Author: acoakley
A landmark Defence and Security Pact between the EU and the UK is signed and with it a new chapter in post-Brexit relations begins.
As the dust settles on the symbolism, a more difficult conversation begins on how to turn diplomatic momentum into meaningful, accountable, and future-proof cooperation. What could a EU-UK defence pact deliver, and what should it avoid?
Public support is there, but so are the risks
Public and political momentum is tangible, but governance still lags behind. Support for closer defence ties is already mainstream on both sides of the Channel. Yet the oversight, safeguards, and transparency we apply in other sectors (like humanitarian aid) remain worryingly absent from discussions about European defence.
Over 60% of UK citizens support closer defence ties with the EU, a striking shift from past scepticism around joint military ventures. This opens a window for cooperation rooted in shared threat perceptions, particularly vis-à-vis Russia and US foreign policy. This newfound openness cannot be taken for granted. Unlike other policy areas (e.g. migration or trade), defence cooperation seems less politically “sticky”, but will remain so only if its outcomes are seen as credible, effective, and fair.
Industrial integration is not neutral
The potential for joint procurement and industrial collaboration is immense, but not without significant governance and sovereignty risks. The UK’s defence industry is deeply integrated with the US, raising concerns about how “European” future joint systems with the UK would be. British defence giants like BAE Systems and Rolls-Royce operate extensively within the US market, and their products often include US-origin components.
This matters because such components can carry legal and political restrictions on their use, such as the Arms International Traffic in Arms Regulations (AITA), which can restrict the export or operational use of any system containing components of American origin. In Ukraine, for example, these constraints have already had real consequences: certain Western-made systems cannot be used for long-range strikes or exported without prior authorisation. In this way, third countries may still retain veto power over how weapons are deployed, even in urgent wartime scenarios.
The EU-UK Defence Pact aims to deliver strategic flexibility and autonomy. For this to materialsie, any co-produced systems must be designed from the outset to be free from those restrictions. Otherwise, European states risk being politically aligned but operationally constrained.
Democratic oversight remains fragmented
European defence is still more ambition than architecture. While the EU has taken major steps toward greater coordination, defence remains a patchwork of national systems, divergent priorities, and fragmented oversight. The EU cannot currently fund military operations from its core budget, and procurement remains largely a national prerogative. Crucially, as defence budgets rise, governance gaps widen. NATO, the EU Parliament, and national parliaments exercise some oversight, but EU-level defence cooperation lacks a robust, integrated, and harmonised accountability framework.
Parliamentary scrutiny varies widely and even in member states with relatively strong national controls (e.g. Germany, where parliament must approve contracts over €25 million) there is limited political appetite to elevate or align oversight at the EU level. The EU can support coordination and financing, but lacks meaningful levers to enforce transparency or ethical standards across borders. The risk is that joint initiatives, procurement programmes, and industrial integration will advance faster than the institutions designed to govern them.
Strategic urgency Is driving speed, but scrutiny is lagging
The risk remains that political capital is spent on symbolic breakthroughs rather than institutional substance. Momentum should not override scrutiny. The summit may have delivered a strong political gesture, but all the critical legal and practical details—on access, conditionality, and governance—will only be hashed out in the months ahead. And behind the political consensus lie unresolved questions: under what conditions will UK firms access EU defence funds (e.g., the new €150bn SAFE facility)? How will rules of origin be defined for joint procurement? Can export control regimes be aligned to prevent governance loopholes? The current moment might be a “market-moving opportunity” for defence actors, but the investment case remains underspecified.
Also, speed must not come at the cost of integrity. Joint declarations are welcome, but mechanisms must follow. Political incentives may prioritise quick wins, especially in the face of domestic pressures. Meanwhile, divergent French and German views on UK involvement, and rising populist sentiment across Europe, may push governments toward optics rather than institutional depth.
Defence without accountability is a false promise
The takeaway was clear: cooperation must be conditional on transparency. With the pact now agreed, attention must turn to how it will be implemented. For this new phase of EU–UK defence cooperation to succeed, its delivery must match its ambition with transparency and accountability built in from the start.
At TI-DS, we believe that how defence cooperation is built matters just as much as what is built. The UK and EU have a shared interest in security. They must now demonstrate a shared commitment to governance. With new money, new mechanisms, and new threats, the time to embed transparency and integrity is now not after the contracts are signed.
Dr. Francesca Grandi, Head of Programme, Transparency International Defence and Security
The UK and EU are “never, ever getting back together”. But on 19 May, they will be testing the waters. In 2023, David Lammy floated the idea that a Labour government would “start dating” the EU again after the “very, very bitter divorce” of Brexit. That intent was later baked into Labour’s 2024 manifesto.
On Monday Prime Minister Keir Starmer will host European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, European Council President António Costa, and the EU’s foreign and security chief Kaja Kallas in London – the first formal UK-EU Summit since Brexit. What can we expect?
Defence and security cooperation as first step
The first talking point will be defence and security cooperation, the least contentious of issues that the UK and EU are seeking to negotiate, focusing on Russian aggression, the unclear future of NATO, and the US’ reliability as security partner. They are expected to sign an agreement on defence and security cooperation, as long as old ghosts—like fishing—don’t wet the deal.
Geopolitical and strategic considerations are not the only reason behind the willingness to close a deal. Readiness 2030, the White Paper for European Defence published by the EU Commission in early April, enables EU Member States to spend over €800bn on defence through changing its fiscal rules and introducing a new financing instrument. It also incentivises joint procurement – with countries and from companies based in the EU, Ukraine, or in countries with a special trade relationship with the EU (EEA EFTA States). EU accession candidates can be partners too.
The UK falls in none of these categories. Whilst a small part of the costs can come from other countries for smaller products such as ammunition, missiles and small drones, this is unlikely going to be enough to satisfy UK defence heavyweights such as BAE Systems or Babock International.
For a country with a well-advanced defence industry, and a government that has made boosting economic growth its primary mission – and whose success will likely by measured by whether it can make that happen – this is a huge problem. Likewise, the EU is losing out on cooperating with one of the most capable militaries in Europe who have a highly advanced defence industry, and access to a nuclear deterrent.
Looking at the substance
The contents of the agreement that is currently being drawn up by the EU Commission’s European External Action Service (EEAS), are still speculation. Rumoured is an agreement similar to the partnership that Norway has with the EU. This would unlock access to Security Action for Europe (SAFE), the €150bn loan instrument through which the EU Commission will fund joint procurement ventures.
In such an agreement lie opportunities beyond economic growth. On the political side, it would establish a regular dialogue and joint consultation mechanisms between the two. Critical gaps in oversight, intelligence and information-sharing, and strategic planning, which were lost with Brexit, could be closed.
This possibility brings renewed hope for the fight against corruption, as the UK lost access to the bloc’s data and information-sharing systems e.g. on corruption cases in arms transfers – a dangerous blind spot at a time in which both sides are seeking to massively increase their defence spending. Should access to SAFE loans and joint procurement be made conditional on transparency and accountability commitments, the UK’s eligibility to this instrument would bring further benefits to civic oversight of cross-European efforts to rearm rapidly.
A promising start
Whilst it is too early to say that love is in the air, rising security concerns have undeniably pushed both sides closer together. Amongst the many contentious issues yet to be negotiated, defence and security is the one in which the common interests seem to outweigh the differences. The UK needs the EU’s money to boost its economic growth, and the EU needs the UK’s expertise and capabilities on defence to build a credible defence. Economic interests might be at the forefront, but this ‘first date’ also yields hope for strengthened oversight and accountability in the defence sector.
Emily Wegener, Senior Policy and Campaigns Officer, Transparency International Defence & Security
London – April 16th– As armed conflicts surge and organised crime activity rises, a new report from Transparency International Defence & Security (TI-DS) and Transparency International US (TI-US) reveals how corruption is quietly but consistently enabling weapons to fall into the wrong hands.
Under the Radar: Corruption’s Role in Fueling Arms Diversion investigates over 400 cases of diversion across 70 countries and shows how corruption, including bribery, embezzlement, and abuse of authority, serves as a key enabler of illicit arms flows.
The report’s release comes at a time of intensifying global concern over weapons diversion. It shows how corruption-fuelled diversion has empowered organised crime, fuelled armed conflict and violence, weakened military effectiveness, and undermined governance and security around the world.
“Despite greater recognition of corruption’s corrosive effect on arms control policies, corruption has often been sidelined in efforts to assess risks of arms diversion like a detective ignoring key clues in a recurring crime,” said Colby Goodman, Senior Researcher at TI US and TI-DS and one of the report’s authors. “Some states’ actions in recent years to add corruption risk assessments are a critical first step to better tackling this global scourge.”
The report provides critical information and tools for states to help identify and mitigate corruption-fuelled arms diversion as they develop new national arms control policies and engage in ongoing discussions within the United Nations on curbing arms diversion.
“The vast amounts of weapons diverted to terrorist groups in the past war on terror is a stark reminder of what happens when governments lose sight of corruption risks in the name of national security,” said Dr. Francesca Grandi, Head of Advocacy at Transparency International Defence & Security. “As demand for arms imports grows amid increasing global insecurity, this report offers practical and effective tools for arms exporting countries to strengthen integrity in their export control systems. It should also help spark more serious conversations globally, at the United Nations and in other fora, about sharing corruption-related information to prevent arms diversion.”
Some of the reports key findings include:
- The theft or embezzlement of state-owned weapons for private gain is the most common type of corruption-fuelled diversion, accounting for over 350 cases. Bribery and abuse of authority remain a serious concern for diversion.
- Corruption facilitates diversion at each stage of a weapon’s lifecycle, including production, international transfers, active use and storage, and disposal. The active use and storage stage had the most corruption-fuelled diversion cases followed by the disposal, international transfer, and production stages.
- Many of the corruption-fuelled diversion cases resulted in devastating consequences for civilians. In more than 200 cases, military or security personnel reportedly colluded with illicit actors, such as insurgents or terrorists, in connection with arms diversion, which resulted in hundreds of deaths and injuries.
To address this urgent issue, the report offers key analysis and recommendations for states engaged in arms exports and imports:
- Strengthen national policies by explicitly identifying corruption as a key risk for arms diversion and developing implementation guidelines that incorporate targeted risk assessment questions that measure key, often overlooked defence and security institutional controls.
- Improve international collaboration on corruption in arms transfers by sharing information on corruption risks in arms transfers within the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) framework and establishing working groups within the ATT and other multilateral for deeper discussions on the topic.
- Support research and foreign aid to curb corruption-fuelled arms diversion, including funding studies on related issues and efforts to strengthen the integrity of defence and security institutions.
You can read the full report here: Under the Radar Corruptions Role in Fueling Arms Diversion
About Transparency International Defence & Security:
Transparency International Defence & Security (TI-DS) is part of Transparency International, the world’s leading anti-corruption Movement, comprised of 100 national Chapters and a Secretariat in Berlin. TI-DS is a global centre of excellence, evidence and advocacy dedicated to building integrity in the defence and security sector for the benefit of citizens, states, and the world. It is hosted by Transparency International UK and works with Chapters across the Movement. Since its establishment, TI-DS has worked to bring anti-corruption firmly into the global defence and security agenda.
For media inquiries or to request interviews with the report authors, please contact:
Amanda Coakley, Global Media & Communications Advisor
acoakley@transparency.org