Theme: Operations
By Steve Francis OBE, Director of Transparency International – Defence & Security
The Government Defence Integrity Index (GDI) is the first global analysis of corruption risks and the existence and enforcement of controls to manage that vulnerability in defence and security institutions, highlighting priority areas for improvement. Key to analysing results from the Index is understanding that the GDI measures corruption risk, not levels of corruption per se.
GDI data will be released in regional waves through 2020. Results from the most recent wave – the Middle East and North Africa – were published in November.
On the whole, the data paints a fairly bleak picture for the region. Tunisia leads the group with an overall grade of “D,” indicating a “high” degree of defence corruption risk, while the other 11 assessed countries received either an “E” or an “F” – signalling “very high” or “critical” levels of risk. Regional averages reflect a similar performance across the individual risk areas – political, financial, personnel, operations, and procurement.
With these findings in mind, what can the analysis of the GDI’s result teach us about protracted cases of armed conflict, political instability, and insecurity that seem to characterise the region?
1. In many cases, high defence corruption risk is symptomatic of wider governance issues.
The GDI’s political risk indicators and aggregated scores on anti-corruption themes examine broader issues of legislative oversight, public debate, access to budgetary information, and civil society activity – issues that don’t just impact the defence sector. Indeed, this area of the assessment highlights essential ingredients for any open and transparent government that engages constructively with its citizens. As most of the assessed MENA countries are governed by authoritarian regimes, we should not be too surprised then that these wider governance challenges also exist in the defence sector. Specifically, our data found a clear lack of external oversight, audit mechanisms, and scrutiny of defence institutions across the region.
Table: MENA region average scores for key political risk indicators and anti-corruption themes
| Question | Indicator/Theme | Score | Grade |
| Q1 | Legislative scrutiny of defence laws and policies | 15 | F |
| Q3 | Defence policy debate | 9 | F |
| Q4 | CSO engagement with defence and security institutions | 15 | F |
| Q6 | Public debate of defence issues | 23 | E |
| Q13 | Defence budget scrutiny | 10 | F |
| Q17 | External Audit | 8 | F |
| Aggregate | Openness to civilian oversight | 14 | F |
| Aggregate | Oversight | 14 | F |
| Aggregate | Budgets | 15 | F |
| Aggregate | Transparency | 15 | F |
| Aggregate | Undue influence | 19 | E |
2. Countries with the highest defence corruption risk are also significant arms importers.
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Algeria were three of the world’s top five arms importers from 2014-2018. All three received an “F” grade in the GDI, with Egypt and Algeria receiving the bottom two regional scores (6/100 and 8/100, respectively).
The region has gaps in export controls, with only Lebanon and Palestine having ratified the Arms Trade Treaty, in addition to related risks like a lack of regulation around lobbying in defence and virtually no transparency around defence spending.
Although major arms exporters to the region like the United States have rules against the transfer of arms to third parties, end-use monitoring is not always consistent or comprehensive. This is especially troubling given that top arms importers in the region are either directly involved in or are arming parties to the devastating conflicts in both Yemen and Libya.
3. Low-scoring countries also exhibit high corruption risk by blurring the line between business and defence.
While the region as a whole scored poorly on indicators relating to the beneficial ownership (47/100) and scrutiny of military-owned businesses (44/100), these risks are greatest in countries with extensive military-run industries and/or significant natural resources. In Egypt for example, the military owns lucrative businesses across industries ranging from food and agriculture to mining, but has few controls in place for regulating these ventures. In Algeria, a largely state-owned economy renowned for high levels of corruption and patronage, there are a range of potential implications now that the military has stepped in to fill the vacuum following the ousting of President Bouteflika in March 2019 following mass public unrest.
The Gulf monarchies offer an example of how defence and business can overlap at the level of the individual. In the assessment for Saudi Arabia, we found that members of the royal family who serve in senior military positions also have controlling or financial interests in businesses related to the country’s petroleum sector. In the UAE as well, our research found that Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and Deputy Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, is also the Chairman of a company dealing in natural resources.
On the other end of the spectrum, the GDI found that in Morocco, Palestine, and Tunisia, defence and security institutions do not own businesses of any significant scale, thereby removing a significant source of corruption risk.
As the GDI data shows, the risk of defence corruption in the MENA region is a serious concern with the potential to exacerbate ongoing conflict and instability. However, robust tools like the GDI can help governments to identify gaps in safeguarding practices – the first step in a process towards reform – while supporting civil society and oversight actors in countries across the region in conducting evidence-based advocacy.
Bénédicte Aboul-Nasr is a Project Officer at Transparency International Defence and Security. She works on issues related to corruption, conflict, and insecurity in the Middle East and North Africa region, as well as on how corruption affects United Nations Peacekeeping.
This week, Member States are convening for the 74th Session of General Assembly, during which they will discuss the general affairs of the United Nations. This will include a session focusing on a comprehensive review of peacekeeping operations.
Last September, the Security Council held its first meeting on corruption, underlying its relationship to global insecurity. Secretary-General António Guterres emphasised these links, noting that: ‘Regrettably, there is currently no coordinated strategy to gain the necessary leverage … to break the link between corruption and conflict’. The sentiments were echoed by the UK, calling corruption ‘an insidious plague’; and the Executive Director of our chapter in Venezuela made the same argument. And while not often discussed, links between corruption and the conflicts which the UN seeks to address with peacekeeping operations should be discussed.
There is no doubt that corruption breeds conflict and insecurity, as well as poverty and inequality. Six of the ten lowest-scoring countries in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index were also amongst the ten least peaceful countries in the most recent Global Peace Index. Transparency International’s research has long highlighted that addressing corruption can help prevent and address the very conflicts the UN finds itself involved in.
The Secretary-General has praised peacekeeping for its instrumental role in supporting peace and security – all the while acknowledging shortcomings and promising to reform performance and accountability and the conduct of peacekeepers and peacekeeping operations throughout his ‘Action for Peacekeeping’ (‘A4P’) initiative. Whilst those fighting corruption around the world will welcome his strong words, newly implemented reforms and a persistent focus on the challenges operations face present an even better opportunity for the UN to do more to root out corruption within its ranks.
Corruption undermines the chances of mission success, particularly of complex UN peacekeeping missions in the most high-risk areas of the world. Where fuel supplies are sold off, for example, troop mobility is reduced; when soldiers have paid to become blue helmets instead of earning their post through merit, missions may lack the skills they need; and when a blind eye is turned to smuggling, it enriches combatants and fuels further conflict. Such misconduct also reduces public trust in the ability of intervention forces to secure the peace.
The increasing discussions around corruption and conflict are a welcome step to beginning to address the problem. But as is so often the case, taking serious action is harder. In order to make words a reality, the UN will need to address corruption within its own systems, and figure out how to deal with corrupt governments in the areas where peace operations are in place – in particular if leaders are more focused on self-enrichment than on the needs of the population or the fulfilment of a UN mandate.
A leaked staff survey of the Secretariat in December 2017 had depressing findings: 50% of staff doubt people at all levels are held accountable for ethical behaviour; 55% were not confident that ‘UN staff members will be protected from retaliation for reporting misconduct or cooperating with an authorised audit or investigation’. Far from New York, the problem can have immediate with dire consequences for the hope of lasting peace.
So how can the UN go from public statements to actually handling the issue?
The UN Secretariat should strengthen its commitment to tackling corruption and the associated risks, particularly in the context of peace operations. To do so, the Secretary-General could issue a direction providing greater clarity on the responsibilities of Troop and Police Contributing Countries; in particular, when it comes to investigating instances of corruption and holding individuals responsible for misconduct to account within their national judicial systems. Whistleblowers – one of the best ways of identifying corruption – should be encouraged to come forward. Ultimately, holding perpetrators to account is often the best way to shift an institutional culture away from turning a blind eye, or even condoning graft.
The UN also needs people in the organisation with the mandate, expertise and capacity to get to grips with this issue – from understanding the risks on the ground to navigating corruption risks in one of the world’s largest and most complex bureaucracies.
Guterres was right when he said that ‘In peace operations, our engagement should be designed and implemented with a clearer anti-corruption lens to reinforce a culture of accountability and respect for the rule of law.’ But in a Member State organisation, this will be tough. The sad truth is that many governments in states where there are UN operations are kleptocratic or based around highly corrupt regimes and networks – often in direct contravention to the UN’s aims and to mission mandates. Operating with an ‘anti-corruption lens’ will not mean just improving procedures, but making difficult political decisions; ultimately, the UN has to be willing to put its goals in peace operations over the interests of diplomacy, if it is to successfully implement its own peacekeeping mandates.
Transparency International wants to help the UN fulfil its aims and support its efforts to strengthen peace and security worldwide. In July, we published an assessment of corruption risks within UN bodies relating to peacekeeping, to illuminate the dynamics of corruption and better support efforts to address it. TI’s Defence and Security Programme is also working on a toolkit for those leading international interventions to help officials, commanders and their planners chart a course through the challenges of conducting operations in high-risk, corrupt environments and understand the ways of responding to corruption.
If admitting to a problem is the first step to solving it, then the UN is on a much better path than it has been, and Guterres should be commended for this. But now is the time to start the next round of the heavy lifting needed to weave a more consistent approach to tackling corruption into the fabric of the organisation and its missions. Doing so promises to make UN operations more effective, cheaper, and better able to serve the interests of the most vulnerable.
Not tackling the underlying dynamics at the root of a conflict, and inadvertently sustaining or even reinforcing it, merely serves to prolong a peace intervention and can end up sowing the seeds of the next crisis. If the UN is serious about reducing the root of conflicts — all of which will be discussed in much detail over the coming weeks — it should ensure that its own operations are capable of responding to the very corruption risks they are vulnerable to — regardless of political sensitivities.
Since 1948, and the birth of modern peacekeeping, the United Nations has been engaged in over 70 peacekeeping (and numerous political) missions in countries experiencing violent conflict. The 14 current operations (and 11 field-based Special Political Missions) involve personnel from over 125 countries in increasingly proactive engagement, with the UN finding itself a protagonist in complex situations of ongoing violent insecurity.
Recent missions have seen increased potential for overstretch. In what are already immensely challenging contexts, corruption can undermine international efforts, reducing mission effectiveness and diminishing public trust in intervention operations. Where intervention forces lack adequate oversight and control, for example, or procurement is based on the interests of a single individual or state rather than the requirements of the organisation, the UN’s ability to respond to crises suffers. In such a complex and political organisational context, ensuring accountability and oversight is challenging. But where effective oversight of peace and military operations is in place and corruption risks are limited, the ability of the UN and its Member States to secure peace and stability significantly increases.
The Transparency International – Defence & Security has been working to understand and mitigate corruption risks in governments, defence forces, and international organisations for over a decade. Our work has confirmed that corruption is a key and important factor in conflict and insecurity settings; it can perpetuate conflict and instability, and can undermine the effectiveness and credibility of peacekeeping, peace building and other international efforts.
United Nations (UN) peace operations have always faced complex challenges, and in the current international environment, these are set to increase. The process of designing and delivering a peace operation is exceptionally challenging and profoundly political – from the initial mandate design and approval, the involvement of multiple actors (both UN and non-UN), through to the management of personnel and equipment, successive mandate renewals and the transition and closure of missions.
As this complexity increases, peace operations also face growing threats to their legitimacy. The UN has done much to address the risks faced by missions, but scandals implicating peacekeepers can still cause enormous damage and need to be met by a robust response. Failure in this respect can be doubly damaging at time when critical voices are calling for budget reductions and a more effective use of resources in multilateral responses. Corruption and poor governance, around and within peacekeeping missions, or the failure to understand how such issues may influence conditions in the mission area, will only exacerbate these challenges, undermining mission effectiveness and diminishing political and public trust in UN operations. Indeed, the UN’s responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security – and by implication, to prevent human suffering – risks being frustrated if corruption is overlooked or facilitated through lack of awareness or inadequate oversight. Corruption, defined by Transparency International as “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain”, needs to be recognised as one of the principal challenges facing UN operations, and merits distinct treatment as a major strategic and operational risk.
The United Nations (UN) should further expand its work to safeguard against corruption around peacekeeping missions or risk jeopardising the success of its operations, according to new research published by the Transparency International Defence and Security Programme (TI-DS).
UN peace operations can be an effective way to respond to conflicts, natural disasters and other crises. But the risk of not placing anti-corruption at the heart of the planning and conduct of missions threatens to undermine their success – and can perpetuate the very conflict the UN seeks to quell.
Following commitments by Secretary-General António Guterres to put transparency and accountability measures at the forefront of his proposed UN reforms, TI-DS has recommended five actions which would help enhance the effectiveness of future missions.
In a new report entitled Corruption Risks and UN Peace Operations: Strengthening Accountability to Improve Effectiveness, TI-DS has assessed these risks and identified areas the UN is struggling to fully address.
Steve Francis, Director of Transparency International’s Defence and Security Programme, said:
“UN Peacekeepers face a difficult task when being deployed to conflict zones where corruption may have sparked the very conflict they are there to quell. If the UN is serious about reducing the root causes of conflict, it should do everything possible to ensure its own operations are protected against the same corruption risks host nations are vulnerable to. Ultimately the objective of these operations is to protect civilians, provide security and establish conditions for a sustainable peace – failure to make anti-corruption a guiding principle in both a peace keeping mission’s design and delivery threatens to delegitimise what is supposed to represent a global response for good.
“Acknowledging there is a problem with corruption is undoubtedly the first step to solving it, and the commitment from Secretary-General António Guterres to improve accountability in peacekeeping operations is a welcome step in the right direction. Transparency International wants to help the UN in its efforts to reform, and our research offers clear, deliverable changes which would address the risks and strengthen those anti-corruption measures already in place. We hope the UN leadership will consider our recommendations, make good on its pledge to improve accountability and take the required steps to safeguard the legitimacy and success of future peacekeeping operations.”
The report summarises the key findings of an in-depth study which has also been published today. TI-DS drew on UN documents, secondary literature and some 50 interviews with a range of former UN officials, officials from Member States, as well as academics and community groups.
Recommendations include:
- Adding credibility to the commitment to fight corruption by improving funding to specialist oversight offices, and staffing these internal watchdogs with anti-corruption experts.
- Acknowledging that UN peacekeeping operations, which inherently involve a large influx of funds, resources and personnel, may create an unintended corruption risk for the host nation – and planning ways to mitigate this risk from the outset.
- Drafting clear and unambiguous mandates in conjunction with host nations and other UN Member States to enhance the legitimacy and effectiveness of peacekeeping missions.
- Ensuring any peacekeepers found to have engaged in corrupt or illegal behaviour are properly held to account by monitoring the steps taken against those who have been repatriated for trial or investigation.
***ENDS***
Contact:
Harvey Gavin
harvey.gavin@transparency.org.uk
+44 (0)20 3096 7695
+44 (0)79 6456 0340
Notes to Editors:
The UN Security Council held its first ever meeting to address the links between corruption and conflict in September 2018. Addressing the Council, Secretary-General António Guterres emphasised these links and warned that corruption is a problem in all nations, both rich and poor.
He said UN Member States must be on the front lines of combatting corruption, adding that UN peace operations should also employ a clear anti‑corruption lens.
TI-DS is one of Transparency International’s global initiatives and is based in our London office. Through its work, TI-DS is fighting to establish global standards and hold advanced and emerging powers to account, prevent conflict and support fragile countries and address systemic corruption risks in the arms trade.
Transparency International is the civil society organisation leading the fight against corruption
As international interventions – from stabilisation missions and peacekeeping contributions to security assistance – frequently take place in environments affected by corruption and conflict, they will need to grapple with corruption issues, including the particularly destructive form corruption can take in defence and security forces. Their design and implementation will need to take corruption risks into account, and will need to minimise the risk of missions exacerbating corruption. Where a military component is part of the intervention, the intervening forces will need to mitigate corruption risks in their own activities and be able to support wider anti-corruption measures.
This document is part of a larger body of work on analysing and mitigating corruption risks in interventions with a military component. It signposts the key issues that are likely to need attention at the strategic and political levels, where key policies are set, mission mandates established, and conditions for troop contributions agreed. For more detail on specific corruption pathways, mitigation measures, and military planning processes, please consult the Interventions Anti Corruption Guidance website.
Corruption undermines the success of international interventions, reducing mission effectiveness, diminishing public trust in intervention forces. Where intervention forces lack adequate oversight and control, for example, or procurement is based on the interests of a single individual or state rather than the requirements of the organisation, its ability to respond to crises suffers. International organisations are complex and political organisations, which can make ensuring accountability and oversight challenging. But where they are able to ensure that there is effective oversight of peace and military operations and corruption risks are limited, their ability to secure peace and stability will be much greater.
This tool is designed to help international organisations conducting peace or military operations assess their vulnerability to corruption, with the aim of helping institutions strengthen themselves against this risk, improve their effectiveness, and ensure their operations are in the best interest of those directly affected by them and the global public. It sets out good practice for accountability and good governance of peace or military operations conducted by international organisations, and to ensure that those operations are overseen effectively.
Drawing on the methodology of the Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index, this set of questions aim to assess levels of corruption risk and vulnerability and to enable institutions to assess how their systems compare to international good practice. It is separated into five sections: political risk, financial risk, personnel risk, operations risk, and procurement risk.
Corruption is a key driver of conflict and instability and poses a direct threat to the successful implementation of peacekeeping mandates. As the Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations recognises, corruption provides financing for organised criminal groups, leads to violent extremism and public unrest, and can undo years of peacekeeping efforts.
Recently allegations of sexual abuse by foreign military forces in CAR have demonstrated that gross misconduct by peacekeeping troops continues to challenge missions and must be addressed by the peacekeeping community. While sexual abuse is the most visible form of misconduct, any act that undermines a mission’s credibility, including corruption, must be seen as a threat.
Our research demonstrates that, notwithstanding the UN’s continuing efforts, both it and TCCs need to take more systematic action to reduce corruption risk in international missions.
The effectiveness of international interventions and defence capacity building programmes is at considerable risk from corruption threats in countries being supported. Corruption can not only reduce the chances of success of the mission, but can also lead to complete subversion of its intent. This paper discusses ways in which the international community can better recognise and address such threats.
Corruption is a feature of all conflicts, playing a key role in the power-struggle between competing groups for resources and power. This places mission leaders in a challenging situation because it means engagement with corrupt entities is frequently inevitable. This handbook is directed at military and civilian leadership and their staff involved in planning and carrying out operations. It seeks to provide practical guidance that can be used in daily work.
Peacekeeping and other conflict-related missions, which are the subject of this report, are seriously affected by corruption. Conflict environments are difficult, and the fact that corruption is often rife complicates the work of the UN and other international organisations immensely. Powerful local stakeholders are often corrupt, but cannot be ignored by peacekeepers and policymakers. Ignoring corruption embeds it more deeply and damages the legitimacy of key institutions, putting the long-term success of international interventions at risk.
Military forces around the world pride themselves on being highly trained, and having strong values like integrity and selflessness embedded in all their instruction. Corruption as an issue can seem marginal, as something for civilians to think about. Developing the capacity of defence ministries and military forces to recognise and react to this problem requires training. Such training has not been available up until recently. But, in the last few years, TI-DSP, in collaboration with NATO and other partners, has developed a course to address the military and defence aspects of corruption. The purpose of this study is to follow up on the impact of this course, and see whether it was lasting and had resulted in changes in attitudes and behaviour.