March 6, 2024 – Following the acquittal of two men charged with paying bribes to secure and maintain a major multi-billion-pound defence contract with Saudi Arabia, a full independent inquiry is now vital in order to examine the evidence presented in court of the British government’s direct involvement in these corrupt arms deals.
Despite it being accepted that millions of pounds of bribes were paid to senior Saudi officials in exchange for lucrative deals to supply military communications equipment between 2007 and 2012, the two former executives of GPT Special Project Management were today found not guilty of corruption after being prosecuted for overseeing these payments.
The two men had argued that British officials, politicians and diplomats knew about and consented to nearly £60 million worth of bribes to the Gulf state since 1978.
It is reasonable to assume that, in deciding to acquit these men, the jury gave serious weight to the significance of the evidence that was presented in court of the UK government’s involvement in the alleged bribes.
Josie Stewart, Director of Transparency International Defence & Security, said:
“This case involves Europe’s largest defence manufacturer, senior members of the Saudi Royal Family, and allegations of high-level involvement by successive UK governments about systemic corruption that went on for decades. The details that emerged in court wouldn’t look out of place in a Hollywood screenplay but sadly the reality surpasses fiction.
“Ian Foxley, the whistleblower who lifted the original lid, had no idea at the time how far the rot would go. Thanks to the court monitoring work of our partners at Spotlight on Corruption, we now have a good idea: it went far, and it went high. We now need to know how far, and how high.”
The case raises serious questions over whether any of the Ministry of Defence’s (MoD) procurement staff queried the corrupt payments. If not, then why not? If so, then to what level and who authorised their continuity? And, who within the MoD authorised the decision to continue opaque payments that may have benefitted Saudi government officials after the case was under investigation?
Transparency International Defence & Security joins Spotlight on Corruption’s urgent call for a transparent, independent judge-led inquiry into the full nature and extent of the UK government’s knowledge of and involvement in these defence contract payments made to Saudi Arabia.
This inquiry must consider whether ongoing contractual arrangements are still at risk of corruption, what measures the MoD is putting in place to prevent this, and the adequacy of the MoD’s measures to protect and enable whistleblowers to uncover corruption. A temporary halt should also be placed on any arms transfer licenses approved by the same officials during the period in question until evidence of responsible and corruption-free arms control systems can be provided.
But this inquiry will not be enough, because this case is not an isolated incident. Enormous budgets, close political ties, and high levels of secrecy make the defence and security sectors fertile ground for hidden payments, undue influence, bribery, and corruption.
It’s imperative that we restore integrity to the arms trade in order to rebuild trust in our institutions, safeguard the public interest, and strengthen global security.
As this case shows, the UK, and governments in all arms-supplier countries, must take action to integrate heightened anti-corruption standards into arms transfers. The current controls are clearly not up to the task. They need strengthening with:
- Increased investment in proactive measures to detect corruption risks in arms transfers, including during the arms deal and licensing processes.
- Development of arms transfer policies that recognise corruption as a significant risk and establish procedures for investigation and mitigation;
- Comprehensive disclosure of all intermediaries, subcontractors, and service providers involved, and independent monitoring of all defence sector contracts in which official support is sought or given;
- Verification of recipient countries’ anti-corruption systems and inclusion of this verification as criteria in arms transfer/license decision-making; and
- Commitment to share information on corrupt recipient(s) to other arms supplier states.