Political Risk:

High

Score:

48/100

Defence and Security Policy and Policy Transparency

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Q1 58/100

Is there formal provision for effective and independent legislative scrutiny of defence policy?

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Formal rights Score: 50 / 100
Parliament has sought an active role in the scrutiny and formulation of defence and security policies, but its functions have been restricted by legislative…
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Effectiveness Score: 25 / 100
Although the legislature has sought an active role in the National System of Defence, it has only partially succeeded in its attempt to be…
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Independent legislature scrutiny Score: 100 / 100
Notwithstanding Chile’s traditionally dominant executive branch [1, 2], Congress has been able to perform its duties with autonomy and relative effectiveness [3]. Legislators in…
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Q2 29/100

Does the country have an identifiable and effective parliamentary defence and security committee (or similar such organisations) to exercise oversight?

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Formal rights Score: 50 / 100
The two chambers of Congress both have a permanent Committee of National Defence (“Comisiones de Defensa Nacional”), in charge of studying and debating the…
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Expertise Score: 0 / 100
While in a comparative regional perspective, the Chilean Congress has been qualified as effective and professionalised [1], the evidence points to the absence of…
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Responsive policymaking Score: 0 / 100
Although Congress is considered a key actor in the policymaking process in Chile, there is a consensus among scholars that the attributions of Chile’s…
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Short-term oversight Score: 50 / 100
Permanent committees on defence meet regularly, two times per month, on average [1, 2]. Members of defence committees examine and elaborate amendments on drafts…
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Long-term oversight Score: 50 / 100
While the standing National Defence Committee in both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies are charged with reviewing day-to-day policies and issues in…
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Institutional outcomes Score: 25 / 100
There is no clear evidence incorporation of recommendations made by the Standing Committees of Defence and Special Commission of Inquiry in Congress. In part,…
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Q3 44/100

Is the country’s national defence policy or national security strategy debated and publicly available?

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Scope of involvement Score: 50 / 100
The scope of participation in the country’s defence policy or security strategy is almost always limited to formal consultation within the legislative process and…
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Scope of debate Score: 50 / 100
While there is a regular discussion of defence issues in the permanent Commission of National Defence in both the Senate and the Chamber of…
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Public consultations Score: 50 / 100
Based on dispositions in the 2010 Law of Citizen Participation [1], in 2015, the MDN created a Civil Society Council (COSOC) for the defence…
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Transparency Score: 25 / 100
Documents and reports on the defence and policy strategy are hardly available to the public for scrutiny and debate. The National Book of Defence…
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Q4 58/100

Do defence and security institutions have a policy, or evidence, of openness towards civil society organisations (CSOs) when dealing with issues of corruption?

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Policy of openness Score: 50 / 100
The Ministry of National Defence (MDN) has a policy of participation toward civil society organisations (CSOs) based on the dispositions in the Law of…
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CSO protections Score: 75 / 100
Chileans have the right to open and free private discussion, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) form and operate without interference [1]. However, journalists may face…
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Practice of openness Score: 50 / 100
The MDN and the armed forces have a limited policy of openness toward civil society, mainly based on the Civil Society Council as well…
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Q5 75/100

Has the country signed up to the following international anti-corruption instruments: UNCAC and the OECD Convention?

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Signatory and Ratification status Score: 100 / 100
The country signed (December 2003) and ratified (September 2006) the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) and the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention (2001). Chile is…
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Compliance Score: 50 / 100
The report of the Implementation Review Group of the UNCAC for the period 2010-2015 highlighted that legal reforms adopted were in the direction of…
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Q6 38/100

Is there evidence of regular, active public debate on issues of defence? If yes, does the government participate in this debate?

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Public debate Score: 25 / 100
Outside of state agencies, the public debate on defence and security issues has been discontinuous and shaped by specific controversies, namely: the controversy between…
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Government engagement in public discourse Score: 50 / 100
The instances of government engagement in public discourse show the continuation of the traditional culture of low public engagement in the strategic planning of…
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Q7 88/100

Does the country have an openly stated and effectively implemented anti-corruption policy for the defence sector?

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Anti-corruption policy Score: 100 / 100
The anti-corruption policy in the defence sector derives from different legal bodies in government and the Agenda on Probity and Transparency in the defence…
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Effective implementation Score: 75 / 100
The MDN established an action plan with five pillars [1]. Each pillar has been addressed through specific actions and policies regulated through Exempt Resolutions…
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Q8 42/100

Are there independent, well-resourced, and effective institutions within defence and security tasked with building integrity and countering corruption?

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Mandate and resources Score: 50 / 100
While some compliance and ethics units have been identified in the defence sector, there are important weaknesses in their mandate and little evidence of…
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Independence Score: 25 / 100
The internal units in the MDN and the armed forces lack sufficient independence, for they are integrated by members that are in the chain…
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Effectiveness Score: 50 / 100
There is no evidence that institutions of internal control and audits within the Ministry of National Defence are thoroughly staff and trained to tackle…
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Q9 NS/100

Does the public trust the institutions of defence and security to tackle the issue of bribery and corruption in their establishments?

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Score: NS / 100
This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. Public opinion on the defence sector’s commitment to combat bribery and corruption has been…
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Q10 50/100

Are there regular assessments of the areas of greatest corruption risk for ministry and armed forces personnel, and are the findings used as inputs to the anti-corruption policy?

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Risk assessments Score: 50 / 100
There is some evidence of assessments of risks of corruption within the defence sector, but efforts are recent, and there is still no evidence…
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Regularity Score: 50 / 100
While there is no specific regularity for an overall risk assessment in the sector, the MDN established by-annual revisions to the Special Registry of…
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Inputs to anti-corruption policy Score: 50 / 100
There are specific cases that evidence the implementation of risks assessments and the elaboration of risks matrixes in institutions of defence and the armed…
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Defence Budgets

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Q11 42/100

Does the country have a process for acquisition planning that involves clear oversight, and is it publicly available?

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Acquisition planning process Score: 50 / 100
The development of a process for the acquisition planning cycle in defence is recent. Experts have identified many inflexibilities in the decision-making process, which…
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Transparency Score: 25 / 100
There is limited access to accurate, detailed and timely information on the procurement planning process in the armed forces. The information for the acquisition…
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External oversight Score: 50 / 100
The oversight function of the elaboration and implementation of acquisition plans in the armed forces and El Estado Mayor Conjunto (EMCO) (Joint Chiefs of…
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Q12 50/100

Is the defence budget transparent, showing key items of expenditure? And it is provided to the legislature in a timely fashion?

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Comprehensiveness Score: 50 / 100
The defence budget contains multiple components, with unequal degrees of transparency on each of them. The budget component that pertains to the General Budget…
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Timeliness Score: 50 / 100
The fiscal year in Chile goes from January 1st to December 31st. According to the Budget Cycle in the Public Sector, every year, on…
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Q13 50/100

Is there a legislative committee (or other appropriate body) responsible for defence budget scrutiny and analysis in an effective way?

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Formal rights Score: 50 / 100
The annual budget proposal for the defence sector is debated in Congress in a Special Budget Commission formed by members of the Senate and…
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Influence on decision-making Score: 50 / 100
Although there are formal instances in which Congress and the defence committees can review and analyse the budget proposals for the defence sector, in…
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Q14 50/100

Is the approved defence budget made publicly available? In practice, can citizens, civil society, and the media obtain detailed information on the defence budget?

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Proactive publication Score: 50 / 100
The Direccion de Presupuestos de Chile (DIPRES) publishes annual budgets for the Ministry of National Defence (MDN) and each of the branches of the…
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Comprehensiveness Score: 50 / 100
The vast majority of the approved defence budget that belongs to the Budget Law of the Public Sector is fully disclosed by the Budget…
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Response to information requests Score: 50 / 100
Information requested by citizens, media, and civil society concerning the defence budget, expenditures, and acquisitions is guaranteed by the Law of Access to Public…
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Q15 33/100

Are sources of defence income other than from central government allocation (from equipment sales or property disposal, for example) published and scrutinised?

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Transparency Score: 50 / 100
There are at least six secondary sources of funding, which, taken together, account for about five per cent of the total budget: the Revolving…
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Institutional scrutiny Score: 50 / 100
Mechanisms of scrutiny for defence income performed by the General Comptroller (CGR), which is in charge of the external audit of the defence income…
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Public scrutiny Score: 0 / 100
The public scrutiny of non-central government sources of funding for the defence sector has found formidable obstacles. This has to do with the “restricted”…
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Q16 56/100

Is there an effective internal audit process for defence ministry expenditure (that is, for example, transparent, conducted by appropriately skilled individuals, and subject to parliamentary oversight)?

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Activity Score: 75 / 100
The Internal Audit Unit engages actively in the reviewing of ministry expenditures and there is a formalized process for this. However, institutional outcomes based…
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Enabling oversight Score: 50 / 100
After two legal cases involving irregular payments to arguably false invoices for military acquisitions and services (Causa Rol N°575-2014 and Causa RUC N°1400687387-2), the…
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External scrutiny Score: 50 / 100
The external scrutiny of the audit process is performed regularly by the CAIGG. The MDN, through the sub-secretary for the armed forces, submits to…
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Institutional outcomes Score: 50 / 100
Since the last corruption scandals, the MDN has highlighted the implementation of internal audit processes [1]. However, the analysis of the institutional outcomes in…
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Q17 69/100

Is there effective and transparent external auditing of military defence expenditure?

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Activity Score: 75 / 100
In the last decade, there has been an increasing importance of developing mechanisms of control and external audit in budget execution in the public…
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Independence Score: 100 / 100
External audit units work with important degrees of autonomy. The CGR is an autonomous superior oversight body of the state administration with a constitutional…
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Transparency Score: 50 / 100
The external audit information is proactively posted online on the CGR website [1]. The search engine allows the public to specify the type of…
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Institutional outcomes Score: 50 / 100
Commentators point out that, before 2008, the external audits of the armed and security forces was almost nil [1]. Since the last wave of…
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Nexus of Defence and National Assets

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Q18 40/100

Is there evidence that the country’s defence institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation and, if so, are these interests publicly stated and subject to scrutiny?

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Legal framework Score: 0 / 100
Neither the Organic Law that Regulates the Armed Forces (Law 18.948) nor the Military Justice Code [1] establishes restrictions on the defence institutions that…
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Defence institutions: Financial or controlling interests in practice Score: 75 / 100
Although defence institutions do not have control over businesses related to the country’s natural resource exploitation, there is an indirect financial interest linked to…
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Individual defence personnel: Financial or controlling interests in practice Score: 100 / 100
Although there were institutionalised financial interests that linked resources for military maintenance and acquisitions in the armed forces with the profits of the state-owned…
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Transparency Score: 0 / 100
Despite several attempts at increasing transparency, details of operations and resource expenditures related to the military remain secret and are expected to continue this…
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Scrutiny Score: 25 / 100
There exists some parliamentary and public scrutiny of financial interests in the armed forces, but these instances have not been systematic, and they have…
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Organised Crime

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Q19 63/100

Is there evidence, for example through media investigations or prosecution reports, of a penetration of organised crime into the defence and security sector? If no, is there evidence that the government is alert and prepared for this risk?

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Penetration of organised crime Score: 50 / 100
During Chile’s military dictatorship, there was an “opacity” that served to cover corruption within the military sector [1, 2], with cases of incipient penetration…
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Government response Score: 75 / 100
The awareness of the government concerning the possibility of organised crime in defence and security has translated into an increase of control in cases…
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Q20 0/100

Is there policing to investigate corruption and organised crime within the defence services and is there evidence of the effectiveness of this policing?

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Existence of policing function Score: 0 / 100
There is no evidence of a specific unit within the national police force or the military police that deals with organised crime and corruption…
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Independence Score: NA / 100
This indicator has been marked ‘Not Applicable’, as there is no evidence of a specific unit within the national police force or the military…
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Effectiveness Score: NA / 100
This indicator has been marked ‘Not Applicable’, as there is no evidence of a specific unit within the national police force or the military…
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Control of Intelligence Services

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Q21 50/100

Are the policies, administration, and budgets of the intelligence services subject to effective and independent oversight?

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Independence Score: 50 / 100
The intelligence services in Chile are organised in the National State System of Intelligence (SIE). In 2004, new legislation organised and ruled this system…
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Effectiveness Score: 50 / 100
Although formal provisions for independent oversight exist, their effectiveness is limited. The Commission for the Control of the State Intelligence System has access to…
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Q22 8/100

Are senior positions within the intelligence services filled on the basis of objective selection criteria, and are appointees subject to investigation of their suitability and prior conduct?

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Objective selection criteria Score: 0 / 100
The system of state intelligence is formed by the National Agency of Intelligence (ANI), the Directorate of Defence Intelligence of the El Estado Mayor…
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Selection bias Score: 25 / 100
There is a great deal of opacity surrounding the selection and appointment of candidates. Scholars have observed poor articulation of the intelligence system in…
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Vetting process Score: 0 / 100
There is no evidence of investigation of individuals’ suitability for the directive body. If it exists, information about it is considered secret and denied…
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Export Controls

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Q23 67/100

Does the government have a well-scrutinised process for arms export decisions that aligns with Articles 7.1.iv, 11.5, and 15.6 of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)?

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Signatory and Ratification Score: 100 / 100
Chile signed up the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) in June 2013 and ratified it in May 2018 [1, 2]. In January 2019, the Ministry…
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Compliance Score: 100 / 100
According to the Chilean National Report on the implementation of the Programme of Action on weapons and the International Tracing Instrument [1], the country…
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Parliamentary scrutiny Score: 0 / 100
Congress does not have an explicit role in the approval of exports of weapons and arms. Instead, the MDN has an Advisory Committee on…
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Lobbying in Defence

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Q76 56/100

Does the country regulate lobbying of defence institutions?

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Legal framework Score: 100 / 100
In March 2014, after ten years of the corruption scandals that gave rise to a political agreement to modernize the public administration and enhance…
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Disclosure: Public officials Score: 50 / 100
The Chilean legislation is unique in the sense that it established not one but five registers to enhance transparency in public institutions signalled in…
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Lobbyist registration system Score: 25 / 100
According to the legislation, each institution where lobbying operates must generate a Register of Lobbyists and Managers of Private Interests [1]. Lobbyists, managers of…
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Oversight & enforcement Score: 50 / 100
The Chilean legislation [1] has been deemed “exigent” due to its specific sanctions for faults and omissions [2]. However, some authors have highlighted the…
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