Political Risk:

Moderate

Score:

60/100

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1 83/100

Is there formal provision for effective and independent legislative scrutiny of defence policy?

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Formal rights Score: 100 / 100
Legislative scrutiny of defence policy is offered by the Parliament of Ghana through two main platforms. Its committee system as provided for under Article…
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Effectiveness Score: 100 / 100
The often-partisan nature of debates in parliament has resulted in few rejections compared to approvals of proposals put forward by the executive. Debates on…
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Independent legislature scrutiny Score: 50 / 100
While there is no evidence of attempts by the military to influence legislative scrutiny, the independence of legislative scrutiny on defence policy cannot be…
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2 92/100

Does the country have an identifiable and effective parliamentary defence and security committee (or similar such organisations) to exercise oversight?

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Formal rights Score: 100 / 100
The Parliamentary Select Committee on Defence and Interior (PSCDI), operating (as other Parliamentary Committees) per Article 103 (3) of the 1992 Constitution, is tasked…
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Expertise Score: 75 / 100
The current committee comprises persons with varied experiences, including disaster management, health, policing, defence and local government, among others. (1) In any case, with…
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Responsive policymaking Score: 100 / 100
The Committee has been instrumental in reviewing major defence and security policies, such as the Securities and Intelligence Agencies Bill 2020, which sought to…
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Short-term oversight Score: 100 / 100
The frequency of the Defence and Interior Committee meetings depends on the volume of work to be considered. Given the current state of the…
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Long-term oversight Score: 100 / 100
Either the Committee for Defence and Interior or a Special Committee of Inquiry may be tasked with conducting investigations, including those on operations. (1)…
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Institutional outcomes Score: 75 / 100
In the case of bills, for instance, once changes and amendments are voted upon, the amendments are incorporated. (1) In July 2023, Parliament passed…
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3 56/100

Is the country’s national defence policy or national security strategy debated and publicly available?

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Scope of involvement Score: 75 / 100
There is evidence of discussions regarding threats to Ghana at the parliamentary committee level. For instance, the Report of the Committee on Defence and…
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Scope of debate Score: 50 / 100
Parliament occasionally engages in debates about military activities, particularly when the minister of defence presents the ministry’s budget or responds to concerns about the…
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Public consultations Score: 25 / 100
There have been consultations regarding threats to Ghana’s national security and the national security strategy. While these are not regular, they nevertheless involve parliamentarians,…
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Transparency Score: 75 / 100
The National Security Strategy (NSS) is a public document prepared by the Ministry of National Security based on non-partisan and inclusive consultations involving Parliament…
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4 42/100

Do defence and security institutions have a policy, or evidence, of openness towards civil society organisations (CSOs) when dealing with issues of corruption?

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Policy of openness Score: 0 / 100
Notwithstanding their key role as “anti-corruption watchdogs,” there are no policies reflecting openness towards CSOs in the defence sector. Although this lack of policy…
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CSO protections Score: 100 / 100
The environment for creating and operating a CSO in Ghana is liberal, relative to other countries in the region. Guaranteed by the freedoms enshrined…
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Practice of openness Score: 25 / 100
Anchored in the burgeoning civil-military relations in the country, there have been some interactions between CSOs and Defence and Security Institutions. (1) Nevertheless, issues…
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5 75/100

Has the country signed up to the following international anti-corruption instruments: UNCAC and the OECD Convention?

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Signatory and Ratification status Score: 100 / 100
Ghana signed and ratified the UNCAC on 9 December 2004 and 16 December 2005 respectively.(1) Regarding the OECD Convention, Ghana is not a major…
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Compliance Score: 50 / 100
Per the status of implementation, Ghana has fully implemented almost all the articles in the UNCAC. However, enforcement in practice for the respective articles…
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6 88/100

Is there evidence of regular, active public debate on issues of defence? If yes, does the government participate in this debate?

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Public debate Score: 75 / 100
Outside government, there has been occasional debates about defence issues and aspects of the country’s national security strategy. Civil Society Organisations like the West…
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Government engagement in public discourse Score: 100 / 100
The government engages in regular debate with academia, opinion-formers, and CSOs about defence issues in collaborative ways. (1) The Counterterrorism Fusion Centre under the…
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7 63/100

Does the country have an openly stated and effectively implemented anti-corruption policy for the defence sector?

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Anti-corruption policy Score: 100 / 100
Ghana has signed and ratified a number of regional and global anti-corruption conventions, including the UNCAC and the ECOWAS Protocol on the Fight Against…
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Effective implementation Score: 25 / 100
The OSP’s harmonised duties and responsibilities enjoin it to prosecute offences under the Public Procurement Act, 2003 (Act 663) and the Criminal Offences Act,…
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8 75/100

Are there independent, well-resourced, and effective institutions within defence and security tasked with building integrity and countering corruption?

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Mandate and resources Score: 75 / 100
The Inspector General’s Department (IGD) of the Ghana Armed Forces, Stationed at the General headquarters was set up in 2012 to address issues relating…
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Independence Score: 50 / 100
The Inspector General’s Department is situated within the Chain of Command. However, to provide some level of insulation from interference, it reports directly to…
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Effectiveness Score: 100 / 100
The Inspector General’s Department of the General Headquarters periodically inspects operational readiness and conducts training for units of the Ghana Armed Forces. These trainings…
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9 NS/100

Does the public trust the institutions of defence and security to tackle the issue of bribery and corruption in their establishments?

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Score: NS / 100
The police and the military have traditionally been on opposite sides of the spectrum when it comes to public trust. Results from Round 9…
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10 25/100

Are there regular assessments of the areas of greatest corruption risk for ministry and armed forces personnel, and are the findings used as inputs to the anti-corruption policy?

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Risk assessments Score: 75 / 100
The GAF’s Department of the Inspector General is responsible for conducting risk assessments pertaining to the armed forces. The Chief of Defence Staff (CDS)…
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Regularity Score: 0 / 100
There are no fixed periods for the conduct of risk assessment by the office of the Inspector General’s Department of GAF; the frequency of…
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Inputs to anti-corruption policy Score: 0 / 100
There is a restriction on the outcomes of risk assessments, which makes it difficult to determine if these assessments contribute to the formulation of…
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11 75/100

Does the country have a process for acquisition planning that involves clear oversight, and is it publicly available?

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Acquisition planning process Score: 100 / 100
Ghana has made substantial progress in enhancing the transparency and supervision of its acquisition planning procedures, particularly in relation to defence procurement. The Public…
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Transparency Score: 25 / 100
Although the general structure and principles of defence procurement are publicly accessible, precise details of acquisition plans are frequently classified for reasons of national…
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External oversight Score: 100 / 100
The external oversight bodies of the expenditure of the MOD include the Public Procurement Authority, as established under the Public Procurement Act of 2003…
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12 63/100

Is the defence budget transparent, showing key items of expenditure? And it is provided to the legislature in a timely fashion?

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Comprehensiveness Score: 75 / 100
The budget allocation for the MOD is comprehensively crafted, containing disaggregated portions based on the function of the various aspects of such allocation. The…
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Timeliness Score: 50 / 100
Trends indicate that the presentation of defence budgets typically occurs two months into the new fiscal year. This is evidenced by the 2022 budget…
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13 63/100

Is there a legislative committee (or other appropriate body) responsible for defence budget scrutiny and analysis in an effective way?

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Formal rights Score: 100 / 100
There are two institutions of parliament charged with the responsibility to serve as oversight bodies to scrutinise the defence budget. First, the 19-member Parliamentary…
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Influence on decision-making Score: 25 / 100
The Parliamentary Select Committee on Defence and Interior commands the powers to make major amendments to the defence budget. However, in practice, there is…
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14 83/100

Is the approved defence budget made publicly available? In practice, can citizens, civil society, and the media obtain detailed information on the defence budget?

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Proactive publication Score: 100 / 100
The budget is presented both in aggregated and disaggregated format. The broad national budget statement presents the disaggregated form, which largely lacks key explanatory…
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Comprehensiveness Score: 75 / 100
While some parts of the MOD’s budget are kept secret out of security concerns, most of the budget is made public. It is the…
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Response to information requests Score: 75 / 100
The Right to Information Act 2019 (Act 989) allows for information held by public institutions to be accessed; nevertheless, Section 9(2) of Act 989(1)…
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15 33/100

Are sources of defence income other than from central government allocation (from equipment sales or property disposal, for example) published and scrutinised?

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Transparency Score: 25 / 100
There is selective publication of sources of funding to the Ghana Armed Forces. (1) Donor agencies may report funding to the military, such as…
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Institutional scrutiny Score: 75 / 100
The Ghana Audit Service (GAS) conducts regular financial audits of the Ghana Armed Forces to ensure that military expenditures are in line with approved…
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Public scrutiny Score: 0 / 100
Public scrutiny of non-central government sources of funding is minimal or non-existent. (1) (2)
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16 88/100

Is there an effective internal audit process for defence ministry expenditure (that is, for example, transparent, conducted by appropriately skilled individuals, and subject to parliamentary oversight)?

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Activity Score: 75 / 100
As a public sector organisation, the defence ministry is subject to the Public Financial Management Act, 2016 (Act 921). Consequently, per Section 83 (1),…
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Enabling oversight Score: 100 / 100
Although the Internal Auditor does not report directly to the Public Accounts Committee of Parliament, the Provisions of the Public Financial Management Act, 2016…
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External scrutiny Score: 100 / 100
Section 83 (7) of the Public Financial Management Act, 2016, provides a clear guideline regarding how audit reports are released, including to the Audit…
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Institutional outcomes Score: 75 / 100
The Ministry of Defence, like other public sector organisations are subject to the oversight responsibilities of the Public Accounts Committee. (1) The Ministry therefore…
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17 63/100

Is there effective and transparent external auditing of military defence expenditure?

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Activity Score: 75 / 100
Sections 84 and 85 of the Public Financial Management Act, 2016 (Act 921) provides for external auditing of public sector organisations including the Ministry…
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Independence Score: 50 / 100
Under the leadership of the Auditor General, the Audit Service operates independent of the Defence Ministry with a budget approved by Parliament similar to…
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Transparency Score: 50 / 100
The Audit Service publishes reports relating to key audit assignments on its website. (1) Public Access to Information from its Audit Activities are also…
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Institutional outcomes Score: 75 / 100
The Ministry of Defence like other public sector organisations is subject to the oversight responsibilities of the Public Accounts Committee. (1) The Ministry therefore…
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18 58/100

Is there evidence that the country’s defence institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation and, if so, are these interests publicly stated and subject to scrutiny?

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Legal framework Score: 0 / 100
The are no existing legal frameworks that prohibit defence institutions and individuals from engaging in business duties of financial interest in the country’s natural…
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Defence institutions: Financial or controlling interests in practice Score: 100 / 100
There are no cases to show that defence institutions have been involved in business activities related to the exploitation of Ghana’s natural resources. [1]…
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Individual defence personnel: Financial or controlling interests in practice Score: 75 / 100
There are no cases where individuals of the force officially engage in the exploration of natural resources. There are, however, cases where individuals have…
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Transparency Score: NA / 100
This indicator has been marked ‘Not Applicable’ as defence institutions have not formally declared any interest in resource exploitation in Ghana. (1) (2)
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Scrutiny Score: NA / 100
This indicator has been marked ‘Not Applicable’ as defence institutions have not formally declared any interest in resource exploitation in Ghana. (1) (2)
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19 13/100

Is there evidence, for example through media investigations or prosecution reports, of a penetration of organised crime into the defence and security sector? If no, is there evidence that the government is alert and prepared for this risk?

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Penetration of organised crime Score: 25 / 100
Notwithstanding the general perception of the GAF’s professionalism, there are instances in which criminal elements infiltrate the force. One example is the alleged conflict…
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Government response Score: 0 / 100
Ghana has not been known for military involvement in organised crime, and the professionalism of the military has been cited as a key factor…
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20 83/100

Is there policing to investigate corruption and organised crime within the defence services and is there evidence of the effectiveness of this policing?

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Existence of policing function Score: 100 / 100
The Military Police (MP) of the Ghana Armed Forces (GAF) is a specialised branch within the military that is responsible for maintaining discipline, law,…
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Independence Score: 50 / 100
The Military Police (MP) of the Ghana Armed Forces (GAF) is not entirely independent in the performance of its functions as it operates within…
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Effectiveness Score: 100 / 100
Cases are investigated and prosecuted through formal channels, and while the possibility of undue political influence, especially by the President who is also the…
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21 38/100

Are the policies, administration, and budgets of the intelligence services subject to effective and independent oversight?

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Independence Score: 50 / 100
The mandate of the Defence and Interior Committee of Parliament also includes considering the policies administration and budgets of the intelligence services. (1) (2)…
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Effectiveness Score: 25 / 100
The Defence and Interior Committee does not have real time regular access to all classified information owing to national security concerns.(1) This creates a…
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22 25/100

Are senior positions within the intelligence services filled on the basis of objective selection criteria, and are appointees subject to investigation of their suitability and prior conduct?

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Objective selection criteria Score: 25 / 100
The filling of Senior positions within the securities and intelligence services in Ghana is guided by the Securities and intelligence Agencies Act 2020 (Act…
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Selection bias Score: 50 / 100
The process of filling senior positions within the securities and intelligence services in Ghana, as described, can be subject to selection bias as it…
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Vetting process Score: 0 / 100
The Security and Intelligence Agencies Act, 2020 also states that an intelligence agency “shall have control over the selection, training and induction of a…
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23 88/100

Does the government have a well-scrutinised process for arms export decisions that aligns with Articles 7.1.iv, 11.5, and 15.6 of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)?

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Signatory and Ratification Score: 100 / 100
Ghana has signed the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) on 24th September 2013. Ghana’s parliament ratified the treaty on 22nd December 2015, with the treaty…
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Compliance Score: 75 / 100
Ghana does not export arms; therefore, the compliance to article 7.1.iv will not be applicable to Ghana. (1) The country has complied with article…
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Parliamentary scrutiny Score: NA / 100
Ghana is not an arm exporter according to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) data fact sheet, and therefore this sub-indicator is scored as…
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76 0/100

Does the country regulate lobbying of defence institutions?

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Legal framework Score: 0 / 100
The country has no framework for regulating lobbying activity. The Public Procurement Act for instance does not have any provision on lobbying within the…
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Disclosure: Public officials Score: NA / 100
The country has no framework for regulating lobbying activity. (1)
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Lobbyist registration system Score: NA / 100
The country has no framework for regulating lobbying activity. (1)
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Oversight & enforcement Score: NA / 100
The country has no framework for regulating lobbying activity. (1)
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Defence and Security Policy and Policy Transparency

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Q1 NA/100

Is there formal provision for effective and independent legislative scrutiny of defence policy?

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Q2 NA/100

Does the country have an identifiable and effective parliamentary defence and security committee (or similar such organisations) to exercise oversight?

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Q3 NA/100

Is the country’s national defence policy or national security strategy debated and publicly available?

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Q4 NA/100

Do defence and security institutions have a policy, or evidence, of openness towards civil society organisations (CSOs) when dealing with issues of corruption?

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Q5 NA/100

Has the country signed up to the following international anti-corruption instruments: UNCAC and the OECD Convention?

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Q6 NA/100

Is there evidence of regular, active public debate on issues of defence? If yes, does the government participate in this debate?

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Q7 NA/100

Does the country have an openly stated and effectively implemented anti-corruption policy for the defence sector?

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Q8 NA/100

Are there independent, well-resourced, and effective institutions within defence and security tasked with building integrity and countering corruption?

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Q9 NA/100

Does the public trust the institutions of defence and security to tackle the issue of bribery and corruption in their establishments?

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Q10 NA/100

Are there regular assessments of the areas of greatest corruption risk for ministry and armed forces personnel, and are the findings used as inputs to the anti-corruption policy?

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Defence Budgets

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Q11 NA/100

Does the country have a process for acquisition planning that involves clear oversight, and is it publicly available?

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Q12 NA/100

Is the defence budget transparent, showing key items of expenditure? And it is provided to the legislature in a timely fashion?

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Q13 NA/100

Is there a legislative committee (or other appropriate body) responsible for defence budget scrutiny and analysis in an effective way?

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Q14 NA/100

Is the approved defence budget made publicly available? In practice, can citizens, civil society, and the media obtain detailed information on the defence budget?

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Q15 NA/100

Are sources of defence income other than from central government allocation (from equipment sales or property disposal, for example) published and scrutinised?

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Q16 NA/100

Is there an effective internal audit process for defence ministry expenditure (that is, for example, transparent, conducted by appropriately skilled individuals, and subject to parliamentary oversight)?

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Q17 NA/100

Is there effective and transparent external auditing of military defence expenditure?

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Nexus of Defence and National Assets

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Q18 NA/100

Is there evidence that the country’s defence institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation and, if so, are these interests publicly stated and subject to scrutiny?

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Organised Crime

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Q19 NA/100

Is there evidence, for example through media investigations or prosecution reports, of a penetration of organised crime into the defence and security sector? If no, is there evidence that the government is alert and prepared for this risk?

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Q20 NA/100

Is there policing to investigate corruption and organised crime within the defence services and is there evidence of the effectiveness of this policing?

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Control of Intelligence Services

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Q21 NA/100

Are the policies, administration, and budgets of the intelligence services subject to effective and independent oversight?

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Q22 NA/100

Are senior positions within the intelligence services filled on the basis of objective selection criteria, and are appointees subject to investigation of their suitability and prior conduct?

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Export Controls

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Q23 NA/100

Does the government have a well-scrutinised process for arms export decisions that aligns with Articles 7.1.iv, 11.5, and 15.6 of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)?

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Lobbying in Defence

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Q76 NA/100

Does the country regulate lobbying of defence institutions?

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