Theme: Operations

April 9, 2024 – In the face of Haiti’s escalating crisis, marked by a surge in gang violence, a recent UN report underscores the critical need for an unwavering commitment to accountability and anti-corruption measures across public and defence sectors. 

A UN Human Rights Office report calls for immediate and bold action to tackle the “cataclysmic” situation in Haiti. 

In 2023, 4,451 people were killed and 1,668 injured due to gang violence. The number skyrocketed in the first three months of 2024, with 1,554 killed and 826 injured up to 22 March. 

The report identifies key factors contributing to the crisis including an illicit economy incubated by corruption that facilitates the patronage of armed gangs by elites, and widespread corruption that contributed to the pervasive impunity in the country’s justice systems. 

Responding to the worsening situation and intensified gang violence in Haiti, Sara Bandali, Director of International Engagement at Transparency International UK, said: 

“We stand firmly with UN High Commissioner Volker Türk in making Haiti’s security crisis a top priority to protect its people and end the spiral of suffering.  

“With gang violence and ‘self-defence brigades’ on the rise, and a government that is highly susceptible to corruption, the resurgence of private military security companies could also further destabilise the country.  

“The urgency to confront the twin issues of corruption and governance failures is paramount. Accountability and anti-corruption efforts across public bodies and the defence & security sector are critical for the nation’s return to peace, stability, and security, and should never be traded off.” 

Notes to editors: 

Transparency International – Defence & Security previously warned about the destablising effects of private military security companies on Haiti following the assassination of the country’s president in 2021. 

Our Hidden Costs report provides further detail on private military security companies and the risks they pose to fuelling corruption and conflict.

Photo by Heather Suggitt on Unsplash.

Transparency International Defence & Security’s (TI-DS) 2023-2025 Gender Mainstreaming Strategy aims to promote the capacity of the organisation to mainstream a gender perspective and move towards good and best practice approaches of gender-sensitivity and gender-responsiveness. Gender-sensitivity ensures that TI-DS programmes, projects and activities reduce the risk of harms to partners and participants and reduces risks of reproducing gender inequalities. Gender-responsiveness is more of a pro-active effort to challenge harmful gender norms at the root of corruption and its impacts. Both approaches require attention to gender at every stage of programme cycles, from deign to implementation and monitoring, evaluation and learning.

By Patrick Kwasi Brobbey (Research Project Manager), Léa Clamadieu and Irasema Guzman Orozco (Research Project Officers) 

Corruption in defence and security heightens conflict risks, wastes public resources, and exacerbates human insecurity. It is crucial to recognise the gravity of corruption in the defence and security sector and develop institutional safeguards against it. Against this backdrop, Transparency International – Defence & Security (TI-DS) is launching the 2025 Government Defence Integrity Index (GDI) – the premier global measure of institutional resilience to corruption in the defence and security sector. This blog outlines what the GDI entails, its relevance, how it is produced, and essential information about the launch.   

What is the GDI? 

The GDI analyses institutional and informal controls to manage the risk of corruption in public defence and security establishments. The index focuses on five broad risk areas of defence: policymaking, finances, personnel management, operations, and procurement. To provide a broad and comprehensive reflection of these risk areas, the GDI assesses both legal frameworks and their implementation, as well as resources and outcomes. 

Because of its focus, the index provides a framework of good practice that promotes accountable, transparent, and responsible governance in national defence establishments. The GDI is a critical tool in driving global defence reform and improving defence governance.  

Previously dubbed the Government Defence Anti-corruption Index, the GDI was first released in 2013. Updated results were published in 2015, before the index went a major overhaul in 2020.  The project now runs in a five-year cycle, so the new iteration will be published in 2025.  

Gender: A New Dimension of the GDI 

For the first time, the GDI will incorporate a gender approach. The 2024-2026 TI-DS Strategy acknowledges that corruption in the defence sector involves gendered power dynamics that produce different impacts, perceptions, risks, forms of corruption, and experiences for diverse groups of women, men, girls, boys, and sexual and gender minorities. In alignment with the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda, many defence and security institutions now recognise gender. Nevertheless, their efforts mainly focus on achieving gender balance, mainstreaming, and representation. There is a lack of visibility on gendered corruption risks in the defence and security policy agenda, as anti-corruption measures and gender concerns are often addressed separately. 

Consistent with our commitment to addressing this, the 2025 GDI adopts a gender perspective to assess the gender dimensions of corruption risks in this sector. For this iteration, gender indicators have been developed and will be piloted. The gendered corruption risk indicators cover four cross-cutting themes: legal and normative commitments, gender balance strategies, gender mainstreaming strategies, and prevention and response to gender-based violence.  

Integrating gender into corruption risk assessments like the GDI can help produce gendered anti-corruption interventions that recalibrate uneven power relations affecting people of diverse genders and minority groups. Additionally, it will help to identify evidence-based best practices in the gender, anti-corruption, and security space. 

Why is the GDI important? 

The GDI offers an evidence-based approach which emphasises that better institutional controls reduce the risk of corruption. It constitutes a comprehensive assessment of integrity matters in the defence sector and plays a crucial role in driving global defence reform, thereby improving defence governance. 

The relevance of the index is enshrined in the rationale for creating it. The GDI recognises that:  

• Corruption within the defence and security sector impede states’ ability to defend themselves and provide the needed security for their citizens. For instance, in Iraq in 2014, 50,000 ‘ghost soldiers’ were found in the budget – soldiers that existed only on paper and whose salaries were stolen by senior or high-ranking officers. The Iraqi forces were left depleted, unprepared to face real threats and unable to protect citizens and provide national security.
• The secrecy of the defence sector contributes to the wastage of resources and the weakening of public institutions, facilitating the personalisation/privatisation of public resources for private gains via defence establishments. According to the 2020 GDI, 37% of states in the index had limited to no transparency on procurements.
• Efficacious public institutions and informal mechanisms are central in preventing the wastage of state funds, the misappropriation of power, and the development of graft in the defence and security sector. In 2023, it was revealed that the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence was planning to overpay suppliers for food intended for troops. This led to official investigations and ultimately saw the auditions in the Ukrainian parliament pass legislation that enhances transparency in defence procurement.

These examples underscore the importance and timeliness of the GDI in rooting out corruption in national defence and security sectors. 

How is the GDI created? 

The GDI consists of questions broken down into indicators spanning the five corruption risks. These serve as the basis of data collection in countries carefully selected using the TI-DS selection criteria, which predominantly centre on the susceptibility of a country’s defence institutions to corruption. These countries will be drawn from the following TI regions: sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East and North Africa, Central and Eastern Europe, Latin America, Asia Pacific and South Asia, and Western Europe and North America.  

TI-DS uses a rigorous methodology consisting of an independent Country Assessor conducting research and providing an original, context-specific data that is accurate and verifiable. The data are then first extensively reviewed by a TI-DS team of topical and methodology experts before being sent to external reviewers (specifically, peer reviewers and relevant TI national chapters and governments) for additional quality checks. As part of its commitment to transparency, TI-DS has published the GDI Methods Paper that outlines the methodological and analytical considerations and choices . 

Overview of the Launch 

The 2025 GDI research project, which will be conducted in six waves representing the TI regions, began on Tuesday 26 March 2023. A webinar was organised for TI national chapters whose countries are in the first wave. This information session ensured mutual learning between TI-DS and the chapters. Other webinars will be organised later for chapters whose countries are in the subsequent waves. 

TI-DS has secured ample funding for the sub-Saharan African wave of the 2025 GDI. However, as the GDI is of utmost importance and requires timely execution, we are working towards securing additional funding to cover the administrative and operational costs of the remaining five waves. TI-DS invites the stakeholders to get in touch via gdi@transparency.org to help support the remaining waves. Thank you. 

March 28, 2024 – Transparency International – Defence & Security (TI-DS) is excited to announce the start of work on the next iteration of the Government Defence Integrity Index (GDI), the leading global benchmark of corruption risks in the defence and security sector.  

The GDI 2025 is TI-DS’s flagship research product and follows on from the GDI 2020. This latest iteration includes expert assessments of around 90 countries as well as the introduction of a gender perspective, recognising the nuanced impacts of corruption across different gender and underrepresented groups. 

The GDI provides a framework of good practice that promotes accountable, transparent, and responsible governance in the defence & security sector. It is a useful tool for civil society to collaborate with Ministries of Defence, the armed forces, and with oversight institutions, to build their capacity in advocating for transparency and integrity. 

Countries are evaluated by independent assessors who assess the strength of anti-corruption safeguards and institutional resilience to corruption in five key areas: 

1. Financial: includes strength of safeguards around military asset disposals, whether a country allows military-owned businesses, and whether the full extent of military spending is publicly disclosed.  
2. Operational: includes corruption risk in a country’s military deployments overseas and the use of private security companies.  
3. Personnel: includes how resilient defence sector payroll, promotions and appointments are to corruption, and the strength of safeguards against corruption to avoid conscription or recruitment. 
4. Political: includes transparency over defence & security policy, openness in defence budgets, and strength of anti-corruption checks surrounding arms exports. 
5. Procurement: includes corruption risk around tenders and how contracts are awarded, the use of agents/brokers as middlemen in procurement, and assessment of how vulnerable a country is to corruption in offset contracts.  

These independent assessments go through multiple layers of expert review before each country is assigned an overall score and rank. This makes the GDI extremely rigorous in its methodology.  

The amount of work required to produce the GDI means the new country results will be released in six waves: 

• Sub-Saharan Africa 
• Middle East and North Africa 
• Central and Eastern Europe 
• Latin America 
• Asia Pacific and South Asia 
• Western Europe and North America 

The first wave is provisionally due to be published in early 2025.  

Notes: 

The GDI was previously known as the Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index (GI), with results published in 2013 and 2015. The Index underwent a major update for the 2020 version, including changes to the methodology and scoring underpinning the project. The 2025 results can be compared with those from 2020 to get a picture of global trends in defence governance, and which countries are improving. 

The GDI is a corruption risk assessment of the defence and security sector within a country, which assesses the quality of mechanisms used to manage corruption risk –and evaluating the factors that are understood to facilitate corruption. 

It is not a measurement of corruption and does not measure the amount of funds that are lost to corruption, identify corrupt actors, or estimate the perceptions of corruption in the defence & security sectors by the public. 

TI-DS has secured funding for the sub-Saharan African wave and is working towards securing additional support to cover the costs of producing the remaining five waves. We invite all stakeholders, including public agencies, multilateral organisations and INGOs, to get in touch via gdi@transparency.org to help support the remaining waves.

February 15, 2024 – As African leaders gather in Addis Ababa for the 2024 African Union (AU) Summit, the urgent agenda of addressing peace and security takes centre stage.

While ensuring the safety of citizens remains the primary obligation of governments, many African countries grapple with persistent conflicts and an alarming recurrence of coups. Internal conflicts, often fuelled by the illicit arms trade and the unlawful exploitation of natural resources, has threatened the stability of several countries on the continent.

Corruption has served as a catalyst for conflicts in Burkina Faso, Sudan, Mali, Nigeria and the Central African Republic, which has poured fuel on the flames of grievances against political leaders and incited violent upheavals.

By eroding public trust and undermining the effectiveness of defence and security institutions, corruption has eroded the rule of law and perpetuated instability. This has led to diminished access to essential services for many and fostered environments conducive to human rights abuses. There is a pressing need to recognise corruption as a security threat in itself and prioritise anti-corruption efforts within security sector reform and governance (SSR/G).

It is imperative that AU members unite in addressing corruption within defence and security sectors as a crucial step toward achieving conflict resolution, peace, stability, and security goals.

Transparency International Defence & Security calls on states to:

• Recognise corruption in defence as a security threat: Governments must acknowledge the threat of corruption to national security and allocate resources accordingly.
• Empower civilian oversight: Governments should encourage active citizen participation in oversight to enhance transparency and accountability.
• Integrate anti-corruption in peace efforts and SSR: Embed anti-corruption measures into conflict resolution, peacebuilding and security sector reform agendas for more resilient societies.

Peace and stability in Africa and around the world cannot be safeguarded without making the efforts to address the insidious threat of corruption proportionate to the threat which it represents.

The deposed Niger government’s efforts fighting corruption contrast markedly with the neglect shown in neighbouring Burkina Faso ahead of the previous coups which rocked the region. Transparency International Defence and Security’s Mohamed Bennour, Michael Ofori-Mensah and Denitsa Zhelyazkova compare the collapse of the two nations and show how ECOWAS can reinforce democracy in the region.

Upon his election as chair of the West African regional bloc ECOWAS last month, Nigeria’s new president Bola Tinubu made plain his intentions to champion democracy in efforts to arrest the spate of military uprisings that have disrupted the region in recent years.

It wasn’t long however before another arrived, this time in Niger. ECOWAS swiftly threatened military intervention. ECOWAS and other power brokers traditionally tend to respond to events of this kind with talk of zero tolerance and sanctions – tough words but sentiment that, too often, is accompanied by minimal analysis of the root causes.

Transparency International in Niger are among the civil society groups that have observed a trend leading to coups in their country: the discovery of lucrative natural resources. In November, the Niger-Benin pipeline, the largest in Africa, is due to start exporting crude petroleum for the first time. This will multiply Niger’s crude exports by five, with an expected GDP increase of 24 per cent. Before this, the discovery of uranium in 1974 coincided with the overthrow of Niger’s leadership. Then an oil boom in 2010 was swiftly followed by another coup.

The resources vary but the outcomes follow a pattern.

The removal of Niger’s president Mohamed Bazoum has been lamented by our colleagues on the ground. This is because he had been showing willingness to step up to the long-ignored challenge of confronting corruption in the country.

Supporters of Bazoum protested in the street against the coup, together with CSOs and unions. Some have expressed their scepticism about the military being able to solve the governance challenges and issues of insecurity faced in the country.

The scepticism is driven by the fact that Niger’s security had been progressing better than in neighbouring countries, with fewer terror fatalities than those recorded in Mali and Burkina Faso.

There have been counter protests in Niger. Yet Bazoum had only been in power for two years. ANLC, (Transparency International’s chapter in Niger) had enjoyed political support from the president and parliament for the adoption of an anti-corruption law, central to addressing risks in defence and security and other sectors. This law, if and when implemented, will protect informants, witnesses, experts and whistleblowers. It will also criminalise bad practices common in Niger, such as the over-invoicing of public contracts and refusing to declare assets of civil and military figures.

Contrasting situation in Burkina Faso – decline and lost trust

The strides that had been made in Niger contrast with the decline seen in Burkina Faso, which until last week had been the nation that had suffered a coup most recently. There, a failure to secure enough resources for the army put paid to its elected leaders. Endemic corruption within the security forces contributed to the eroding of the perceived legitimacy of authorities. Public trust in government was lost. Several reports from Transparency International Defence and Security have shown how this creates dynamics for the expansion of non-state and extremist groups.

Corruption is not a victimless crime. In April, 44 civilians were killed by terrorist groups in north-eastern Burkina Faso.  Later that month, a further 60 were killed by men in national military uniform in the northern village of Karma.

Ironically, Burkina Faso was considered immune to the regional spread of violence until relatively recently. Almost overnight, the land-locked state found itself a focal point in the expansion strategies of various extremist groups when a Romanian citizen was abducted in Tambao on Burkina Faso’s north-east border with Mali and Niger in 2015.

Ever since, terrorist groups, including the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), the al-Qaeda-affiliated Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), and the Burkinabe-founded Ansarul Islam have been exploiting an unresolved socio-economic crisis amid endemic corruption.

At a summit in February, the African Union announced that Burkina Faso and Mali will remain suspended from the continental bloc. Adding more pressure to the countries’ leadership, ECOWAS also extended existing sanctions on both countries, “reaffirming zero tolerance against unconstitutional change of government“.

Sanctions can be a useful tool. They deliver a clear stance against illegal and undemocratic change of power. However they do not offer lasting solutions to some of the core issues behind the takeovers. And they can risk exacerbating grievances and harming the most vulnerable groups.

In order to build a democratic and secure future in Burkina Faso, corruption in the defence sector must be tackled. There must be a focus on pragmatic reforms to ensure, and safeguard, transparency, accountability and efficacy. And civil society must be involved in the process. Our Government Defence Integrity Index provides evidence supporting arguments that the more open to civil participation and transparent a government is, the higher the level of institutional resilience to corruption.

Until last month, Niger had what Burkina has needed. National civil society was engaged with both government and the military, working for greater transparency and tackling defence sector corruption.

Now, our colleagues in Niger have called for “the immediate restoration of a civil regime supported by inclusive governance and the preservation of civic space. These measures are essential to maintain the principles of transparency and accountability that we defend.”

Not for the first time, as the international community scrambles to respond to events in the country, and watches as they continue to unfold, we have been reminded that corruption is a fundamental threat to security. Access to and control over natural resources drives power struggles that extend beyond country borders. Only driving out corruption will suffice to break the cycle for all those suffering in the Sahel.

Responding to reports of corruption in Ukraine military recruitment centres, Josie Stewart, Director of Transparency International Defence and Security, said:

Reports of “unfit to serve” certificates being sold from Ukraine’s regional military recruitment centres demonstrate once again how corruption can potentially undermine military systems.

This case affirms the role free media can play in holding officials to account while it has been good to see swift action taken by the government since the findings were published.

In contrast to the corruption-related problems that have plagued the effectiveness of Russia’s Army from the start, Ukraine has invested in improving oversight and accountability.

Ukraine is continuing to fight corruption at the same time as fighting on the battlefield. With the stakes this high, they know they must win on both fronts.

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Corruption can be a determining factor in the success or failure of a military operation. It can also exacerbate insecurity in the operating environment by inadvertently strengthening corrupt networks. Rather than being treated as a secondary issue by militaries, identifying and countering corruption risks should be treated as a strategic priority.

TI-DS_MilitaryOperations_Factsheet_digital0

Transparency International Defence and Security Director Josie Stewart said:

We welcome the report of the UK Foreign Affairs Committee’s inquiry on private military and security companies (PMSCs), to which we gave evidence. We are particularly pleased to see the recommendation that the UK should include, as a key criteria for assessing UK security partnerships, “the level of willingness on both sides to uphold transparency and standards of good governance”.

This is essential to mitigate risks of corruption, conflict, and insecurity. We are disappointed however not to see more focus on addressing regulatory oversight of the global PMSC industry. A draft UN Convention on Regulating PMSC Activities has been the subject of international debate since 2011, yet no meaningful progress has been made. As a minimum, the UK should adopt our recommendations on PMSC beneficial ownership, contract and export transparency. This would help set a standard for PMSC oversight and accountability, as well as protect the UK’s domestic PMSCs from being tarred with the same brush as malign groups like Wagner.

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Ed Storey and Sabrina White reflect on the recently marked ‘UN peacekeeper day’.

The United Nations (UN) must continue to reform to address ongoing concerns related to sexual exploitation and abuse. Furthermore, in the interests of strengthening prevention efforts and supporting justice, we strongly believe that some forms of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse should be recognised and approached as sexual forms of corruption.

Defined simply, sexual extortion is a sexual form of corruption that refers to the abuse of entrusted power through psychological rather than physical coercion to obtain a sexual advantage or favour. For example, the exchange of sex for food or basic goods required for survival or sex for a salary constitute a sexual form of corruption. Acknowledging that some forms of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse are sexual forms of corruption would allow for a fresh perspective on corruption evident in peacekeeping operations and present an opportunity for improving integrity and accountability of peacekeeping.

Since their first mission in 1948 to the Middle East, UN peacekeepers, the blue helmets, have come to be a symbol of hope and human cooperation across the globe. UN peacekeepers have embarked on some 72 missions since their formation in which over 1 million men and women have served. Their interventions have undoubtedly saved countless lives, and the international community owes the approximately 3,500 peacekeepers who have laid down their lives in services a great debt of gratitude. However, these peacekeeping missions have left numerous stories and scandals of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse in their wake. From individual cases of rape, to running a child sex ring in Haiti, and peacekeepers exchanging food for sex, it has grown obvious that U.N peacekeeping operations face a systemic problem of sexual exploitation, sexual abuse, and sexual forms of corruption.

Harrowing stories 

The victims’ stories often follow a tragically similar pattern. Peacekeepers are typically deployed to war-torn regions of the world inhabited by people who may be struggling to meet their basic survival needs. Furthermore, amidst an often-unstable security situation and due to the financial resources and demand for services accompanying missions, civilians often congregate around peacekeeper bases. Peacekeepers have a position of authority, access to shelter, food, and financial resources. They are in a prime position to prey upon those they should be protecting. Victims are often very young, sometimes prepubescent, typically out of school, and with a family struggling or unable to support them. Many victims are led to believe that they are cared for by their abuser and come to hope that by submitting to abuse they may be able to escape to a better life elsewhere. Such cases are well documented by the UN itself, and some victims have been left with children fathered and abandoned by peacekeepers which places a significant financial burden on survivors who may already struggling.

Many of these cases of sexual assault are well illustrated in the harrowing story of Sarah, as reported by the Economist. However, a significant number of the crimes of peacekeepers should be classified as acts of sexual extortion, and therefore both sexual violence and corruption. These acts are distinct from rape as they involve a person in a position of authority psychologically rather than physically coercing a victim to engage in survival sex, defined as sexual acts performed in return for the basic necessities to support life such as food or shelter. There are numerous cases of young victims coerced into survival sex with peacekeepers documented by multiple organisations for a significant amount of time.

As long ago as 2001, Save the Children reported many cases of vulnerable, very young girls, being forced to remove their clothing for peacekeepers cameras in exchange for biscuits. In many cases, rape and survival sex are closely linked, and often initial sexual assault may later necessitate a survivor engaging to survival sex to provide for a child a peacekeeper has fathered then abandoned.

These circumstances that may force victims into survival sex are clearly represented in the story of Grace and Emma. In Grace’s case, sexual relations with a Uruguayan peacekeeper left her pregnant. Grace was unable to cover the costs of pregnancy, childbirth and raising Emma, and was therefore forced to engage in survival sex. Grace would meet with peacekeepers in a nearby UN base where she would receive a little money, food or hygiene products in exchange for sex to support Emma. There are numerous stories like Grace’s, in a study on peacekeeper abuses in the Democratic Republic of Congo, it was found that survival sex in exchange for basic essential goods was the most prominently recurring motivation for engaging sexually with peacekeepers.

Viewing these crimes as corrupt acts, as well as sexual violence, opens new avenues for prevention, response, and potential prosecution. This goes for all incidences of sexual corruption, including survival sex and sex for jobs in the humanitarian sector. These cases illustrate that corruption is not solely an issue of good governance, but also individual abuses of power are powerful reminders of how destructive of an impact corruption has on the lives on individuals. Often by necessity, policy discussions remain at the abstract level, focusing on good governance. However, we strongly believe that the stories of victims and survivors must be acknowledged and at the policy-making table, to keep discussions grounded and the stakes at play in mind.

The United Nations has taken steps in the right direction in response to these issues, especially since António Guterres’ election as Secretary-General. But, there remains much to be done, and the UN must commit to tackling this systemic corruption issue head-on and aggressively to ensure that UN peacekeepers are successful in their role of ensuring rather than undermining human security. It is strongly recommended that some forms of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse are acknowledged as sexual forms of corruption and that anti-corruption training be provided alongside training on the zero-tolerance policy for sexual exploitation and sexual abuse and gender. We owe it to the victims and survivors to pursue justice, and to ensure that the matter is not shelved until the next media storm brings it to light.

Ed Storey is a Transparency International Defence and Security Intern and a University of Sussex Corruption and Governance postgraduate student. Sabrina White is Transparency International Defence and Security’s Gender Specialist and a PhD researcher in victim-centred approach to sexual exploitation and sexual abuse in UN peacekeeping.

Negotiations have been taking place in Geneva this month around the control and accountability of private military and security companies (PMSCs). Transparency International Defence and Security’s Ara Marcen Naval contributed to the discussions in Switzerland. Here she delivers a call to action to other civil society organisations.

As an NGO committed to promoting transparency and accountability in the defence and security sector, Transparency International Defence and Security (TI-DS) is deeply concerned about the corruption risks associated with the activities of PMSCs. These groups, while playing a role in enhancing security in some cases, often operate in secrecy, outside standard transparency and accountability structures. This permissive environment creates opportunities for corruption and conflict to thrive, deprives governments and citizens of financial resources, and undermines security and human rights.

I write having participated last week in the discussions of the Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working Group on PMSCs. This fourth session was convened to discuss a new draft of an international instrument to regulate the activities of PMSCs. This is a critical platform for addressing these concerns and others related to companies’ human rights obligations. There are various questions: how to ensure their activities comply with international humanitarian law? Should these companies be allowed to participate directly in hostilities?

The PMSC industry is a rapidly evolving and intrinsically international one, with a well-documented link to global conflict. The lack of regulatory oversight has led to heightened global risks of fraud, corruption, and violence, with little in the way of accountability mechanisms at both the national and international levels, so progress at a global level is key.

Current initiatives to try and regulate the market, such as the Montreux Document and the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers, are a step in the right direction. However, these initiatives have limited support among states around the world. They do not cover some key military and intelligence services and exclude some important anticorruption measures. TI-DS thinks these initiatives don’t go far enough to address the risks posed. We are hopeful that the efforts of the working group will provide a much-needed stronger set of enforceable standards.

TI-DS welcomes the progress made in the revised draft discussed last week, including references to the UN Convention Against Corruption and the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime. These references are essential steps towards policy and legal coherence, aligning efforts to regulate PMSCs with international legal obligations related to corruption and transnational organised crime.

While in Geneva I continued to propose ways that the text of the draft instrument can better incorporate anticorruption standards, including transparency of contracts and beneficial ownership, and through the recognition of corruption-related crimes as well as human rights abuses.

But we are deeply concerned about the overall lack of engagement. The room was almost empty, with many states not attending the discussions and a general lack of civil society actors actively following this critical process – prospective changes that could significantly impact conflict dynamics, international security, human rights and respect for international humanitarian law.

This is the Geneva Paradox. Other similar processes, like those related to business and human rights or others trying to get a grasp of new types of weapons systems, are filling the rooms of the United Nations, with both states and civil society in attendance. We feel that this process – which is attempting to regulate the activities of PMSCs to stop the trend of these corporate actors becoming rogue actors in wars and conflicts around the world – deserves equal attention.

In September, the Human Rights Council will set the agenda for this issue going forward. We hope that more states and civil society organisations join efforts in the coming period to give this issue the critical attention and scrutiny it deserves.

A working group of the United Nations assembled in Geneva, Switzerland on April 17, 2023 to evaluate and negotiate regulation of private military and security security companies (PMSCs).

Transparency International Defence and Security Head of Advocacy Ara Marcen Naval joined and delivered the following statement:

Mr. Chairperson rapporteur, distinguished delegates,

I stand before you today at this crucial discussion to bring to your attention, and consideration, the corruption risks linked to the activities of Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) with a sense of urgency and resolve.  PMSCs can play an important role in government efforts to enhance security, but they often operate in secret and outside standard transparency and accountability structures.  This dynamic provides a permissive environment for corruption and conflict to thrive and deprives governments and its citizens of financial resources and security.

The Defence and Security Programme of Transparency International welcomes the progress made in the revised draft and the changes made to include references to the Convention Against Corruption and Convention against transnational crime. These references are important steps towards policy and legal coherence and to ensure that the efforts to regulate the activities of PMSCs align with the international legal obligations in relation to corruption and transnational organised crime.

Corruption and the unchecked actions of PMSCs have far-reaching consequences, eroding the rule of law, undermining human rights and security, and threatening the legitimacy of governments.  It corrodes public trust, undermines democratic institutions, and creates a culture of impunity that breeds more corruption. It can also weaken the fabric of societies, divert resources meant for development, and perpetuate inequality and injustice.

Transparency International has identified dozens of cases in which PMSCs are suspected of involvement in corruption and fraud.  Some of the most concerning cases involve PMSCs colluding with government officials to inflate threat perceptions to win or sustain contracts.  In one case, this action led to excessive use of force against protesters resulting in unnecessary injuries to civilians and security forces. 

Transparency International has also raised concerns about some of the practices of PMSCs failing to disclose conflict of interests that could undermine government decisions, or even threaten national security.

In some cases multinational PMSCs have fuelled corruption by requiring local partners to pay kickbacks for participating in government funded contracts. 

In these cases, the opaque arrangements prevalent in the sector make it extremely difficult to ascertain chains of command, responsibilities and levels of coordination among the different security actors, and undermine monitoring efforts and accountability. Furthermore, it is usually difficult to find public confirmation of the nature of the contract and the identity of subcontractors in the event that they are hired.

We hope that during the discussions on the potential instrument, the distinguished delegates will confront the implications corruption has and the abuses of PMSCs head-on and work together to prevent, detect, and punish corruption in all its forms. Transparency and reporting are the greatest steps that states can take to allow for effective monitoring and oversight of private military and security companies and other actors providing security services in order to effectively prevent, address and remedy any abuses committed.

Distinguished delegates, the stakes are high. The impact of corruption and the actions of PMSCs are felt by communities around the world, often with dire consequences for the most vulnerable among us. The fight against corruption and the responsible use of PMSCs requires our unwavering commitment and concerted and holistic action. Thank you.

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