GDI.

According to a written response provided by the Headquarters of the Defence Forces, the Defence Forces has stakeholder cooperation in relation to which internal norms have been issued. Stakeholder cooperation is regulated by legislation in force and processes it enables, such as Act on Security Clearance [1,2].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

In choosing sub-contractors, the Ministry of the Armed Forces (MOAF) has to abide by Decree No. 2016-361 of March 25, 2016 on defence or security procurement. [1] There are some controls over the use of private military contractors, but no clear policy exists. Though France has signed the Montreux document, there is no proper legal standard applicable to PMCs, whereas state representatives in the same roles are held to higher legal standards, as stated in Article R4122-14 of the Defence Code [2]
No definition or mention of corruption-related offences in relation to PMCs was found. This may not be surprising given the fact that the standards for the Code of Conduct for PMCs are defined by the International Code of Conduct Association (ICOC), [3] which is mainly controlled by the industry.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

According to a journalist and expert researcher on defence issues, [1] PMCs are not subject to any form of scrutiny.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

As we have seen, there are no real policies and laws on the use of PMCs, but when corruption schemes are reported to the judicial authorities – which doesn’t happen on a regular basis – sanctions are usually applied.
For instance, the National Financial Prosecutor (PNF) is currently investigating a case in which high-ranking commanding officers in charge of logistics for the French army are suspected of influence peddling, having been corrupted by an aerial transport subcontracting company (ICS) that was over-charging for its services to the Ministry of the Armed Forces. This investigation didn’t come off from an internal assessment or audit, but from an anonymous denunciation. Letters were sent to the press, the Ministry and to competitors, which then ended up on the PNF judge’s desk.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Private military contractors (PMSC) perform a variety of tasks for the Armed Forces both during deployment and at home; these functions are primarily logistical [1]. PMSCs can be hired without involving the legislative branch or informing the general public. Also, the lack of definition of what constitutes a PMSC creates a legal grey area that undermines scrutiny. In 2016, Transparency Germany demanded that the awarding of contracts to PMSCs and the imposition of international quality standards be made more transparent [2]. While there is a voluntary Code of Conduct in place for PMSCs, no company has adopted this [3]. Aside from this, there is no clear policy in place regulating the use of PMSCs by German defence institutions.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Since the country has no clear policy on the use of PMSCs, there are also no provisions for oversight of such actors.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Since the country has no clear policy on the use of PMSCs, there is no legal framework to enforce.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Ghana is not a participating state of the Montreux Document, which defines how international law applies to the activities of private military and security companies (PMSCs) when operating in armed conflict zones (1).

At present, the GAF has never deployed private military contractors in its operations. However, the private security industry is a rapidly growing business in Ghana with more than 350 companies operating (including companies without license or premises), and employing around 15,000 people (2).

The legal framework that deals with the private military and security companies (PMSCs) is weak. The industry is regulated by the Police Act, 1970 (Act 350) and following regulations, such as the Police Service Regulations (1992), and Legislative Instruments 1571 and 1579. However, there is a lack of specificity, and overall it is outdated (no mention of the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the Act, the definition of “private security organisation” is vague, and does not specifically address corruption-related offences) (3).

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Laws ensure the Ministry of Interior has oversight and scrutiny powers over private military and security companies (PMSCs) (1).

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

According to the Association of Private Security Organisations of Ghana (APSOG), most of the 350 private security companies in Ghana do not have a licence (1). Consequently, the association expressed its concerns over the enforcement capacity of the Ministry of Interior.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. There is no legal framework about PMCs in Greece.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. There are no legal provisions for oversight of PMCs in Greece and no relevant oversight bodies to enact any scrutiny.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. There is no legal framework about PMCs in Greece.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

The Hungarian government has signed the Montreux Document [1]. However Hungarian laws are not clear and as the 2015 Index highlights there is no legal prohibition on the use of PMCs [2], and for non-combatant roles, the use of contractors was a regular practice. Although the government does not use PMCs widely, except for logistics and transport, there is no clear policy on this issue; in foreign missions, the number of contracted workers providing services was relatively high (like in case of PRTs). The PSC’s hired by the government are the subject of international or Hungarian law, but they are not the subject of special legislative measures on military or civilian professionals working for the MoD or HDF (these are harsher than the civilian code) [3].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

There is no information on monitoring the work of PMCs, or having any oversight on their use beyond the level of how any contracted service provider is monitored.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

There were no legal issues related to PSCs. PMCs are mainly non-existent and only used in foreign missions.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Private military contractors are not employed. Private sector participation in the Indian defence sector is restricted to defence production and procurement [1].

India does have a robust private security industry valued at Rs 570 billion [2]. Ex-military personnel are employed by private security companies in India [3].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Private military contractors are not employed [1][2].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Private military contractors are not employed [1][2].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

There are no known regulations on private military contractors or intermediaries. One interviewee suggested that this kind of activity does not occur in Indonesia [1]. Indonesia is not party to international non-binding instruments that regulate PMSCs, most notably the Montreux Document of 2008 and International Code fo Conduct Association of 2013 [2].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Research could find no information on the scrutiny of PMCs in Indonesia.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Indonesia has no policies or laws on the use of PMCs [1].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Private military contractors (PMCs) – semi-government entities – are employed, but the government imposes no restrictions nor clear policy on their use. [1, 2]. Also, militias/mercenaries are employed, but the government imposes no restrictions nor clear policy on their use [3, 4, 5].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

PMCs nor militias are known to be subject to any form of scrutiny or oversight. Khatam al-Anbiya is said to be operating without government supervision, no evidence of oversight was found [1, 2].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

This indicator is marked Not Applicable, as the government imposes no restrictions on the use of private military contractors and intermediaries [1, 2, 3, 4, 5].

TThe second article of Iraq’s new ‘Private Security Companies Law’ (1) introduces legislation that dictates the behaviour and legal obligations that foreign contractors must comply with. Unlike the memorandum issued by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in the context of US occupational rule (2), this framework “is specific in its operational scope” relating to the issuance of licences, employment process, obligations and penalties (1). Regulatory controls, as the reviewers note, remains weak.

Widely accessible evidence confirms the presence of private military contractors (PMCs), although information concerning the level of scrutiny they are subject to is absent. A report published in 2016 (3) evidences the continued presence of PMC’s, citing US Army ‘Contracting Command’ request for proposal (RFP) for Security Assistance Mentors and Advisors (in Iraq) submitted in 2015. Further evidence of America’s continued reliance on private military contractors is the existence of America’s Office of Security Cooperation — 175 of its members are said to be military personnel and 45 of which are Defense Department civilians (3). While the ISG’s conquest extended the need for military contractors, contractor reliance reflects America’s evolving foreign policy commitments in the region as it draws down its troops, lowering its commitment to send more military forces, some of whom were redeployed elsewhere (4), (5). The source further argues that “it is difficult to believe that contractors will not be heavily utilized in some capacity in the fight against IS, under either a Democratic or Republican administration” (3, p. 129). As for a legal framework governing the behaviour and activities of private security contractors, neither international or local laws exists, or mechanisms for accountability, despite performing inherently governmental functions for the US government (6). Upwards of 15,000 have been deployed to Iraq, as one source states (7).

The use of PMC’s marks an important shift in Iraq’s security landscape, one that’s been met with greater calls for the scrutiny that successive Iraqi governments have all failed to tailor. A Buzz News (8) piece uncovers details unknown before that the former CEO of Blackwater has founded another Hong Kong-based security and logistics company that freely operates in Southern Iraq. The exposé published an official license that the company known as Frontier Logistics Consultancy DMM was granted by the ministry of trade. The facts are indisputable, had the firm been scrutinised, no license would have been granted. Operations and logistics are two important areas in which the Iraqi government ensures little to no scrutiny over.

There is no evidence to support the claim that Iraq’s government exercises legislative oversight and scrutiny on the contractor force. The absence of a strategy results in a lack of clear-cut objectives (1), mistrust dominates the perception held by Iraqi security actors towards America’s military forces. General Secretary of Asa’ib Ahl al Haq, Qais al Khazali, has repeatedly threatened to up the ante should America seek a permanent war footing (2). As disconcerting, is the decentralization of authority and oversight of contractors, with no single institution in America’s DoD to monitor their fulfilment of billion-dollar worth security contracts (2). While the source is a little old, as was raised in a congressional hearing, various contractors that have or continue to serve in Iraq, face “accusations of negligence and profiteering” (3). Similar allegations have surfaced in recent years (4). In the absence of evidence of PMC scrutiny, a score of 0 has been awarded. Overall there is an absence of evidence of PMC scrutiny.

The presence of PMCs appears to be in direct violation of article 5 of The Private Security Companies Law (1), which stipulates that work permits issued by the National Security Council “will be granted to Iraqi firms only”. What follows in Article 5 contradicts the above-mentioned starting; “however, in response to urgent national security matters, foreign firm branches may be approved by the Council of Ministers”. Whether authorisation of existing PMCs has been passed is unclear as information on this subject is not published by Iraq’s security and defence establishment. The law (1) also designates (Article 3, 6 and 9) the MoI as the permit-issuing body, but in light of the institution’s leanings towards Iran (source needed), it appears unlikely for the MoI to have issued permits to US firms. In light of these contradictions and vagaries, and, in the absence of a comprehensive guide on the lawful use of foreign firms, a score of zero has been awarded. It is worth mentioning that, no PMCs have been prosecuted by an Iraqi military court for human rights abused; further evidence of judicial ineffectiveness in sanctioning officials that facilitate the unlawful presence of PMCs.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. Israel does not prohibit the use of PMSCs and regularly outsources military and security functions to private contractors (1). The main instrument regulating the use of PMSCs is the Law on Private Investigators and Security Services which defines the requirements for the establishment and operation of private security companies in Israel and working as a private investigator. Although the law does not provide a definition of the term PSC, it defines guard services as including standard security services for protection of persons and property, and the installation and maintenance of alarm systems and other security equipment (2). Only licensed companies are allowed to participate in government tenders for selecting companies to operate in specific contexts, particularly in the occupied Palestinian territories (oPt). These tenders outline precise criteria regarding the skills of PSC employees and provide KPIs, however their content is classified and difficult to access even via FOI requests (3).
Additionally, the Powers for Maintaining Public Security Law legislates for the use of PSCs at checkpoints and in East Jerusalem, granting them powers to to demand identification, conduct body searches and proceed with the detention of individuals (4).
Finally, it should be noted that in the settlements on the West Bank, Order No. 432 Concerning Guarding in Communities allows the military to outsource security responsibilities in the settlement to settlers themselves as Civilian Security Coordinators (CSCs) (5). These guards are paid with funds from the MoD and their powers have been significantly expanded in recent years to quais-policing powers (6).

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. Legislation provides for some oversight mechanisms. For instance, PMSCs are required to obtain a licence from a committee appointed by the Ministry of Justice and Public Security Minister. The Law on Private Investigators and Security Services (1972) also provides a disciplinary process which can result in disqualification and suspension of licence. However, this only applies to investigators and not to PSCs whcih are not subject to any ethical code or regulations (1). Under the 2005 Public Security Law, which regulates PSC use in East Jerusalem, designation lies with the Ministry of Defense and the powers of PSC personnel are more limited than those authorized within Israel. In order to conduct body searches the supervision and monitoring of the public authority responsible of the checkpoint, i.e. the soldier, police or public officer, is required (2). There is very little scrutiny of training. The required training level and the procedures according to which private security contractors will operate are also sometimes defined in the document of tender for bids. That being said, however, the content of the training plan is not subject to public scrutiny and, furthermore, the training courses for private guards have been outsourced to private companies (3). With regards to CSCs, oversight is even weaker and there is a a total absence of transparency regarding their powers and a reduction in the effective monitoring, control, and supervision of their operations (4). There is very litle evidence of parliamentary scrutiny of private security or military contractors as the tenders are classified and protected by military secrecy rules.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. There have been numerous human rights abuses involving PMSCs and Civilian Security Coordinators and very little evidence that sanctions and rules are enforced. For CSCs in particular, there is a total absence of even basic investigations into suspected offences committed by them (1). There are near daily reports of incidents involving private security contractors in the oPt that reflect, among other things, the existing confusion regarding their rules of engagement, lack of or insufficient supervision, difficulty of identification, broad discretion in the exercise of their powers, and their engagement or complicity in criminal activity, abuse and misconduct against Palestinian civilians (2).

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Italy signed and ratified the UN convention against the recruitment, use, financing and training of mercenaries of 1989 [1] with law 12 May 1995, n. 210 [2], thus making illegal any activity related to mercenaries. With a more specific focus on private military contractors (PMCs), Italy signed the 2008 Montreux Document [3] in June 2009 [4], but did not emanate any specific law on the matter, thus lacking a complete and clear legal framework [5].

Drafts law have been presented in the last years to the Chamber of Deputies, but no formal decision has been taken yet. Two formal drafts law have been presented: draft law n. 1295/2018[6] and draft law n. 1869/2018 [7]. In the presentation document of the two proposals, the aim is to use the existing foreign legislation, in order to reach a smooth and fitting regulation that would maximise different interests: economic, bureaucratic, of security and efficiency, while respecting the international standards and laws [8]. None of the drafts laws texts contains reference to corruption prevention.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

In the text of the drafts laws cited in 56A there is mention of the need for authorisation relating to the performance of work [1] [2]. However, there are no additional details on the body to undertake the proposed process.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Since there is no legislation regulating the use of PMCs, it is not possible to assess the application of sanctions in case of non-compliance.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. The Law to Control the Possession of Firearms and Swords prohibits private persons from operating as armed military contractors. [1] A retired higher Self-Defence Force (SDF) officer stated in an interview that, to his knowledge, private military contractors had never been used. [2] An exception to the prohibition against employing private armed guards was, however, made in 2013 to permit Japanese registered commercial vessels to have private military contractors on board to protect them against pirates. In April 2013, the Law to Control the Possession of Firearms and Swords was amended, and in November the same year, a Special Law on Guards on Ships [3] was adopted to implement this. [4] The special law applies only when a ship is in a piracy prone area covering the Bay of Somalia and Gulf of Aden determined by latitude and longitude coordinates in a government ordinance. [5] When the ship is outside this area or guards are off duty, the arms must be locked away. [6] Only certain large ships, primarily oil tankers, with features that make them possible to board by pirates from speedboats may use armed guards. [7] Japan became a participating state of the Montreux Document [8] on February 6, 2014. [9] In a nonbinding report made in 2018 on the recommendation of the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan repeatedly stated that Japan has supported the Montreux Document since it became a participating state of the document. It stated that currently, Japan does not foresee that it will make use of private military contractors of the type that is covered in the document, but finds the contribution of the document to international humanitarian law and human rights law valuable. Japan attends the annual meetings linked to the document and contributes to discussions on best practice. [10] Personnel must meet all the conditions listed in article 7 of the Special Law on Guards on Ships in order to receive approval from the Government of Japan to work as a PMC on a private Japanese ship. These conditions include having the necessary military skills, being mentally suited, and having completed any prison sentence five years prior to being hired. There are, however, no rules beyond that in the law for dealing with PMCs which have been convicted of corruption. Articles 9 and 10 set out the criteria for withdrawing the approval to work as a PMC. [11] Regarding oversight, the Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport may request reports from ship owners or ship captains on, [12] and conduct inspections of their offices and facilities [13] to examine, the enforcement of the Special Law on Guards on Ships.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. The Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport may request reports from ship owners or ship captains [1] and conduct inspections of their offices and facilities [2] to examine, the enforcement of the Special Law on Guards on Ships. No reports of oversight by parliament or another body were found in a search of the mainstream national newspapers Asahi Shimbun [3] and Yomiuri Shimbun, [4] however, nor was any report on the issue found on the House of Representatives’ webpage for received reports. [5] The Cabinet Secretariat has published an annual report on policies to counteract piracy in the Bay of Somalia and Gulf of Aden since 2010. The reports published from 2014 onwards include an identical page with information on the Special Law on Guards on Ships. [6]

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. No reports of breaches of policies or laws on the use of PMCs were found in the mainstream national newspapers Asahi Shimbun [1] and Yomiuri Shimbun. [2]

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Private military contracting is not prohibited and/or restricted in Jordan and the government imposes no restrictions on the use of Private Military Contractors and intermediaries. Law No. 35 of the year 1966, Officers Service Law of the Armed Forces, does not include any article on private military contracting. Law No. 35 is one of the very few public laws available to the public in relation to the defence sector in Jordan. There is no evidence of policies restricting Private Military Contractors, and instead there is evidence that private military contracting is common in Jordan. The state of Jordan does not outlaw private enterprise under the umbrella of the state’s defence and security operations. There are many examples of defence personnel being involved in defence-related private enterprises, as well as corruption related to them [2, 3, 4]. Abdel-Hadi al-Majali, who held defence posts, founded one of Jordan’s first private security enterprise in the country; his son is currently the head of MID Contracting, and his cousin, Shadi Ramzi, heads the KADBB, Jordan’s largest military services private business [4]. These examples provide evidence that private defence-related enterprises are legal in Jordan, however, corruption accusations related to these enterprises are usually in relation to granting these companies preferential treatment for contracting [3, 4,5]. It is to be noted that Jordan signed the Montreux Document May 18, 2009 [6].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

There are a few military contractors in Jordan. Some of them work for foreign embassies (USA), and have been more present in the last five years. There is no external or internal scrutiny over these contractors. Besides that, there is no law that organises the work of external contractors. Private Military Contractors are not subject to any form of external scrutiny [1,2]. King Abdullah II Design and Development Bureau (KADDB) [3] is a private military contractor. Operating under the umbrella of KADDB Investment Group, KADDB owns several other companies, which are also associated with the country’s natural resources such as JLVM, JORDANAMCO, JMSS, JADARA, JORAMMO, and ARM. It has become clear through research that these major enterprises, which are also military contractors, are not subject to scrutiny. Despite the Jordanian Armed Forces partially declaring the investments and businesses it runs [4], none of these enterprises have been audited by the Audit Bureau, as they do not appear on the list of audited entities.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

There are no restrictions on the use of Private Military Contractors in Jordan. In this context, as Private Military Contractors are not governed by clear policies, an assessment of the enforcement of policies is irrelevant.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. There is no evidence of any policies that address private military contracting in Kenya.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. There exist no mechanisms of scrutiny of PMCs because there are no known laws governing private military contracting in Kenya.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI, with there being no known policies or laws on PMCs in the Kenya Defence Forces, there are equally no provisions for the enforcement of such laws.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Kosovo has not implemented the Montreux Document [1]

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Kosovo has not implemented the Montreux Document [1]

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Kosovo has not implemented the Montreux Document [1]

This is indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Analysts and officials say private military contractors are employed (1,2,3,4,5). But their work appears to be completely unregulated because not one of Kuwait’s military and security laws address them.

This is indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

There are no special provisions for the oversight of PMCs but all financial transactions are scrutinised by the SAB and Parliament, as detailed in the answer to Q17.

Articles 2 and 3 of Law no. 25 of 1996 (1), which is concerned with the agreements in which the state is part, say that procurement deals and any kind of agreement that the defence and security agencies enter must give an explicit breakdown, which shows what exactly has been given to the state and for how much. Article 5 says that parties that fail to report, or misreport, any payment or favour they received in relation to the deal (within 30 days of receiving it) could be sentenced with to up to three years in prison and given a fine that is in equal in value to whatever they received. They also have to give the state whatever they got.

But there are shortcomings: first, the above law only applies to agreements worth 330,000 USD or more, and the law mentions that the parties involved could avoid prosecution so long as they report these payments to the SAB, and have a known partner in Kuwait in case they are “a known or hidden intermediary.” Additionally, Article 2 of this law also reveals that the defence and security agencies do not need to conduct tenders if they do not want to.

This is indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

There are no policies or laws in place regarding the use of PMCs. Additionally, it is impossible to make a reliable assessment when officials refuse to talk about the matter and there are no research papers or news stories about the subject, but this complete absence of information is a cause for concern, especially since state auditors have said that no one is ever punished for corruption in these agencies.

It is important to bear in mind that this does not necessarily mean that there are many violations related to this issue since we have almost no facts on the matter.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Latvia has no tradition of using military contractors. The staff of the Ministry and the Armed Forces carry out all operational duties. [1] Latvia is not part of the Montreaux document. [2]

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Latvia has no tradition of using military contractors.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Latvia has no tradition of using military contractors.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Lebanon is not a signatory of the Montreaux Document (1). Furthermore, research has not found policies or laws related to Private Military Contractors (PMCs) (2). However, Decree no. 4082/2000 “Organizing the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities” mentions the presence of a department for monitoring and controlling the Private Security Companies (PSCs) (3).

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

No evidence was found for the provision of scrutinizing PMCs. The “Department of Control over Security Companies” at the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities is responsible for monitoring private security companies and has the authority to revoke their license if they violate laws and regulations (Art. 77 ) (1).

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

There are no laws or policies related to PMCs in Lebanon (1).

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

There is no information or evidence that private military contractors have ever been employed. Although there is no clear policy or legislation which forbids the use of private military contractors, the Ministry of Defence publishes information about private military and security company regulation, including the Montreaux document (Lithuania signed the Montreux Agreement in 2012) [1, 2]. The text is available and includes a descriptive section on international humanitarian law, but does not explicitly make reference to Lithuania.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Lithuania do not employ Private Military Companies and has no policies or laws on the use of Private Military Companies.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Lithuania do not employ Private Military Companies and has no policies or laws on the use of Private Military Companies.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

There is no specific law on private military contractors (PMCs) in Malaysia. Nonetheless, there is no evidence of private military contractors operating in the country. [1] [2]

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

There are no clear provisions for the oversight of PMCs through parliament since there is no law covering PMCs in the country. [1]

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Enforcement does not exist since there are no private military contractors operating in Malaysia. [1]

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Private security companies are regulated by the law N° 96-020 (February 1996) and Arrêté n° 2011-0569/MSIPC-SG (February 2011).¹ The law from 1996 allows PSCs to use weapons, but only if they have obtained special dispensation from the government.² However, virtually all companies are limited to using arms such as cudgels, truncheons or, at most, bladed weapons.³ Despite this provision, it appears that in reality very few companies are able to arm their guards at all.³ The one exception to this is the company Escort, which guards the high-profile Radisson Blu Hotel, the site of a major terrorist attack in 2015, among other locations.⁴ Security personnel working for Escort have access to guns.⁴
Meanwhile, the decree from 2011 outlines some of the laws that PSCs, along with other security actors, are subject to, and stipulates that the use of private detectives is outlawed in Mali.¹
In November 2016, the Council of Ministers adopted a modified version of the 1996 law governing PSCs in a bid to improve the regulation of the sector. The amendment will oblige PSCs to subject job applicants to medical and psychological examinations to help ensure that guards, especially armed guards, are of sound mind.⁶ Moreover, PSCs will also be legally required to ensure that their employees undergo formal training – either through private training centres or with the assistance of public security agencies.⁶ From now on, security guards will have the possibility of accessing and deploying self-defence sprays, dogs and pump-action shotguns. PSCs will have six months, starting from 15 March 2018, to comply with the new legislation.⁸

However, there is no evidence from the media coverage of the amendment that suggests it contains provisions outlining the criteria against which PSCs are selected or the circumstances under which they may lose their contracts for abuses, irregularities or other misdemeanours.² ⁴ ⁶ ⁸ The country has not signed The Montreux Document,⁷ nor are there any anticorruption regulations in the domestic legislation specifically relating to PSCs.¹ ² ³ ⁴ ⁵ ⁶ ⁷

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Until recently, there was no legal framework relating to recruitment or training procedures for PSCs.1 There is a collective convention for companies providing guards, which covers some of the rights and responsibilities of employers in regulating the industry. It also provides a salary framework for guards. However, the convention is not widely circulated or known by many people working in the sector.1
The level of training and remuneration offered varies widely within the sector. Many security guards earn as little as 30,000 to 50,000 CFA per month (56 to 94 USD), indicating a strong potential for bribery to persuade guards to help criminal actors.3
The fact that the government has only very recently introduced legal requirements for PSCs regarding training standards and psychological assessments for employees highlights how unregulated the sector is at present (see 56A). The new law will require PSCs to deposit 50,000,000 CFA if headquartered in Bamako or 30,000,000 CFA if operating anywhere outside of the capital as part of their operating agreements.2 This will give the state authorities greater leverage over PSCs operating in the country. But there is still no comprehensive policy for how the government scrutinises the conduct of PMCs.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

There are currently more than 300 PSCs operating in Mali (6). In law, each company has to have an agreement with the government in order to be commercially active. International PSCs, such as G4S and ERYS, are subject to the same legal constraints as Malian firms (5). However, many PSCs are operating without having entered into an agreement with the authorities (9). The authorities maintain that police and gendarmerie units are seeking to identify companies operating without agreements with a view to closing them down (9). But there are no publicly recorded instances of such PSCs being punished for violations (1-9).

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

In Mexico, the use of private military contractors is not regulated and the Montreux Document is not applied either.

However, specialists in the subject point out that several companies of this type have activity in Mexico and “coexist with subsidiaries and local offices of multinational companies as well as national companies that are mainly engaged in the industries of military logistics, police, private security, aerospace, armor, cybersecurity, private guards, security systems, negotiation in kidnappings, equipment, geolocation, tactical vehicles, and training in various subjects. A good part of these companies have legal recognition as private security companies and offer their catalog of services to the governing bodies and private initiative in international events.” [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

There are no provisions for the supervision of Private Military Contractors. There is a law that regulates private security “in charge of individuals in order to carry out security-related actions in terms of protection, surveillance, custody of people, information, real estate, or securities, including their transfer; installation, operation of systems and security teams, provision of data for the investigation of crimes, and support in the event of damages or disasters, as auxiliary to the Public Security function.” [1] In this case, private security companies will request SEDENA permission so that operational personnel can carry weapons in the performance of their duties. [2] [3]

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Mexico does not have policies or regulations on the use of Private Military Contractors. [1]

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

There is no explicit law or policies prohibiting the use of PMCs. [1] However, the government claims that PMCs cannot be engaged. [2]

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

There is no explicit law or policies prohibiting the use of PMCs. [1] In this regard, there are no clear provisions for the oversight of PMCs.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

There is no explicit law or policies prohibiting the use of PMCs. [1]

This sub-indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

No evidence was found that the Moroccan government imposes restrictions on the use of private military contractors and intermediaries (1)(2).

This sub-indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

No evidence was found that PMCs are subject to any form of scrutiny and no background information was found surrounding PMCs in Morocco (1)(2)(3)(4).

This sub-indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Morocco has no policies or laws on the use of PMCs.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

The Ministry of Home Affairs, the Ministry of Planning and Economic Development and the Ministry of Commerce initiated discussions with private security service providers in Myanmar for the development of a Private Security Service Law in 2015 [1]. But there is no law regarding private military contractors in Myanmar. The Indian Arms Act (1878) includes provisions for the possession of arms, but nothing for private military contractors (PMC) [2]. Article 338 of the 2008 Constitution states that all armed forces in the Union shall be under the command of the Defence Services [3]. Therefore, even if private military contractors were employed, they would be under the control of the Defence Services.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Since the Private Security Law is yet to be developed, there are no provisions for the scrutiny of PMCs in Myanmar.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Since the Private Security Law is yet to be developed, there is currently no legal framework to enforce.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

The use of Private Military Contractors (PMCs) is legal in the Netherlands, but there is no clear policy on how PMCs are selected or how to manage PMCs who are (accused of being) corrupt. PMCs are involved in a range of activities, including those which expose them to corruption. For example, as of January 2022, a PMC will be responsible for guarding naval ships in the Gulf of Aden [1]. As a policy, the same integrity rules that apply to defence personnel also apply to PMCs and any complaints of corruption or malpractice can be reported to the COID [2].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

The KMAR manages PMCs and the authority over the KMAR lies with various ministries, including the Ministry of Justice and Security, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations and the Ministry of Defence [1,2]. However, there is very little information regarding oversight of PMCs and it is unclear (also to interviewees) how this oversight occurs in practice.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Policy on PMCs is opaque and therefore adherence is unclear. According to the COID, there has been at least one case where the contract of a PMC was either ended or not renewed due to an integrity violation [1]. However, sanctions are not always applied and the Dutch Ministry of Defence (MoD) has knowingly continued contracts with companies known to be corrupt. For example, in Iraq, catering was handled by a company called Supreme, despite the fact that the company pleaded guilty to deliberate fraud during the American Public Prosecution Service’s case against it and that a report was made to the COID stating that the company was defrauding the Dutch MoD [2].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

New Zealand has legislation that prohibits the employment of mercenaries [1, 2]. The New Zealand Defence has stated that it does not engage “private military contractors” for the conduct of operations [3].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Although the NZDF have stated that they do not engage PMCs for the conduct of operations, the hiring of private security contractors is legally permitted. Their activities and conduct are largely governed through the Private Security Personnel and Private Investigators Act 2010 which ensures that persons are suitably qualified and do not behave in ways contrary to the public interest [1]. The Licensing Authority may make whatever inquiries it deems necessary in order to issue a license for an individual or company to operate in a private security and private investigator role [2]. The Licencing Authority serves a notice to the NZ Police for application for a license; the Police may object to a license [3]. The NZ Police may also object to an application for certificate approval [4]. A licensee or certificate holder must show to the NZ Police and the Complaints, Investigation, and Prosecution Unit any record or document that is required by regulations [5].

Apart from the Act, private contractors must comply with all relevant NZ Law; moreover, as Government contractors they must also comply with all relevant Codes of Conduct and Conflicts of Interest policies prescribed and/or applicable to the government department or agency which hires them [6]. Monitoring the Supplier Code of Conduct is the responsibility of the contracting agency, which means no independent oversight body or mechanism exists, outside of the regular external auditing body [7]. Similarly, no formal policy of enforcement exists if a supplier does not meet these expectations (this does not apply to criminal acts). The agency, in this case MoD or NZDF, may determine the consequences, which may result in a company being blacklisted from procurement opportunities as per Rule 44 of the Government Procurement Rules (though it is unclear whether this is limited to defence contracts or Government-wide tenders). If serious wrongdoing is proven through evidence then the agency should report the case to the Serious Fraud Office, or the NZ Police in the case of bribery of a foreign official outside New Zealand [8, 9, 10].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

No violations of laws and policies on the use of PMC could be found. This is not surprising considering that the NZDF is prudent in its application of contractors in supporting Military missions [1,2.3].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

The assessor found no evidence of the defence sector hiring private security contractors. However, doing so is not outlawed in either the Constitution (1) or the Military Penal Code (2). The score reflects the fact that there is no express ban in the Constitution or the Military Code prohibiting the use of PMCs. There is no clearly stated policy either. Private companies (uranium miner AREVA, for example) in the north do hire PMCs to protect infrastructure and staff from security threats. Niger has not adopted/signed and does not participate in the 2008 Montreaux Document on Private Military and Security Companies (3).

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Niger has no policies or laws on the use of PMCs. The lack of legislation is evidence of a lack of scrutiny.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Niger has no policies or laws on the use of PMCs. The lack of legislation is evidence of a lack of enforcement.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Private military contractors are engaged from time to time; however, there is no evidence of any organisational guidelines on any sort of due diligence checks, which should be carried out before engaging private military contractors. “This is a common attraction about hiring private military companies or mercenaries – they can get away with things that private citizens can’t if you are a national government” (1), (2). The use of military contractors is expedient, as the normal rules do not apply to them, this has been identified as a reason for their continued attraction. In the North-East internal security situation, there is widespread use of CJTFs. Although it is reported that “MOUs” are signed with them, there is little evidence to suggest that clear guidelines exist, or effective training of civilians involved in military operations occurs. As a result, there are many allegations of the involvement of the CJTF in human rights abuses. Another development is the proposal to absorb “qualified” members of the CJTF into the regular army corp (3), (4), (5), (6).

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Private military contractors are engaged from time to time; however, the engagement of PMCs falls under the purview of the executive arm of government. This is normally an extra-budgetary expenditure, so it would not be a decision which follows the normal exercise of executive discretionary powers (1). There is no legislative oversight or scrutiny of such decisions. During the last administration when PMCs were hired, the matter was considered a national secret and rarely reported within the national media. “Paradoxically, the new administration would again re-engage the services of another PMC, the Specialised Tasks, Training, Equipment and Protection company (STTEP), to support the military, despite the absence of an enabling law to allow this type of arrangement. It is uncertain if the current government contemplated the far-reaching concerns over probity and transparency or even the possible backlashes of such engagement. It might be that precisely because of such negative prospects, the administration preferred the whole affair to be shrouded in secrecy” (1), (2), (3). The use of children in the Civilian Joint Task Force was recently stopped, by the signing of an action plan to stop the use of children in conflict (4). The use of local PMCs has raised some questions in the media. No official oversight mechanism exists concerning the use of the CJTF (5).

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

No laws deal with the hiring of PMCs. For example, there is no oversight body responsible for scrutinizing the activities of the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) (1). A recent development prevents the use of children in the CJTF (2), (3). No rules govern the use of private military contractors. The FGN has recruited both foreign private military contractors and local citizens who were formed into a militia to support the military operations in the North East of the Country. Over the years, as the CJTF has demonstrated its usefulness there have been attempts made to formalize its use through the provision of some training and recruitment into the regular army (3). However, widespread allegations of the complicity of the CJTF in human rights abuses exist. The evidence suggests that the CJTF are a state-sponsored militia (2), (3). Although some training is provided for them, they have been implicated in several cases of human rights abuses. The level of scrutiny is less than that applied to the regular Nigerian military. For example, they were able to use child soldiers and commit human rights abuses such as extrajudicial killings and rape. The recommendation is that the use of militias such as the CJTF should be regularised as soon as possible, training should be provided, and internal and external accountability mechanisms created (4).

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. The Law on Service in the Army does not stipulate the required use of private military contractors [1]. Thus, no private military contractors have been contracted at home or during missions abroad. One of the reasons for this is the limited defence budget, which discourages the engagement of any private security staff [2].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. Private military contractors are not legally defined subjects, so they are not officially scrutinised or overseen within the defence sector [1].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. Private military contractors are not legally defined subjects within the defence sector [1].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. Norway is a signatory of the Montreux Document and the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (ICOC), both of which lay out good practices and guidelines for the employment of PMCs [1]. Norway is also a member of the International Code of Conduct Association, which was established to promote, govern and oversee the implementation of the International Code of Conduct [2]. Norwegian legislation allows private security providers in very limited circumstances. The new Regulation on Ship Security permits the carrying of firearms on Norwegian-owned ships in certain maritime zones [3]. It stipulates when armed guards may be used, how weapons are to be stored on board and what procedures should be followed when using armed weapons. The regulation was passed in 2011 as a result of lobbying by Norwegian ship-owners facing problems with piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean [4]. At the same time, the Act on Private Security Companies explicitly prohibits employees of Norwegian-registered, land-based companies to carry firearms, both inside and outside of Norway [5]. In some instances, the Norwegian state has therefore used services that Norwegian companies are not allowed to supply. For instance, the Norwegian Foreign Office has employed foreign private security companies to protect vital assets in Afghanistan, like the Norwegian embassy in Kabul [6]. PMCs have also been used in a limited scope at Norwegian military bases in Afghanistan [7].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. The Regulation on Ship Security requires that any incident of attack involving the use of coercive measures has to be reported to the Norwegian Maritime Authority within 72 hours [1]. The regulation does not provide requirements directed towards the security companies themselves, but addresses the responsibility of ship owners to inform Norwegian authorities when and why the use of private security services is required. Parliament does not conduct active scrutiny of these activities.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. |In the event of corruption or any other criminal offence involving a PMC, the Norwegian Penal Code would apply [1]. Any PMC found guilty of corruption would no longer be able to deliver services to the Ministry of Defence. This legislation applies to the personnel of the Norwegian based companies. There are no registered cases in this regard [2].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

There is no law or policy dedicated solely to PMCs, nor is there evidence of employment of any PMCs by the MoD (1), (2). Oman is not a participating member of the Montreaux Document, defining PMCs within international law (3). The Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism Law includes applicable provisions for PMCs, which are considered non-financial businesses (4). The legislation scrutinises transactions suspected to involve money laundering, terrorist funding or organisations (4). They do not explicitly relate to PMCs, but as mentioned above there are no examples of contracting PMCs, and PMCs would have to abide by business standards in any case. According to our sources, some guidelines restrict and have some control over PMCs in Oman (5), (6). These guidelines are not law and are flexible too, they can be applied differently across the years and contractors.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

There is no legislation explicitly targeting PMCs (1), (2). There is no reference to the employment of PMCs in Omani media. There is no evidence of oversight bodies scrutinising PMCs and parliament does not have the mandate to discuss or scrutinise the defence and security sectors (3). According to our sources, there is no oversight of PMCs. The reason is, that they are not widespread and if they are present, they conduct training and are not engaged in military operations (4).

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

There are no policies explicitly applicable to employing PMCs in Oman (1). In cases of violations of the PMC guidelines (as there are no policies or laws), there are almost no sanctions applied (2). According to another source, PMCs are at a small scale, and when they violate guidelines, there is no potential to sanction them as the process of investigation, and sanctioning will be expensive (3).

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

As Israeli forces have full control over security in the area (1), a private contractor by the Palestinian Authority is not allowed. Besides that, the PA is not part of the Montreaux document (1).

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

There are no laws for private military contractors as the political situation does not permit that. According to the Oslo agreement, the security of the are will be under the Israeli military forces until 1999. However, Israel still controls the areas in the West Bank, dividing it into several cantons, it is not possible to have private military contractors as it would require permission and an agreement with Israel (1).

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

There are no laws for private military contractors as there is no sovereignty over the security and defence of the West Bank. Therefore, the absence of PMCs is related to an external force (Israeli occupation), and therefore, there is no need for policies and laws that organize them (1).

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. The use of private military contractors is allowed under Section 3, Article 1 of the Government Procurement Act RA 9184 and has been employed by the Defence Department on several occasions [1, 2, 3]. These PMCs are subject to a similar level of scrutiny from pre-procurement and post-qualification processes [1, 2].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. Oversight of the PMCs is done by the Department of Budget and Management under the supervision of the Government Procurement Policy Board (GPPB) [1, 2 ] and the Commission on Audit [3], which can also suspend transactions [4].

COA audit reports reveal that the armed forces failed to conduct detailed investigations of employed PMCs, thus recommending the disqualification and blacklisting of these companies [1, 2]. The GPPB also issued blacklisting guidelines that are applicable to all suppliers, including PMCs [3].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Commercial security activity is licensed. The Act on Measures of Direct Coercion and Firearms entitles the use of firearms by licensed bodyguards and security guards (Article 2.1.20) [1].
The Act on Personal and Property Protection entitles private companies to provide licensed protection services using licensed, armed protection and security guards (chapter 4) [2]. Such commercial companies are defined by law as “Specialized Armed Security Formations.” They are entitled to protect public property, too. The MoD widely use private contractors to protect its real estates, polygons etc. and to reduce the use of professional soldiers in such time consuming secondary activities.
Both acts limit the use of force and firearms by PMCs to the boundaries of protected objects (with an exception for convoys). There is no legal basis, which means that it is prohibited, to use such contractors in other ways (as abroad or for any offensive or strict military operations). Consequently, the use of such contractors as private military contractors if forbidden by law.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Private security companies (“Specialized Armed Security Formations”) are licensed and scrutinised by the Ministry of Interior (The Act on Personal and Property Protection, chapter 4) [1]. The Ministry of Interior has clear rules of scrutiny that allows it to revoke licenses. The last available audit, by Supreme Audit Office in 2012 stated, that the scrutiny was performed generally well; however, the ministry was not active enough to collect ongoing information on irregularities, which might have resulted in the abolishment of licences [2].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

The Ministry of Interior has clear rules of scrutiny which may abolish licenses. The last available audit, by the Supreme Audit Office in 2012 stated, that the scrutiny was performed generally well, however, the ministry was not active enough to collect ongoing information on irregularities which might have led to the abolishment of licences [1].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

The Portuguese Republic is a signatory of the Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies [1]. The Law on National Defence [2] and the Armed Forces Organisation Act [3] explicitly define military defence as exclusive to the armed forces. There is no law or policy regarding private military contractors (PMCs).

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

The Law on National Defence [1] and the Armed Forces Organization Act [2] explicitly define military defence as exclusive to the Armed Forces and there is no evidence of employment of PMCs. As a result, there are no provisions for the establishment of oversight mechanisms to scrutinise PMC activities.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

No known private military contractor is operating within Portuguese territory, although a recent news article shows that former military staff are known to be employed outside of Portugal by PMCs [1].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Qatar is a signatory to the Montreux document as of April 30, 2009 and has policies on the use of private military contractors, which do not specify particular preventive measures. The Qatari policy in relation to regulating PMCs is Law No. 19 (2009) for Regulating the Provision of Private Security Services. Article 2 of the law states that ‘it is not allowed to provide private security services by private security services companies without obtaining a license for that from the Licensing Authority, and in accordance with the provisions of this Law.’ [1] In relation to its commitments to the Montreux document, Qatar has expressed that it has ‘specific provisions for on-the-ground monitoring of PMSC compliance with legislation, licences or regulations ……and PMSCs in Qatar are expected to submit updated registers every two years.’ [2,3] Whilst there is a law that regulates PMCs, the law does not include specific provisions in relation to the conduct expected of PMCs. [4]

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Scrutiny over PMCs is much more present than scrutiny over the public defence sector. Although there is some scrutiny over PMCs, there is no evidence of this being carried out in a meaningful way. Policies set out the main regulations and guidance PMCs should adhere to, and those include restrictions over their work and the necessity of obtaining licences from relevant authorities prior to commencing their work. For example, article 18 of the Law No. 19 (2009) states that ‘private security services companies are subject to the control and inspection of the Licensing Authority in the manner it deems appropriate.’ [1] However, the policy does not specify the form of scrutiny PMCs could be subject to by the authorities, or the mechanism through which such scrutiny could possibly take place, and therefore the process remains unclear. In addition to that, the policy does not mandate PMCs to submit financial or audit reports. [2]

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

There are rare incidents when PMCs violate the terms and laws, but they are usually sanctioned according to the law. Such PMCs normally work as consultants at a senior level. [1,2]

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

The use of private military contractors (PMC) is forbidden by law. Article 13, Clause 5 of the Russian Constitution forbids the ‘formation and use of public entities whose aims and actions focus on … forming armed groups’ [1]. Also, Article 71, Clause M reiterates that issues of defence and security shall be under the control of the Russian Federation [1]. Article 359 of the Russian Criminal Code criminalises the recruitment, training and financing of mercenaries, as well as acting as a mercenary [2].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

PMCs are illegal in Russia and are therefore not subject to any form of scrutiny [1,2]. However, many experts insist on legalising PMCs to control their actions and provide basic security for Russian mercenaries, who are currently left without any guarantees or payment on the battle fields [3,4]. Recently, the military veterans organisation asked the International Criminal Court to investigate and prosecute PMC organisers who leave soldiers without basic security on the battlefields [5].

In 2018, a bill on use of PMCs was proposed to the Russian State Duma, but the bill was rejected for its ‘unconstitutional nature’ [6].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Despite the fact that the use of PMCs is legally forbidden [1,2], PMCs, in particular the so-called ‘Wager PMC’ [3,4] and ‘Patriot PMC’ [5], have been widely used recently in military conflicts where Russian is involved, in order to avoid litigation and publicity. Russian soldiers, upon verbal agreement, were transferred to military zones without any paperwork, uniform or insignia [6]. A lot of Russian men have been participating in military campaigns in Syria [7,8], the Central African Republic [9,10], Sudan [11] and Venezuela [12,13] as mercenaries. The Russian government, nevertheless, does not acknowledge mercenaries as Russian soldiers [14].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

According to our sources, PMCs are used in the country through the office of the crown prince. Therefore, there are some de-facto restrictions on them but not through a legal framework. These restrictions vary based on the mission, and duration of the mission (1), (2). Controversial US private military contractor Blackwater (now known as Academi) is also said to be active in the country, with UK press source the Daily Mail alleging that Blackwater mercenaries were employed by the Saudi state to torture detainees that were held in the Ritz Carlton as part of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s anti-corruption crackdown in November 2017 (3). Blackwater operatives were also reportedly used by the government to “guard” Lebanese Prime Minister Saad al-Hariri after he was allegedly held hostage by Saudi authorities in the same month, according to London-headquartered media outlet The New Arab (4). Beyond Saudi Arabia, the government has made extensive use of PMCs in the regional conflicts in which it is engaged, primarily the ongoing war in Yemen that began in March 2015 where Saudi is leading a coalition against the Houthi fighters. Other than Blackwater/Academi, Saudi Arabia has hired other PMCs to fight and provide security services in that conflict, including UK companies Griffin Security and ArmourGroup International (5), (6).
According to a US military official with knowledge of Saudi defence policy, “private military companies such as US-based Vinnell have been operating in Saudi Arabia since the 1970s, and they are not currently executing missions, but rather are there as trainers, for example, training the Saudi Arabian National Guard, and some as maintainers. They are regulated in the sense that they must obtain a license to operate there from the US State Department, which represents some kind of oversight, but I’m not aware of any scrutiny or oversight regulating their conduct in Saudi Arabia” (7).

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

There is no evidence of PMCs in Saudi Arabia being subject to any kind of scrutiny or oversight (1). There are some restrictions on the operations of military contractors in Saudi Arabia, for example limiting them to selling weapons and other military equipment to the Saudi government as well as providing ancillary services such as servicing military equipment and training military personnel. There are also regulations prohibiting military contractors from engaging agents on a commission basis in sales of armaments and other military equipment to the Saudi government (2). However, there is no indication of any oversight mechanism specifically for PMC operations in Saudi Arabia under local law, nor of what repercussions PMCs may be subject to in the event of a breach of law or involvement in corrupt activities.

Saudi Arabia is not a signatory to the Montreaux Document (3).

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Saudi Arabia has no policies or laws on the use of PMCs (1).

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Engagement of PMCs is allowed within the existing legislative framework; however, it is not sufficiently developed. The adoption of the Law on Private Military Security in 2013 [1] has enabled the engagement of private security personnel to provide security for the MoD with the obligation of conducting a security check before contracting. However, there are no records of the MoD engaging PMCs so far.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

There is no evidence that PMCs are engaged in operations of the Serbian Armed Forces. SAF representatives participate in multinational operations (currently sic UN and four EU missions) within contingents of other countries [1]. Thus, they might operate with PMCs employed by the main contingent, but there is no record of hiring them.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

There is no evidence that PMCs are engaged in operations of the Serbian Armed Forces. SAF representatives participate in multinational operations (currently sic UN and four EU missions) within contingents of other countries [1]. Thus, they might operate with PMCs employed by the main contingent, but there is no record of hiring them.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

The Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) and the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) do not employ private military contractors (PMCs) in overseas missions although it engages commercial contractors to provide essential services such as administrative and logistics support (accommodation, catering, and equipment maintenance) for overseas missions [1, 2]. Contractors are subject to a standard Conditions of Tender (COT). The COT contains instructions to prospective suppliers on the tender and the structure of the tender proposals for submission [3], and competing firms are subject to the same set of legislation designed to curb corruption [4]. However, there is no specific legislation that centres on PMCs.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

PMCs are subject to the same level of scrutiny by the Defence Science and Technology Agency (DSTA) and MINDEF/SAF internal auditing mechanisms [1, 2] as well as independent organisations such as the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) [3]. Issues regarding contractors can be debated in Parliament for oversight [4].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

When violations have been detected, the MINDEF has consistently acted swiftly to remedy the issues and punish errant contractors [1]. However, the MINDEF does not hire PMCs in practice and there is no specific legislation that govern PMC activity, but it can be assumed that this would also be tightly regulated.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

The South African government is, as a matter of policy, as opposed to the use of private military companies (PMCs) in combat roles. As a result, the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) does not employ PMCs in combat roles. However, private organisations do provide various support services to the SANDF. Domestically, Private Security Companies (PSCs) are highly active and augment police services. The conceptual overlaps between privatised combat functions privatised military support (logistics/training) functions and privatised security functions therefore poses challenges for consistent policy application and practical legislative regulation. In the case of South Africa, the policy toward PMCs is generally informed by a government-led ideological opposition to ‘mercenaries’, taken broadly to refer to privatised military activities [1].

An example highlighting official South African government policy regarding ‘mercenaries’:
South Africa’s permanent representative to the UN, Ambassador Jerry Matjila:
“As a responsible member of the African Union and the United Nations, South Africa condemns all mercenary activities in any African or non-African country. We believe these activities are in clear contravention of continental and international conventions and legal instruments.” [2]

“South Africa has consistently taken strict measures against its nationals found to be involved in mercenary activities or violating the Foreign Military Assistance Act. We have co-operated and collaborated with fellow African countries in instances where our nationals were implicated in mercenary activities.” [2]

South Africa was among the 17 States which jointly finalised the Montreux Document on 17 September 2008 [3]. The document consists of recommendations for governance of PMSCs in warzones, including company track record verification and staff vetting procedures, training for IHL compliance, and guidance on legal prosecution in instances of breaches [4].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

South African legislation regulating PMCs is relatively comprehensive, and reflects, in principle, the policy of the government regarding the use of ‘mercenaries’. However, as suggested in the previous sub-indicator explanation, the practicalities of regulating ambiguous notions of ‘military support’, and the opaque behaviour of the NCACC (which serves as a regulatory body for PMCs), has resulted in mixed scrutiny performance. The Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and Regulation of Certain Activities in Country of Armed Conflict Act 27 of 2006 (Mercenary Act 2006) [1] ostensibly replaced the previous Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act 15 of 1998 (RFMA 1998) [2], but it is worth noting that the Mercenary Act has yet to come into force, and lacks supporting regulations. As such, the Mercenary Act 2006 presumably remains the guiding source of legislation.

The RFMA 1998 (and ‘Mercenary Act 2006’) are both extraterritorially applicable but do not make specific mention of anti-corruption measures. Privatised military services remains an ambiguous concept. Notably, the Mercenary Act 2006 defines those services as “any form of military or military-related assistance, service or activity,” “any form of assistance or service to a party to an armed conflict by means of advice or trainings, personnel, financial, logistical, intelligence or operational support, personnel recruitment, medical or para-medical services or procurement of equipment” and “security services” [3]. This is a substantially broader definition than is normally applied and consequently provides for the regulation on the provision of international humanitarian aid. The regulation of said military services is provided by the National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC) – making the NCACC a de facto authority on the legality of employment of PMSCs in overseas conflict. It is not clear to what extent the NCACC has applied regulatory oversight to this matter [5].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

In principle, South Africa has taken a prohibitive regulatory stance toward PMCs. In practice, the enforcement (and indeed, enactment) of that regulatory legislation has been inconsistent. South African nationals continue to play an active role in PMCs in several ongoing conflicts on the continent (Nigeria and Somalia) and elsewhere (Iraq, Afghanistan).

It does not appear that the enforcement of regulatory legislation by the NCACC is made clearly available for public scrutiny [1]. South African nationals continue to participate in providing security services/military services in combat zones in several countries. South African nationals, through STTEP, supported Nigerian Armed Forces in counter-insurgency efforts against Boko Haram in 2015 [2]. Relatedly, South African nationals also continue to serve in other countries’ militaries (notably, the British Army and the Israeli Defence Force). There have not been any prosecutions arising from these violations of the Mercenary Act or RFMA. It is plausible, however, that PMCs such as STTEP could be less an example of corruption and more a case of weak governance.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI._x000D_
_x000D_
The Private Military Contractor is a broad concept including “mercenaries recruited in order to fight in an armed conflict” (ICRC, 2011: 40) [1] ; however, it can also refer to “military support firms providing intelligence, logistics and maintenance services to the military” (Choi, 2008). [2] In South Korea, only the latter can be applied because there are no individual PMCs employed by the armed forces to fight in operations, according to interviews with defence experts. [3] [4] Since conscription exists for all male citizens in South Korea, the need for mercenaries has not been discussed actively. [3] [4] Due to this defence and security environment, it is difficult to find a clear policy or measures specifically designed for PMCs. [2] The Defence Acquisition Programme Act provides legal standards to select defence contractors who wish to provide defence supplies or logistics to the armed forces. Potential suppliers are required to submit a pledge of integrity that prohibits improper solicitations, unfair practices that obstruct open competition in bidding and unjust subcontracting. [5]

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI._x000D_
_x000D_
As mentioned in Q56A, there is no policy in place for PMCs in operations. [1] Instead, defence suppliers who wish to provide logistics or maintenance services to the South Korean military are subject to the Defence Acquisition Programme Act which includes procedures and qualification for defence contractors. [2]

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI._x000D_
_x000D_
No PMC involved in operation has been identified in South Korea. [1] [2]

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

The Constitution prohibits the recruitment of “any armed or paramilitary force in South Sudan except in accordance with the Constitution and the law”. [1] Nevertheless, the terms, “except in accordance with the Constitution and the law,” seem to indicate that there is room for hiring paramilitaries if the process is conducted within the limits of the law and the Constitution. The Constitution does not mention any legal standards for paramilitaries/private military contractors. Erik Prince of Blackwater is alleged to have pitched to President Salva Kiir the idea of a mercenary army to help defeat rebels in the vicinity of oilfields at the height of the war, but the idea was not embraced by the government. [2]

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

There are no laws dealing with the contracting of or use of PMCs. Neither the SPLA White Paper on Defence nor the SPLA Act 2009 mention PMCs. [1] [2]

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

There are no laws dealing with the contracting of or use of PMCs. Neither the SPLA White Paper on Defence nor the SPLA Act 2009 mention PMCs. [1] [2]

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

According to Abrisketa and Gómez Isa, “Spanish Law does not prohibit mercenary activity as such nor enlistment of nationals in foreign armed forces. Voluntary participation by a Spanish national in an armed conflict abroad or voluntary enlisting in a foreign army of a state with which Spain has no (imminent) armed conflict is not prohibited. Spain has not indicated that it will support (or become party to) the 1989 UN Convention against recruitment, use, financing and training of mercenaries” [1].

As of 24 November 2020, Spain is not a signatory to the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries [2], although Spain signed the Montreux document on 20 May 2009 [3]. A document, by the Higher Centre for National Defence Studies (which belongs to the Ministry of Defence), declared that external support services, in the first stages of force deployment, was “essential since it facilitates a faster deployment, normally obtained through local contractors and personnel,” and also stated that “the use of these private companies, in zones that are not actually in combat or in proximity to it, can be advisable, giving the capacity to offer services quickly and flexibility, so as not to be placed under limitations, procedures and legislation to which public organisations are subject and not requiring, in general, important organisational structures” [4]. Abrisketa and Gómez Isa noted that the tendency to externalise was increasing in 2009 [1] and that this trend has continued. According to the Private Security Monitor of the University of Denver (USA), “Spanish law maintains that it is the sole obligation of the state to provide for security. However, to accomplish this end, the law leaves open the possibility that Spanish security forces can be complimented by the activity of private security companies.

According to the PRIV-WAR report on Spain, this legal foundation for Spanish private security is derived primarily from the Spanish Constitution, the Organic Law on the Protection of Citizens’ Security of 21 February 1992, the Law on Private Security of 30 July 1992, and the Organic Law on National Defence of 17 November 2005. Spain’s use of private security is overwhelmingly domestic, with contractors providing support to the Spanish military primarily in a logistical capacity. Contractors may be used abroad to protect military bases, but there is restrictions on the amount of risk they may undertake. In addition, Spain responded to the Private Security Monitor’s questionnaire on maritime private security” [5].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. There are not specific rules on PMCs in Spanish labour law [1].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. There are not specific rules on PMCs in Spanish labour law [1].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. No formal policy could be found regarding private military contractor (PMC) employment by Sudan and it is likely that no such policy exists. However, it seems likely that, during and since the Bashir regime, some formal arrangements did/do exist with private sector military contractors from Russia, possibly some Gulf states and neighbouring African countries. At the very least, the Russian Wagner Group (although it is classified by some as a Russian state entity rather than a PMC [1]) has been identified to be working in Sudan for the Sudanese government and the Russian government itself has reported that private Russian companies are training Sudan’s army [2,3].

Additionally, Sudanese armed groups themselves provide mercenaries to fight in places such as Yemen and Libya, services that are purchased by some of the above-mentioned countries [4,5]. Moreover, to a great extent, the Bashir regime used paramilitaries and militias from Sudan and neighbouring countries in a similar way to military contractors. Official and legally legitimate contracts between the (former) Bashir regime and any of these actors may or may not exist, but the mode of engagement appears somewhat the same as though they were formally and legally contracted. Former President Bashir used state resources to feed a vast patronage network of paramilitary and proxy forces that helped to keep the regime in power for decades. Access to weapons, ammunition, vehicles, land, real estate, as well as tax avoidance, favoured exchange rates for gold, untaxed exports and imports, mercenary contracts in other countries, money laundering opportunities and privileged control of state-owned enterprises, natural resources and border crossings all served as ‘currencies’ that Bashir used to employ, supply and reward various paramilitary forces and their affiliates, as well as militias with which the regime might have had a less consistent or formal relationship with respect to chain of command [6,7,8].

The Bashir regime’s accumulation of wealth and political survival relied on the prevention of any one armed group from gaining enough power to unseat the regime. The rise of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), commanded by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, who is known colloquially as ‘Hemedti’ and has served as the deputy head of Sudan’s transitional Sovereignty Council since August 2019, is a direct consequence of Bashir’s 2017 decision to permit Hemedti’s RSF forces to take over the largest gold mining area in Darfur (from another militia) and export directly to the UAE, to provide mercenary services abroad and to serve as the border guard in prime trafficking route locations, as well as his decision to ultimately invite the RSF to establish bases near the seat of the regime in Khartoum. By 2018, Bashir announced the formal absorption of the RSF into Sudan’s military – but at the same time, he allowed it to maintain its organisational structure, processes, spending and identity separately from other security and defence forces [9,10]. This set the stage for Hemedti and the RSF to be the dominant forces in the coup that overthrew Bashir in 2019 and in the transitional government that followed.

In October 2020, the signing of the Juba Peace Agreement [11] effectively promised the absorption of formerly combative militias into the national forces. In effect, these moves seem to be an attempt to maintain, further consolidate and potentially shuffle the existing patronage system into a relatively stable state that enables its survival even as it must incorporate and ‘feed’ the recently added Juba Agreement partners. This would reflect a significant change of de facto ‘policy’ regarding the use of domestic paramilitary and proxy forces in Sudan, although relationships with foreign partners might remain. Unless the government takes drastic steps to increase transparency and share spoils among the motley stakeholders to the fragile peace and takes actions that sincerely encourage patience among the diffuse community groups and organisations in Sudan that started the revolution, then sooner or later, distrust among stakeholders and a persistently poor foreign investment climate, combined with other crisis factors, will break the peace and dash hopes of development and a better life for the people.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. PMCs, including the Russian Wagner Group and several paramilitary organisations that have historically received support from the GoS, are employed and are not subject to scrutiny by a government oversight body [1,2,3,4,5,6,7]. The support they receive is not publicly divulged and the country’s general procurement laws do not mention any oversight mechanisms that specifically apply to PMCs [8].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. A review of the websites run by the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Interior [1,2,3], as well as a review of Sudan’s Procurement Act of 2010 [4], yielded no evidence that Sudan has any laws specifically governing the use of PMCs.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

No policies or laws seem to exist in Sweden for regulating specifically the use of private military companies (PMCs). Certain private service providers specialising in military security have been hired by government ministries at a number of occasions. For example, Vesper Group – a Swedish security firm consisting of previous military officers – has won contracts for a value of up to SEK 17 million for patrolling alongside MoFA staff in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan [1], and the Swedish security company 4C Strategies has sold war gaming solutions to the Armed Forces [2]. Commentators have noted how the employment of PMCs for carrying out particular tasks at home and abroad should be seen as a ‘strong trend’ in Sweden [3]. However, the issue has not been meaningfully debated in parliament since 2003, when a motion was tabled by a Green Party MP [4], and academics have discussed at length how this may have serious legal and practical implications in the future if the policy area remains unaddressed [5].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. No policies or laws exist in Sweden for regulating the use of PMCs [1].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. No policies or laws exist in Sweden for regulating the use of PMCs [1].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. The use of private military contractors is regulated in the Federal Act on Private Security Services Provided Abroad (PSSA) on one hand [1] and by the Ordinance on the Use of Private Security Companies by the Federal Government (OUPSC) on the other [2]. The law does not prohibit the use of such companies, but they are barred from any direct participation in hostilities (Article 8, PSSA) and might therefore not be considered private military contractors under some definitions of the term. Article 32f of the PSSA and Article 5f of the OUPSC prescribes training in combating corruption for all personnel of security companies operating abroad. Switzerland launched, together with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the process leading to the Montreux Protocol and aims at following good practices when regulating private military security providers [3, 4].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. The use of private military contractors is regulated in the Federal Act on Private Security Services Provided Abroad (PSSA) on one hand [1] and by the Ordinance on the Use of Private Security Companies by the Federal Government (OUPSC) on the other [2]. Section 4 of the PSSA sets out the rules of oversight of private security companies in general and includes an obligation to cooperate and the possibility of measures like unannounced inspections or seizure of materials (Article 19 PSSA). Federal agencies that want to contract a private security company are required to consult the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA) and the DDPS. Article 38 of the PSSA requires the authorities to publish an annual public report on the implementation of the law for the Federal Council. The FDFA is charged with authoring this report [3, 4, 5]. The only sizeable (but still small) operation of the Swiss Armed Forces abroad is the Swiss Armed Forces in Kosovo (SWISSCOY) mission in support of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) in Kosovo [6]. In addition, some private security providers are contracted by the Swiss Armed Forces for guarding non-sensitive installations in Switzerland [7]. There are no reports of the Swiss Armed Forces charging private companies with military functions.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. The only sizeable (but still small) operation of the Swiss Armed Forces abroad is the SWISSCOY mission in support of the KFOR mission in Kosovo [1]. This research has not shown that any private military companies have been contracted for this operation, and it seems unlikely considering the political sensitivity of that operation. In addition, some private security providers are contracted by the Swiss Armed Forces for guarding non-sensitive installations in Switzerland [2]. There are no reports of the Swiss Armed Forces charging private companies with military functions and violations of the law. The three reports on private security companies issued so far do list some prohibitions based on the law, but no violations have been prosecuted [3, 4, 5].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. Private military contractors are prohibited from being employed by Taiwan’s armed forces in accordance with the “National Defence Act”, “Organisation Act of the Ministry of National Defence”, and the “Organisation Act of the General Staff Headquarters of the Ministry of National Defence” [1, 2, 3].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. Private military contractors are prohibited by law from being employed by Taiwan’s armed forces [1, 2, 3].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. Private military contractors are prohibited by law from being employed by Taiwan’s armed forces [1, 2, 3].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Article 147 of the Constitution states that “It is hereby prohibited for any person or any organization or any group of persons except the Government to raise or maintain in Tanzania an armed force of any kind”. [1] No evidence of this being expressed in legislation was found, however, there is also no evidence of any PMCs operating in Tanzania at any time since, based on reviews of academic literature and more general web search.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Article 147 of the Constitution states that “It is hereby prohibited for any person or any organization or any group of persons except the Government to raise or maintain in Tanzania an armed force of any kind”. [1] No evidence of this being expressed in legislation was found, however, there is also no evidence of any PMCs operating in Tanzania at any time since, based on reviews of academic literature and more general web search.

This indicator is assigned a score in the GDI.

Article 147 of the Constitution states that “It is hereby prohibited for any person or any organization or any group of persons except the Government to raise or maintain in Tanzania an armed force of any kind”. [1] No evidence of this being expressed in legislation was found, however, there is also no evidence of any PMCs operating in Tanzania at any time since, based on reviews of academic literature and more general web search.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. The employment of private military contractors is neither forbidden nor permitted by law since such a law does not exist. Therefore, there is no corruption policy regarding private military contractors in Thailand. According to Interviewee 3, who is a senior military official, there are no PMCs currently hired in Thailand and there are no laws regarding PMCs at the moment [1].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. As outlined in 56A, Thailand has no policies or laws on the use of PMCs [1].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. As outlined in 56A, Thailand has no policies or laws on the use of PMCs [1].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Private military contractors are not allowed in Tunisia. Article 17 of the constitution decrees that only the State may establish armed forces and internal security forces, according to the law and to serve public interest prohibiting the existence of any armed group that does not belong to the State (1). According to our sources, PMCs are forbidden and there are no PMCs in Tunisia, past or present (2,3).

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

As private military contractors are not allowed in Tunisia (1), is is not relevant to talk about their scrutiny (2,3). Therefore, this subindicator should be marked as Not Applicable.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

According to our sources, there are no PMCs within the Tunisian military however, if there were, these violations of the law would be punished. Besides that, any use of PMCs would be faced vigorously by the state and its institutions. Security and armed forces are strictly state-owned and PMCs are not allowed (1,2).

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

The Turkish Contracting Law (4734) only authorises the Ministry of Defence to ‘privatise’ transportation/shuttle and catering services in Turkey [1]. This law does not authorise the Ministry of Defence to outsource military capabilities, meaning that an item relating to the employment of Private Military Companies (PMCs) within the defence sector cannot be put into the government’s central budget in legislative terms. Please also note that there is still no Private Military Company (PMC) in Turkey that has full tactical military capabilities, but there are some private security firms that claim to. There are some firms in Turkey, such as SADAT, which openly claim to deliver military services outside Turkey for foreign clients.

SADAT Defense is the first and the only company in Turkey that provides consultancy and military training services internationally in the international defence and interior security sector. It offers services in three main areas: consultancy, training and supply. It is said that the Turkish private military company SADAT has overseen supervision and payment to mercenaries [2]. SADAT is connected to the Turkish government and there are strong indications of this relationship, including the appointment of Adnan Tanrıverdi, the founder of the company, as a security adviser to President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and the company’s provision of security protection to the Turkish President [3]. The Guardian also reported that a group of Syrian fighters from Idlib province, the lone rebel-held bastion where Turkey holds considerable sway, were recruited in recent weeks to work for a private Turkish security company operating in Azerbaijan [4].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

As explained in 56A, in both legal and legislative terms, the Turkish military has no authority to outsource ‘operational capabilities,’ meaning it is not legally possible for the Ministry of Defence to procure a ‘private military service’. There are some firms in Turkey, such as Akademi Sancak [1], which provide private military and intelligence services, but the assessor was not able to find any reports on open sources indicating that the Turkish military has procured any services from Akademi Sancak yet.

Interviewee 6 suggested that there is debate over the privatisation of the security service of guarding military housing and summer resorts (note: not military units) by procuring services from private security firms in Turkey, but he emphasised that the top command is still reluctant even to privatise this service [1].

In his 2015 scholarly article entitled ‘Using Outsourcing in Turkish Armed Forces and Private Military Companies in the Context of Privatization of Logistic Services’, Colonel M. Cem Ogulturk asserts that, due to the absence of legislative framework enabling the inclusion of spending for PMCs in the central government budget, it is not likely that the Turkish military will outsource operational tasks to private entities in the near future [2].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

There is no evidence that Turkey has employed PMCs in recent years, in line with current legislation (see 56B).

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. There is no policy on the use of private military contractors (PMCs), and there is no evidence that Uganda deals with PMCs. However, some reports online show that Uganda relies heavily on private military contractors; however, they are not detailed. David Goldman, in his piece, reported that “an Intelligence report on 2011 by SIN showed how Ugandan soldiers rely on strategies crafted by former US Special Forces commandos working for private military companies” [1]. However, the UPDF Act [2], under the employment section does not specifically address recruitment of private military contractors. Article 51 (4) of the UPDF act states that Notwithstanding subsections 2 and 3, the Defence Forces Council may undertake such special recruitment as the interests of the Defence Forces require. The recruitment mainly addresses local recruitment of Ugandans but leaves no restriction on the private military contractors.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. Uganda does not have policies or laws on the use of PMCs. Defence matters are conducted in secrecy, private military contractors may be there but not subject to a similar level of scrutiny as for the armed forces. For example, according to one MP [1], they(as MPs) only got to know that private contractors from North Korea were in Uganda training police after the landlady where the North Koreans were staying complained in a letter to President Museveni that she had not been paid the house rent for a long time.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. Uganda does not have policies or laws on the use of PMCs.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Private military contractors are illegal in Ukraine, although some MPs stated they were going to develop a draft law on PMCs to legalize their activities [1]. Despite the ban, PMCs have been used for a long time, providing legal services, and conducting training on tactical medicine or training on legal weapons. However, a wider range of possible activities is banned by the Criminal Code of Ukraine, and PMCs can be seen as mercenaries [1, 2]. At the same time, there are paramilitary NGOs which allegedly are supported by the current minister of the interior as well as some MPs. They may be used during election campaigns [3]. There are also allegations that former combatants join organized crime networks [4]. Ukraine co-drafted the Montreux Document, but there is no information on its implementation [5].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

PMCs are illegal in Ukraine. Those businesses which provide training on tactical medicine or training on legal weapons are subject to the same financial, and other types of control as all other businesses in Ukraine.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

PMCs are illegal in Ukraine. Following the Russian aggression, Ukraine not only announced mobilization but also created volunteer battalions [1]. Sometime after their engagement in combat, allegations were brought up that volunteer battalions could be used by oligarchs for their own private goals [2]. Ukraine, therefore, incorporated all volunteer battalions into the formal structures of the AFU or within Police [3].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

The UAE is not a signatory to the Montreaux document, which is an agreement about the use of private military and security companies in war zones (1). The UAE’s position concerning the Montreaux document demonstrates its interest in not regulating the use of private military contractors. There is only one federal law that partially governs PMCs; Federal Law No. 37 of 2006 regulates the setting up and licensing of PMCs, but the law includes no information or regulations in relation to corruption (2). The policy lacks regulations about the procedure for selecting PMCs, criteria for dealing with PMCs which have been convicted of corruption, and provisions for contract language which enables the state to fire PMCs for offences or violations. The policy also lacks information on how these PMCs could be contracted and overseen (3), (4).

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Whereas there are barely any policies that imposing restrictions on the use of private military contractors and intermediaries, laws within the UAE contain provisions for oversight of PMCs but these laws are weak, and scrutiny is not undertaken in a meaningful way. There is only one regulation that specifically deals with PMCs, and that is Federal Law No. 37 of 2006 On Private Security Companies (1), (2), (3). This law; however, does not provide a proper policy for regulating the work of PMCs and is mainly concerned with the minimum standards for operation. It is important to take into consideration that PMCs as private companies are also regulated by other laws such as those related to Labour Laws and Human Resources (4), (5), (6), (7).

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

There are no restrictions on the use of private military contractors in the UAE. In this context, as private military contractors are not governed by clear policies, an assessment of the enforcement of policies is irrelevant in this context.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

UK PMCs are not formally regulated by the government, as the Private Security Act 2001 [1] applies only to domestic companies. The UK Government has struggled with the question of how to regulate PMCs effectively. The FCO published a Green Paper in 2002 [2] and has consulted on the issue since but has not made substantial progress toward establishing a system of regulation.

The MoD has developed a set of procedures to ensure PMC activity is broadly consistent with its existing obligations. JSP 567 is the main reference document which outlines the MODs usage of Private Security Contractors and how it ensures it remains compliant with the International Committee of the Red Cross initiative and the Montreux Document [3]. Government reviewer for the 2015 assessment (see below) states: “The process for approving the use of Private Security Contractors (PSC) either directly or by contractors is managed through a 2-Star (senior level staff) PSC Committee. There is a requirement to consider procedures to monitor the use of PSCs, both those directly contracted by MOD and those sub-contracted by contractors to MOD, including the investigation of any allegations of misconduct. As a signatory of the Montreux Document, and a state contracting with PSCs, the UK may also be under a legal obligation to investigate and prosecute allegations of wrongdoing by PSCs.”

A system of PMC self-regulation exists but this does not appear to be robust. Some UK PMCs participate in a government backed self-regulation initiative convened in Switzerland. The UK, US, Swedish, Australian and Swiss governments were the founding signatories to the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers (ICoC). ICoC is a voluntary measure to which PMCs can sign up to and apply to be certified as meeting a criteria of professional standards. The ICoC is supported by a “global oversight mechanism, named the ICoC Association (ICoCA)”, which is a not-for-profit based in Geneva and launched in September 2013. ICoCA’s Board of Directors is drawn from government, industry and civil society. The organisation is tasked with certifying and monitoring PMCs and developing standards of practice. It is unclear how ICoCA will monitor PMCs effectively, whether it has any enforcement powers and how or whether it will liaise with regulatory or prosecution offices in other states. ICoCA’s focus is on developing and raising standards but it appears to have no powers to enforce sanctions on non-compliant bodies. [4]

The MOD also has a policy on contractor support on operations (CSO). Whilst on deployed operations, CONDO (Contractors ON Deployed Operations) Personnel are subject to service discipline and this is designated as CSSD (Civilians Subject to Service Discipline) under Section 15[7] of the Armed Forces Act 2006 [5].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

UK PMCs are not formally regulated by the government, as the Private Security Act 2001 applies only to domestic companies [1]. The UK Government has struggled with the question of how to regulate PMCs effectively. The FCO published a Green Paper in 2002, and has consulted on the issue since but has not made substantial progress toward establishing a system of regulation [2].

The MoD has developed a set of procedures to ensure PMC activity is broadly consistent with its existing obligations. The government reviewer for the 2015 assessment states: ‘[t]he process for approving the use of Private Security Contractors (PSC) either directly or by contractors is managed through a 2-Star (senior level staff) PSC Committee. There is a requirement to consider procedures to monitor the use of PSCs, both those directly contracted by MOD and those sub-contracted by contractors to MOD, including the investigation of any allegations of misconduct. As a signatory of the Montreux Document, and a state contracting with PSCs, the UK may also be under a legal obligation to investigate and prosecute allegations of wrongdoing by PSCs’ [3].

A system of PMC self-regulation exists, but this does not appear to be robust. Some UK PMCs participate in a government-backed self-regulation initiative, convened in Switzerland. The UK, US, Swedish, Australian and Swiss governments were the founding signatories to the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers (ICoC). ICoC is a voluntary measure to which PMCs can sign up to and apply to be certified as meeting a criteria of professional standards.

The ICoC is supported by a ‘global oversight mechanism, named the ICoC Association (ICoCA)’, which is a not-for-profit based in Geneva and launched in September 2013. ICoCA’s Board of Directors is drawn from government, industry and civil society. The organisation is tasked with certifying and monitoring PMCs and developing standards of practice. It is unclear how ICoCA will monitor PMCs effectively, whether it has any enforcement powers, and how or whether it will liaise with regulatory or prosecution offices in other states. The ICoCA’s focus is on developing and raising standards, but it appears to have no powers to enforce sanctions on non-compliant bodies [4].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

UK PMCs are not formally regulated by the government, as the Private Security Act 2001 applies only to domestic companies [1]. The UK Government has struggled with the question of how to regulate PMCs effectively. The FCO published a Green Paper in 2002, and has consulted on the issue since but has not made substantial progress toward establishing a system of regulation [2].

The MoD has developed a set of procedures to ensure PMC activity is broadly consistent with its existing obligations. The government reviewer for the 2015 assessment (see below) states: ‘[t]he process for approving the use of Private Security Contractors (PSC) either directly or by contractors is managed through a 2-Star (senior level staff) PSC Committee. There is a requirement to consider procedures to monitor the use of PSCs, both those directly contracted by MOD and those sub-contracted by contractors to MOD, including the investigation of any allegations of misconduct. As a signatory of the Montreux Document, and a state contracting with PSCs, the UK may also be under a legal obligation to investigate and prosecute allegations of wrongdoing by PSCs’.

A system of PMC self-regulation exists, but this does not appear to be robust. Some UK PMCs participate in a government-backed self-regulation initiative, convened in Switzerland. The UK, US, Swedish, Australian and Swiss governments were the founding signatories to the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers (ICoC). ICoC is a voluntary measure to which PMCs can sign up to and apply to be certified as meeting a criteria of professional standards.

The ICoC is supported by a ‘global oversight mechanism, named the ICoC Association (ICoCA)’, which is a not-for-profit based in Geneva and launched in September 2013. ICoCA’s Board of Directors is drawn from government, industry and civil society. The organisation is tasked with certifying and monitoring PMCs and developing standards of practice. It is unclear how ICoCA will monitor PMCs effectively, whether it has any enforcement powers, and how or whether it will liaise with regulatory or prosecution offices in other states. The ICoCA’s focus is on developing and raising standards, but it appears to have no powers to enforce sanctions on non-compliant bodies.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. There is no statute which prohibits the use of private military contractors in the United States. The terms ‘Private Military Companies’ (PMCs) or ‘Private Military Security Companies’ (PMSCs) are not frequently used in government legislation or policy. Moreover, the US does not have a singular approach to regulating the contracting of PSCs on the ground in overseas contexts. Instead, it has multiple approaches, and each agency/department has their own requirements that are applied to security contractors on the ground [1]. For example, there is a DoD instruction that regulates ‘Operational Contract Support’, which would include the activities of PMCs. This instruction mandates the contractor actions to incorporate the appropriate contingency management processes during operations and comply with applicable US, international and local laws [2]. All contractors authorised to accompany the force (CAAF) are subject to the US Code ‘The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000’ (MEJA), which extends US federal criminal jurisdiction to certain defence contractor personnel for offences committed outside US territory [3]. CAAFs are subject to the ‘Geneva Conventions Accompanying the Force’ and are required to carry identification and receive training by the DoD. According to the DoD instruction on ‘Operational Contract Support’, contingency contractor personnel are only authorised to use force for individual self-defence [2].

Further, Instruction 3020.50 on ‘Private Security Contractors’ (PSCs) regulates the accountability, training, equipping and conduct of personnel performing private security functions during military operations [4]. PSCs must meet the legal, training and qualification requirements to carry a weapon. Where a PSC discharges their weapon, is injured or killed, injures or kills another individual or destroys property and where other active non-lethal measures are taken, this must be reported in accordance with the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) [4,5]. Furthermore, PSCs are specifically prohibited from engaging in offensive combat and any mercenary activities [6]. The United States is signatory to the Montreux Document and the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Services Providers, however, neither of these are legally binding [7,8]. There is a grey area around PSCs in the State Department as they are not covered by MEJA. For example, contractor personnel involved in incidents in Abu Ghraib prison were not held accountable for committed crimes because MEJA did not extend to them based on their contract with the State Department [1,9].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. Contractors are managed by the Defense Contracting Management Agency (DCMA), however, they do not report to Congress [1,2]. In 2008, an independent commission was established by Congress with the specific manadate of examining waste, fraud, abuse and accountability in contingency contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Commission’s report was published in 2011 [3]. According to this report, between $31-60 billion was lost to contract waste and fraud in contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) does provide some scrutiny of private security companies, however, the most recent report on PSCs was published in 2009. This report made six recommendations to the DoD, five of which were not implemented [4]. Beyond this, it is very unclear who conducts scrutiny over the activities of PSCs and PMCs.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. During the Iraq and Afghanistan operations, contractors accounted for more than 50% of the total military force in-country [1], suggesting a dependence on contractors by the DoD. This statistic is not disaggregated to provide information on the number of PSCs/PMCs. Congress does not consider contractors to be troops and contractors therefore do not count against troop-level caps [2].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. There are no regulatory restrictions on the use of private military companies or contractors. In previous years Venezuela has participated in some of the UN discussions on developing regulations to govern the actions and practices of such companies [1]; however, there has been no indication that the resulting positions of these talks have been included in the country’s legislation. In addition, Venezuela has not signed the Montreux Document.

In 2019, reports indicated the presence in Venezuela of officers from the Russian military company Wagner, said to be participating in secret operations on behalf of Russia and as a reinforcement for Maduro’s security during the ongoing political crisis [2]. However, there is insufficient information to verify these allegations, as well as no evidence of activity by private military contractors in the country in previous years.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. No formal mechanisms for the scrutiny of Russian contractors’ activities are recorded in Venezuela. Even the National Assembly Defence Committee does not receive any information on the proven presence of or allegations about private military contractors in the country [1].

Reports from civil organisations that are experts in the field of Venezuelan defence and security indicate that there is total ignorance of the actions carried out by contractors such as Rosoboronexport and of the recent reports about the Wagner company [2]. Information on training received by military forces from these contractors on the handling of defence equipment is rarely announced in the press, and the legislature has no knowledge of the agreements and contracts signed with these companies [3].

Recently, complaints about the prsence of contractors from Wagner, in the face of press reporting that denounced this information [4], the Maduro government has not made any announcements to respond to these accusations. Nevertheless, Russian government spokespeople have denied sending officials of this military company to Venezuela [5].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. Venezuela has no regulations that prohibit or regulate the hiring of private military companies; however, the obligations set forth in the constitution to report to the legislature and to allow the external monitoring of contracts entered into by the Ministry of the People’s Power for Defence (MPPD) [1, 2] are being contravened. As such, the presence of these companies in the country raises questions about irregular activity [3].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. There is no law which guides or prohibits the use of PMCs.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. There is no law which guides or prohibits the use of PMCs.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. There is no law which guides or prohibits the use of PMCs.