Political Risk:
Moderate
Score:
55/100
Defence and Security Policy and Policy Transparency
Q1
58/100
Is there formal provision for effective and independent legislative scrutiny of defence policy?
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The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (the Parliament of Ukraine) is the sole legislative power in Ukraine [1], and it has a monopoly over approving…
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The VRU regularly approves laws on security and defence. One of the latest examples is the Law of Ukraine № 2268-19 “On the peculiarities…
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The president ensures the national security [1] of Ukraine, and has the most effective legislative initiative since 73% of all draft laws introduced by…
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Q2
42/100
Does the country have an identifiable and effective parliamentary defence and security committee (or similar such organisations) to exercise oversight?
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The Law of Ukraine [1] ensures that parliamentary committees and special commissions only have the power to analyse the progress of implementation of laws…
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The Committee on National Security and Defence is comprised of 13 MPs, eight of which have experience in being engaged with the defence and…
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All fundamental laws on defence and security have been amended in recent years, these amendments took place as a response to the Russian aggression…
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In 2015-2017 the committee had 30 meetings on average each year [1]. In 2017, committee members initiated one amendment to the Budget of Ukraine…
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According to corresponding reports, the committee did not conduct any long-term investigations on current activities. Nor did it commission any external body to do…
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The committee asked the Prime Minister of Ukraine to ensure the proper preparation of draft laws before submitting them to the VRU [1]. But…
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Q3
56/100
Is the country’s national defence policy or national security strategy debated and publicly available?
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The main defence policies and security strategy are debated by the executive, the president, the legislature and the public, although the latter three seem…
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In their debates around the defence policies and security strategy in Ukraine the executive, the president, the VRU and the public address issues such…
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There is a lack of evidence that the government holds formal, regular public consultations on defence policy and security strategy; main defence policies come…
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The main defence policies and security strategy are easily available on the VRU and President of Ukraine official websites. However, there are exceptions such…
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Q4
75/100
Do defence and security institutions have a policy, or evidence, of openness towards civil society organisations (CSOs) when dealing with issues of corruption?
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The Law of Ukraine [1] provides that activities of the AFU and other defence institutions and law enforcement bodies (if the information is not…
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Although citizens of Ukraine have constitutional rights to freedom from accusations [1] and freedom of expression [2], there is evidence that CSOs are under…
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The MoD has experience cooperating with anti-corruption CSOs, including Transparency International Ukraine, the Independent Defence Anti-corruption Committee (NAKO), and the Norwegian Center for Integrity…
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Q5
25/100
Has the country signed up to the following international anti-corruption instruments: UNCAC and the OECD Convention?
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Q6
75/100
Is there evidence of regular, active public debate on issues of defence? If yes, does the government participate in this debate?
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Razumkov Centre and DCAF are the CSOs conducting roundtables and seminars on defence and security issues regularly involving academics, journalists, opinion-formers and CSOs as…
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There is evidence that government representatives (MoD, NSDC and state-owned defence enterprise officials) engage in discussion with the public on the issues of defence…
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Q7
88/100
Does the country have an openly stated and effectively implemented anti-corruption policy for the defence sector?
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There is an Anticorruption strategy adopted by the CMU and aims to create an effective national system of prevention and counteraction of corruption [1].…
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The anti-corruption action plan at the level of the MoD is Annexe 1 to the MOD Anticorruption programme for 2015-2017 [1]. Annexe 1 also…
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Q8
50/100
Are there independent, well-resourced, and effective institutions within defence and security tasked with building integrity and countering corruption?
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There are several units responsible for combatting corruption within the MOD. First, the Corruption Prevention and Combating Bureau. The Bureau coordinates and supervises the…
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The Corruption Prevention and Combating Bureau is subordinate to the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine [1]. The Internal Audit Department is also subordinate to…
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NABU can be seen as one of the effective authorities tasked with combatting corruption; it also one of the first state authorities to investigate…
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Q9
NS/100
Does the public trust the institutions of defence and security to tackle the issue of bribery and corruption in their establishments?
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This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. According to recent polls, Ukrainian citizens consider corruption the biggest problem of the country,…
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Q10
75/100
Are there regular assessments of the areas of greatest corruption risk for ministry and armed forces personnel, and are the findings used as inputs to the anti-corruption policy?
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There is evidence of the MoD given the task to conduct corruption risk assessments [1], and the MoD calling civil society organisations to participate…
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There are regular (once every three years) fundamental assessments of the areas of corruption risk for the MoD and the AFU. For instance, the…
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The risk assessment findings are used to develop and regularly update the MoD anti-corruption policy [1]. Thus, for instance, the MoD drafts and adopts…
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Defence Budgets
Q11
58/100
Does the country have a process for acquisition planning that involves clear oversight, and is it publicly available?
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The MoD generally conducts two types of procurement: open and classified. If the information on a particular good or service is classified (battle tanks,…
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Information on the process of classified defence acquisitions is classified itself including the information on the justification of purchases, timelines and outcomes. At the…
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There is a lack of evidence of external oversight over defence acquisitions, although there is oversight, particularly over procurements in place. If referring to…
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Q12
75/100
Is the defence budget transparent, showing key items of expenditure? And it is provided to the legislature in a timely fashion?
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The government made some steps for more financial predictability and stability. On January 31, 2018, the Cabinet of Ministers adopted changes to the Budget…
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In 2015, the government started a good practice of introducing draft laws on the annual State Budget in two and a half months prior…
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Q13
75/100
Is there a legislative committee (or other appropriate body) responsible for defence budget scrutiny and analysis in an effective way?
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Q14
67/100
Is the approved defence budget made publicly available? In practice, can citizens, civil society, and the media obtain detailed information on the defence budget?
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The State Budget of Ukraine for 2018 (as well as its defence clauses) are published each year after its adoption (as well as the…
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The State Budget of Ukraine for 2018 (as well as its defence clauses) is fully disclosed for the public and regularly published [1]. Defence…
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There is no particular evidence on information requests regarding the defence budget. In 2017, however, the MoD received and processed more than 1100 information…
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Q15
67/100
Are sources of defence income other than from central government allocation (from equipment sales or property disposal, for example) published and scrutinised?
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The annual laws on the State Budget of Ukraine contain information on all budget revenues by type of revenue, amounts received, and include all…
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The State Audit Service conducts the external financial control [1] as well as the Accounting Chamber, which also conducts the financial control of classified…
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Generally, information about public scrutiny of defence income is absent in the open sources in Ukraine. There is some evidence of public scrutiny of…
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Q16
69/100
Is there an effective internal audit process for defence ministry expenditure (that is, for example, transparent, conducted by appropriately skilled individuals, and subject to parliamentary oversight)?
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The Internal Audit Department is an internal MoD unit that audits the financial and material resources of the MoD to prevent the illegal and…
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With 64 bn. UAH, the MoD budget for 2017 [1, 2], the Internal Audit Department managed to audit 81 bn. UAH worth of assets…
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There is no evidence for anticorruption CSOs being provided with internal audit reports; however, the Internal Audit Department regularly publishes general findings and statistics…
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Implementation of the Internal Audit Department’s recommendations in 2016 made before the adoption of management decisions provided additional income and prevented unnecessary costs of…
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Q17
50/100
Is there effective and transparent external auditing of military defence expenditure?
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Ukrainian legislation has provisions on two authorities conducting auditing and monitoring of defence expenditure. Namely, the State Audit Service which conducts external financial control…
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The State Audit Service carries out the external financial control function on behalf of the Government and is under to the CMU (the CMU…
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Both the State Audit Service [1] and the Accounting Chamber [2] proactively publish their findings online, activities reports [3, 4] as well as their…
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Both the State Audit Service [1] and the Accounting Chamber [2] proactively publish updates on the state of implementation of their recommendations including both…
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Nexus of Defence and National Assets
Q18
40/100
Is there evidence that the country’s defence institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation and, if so, are these interests publicly stated and subject to scrutiny?
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Defence institutions are not prohibited from having controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with Ukraine’s natural resource exploitation. For instance, the MoD is…
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There are instances of the MoD being involved in businesses related to country`s national resource exploitation, but these are MOD legal activities with the…
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Defence personnel are prohibited (except for servicemen of regular military service and cadets) from engaging in other paid (except for teaching, scientific and creative…
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According to a publicly available list [1] of all enterprises owned by the state, the MoD runs 118 enterprises, including those on the temporarily…
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MoD enterprises, including those related to Ukraine’s national resource exploitation, are subject to public scrutiny [1]. There is no evidence of parliamentary scrutiny of…
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Organised Crime
Q19
50/100
Is there evidence, for example through media investigations or prosecution reports, of a penetration of organised crime into the defence and security sector? If no, is there evidence that the government is alert and prepared for this risk?
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According to 2015 data, the most common violations amongst servicemen was unauthorized retirement or service – 63.3% [1]. The Military Law-Enforcement Service stated there…
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The government is aware of the possibility of organised crime in the defence sector [1] and declares its will to take corresponding actions [2].…
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Q20
67/100
Is there policing to investigate corruption and organised crime within the defence services and is there evidence of the effectiveness of this policing?
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There are three authorities authorised to combat corruption and organized crime within the defence service: the Military Law-Enforcement Service [1], Security Service of Ukraine…
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There are reasons to doubt the independence of the Security Service of Ukraine [1] since the Security Service of Ukraine is under the control…
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There is no strong evidence of undue political influence on the NABU; it investigates cases of high ranking military officers being involved in corruption…
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Control of Intelligence Services
Q21
50/100
Are the policies, administration, and budgets of the intelligence services subject to effective and independent oversight?
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The VRU Committee on National Security and Defence is only authorized to provide legislative support of the security services, intelligence and counterintelligence activities [1].…
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The MPs, including members of the VRU Committee on National Security and Defence, have access to classified information at all levels of secrecy, which…
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Q22
25/100
Are senior positions within the intelligence services filled on the basis of objective selection criteria, and are appointees subject to investigation of their suitability and prior conduct?
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There are four executive bodies in Ukraine whose activities are related to intelligence: Security Service of Ukraine (due to its counter-intelligence powers), MOD Main…
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The President of Ukraine has a decisive influence on the SSU activities [1], appointments to the service [2] as well as on the appointments…
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There is not enough information to score this indicator. There is no publicly available information on the investigation of candidates by external parties (besides…
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Export Controls
Q23
25/100
Does the government have a well-scrutinised process for arms export decisions that aligns with Articles 7.1.iv, 11.5, and 15.6 of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)?
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Ukraine signed the ATT; however, it has not ratified it yet [1]. Ukraine is a major arms exporter [25] and has its own export…
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Ukraine signed the ATT; however, it has not ratified it, yet [1].
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Upcoming arms exports are not debated in the VRU, although sometimes MPs touch on issues of arms export and export control [1, 2]. Some…
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Lobbying in Defence
Ukraine failed to develop and to approve legislation on lobbying and the country does not regulate these kinds of activities. Several expert institutions in…
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This indicator is marked Not Applicable given that lobbying is not regulated in Ukraine, and there is no requirement to disclose lobbyist meetings at…
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This indicator is marked Not Applicable given that Ukraine has neither has a legal framework for lobbying, nor any mandatory or voluntary registration system…
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This indicator is marked Not Applicable given that there is no legal framework regulating lobbyist activities and there is also no oversight entity in…
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