Theme: Political

Further insights from Armenia, Guatemala, Malaysia, Niger, and Tunisia illustrate access to information challenges

December 10, 2024 – New research from Transparency International Defence & Security (TI-DS) underscores the need for better access to information in the defence sector to curb corruption, ensure accountability, and improve civic engagement.

Published today, Unlocking Access: Balancing National Security and Transparency in Defence shines a light on opaque defence sectors worldwide at a time of increased geopolitical tensions and global military spending reaching record highs of $2.4 trillion.

Read the report

The report highlights challenges and good practices of transparency in defence budgets, procurement and policy processes using detailed case studies from Armenia, Guatemala, Malaysia, Niger, and Tunisia. The countries are at varying stages of progress in advancing access to information in their defence sectors and face a range of challenges, including conflict-driven secrecy, democratic backsliding, and stalled reforms.

Our analysis reveals that while international frameworks provide guidelines for transparency, implementation remains weak. Blanket national security exemptions are often used to justify withholding critical information, while public interest tests designed to balance the benefits of disclosing against the potential harm are mostly absent.

This lack of transparency increases the risk of corruption, mismanagement of funds, and fuels public distrust of the very institutions tasked with protecting citizens.

Michael Ofori-Mensah, Head of Research at Transparency International Defence & Security, said:

“The defence sector remains one of the most secretive corners of government, making it a breeding ground for corruption. Striking a balance between national security and the public’s right to know is crucial to ensure accountability, but far too often governments tip the scales towards secrecy. It’s time for transparency to be the rule, not the exception.”

Case study insights

Armenia has kept high levels of defence spending because of its decades-long conflict with Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh territory, which recently concluded with major losses for Armenia. Access to information was enshrined in a 2003 national freedom of information law but has been severely curtailed by the 2024 states secrets law, which prohibits the release of information related to most defence spending.

Guatemala has endured a growing corruption crisis for the past decade, as the presidency and the powerful Public Prosecutor’s office stifled anti-corruption efforts, forced anti-corruption officials into exile, and blocked potential reform candidates from elections. As the Secretariat for Access to Public Information is required to work with the Prosecutor’s Office on access to information enforcement, implementation of the law has faltered until now.

Malaysia saw a peaceful power transition in 2018, but governance reforms – including access to information – have stalled, with the Official Secrets Act 1972 (OSA) severely limiting access to information. The OSA functions as the de facto national framework for access to information and overrules any other legislation on information access. There is little knowledge about the defence budget or expenditures, and almost no publicly available information about acquisition planning.

Niger experienced a military coup in July 2023 that has led to increased violence, stark reductions in foreign assistance, and a severe curtailing of access to information and other democratic rights. Even prior to the coup, defence income and military spending were mainly non-transparent, as were defence purchases. But a new far-reaching law was passed in 2024 that excludes all defence matters from public procurement, public accounting, and taxes.

Tunisia has seen democratic backsliding since 2021 which reduced government transparency. Though a strong access to information law exists, defence-related information is often kept confidential. Still, Tunisia has a strong access to information law, with an effective independent oversight body that has helped to implement the law throughout the public sector.

The report offers specific recommendations for each of these five countries to improve access information which broadly fit into these categories:

1. Balancing tests: Legal frameworks should require officials to assess the public interest versus potential harm before withholding information.
2. Proactive disclosure: Governments should regularly and proactively publish defence budgets, procurement plans, and financial results to enhance accountability.
3. Independent oversight: Review bodies should be established to monitor and adjudicate disputes over information access.
4. Civil society engagement: Defence planning and policymaking should be open to civil society for broader input and oversight

Notes to editors:

The case studies in Unlocking Access were produced using an updated version of our Government Defence Integrity Index 2020 – the leading global assessment of the governance of and corruption risks in defence sectors. The data was supplemented by interviews with local experts, and the review of policy reports and media investigations.

French and Spanish versions of this press release are available.

Despite widely agreed international standards for access to information in the defence and security sector, transparency remains insufficient to ensure accountability. National security exemptions are frequently applied in vague and undefined ways, limiting the release of precise, timely and detailed information that is crucial for understanding how government is functioning and protecting public interest, especially in areas as fundamental as national security.

Read the launch press release:

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Information exchange within government facilitates various types of accountability – from parliamentary scrutiny of executive decisions, to audits of the government’s use of public funds as well as disciplinary sanctions for public officials. More importantly, information disclosure to the public by government bodies also forms the foundation for meaningful citizen engagement and accountability. This is true not just for voting and activism, but for interest in the policies that determine the course of daily life, including whether the security forces are absent, overmilitarised, or well-balanced.

Legitimate national security interests are best safeguarded when the public is well-informed about government activities, including those undertaken to ensure safety and protection. Access to information enables public scrutiny of government action and facilitates public contribution to policymaking and national debate, thus serving as a crucial component of genuine national security, democratic participation, and sound policy formulation. Access to information is also a specific aspect of governance that involves the intentional disclosure of information. These policies require the release of information that is relevant to the public, and is also accessible, accurate and timely.

This report provides an overview of the state of defence transparency and access to information related to defence and security sectors worldwide, drawing on the Government Defence Integrity (GDI) database on institutional integrity and corruption risk. In light
of increasing global military spending (with a new world record of $2.443 trillion recorded in 2023) the overarching focus is on access to defence-related financial information, as transparency and appropriate oversight of defence finances remain critical for public
accountability, among others.

Further, this report also includes a review of global standards for transparency that apply to the defence sector, specifically the UN Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) and the Global Principles on National Security and the Right to Information (or Tshwane Principles). This is coupled with specific exploration of five country cases (Armenia, Guatemala, Malaysia, Niger, and Tunisia) and insights from their legal frameworks and implementation experiences. It concludes with recommendations for good practice to enhance access to information.

Corruption undermines the legitimacy and effectiveness of government institutions in all sectors, but it thrives in areas where large budgets intersect with high levels of secrecy and limited accountability, write Michael Ofori-Mensah, Denitsa  Zhelyazkova and Harvey Gavin. 

The defence and security sector features all these risk areas, making it particularly vulnerable. The combination of secrecy, limited oversight and, often, high levels of discretionary power in decision-making, creates an environment ripe for corruption. This vulnerability not only undermines the ability of governments to fulfil their primary duty to their citizens of keeping them safe, it also undermines their legitimacy.  

Transparency International – Defence & Security is working to address this issue. A key contribution is our recent involvement in NATO’s Building Integrity Institutional Enhancement Course. This program focuses on supporting national governments with capacity building in developing Integrity Action Plans aimed at strengthening the integrity of their defence institutions. Before drawing up these plans, defence officials must identify areas most at risk of corruption. This is where the recent enhancement aimed at improving accessibility and use of our Government Defence Integrity Index (GDI) becomes an invaluable diagnostic tool. 

The GDI is the world’s leading assessment of corruption risks in national defence institutions. As a corruption risk assessment tool, it examines the quality of institutional controls to manage the risk of corruption in nearly 90 countries around the world on both policymaking and public sector governance and covers five major risk areas: 

1. Financial: includes strength of safeguards around military asset disposals, whether a country allows military-owned businesses, and whether the full extent of military spending is publicly disclosed.   
2. Operational: includes corruption risk in a country’s military deployments overseas and the use of private security companies.   
3. Personnel: includes how resilient defence sector payroll, promotions and appointments are to corruption, and the strength of safeguards against corruption to avoid conscription or recruitment.  
4. Political: includes transparency over defence & security policy, openness in defence budgets, and strength of anti-corruption checks surrounding arms exports.  
5. Procurement: includes corruption risk around tenders and how contracts are awarded, the use of agents/brokers as middlemen in procurement, and assessment of how vulnerable a country is to corruption in offset contracts.   

Within these areas, the GDI identifies 29 specific corruption risks, assessed through 77 main questions and 212 underlying indicators. These indicators examine both legal frameworks and their implementation, as well as the allocation of resources and outcomes. 

It, therefore, provides defence institutions with a comprehensive assessment of corruption vulnerabilities and a platform to identify safeguards against corruption risks. Each indicator is scored on a scale from 0 to 100, with aggregated scores determining the strength of a country’s institutional practices and protocols to manage corruption risks in defence,: from A (low corruption risk/very robust institutional resilience to corruption) to F (high corruption risk/limited to no institutional resilience to corruption).

Our recent updates to the GDI website have significantly improved its functionality, allowing users to group countries by various categories such as region, income level, regime type, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) group and intergovernmental body affiliation. For example, policymakers seeking to understand problematic areas within the EU defence sector can now explore specific indicators of interest and export the data for detailed analysis.  

The enhancement also provides a functionality that enables comparisons across the 77 main questions of the GDI thus facilitating targeted assessments of particular risk areas and cross-country analysis. 

Data from the GDI, both quantitative and qualitative, can be downloaded in .csv format, compatible with numerous data processing tools like Excel, SPSS, and Access. This feature allows users to generate customised spreadsheets containing only the information pertinent to their needs. The qualitative data, derived from expert assessor interviews, provides critical insights that complement the quantitative scores, offering a nuanced understanding of corruption risks. 

(Note: these updates apply to the current 2020 iteration of the GDI. Our team is working on the 2025 GDI – you can find more information about it here) 

The ongoing challenges posed by corruption in the defence sector demand sustained and coordinated efforts from both national governments and the international community. Initiatives like NATO’s Building Integrity Institutional Enhancement Course, supported by tools like the GDI, represent significant strides toward fostering good governance in defence institutions. But maintaining high standards of defence governance remains an ongoing challenge that requires vigilance and commitment. 

Reforms are urgently needed to address the institutional gaps identified by the GDI. Integrity Action Plans, informed by comprehensive corruption risk assessments, are essential for guiding these changes. By prioritising transparency, accountability and resilience, countries can strengthen their defence institutions, reduce corruption and improve peace and security.

The Geneva Peace Week (GPW) is one of the important appointments on the international peacebuilding calendar, writes Francesca Grandi, our Senior Advocacy Expert. This year, it centred around the question: “What is Peace?”  

A call to action and an opportunity for reflection, the forum brought together a wide array of stakeholders from the peace and security ecosystem and beyond, highlighting the cross-cutting nature of peacebuilding and the need for innovative and collaborative solutions for building lasting peace. 

Building bridges 

Transparency International Defence & Security (TI-DS) attended GPW 2024 to make the case for recognising corruption in the defence and security sectors as a key driver of violence and armed conflict, and to advocate for a more comprehensive and systematic inclusion anti-corruption measures in peacebuilding frameworks. We introduced our research and engaged with many panels. Colleagues in international NGOs, UN bodies, and Member States expressed a genuine interest in our work and acknowledged the importance of addressing corruption in the defence and security sector to build trust and resilience in fragile contexts. It was clear that more research and practical tools are needed to bridge what we know about corruption and armed conflict. 

Anti-corruption as a preventive tool  

In nearly every session, the themes of prevention, trust-building, and institutional resilience resonated strongly with our message that anti-corruption contributes to postive peace and security outcomes and provides a relevant lens across a wide range of peace and security issues.  

Corruption hampers the effectiveness of security sector reforms, arms controls, and truth and reconciliation processes; it undermines the protection and promotion of human rights; it erodes trust between former combatants and government institutions, and thus the successful reintegration of ex-combatants, increasing the likelihood of conflict relapse.  

We asked whether corruption is sufficiently integrated into international peace frameworks, such as the UN Pact for the Future. While some peacekeeping mandates include anti-corruption provisions, the absence of explicit references in key documents remains a concerning omission. 

By addressing corruption as a root cause of conflict and ensuring that public resources are used as intended, we can build more resilient and inclusive societies and enhance the impact of localised and gender-responsive peacebuilding approaches. By integrating anti-corruption strategies in our peace responses, we can strengthen institutional integrity and help foster the public trust and the institutional resilience needed for lasting peace. 

Next steps: Expanding partnerships and advocating 

Moving forward, TI-DS remains committed to advocating for integrating anti-corruption as a key component of the global peace and security agenda and for including corruption prevention strategies in future peace interventions, emphasising their role in strengthening governance and peace processes. 

As we continue our advocacy efforts, our focus remains on building partnerships, producing evidence-based research, and ensuring that anti-corruption remains at the forefront of global peace and security discussions. The GPW provided us with a platform to advance these objectives, and we look forward to furthering our work in this vital space.

Two years have passed since Burkina Faso witnessed its second coup within a year, on September 30, 2022, plunging the troubled nation into deeper instability and uncertainty. 

Since these pivotal events, it is important to examine some of the governance factors that led to them and the profound impact they have had on the country’s security and its people. The coups in Burkina Faso are not isolated incidents but symptoms of long-standing issues in the nation’s defense and security sectors, made worse by persistent corruption and weak governance, write Michael Ofori-Mensah and Harvey Gavin.

The first coup in January 2022, led by Lieutenant Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba, was partly fuelled by the Burkinabè government’s inability to contain the growing jihadist insurgency that has plagued the region as well as weak civilian oversight of the military. Despite international support and initiatives aimed at stabilising the country, the government’s efforts faltered, leaving the population increasingly vulnerable to extremist violence. This continued failure eroded public trust in the government’s leadership. After a series of anti-government protests, the country’s democratically elected president, Roch Kaboré, was ousted by members of the Burkina Faso Armed Forces on January 23.  

Just months later, on September 30, 2022, a second coup, led by Captain Ibrahim Traoré and comprised of other members of the armed forces frustrated with the lack of progress in improving the security situation, overthrew the leaders of the first. But instead of paving the way for stability, this second coup further destabilised the country, deepening the security crisis and undermining any prospects for effective governance. Figures from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) project show 1,985 civilians were killed in Burkina Faso during the two years leading up to the second coup (from September 30, 2020, to September 30, 2022). Despite the leaders of both coups claiming they would improve the security situation, 4,843 civilians were killed in the two years after September 30, 2022.  

At the heart of Burkina Faso’s instability lies a deep-seated problem of weak governance and pervasive corruption within the defence and security sectors. Our 2020 Government Defence Integrity Index (GDI) found that the country faces considerable corruption risk across its defence institutions, with little to no transparency or controls across finances and procurement. These issues significantly contributed to weakening the resilience of the military and its ability to effectively address the jihadist threat.  

Corruption within the country’s defence and security sector has diverted resources away from critical security needs, weakening the military’s operational capabilities while eroding the trust between the armed forces and the civilian government. This was highlighted in 2021 when in June jihadists killed more than 100 people in Solhan, a village in the north of the country. In November of the same year a further 49 police officers and four civilians were killed near Inata, in the same region. A memo from security forces in the area warned their superiors that they had run out of food and had been forced to commandeer livestock from citizens. The lack of safeguards against corruption in defence and security institutions has played a major role in the deteriorating security situation, creating fertile ground for insurgent groups to exploit and thrive. 

The ongoing jihadist insurgency has had devastating effects on Burkina Faso’s security landscape and its people. Attacks have become more frequent and brutal, targeting both military personnel and civilians, with more than 6,000 people killed – including around 1,000 civilians – between January and August this year. The pervasive insecurity has created a climate of fear and instability, with entire communities displaced. 

The inability of successive governments to effectively address the insurgency has only exacerbated the situation. Each failed attempt to quell the violence has diminished public confidence in the government and increased public frustration. This frustration has, in turn, provided fertile ground for military coups, which, rather than resolving the underlying issues, have led to further instability. 

New research from the Africa Center for Strategic Studies highlights vividly the scale of this instability. The Sahel region accounts for more than half of all annual reported fatalities (11,200) involving militant Islamist groups in Africa. Burkina Faso bears the majority of this violence (48 percent) and fatalities (62 percent) linked to militant Islamist groups in the Sahelian theater. 

Note: Compiled by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, each map shows violent events involving the listed groups for a year ending June 30. Group designations are intended for informational purposes only and should not be considered official. Due to the fluid nature of many groups, affiliations may change.  

Sources: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED); Centro Para Democracia e Direitos Humanos; Hiraal Institute; HumAngle; International Crisis Group; Institute for Security Studies; MENASTREAM; the Washington Institute; and the United Nations. 

Beyond the political and security implications, the escalating jihadist insurgency has had a profound impact on human security in Burkina Faso. The civilian population bears the brunt of the violence, facing daily threats to their lives and livelihoods. Families have been torn apart, and communities have been shattered by the constant threat of violence and displacement. 

Had there been greater resilience and integrity within Burkina Faso’s defence and security institutions, the trajectory of the country’s security situation might have been different. Strong, accountable institutions are essential for maintaining internal stability and effectively countering security threats. They build public trust, ensure the proper allocation of resources and foster cooperation between military leadership and the population they are entrusted to protect.  

Two years since the September 2022 coup, it is imperative for regional bodies like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the international community to renew their commitment to supporting Burkina Faso. While international forces are no longer in the country,  

The past two years have underscored the urgent need for comprehensive reforms in Burkina Faso’s defence  and security sectors. The recurring coups, driven by the government’s inability to manage the jihadist insurgency, have only deepened the nation’s challenges, leading to greater instability and suffering for its people. 

Burkina Faso stands at a crossroads, grappling with the fallout of a series of coups which have been fuelled by a lack of integrity, accountability and transparency in its defence and security sector. The withdrawal of international forces, including UN personnel, has left civilians vulnerable to escalating jihadist violence, as evidenced by recent reports documenting significant civilian casualties. Meanwhile, the Burkinabè armed forces have also suffered heavy losses. 

The formation of the Alliance of Sahel States, following Burkina Faso’s exit from ECOWAS, complicates the prospects for meaningful dialogue and reform. Amidst the global focus on conflicts in Ukraine, Gaza and Lebanon, the profound human tragedy unfolding in Burkina Faso and the wider Sahel region must not be overlooked. It is imperative for ECOWAS and the African Union to take decisive action, with the support of the international community, to strengthen defence governance as part of broader reforms. Cooperation, not competition, is key to addressing the corruption and insecurity issues the region faces. Civil society should have guaranteed freedom of expression, and space, to participate in the peacebuilding and conflict prevention process. The Burkinabè government needs to provide mechanisms for this participation, as well as broaden public debate on defence issues and policies. 

Overall, commitment to civilian democratic oversight of the armed forces is essential for building a resilient defence sector and ensuring the protection of the Burkinabè people.

As members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) gather this week in Laos for the 44th and 45th ASEAN Summits, this blog by Yi Kang Choo, our International Programmes Officer, explores the concerning absence of a strong focus on corruption risks – particularly in the region’s defence and security sectors.

Given the steady rise in military spending in the region, the ongoing civil war in Myanmar, and heightened tensions over territorial and maritime disputes in the South China Sea involving ASEAN nations, a discussion about how to root out corruption, and increase resilience to it, in these sectors seems overdue. 

Transparency International Defence & Security (TI-DS), alongside national TI Chapters in Indonesia (TI-ID) and Malaysia (TI-M) urge ASEAN states to recognise the pressing threat that corruption in the defence sector poses to regional peace and security. As Malaysia prepares to take on the role of ASEAN Chair in 2025, Transparency International Malaysia specifically highlights the crucial need for Malaysia especially to champion collective anti-corruption initiatives, particularly within defence and security sectors across the region. Malaysia needs to use its leadership by demonstrating that it is executing its national anti-corruption strategies with greater transparency and how such initiatives will help the ASEAN region as a whole.

Recent data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) highlights that global military expenditure reached a record high of $2.443 trillion in 2023, with ASEAN member states seeing an average rise of 2.34% since 2022. As our research shows, increased defence spending without appropriate oversight often correlates with rising corruption risks. In systems already susceptible to corruption, an influx of funds is most likely to benefit corrupt actors, creating a self-perpetuating cycle that prioritises private gains over peace and security outcomes. 

Our Government Defence Integrity (GDI) Index shows nearly half of all ASEAN member states face high to critical corruption risks in their defence sectors. This includes Malaysia, the incoming ASEAN Chair in 2025. Corruption can severely undermine the reliability and quality of military infrastructure and equipment, divert critical public resources, and compromise the safety and operational effectiveness of armed forces during potentially critical situations. 

Additionally, effective civilian oversight of defence institutions remains limited across the region, especially given the restrictive civic spaces in all ten ASEAN countries, which have been categorised as ‘closed’, ‘repressed’, or ‘obstructed’ according to 2023 CIVICUS Monitor rating. 

To address these urgent challenges, TI-DS calls on ASEAN member states to: 

• Recognise and respond to corruption as a threat to peace and security – Corruption exacerbates inequalities within and between nations, fuelling conflicts and geopolitical tensions. ASEAN must prioritise strengthening governance systems, embedding corruption safeguards, and building integrity within its armed forces into defence and security decision-making.  

• Create mechanisms for meaningful civil society engagement and effective parliamentary and civilian oversight in defence and security sectors – To ensure these sectors operate under effective scrutiny and accountability, civil society must be empowered to fulfil its role as critical observer in an independent, protected and effective manner. This includes the protection of civic space and ensuring public access to information, also in defence and security, with restrictions on the grounds of national security only applied on well-justified, exceptional circumstances. Additionally, whistleblowers and investigative journalists must be protected from retaliation, particularly when transparency serves the public interest over secrecy. 

• Implement robust anti-corruption controls for arms transfers – Governments must conduct thorough corruption risk assessments for arms deals and ensure recipient countries uphold strong anti-corruption standards. Measures must be taken to prevent arms from being diverted and misused. (Read our briefing paper to learn more about how arms trade loopholes enabled crimes against humanity in Myanmar.) 

Against the backdrop of heightened security risks, we call for ASEAN governments to prevent further risk for conflict and tensions through taking anti-corruption and its risks to defence, peace and security seriously, as well as to fully acknowledge the role of civil society in embarking on this vital endeavour for the region. 

Notes to editors:  

ASEAN Member States including Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Myanmar feature in Transparency International Defence & Security’s 2020 Government Defence Integrity Index (GDI).  

The Index scores and ranks countries based on the strength of their safeguards against defence and security corruption.   

Malaysia and Indonesia appear in band ‘D’, indicating a ‘high’ risk of corruption, whereas Thailand appear in band ‘E’, indicating a ‘very high’ risk of corruption, and Myanmar in band ‘F’, indicating a ‘critical’ risk.

Access to information is a cornerstone of healthy, accountable and transparent societies and essential for democracy.   

By improving the public’s ability to obtain and use government-held information, citizens are empowered to participate fully in democratic processes, make informed decisions, and hold their leaders accountable.  

Access to information is vital in all public sectors, but particularly so in defence and security where high levels of secrecy combined with substantial public budgets greatly increase the risk of corruption. Transparency and access to information in this sector provides a crucial bulwark against the misuse of funds, ensures accountability, and maintains public trust.  

Ahead of Access to Information Day 2024, we’re excited to share details of our upcoming report which provides a comprehensive overview of the state of defence transparency and access to information worldwide.  

Our report aims to strengthen accountability by enhancing access to defence information, in line with our broader goal to ensure informed and active citizens drive integrity in defence and security.  

Utilising our Government Defence Integrity (GDI) 2020 database, which assesses institutional integrity and corruption risks, the report offers a detailed assessment of global defence transparency and access to information, with a focus on defence finances including budgeting information and spending practices. This is particularly urgent in an era of increasing military spending. The latest defence spending data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) shows world military expenditure rose for the ninth consecutive year to an all-time high of $2.443 trillion in 2023. This represents an increase of 6.8 per cent in real terms from 2022, which is the steepest year-on-year increase since 2009.   

Additionally, the report also includes a review of global standards for transparency that apply to the defence sector. This is coupled with insightful case studies from Niger, Tunisia, Malaysia, Armenia and Guatemala and a review of good practices. The report concludes with recommendations to enhance access to information in particular contexts.  

We look forward to sharing the full report and the accompanying case studies shortly. Updates on the launch date will be provided via our X/Twitter and LinkedIn accounts.

This toolkit is designed for advocates, activists and stakeholders engaged in advancing good governance and anti-corruption standards in the defence and security sectors, as well as advocates working in neighbouring agendas, like development, human rights and peace and security. It provides practical guidance, resources, and best practices to navigate the complexities of corruption in the defence and security sectors.

Users can utilise this toolkit as a comprehensive reference manual, with sections dedicated to understanding key concepts, planning advocacy strategies, and implementing actionable initiatives. It also covers topics such as security sector reform, corruption in arms trade, military spending, but also stakeholder engagement and advocacy tactics, aiming to empower users in advocating for robust governance and transparency in the sector.

A year on from the coup d’etat in Niger, Denitsa Zhelyazkova looks back at what has changed so far and what needs to happen to address corruption in the country’s defence sector.  

Last month marked an important date for political leaders and human rights advocates all around the globe: one full year after the coup d’etat in Niger. On July 26, 2023, senior army officers from the National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland (Conseil National pour la Sauvegarde de la Patrie, or CNSP), led by General Abdourahamane Tchiani, seized power, suspended the constitution and detained country’s democratically elected leader, President Mohamed Bazoum.  The junta claimed the reasons for the coup were the continuous deterioration of the security situation under Bazoum and poor economic management, among others. On August 20 that year, the coup leader proposed a three-year transition plan back to democratic rule, but concrete steps towards this have yet to materialise. Even though the 2023 mutiny was not a new phenomenon for the region, especially given the number of recent putsches in neighbouring Mali and Burkina Faso, this coup signifies a pivotal point in Nigerien politics.  

Major changes since the coup 

• Cutting ties with the West and regional actors:  Niger is heading for a shift in strategic alliance and moving away from traditional Western security providers. Strengthening regional ties with Mali and Burkina Faso under a new mutual defence pact called the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) resulted in the new ‘Confederation of Sahel States’, emphasising both economic and military cooperation. They signed a treaty on the July 6 this year restating their sovereignty from France’s influence in the region, their departure from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), as well as their aim to create a new common currency.  In addition to potentially having catastrophic economic and further humanitarian consequences, this step will likely complicate relations with neighbouring states and reshape international influence in the Sahel region. 

• New anti-corruption body: General Tchiani has dissolved two of the country’s highest courts, the Court of Cassation and State Council, replacing them with a new anti-corruption Commission and a State Court.  The commission’s main role will be recovering all illegally acquired and misappropriated public assets. Consisting of judges, army and police officers as well as representatives of civil society, the selection process of these members lacked transparency. Furthermore, it is not clear at this stage whether the anti-corruption regulations discussed under Bazoum will be implemented and whether the transitional commission and court can have an impact on that.  

Damage 

Turning away from democracy rarely leads to peace and stability.  

In the immediate aftermath of the coup, violence and human rights abuses spiked, with Human Rights Watch reporting that CNSP supporters looted and set fire to the headquarters of Bazoum’s party, the Nigerien Party for Democracy and Socialism (PNDS). 

France, the EU, and the US condemned the coup and suspended development aid. UN humanitarian operations were also stopped. The African Union (AU) responded by suspending Niger, while ECOWAS closed its borders, demanded Bazoum’s release, and threatened military intervention and sanctions. Tensions escalated further as Mali and Burkina Faso warned that ECOWAS intervention would be considered a ‘declaration of war’ against them. 

The putsch and its direct economic consequences are now threatening to worsen human suffering in the landlocked country that has been grappling with poverty, political instability and endemic corruption for decades. Being one of the poorest countries in world, Niger recently ranked 189 out of 193 territories in the critical HDI value from the UN’s Human Development Index, signalling a dire humanitarian crisis. Even though ECOWAS sanctions were lifted in February this year for humanitarian purposes, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported a surge in humanitarian need. An additional 600,000 people required humanitarian assistance in 2023, to an estimated total of some 4.3 million people, as extreme poverty is expected to reach 52%. Despite faring comparatively better against Burkina Faso and Mali in terms of fatalities, Niger is still suffering with violence and internal turmoil, with over 370,000 internally displaced people, primarily consisting of women and children. 

ACLED graph using their own data on political violence, August 3, 2023.

The vicious cycle of conflict and corruption 

Niger has been struggling with jihadist violence and security threats on several fronts, from IS Sahel and the al-Qaeda-affiliated JNIM in the west and south of the country, to bandits, organised crime networks in resource-rich Agadez as well as Tahoua, and even Boko Haram rebels around Diffa near the border with Nigeria. Despite these serious security challenges, historically weak governance of the defence sector has been eroding Niger’s capabilities to defend its own citizens. An embezzlement case in 2020 revealed how a notorious arms dealer exploited government contracts for nearly a decade to funnel hundreds of millions of dollars to purchase weapons from Russia. With more than $130 million lost to corruption in this case alone, it brought to light just how urgent reform of the security sector, with anti-corruption at the core, is.  

Now that the country is ruled by a military government, increased levels of secrecy are expected to rise around defence planning and spending, as well as personnel recruitment and payments. The newly adopted Ordinance 2024-05 of February 23, 2024, is a huge step backwards in terms of good governance in the security sector, allowing for even more opaque practices in defence budget planning and management. The new decree dictates that public procurement and public accounting expenses related to the acquisition of equipment, materials, supplies, as well as the performance of works or services intended for the Defense and Security Forces (FDS) are exempt from regular oversight regulations. Moreover, defence expenses are exempt from taxes, duties and fees during the transition period. Unfortunately, opaque practices have become the norm when it comes to Niger’s defence governance.  

The 2020 iteration of Transparency International – Defence & Security’s Government Defence Integrity Index (GDI) found that Niger faces a very high level of corruption risk, which is consistent with other fragile and conflict-affected states in the region. The results showcase the country’s issue with building robust institutions despite increased military spending and advanced operational training by Western allies in the past years. Scoring in the bottom quarter of the GDI 2020, Niger received the lowest score of all West African countries assessed in the index, with secrecy and opaque procurement practices being the biggest concerns. According to the 2013 Decree on defence and security procurement, Niger’s defence acquisition plan is not subject to public disclosure and is classified as “top secret,” nor is the plan subject to legislative scrutiny by the Security and Defence Committee. Despite the egregious 2020 embezzlement case, findings from a 2022 audit on state spending estimate budget discrepancies of approximately $99 million. Greater public oversight of defence spending, not expanded exemptions from transparency for the military and security services, is vital to restoring public trust and to ensure much-needed funds are not lost to corruption.  Considering the new cooperation agreements with global actors notorious for the high levels of corruption risk in their defence sectors – such as Russia and Turkey – it is crucial for Niger to prioritise transparency and accountability in its defence governance. 

One key rationale the military provided for the taking power last year was the worsening security in the country. However, violence has persisted and escalated, calling into question the effectiveness of military operations. Oversight of military spending has also been curtailed. Corruption in the defence sector not only hinders military capabilities, but also erodes public trust in the very institutions established to protect citizens. If opaque practices persist, allowing greedy officials to benefit while citizens continue to suffer, this can bring even more instability. Following the steps of Mail and Burkina Faso could potentially drag Niger into a vicious cycle of coups, violence, loss of territory to rebels, and of course the fuel driving the cycle – widespread corruption in the security sector.  The path to democracy inevitably starts with focusing efforts on building resilient institutions and addressing corruption as a top priority through an urgent (and long-overdue) security sector reform.

Ara Marcen Naval examines how Venezuela’s military entrenchment in government and the economy undermines democracy and fuels corruption, and highlights the urgent need for transparency and civilian oversight.

Venezuela’s recent turmoil, marked by allegations of electoral fraud and widespread protests, reflects deeper systemic issues affecting the nation. These issues include evidence of rampant corruption, an overly militarised government, and the erosion of democratic principles.  

The Venezuelan government’s adoption of a ‘civic-military’ model, has led to the military’s deep entrenchment in both political and economic spheres. This strategy not only ensures military loyalty through ideological indoctrination but also through substantial economic privileges. Consequently, the military’s influence extends far beyond traditional defence roles. 

According to a 2021 report by Transparencia Venezuela, the Bolivarian National Armed Forces (FANB) hold significant positions in key sectors. Military personnel are present in the boards of at least 103 public companies and 11 out of 34 government ministries. Furthermore, 24 companies under the Ministry of Defence, mostly unrelated to military functions, highlight the extensive military footprint in non-defence areas. 

There are risks associated with the military’s involvement in Venezuela’s economy. The military controls crucial sectors such as manufacturing and agriculture and food, which allows them to manipulate essential resources. This control is not only undemocratic but also breeds corruption and inefficiency. 

Transparencia Venezuela reported an increase in the number of military personnel on public company boards from 2020 to 2021. However, this increased presence has not led to improved transparency or accountability. Many military-run enterprises operate with little public oversight, raising serious concerns about corruption and mismanagement. According to the Government Integrity Index, Venezuela faces critical corruption risks across its defence sector. Civilian democratic control of the military is extremely weak, and defence institutions are largely unaccountable to the public. Corruption is endemic throughout the sector. External scrutiny and institutional transparency are virtually non-existent, particularly concerning arms acquisitions and financial management. This lack of oversight exacerbates corruption and mismanagement issues, further undermining democratic governance and public trust. 

The political power wielded by the military in Venezuela is equally concerning. Numerous former military officials occupy significant political roles, including governorships and mayoralties. The 2021 regional elections saw several ex-military figures elected, underscoring the military’s entrenched political influence. 

Nicolás Maduro, the political successor of Chávez, has continued and deepened the militarisation of the government. During his tenure, a significant number of high-ranking government positions have been occupied by active or retired military officers, further consolidating military power within the state apparatus. The FANB has expanded its role in the economy and the management of the country’s strategic resources. In essence, the Venezuelan Armed Forces are closely tied to Chávez, Maduro, and their political project. This intertwining of military and political power creates a robust support system for the ruling regime. By placing military loyalists in key civilian roles, the regime secures a power base that is resistant to opposition and external pressures. 

The Venezuelan government leverages its control over the armed forces to maintain ‘social peace’, which often means suppressing dissent and protests through force. The recent electoral fraud allegations have sparked significant public outcry, met with harsh responses from the government, calling the demonstrations ‘terrorists acts’ and sending the security forces to clash with upset citizens. This repression stifles democratic expression and perpetuates a cycle of fear and control. 

The militarisation and corruption within the Venezuelan government have profound implications for democracy. The dominance of military power in political and economic spheres erodes democratic institutions and processes. Electoral fraud allegations are symptomatic of a broader decline in democratic norms, where elections are manipulated to maintain the status quo rather than reflect the will of the people. 

While Venezuela finds its way out the current situation, hopefully moving towards democratic principles, there will need to find pathways to address these deep-rooted issues. First, enhancing transparency and accountability within military-run enterprises is crucial. Implementing robust anti-corruption measures and ensuring independent audits of military expenditures can help restore public trust. 

Moreover, reducing the military’s role in civilian government functions is essential to strengthening democratic institutions. Encouraging civilian oversight of the military and promoting democratic norms can gradually diminish the military’s political influence. To get out of the current crisis, there is a need to improve the governance of the defence sector, and the military has a key role in the democratisation and accountability process.

As world leaders convene in Washington DC for the 2024 NATO summit, Ara Marcen Naval highlights the need to address and prevent corruption in military spending. 

As global insecurity rises, so does militarisation and defence spending. The latest data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) shows world military expenditure rose for the ninth consecutive year to an all-time high of $2.443 trillion in 2023. This represents an increase of 6.8 per cent in real terms from 2022, which is the steepest year-on-year increase since 2009.  This sharp rise demands our attention and underscores the urgent need for greater transparency in military spending. 

Transparency International Defence & Security has long sounded the alarm on corruption – a hidden threat in times of rising military expenditure. 

Corruption in the defence sector is multifaceted. While bribery is the most recognised form, corruption also includes conflicts of interest, embezzlement, nepotism, sextortion, and undue influence. This pervasive issue thrives in environments characterised by secrecy and wealth – factors that are especially prevalent in the defence and security sector. Often deemed too complex and sensitive for meaningful external scrutiny, this sector is fertile ground for corruption when oversight is inadequate. 

The rise in defence spending is linked with increasing corruption risks. Increased spending must be accompanied by vigilant attention to corruption risk. There is a strong indication that the relationship between defence spending and corruption is cyclical. In countries experiencing state capture – where private interests corrupt a country’s decision-making to benefit themselves, rather than the public – elites are more likely to prioritise military spending, further perpetuating corruption. 

Many defence institutions worldwide are ill-equipped to manage the higher corruption risks that militarisation brings. Transparency International Defence and Security’s Government Defence Integrity Index (GDI), which assesses countries on the strength of their safeguards against defence and security corruption, shows one-third of the world’s top 40 highest military spenders face high to critical corruption risks in their defence sectors. Even if some high spenders may have stronger domestic controls, they often export arms to countries facing much greater corruption risks. 

Evidence shows that countries spending more on defence as a percentage of GDP tend to score lower in the GDI, indicating higher vulnerability to corruption. The 15 countries with the biggest military spending increases between 2021 and 2023 fall into c moderate to high corruption risk categories. 

As international insecurity rises, so does global defence spending. However, the hidden cost of this escalation is the proliferation of corruption within the defence sector. When defence spending rises in countries where corruption safeguards are not prioritised, the issue becomes more serious. Corruption in the defence sector undermines peace and security by diverting critical resources and eroding public trust. 

To manage the corruption risks associated with defence spending, NATO and its allies should: 

• Ensure comprehensive transparency and oversight of defence budgets, allowing the public to have a clear picture of spending plans. 

• Implement controls to reduce the risk of funds being lost to corruption as budgets are spent, such as granting parliaments, or a parliamentary defence committee, extensive powers to scrutinise spending and publishing the approved budget in an easy-to-understand form. 

• Integrate anti-corruption measures into arms export controls to prevent exporting arms to countries unable to manage corruption risks. 

• Utilise good governance and transparency as a tool for deterrence against foreign or domestic threats.  

Only by addressing and preventing corruption can we ensure that defence and security sectors genuinely uphold national and human security, rather than exacerbating insecurity and putting populations at further risk of harm. 

About the Government Defence Integrity Index (GDI) 

The GDI measures institutional resilience to corruption by focusing on policymaking and public sector governance in national defence institutions. The Index is organized into five main risk areas: policymaking and political affairs, finances, personnel management, military operations, and procurement. Each indicator is scored based on five levels from 0-100, and scores are aggregated to determine the overall corruption risk level, ranging from A to F. 

Header image: Dragoș Asaftei – stock.adobe.com