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Military expenditure in Tunisia has increased to over 2% of the country’s GDP in recent years as counter-terrorism has become a government priority. The country has been under a state of emergency since 2015, due to continued conflict in neighbouring states and increased support for non-state armed actors and extremist groups. Despite this, Tunisia’s defence sector faces high corruption risks, largely due to its secretive nature and the difficulties for Tunisian citizens to access information on military spending and equipment. While the armed forces benefit from a high level of public trust and have made several commitments to strengthen integrity within the defence system, implementation of these commitments has, to date, been uneven. Moving forward on defence sector reforms would improve the military’s ability to respond to potential threats.
Strengthening governmental institutions, including through transparency and accountability to citizens, is also crucial in a nascent democracy such as Tunisia, to ensure that the government is capable of responding to the population’s needs. As part of this, Transparency International established a project in 2018 to advocate for the Ministry of Defence to strengthen access to information and accountability to Tunisian citizens.
We have been working in partnership with I WATCH, Transparency International’s chapter in Tunisia, since 2017. The primary aim of our Tunisia country programme is to promote improved transparency and encourage tangible reform within the Tunisian defence sector, by bolstering the capacity of civil society and supporting democratic civilian oversight of the sector. Transparency International – Defence & Security and I WATCH are keen to engage with the Ministry of Defence throughout the development of the Government Defence Integrity Index, all the while strengthening external oversight of the defence sector and raising civil society awareness of the importance of defence sector oversight.
In order to achieve these aims, we established an independent monitoring group comprised of Tunisian civil society and experts within the defence and security sectors in 2019 alongside I WATCH. The purpose of this group is to monitor the Tunisian defence sector’s progress in implementing reforms and improving transparency and accountability to Tunisian citizens. The group held its inaugural meeting in September 2019, where it identified its top priority issue areas to tackle in the coming year and developed an agenda for producing research and evidence-based advocacy.
The Niger Delta is the most important oil-producing region in Africa, with its oil providing 70 per cent of Nigeria’s government revenue. However, alongside the legitimate trade in the Delta’s oil products, there is a lucrative and organised illicit oil trade that reportedly loses Nigeria 200,000 barrels of oil every day. Participants in oil theft, also called “oil bunkering”, steal oil from pipelines, refine the oil, and then sell it to local, regional and international markets. It is a profitable criminal industry that cost the Nigerian government 3.8 trillion Nigerian naira (approx. USD$105 billion) in 2016 and 2017.
The illegal oil industry in the Niger Delta has received much international attention over the past few decades. Illegal activity has led to revenue losses as oil is siphoned off and stolen; the human cost and environmental pollution have similarly been significant. Regular spills of oil, arguably caused by oil theft and sabotage, have polluted the waterways, contaminated crops and other food sources, and released toxic chemicals into the air. In 2017, reports emerged that oil spills doubled the risk of child mortality in the Delta region.4 What remains under-explored, however, is the extent to which this illegal trade is enabled by one of Nigeria’s key state institutions: its armed forces.
This discussion paper presents preliminary findings based on interviews and focus group discussions conducted in the Niger Delta between February and July 2018. The goal is to understand how the situation evolved, to offer insight into our initial conclusions, to invite feedback and further consideration of the matter, and to provide guidance for further research.
Following several years of debate, Tunisia finally has strong legislation regarding access to information. The government adopted a law to this effect in 2016, praised by many as being one of the most progressive access to information laws in the world. However, the law has faced limitations to its application, which include overzealous application of national security related exceptions.
Transparency International Defence & Security and I WATCH (Transparency International’s national chapter in Tunisia) have conducted research to understand how the access to information law is being implemented in the defence sector. We have spoken with Members of Parliament, independent commissions and civil society organisations (CSO) in Tunisia, and conducted desk research. Additionally, I WATCH has filed several access to information requests to the MOD directly, to evaluate the nature of responses received. These activities have provided the findings, and formed the basis of our conclusions and recommendations, outlined below.
A translation of the report can also be read in Arabic here.
Ahead of the 2019 Presidential elections in Nigeria, Transparency International and the Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Center (CISLAC) are calling on candidates to commit to scrapping the unaccountable and secretive “security vote” spending – one of the most durable forms of corruption in Nigeria—saying that they fail to provide real security for citizens.
Read the full report below and download ‘Annex A: Federal Security Vote Data’ here and ‘Annex B: State Security Vote Data’ here.
The Tunisian anti-corruption landscape has developed significantly since 2011. Tunis has created anti-corruption institutions, issued stronger legislation on public access to information and protection of whistle-blowers, and proposed legislation on declaring assets and probing illicit enrichment. This marks positive progress that should be both applauded and capitalised upon.
Yet the defence sector – which generally enjoys strong public trust – has not received the same scrutiny. Research indicates that it is often exempted, on the basis of national security, from significant reform. Tunisian defence spending has been rising, with an increase in expenditure of almost 64% from 2011 to 2016. But transparency and integrity structures have not kept pace. This presents an urgent challenge. Secrecy and weak oversight are the breeding ground of corruption. And corruption undermines defence institutions, reducing their capability to respond to threats, and leads to wasteful spending. With a national emergency declared and rising defence spending, strengthening defence integrity and tackling weaknesses leading to corruption should be a priority for the Tunisian government.
Ahead of presidential elections in Egypt, our new report analyses the role and growing economic power of the military.
This report is currently unavailable to download. It will be re-uploaded as soon as possible.
Weaponising Transparency has found that unpublished defence budgets and arms procurements are still open to abuse by corrupt officials seeking to benefit from the conflict with Boko Haram and launder stolen money abroad. Many deaths in the conflict have occurred while the military lacks vital equipment, critical training, and morale.
Since 2011, 50,000 people have lost their lives in the conflict with Boko Haram, while millions have been displaced. An estimated US $15bn has been stolen from the defence sector and billions of Naira spent annually without clear rationale. While President Buhari has made significant moves to take on the secretive and powerful defence sector, the pace of reform in the MOD is too slow and lacks any strategy.
In this study Transparency International’s London-based Defence and Security Programme explores in some detail how security assistance programmes fared in an environment affected by corrupt practices and the nexus of corruption and criminality. The case study here is security assistance provided to the Malian Army by the U.S. and France in 2001-2012, i.e. prior to the coup in which units of the Malian Army deposed a sitting president. Our goal is to unpack the impact corrupt practices can have on the success of specific security assistance programmes and to start a conversation on how these risks can be addressed.