Political Risk:
Very High
Score:
26/100
Defence and Security Policy and Policy Transparency
Q1
75/100
Is there formal provision for effective and independent legislative scrutiny of defence policy?
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Parliament primarily has formal oversight over defence policy and practices through the Defence, Home Affairs and Security Services committee of the House of Assembly…
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Parliament exercises budgetary power over defence once a year during the annual budget cycle. This is usually done as part of the broader responsibilities…
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There is not enough information to score this indicator. There are no recorded instances where the executive or the military have publicly undermined parliamentary…
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Q2
20/100
Does the country have an identifiable and effective parliamentary defence and security committee (or similar such organisations) to exercise oversight?
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There is a Defence, Home Affairs and Security Services Committee in the House of Assembly and the Peace and Security Committee in the Senate.…
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Only three of the 20 members of the Portfolio Committee have defence expertise [1]. None of the opposition MPs have military experience nor academic…
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The Defence Committee does not review defence policy [1]. The defence policy is not presented to Parliament or the Committee on Defence for review…
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The Defence Committee periodically provides oversight over the defence sector. There are instances when senior military officers appear before the Defence Committee, but this…
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The Defence Committee has the powers to investigate activities of the military; however, in practice, the Defence Committee has never conducted a defence investigation…
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This indicator has been marked “Not Applicable,” as there is no evidence that the Defence Committee provides any recommendations [1, 2, 3].
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Q3
6/100
Is the country’s national defence policy or national security strategy debated and publicly available?
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There is debate on defence policy; however, the media, civil society and opposition political parties, particularly the Movement For Democratic Change (MDC), have for…
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Discussions on defence policy are largely focused on the political economy of the military, the debates centre around security sector reform. The military in…
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There is no formal consultation of the public concerning defence policy, the closest interaction between the public and government on defence policy is the…
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There has not been a release of documents as yet to the public relating to defence policy and strategy. However, the impending completion of…
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Q4
8/100
Do defence and security institutions have a policy, or evidence, of openness towards civil society organisations (CSOs) when dealing with issues of corruption?
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No policy requires the military to be open to civil society, nor is there an interaction framework. In fact, the security sector in Zimbabwe…
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Civil society organisations can operate in Zimbabwe; there are general provisions in the Constitution that allow freedom of expression, freedom of association, freedom of…
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The Zimbabwe Peace and Security Programme is one of very few known initiatives to facilitate engagement between CSOs and the military [1]. The project…
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Q5
75/100
Has the country signed up to the following international anti-corruption instruments: UNCAC and the OECD Convention?
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Zimbabwe is not a significant defence exporter. Zimbabwe signed the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) Convention on 20 February 2004 and ratified it…
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Zimbabwe has complied with a number of the articles in the UNCAC provisions in the legislative framework of Zimbabwe addressing certain aspects of the…
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Q6
50/100
Is there evidence of regular, active public debate on issues of defence? If yes, does the government participate in this debate?
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The role of the military in Zimbabwe’s politics and economy is arguably a major highlight in public debates. Activists, journalists and academics usually raise…
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The government does not participate in public debates on matters of the security sector. Senior government officials shun public debating platforms on non-security issues,…
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Q7
NEI/100
Does the country have an openly stated and effectively implemented anti-corruption policy for the defence sector?
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There is a National Anti-Corruption Strategy, and it applies to the defence sector. The National Anti-Corruption Strategy defines the country’s priorities, objectives and actions…
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There is not enough evidence to score this indicator. The National Anti-Corruption Strategy was adopted in July 2020, and at the time of this…
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Q8
58/100
Are there independent, well-resourced, and effective institutions within defence and security tasked with building integrity and countering corruption?
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There are units within the military meant to ensure integrity. However, there is no evidence of compliance or effectiveness or adequate staffing [1]. The…
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The law allows the National Defence Commission to investigate acts of corruption under their broad mandate [1]. The commission is not under military command.…
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Staff units have administrative officers trained to detect and prevent corrupt practices [1]. However, they do not necessarily have an action plan, with appropriate…
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Q9
NS/100
Does the public trust the institutions of defence and security to tackle the issue of bribery and corruption in their establishments?
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This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. Before the events of November 2018 [1], research by Afrobarometer and the Mass Public…
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Q10
0/100
Are there regular assessments of the areas of greatest corruption risk for ministry and armed forces personnel, and are the findings used as inputs to the anti-corruption policy?
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A defence specific corruption risk assessment has not been commissioned in recent times. There is not a publicly available one [1, 2].
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This indicator is marked “Not Applicable,” since risk assessments are not conducted.
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This indicator is marked “Not Applicable,” since risk assessments are not conducted.
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Defence Budgets
Q11
33/100
Does the country have a process for acquisition planning that involves clear oversight, and is it publicly available?
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The law provides clear acquisition procedures which ought to be followed by all government departments and public entities, defence institutions included [1, 2]. All…
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There is no transparency in the acquisition planning process [1]. Military and intelligence purchases are kept secret, and they are not publicised whatsoever, except…
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There is external oversight of military plans done by the National Security Council (NSC) comprised of the president, vice president and select ministers, as…
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Q12
50/100
Is the defence budget transparent, showing key items of expenditure? And it is provided to the legislature in a timely fashion?
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The defence budget is usually top-line, and it does not provide specific information on military R&D, training, construction, procurements and acquisitions, maintenance of equipment,…
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The legislature receives an accurate defence budget proposal less than two months before the start of the budget year [1]. The involvement of Parliament…
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Q13
38/100
Is there a legislative committee (or other appropriate body) responsible for defence budget scrutiny and analysis in an effective way?
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There is a Committee on Defence, Security and Home Affairs that provides general oversight over all the security institutions in Zimbabwe, including budget scrutiny.…
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The committee reviews the defence budget but fails to take advantage of its formal powers of scrutiny [1]. The committee has fewer powers than…
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Q14
25/100
Is the approved defence budget made publicly available? In practice, can citizens, civil society, and the media obtain detailed information on the defence budget?
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The Defence budget is published in full, in an aggregate form, together with the rest of the country’s national expenditure and revenue estimates. [1].…
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Most areas of the approved defence budget are not published in detail, as most of the data is in an aggregated form [1]. There…
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It is extremely difficult or impossible to obtain any details on the budget [1]. There are no laid out procedures or channels of requesting…
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Q15
25/100
Are sources of defence income other than from central government allocation (from equipment sales or property disposal, for example) published and scrutinised?
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The military in Zimbabwe is known to be involved in several profit ventures, including interests in mining, among other sources of funds, yet the…
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The Ministry of Defence has a centralised audit unit that is meant to deal with the scrutiny of all the books of the security…
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The public, the media and l society organisations have no access to information pertaining to non-centralised sources of funds, including the disposal of property…
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Q16
25/100
Is there an effective internal audit process for defence ministry expenditure (that is, for example, transparent, conducted by appropriately skilled individuals, and subject to parliamentary oversight)?
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There is an internal audit unit within the Ministry of Defence (MoD) that carries out internal audits of defence expenditure [1], but this is…
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The work of the internal audit units is usually for the benefit of the MoD and the commander of the defence forces as well…
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Internal audits are submitted for review to external auditors, specifically the Office of the Auditor General Zimbabwe, as required by the Public Finance Management…
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The MoD addresses recommendations or queries from both its internal audit unit as well as from the auditor general [1]. However, there is a…
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Q17
25/100
Is there effective and transparent external auditing of military defence expenditure?
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The Office of the Auditor General Zimbabwe (OAG) has the mandate to scrutinise all public accounts, including those belonging to the Ministry of Defence…
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The OAG acts independently, but their work is undermined by the fact that they do not receive detailed and disaggregated financial data on military…
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The auditor general publishes all her reports for public access for each financial year as soon as the report is completed and tabled before…
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The MoD addresses recommendations or queries from the auditor general [1]. However, there is a perception that this is superficial given that the military…
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Nexus of Defence and National Assets
Q18
0/100
Is there evidence that the country’s defence institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation and, if so, are these interests publicly stated and subject to scrutiny?
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The Constitution of Zimbabwe does not explicitly prohibit defence institutions from having controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource…
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The Zimbabwe Defence Forces are involved in several mining ventures; the ventures are arguably illicit in that they are not provided for in any…
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There are numerous reported cases of individual defence personnel involved in the exploitation of natural resources, for instance, related to the Marange diamond mine…
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Though interests are not publicly declared, their existence is not hidden. It is a case of authorised illegality in which the Military’s conflation with…
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In principle, Parliament through the Portfolio Committee responsible for mining oversight can scrutinise all mining activity; however, research has proved that the conflation between…
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Organised Crime
Q19
13/100
Is there evidence, for example through media investigations or prosecution reports, of a penetration of organised crime into the defence and security sector? If no, is there evidence that the government is alert and prepared for this risk?
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There are several reported cases of organised crime by the military and Central Intelligence Organisation operatives in Zimbabwe. They primarily involve the use of…
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Apart from arrests of the soldiers and intelligence operatives for varying acts of armed robbery and supply of weapons for criminal purposes and their…
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Q20
0/100
Is there policing to investigate corruption and organised crime within the defence services and is there evidence of the effectiveness of this policing?
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The Zimbabwe Republic Police has specialised units to combat different kinds of crimes; collaboration between the units can cover most forms of organised crimes.…
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The military police unit exercises its functions relatively independently of other units within the military. However, their reach cannot extend to senior officers and…
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This indicator is marked “Not Applicable” as there is no policing function in the defence sector addressing corruption and organised crime. The outcomes of…
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Control of Intelligence Services
Q21
0/100
Are the policies, administration, and budgets of the intelligence services subject to effective and independent oversight?
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There is no independent oversight of the intelligence services (i.e. the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO)). Though Section 224 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe provides…
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This indicator is marked “Not Applicable,” as there is no independent oversight of the budgets and operations of the intelligence services in Zimbabwe [1,…
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Q22
0/100
Are senior positions within the intelligence services filled on the basis of objective selection criteria, and are appointees subject to investigation of their suitability and prior conduct?
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The Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) is provided for in the Constitution; however, there is no Act of Parliament to provide for its operation and…
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Senior appointments are primarily made by the executive, the absence of an Act of Parliament in this respect makes the appointments discretionary, giving room…
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Procedurally, there should be vetting before promotions; however, senior appointments are highly politicised and compromised. The appointment process is a highly political process that…
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Export Controls
Q23
50/100
Does the government have a well-scrutinised process for arms export decisions that aligns with Articles 7.1.iv, 11.5, and 15.6 of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)?
View QuestionLobbying in Defence
The country has no framework for regulating lobbying activity [1, 2, 3].
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This indicator is marked “Not Applicable,” as the country has no framework for regulating lobbying activity [1, 2, 3].
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This indicator is marked “Not Applicable,” as the country has no framework for regulating lobbying activity [1, 2, 3].
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This indicator is marked “Not Applicable,” as the country has no framework for regulating lobbying activity [1, 2, 3].
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