There is no obligation on defence and security institutions to establish permanent consultations with civil society organizations for information sharing purposes [1]. Therefore, there is no mechanism in place for this purpose. In practice; however, there is intelligent collaboration. CSOs rely on the principles of the right to information, transparency in public management and the right to citizen participation to engage with security and defence institutions, including on issues related to transparency and the fight against corruption [2]. CSOs – like the CAPE (Cadre d’Appui aux Processus Electoraux), WIPeS (Women Initiative for Peace and Security) etc. – use this way to collaborate with security institutions. They also maintain good relations with the military authorities to facilitate their collaboration [2]. Security institutions therefore remain open to collaboration with CSOs on these issues, but they sometimes pretend to be a defence secret in order not to share sensitive information [3].

In Benin, collaboration between defense and security forces and civil society on corruption issues is still limited and unstructured. In general, anti-corruption mechanisms in the security sector are mainly managed internally, through cells dedicated to integrity and the fight against corruption, which supervise operations, particularly in security maintenance missions peace. Civil society is not involved in these control and integrity mechanisms, although it can play a role of pressure or external observer. NGOs and civil society organizations, such as Social Watch Benin, work on transparency and good governance initiatives, but their influence remains indirect in the security sector. However they are still CSOs that can collaborate with security institutions.

According to Article 23 of the Beninese Constitution, freedom of expression is guaranteed for all people and/or institutions [1]. This same constitution guarantees, under the conditions laid down by law, freedom of association in general in Benin [2]. In practice, CSOs enjoy these freedoms and operate freely on the national territory. There is no evidence of interference or intimidation by the government. However, there has been a considerable decline in the activism of CSOs – such as FONAC (Front des organisations nationales contre la corruption) and ALCRER (Association de Lutte Contre le Racisme, l’Ethnocentrisme et le Racisme) – interested in the issue of corruption since 2016[3]. This “considerable decline” may be an indicator that CSOs no longer feel protected to engage in activism.

While evidence might not exist when it comes to traditional anti-corruption CSOs, there is ample evidence of intimidation and retaliation against journalists and media organizations. For instance, between 2020 and 2024, several journalists were imprisoned for their reporting. A journalist was arrested for reporting on allegations of extrajudicial killings by the police in Port-Novo, the capital city [4]. Several other cases have been reported on by the local and international media [5]. Additionally, several media outlets were forced to close. The most recent case was the Golfe TV outlet, which was forced into closinge its doors after its financial assets were frozen for a long period of time. The independent press group was accused of “apology for a coup d’état” after comments on the situation in neighboring Niger [6]. These incidents and many others might serve as a deterrent to CSOs that might otherwise be interested in anti-corruption activities in the defence and security sector.

CSOs have been able to work with defence and security institutions specifically on corruption issues, but not on a regular and in-depth basis [1]. In 2022, Social Watch Benin collaborated with the Ministry of the Interior and Public Security as part of a programme to support the fight against impunity and the strengthening of the rule of law in Benin. This has made it possible to put in place a Code of Integrity and Good Conduct for the Ministry’s staff [2].

There is no policy requiring openness to civil society organisations in the defence sector. [1] [2]

Civil society organisations are protected by law. Some have the courage to speak out on defence and security issues. However, since 2015, civil society organisations have been under constant threat of reprisals from government actors and in 2017, a law was passed introducing a fairly harsh operating regime that allows the government to interfere, particularly with the funding of civil society organisations. [1] [2] In 2018, the country experienced an NGO crisis, culminating in the suspension of 130 NGOs by the National Security Council for various reasons. In 2019, 93 NGOs were readmitted after being required to involve provincial governors in staff recruitment. In June 2019, the well-known human rights organization PARCEM was suspended by the government.[3]

Through the media, civil society organisations are trying to call on the government to be transparent on defence and security issues. The authorities are responding by asking civil society organisations to be careful about defence and security issues to avoid the risk of sowing unrest in the country [1] [2].

There is no open policy towards CSOs. However some CSOs actively address human rights violations such as extrajudicial killings and police brutality by security forces. When security issues are involved, CSOs face pressure from the government, which accuses them of lacking autonomy and of being agents of foreign influence, whether from foreign countries and partners.[1] A significant mistrust exists between security apparatus and the government towards the CSO. In short, there is no clear or established policy of the security apparatus towards CSOs regarding corruption and human rights violations. Nonetheless, in practice, some CSOs are active in human rights violations. In terms of corruption within the military, CSOs are very limited in activity, but they often report corruption in the police, gendarmerie and customs services. Some cases include bribery during police checks on drivers, or corruption in the recruitment of police officers, etc. Specifically, CSOs have highlighted corruption in the recruitment of army officers and soldiers within the defence sector, but seldone address corruption in the procurement or purchase of weapons. Returning to human rights, CSOs have been vocal in some instances, criticising abuses committed by the army and the separatists in the Anglophone regions. Notably, the Ngarbuh massacre was publicised by CSOs, who accused the Cameroonian army of murdering innocent people. The Cameroonian security institutions, which initially denied the facts, finally admitted them after the President of the Republic requested an investigation under pressure from international bodies.[2] Lastly, most of these NGOs effectively rely on support from international NGOs and foreigin partners. Finally, all operational and strategic documents are stamped “confidential”, “confidential-defence”, “Secret” or “Secret-defence”. There is no advisory commission on defence secrets, as is the case elsewhere, to give its opinion on the de-classification and communication of classified information.[2] In brief, there is no clear or known policy of the security apparatus towards CSOs concerning human rights violations.

The Cameroon constitution guarantees freedom of expression and protects to CSOs. However, some laws, such as the anti-terrorism law, restrict this freedom. Additionally, there is no specific protection for CSO members from the defence and security forces. Most critical CSOs face government pressure, especially their leaders and members. This has been the case for the leaders of groups like “Un monde à venir”, and “REDHAC”. The Ministry of Territorial Administration is the authorith to disband CSOs whose tone is not conciliatory towards the government,[1] and the prefects and subprefects often prohibit gatherings or demonstrations planned or organised by CSOs when those demonstrations do not support the government. Even intellectual debates organised by CSOs can be banned if participants criticise the government, as in 2015 with “La Grande palabre” [2]. In summary, CSOs lack administrative support, which is linked to the political context of an authoritarian State.[3] The subordination of the army to civilian democratic powers, often conveyed by general officers, is thus a force that explains the harmonious relationship between the security sector and the public political arena. conversely, civil society and the general public have an ambivalent relationship with the security forces. While the forces are seen as capable of fulfilling their duty to protect and promote human security, they are frequently critised for human rights and the disproportionate use of forces against civilians. This creates a symbolic distrust of a temporary nature, a factor shaping problematic yet evolving relations.

Defence and security institutions recognise the potential positive role of some civil society organisations, but their actions regarding corruption are limited. They mostlty operate in areas such as the protecting human rights, the managing humanitarian disasters, and the empowering women and girls, to name a few. The government often mobilises its affiliated media to undermine the public image of Anglophone separatists and staunch opposition leaders. For example, Vision 4, financed by the regime’s barons, considers the demonstrators to be terrorists and describes the leaders of the October 2016 protests by lawyers and teachers as secessionists.[1] On human rights issues, Civil Society Organisations have sometimes acted as a counterweight to government policy. Due to the sensitivity of corruption within Defence institutions, the government does not involve CSOs. The rare exceptions occur when the government wants to show it is fighting against corruption, such as police controls on drivers on the road.[2] Within Defence, the army usually asserts that it operates in accordance with general disciplinary regulations and misconducts are identified and penalties imposed based on the codes. The military court is responsible for punishing misconduct by military personnel.[3]

There is no known official or unofficial policy dedicated to CSOs working in the defence sector. Defence and security management has few links with other aspects of society. [1] [2] However, since early 2025, the Ministry of Defence has been supporting a think tank called the Abidjan Institute for the Economics of War (IGEA). [3]

The situation is ambiguous for CSOs, whose rights are recognised and respected depending on their proximity to the authorities. Some CSOs have access to important information that they can pass on, while others do not. Other CSOs suffer from the silence of the authorities or may fear coercive measures [1] [2]. An order adopted on 12 June 2024 has been criticised by members of Ivorian civil society, who see it as an obstacle to freedom of assembly and association. The government’s official objective is to combat terrorism and money laundering more effectively, but in reality, this order would allow the government to interfere in the accounts of CSOs by requesting special reports on their current activities and, ultimately, to dissolve associations. Furthermore, the order stipulates that there is no right of appeal in the event of dissolution [3] [4] [5].

The beginnings of collaboration between the government and CSOs can be seen in partnerships with organisations such as the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), Equal Access and other local organisations in the management of violent extremism in northern Côte d’Ivoire [1] [2]. Furthermore, since the beginning of 2025, the Ministry of Defence has been supporting a think tank called the Institute for the Economics of War in Abidjan (IGEA) [3]. However, issues related to corruption are not being addressed at this stage.

Notwithstanding their key role as “anti-corruption watchdogs,” there are no policies reflecting openness towards CSOs in the defence sector. Although this lack of policy is not unique to the defence sector, it is especially notable because the defence setup has been leveraged for other assignments outside the scope of their traditional roles of defence and deterrence. (1) This includes policing and a task force for addressing the phenomenon of illegal mining. Exposing defence institutions to potentially corruptible activities, without the monitoring spotlight provided by CSOs, can be challenging. (2) (3)

The environment for creating and operating a CSO in Ghana is liberal, relative to other countries in the region. Guaranteed by the freedoms enshrined in the 1992 constitution, CSOs enjoy an environment free from intimidation or harassment of any form. (1) (2) (3) (4)

Anchored in the burgeoning civil-military relations in the country, there have been some interactions between CSOs and Defence and Security Institutions. (1) Nevertheless, issues regarding corruption are handled by defence institutions outside the scope of their engagements with CSOs. (2)

While there is no formal or informal policy that requires openness towards Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in the defence sector, anecdotal evidence shows elements of collaboration with CSOs, especially around gender training, humanitarian activities, and tree planting [2]. The DOD also invites CSOs for pre-deployment briefings [2].

Interviews with two civil society members confirm that there is robust space for civil society groups to engage in multiple activities within Kenya. Despite threats and intimidation over political issues, the government has not actively attempted to close this space. However, a senior military officer noted the absence of any CSO working with the military to support protection initiatives [1].
Kenyan CSOs benefit from constitutional protections, such as the rights to freedom of expression and association, allowing them to operate openly without government interference. Article 37 of Kenya’s Constitution guarantees the right to peaceful assembly, including the right to assemble, demonstrate, and petition. However, attempts to roll back these freedoms have emerged recently. The Public Order Act governs public meetings, requiring organisers to notify authorities 3-14 days in advance for gatherings involving 10 or more people. The Act has notable flaws, including:
• No specified timeframe for authorities to respond to notifications.
• No official appeal process (though court challenges are possible).
Additionally, the Act prohibits spontaneous gatherings and restricts public meetings to between 6:00 am and 6:00 pm, banning multiple demonstrations in the same place and effectively outlawing counter-protests [2].
Collaborative research conducted by ARTICLE 19 Eastern Africa, HAKI Africa, the Kenya ICT Action Network (KICTANet), and the Centre for Human Rights and Policy Studies (CHRIPS)—with support from the Fund for Global Human Rights—highlights how Kenya’s government has used repressive national security and counterterrorism measures to erode critical rights, endanger civic space and human rights defenders, and contribute to widespread human rights violations [3].
Following recent anti-tax demonstrations, the government is investigating 16 CSOs, with the Ford Foundation among those under scrutiny [4]. Additionally, a bill introduced by Hon. Ruku seeks to grant police expansive powers to ban or disrupt demonstrations and impose harsh fines or jail terms on protesters [5].
The Cabinet Secretary for Interior has also proposed draft regulations under the Public Order Act to confine protests and demonstrations to designated areas [5]. CSOs have expressed concerns about the bill and the draft regulations, arguing that these measures could be used to limit Article 37 rights, crack down on legitimate protests, and shield police from accountability for human rights violations [6].

Defence and security institutions are open towards CSOs, but have infrequently or superficially worked on issues of corruption. The military does not engage with CSOs on corruption issues. They instead engage with the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission, whose mandate includes combating and preventing corruption and economic crime in Kenya through law enforcement, preventive measures, public education and promotion of standards and practices of integrity, ethics, and anti-corruption [1, 2].

The policy of openness outlines that matters of defence and security ought to be open and consultative. This policy of openness led to the establishment of the county security committees across Liberia’s fifteen political subdivisions. The National Security Strategy (NSA) calls for greater openness in the process of developing national priorities. It calls for nationwide consultation in determining the security and defence need of the society. Furthermore, it calls for country and district security councils to be established as a channel through which policy on security and defence can be utilised. The NSA also outlines that the drafting of national security priorities must not be limited to the security sector or regime alone, but rather it must include individuals, communities [civil society], ethnic and religious groups. The NSA laid out a popular vision for defence and security in post-war Liberia.[1][2]
However, the use of national security concern, a metaphor and the prerogative to be exclusive and discrete, have overwhelmed the process, making it almost impossible for policy of openness to be practiced.[3] As a result, the access to defence and national security issue remains the prerogative of elites and not the general public.

Numerous civil society groups and nongovernmental organizations (NGO), including human rights organisations, operate in the country. A National Aid and NGO policy was introduced in 2020 to improve the coordination of humanitarian aid in the country. CSOs are protected under Liberia’s association laws.[1][2] This entails the rights of freedom of expression/speech and freedom of association. The Independent Commission of National Human Rights is also in defence of the sector’s cultural and political rights.[3]
CSOs’ protection from government’s interference is guaranteed. Civil society operates without harassment or intimidation from the government. However, they don’t have full access to monitoring the defence and security sessions. The Independent National Commission on Human Rights (INCHR) conducts regular prison monitoring and generally has unrestricted access to civilian detention centers. However, access to military detention facilities, such as those within the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), is often denied.[4][5] This restriction hampers comprehensive oversight and raises concerns about transparency and accountability within military detention settings.

In the transition process of Liberia from the notion of regime security to human security, CSOs have played an active role in partnering with the government to engage the media and the public.[1] The defence sector has made notable progress in fostering openness by involving civil society in its activities. However, since the withdrawal of UN peacekeepers over six years ago, this space has gradually started to shrink.
Currently, there is a strong perception that partnership between civil society and the defence sector is weaker than it was during the period of the security sector reform process.[2]

The “Internal Anti-Corruption Policy” Plan adopted by the Ministry of National Defense indicates that in terms of education and anti-corruption mobilization, the ministry should engage civil society organizations in the process of education and awareness [1]. However, it would be a desire to comply with the national anti-corruption strategy, which requires each ministry to adopt a sectoral anti-corruption policy [1]. The procedure to follow is not indicated, and civil societies indicate that they have not been contacted by the defense forces either for consultation or for sharing information [2].

In Madagascar there is no coherent national policy on formalization and the role of civil society. There is also no mechanism for dialogue or even a legal framework obliging the State to inform civil society [1]. Civil society cannot fully play its role because all actions of inquiry are considered acts of a political nature [2]. For instance, in November 2022, the Executive Director of Transparency International-Initiative Madagascar was questioned by the judicial police for denouncing cases of corruption in a commercial matter. She was prosecuted for “slanderous denunciation, abusive denunciation, denigration and disorganization” [2]. Thus, the State does not hesitate to prosecute certain leaders of civil society by accusing them of acts of destabilization. Some were sentenced to long prison terms [3].

The activities of CSOs in the field of defense forces are minimal or even non-existent [1]. Certainly, the Minister of Defense’s anti-corruption plan considers it important to involve them, but CSOs have not always been invited by the military authorities. The ministry largely prefers to work with official institutions of the anti-corruption system such as Bianco [2].

There is no official policy requiring collaboration between defence and security institutions and CSOs. However, the National Security Sector Reform Strategy and its 2022-2024 Action Plan cites CSOs among security sector actors, particularly in the category of institutions responsible for supervision, control, and monitoring of security organisations. As part of the implementation of the security sector reform [1][2] and the national strategy for security sector reform and its action plan,[3] it is planned to work with CSOs at the municipal, regional and local levels within the security advisory councils. Civil society representatives are chosen, following the process, by the head of the local executive. This trend is likely to favour CSOs supported by or having a privileged link with the State, in particular the National Council of Civil Society (CNSC), the Coordination of Women’s Associations and NGOs of Mali (CAFO), the National Youth Council (CNJ), etc. Moreover, despite this reality, CSOs working on these issues try to get involved independently or, at times, in certain activities with the green light from the authorities. This is the case for the operationalisation of security advisory councils.[4]

The constitutions of 1992 and 2023, the transition charter, and various laws and policies guarantee the functioning of CSOs while regulating the nature of government interference. However, in recent times, we are witnessing a questioning of these freedoms. Indeed, the exercise of public freedoms in and around the public space is shrinking drastically due to the dissolution of certain civil society organisations,[1] the suspension of activities by political parties and movements, and against a backdrop of arrests and orders of committal for damage to the credit of the State or other offences.[2]

As part of the implementation of the security sector reform [1][2] and the national strategy for security sector reform along with its action plan,[3] defence and security institutions plan to work with CSOs at municipal, regional and local levels through security advisory councils. Civil society representatives are chosen following the process by the head of the local executive. This trend is likely to favour CSOs that are supported by or have a privileged link with the State, particularly the National Council of Civil Society (CNSC), the Coordination of Women’s Associations and NGOs of Mali (CAFO), and the National Youth Council (CNJ). Moreover, despite this reality, CSOs working on these issues attempt to engage independently or sometimes on specific activities with the authorities’ tacit approval. This is evident in the operationalisation of security advisory councils.[4]

The culture of secrecy regarding defence and security issues compromises transparency and the relationship with civil society organisations [5]. One of the basic guiding principles of the Defence and Security Policy is the need for all sectors of the state and society to get involved in national defence and security [2]. The institutions of the Defence and Security Forces are not yet fully open, as a result of history (including its post-independence security doctrine, periods of internal conflict), a culture of secrecy and a perception of internal and external, military, non-military and hybrid threats. In this context, it is necessary to consolidate the Policies of Openness to the CSOs [4, 5]. Paragraph E of Article 2 of the Defence Policy demands the involvement of all sectors of the state and society in defence and national security, instead of requiring these defence and security establishments to be open [3]. Also, it does not explain or mention how to do this, in what context and situations, leaving room for ambiguity in times of peace or war [1].

Since the early 1990s, CSOs in Mozambique have benefited from a range of legal protections, including the rights to freedom of association, expression, and access to information, allowing them to operate without government interference or intimidation [1]. These rights are safeguarded by the Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique and relevant legislation: Act No. 8/91 (July 18) governs the right to free association, while Act No. 9/81 (July 18) regulates the exercise of freedom of expression. However, in recent years, some protests organised by CSOs have been prohibited by police authorities, often without clear justification [2]. While the Defence and Security Institutions are not generally open to engagement with CSOs [3], there have been instances of collaboration, particularly in areas such as training, gender issues, human rights, and HIV awareness. However, cooperation on corruption and accountability has been minimal [4]. The Defence and Security Forces maintain a high level of distrust toward CSOs, frequently accusing them of promoting external, subversive agendas against the state [5].

The Defence and Security Institutions engage CSOs on several aspects of National Defence and Security, including gender issues [1], Child soldiers [2], human rights [3], international humanitarian law [4], and other issues, but not yet on corruption issues. The Mozambican Armed Forces have a radio program (Hora do Soldado [Soldier Time]) and a television program (Antena do Solado [Soldier Antenna]) through which information is provided about the activities of the Armed Forces, but they do not yet address issues of corruption [5].
The Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces have always been closed to CSOs, despite the Defence Policy guiding the need for the involvement of all sectors of the state and society in national defence and security. But this scenario began to change with the awakening of the importance of CSOs in combating the terrorist insurgency that has affected Mozambique since 2017 [6].

Niger’s anti-corruption efforts have evolved through institutional reforms and policy initiatives. The High Authority to Combat Corruption and Related Infractions (HALCIA) was established in 2011 and strengthened in 2016, gaining investigative powers and direct referral capabilities [1]. The National Strategy to Fight Corruption (SNLC), adopted in 2018, aimed to enhance prevention, enforcement, and international cooperation but lacked provisions for the defense sector. Despite formal oversight through COPIL-SNLC, civil society activists have criticized the absence of genuine evaluations [2]. Following the military coup in July 2023, HALCIA was dissolved and replaced by the Economic, Financial, and Tax Crime Fighting Commission (CoLDEFF) in September 2023 [3]. While CoLDEFF was established to investigate economic and financial crimes, concerns have emerged regarding its alignment with the military leadership. Rather than focusing on judicial processes, it prioritizes financial recoveries, leading critics to view it as a tool for intimidation and asset seizure rather than genuine anti-corruption enforcement [4]. To sum-up, through 2018-July 26, 2023, there was some evidence of openness to cooperation with CSOs is present and the acknowledgement of the role of Transparency International’s local chapter in Niger is a sign of that [5]. However, there is no specific policy to fight corruption in the defense and security sector.

Historically, there is an important number of CSOs in Niger [1], but only one is focused specifically on the issues regarding the fight against corruption. The Nigerian Association for the Fight Against Corruption (ANLC) was created in 2001, and became section of Transparency International in 2002. It provides for a large variety of activities: legal assistance, research, and awareness-raising actions against corruption [2]. In recent years, several arrests have targeted civil society actors who exposinge corruption in the military and defense sector. Investigative journalist Moussa Aksar, who uncovered large-scale embezzlement within the Ministry of Defense, has been subjected to judicial harassment and fines under cybercrime laws [3,4]. Other human rights defenders, such as Moussa Tchangari, have been arrested under vague national security charges, further restricting civil society’s ability to engage with defense institutions [5]. The broader post-coup environment has seen increased restrictions on media and CSOs, with government authorities actively suppressing independent investigations into corruption. Despite these pressures, some organizations, such as the local chapter of Transparency International and DCAF, continue to operate. However, their engagement with the security sector is limited, and independent voices face growing risks. While CSOs still exist, their role in engaging with defense and security institutions remains highly restricted. The authorities tolerate only selective engagement with government-friendly organizations, while independent anti-corruption activists face intimidation and legal prosecution.

In Niger, engagement between civil society organizations (CSOs) and defense institutions remains extremely limited, particularly on issues related to corruption. A 2020 audit of the Ministry of Defense revealed large-scale embezzlement and procurement fraud between 2014 and 2019, yet the scandal was suppressed, with implicated officials promoted rather than held accountable [1]. CSO representatives, such as Ali Idrissa, have criticized the lack of transparency and the impunity, but their efforts to push for justice have been largely ignored [1]. The repression of journalists and anti-corruption activists has intensified, particularly after the July 26, 2023 military coup. Investigative journalists like Moussa Aksar and human rights activists like Moussa Tchangari have faced judicial harassment, imprisonment, and criminal charges for their work [2,3,4]. Given the increasing restrictions on CSOs, their engagement with security and defense institutions is either nonexistent or tightly controlled by the state. While some CSO representatives have attempted to address corruption within the defense sector, they face systematic repression and exclusion. Engagements, if they occur, are limited to state-aligned CSOs or those that avoid criticism of defense institutions. However, engagement occurs between the FDS and the Agence Nigerienne de Lutte contre la Corruption, who saw the commitment of the Ministry of Defence and the Interior to protecting human security by combating corruption, instability and conflict [5].

There is no formal or informal policy that requires openness towards civil society organisations (CSOs) in the defence sector. The few CSOs that focus on defence are usually not involved in the formulation or discussions surrounding national defence policy and the setting of strategic objectives for the nation. However, there are institutional enablers that can be leveraged to foster interface between CSOs and the defence sector such as the Ministry of Defence’s SERVICOM Unit [1] and the Open Government Partnership (OGP) [2]. However, CSOs like CISLAC and CLEEN Foundation have continued to provide research and knowledge products that benefit the Ministry of Defence in relation to capacity building for the Ministry, NASS and the Armed Forces. CSOs have also continued to press for openness and transparency in the affairs of the Ministry of defence, such as the April 2012 demand by a Coalition of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in Nigeria that the ongoing probe on the procurement of arms by the National Assembly should focus on the Ministry of Defence, and not the immediate past Service Chiefs [3]. Thus, the CSOs have vital areas of contributions in the defence and security sector for Nigeria’s democratic sustenance. However, the CSOs are yet to be fully acknowledged as a genuine force as there is already lack of a well-structured institutional framework to support more collaboration between governmental ministries and CSOs [4].

Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in Nigeria operate within a complex policy, regulatory, and legislative framework that the government or party in power rely on to restrict their activities or shrink the civic space. Before 2011, CSOs in Nigeria had operated freely, but successive controversial bills seeking to tighten the regulation of CSOs have been a source of heated debate in both the National Assembly and civic space [1]. In 2017, Buba Jubrin sponsored a bill that sought to regulate NGOs and CSOs. The bill passed second reading at the House of Representatives and was subsequently referred to the Committee on Civil Society Organisations and Development Partners before it was dropped after a staunch pushback by CSOs and NGOS [2]. The NGO Bill borrows a leaf from a previous legislative proposal in 2014, designed to give the Nigerian government the powers to regulate international funding to civil society organizations. A similar bill resurfaced in July 2022 and more recently in March 2024 [3]. Critics contend that the primary objective of the bill is to clamp down on the Nigerian civil society by widening the state’s discretionary powers to interfere with NGO operations and to impose additional layers of obstruction to a free civic space [4]. CSOs have equally accused the administration of President Bola Ahmed Tinubu of deploying draconian tactics such as the coordinated use of state resources, the mischievous interpretation of laws, especially the Cybercrimes Act of 2015 which has now been amended, and the abuse of power and public institutions to further shrink Nigeria’s fragile civic space [5]. Other attempts to shrink civic space include the Social Media Regulation Bill, occasional intimidation and harassment by the national and sub-national legislatures/Governments, as well as armed forces. In March 2025, the National Assembly Committee on Civil Society and Development Partners summoned CISLAC/TI-Nigeria to appear before the Committee with some listed documents, to clarify its role and declare the funds received/activities executed under the controversial USAID funds in Nigeria [6]. This invitation has been widely condemned by Civil Society groups nationwide, which regarded it as an undercover attempt to intimidate this organisation and bully it into silence from demanding transparency and accountability from both legislative and executive realms in Nigeria. Moreover, CISLAC/TI-Nigeria’s office was attacked by security forces in the previous administration [7]. Growing cases of attacks on press freedom and the flagrant abuse of the rule of law by the state security forces.

Defence and security institutions are engaging with a range of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) on defence and security issues. The Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) Nigeria, in collaboration with the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR) and the National Women Platform on Security Sector Reform and Governance, have organised two streams of Women Only Civil-Military Relations Training to improve the capacity of the Desk Officers of defence and security institutions and women human rights practitioners in integrating human rights standards in delivering their mandates [1]. The Nigerian Army is also collaborating with CSO to guarantee the success of the Federal Government’s Safe Schools Initiative aimed at ensuring uninterrupted access to Education for children residing in regions affected by violence [2]. Increasingly, CSOs are engaging with defence institutions in capacity building in areas such as the protection of civilians, civilian harm mitigation, early warning, Safe Schools Initiative, gender mainstreaming, and respect for human rights [3]. Apart from the existing collaboration with defence agencies, organisations such CISLAC/TI-Nigeria also enjoys another level of collaboration within the security sector in the areas of Counter-Terrorism; Citizens’ Mobilisation against Terrorism Financing, Violent Extremism; anti-corruption, transborder corruption, transparency and accountability in the Defence and Security procurement, personnel, operations, procurement and financial management. CISLAC actively collaborates with the Anti-Corruption Technical Unit of the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps, the Counter-Terrorism Unit of the Nigerian Police, and the Complaint Response Unit of the Nigeria Police, especially in the areas of reporting, capacity building, public sensitisation and advocacy. However, there is still more to do, especially on the side of the military, when it comes to the depth of the collaboration. For instance, they do not draw CSOs in actual cases of corruption.

There are certainly forms of collaboration between the defence and security forces, but there is no formal, institutionalised policy obliging them to open up to CSOs. [1] Studies are carried out by CSOs on issues related to the defence and security forces and in collaboration with them, but they are not always related to corruption. [2]

Article 10 of the Senegalese Constitution stipulates that everyone has the right to freely express and disseminate their opinions through speech, writing, images and peaceful marches, provided that the exercise of these rights does not undermine the honour and consideration of others, or public order.[3] However, even if freedom of expression is a reality in Senegal, people working as journalists and members of civil society have been arrested for revealing corrupt practices within the defence and security forces, because the information revealed was either sensitive or lacked evidence. [1] For instance, a columnist on a major private TV channel has been charged with disseminating false information and inciting hatred, and has been taken into custody. The charges relate in particular to comments he made during a programme in which he alleged that members of the national police had accepted bribes to allow the passage of a pirogue carrying 30 dead migrants in Senegal. [2]

Collaboration between civilians and the defence and security forces is fundamentally based on the complementarity between the two entities for the joint construction of security. Collaboration consists of creating and developing complementarity and synergy between the two components of civil and military society, so as to ensure security in the human sense of the term, but mainly on issues other than corruption [1] . In July 2024, the Ministry of the Armed Forces, in collaboration with the Peace and Security Network for Women in the ECOWAS region (REPSFECO), organised a high-level panel on ‘The contribution of women in the Armed Forces to peace missions: exchanges of experience, challenges and opportunities for sustainable peace’. The opening ceremony was chaired by Air Force General (2S) Birame DIOP, the Minister of the Senegalese Armed Forces. [4] Moreover, tthe Centre de Hautes Etudes de Défense et de Sécurité is a public institutions of the sSenegalese army that collaborates a lot with Civil Society Organisations and academies on issues related to peace and security. However, corruption is not part of the issues they work on. [3] Another example is the study by a CSCO named PWA Senegal was done on road safety in Senegal on which civilians, the police, and the gendarmerie responded to the questionnaire, specifically questionions related to corruption in the axes Dakar Ziguinchor and Dakar Tambacounda. [2]

The White Paper on National Defence, 1996, in Chapter 3: Civil-Military Relations stipulates that “The DOD recognises that it has a positive duty to provide sufficient information to ensure adequate parliamentary and public scrutiny and debate on defence matters”. [1] However, there is no explicit mention of how to do that in the White Paper. The Promotion of Access to Information Act allows citizens to request access to a broad range of information held by government bodies, but section 41 of the Act allows for the refusal of requests for records if it were to prejudice the defence of the Republic. [2]

South Africa has an active civil society protected by constitutional provisions upholding rights including free speech and freedom of association [1]. The Non-Profit Organisation Act likewise provides a legal framework for CSOs with the objective of fostering an environment within which CSOs can flourish [2]. CSOs operate free from government intimidation in practice and civil liberties are protected in practice. Freedom House rates South Africa as “Free” with a score of 79/100. [3]

While South Africa has a wide range of CSOs working on issues of corruption, including Open Secrets, Corruption Watch, and a range of others, defence institutions have not exhibited an interest in engaging with CSOs on issues of corruption. There are, however, examples of individuals within the defence and security sector working informally with CSOs to expose corruption [1]. Concerns have, however, been raised around the sector’s openness to CSOs based on clauses of the General Intelligence Laws Amendment Bill, which has been criticised over concerns that it will enable surveillance of CSOs, place restrictions on access to certain information, and close the space within which CSOs function. [2]

The defence and security apparatus in South Sudan is legally required to engage with Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) to promote transparency and accountability. The Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) Act of 2009, in particular, emphasizes the importance of civil-military relations, stipulating that the SPLA leadership, including the Minister of Defence, must conduct their affairs in a manner that fosters these relationships and ensures accountability [1]. Civil society organizations play a crucial role in advocating for good governance and holding the government accountable, particularly in the management of public resources and affairs [2]. The SPLA Act of 2009 thus provides a foundation for CSOs to demand transparency from the military. However, while the Act highlights the need for transparency and accountability, it falls short of detailing the mechanisms or processes for how interactions between CSOs and the military should occur [2]. This lack of explicit guidelines creates ambiguity and potential challenges in implementing the intended transparency and accountability measures. In practice, this gap often leads to a situation where the military’s engagement with CSOs is inconsistent, and the level of openness can vary significantly depending on the leadership and the specific context. Therefore, while the SPLA Act lays the groundwork for civil-military cooperation, there is a need for clearer regulations and procedures to ensure effective interaction between the security sector and civil society.

Article 24 of the Transitional Constitution provides for freedom of expression; Article 25 provides for the freedom of association and assembly, and Article 32 provides for the right of access to information. Also, the constitution, in its Article 143, provides for the establishment of the Anti-Corruption Commission. This would mean there are sufficient legal and policy commitments for the CSOs’ protections and for defence and security institutions to be open on public issues to the CSOs, including on issues related to corruption. Indeed, since independence, CSOs in South Sudan have evolved and become more active in promoting peace, accountability and getting involved in policy debates in the country [1]. However, civic space is prohibitive in South Sudan and therefore limits the extent of engagements between CSO actors and defence and security institutions and officials. For example, when the government attempted to introduce a controversial National Security Law in July 2024, the CSOs were vocal, calling on the government to rethink the bill. Under the umbrella of the South Sudan Civil Society Forum (SSCSF), CSOs stated that, “the SSCSF remains steadfast in advocating for a transparent and accountable government that prioritizes the welfare and rights of all citizens,” adding that “We call for the cultivation of an environment that champions checks and balances, enhances judicial oversight, and advances fair electoral processes and democratic governance” [2] In addition, a report published by OHCHR in October 2023 indicated that the government of South Sudan had ‘imposed widespread restrictions and surveillance on civil society groups and their activities’. Systematic restriction of democratic spaces on CSOs was particularly blamed on the NSS, with political leaders condoning the activities of the NSS in the media and civil society. [3]

Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in South Sudan are increasingly taking an active role in engaging with the defence and security sector. Their involvement primarily focuses on promoting human rights, good governance, contributing to the formulation of policies and laws, and advocating for sustainable development within the country [1]. These efforts are crucial in fostering a more inclusive and transparent governance system. However, there is currently no public information available in the media regarding any direct engagement between CSOs and the security sector specifically related to corruption [2]. This gap suggests that while CSOs are making strides in certain areas, their role in addressing corruption within the defence and security sector might be limited or not widely reported. This lack of visibility could be due to the sensitive nature of corruption issues within the security sector, which might restrict open discussions and collaboration between CSOs and the relevant authorities. For CSOs to effectively combat corruption in this sector, more structured and transparent channels of engagement would be necessary, alongside stronger media coverage to highlight these efforts. A member of a Juba-based CSO confirmed that there is limited engagement between the military and the CSOs, especially on matters related to defence procurement [3].

Efforts have been made in Uganda to have a policy that enables civil society organisations to interact with UPDF, the Police, and other agencies on issues of corruption. For example, the UPDF established a complaint desk to receive and investigate corruption reports.
There is a clear policy of openness when dealing with the CSOs by the Ministry of Defence and Veteran Affairs (MoDVA). However, there have not been any indications that this happens. Civil Society Budget Advocacy Group (CSBAG) and some members of the public endeavour to hold the ministry accountable on issues of the budget, but the results are yet to be felt and seen. The MoDVA appears to be using the provisions of the NGO Act 2016 to limit or not even engage meaningfully with the CSOs. As a result, the two sectors seem to always treat each other with suspicion [1], [2], [3].

Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in Uganda have a legal basis for their operations, with protections outlined in Article 28 of the Constitution and Section One of the NGO Act (2016). These laws require the government to provide an enabling environment for CSOs, strengthening their capacity and fostering partnerships with the state [1][2]. However, in practice, the operating environment for CSOs is significantly more restrictive than these legal provisions suggest.
The Ugandan government frequently criticizes and restricts CSOs, particularly those advocating for human rights, democracy, and political reform. Many organizations face harassment, surveillance, and even closure when their work is perceived as opposing government interests [3][4]. Laws such as the Public Order Management Act (2013) further restrict their activities, making it difficult to hold public gatherings or protests, particularly for groups that challenge state policies. Reports indicate that activists have been arrested, beaten, or threatened by security forces, creating a climate of intimidation and self-censorship [5].
Additionally, the securitization of terrorism has been increasingly used to justify crackdowns on CSOs. Under the 2002 Anti-Terrorism Act and policies enforced by institutions like the Financial Intelligence Authority (FIA), organizations working on governance and human rights have been targeted, criminalized, and labelled as threats to national unity. Some have had their bank accounts frozen on allegations of funding terrorism, further curbing their ability to operate freely [6].
Thus, while CSOs are legally recognised in Uganda, their practical ability to function without government interference is often compromised by restrictive laws, security-led crackdowns, and the threat of violence or legal action. The legal framework provides a foundation for CSO operations, but the government’s actions frequently undermine their autonomy and effectiveness.

The Ministry of Defence and Veteran Affairs (MoDVA) has signed Memoranda of Understanding with several Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), including the Refugee Law Project, UN Women, Save the Children, Foreign Correspondents Association of Uganda, and Amnesty International, primarily to discuss human rights issues [1]. Additionally, CSOs such as the Uganda Debt Network and the Anti-Corruption Coalition Uganda have actively advocated for transparency and accountability in the defence sector, particularly regarding the utilization of the classified defence budget [2].
Beyond these formal agreements, CSOs have played a broader role in promoting security sector reform (SSR) and enhancing civilian oversight of Uganda’s security institutions. One notable initiative is the Civilian Oversight and Security Sector Reform Project, which aims to increase transparency and accountability within security agencies, including the military and police [3].
Furthermore, CSOs collaborate with security institutions through capacity-building programs, advocacy campaigns against corruption, and initiatives to strengthen accountability. Organisations supported by UNODC and the Commonwealth have contributed to citizen-led anti-corruption efforts and training programs designed to improve transparency [4][5].
However, while these avenues for collaboration exist, the effectiveness of such efforts remains mixed due to political and institutional barriers. Despite CSOs’ contributions, significant challenges—including limited access to classified defence information and political resistance to deeper oversight—continue to undermine transparency and accountability efforts [6].

Zimbabwe does not have any formal or informal policy that creates space for civil society organizations (CSOs) in the defence sector [1]. There is a lack of openness towards civil society [1]. The security sector threatens and arrests civil society members who do not comply with government demands to submit their strategic and organisational plans. The government has also enacted the PVO Amendment Bill, which stifles efforts to protect the rights of Zimbabwean citizens [2][3]. Hence, civil society members who do not adhere to these government directives may face arrest and detention as it introduced tighter restrictions and surveillance on CSOs, signalling a shrinking civic space, not expansion into defence matters [3].

While CSOs can operate in Zimbabwe [1] (with limited scope), the defence and security does not have an open policy of openness to work with civil society when dealing with corruption. Following the Gazette of the Private Voluntary Organisation (PVO) Amendment Bill of 2024, civil society organisations are required to be vetted by the office of the Registrar and screened to see if they can be registered to operate in Zimbabwe [2]. Thus, under this PVO amendment bill, civil society is not protected, especially those which are perceived to be anti-government, can be de-registered and their operations suspended by the government [2][3].

The defence and security function in secrecy, and they do not openly work with civil society, especially those which are anti-government [1]. The CSO’s are already under attack from the government, including being arrested and detained by the police in Zimbabwe [1]. CSOs that do not comply with government directives are threatened that they will be banned permanently from operating in Zimbabwe [2].