Civil war has been raging in Sudan for soon two years with no end in sight. Its violence and destruction have caused a “humanitarian catastrophe”. Yet, as the conflict remains at the margins of media and public attention, so does one of its main drivers: corruption.
Weak defence governance and failed security sector reforms have played an important role in driving the conflict. Over the last six years, Sudan has experienced high levels of political instability, writes Emily Wegener.
Whether as a driver of the protests in 2018-2019 that forced President Omar al-Bashir out of power, or a as contributing factor to the October 2021 military coup staged by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) that halted the democratic transition process, corruption continuously contributed to this volatility. Regimes fell, but the power structures and the corruption networks in and around the military and security forces survived. These networks then fuelled tensions between the SAF and RSF, which reached their breaking point in April 2023 with the outbreak of armed conflict between the two groups.
From the onset of the conflict, corruption has driven the violence. Failure to agree on a way forward in the country’s security sector reform (SSR) – the process of improving a country’s police, military and related institutions to ensure they are effective, accountable and respect human rights – is widely seen as one of the key reasons for why the democratic transition failed. Placing the RSF under civilian control and enhancing democratic scrutiny of the SAF were two of the most contentious questions in the SSR process.
But what made improving the oversight and accountability of these groups so contentious? Our 2020 Government Defence Integrity Index (GDI) assessed the corruption risk as critical throughout Sudan’s defence institutions, concluding that “corruption is widespread in the sector and there are virtually no anti-corruption mechanisms”. Civilian democratic control and external oversight of defence institutions were also found to be non-existent.
An absence of accountability enabled both the SAF and the RSF to repurpose the state’s defence and security institutions to enrich high-ranking security officials and create an economy dominated by military interests. Companies owned by SAF officials have long controlled lucrative private sectors, from telecommunications to meat processing, to the detriment of public investment and sustainable economic growth. Meanwhile, the RSF controls most of the country’s gold trade – a significant income stream, considering that Sudan was the third-largest gold-producer on the continent in 2023. By the time the war broke out, the RSF owned around 50 companies, acquired largely by reinvesting the profits from gold trade into other industries. Transition to civilian rule would have meant placing the SAF under civilian oversight; for the RSF, integration into the army. When the RSF was not ready to give up its advantages, or accept this level of accountability, it declared war.
Why we produced ‘Chaos Unchained’
In February 2025, nearly two years the outbreak of the war, Sudan is facing starvation and the world’s largest displacement crisis. An estimated 30% of the population, over 11 million people, have been forced to leave their homes. According to the UN Secretary General’s latest report, over 25 million people live in food insecurity, including over 750,000 people living in conditions comparable to famine, as defined by the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC). Both sides, and the RSF in particular, are reported to have perpetrated ethnic cleansing and sexual violence.
Yet, the attention paid to the conflict is scarce. Sudan rarely makes the headlines. Across the international community, the focus is elsewhere. To shed light on this ‘forgotten conflict’ and its drivers, we have produced a 10-minute video looking at the origins of Sudan’s turmoil. Chaos Unchained: Conflict and Corruption in Sudan examines how corruption, kleptocratic plunder of the country’s resources and lax enforcement of arms embargoes have contributed to the ongoing conflict and the humanitarian catastrophe that comes with it.
Possible solutions
Governments and private actors can take steps to reduce the role of corruption in prolonging the fighting, and to limit the chance of relapse after a political solution is negotiated.
At international level, the UN, the EU and their Member States can:
- Recognise the links between corruption in the defence and security sector and the violence and elevate the importance of addressing corruption in the conflict resolution agenda. A strong precedent is the UN Security Council Resolution 2731/2024 on the situation in South Sudan, where the Council recognises that “intercommunal violence in South Sudan is politically and economically linked to national-level violence and corruption”, and stresses the need of effective anti-corruption structures to ensure and finance the political transition and humanitarian needs of the population.
- Explore the links between arms diversion and corruption, and the resulting circumvention of UN arms embargo and human rights abuses in the Darfur region. Existing mechanisms such as the Human Rights Council’s Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Sudan and the Security Council’s Panel of Experts can contribute to improving the evidence base on the role of corruption, especially in the defence and security sectors, in fuelling the war and humanitarian crisis.
- Prioritise strengthening the rule of law and anti-corruption measures in peacebuilding. Placing the SAF and the RSF and their economic assets and activities under civilian oversight is a key step toward transparent and accountable defence and security forces. A long-term, transformative, and inclusive SSR process will be the most necessary but also the most contentious element of any negotiated solution to the conflict in Sudan. Additionally, any peacekeeping or peacebuilding interventions will need to firmly prioritise anti-corruption as a conflict prevention measure.
At national level, the governments of arms exporting countries can:
- Strengthen arms export policies and implementation guidelines. Foreign-made weapons and military equipment are being diverted into Darfur despite a long-standing UN Security Council arms embargo. Arms exporting countries can use our GDI to better assess the risk of corruption in defence institutions. Robust corruption risk assessments can help to curb diversion risks in arms sales to Sudan and the regional partners of the SAF and the RSF.
- Better regulate defence offsets. In connection with major arms sales, defence companies often negotiate lucrative offset packages with even less transparency than the arms sales. Our research has shown that defence company offsets can contribute to fuelling conflict dynamics, including in countries like Sudan by supporting industries in the UAE that help finance Sudanese armed actors. Enhancing internal and external transparency and oversight around these deals can mitigate risks of contributing to natural resource laundering for armed groups and fuelling conflict dynamics such as the one in Sudan.
Sudan shows that fighting corruption is not separate from discussions on ceasefires, political negotiations and peace processes. Integrating anti-corruption measures and fostering transparency and accountability in Sudan’s defence and security sector is key to the long-term success of any negotiated political solution.
You can watch Chaos Unchained: Conflict and Corruption in Sudan here.
Register here to join our webinar on Thursday, 6 February, in which we discuss the root causes of the conflict and pathways to peace with an expert panel.