Category: Conflict & Insecurity

February 25, 2021 – Stabilisation and peacebuilding efforts in West Africa are being undermined by a failure to address underlying corruption and a lack of accountability in the region’s security sectors, according to new research by Transparency International.

The Missing Element finds that strengthening accountability and governance of groups including the armed forces, law enforcement and intelligence services – not just providing training and new equipment – is a crucial but often neglected component to successful security sector reform (SSR).

Read the report.

By analysing examples from across West Africa, the report details how the high threat of corruption has undermined the rule of law, fuelled instability, and ultimately resulted in SSR efforts falling short of their objectives.

The report serves as a framework for policymakers to assess how corruption is fuelling conflict, then embed anti-corruption measures to reform the security sector into one which is more effective at maintaining peace and more accountable to the population it serves.

Natalie Hogg, Director of Transparency International’s Defence & Security Programme, said:

“Stabilisation and peacebuilding efforts across West Africa have focussed largely on providing training and equipment but rarely resulted in major change. This report details how a focus on anti-corruption and strengthening accountability has been the missing element. Only by recognising and understanding the impact of corruption in the defence and security sector and taking steps to combat it can these programmes hope to transform the sector into one which is both efficient and accountable.”

The Missing Element analyses security sector reform and governance in five countries that our research has previously flagged as being at a high risk of defence sector corruption: Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Mali, Niger and Nigeria.

It concludes these interventions fell short because the focus was on providing practical support such as training programmes and new weapons and equipment (with between 80-90% of funding for SSR initiatives typically spent on these) rather than addressing underlying corruption.

The report assesses the main corruption risks in West Africa which are undermining SSR efforts, including:

Financial management

Limited or ineffective supervision over how defence budgets are spent present a huge corruption risk, but reforms to improve transparency in this area have often been neglected as part of SSR programmes.

National defence strategies in Niger and Nigeria are so shrouded in secrecy that it is impossible to determine whether defence purchases are legitimate attempts to meet strategic needs or individuals embezzling public funds. In Mali, Ghana, and Côte d’Ivoire, a lack of formal processes for controlling spending has resulted in numerous examples of unplanned and opportunistic purchases.

Defence sector oversight

Effective oversight and scrutiny of the defence sector by parliamentarians is essential to increase accountability and reduce opportunities for corruption, but despite being a key pillar of SSR, parliamentary oversight remains poor in West Africa.

In Ghana, only a handful of the 18 members of the Parliament Select Committee on Defence and Interior have the relevant technical expertise to perform their responsibilities. In Mali, the parliamentary body charged with scrutinising the defence sector was chaired by the president’s son until mid-2020. In Niger, the National Audit Office, which is responsible for auditing the defence sector’s spending, published its audit for 2014 in 2017.

Recommendations:

• SSR policymakers at institutional level, such as United Nations (UN), African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), to publicly acknowledge the nexus between corruption and conflict, and adapt SSR policy frameworks accordingly.
• SSR practitioners operating in West Africa to undertake corruption-responsive SSR assessments to better inform the design of national SSR strategies and in all phases of their implementation.
• SSR practitioners to build on anti-corruption expertise to ensure that corruption is addressed as an underlying cause of conflict.

Notes to editors:

Security sector refers to the institutions and personnel responsible for the management, provision and oversight of security in a country. Broadly, the security sector includes defence, law enforcement, corrections, intelligence services and institutions responsible for border management, customs and civil emergencies.

Security sector reform (SSR) is a process of assessment, review and implementation as well as monitoring and evaluation led by national authorities that has as its goal the enhancement of effective and accountable security for the state and its peoples without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law.

The five countries analysed in this report (Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Mali, Niger and Nigeria) were previously assessed in Transparency International Defence & Security’s Government Defence Integrity Index.

About Transparency International Defence & Security

The Defence & Security Programme is part of the global Transparency International movement and works towards a world where governments, the armed forces, and arms transfers are transparent, accountable, and free from corruption.

Two decades after the UN formally acknowledged the disproportionate and devastating impact of armed conflict on women and girls with the landmark Security Council Resolution 1325, we speak with Hon. Florence Kajuju, chair of the Commission on Administrative Justice and Secretary General of the African Ombudsman and Mediators Association, to discuss its effect and the need to integrate a gender perspective in security sector reform.

Our research shows that corruption has a detrimental effect on the efficiency of security institutions and can threaten peace and breed instability. A growing body of evidence also points to how patterns of both facilitating and tolerating corruption are gendered and are often based upon patriarchal structures and imbalances of power within societies. Fragile and insecure contexts exacerbate underlying gender dynamics that make the varied experiences of women, men, girls, and boys more visible.

The 20^th anniversary of the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security is a crucial reminder of the need to reaffirm the importance of including women and gender perspectives in conflict prevention, peacebuilding and governance. To mark the occasion, we interview Hon. Florence Kajuju, the Chairperson of the Commission on Administrative Justice (Office of the Ombudsman) and Secretary General of the African Ombudsman and Mediators Association (AOMA). Hon. Kajuju is an Advocate of the High Court of Kenya with over 25 years’ experience. She has previously served as a County Member of Parliament and Vice-Chairperson of the Law Society of Kenya.

Transparency International – Defence & Security: Hon. Florence Kajuju, could you please tell us what UNSC Resolution 1325 has meant for you personally and in your career?

Hon. Florence Kajuju: The passing of UNSC Resolution 1325 was a huge gain for women and it is up to us to make sure that we continue moving the agenda forward, so that we do not fail the women of this country and beyond. In my journey as an advocate at the High Court of Kenya and as a member of parliament, I have witnessed how women have struggled to be at the decision-making table, have been told to be in the kitchen rather than to vote, even though we as women make up over 50 per cent of the population. This resolution was certainly instrumental in the passing of the Kenyan Constitution in 2010, as we sought to ensure women were given equal opportunities and participate in the politics, social aspects and economics of the country. At national and county levels, we need to make sure that the Women, Peace and Security Agenda is implemented to the letter and that, in all aspects of civilian oversight, those institutions are indeed able to carry out their mandate.

Kenya also put in place a national action plan in 2016 to operationalise UNSC resolution 1325 and the Women, Peace and Security agenda. As a result of this, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) developed a gender policy. This policy has effectively increased women management in the MoD and I am pleased to report that this notably led to the appointment of the first Major General in the country, Fatuma Ahmed in 2018. Before this, as a woman if you had a child or were breastfeeding, you could be turned down from becoming a military official in recruitment processes, which are not valid reasons to not be part of the military!

I can also report on the increasing participation of women within  peace committees which represent at the community level the National Steering Committee on Peace Building and Conflict Management, as a result of the UNSC resolution 1325, and which led to an increase from 14 per cent of women participation in 2013 to 29 percent in 2018. This of course isn’t enough, but it is already a success. We now also have a national budget that is gender-responsive and aims to ensure that everyone feels part of the society. This is a good thing that this country has done.

Security Sector Reform seeks to enhance the effectiveness and accountability of a country’s security sector. From your perspective, how can an understanding of underlying gender dynamics at play in conflict and insecure settings help increase the ability of the security sector to meet the range of security needs within society?

To enhance the effectiveness and accountability of our security sector, it is crucial to make sure that

everyone is given equal opportunities, in a spirit of inclusiveness. The various ways in which gender affects the security of various groups should always be considered when building reform programmes. Stereotypes within government and institutions need to be dealt with. Men and women need to be on the playing field together and both be part of the game so we are able to achieve maximum benefits. As a result, a gender perspective needs to be taken in consideration throughout the entire reform process, from the design to the planning phase and to the monitoring and evaluation phase. We certainly need to be better at this in Kenya, especially as we have numerous very good laws, but implementation is lacking. This is why institutions such as the Ombudsman office are essential in overseeing the implementation of laws and regulations.

Evidence shows that there is no effectiveness without accountability. In your view, how can integrating a gender perspective in reform programmes help rebuild security forces, in a manner consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, transparency and the rule of law?

We have a history of having a patriarchal culture in our society, of women being second-class citizens, which we have been seeking to challenge, as civilian overseers of defence and security forces in particular. We have therefore put in place a gender policy, which looks both at the internal system within the Ombudsman office but also externally at the type of complaints that are being brought to us; we’ve looked at the number of complaints that speak specifically to the intersection of gender dynamics, peace and security.  One example of this has been the case of post-election violence which took place in Kenya in 2007-2008; those who were most affected by the political violence were women and children. Our role as the Ombudsman office was to make sure that beyond the complaints being dealt with, we supported the security forces in structurally taking gender consideration on board and implementing due process.

The creation of a dedicated civilian military ombudsman office in Kenya would also be a great move in this direction. It is also important for the Defence & Foreign Committee and the Administration & National Security Committee in parliament to sit down together and originate legislation or amend existing legislation to ensure a gender lens is adopted, in line with the Women, Peace and Security agenda. Once this is done across legislation, this will ease our mandate to ensure security forces abide by the law.

By Benedicte Aboul-Nasr, Project Officer, Transparency International – Defence & Security

On October 17, 2019, Lebanese citizens took to the streets in response to a government proposal to tax WhatsApp communications, in what would become known as the “Thawra”, or “Uprising” against widespread corruption and worsening economic conditions. A year after the beginning of the protests, and two months after the explosion in the Port of Beirut killed 191 people, injured over 6,500, and uprooted nearly 300,000, Lebanese citizens still have no clear answers as to why for six years, 2,700 tons of explosive chemicals were stored in hazardous conditions at the heart of Lebanon’s capital. Many suspect that a long history of negligence and corruption, the very factors that pushed people to the streets last year, are at least partly responsible for the devastation that took place on August 4, 2020.

The government response has been uneven and in the aftermath of the explosion authorities were slow to support immediate relief efforts. Instead, when Lebanese protesters took to the streets on August 8 to voice their anger towards a political class that many believe has benefited from Lebanese resources for decades, security forces responded harshly, deploying tear gas and live ammunition against protesters. Two days later, Hassan Diab’s government resigned, noting that corruption in Lebanon is “bigger than the state”. And, on August 13, eight days after the explosion, Parliament voted for a state of emergency, giving defence forces a broader mandate than the one they already had under the general mobilisation adopted to help contain COVID-19. Since then, Prime Minister-designate Mustapha Adib stepped down, within a month of his nomination, having failed to achieve the consensus necessary to form a government. At the time of writing, Lebanon remains in a political impasse, while former Prime Minister Hariri, who had stepped down two weeks into the protests in October 2019, is in the running to replace his successor.

Allegations of government corruption are not isolated incidents, and mismanagement has led to numerous crises and leadership vacuums over the years, which paved the way for the protest movement. Lebanon is now facing one of the most serious financial crises in its history which has crippled the economy. The state has defaulted on debt payments and banks are imposing de facto capital controls on withdrawals while Carnegie’s Middle East Center estimates that close to US$800 million were transferred out of the country within the first three weeks of the protests. The Lira lost 80% of its value over nine months; by July this year and Lebanon became the first country in the region to enter hyperinflation.  Even before the COVID-19 crisis hit, the World Bank had estimated that up to 45% of Lebanese citizens would be below the poverty line by the end of 2020. Despite undeniable evidence that the situation was untenable, prior to the explosion, discussions with the IMF had been stalled for months, and Alain Bifani, the finance ministry’s director-general, had resigned over state officials’ unwillingness to acknowledge the scale of the crisis and achieve consensus to identify solutions. The contract for a forensic audit of the Central Bank was only signed in August, and the audit itself did not begin until September.

The international community has offered loans and significant humanitarian aid to support victims and the reconstruction of Beirut. Tellingly, several governments have pledged that they would not disburse aid through the government, and are prioritising non-governmental organisations that have been at the forefront of assessment and reconstruction needs. Aid disbursed through the government, and renewed commitments to unlock funds promised by the CEDRE conference in 2018, are conditional on stringent anti-corruption reforms being adopted and must be accompanied by strict oversight. In this regard, it is crucial that Lebanese civil society and non-profit organisations are granted access to sufficient information to oversee the disbursement of aid and prevent funds from being lost.

As part of the broader powers and responsibilities granted to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) under the state of emergency proclaimed after the explosion, the military has been given the crucial role of coordinating the distribution of humanitarian aid and supporting other public bodies in their reconstruction efforts. In carrying out these roles, and with the additional powers from which they benefit, it is crucial that the LAF ensure the highest standards of integrity and transparency with the Lebanese public. The LAF has benefitted from a high level of trust in the past, and remains one of the most representative branches of government – the institution must ensure that it maintains trust and supports ways forward for the Lebanese, in particular as Lebanese citizens and organisations rebuild.

The coming months will be crucial for Beirut’s reconstruction and to help lift Lebanon out of the crisis it is experiencing. Anti-corruption measures and transparency, not only in the disbursement of aid but also in reform efforts, should be prioritised by the armed forces themselves, and more broadly by an incoming government committed to resolve the financial and political crises Lebanon currently faces as the country seeks international support. The Lebanese Transparency Association (LTA), Transparency International’s national chapter in Lebanon, has been advocating alongside Transparency International – Defence & Security for increased transparency and accountability of the defence sector since 2018. In 2020, LTA continued to emphasise the urgent need for further transparency with constituents, and for the armed forces to implement access to information legislation to allow Lebanese citizens to understand how the body functions. As the LAF maintain responsibility in the aftermath of the explosion, both for aid disbursement and for maintaining security alongside security forces, clear communications and oversight of the defence sector are critical.

The explosion and its aftermath have brought issues that Lebanese citizens were familiar with – and which pushed many to the streets over the last year – to the forefront of Lebanon’s dealings with the international community. Only by tackling the root causes, continuing to push for reform, and beginning to rebuild institutions in which the public can trust, will Lebanon have a chance to become more stable and pave a way out of the crisis. Lebanese politicians have often shown willingness to commit to reforms when dealing with the international community in the past. However; reforms have then stalled due to a lack of consensus, for instance leading to delays in implementing access to information legislation, or in selecting members for the National Anti-Corruption Commission. As the international community aims to support Lebanese citizens and help rebuild Beirut, they should be wary of attempts to divert assistance, and of mismanagement in the disbursement of funds. Instead, any international and national initiatives should support Lebanese citizens’ calls to dismantle the root causes of corruption, for the political class to seriously address the financial crisis, and for concrete and measurable steps for reform and accountability.

Benedicte Aboul-Nasr is Transparency International – Defence & Security’s Project Officer working on Conflict and Insecurity, with a focus on the MENA region. She has a background in international humanitarian law and the protection of civilians, and currently researches links between corruption and situations of crisis and conflict.

Governance reforms, including to security sector, are urgently needed

23 October 2020 – Transparency International condemns the Nigerian state’s excessive use of force and the continued perpetration of violence against peaceful protesters.

Protests that began with demands for an end to police brutality and the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS), have since transformed into wider calls for an end to corruption and the looting of public funds. The government must respond to these calls with serious evidence-based anti-corruption reforms, including to the security sector, in dialogue with civil society.

Natalie Hogg, Director of Transparency International – Defence & Security, said: “The appalling violence we have seen against peaceful protestors has to end. The only way to restore the much-needed trust in relations between Nigerian citizens and the security sector is to respect and protect basic human rights. Further repressive actions against legitimate demands for an improved security sector in Nigeria will only escalate the situation.”

Nigeria’s score on the Government Defence Integrity Index by Transparency International – Defence & Security rates corruption risks in the country’s security sector as Very High, with extremely limited controls in operations and procurement. While oversight mechanisms are in place, they often lack coordination, expertise, resources, and adequate information to fully perform their role.

In addition, Nigeria has seen no significant improvement in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index since the current methodology was introduced in 2012. The 2019 Global Corruption Barometer for Africa found that Nigerians rate the police as the most corrupt institution in the country. Almost half of those surveyed reported paying a bribe to the police in the previous 12 months.

Delia Ferreira Rubio, Chair of Transparency International, said: “Corruption deprives ordinary people of their rights to peace, health, security and prosperity. It robs young people of a future in which they can fulfil their potential, and it misappropriates the wealth of a nation for the benefit of the few. Peaceful protesters exercising their right to freedom of assembly must never be met with violence and brutality. Citizens’ demands for an end to corruption must be heard and acted upon.”

Auwal Musa Rafsanjani, Executive Director of the Civil Society Legal Advocacy Centre (CISLAC), Transparency International’s national chapter in Nigeria, said: “The government of Nigeria must immediately stop deploying troops against protestors. The young people who have taken to the streets have a constitutional right to express their grievances through peaceful protest without facing violence and brutality from the state. Together with our civil society partners in Nigeria, we stand ready to work with the government on the root and branch reforms needed to the police and security agencies, and to stop the looting of public funds through corruption. We also condemn the violence and the destruction of property by groups that have infiltrated the peaceful protests.”

Despite promising initiatives, tackling corruption in the Nigerien security sector is still hindered by secrecy

By Flora Stevens, Project Officer – Global Advocacy

Africa’s Sahel has been plagued with conflict and insecurity for more than a decade, and the recent ramping up of violence in the region is putting already weakened armed forces under increased strain. Defence sectors across the region suffer from low levels of civilian democratic control, weak institutional oversight and are struggling to fulfil their mission to improve security in the face of a sharp uptick in attacks from non-state armed groups.

Sandwiched between jihadi militants operating in Mali and Burkina Faso to the west, Boko Haram and affiliated groups continuing to launch devastating attacks in Nigeria to the south and war-torn Libya to the north, Niger has found itself drawn into these conflicts. The complex operational requirements of bringing security to the country, with the huge distances between major settlements, porous borders and hundreds of thousands of displaced people, would pose a challenge for any armed force. But Niger, like its neighbours in the region, is also grappling with the debilitating issue of corruption in its defence sector.

Transparency International Niger has been part of the fight against corruption since 2001. The chapter works to raise public awareness of corruption issues and offers anti-corruption training to citizens. “This has enabled us to mobilise and engage citizens in the fight against corruption in our country,” said Hassane Amadou Diallo, head of the organisation. Transparency International Niger has recorded a series of major successes in its work, including a long-running advocacy campaign which culminated with Niger ratifying the United Nations Convention against Corruption in 2006, and a separate effort to abolish the ‘entrance exam’ to the civil service, a highly competitive processes which on two occasions was marred by fraud and corruption.

More recently, working with Transparency International – Defence & Security, the chapter has been involved in tackling the pernicious issue of defence corruption. Despite recent promising initiatives at national level, efforts designed to fight corruption and improve defence governance have been hindered by a high level of secrecy. It was recently revealed that almost 40% of the $312 million Niger spent on defence procurement contracts over the last three years was lost through inflated costs or materiel that was not delivered, according to a government audit of military contracts. “More than 90% of the contracts awarded to the Ministry of Defence were negotiated by direct agreement, which favoured corruptive practices and overbilling”, said Hassane Amadou. “The competition is unfair, fictitious and sometimes non-existent.” These findings came as the crisis in the Sahel continues to worsen, with hundreds of Nigerien security forces killed in fighting. At the same time, troops on the front line have complained about a lack of kit or being provided with inadequate equipment. Hassane Amadou said the audit that uncovered the extent of the procurement mismanagement would now be subject to a lengthy legal challenge. “TI Niger is hoping a fair trial will take place and that those responsible will be punished in accordance with the law,” he said.

While the findings of the audit are shocking, they unfortunately do not come as a surprise. Transparency International – Defence and Security’s Government Defence Integrity Index (GDI) recently found that while government procurement regulations are clearly spelled out in law, there is a long-standing exemption for defence procurement. The 2016 Code of Public Procurements omits goods, equipment, supplies and services related to defence and security, which effectively leaves the door open to the sort of corrupt practices uncovered by the audit.

Hassane Amadou said that TI Niger has shared the main conclusions of the GDI findings with those in charge of the defence and security forces in the country. “On the basis of the GDI, we then developed an action plan targeting various stakeholders, namely the Ministry of Defence, the parliament, defence and security officials, technical and financial partners, the media and civil society,” he said.

But while there have been signs that Niger is striving to improve its security sector governance as a key pillar for future development and long-term peace and stability, the lack of emphasis on the issue of corruption could critically undermine the effectiveness and sustainability of the whole process.

Despite the impressive reform efforts of the past few years, including the 2016-2021 Renaissance Programme, the 2016 Anti-Corruption Bill, and the 2018 National Strategy to Fight Corruption, Niger is struggling to ensure their effective implementation. The Nigerien government should primarily focus on closing this gap and on rectifying loopholes that allow for corruption in the defence procurement sector to thrive. This could include revising relevant legislation to ensure it effectively applies to all defence acquisitions, with no exceptions.

It is fundamental for the Nigerien military to fully grasp the intrinsic link between corruption and operational efficiency. An important focus area must be the deployment of trained professionals to monitor corruption risks in the field. There is unfortunately currently little evidence of this. There is no pre-deployment corruption-specific training for personnel and no guidelines on addressing corruption risks during operations.

To tackle the security threats Niger is facing, mitigating corruption risks in the defence sector is paramount and requires a robust, disciplined and integrated approach on the part of the Niger government. It needs to ensure civilian oversight is strengthened through well-functioning oversight mechanisms, while making sure corruption is approached in a systemic or comprehensive manner during troop deployment.

This article originally appeared on the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) website.

By Ara Marcen Naval and Karolina MacLachlan.

Throughout the coronavirus outbreak, all eyes have been on the sector providing the frontline response to the epidemic: healthcare. But as the military steps in to assist in a growing number of countries around the world, there are questions about whether that could lead to additional problems.

The military capacity for rapid, large-scale movements – whether to protect hospitals, distribute supplies or increase transport capabilities – can be essential in responding to an infectious disease outbreak. Large-scale military deployments are likely to have the biggest impact in countries with weak healthcare systems and governance, limited civilian response capacities, vastly dispersed populations, or ongoing conflict and insecurity.

As low-income countries brace for the onset of the coronavirus pandemic and health authorities warn of challenges ahead, it is important to remember that large-scale military operations in support of the response to coronavirus in fragile and conflict states carry significant risks. Political, financial and health crises often expose cracks in the system that are less noticeable in more settled times. For instance, long-term governance gaps and ongoing corruption in armed forces can undermine civilian trust, making their work during crises more difficult. Military deployments during the Ebola outbreaks in the DRC and Liberia in 2014 and 2019 are examples of the role armed forces can play in limiting the scale of an epidemic – yet groups such as Médecins Sans Frontières also argued that years of abuse at the hands of the DRC’s military had made the local population wary of these troops, undermining their efforts.

Transparency International’s Defence and Security research shows that in many developing and fragile states, defence sectors tend to be poorly governed. High levels of secrecy and dysfunctional oversight structures often enable fraud, corruption and a wide range of abuses. The coronavirus crisis, like others before, has the potential to exacerbate these vulnerabilities, weakening militaries when they are needed most.

For example, where frontline soldiers go unpaid or have their salaries stolen by senior officers – a problem which research indicates affects the DRC, Iraq, Mali and Nigeria – militaries could see ill-disciplined units prone to avoiding service, busy trying to secure other sources of income or abusing civilians. A health and humanitarian emergency, which puts frontline responders at additional risk, could prove too much for those troops to handle, while sudden access to scarce resources could provide opportunities at the expense of the civilian population. Where militaries are already affected by corrupt practices, acceptance of small bribes and other favours can undermine containment efforts. Simultaneously, favouritism or corrupt networks could skew distribution of healthcare equipment by influencing the choice of priorities. Disciplinary issues, usually more widespread in states with weaker overall defence governance, could make an appearance or be exacerbated by the crisis. In the Philippines, for instance, President Duterte has already given police and military officials the order to shoot ‘troublemakers’.

Finally, a health and humanitarian crisis could see deployments of foreign troops into fragile and conflict states. As the Ebola example suggests, sizable deployments of US and UK forces into Liberia and the DRC helped construct and protect health facilities, distribute supplies and train healthcare workers. However, as international forces intervene in crises, the tangible and intangible resources they bring ­– such as cash, necessary items and political support for local actors – could further strengthen corrupt networks, as has been seen in countries such as Afghanistan. As Transparency International’s guidance on military interventions indicates, international forces themselves are also not immune to corruption, exacerbating challenges already in existence.

As economies weakened by coronavirus will require additional investment to rebuild, countries cannot allow uncontrolled resource outflows through defence and security institutions. Governments should take measures to strengthen defence governance immediately, offering a maximum level of protection in the short term and strengthening the global response. The authors recommend, for instance:

Inserting anti-corruption measures and the highest levels of transparency at the core of any new legislation (including that governing the distribution of resources) to respond to the emergency. This should include making publicly accessible contracts that govern financial flows and procurement associated with the crisis.
Ensuring that military deployments to help manage the emergency have clear timelines, independent oversight and are subject to review and audit mechanisms.
Extending protection to whistleblowers to help ensure that those who see corruption, whether in healthcare or in defence, can safely report it.
In the longer term and as the crisis recedes, it is key that attention to oversight and control of the defence sector becomes a priority, especially in fragile and conflict-affected states. Defence, healthcare and development are not mutually exclusive; slippage in one is likely to endanger progress in the other. Without fixing defence, sustainable development and better healthcare are unlikely to take root, especially in the most vulnerable countries.

Ara Marcen Naval is the Head of Advocacy for Transparency International – Defence & Security.

Karolina MacLachlan is Transparency International – Defence & Security’s Regional Programme Manager for Europe.

By Matthew Steadman, Project Officer – Conflict & Insecurity

2019 was a deeply concerning year for the Sahel. Attacks by extremist groups have increased five-fold in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso since 2016, with the UN now describing the violence as “unprecedented”. The past year was the deadliest by far with more than 4,000 deaths reported. Niger lost 89 soldiers in a single attack by Islamic State in Changodar in January, whilst two ISGS attacks in Mali in November claimed the lives of 92 soldiers. In Burkina Faso alone, 1,800 people were killed in the past year due to extremist violence. The intensification of extremist activity in the Sahel threatens to engulf West African coastal states, as already weakened national defence and security forces come under increasing pressure. Much international coverage of the developing events has focussed on the operational aspect of the crisis, from the various armed groups operating in the region to the international response, spearheaded by France’s Operation BARKHANE but also including MINUSMA, the G5 Sahel, the United States and the EU. However, one aspect that has been regularly overlooked is the poor capacity of the region’s national defence forces to respond to security threats as a result of poor defence governance, corruption and weak institutions.

Corruption and conflict go hand in hand, with corruption often fuelling violence and subsequently flourishing in afflicted regions. Because of corruption and poor governance, defence and security actors are often seen not as legitimate providers of security, but as net contributors to the dynamics of conflict; with poor training, management and institutional support leading to a downward cycle in which it is the civilians that more than often feel the brunt – as has been seen in Burkina Faso, Nigeria and Mali. When security institutions are perceived as corrupt, public confidence in government erodes further. Fragile governments that are unable to respond to the needs of citizens can exacerbate existing grievances, heightening social tensions and hastening the onset of violence. Across the Sahel, armed groups have been able to entrench themselves first and foremost in those areas which have been neglected by weakened and corrupt central authorities, often by positioning themselves as providers of security, justice and basic services. In this way, it is crucial to view corruption not just as the consequence of conflict, but more often as its root cause and therefore a critical element for any attempt at resolution to address.

Against this backdrop, research by Transparency International – Defence & Security’s Government Defence Integrity Index (GDI), highlights the deficiencies in the safeguards which should provide protection against corruption in the defence sectors of Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Mali, Niger and Nigeria, increasing the likelihood of defence funds and capabilities being wasted due to mismanagement of human, material and financial resources. In doing so, the GDI outlines a number of key issues which need to be addressed in order to enhance security forces’ ability to respond to threats and protect local communities:

Reinforce parliamentary oversight

Despite most countries having formal independent oversight mechanisms for defence activities, policies and procurement, our research has found that these are often only partially implemented, easily circumvented and insufficiently resourced to carry out their mandates. The result, is defence sectors which are still largely the preserve of the ruling elite and shrouded in secrecy, raising concerns over the use of vital defence funds and the management of resources and assets.

Strengthen anti-corruption measures in personnel management and military operations

Personnel management systems are also vulnerable, with inadequate or non-existent whistleblowing protections and reporting mechanisms, unclear appointment, and promotion systems open to nepotism, and codes of conduct which fail to specifically mention corruption or enforce appropriate sanctions. Equally, despite many countries in the region being actively engaged in on-going counter insurgencies, there is no evidence of Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso or Nigeria having up to date doctrine which recognises corruption as a strategic threat to operations, meaning there is little if any appropriate training on the pitfalls associated with operating in corrupt environments and little appreciation of how soldiers’ conduct might exacerbate the violence they are trying to quell.

Increase transparency and external oversight of procurement processes

Perhaps most concerning of all is that corruption risks in defence procurement remain extremely high across the region. The procurement process is opaque and largely exempt from the checks and balances which regulate other areas of public procurement in countries like Mali and Niger for instance. Across the region, the effectiveness of audit and control mechanisms over the acquisition of military goods and services is heavily restricted by blanket secrecy clauses and over-classification of defence expenditure. This raises serious concerns over the utility, relevance and value for money of purchased equipment and increases the risk of that frontline troops will not have the resources required to deliver security.

Despite these structural vulnerabilities, international assistance in the region has been heavily focussed on security assistance rather than on improving the underlying structures that govern and manage defence and security in the states that make up the region. The 13^th January summit between French President Emmanuel Macron and the leaders of the G5 Sahel countries, was emblematic of this with the meeting focussed on reaffirming France’s military presence in the region and announcing the deployment of further troops, whilst side-lining the governance deficit which underlies so much of the crisis. Programmes have tended to focus on training and equipping military and police forces in Mali and Burkina Faso for instance, or improving strike capabilities by investing in US drone bases in Niger. The concern however, is that the impact of these efforts will be blunted without a more sustained engagement in addressing the more fundamental failings that lay at the hearty of the problem. Mali’s recent announcement of a recruitment drive for 10,000 new defence and security forces personnel for example, will only be effective if it is accompanied with improvements in the way these troops are trained, led, equipped and managed and if the political and financial processes which govern them are strengthened and corruption risks reduced.

A successful response, at the national, regional and international levels, to the violence cannot be just security focussed. Poor defence governance and corruption risks will continue to hamper national forces’ operations and will hinder the impact of international efforts which support them. A more comprehensive approach is needed which addresses the underlying corruption risks which permeate the region’s defence sectors.  Improving oversight, transparency and accountability is a critical step in securing a sustainable peace in the region and ensuring that defence and security apparatuses do what they should, which is to further the human security of populations that they should be serving.

January 14, 2020 – Sweeping reforms to controls on American arms sales abroad are increasing holes in checks to identify and curb corruption – measures that can also be used to assess whether sales may help or hurt efforts to address terrorist threats and attacks – according to new research by Transparency International Defense & Security.

Launched today, Holes in the Net assesses the current state of US arms export controls by examining corruption risk in three of the most prominent sales programs, which together authorized at least $125 billion in arms sales worldwide for fiscal year 2018.

Across all three different arms sales programs, which are managed by the Defense, State, and Commerce Departments, there is a clear gap in American efforts to assess critical, known corruption risk factors. This include the risks of corrupt practices – such as theft of defense resources, bribery, and promoting military leaders based on loyalty instead of merit – weakening partner military forces.

The United States is one of the biggest arms exporters to countries identified as facing ‘critical’ corruption risk in their defense sector, including Egypt, Jordan, Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, according to recent analysis by Transparency International – Defense & Security.

Steve Francis OBE, Director of Transparency International – Defense & Security, said:

“Given the corrosive effect corruption has on military effectiveness and legitimacy, it is deeply concerning to see that these reforms to American arms export controls have made it easier for practices like bribery and embezzlement to thrive.  In order to ensure American arms sales do not fuel corruption in countries like Egypt, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, it is imperative to understand and mitigate the corruption risks associated with countries receiving US-made weapons before approving major arms deals.”

Of the three programs assessed in the report – Foreign Military Sale, Direct Commercial Sale, and the 600 Series – the 600 Series was identified as having the biggest gaps in its anti-corruption measures. Overseen by the Commerce Department, sales through this program do not require declarations on a series of major corruption risk areas, including on certain arms agents or brokers, political contributions, company subsidiaries and affiliates, and any defense offsets. These areas are common conduits used for bribery and political patronage.

More recently, the Trump administration has proposed moving many types of semi-automatic firearms and sniper rifles to Commerce Department oversight. The proposal calls for additional controls for firearms, but also reduces overall oversight of small and light weapons exports.

 Colby Goodman, Transparency International – Defense & Security consultant and author of the report, said:

“Over the past 30 years, America has established some of the strongest laws to prevent bribery and fraud by defense companies engaged in arms sales. However, defense companies selling arms through the 600 Series program no longer have to comply with key anti-corruption requirements. As a result, US officials will likely find it harder to identify and curb bribery and fraud in sales of arms overseen by the Commerce Department.”

The report analyzed five priority corruption risk factors for American arms sales programs: 1) Ill-defined and unlikely military justification; 2) Undisclosed or unfair promotions and salaries in recipient countries; 3) Under-scrutinized and illegitimate agents, brokers and consultants; 4) Ill-monitored and under-publicized defense offset contracts, and 5) Undisclosed, mismatched or secretive payments.

The report makes a series of policy recommendations that would help strengthen anti-corruption measures in these prominent arms sale programs, including:

• Creating a corruption risk framework for assessing arms sales through programs managed by the Defense, State, and Commerce Departments. These assessment frameworks must examine key risk factors identified in our report, including theft of defense resources and promoting military leaders based on loyalty instead of merits, among others.
• Strengthening defense company declarations and compliance systems for sales of arms overseen by the Commerce Department, including declarations of any defense company political contributions, marketing fees, commissions, defense offsets, and financiers and insurance brokers of arms – all clear conduits for corruption.
• Increasing transparency on arms sales and actions to combat arms trafficking overseen by the Defense, State, and Commerce Department. Critically, the Defense and State Departments need more details on defense offsets in order to properly review proposed arms sales. There is virtually no information on Commerce Department approved arms sales.
• Legislation requiring for firearms and associated munitions to remain categorized as munitions to ensure further relaxing of export controls do not adversely impact US national security or foreign policy objectives.

Notes to editors:

Interviews are available with the report author.

Holes in the Net is available to download here.

Saudi Arabia, a major importer of US-made arms, failed to defend against an attack on its oil facilities in September 2019. Reports have suggested that corrupt ‘coup-proofing’ measures designed to shield the ruling family likely contributed to the ineffective response.

Contact:

Harvey Gavin

harvey.gavin@transparency.org.uk

+44 (0)20 3096 7695

+44 (0)79 6456 0340

20th December, London – The complex web of murky pathways through which the American defense industry works to secure permission to export arms to repressive regimes in the Middle East has been laid bare in new research by Transparency International – Defence & Security.

A Mutual Extortion Racket: The Military Industrial Complex and US Foreign Policy reveals how defense industry players, elected officials, the defence bureaucracy, and governments in the Middle East – working through intermediaries such as lobbyists, think tanks, and public relations firms – are intertwined and serve one another’s interest, often at the expense of US foreign policy outcomes.

These mutually-beneficial relationships have contributed to a vicious cycle of conflict and human rights abuses across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), including increased exports of arms and defence services to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates which began under the Obama administration and has ramped up under President Trump.

Steve Francis OBE, Director of Transparency International – Defense & Security said:

“In the midst of the unending war in Yemen and after the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi last year, questions have been asked over why American arms exports to places like Saudi Arabia and the UAE have not only continued, but accelerated. After examining the murky web of lobbying, campaign finance, revolving door employment, and sometimes even downright corruption, it is now clearer how these exports are allowed to continue, despite attempts by many in Congress to stem the flow.

“While much of the system that allows these exports to continue is riddled with a lack of transparency and oversight, there are some areas in which existing strengths can be amplified. We urge Congress and the Executive branch to adopt our recommendations and ensure that arms exports are better aligned with US foreign policy interests and the American defense industry no longer wields excessive influence over policymaking.”

 

The pathways which allow this ‘extortion racket’ to play out include:

• Controversial sweeteners bolted on to defence contracts known as ‘offsets’

Despite rarely making economic sense, these side deals account for US$3 to $7 billion in obligations every year – and the lack of transparency around offsets means they are a notorious conduit for corruption.  A series of leaked emails in 2017 revealed that American defence firms were indirectly funding advocacy campaigns around drones which were friendly to the Saudi and Emirati governments. Money from the US companies was paid directly into an Emirati development fund which was eventually routed to a US think tank who created the campaigns.

• Political campaign donations

‘Dark money’ groups such as the US Chamber of Commerce, the largest American business lobbying organization, are under no obligation to reveal their donors but can contribute to influence political campaigns, especially via so-called Super PACs. According to a defence lobbyist, the Chamber aims to move any discussion about US defense exports “straight down to dollars and jobs in a congressional district” to incentivise members of Congress not to take any steps that could impact arms sales.

• The so-called ‘revolving door’ between high-level jobs in government and the military and senior roles with defense companies or lobbying firms.

After leaving Congress, Republican Howard McKeon set up a lobbying firm which boasts its status as “the only firm led by a former Chairman of two full congressional Committees”. McKeon signed as a registered foreign agent for the Saudi government in 2016 soon after setting up his firm. During his tenure as Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, $10 billion in military sales were approved to Saudi Arabia – a doubling of previous sales to the country.

Rarely is just one of the pathways identified in the report is used and they are often intertwined to magnify influence towards desired policy outcomes.

Simply limiting lobbying and campaign finance contributions is necessary but not enough to rebalance the egregious flaws of this influence system. Our policy recommendations include:

• Establish a ‘Defense Exports Czar’ on the National Security Council to oversee all aspects of security assistance, including defence exports, and assess whether exports align with larger US foreign policy goals.
• Legislate a ban on offset contracts between the American defence industry and foreign governments.
• Re-establish the State Department as the lead agency for all security assistance, including all defense exports, while Congress should demand more insight and transparency into these exports
• Require all contractors and sub-contractors to list their beneficial owners to ensure contract funds are not funnelled to those tied to corrupt politicians, insurgents, terrorists, warlords or criminal actors.
• Establish legislation to limit contributions to super PACs by the defense industry or its intermediaries and prevent anonymous donations; require defence firms to publicly disclose all donations or political activity over $10,000.

Notes to Editors:

The report is available to download here.

Transparency International’s newly-released Government Defence Integrity Index scores countries according to the risk of corruption in their defence institutions. Saudi Arabia was ranked F – indicating a critical risk – while the UAE was ranked E, indicating a very high risk.

The American arms industry is the largest in the world. In 2018, American companies were responsible for 57 percent of worldwide arms sales, totalling $226.6 billion.

The sector is also a major force in US manufacturing in employment. In 2017, 10 percent of the $2.22 trillion factory output went to produce weapons sold to the Defence department.

Between 2012 and 2015, the US exported 46 percent of all arms delivered to the Middle East. In 2016, 35 of the 57 arms sales proposed were to countries in the MENA region.

Contact:

Interviews are available with the report author.

Harvey Gavin

harvey.gavin@transparency.org.uk

+44 (0)20 3096 7695

++44 (0)79 6456 0340

By Steve Francis OBE, Director of Transparency International – Defence & Security

The Government Defence Integrity Index (GDI) is the first global analysis of corruption risks and the existence and enforcement of controls to manage that vulnerability in defence and security institutions, highlighting priority areas for improvement. Key to analysing results from the Index is understanding that the GDI measures corruption risk, not levels of corruption per se.

GDI data will be released in regional waves through 2020. Results from the most recent wave – the Middle East and North Africa – were published in November.

On the whole, the data paints a fairly bleak picture for the region. Tunisia leads the group with an overall grade of “D,” indicating a “high” degree of defence corruption risk, while the other 11 assessed countries received either an “E” or an “F” – signalling “very high” or “critical” levels of risk. Regional averages reflect a similar performance across the individual risk areas – political, financial, personnel, operations, and procurement.

With these findings in mind, what can the analysis of the GDI’s result teach us about protracted cases of armed conflict, political instability, and insecurity that seem to characterise the region?

1. In many cases, high defence corruption risk is symptomatic of wider governance issues.

The GDI’s political risk indicators and aggregated scores on anti-corruption themes examine broader issues of legislative oversight, public debate, access to budgetary information, and civil society activity – issues that don’t just impact the defence sector. Indeed, this area of the assessment highlights essential ingredients for any open and transparent government that engages constructively with its citizens. As most of the assessed MENA countries are governed by authoritarian regimes, we should not be too surprised then that these wider governance challenges also exist in the defence sector. Specifically, our data found a clear lack of external oversight, audit mechanisms, and scrutiny of defence institutions across the region.

Table: MENA region average scores for key political risk indicators and anti-corruption themes

2. Countries with the highest defence corruption risk are also significant arms importers.

Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Algeria were three of the world’s top five arms importers from 2014-2018. All three received an “F” grade in the GDI, with Egypt and Algeria receiving the bottom two regional scores (6/100 and 8/100, respectively).

The region has gaps in export controls, with only Lebanon and Palestine having ratified the Arms Trade Treaty, in addition to related risks like a lack of regulation around lobbying in defence and virtually no transparency around defence spending.

Although major arms exporters to the region like the United States have rules against the transfer of arms to third parties, end-use monitoring is not always consistent or comprehensive. This is especially troubling given that top arms importers in the region are either directly involved in or are arming parties to the devastating conflicts in both Yemen and Libya.

3. Low-scoring countries also exhibit high corruption risk by blurring the line between business and defence.

While the region as a whole scored poorly on indicators relating to the beneficial ownership (47/100) and scrutiny of military-owned businesses (44/100), these risks are greatest in countries with extensive military-run industries and/or significant natural resources. In Egypt for example, the military owns lucrative businesses across industries ranging from food and agriculture to mining, but has few controls in place for regulating these ventures. In Algeria, a largely state-owned economy renowned for high levels of corruption and patronage, there are a range of potential implications now that the military has stepped in to fill the vacuum following the ousting of President Bouteflika in March 2019 following mass public unrest.

The Gulf monarchies offer an example of how defence and business can overlap at the level of the individual. In the assessment for Saudi Arabia, we found that members of the royal family who serve in senior military positions also have controlling or financial interests in businesses related to the country’s petroleum sector. In the UAE as well, our research found that Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and Deputy Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, is also the Chairman of a company dealing in natural resources.

On the other end of the spectrum, the GDI found that in Morocco, Palestine, and Tunisia, defence and security institutions do not own businesses of any significant scale, thereby removing a significant source of corruption risk.

As the GDI data shows, the risk of defence corruption in the MENA region is a serious concern with the potential to exacerbate ongoing conflict and instability. However, robust tools like the GDI can help governments to identify gaps in safeguarding practices – the first step in a process towards reform – while supporting civil society and oversight actors in countries across the region in conducting evidence-based advocacy.

6 December, Niamey – Security and stability in Niger are threatened by high levels of corruption risk in its national defence sector, according to new research by Transparency International – Defence & Security.

Niger’s defence sector scores poorly in the 2020 Government Defence Integrity Index, which is today being launched in Niamey. Receiving a majority of E and F grades, indicating either a “very high” or “critical” risk of defence corruption, the analysis assesses corruption risk across five key areas: political, financial, operations, personnel and procurement.

But Niger’s overall score of 22/100 places it above the regional average of 18/100, with levels of corruption risk in the country’s political, financial and procurement categories lower than in the region, but higher in terms of personnel and operations.

Steve Francis, OBE, Director of Transparency International – Defence & Security, said:

“In recent years, Niger has become increasingly affected by the conflict and insecurity in neighbouring Mali, which has quickly spread across the Sahel. With Niger now a key member of the G5 Sahel Joint Force, contributing over a thousand troops to the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali and receiving increasing amounts of military and technical assistance from foreign donors, the country is on the frontline of the regional struggle against extremist groups.

“Given the empirical link between corruption and conflict and the corrosive effect of corruption on defence capabilities, it is essential for Niger to accelerate its efforts to improve the governance of the defence sector and strengthen civilian democratic oversight of the defence apparatus. We urge the Nigerien government to improve the access to defence information of legislative and oversight bodies and take steps towards improving transparency and external oversight in procurement processes. Building the integrity and effectiveness of Niger’s defence sector will enhance its ability to respond to multiplying regional security threats and bolster public trust in defence and security institutions.

“With high corruption risks across national defence sectors in West Africa, tools like our Government Defence Integrity Index are more important than ever. By highlighting areas where safeguards against corruption are weak or non-existent, campaigners on the ground and reform minded military leaders and politicians can use these results to push for real change. Taking action to improve transparency and closing the loopholes which allow corruption to thrive is a critical step in building effective and accountable defence and security forces.”

 

These findings come against a backdrop of rising insecurity in Niger and the Sahel more broadly. Attacks by extremist groups against civilians and Nigerien defence and security forces are rising, while the protracted conflicts in Mali and Libya are increasingly spilling across the border into Niger. Mounting instability in Burkina Faso, Northern Nigeria and the Lake Chad region are also threatening to seriously impact the security of populations along Niger’s southern border and are turning the landlocked nation into a critical base in the fight against violent extremism.

Despite recent promising government initiatives and reforms, attempts to improve defence governance in Niger are hindered by high levels of secrecy and defence exceptionalism, which severely limit oversight and control of defence institutions by parliament and audit mechanisms.

The capacity of the National Assembly to hold the government to account is hampered by a lack of technical expertise and limited access to information, whilst a general lack of engagement between the defence establishment and civil society further limits the scope of civilian democratic oversight.

Financial oversight is also curtailed by the lack of a detailed defence budget made available to the legislature. Even the parliamentary Defence and Security Commission is presented with only abbreviated information when it comes to spending on secret items and military intelligence, whilst audit mechanisms are limited in terms of capacity and access to information. This lack of oversight is mirrored in Niger’s defence procurement process, with many purchases excluded from normal public procurement procedures. Moreover, reports from the Inspector General, along with the military acquisition plan are strictly confidential, thereby hugely hindering external control.

Personnel management would be improved through a greater emphasis on addressing corruption, for instance through revamped Codes of Conduct and specific anti-corruption training which are currently lacking. Equally, the nomination and recruitment processes at higher levels are shrouded in secrecy, opening the door for nepotistic practices.

Finally, Niger’s defence sector scores very poorly in terms of operational risk, with its military doctrine lacking an appreciation of corruption as a strategic threat during deployments.

At a time of growing regional instability, Transparency International – Defence & Security urges the Nigerien government to consider heightening efforts to improve civilian democratic oversight of the defence sector and strengthening the integrity of the armed forces to better respond to the security threats with which it is faced.

Notes to editors:

The full, country-specific Government Defence Integrity Index (GDI) results for Niger and West Africa as a whole are available at https://ti-defence.org/gdi/

The GDI assesses the existence, effectiveness and enforcement of institutional and informal controls to manage the risk of corruption in defence and security institutions.

Our team of experts draws together evidence from a wide variety of sources and interviewees across 77 indicators to provide a detailed assessment of the integrity of national defence institutions, and awards a score for each country from A to F.

The GDI was previously known as the Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index (GI). The Index underwent a major update for the 2020 version, including changes to the methodology and scoring underpinning the project. This means overall country scores from this 2020 version cannot be accurately compared with country scores from previous iterations of the Index.

Subsequent GDI results will be released in 2020, covering Central and Eastern Europe and Latin America, G-20 countries, the Asia Pacific region, East and Southern Africa, and NATO+.

Contact:

Harvey Gavin

harvey.gavin@transparency.org.uk

+44 (0)20 3096 7695

++44 (0)79 6456 0340

November 19, London – Corruption is being harnessed by authoritarian regimes as a foreign policy tool, research by Transparency International – Defence & Security warns – and the West could be at risk unless action is taken to address vulnerabilities in key institutions.

Corrupt practices like bribery and embezzlement of public funds have traditionally been viewed as a means of personal enrichment for individuals and networks, but new research published today reveals how policymakers have overlooked a key issue: corruption can be weaponised to achieve foreign policy goals and could potentially become a tool of hybrid warfare.

Corruption as Statecraft details how ‘corruption with intent’ schemes have already been used as part of the foreign policy arsenal of authoritarian states like Russia. They are often based on a dependence in a strategic sector, such as energy exports or infrastructure investments.

Those dependencies, based on a real need and combined with opaque governance and economic arrangements, can enable cross-border schemes where money is funnelled to decision makers in one country with a view to ensuring foreign policy decisions favourable to another country.

Dr Karolina MacLachlan, Regional Programme Manager for Transparency International – Defence and Security, said:

“Typically practices like bribery, money laundering and embezzlement of state funds are used by a corrupt elite for economic gain, but ‘corruption with intent’ schemes are far more insidious. These strategies are not aimed at making money, but are instead focussed on corrupting decision makers and public institutions in other countries in the pursuit of foreign policy goals.

“The damage corruption causes to individuals, communities and entire countries is well documented – and the poorest in society are inevitably left to suffer the brunt of the impact. This indiscriminate ‘collateral damage’ is what needs to make policy makes pay attention.”

Corruption as a tool of foreign policy can be deployed anywhere there is opaque company and government contracting structures, bribery, lack of oversight, and loopholes in key regulations. This means Europe and the United States are both at risk.

The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has already been targeted by a corruption with intent scheme – and its ethics watchdog initially failed to stop it. The European Parliament, unable to fully account for MEPs’ external employment and outside income, is also at risk.

Dr Karolina MacLachlan said:

“While it would be tempting to assume that this weaponising of corruption is only a threat to emerging democracies such as Ukraine or Armenia, our research also highlights a vulnerability at the heart of the Europe Union which malign actors have already exploited – and others that can be exploited in the future.

“Worryingly, there are vulnerabilities in European energy trade and infrastructure investment carried out as part of China’s trillion-dollar Belt and Road Initiative. Large-sale commitments made by a number of countries, alongside limited transparency in international contracts and with legal loopholes, limit countries’ room for manoeuvre and open them up to external pressures and corrupt schemes.

“Despite the warning signs, there is still time for policymakers to address these chinks in the armour. The link between corruption with intent and strategic dependence means that European countries and the US not only need to pay far more attention to their own vulnerabilities and treat corruption as the strategic threat it can be, but also reconsider how they can help other countries fight corruption. Anti-corruption programmes need to be joined with wider political and economic considerations to manage the dependence that corruption schemes can be based on.”

How ‘corruption with intent’ schemes can work:

1. There is a real or perceived need: infrastructure investment, energy, arms imports
2. The need is met by an entity from another country (government, state-owned enterprise, a private company linked to government)
3. The contracting and mode of implementation of the project(s) are opaque, involve intermediaries, are based on unfavourable terms, and create dependence. They are facilitated by local loopholes
4. Opacity is used to funnel money to elites in the recipient country to secure favourable foreign policy outcomes

Contact:

Harvey Gavin
harvey.gavin@transparency.org.uk
+44 (0)20 3096 7695
+44 (0)79 6456 0340