September 16th 2019, London – Transparency International’s Defence and Security Programme (TI-DS) has made some significant changes to its flagship Government Defence Anticorruption Index ahead of the first wave of country results for the 2020 iteration in October.

In order to futureproof the Index and ensure it continues to provide a comprehensive overview of corruption risk in global defence institutions, changes have been made to the methodology and scoring underpinning the project. As in previous versions of the Index, countries have been assessed using 77 indicators, but each of these now features a set of sub-indicators which focus on specific and measureable areas of interest.

This means that while some sub-indicators in the 2020 Index can be compared with historical results, changes in overall country scores from 2015 to 2020 will not reflect the entirety of the new index and should not be seen as an indication of improvement or weakening of country institutions.

In addition, the project will now be named the Government Defence Integrity Index. It will now be referred to using the new acronym GDI to differentiate from previous iterations.

The amount of work required to produce the GDI means the latest results will be released in waves, with the first wave – covering West Africa and the Middle East and North Africa – due to be published in October 2019.

Subsequent waves are scheduled for January 2020 (Central and Eastern Europe and Latin America) and May 2020 (G-20+ countries). The remaining data, covering the Asia Pacific region, East and Southern Africa, and NATO+, is due to be released in the second part of 2020.

This latest version of the Index will be accompanied by a new interactive website which allows users to better explore the results as well as other relevant work produced by TI-DS.



Harvey Gavin
+44 (0)20 3096 7695
++44 (0)79 6456 0340

Transparency International is the civil society organisation leading the fight against corruption

TI Defence & Security

Mon 16 Sep 19 // Conflict & Insecurity

Bénédicte Aboul-Nasr is a Project Officer at Transparency International Defence and Security. She works on issues related to corruption, conflict, and insecurity in the Middle East and North Africa region, as well as on how corruption affects United Nations Peacekeeping.

This week, Member States are convening for the 74th Session of General Assembly, during which they will discuss the general affairs of the United Nations. This will include a session focusing on a comprehensive review of peacekeeping operations.

Last September, the Security Council held its first meeting on corruption, underlying its relationship to global insecurity. Secretary-General António Guterres emphasised these links, noting that: ‘Regrettably, there is currently no coordinated strategy to gain the necessary leverage … to break the link between corruption and conflict’. The sentiments were echoed by the UK, calling corruption ‘an insidious plague’; and the Executive Director of our chapter in Venezuela made the same argument. And while not often discussed, links between corruption and the conflicts which the UN seeks to address with peacekeeping operations should be discussed.

There is no doubt that corruption breeds conflict and insecurity, as well as poverty and inequality. Six of the ten lowest-scoring countries in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index were also amongst the ten least peaceful countries in the most recent Global Peace Index. Transparency International’s research has long highlighted that addressing corruption can help prevent and address the very conflicts the UN finds itself involved in.

The Secretary-General has praised peacekeeping for its instrumental role in supporting peace and security – all the while acknowledging shortcomings and promising to reform performance and accountability and the conduct of peacekeepers and peacekeeping operations throughout his ‘Action for Peacekeeping’ (‘A4P’) initiative. Whilst those fighting corruption around the world will welcome his strong words, newly implemented reforms and a persistent focus on the challenges operations face present an even better opportunity for the UN to do more to root out corruption within its ranks.

Corruption undermines the chances of mission success, particularly of complex UN peacekeeping missions in the most high-risk areas of the world. Where fuel supplies are sold off, for example, troop mobility is reduced; when soldiers have paid to become blue helmets instead of earning their post through merit, missions may lack the skills they need; and when a blind eye is turned to smuggling, it enriches combatants and fuels further conflict. Such misconduct also reduces public trust in the ability of intervention forces to secure the peace.

The increasing discussions around corruption and conflict are a welcome step to beginning to address the problem. But as is so often the case, taking serious action is harder. In order to make words a reality, the UN will need to address corruption within its own systems, and figure out how to deal with corrupt governments in the areas where peace operations are in place – in particular if leaders are more focused on self-enrichment than on the needs of the population or the fulfilment of a UN mandate.

A leaked staff survey of the Secretariat in December 2017 had depressing findings: 50% of staff doubt people at all levels are held accountable for ethical behaviour; 55% were not confident that ‘UN staff members will be protected from retaliation for reporting misconduct or cooperating with an authorised audit or investigation’. Far from New York, the problem can have immediate with dire consequences for the hope of lasting peace.

So how can the UN go from public statements to actually handling the issue?

The UN Secretariat should strengthen its commitment to tackling corruption and the associated risks, particularly in the context of peace operations. To do so, the Secretary-General could issue a direction providing greater clarity on the responsibilities of Troop and Police Contributing Countries; in particular, when it comes to investigating instances of corruption and holding individuals responsible for misconduct to account within their national judicial systems. Whistleblowers – one of the best ways of identifying corruption – should be encouraged to come forward. Ultimately, holding perpetrators to account is often the best way to shift an institutional culture away from turning a blind eye, or even condoning graft.

The UN also needs people in the organisation with the mandate, expertise and capacity to get to grips with this issue – from understanding the risks on the ground to navigating corruption risks in one of the world’s largest and most complex bureaucracies.

Guterres was right when he said that ‘In peace operations, our engagement should be designed and implemented with a clearer anti-corruption lens to reinforce a culture of accountability and respect for the rule of law.’ But in a Member State organisation, this will be tough. The sad truth is that many governments in states where there are UN operations are kleptocratic or based around highly corrupt regimes and networks – often in direct contravention to the UN’s aims and to mission mandates. Operating with an ‘anti-corruption lens’ will not mean just improving procedures, but making difficult political decisions; ultimately, the UN has to be willing to put its goals in peace operations over the interests of diplomacy, if it is to successfully implement its own peacekeeping mandates.

Transparency International wants to help the UN fulfil its aims and support its efforts to strengthen peace and security worldwide. In July, we published an assessment of corruption risks within UN bodies relating to peacekeeping, to illuminate the dynamics of corruption and better support efforts to address it. TI’s Defence and Security Programme is also working on a toolkit for those leading international interventions to help officials, commanders and their planners chart a course through the challenges of conducting operations in high-risk, corrupt environments and understand the ways of responding to corruption.

If admitting to a problem is the first step to solving it, then the UN is on a much better path than it has been, and Guterres should be commended for this. But now is the time to start the next round of the heavy lifting needed to weave a more consistent approach to tackling corruption into the fabric of the organisation and its missions. Doing so promises to make UN operations more effective, cheaper, and better able to serve the interests of the most vulnerable.

Not tackling the underlying dynamics at the root of a conflict, and inadvertently sustaining or even reinforcing it, merely serves to prolong a peace intervention and can end up sowing the seeds of the next crisis. If the UN is serious about reducing the root of conflicts — all of which will be discussed in much detail over the coming weeks — it should ensure that its own operations are capable of responding to the very corruption risks they are vulnerable to — regardless of political sensitivities.

TI Defence & Security

Fri 6 Sep 19 // Industry Integrity

Last week, Transparency International Defence & Security (TI-DS) attended the Fifth Annual Conference of States Parties (CSP5) to The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), where delegations of the 104 signatories gathered to review the status of the Treaty and set the agenda for the year ahead. 

Five years since the introduction of the Arms Trade Treaty, there are plenty of reasons for gloom. This year’s Conference focused on two topics in particular: diversion and gender-based violence. Despite being covered under the ATT – articles 7 and 11 respectively – states have been struggling to address these illicit arms flows and reduce gender-based violence. Any advances made by new states ratifying the treaty – most recently Canada and Botswana – have been countered by the lack of representation from some of the world’s largest arms exporters such as Russia, China and now the US, which withdrew its signature from the treaty.

Meanwhile transfers of weapons continue to increase, and implementation challenges are becoming obvious. However, at this point the question is not one of giving up, but rather one of what can we do to make the Treaty more effective?

The CSP is open to civil society, encouraging participation in side events and lively debates. Only one panel discussion was restricted to state signatories – out of 20 in total. While this shows the role and importance of civil society participation in the ATT process, more can be done to foster this cooperation during the rest of the year.

TI-DS has an important contribution to make to this movement. By working together with Transparency International’s national chapters and other local partners we can do more to support national adoption and implementation strategies.

What does that mean in practice? Here are five learnings from the CSP5 that point the way:

1. Provide the evidence-base for arms control decisions

When deciding whether to approve an arms export application, state licensing bodies must consider a wide range of factors about the importing country – from the internal security situation to regional stability and risk of diversion from the stated end-user. Most states will assess these factors through an in-depth risk assessment of the viability of the export, using both classified and open source information.

Research reports and studies conducted by civil society can provide valuable sources of information for states. TI’s Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index (GI) provides an analysis of the corruption risks within the defence establishments of 90 countries worldwide. Government export control agencies can use this data to consider the risk of corruption in importing countries to inform the likelihood of diversion or misuse of weapons.

2. Raise awareness of the ATT and its relevance to national governments

As organisations with a particular national, regional or thematic focus, civil society organisations (CSO) are well-placed to provide expert insight into the arms control issues facing a country. In states that have not yet adopted the ATT – or are working towards ratifying it – CSOs can work with government agencies, industry and think tanks to facilitate a national debate on the importance and benefits of compliance with the treaty. They can build coalitions of interested parties to work towards a common goal, as shown by the continued contribution made by the Control Arms Coalition.

Moreover, civil society – unlike governments, industry or think tanks – often have the grassroots networks and community buy-in needed to build pressure and hold states to account for their promises when it comes to international obligations such as the ATT.

3. Assist parliaments and governments in implementing the treaty

CSOs working on arms control issues are in general able to develop a broader knowledge base than parliamentarians and other actors whose day jobs only touch upon this complex topic. The potential for cooperation between the two was illustrated by an example presented at this year’s conference which highlighted the role of the Small Arms Survey NGO, who assisted Japan by conducting a gap analysis of its ATT implementation progress.

From giving evidence to a parliamentary committee to providing MPs with research to inform parliamentary questions, CSOs can work directly with concerned parliamentarians to maintain the political will and internal pressure needed to support proper implementation of the treaty.

4. Monitor ATT progress and violations

As third-party stakeholders, CSOs are often able to raise and address controversial topics.

CSOs working in-country may encounter evidence of a violation of treaty obligations and report it to the government. Many CSOs also have the ability and expertise to synthesise these cases into national and regional trends, thereby providing governments with a tool to develop mitigation strategies and improve their progress in implementing the ATT. 

By providing a solid evidence base with clear policy recommendations, CSOs can help states reflect on the progress they have made and highlight areas that need strengthening.

5. Achieve universalisation through improved reporting and transparency

The substantial differences in the way that states submit their ATT reporting obligations constitute a barrier to universalisation. Although 83 per cent of states used the reporting template, some are still submitted incomplete or in non-readable format or indeed in a completely different format that is difficult to consolidate. On top of this, 25 per cent of states failed to submit an annual report at all.

CSOs can work with national governments and industry to promote transparency and common reporting standards, which in turn allows for comparability and more effective implementation of treaty obligations.

The future of the ATT may be uncertain, but states can’t do it alone and nor should they. Civil society can help national governments bridge the gap between policy and practice by providing hands-on insight and analysis into arms control issues worldwide.

Charlotte Linney

The United Nations (UN) should further expand its work to safeguard against corruption around peacekeeping missions or risk jeopardising the success of its operations, according to new research published by the Transparency International Defence and Security Programme (TI-DS). 

UN peace operations can be an effective way to respond to conflicts, natural disasters and other crises. But the risk of not placing anti-corruption at the heart of the planning and conduct of missions threatens to undermine their success – and can perpetuate the very conflict the UN seeks to quell.

Following commitments by Secretary-General António Guterres to put transparency and accountability measures at the forefront of his proposed UN reforms, TI-DS has recommended five actions which would help enhance the effectiveness of future missions.

In a new report entitled Corruption Risks and UN Peace Operations: Strengthening Accountability to Improve Effectiveness, TI-DS has assessed these risks and identified areas the UN is struggling to fully address.

Steve Francis, Director of Transparency International’s Defence and Security Programme, said:

“UN Peacekeepers face a difficult task when being deployed to conflict zones where corruption may have sparked the very conflict they are there to quell. If the UN is serious about reducing the root causes of conflict, it should do everything possible to ensure its own operations are protected against the same corruption risks host nations are vulnerable to. Ultimately the objective of these operations is to protect civilians, provide security and establish conditions for a sustainable peace – failure to make anti-corruption a guiding principle in both a peace keeping mission’s design and delivery threatens to delegitimise what is supposed to represent a global response for good.

“Acknowledging there is a problem with corruption is undoubtedly the first step to solving it, and the commitment from Secretary-General António Guterres to improve accountability in peacekeeping operations is a welcome step in the right direction. Transparency International wants to help the UN in its efforts to reform, and our research offers clear, deliverable changes which would address the risks and strengthen those anti-corruption measures already in place. We hope the UN leadership will consider our recommendations, make good on its pledge to improve accountability and take the required steps to safeguard the legitimacy and success of future peacekeeping operations.”

The report summarises the key findings of an in-depth study which has also been published today. TI-DS drew on UN documents, secondary literature and some 50 interviews with a range of former UN officials, officials from Member States, as well as academics and community groups.

Recommendations include:

  • Adding credibility to the commitment to fight corruption by improving funding to specialist oversight offices, and staffing these internal watchdogs with anti-corruption experts.
  • Acknowledging that UN peacekeeping operations, which inherently involve a large influx of funds, resources and personnel, may create an unintended corruption risk for the host nation – and planning ways to mitigate this risk from the outset.
  • Drafting clear and unambiguous mandates in conjunction with host nations and other UN Member States to enhance the legitimacy and effectiveness of peacekeeping missions.
  • Ensuring any peacekeepers found to have engaged in corrupt or illegal behaviour are properly held to account by monitoring the steps taken against those who have been repatriated for trial or investigation.



Harvey Gavin
+44 (0)20 3096 7695
+44 (0)79 6456 0340

Notes to Editors:

The UN Security Council held its first ever meeting to address the links between corruption and conflict in September 2018. Addressing the Council, Secretary-General António Guterres emphasised these links and warned that corruption is a problem in all nations, both rich and poor.

He said UN Member States must be on the front lines of combatting corruption, adding that UN peace operations should also employ a clear anti‑corruption lens.

TI-DS is one of Transparency International’s global initiatives and is based in our London office. Through its work, TI-DS is fighting to establish global standards and hold advanced and emerging powers to account, prevent conflict and support fragile countries and address systemic corruption risks in the arms trade.

Transparency International is the civil society organisation leading the fight against corruption

TI Defence & Security

Thu 7 Mar 19 // Uncategorised

7th March 2019, London – A resolution, passed in the Dutch Parliament, calling on the Dutch Government to support the inclusion of anti-corruption measures as a separate criterion in EU arms exports, is an important move that we hope will see further action, according to Transparency International Defence and Security Programme and Transparency International Netherlands.

On Tuesday, Dutch MPs voted to support a resolution that called for the strengthening of EU arms export criteria and noting that corruption occurs in major arms deals, contrary to both the law and the principle of fair competition.

The current EU Common Position on arms exports control, which dates from 2008, makes no reference to corruption in its 8 criteria, despite the very high risk of corruption in this sector. Introducing a corruption criterion would open the possibility of an export licence for military technology or equipment being denied where there is a clear risk that the deal might involve a significant level of corrupt practices. 

Steve Francis, Director of Transparency International Defence and Security said:

“We welcome this step by the Dutch Parliament as it calls the Government to take a leading role within the EU to carve out a new and explicit anti-corruption criterion in the EU’s arms export regime. We now hope the Dutch Government will use its influence in the European Council to push for the inclusion of this criterion as part of the Common Position review.”

“Big steps and strong leadership from member states is vital in tackling the risks posed to citizens, as well as the unfair playing field created by defence companies that engage in corrupt activity. We therefore hope other member states will adopt similar approaches to ensure anti-corruption provisions are properly considered ahead of arms deals.” 


Dominic Kavakeb
+44 20 3096 7695
+44 79 6456 0340

TI Defence & Security

Fri 1 Feb 19 // Uncategorised

Less than a month into his new role as Director of our Defence and Security Programme, we sit down with Steve and find out why he joined the fight against corruption and what he’s most looking forward to.

What inspired you to join Transparency International?

I had been aware of TI’s work, especially the Government Defence Index for some time having used the index while studying at Pakistan’s National Defence University. TI’s Corruption Perceptions Index was also in use at the British High Commission in Islamabad during my time there in 2013-15.  But while I was aware of the Movement, I hadn’t necessarily considered it as possible second career option while I was still serving in the military. What I was more certain of however, was that when I did retire from military service, I wanted to find a role in the INGO sector that would allow me to continue to be involved in international development. That said, I was also acutely conscious that although I had worked with and alongside good people from the sector before, moving into it ‘from the outside’ as it were, would be a huge challenge, as anyone that has ‘jumped sector’ would attest to. So when I discovered that TI were recruiting a new Director of the Defence & Security Programme I leapt at the opportunity. It encapsulated everything I was looking for. It would allow me to transition from the military to the INGO sector, yet was a role that would allow me to leverage the experience I had gained over a 30-year career in the Royal Marines. The learning curve would of course still be very steep, but it would be scalable; and I sensed that I could quickly add value, while those other – more sector specific skills – caught up.                    

How has your career in the military shaped your view of corruption?

For most of my career, my understanding of corruption was probably rather rudimentary. When I had come across it, for example as a junior officer working with foreign militaries, it was seen through the lens of low-level criminality. It was generally viewed as something endemic to a culture or a country that had to be accepted as ‘just the way things are’.  Sure, we needed to recognise it; be aware of its pitfalls and work around it, but it wasn’t something that we could tackle. Indeed, it wasn’t even our job to do so, that sort of thing was seen as being for law enforcement agencies to take on, not the military. It wasn’t until I was involved in the Afghan Campaign as planning officer later in my career that I started to realise that one of the reasons why the ISAF coalition could never seem to persuade ordinary Afghans to side with the international community instead of the Taliban, was because although we were offering security, we were doing so without also offering justice. To me, the problem we were facing in Afghanistan seemed to be as much about Justice Sector Reform as it was Defence Sector Reform, yet the international community either failed see it as a priority, or simply equated justice reform with police reform. The flaw in my analysis then, was that while I had recognised a symptom, I hadn’t diagnosed its underlying cause namely the affront that is corruption.  The only consolation is that I wasn’t just me that had failed to recognise the real nature of the insurgency in Afghanistan, most if not all of us had, particularly in the formative stages of the conflict.       

What do you think are the key challenges for tackling corruption in the defence and security sector going forwards?

That’s a difficult one to answer in my first month in TI and when I’m still in the foothills of that learning curve I described. It’s not just the size, complexity and scope of the sector that is a challenge, but also what I’ve heard described as ‘defence exceptionalism’. In essence that (rather convenient) sense within the sector, that defence is inherently different; that by its very nature it has to be shrouded behind a veil of secrecy.  Some parts of it undoubtedly do, but in my experience such areas are actually the exception rather than the rule and the more self-aware, confident and professional a defence institution is, the more it understands that rather than a threat, transparency is actually a strength and a safe guard. Beyond that, a much bigger concern are those forces that together are increasingly challenging liberal democracy and the rules based international order. The headwinds of populism and authoritarianism are stiffening, which will make the job of anyone engaged in ‘speaking truth to power’ both harder and in some cases, more dangerous. Conversely of course, it also makes the job of TI-DS – and many others in civil society – even more important.                 

What are you looking forward to most about the role?

To be able to build an even better and more impactful team around me that can take on the fight against corruption in this most challenging of sectors. We already have a diverse range of fantastically talented and committed people in the Programme and I know there are more out there that both want and deserve to join us in this important endeavour – whether that be here in London, in a sister TI Chapter or working as individuals in support of our projects. I also want to build on the inspired legacy of my predecessor who did so much of the heavy lifting required to chart our current course.      

What can we expect for your team in the coming months?

I hope our scheduled programme of work will speak for itself. What won’t be seen by those outside the team, is all the work we are about to embark on that’s designed to improve our internal management processes. It isn’t glamourous and it isn’t why we joined TI, but it is essential. And if we can get it right – and we will – the pay-off should actually be a reduction in the time spent administrating ourselves and correspondingly more time to think about how we deliver lasting impact – and that’s the fun part of the job.      

TI Defence & Security

Wed 16 Jan 19 // Uncategorised

16th January 2019, London – Transparency International is delighted to announce, from the start of January, Steve Francis as the new Director of its global programme on Defence & Security. His last assignment in the Royal Marines was in the British High Commission in Islamabad where he served as the UK’s Naval and Air Adviser; at Transparency International he will lead the Movement’s global work aimed at tackling corruption in the defence and security sector.

Steve joined the Royal Marines in 1988. Over the course of a 30-year career he served in a number of different roles, including heading up the Royal Navy’s International Engagement Team and working as the principal aide to the Coalition Deputy Commander in Afghanistan.

Transparency International’s global programme on defence and security is based within Transparency International UK (TI-UK) in London. As Director, Steve joins the Senior Management Team of TI-UK helping to shape the organisation’s strategy as well as leading a team of 20 full-time members of staff based in London and other locations around the world.

Steve Francis, Director of Transparency International Defence and Security Programme, said:

“I’m extremely proud to be taking on a global leadership role in such a well-respected organisation. Having served in a number of conflict ridden and fragile states during my former military career, I have witnessed first-hand how corruption can erode State institutions, undermine public trust, create insecurity and perpetuate conflict and its associated evils like poverty and injustice. I am hugely honoured to be given the opportunity to be part of the fight back against that corruption and its practices around the globe.”

Robert Barrington, Executive Director of Transparency International UK, said:

“I am delighted to welcome Steve to lead TI’s global defence and security work. He brings with him a wealth of experience and knowledge from the armed forces, notably in areas of the world where the problem of corruption is particularly acute. TI has selected the theme of defence & security as a key area of focus as it is notorious for corruption, shrouded in secrecy and has a tangible impact on the lives of ordinary people. Steve joins a dynamic team with a number of major achievements already under its belt and is currently working on some very innovative projects which will build on the success of Steve’s predecessors.”



Dominic Kavakeb
020 3096 7695
079 6456 0340

TI Defence & Security

Thu 4 Oct 18 // Industry Integrity

Transparency International Defnce & Security would like to announce the initial phase of the 2019 edition of the Defence Companies Anti-Corruption Index (DCI).

UPDATE: The assessment phase of the DCI is now underway and will last until approximately November 2019. To provide input during this process, please contact the team at

What is the Defence Companies Anti-Corruption Index (DCI)?

The DCI sets standards for transparency, accountability and anti-corruption programmes in the defence sector. By analysing what companies are publicly committing to in terms of their openness, policies and procedures, we seek to drive reform in the sector, reducing corruption and its impact. The DCI will assess 140 of the world’s leading defence companies across 39 countries. The Index was first published in 2012 with a second edition in 2015, and the latest edition is set to be published in early 2020.

Following consultation with the industry, governments and civil society, the upcoming index will apply a revised methodology and will include some key differences from previous editions. The final Questionnaire and Model Answer document for the 2019 DCI can be found here.

How will the 2019 Index be different?

After a comprehensive review, the new DCI assessment has evolved and should be read alongside our recent report ‘Out of the Shadows: Promoting Openness and Accountability in the Global Defence Industry’ – which provides greater insight into the theory behind our methodology. Based on consultations with anti-corruption and defence experts, TI DS have identified 10 key areas where higher anti-corruption standards and improved disclosure can reduce the opportunity for corruption.

In one of the most significant changes to the methodology, TI DS will this year base the research only on what companies choose to make publicly available. The decision to exclude internal information from the evaluation reflects our increased focus on transparency, public disclosure of information, incident response and the practical implementation of anti-bribery and corruption programmes.

Greater openness and transparency will not only help reduce corruption in the sector, it will build public trust, reassure investors, build constructive relationships with customers and improve the reputation of companies and the industry as a whole. Ultimately, the most responsible companies in the sector will benefit from adopting this approach and the clean business practices it promotes.

How have companies been selected?

Companies for the 2019 DCI have been selected on the basis that:

  • The company features in the 2016 edition of SIPRI’s Top 100 Arms-Producing and Military Services companies.
  • The company features in the 2016 edition of Defence Industry Weekly’s Top 100 defence companies.
  • The company is the largest national defence company headquartered in a country exporting at least £10 million, as identified by SIPRI.

To see the list of companies selected for assessment in 2019, click here.

How will data on companies be collected?

Our assessment of a company’s individual anti-bribery and corruption record is based entirely on publicly available information. In particular, we will review the company’s website, including any available reports, for evidence of robust anti-corruption systems, as well as any functioning hyperlinks to other relevant online materials. In reviewing your company’s materials, we will assess the completeness and accessibility of the information, in particular:

  • The amount of information a company publishes about its internal anti-corruption programmes, incident response systems and interactions with third parties;
  • Evidence that these systems are used by employees and made available to all employees;
  • Evidence that the company monitors and reviews its anti-bribery and corruption processes.

Researchers from TI DS began conducting assessments of each company’s public information in May 2019. The initial results will be shared with each company where contact details have been identified, after which you will have the opportunity to review the initial findings and suggest any corrections. The final assessments will be published on our website.

Where can I find the assessment criteria?

The final version of the 2019 Questionnaire and Model Answer document is available here. Companies, governments, and civil society alike were invited to provide feedback on the methodology as part of the process to develop the new Model Answer document. To view an anonymised version of this feedback, click here.

Our accompanying report ‘Out of the Shadows: Promoting Openness and Accountability in the Global Defence Industry’ provides greater insight into the theory behind the changes to the 2019 methodology.

What is the timeline for the Index?

Research for the 2019 assessments began in May 2019.

As part of the research phase, we will aim to contact companies to notify them of an approximate assessment date. Each company will have the chance to review the initial findings and suggest any corrections if relevant. This will be an ongoing process, lasting until November 2019.

We aim to have the assessment phase of the index completed by November 2019, and following an analysis of the overall results, aim to publish the full index in early 2020.

What do companies have to do next?

Once an initial assessment is complete, each company will have a period of 4 weeks to respond to the draft assessment and suggest any corrections or additional published evidence. Where possible, TI will notify companies of an approximate review date in advance.

Companies still have the opportunity to make any improvements to their publicly available documents based on the final version of the Question and Model Answer document. Since the research phase is already underway, companies are encouraged to notify TI of any changes in publicly available documents so that we can take all of these details into account in the assessments. To do this, please email the team at

We aim to complete this research phase by the end of 2019, with the publication of the results expected in early 2020.

Some companies have chosen to make their publicly available information more accessible for TI researchers. This is not compulsory, and the company will still be subject to a full assessment as usual, but this will help with the assessment process. For example, ThyssenKrupp has addressed each section of the DCI methodology on a dedicated webpage.

What kind of feedback are companies expected to provide?

Companies may provide feedback on their draft assessment during the 4 weeks period after they receive the initial findings, between May and November 2019. 

TI will send companies the full assessment, with the scoring and evidence found on a question-by-question basis. Companies may provide feedback in any format they wish. This may include:

  • Comments regarding the score awarded for a particular question;
  • Comments and links to any publicly available information that may have been missed from the assessment;
  • Comments and links to any publicly available information recently published

All feedback will be reviewed by our researchers and incorporated into the final assessment where relevant. To provide input during this process, please contact the team at

Companies will receive a copy of their final assessment prior to publication in early 2020.

Will companies be compared to their 2015 result?

No – due to the extensive changes in the aim, focus and methodology of the 2019 DCI, companies will not be directly compared with their overall score from 2015. Some parallels may be drawn between individual questions that have not changed since the 2015 edition, but this will not be reflected in the overall results.


TI Defence & Security

2nd October 2018, Kyiv – On Tuesday, October 2, the Independent Defence Anti-Corruption Committee presented its new report, Poor governance and corruption in Ukraine’s defence housing system: Risks and Recommendations, and called for systemic changes in how servicemen and women are housed. There are 47 thousand families of servicemen currently waiting for homes. According to a preliminary calculation by NAKO, under the current model, it would take more than 600 years to house them all.

NAKO identified ineffective management and corruption risks, including that a few individuals have the power to make decisions with few controls and little oversight. Interviewees reported that servicemen are required to pay bribes to get a place in the queue for houses, even as some are provided with multiple homes.

And poor oversight means that companies that fail to deliver on the buildings they’ve committed to are not held to account; in one instance, the director of a company that failed to build the homes it was contracted to was even put in the position of overseeing the body ensuring that military properties are built.

The report also identified that poor planning by the MOD leads to unbuilt homes and drained budgets, even as thousands wait for homes. In one building alone, researchers found that the Ministry paid more than $300,000 US dollars over what the Ministry of Regional Development estimated the cost should be.

NAKO Co-Chair James Wasserstrom stated: “It is high time for the MOD to find a realistic way to make good on unrealistic Soviet promises. This is going to require a major change that won’t be easy. It will require political courage to make decisions in the long-terms interests of Ukraine’s military, rather than sticking to commitments that the Ministry is unable to deliver.”

NAKOs New Committee Member, Former NATO Vice Chief fo Staff, SHAPE, LTG Michel Yekovleff, stressed the need for Ukraine to keep its Euro/Atlantic promises: “Being with the EU and NATO means following their principles and procedures”.

In terms of defence housing, it means that Ukraine is expected to follow the best examples of the Euroatlantic contries providing the decent housing to the servicemen in a transparent and non-prone to corruption way”.

NAKO recommends that the Ministry of Defence:

1. Abolish the housing queue. Instead of promising homes that the Ministry cannot deliver, it should move to a model of transparent, fair monetary compensation for personnel, which is not only more realistic, but also puts decision-making in the hands of service families.

2. Conduct an audit of existing homes and the queue of those waiting for homes. This can be used to make the Maino-Zhytlo software, which tracks the queue and available homes, more effective.

3. Adopt capability-based planning, so that housing projects that the MOD embarks on are based on the real needs of its troops.

NAKO conducted the research on housing corruption at the request of Defence Minister Poltorak. The Committee has offered to advise and support the Ministry on the implementation of the recommendations for systemic reform.


Download NAKOs Research ‘Poor Governance and Corruption in Ukraine’s Defence Housing System: Risks and Recommendations’ here


The Independent Defence Anti-Corruption Committee (NAKO) aims to reduce corruption and increase accountability in the Ukrainian defence sector. It is a joint initiative of Transparency International Defence and Security (TI-DSP) and  Transparency International Україна (ТІ Ukraine). NAKO’s vision is that Ukraine’s defence and security sector that is accountable, efficient, and has a low level of corruption. Its mission is to minimize opportunities for corruption through strong research, effective advocacy, and increased public awareness, in order to strengthen the Ukrainian defence and security sector.

The Committee consists of six members: Editor in Chief of ‘Ukrayinska Pravda’ Sevgil Musaieva, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Former First Deputy Secretary Defence and Security Council of Ukraine Volodymyr Ogryzko, Chairman of Centre UA, co-initiator of Chesno Campaign Oleh Rybachuk, Chair of the OECD Working Group on Bribery and Former Anti-Corruption Commissioner in Slovenia Drago Kos, and anti-corruption expert and Former Head of Oversight of Public Utilities at the UN Mission in Kosovo James Wasserstrom. The committee is supported by a Secretariat in Kyiv, which is led by Olena Tregub.

TI Defence & Security

Tue 19 Jun 18 // Uncategorised

19th June 2018, Kiev – The Independent Defence Anti-Corruption Committee (NAKO) announced on June 19th that it is in favour of the revised tender for an independent audit and strategic analysis of Ukroboronprom. It has reestablished dialogue with Ukroboronprom and intends to monitor the tendering process.

NAKO said that the process is the opportunity to bring light to inefficiencies, corruption risks and structural deficits at Ukroboronprom and will be a first step towards resolving these issues and building a state-owned defence establishment that meets the needs of the public and armed forces. The NAKO committee stated that the creation of the independent Supervisory Board, which was appointed by President Petro Poroshenko this January, was a key step towards having effective governance and will be the main customer in the upcoming tender.

Volodymyr Ohryzko, NAKO Co-Chair, stated:

The Supervisory Board of Ukroboronprom is responsible for reforming the institution so that it meets the interests of the public and the Ukrainian state. This audit, in line with international standards, will aid the Supervisory Board in carrying out their responsibility and raising the company to meet international standards of governance.

The call for tender includes three parts: 1) an assessment of the corporate governance of Ukroboronprom and its members, 2) a legal review, diagnosis and consultation of Ukroboronprom and its member companies, 3) an independent financial audit of Ukroboronprom and its member companies.

The original tender did not include some of these components, including the independent financial audit. The NAKO provided recommendations to Ukroboronprom’s Supervisory Board about what should be included in the tender, and the Supervisory Board revised it in line with these recommendations. Following those amendments, the tender process is currently underway. The deadline has been extended from June 18th to September 28th in order to give a broader range of companies the opportunity to bid.

Drago Kos, NAKO Co-Chair said:

We hope to see a strong pool of auditing firms bidding for this. It is undoubtedly complex – but if it can be reformed, the impact on Ukraine and its future will be historic.

Olena Tregub, NAKO Secretary General confirmed that:

The NAKO continues to monitor this tender; our aim is to ensure that the reform of Ukroboronprom is provided with clear advice on the corporate structure and management, and that a full financial audit will identify financial black holes in the company – and will facilitate an evidence-based reform programme.

More details on the tender can be found here.



The Independent Defence AntiCorruption Committee (NAKO) is a joint initiative to fight corruption in the Ukrainian defence sector run by Transparency International Defence and Security Program Great Britain (TI-DSP) and Transparency International Україна (ТІ Ukraine).

The Committee consists of six members: Editor in Chief of online mediaUkrayinska PravdaSevgil MusaievaBorovyk, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Former First Deputy Secretary Defence and Security Council of Ukraine Volodymyr Ogryzko, Chairman of Centre UA, coinitiator of Chesno Campaign Oleh Rybachuk, LieutenantGeneral of the British Army and Former Commander of the NATO Allied Rapid Reaction Corps Timothy Evans, Former AntiCorruption Commissioner in Slovenia Drago Kos and Former Head of Oversight of Public Utilities at the UN Mission in Kosovo James Wasserstrom.

The goal for the NAKO is to reduce corruption risks in defence and security sector of Ukraine by means of monitoring, evaluation and analysis of anti-corruption reforms and providing the corresponding recommendations.


Dominic Kavakeb
+44 20 3096 7695
+44 79 6456 0340


TI Defence & Security